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    Subject Term: "Law enforcement"

    40 publications with a total of 107 open recommendations including 17 priority recommendations
    Director: Kimberly Gianopoulos
    Phone: (202) 512-8612

    3 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of the Interior should work with the Task Force to clarify roles and responsibilities of mission staff engaged in collaborative efforts on combating wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia. (Recommendation 1)

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of State should work with the Task Force to clarify roles and responsibilities of mission staff engaged in collaborative efforts on combating wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia. (Recommendation 2)

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development should work with the Task Force to clarify roles and responsibilities of mission staff engaged in collaborative efforts on combating wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia. (Recommendation 3)

    Agency: United States Agency for International Development
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Mark Goldstein
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Chairman of the FCC should establish quantifiable goals and related measures--performance indicators, targets, and timeframes--for its enforcement program and annually publish the results to demonstrate the performance of this program and improve transparency regarding FCC's enforcement priorities. (Recommendation 1)

    Agency: Federal Communications Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Chairman of the FCC should establish, and make publically available, a communications strategy outlining the agency's enforcement program for external stakeholders, to improve engagement with the telecommunications community on the purposes, objectives, and processes the Enforcement Bureau employs to achieve its mission. (Recommendation 2)

    Agency: Federal Communications Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Zina Merritt
    Phone: (202) 512-5257

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To enhance the department's transfer of its excess controlled property, and to strengthen LESO program internal controls for the application and enrollment of federal agencies, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Director of DLA to review and revise policy or procedures for verifying and approving federal agency applications and enrollment. For example, such steps could include LESO supervisory approval for all federal agency applications; confirmation of the application with designated points of contact at the headquarters of participating federal agencies; or visiting the location of the applying federal law enforcement agency.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To enhance the department's transfer of its excess controlled property, and to help ensure controlled property is picked up by authorized individuals, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Director of DLA to ensure compliance that on-site officials responsible for the transfer of items at Disposition Services' sites request and verify valid identification of the individual(s) authorized to pick up allocated property from the LESO program.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To enhance the department's transfer of its excess controlled property, and to help ensure the accurate quantity of approved items is transferred, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Director of DLA to issue guidance that requires DLA Disposition Services on-site officials to verify the type and quantity of approved items against the actual items being transferred prior to removal from the sites.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To enhance the department's transfer of its excess controlled property, and to strengthen LESO program internal controls, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should direct the Director of DLA to conduct a fraud risk assessment to design and implement a strategy with specific internal control activities to mitigate assessed fraud risks for all stages relating to LESO's transfer of excess controlled property to law enforcement agencies, consistent with leading practices provided in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Seto Bagdoyan
    Phone: (202) 512-6722

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To enhance consumer understanding of agency oversight roles and to strengthen agency oversight of Internet marketing, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Chair of the FTC should develop and provide additional guidance to consumers delineating the agencies' differing roles in their shared oversight of memory supplement and other dietary supplement marketing on the Internet.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To enhance consumer understanding of agency oversight roles and to strengthen agency oversight of Internet marketing, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Chair of the FTC should develop and provide additional guidance to consumers delineating the agencies' differing roles in their shared oversight of memory supplement and other dietary supplement marketing on the Internet.

    Agency: Federal Trade Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for CVE activities.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of May 2017, CVE Task Force officials stated that they are identifying concrete outputs and outcomes for CVE efforts outlined in the 2016 Strategic Implementation Plan. CVE Task Force officials also stated that they plan to develop short-term, medium-term, and long-term outcomes for these efforts. The Task Force plans to report to the White House Homeland Security Advisor on their implementation progress in January 2018. GAO will continue to monitor the CVE Task Force's progress in this area.
    Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for CVE activities.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of May 2017, CVE Task Force officials stated that they are identifying concrete outputs and outcomes for CVE efforts outlined in the 2016 Strategic Implementation Plan. CVE Task Force officials also stated that they plan to develop short-term, medium-term, and long-term outcomes for these efforts. The Task Force plans to report to the White House Homeland Security Advisor on their implementation progress in January 2018. GAO will continue to monitor the CVE Task Force's progress in this area.
    Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of May 2017, CVE Task Force officials stated that they have begun consulting with departments and agencies that have already invested in CVE program assessment and are developing a research-based framework for designing and assessing CVE metrics. The CVE Task Force plans to report to the White House Homeland Security Advisor on their implementation progress in January 2018. GAO will continue to monitor the CVE Task Force's progress in this area.
    Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of May 2017, CVE Task Force officials stated that they have begun consulting with departments and agencies that have already invested in CVE program assessment and are developing a research-based framework for designing and assessing CVE metrics. The CVE Task Force plans to report to the White House Homeland Security Advisor on their implementation progress in January 2018. GAO will continue to monitor the CVE Task Force's progress in this area.
    Director: Gretta L. Goodwin
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that DOJ is contributing to efforts to improve data collection and service provision to Native Americans, the Director of OVW should require grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served using grant funding, and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs: Violence Against Women Office
    Status: Open

    Comments: In responding to a draft of our report, DOJ agreed to require their grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served, but did not agree to require them to track Native American status of those victims as appropriate, citing victim confidentiality and other reasons. In June 2017, following our report's publication, DOJ provided a status update, reporting that OVW already collects consolidated data on the number of American Indian and Alaska Native victims served who are victims of all crimes and it is in the process of revising grantee forms to collect information on the number of people served who are victims of sex trafficking. We continue to believe that collecting grantee information on both the number and Native American status of victims served is important and will continue to monitor implementation.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that DOJ is contributing to efforts to improve data collection and service provision to Native Americans, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs should direct OVC and OJJDP to require their grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served using grant funding, and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs
    Status: Open

    Comments: In responding to a draft of our report, DOJ agreed to require its grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served, but did not agree to require them to track Native American status of those victims as appropriate, citing victim confidentiality and other reasons. In June 2017, following our report's publication, DOJ provided a status update, reporting that OJJDP human trafficking grantees will be required to report the number of human trafficking victims served, beginning with progress reports ending December 31, 2017, and that OJJDP will update applicable solicitations beginning in fiscal year 2018 to reflect this new measure. DOJ reported no new efforts from OVC, and maintained that it will not require grantees to report on the Native American status of their victims served using grant funding because of the concerns it cited initially. We continue to believe that collecting grantee information on both the number and Native American status of victims served is important and will continue to monitor implementation.
    Director: Rebecca Gambler
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    5 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve its efforts to coordinate Predator B operations among supported agencies and assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and tactical aerostat programs, the Commissioner of CBP should develop and document procedures for Predator B coordination among supported agencies in all operating locations.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve its efforts to coordinate Predator B operations among supported agencies and assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and tactical aerostat programs, the Commissioner of CBP should update and maintain guidance for recording Predator B mission information in its data collection system.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve its efforts to coordinate Predator B operations among supported agencies and assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and tactical aerostat programs, the Commissioner of CBP should provide training to users of CBP's data collection system for Predator B missions.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve its efforts to coordinate Predator B operations among supported agencies and assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and tactical aerostat programs, the Commissioner of CBP should record air support forms for Predator B mission requests from non-CBP law enforcement agencies in its data collection system for Predator B missions.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve its efforts to coordinate Predator B operations among supported agencies and assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and tactical aerostat programs, the Commissioner of CBP should update Border Patrol's data collection practices to include a mechanism to distinguish and track asset assists associated with TARS from tactical aerostats.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Rebecca Gambler
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    2 open recommendations
    including 2 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure Border Patrol has the best available information to inform future investments in TI and resource allocation decisions among TI and other assets Border Patrol deploys in the furtherance of border security operations, and to ensure that key parties within Border Patrol's Requirements Management Process are aware of their roles and responsibilities within the process, the Chief of the Border Patrol should develop metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border security along the southwest border using the data Border Patrol already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making investment and resource allocation decisions.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner: U.S. Border Patrol
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DHS concurred agreed with the this recommendation and stated that it planned to develop and incorporate metrics into Border Patrol's Requirements Management Process.
    Recommendation: To ensure Border Patrol has the best available information to inform future investments in TI and resource allocation decisions among TI and other assets Border Patrol deploys in the furtherance of border security operations, and to ensure that key parties within Border Patrol's Requirements Management Process are aware of their roles and responsibilities within the process, the Chief of the Border Patrol should develop and implement written guidance to include roles and responsibilities for the steps within its requirements process for identifying, funding, and deploying tactical infrastructure assets for border security operations.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner: U.S. Border Patrol
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that it plans to update the Requirements Management Process and, as part of that update, plans to add communication and training methods and tools to better implement the Process. DHS plans to complete these efforts by September 2019.
    Director: Gretta L. Goodwin
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that the Capitol Police Board's current and any new approaches help enhance accountability, transparency, and effective external communication with its stakeholders, the Board should revise its Manual of Procedures to fully incorporate each of the leading practices for internal control and governance standards discussed in this report. In so doing, the Board should engage stakeholders in the revision process, such as by soliciting their input on any non-statutory changes that could particularly address the concerns stakeholders have raised, and incorporating their views as appropriate. If, in making revisions to its Manual, the Board determines that statutory changes may be helpful to enhance Board operations, then the Board should also engage with stakeholders on such proposed changes.

    Agency: Capitol Police Board
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Beryl H. Davis
    Phone: (202) 512-2623

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To provide increased oversight of AOC and to keep the Architect and the Congress fully and currently informed, the AOC OIG should revise and implement policies and procedures to provide audit reports that are based on planning that includes an assessment of risk and the assignment of priorities, consistent with requirements in CIGIE's Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.

    Agency: Architect of the Capitol
    Status: Open

    Comments: The AOC OIG has met the intent of GAO recommendation related to "revising" policies and procedures. We have verified that AOC OIG's policies (dated February 2017) have been revised and now require an assessment of risk and the assignment of priorities, consistent with requirements in CIGIE's Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General. However, we do not believe AOC OIG has met the intent of GAO recommendation related to "implementing" policies and procedures. In June 2017, the AOC OIG informed us that it plans to complete a risk assessment in August 2017 and use the results from the risk assessment to aid in developing the AOC OIG fiscal year 2018 audit plan, which AOC OIG plans to complete by October 1, 2017. To fully implement the recommendation, we believe AOC OIG still needs to (1) complete the risk assessment and (2) show how it used the results of the risk assessment to improve the scope of what needs to be audited. We will continue to monitor AOC OIG's actions to address this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To reduce the risk that fraud, waste, and abuse and criminal activities are not detected or fully addressed, the AOC OIG should (1) work with CIGIE to obtain a peer review from another federal OIG of the AOC OIG's overall investigative operations, including consideration of the OIG's reliance on investigations performed by other entities, and (2) make any needed changes in its operating procedures based on the results of the review to help ensure that investigations of AOC are conducted in accordance with CIGIE standards for investigations and AOC Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act) requirements.

    Agency: Architect of the Capitol
    Status: Open

    Comments: On April 27, 2017, the OIG informed us that it has scheduled with CIGIE an external peer review of AOC investigative operations. The Federal Housing Finance Agency OIG is scheduled to perform this review in August 2017. This external review will also include assessing the AOC OIG's reliance on other OIGs and the U.S. Capitol Police to complete certain investigations. Further, AOC OIG indicated that after they receive the results of this peer review, they will make needed changes in operating procedures consistent with the GAO recommendation. We will continue to monitor AOC OIG's actions to address this recommendation.
    Director: Kimberly Gianopoulos
    Phone: (202) 512-8612

    3 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To provide a basis for comparing actual results with intended results that can generate more meaningful performance information, the Secretaries of the Interior and State and the Attorney General of the United States should jointly work with the Task Force to develop performance targets related to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: Agency agreed with recommendation and plans to implement it
    Recommendation: To provide a basis for comparing actual results with intended results that can generate more meaningful performance information, the Secretaries of the Interior and State and the Attorney General of the United States should jointly work with the Task Force to develop performance targets related to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: Agency agreed with recommendation and plans to implement it
    Recommendation: To provide a basis for comparing actual results with intended results that can generate more meaningful performance information, the Secretaries of the Interior and State and the Attorney General of the United States should jointly work with the Task Force to develop performance targets related to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: Agency agreed with recommendation and plans to implement it
    Director: Anne-Marie Fennell
    Phone: (202) 512-3841

    6 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of BLM's efforts to track and deter unauthorized grazing, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of BLM to amend the regulations on unauthorized grazing use--43 C.F.R. Subpart 4150 (2005)--to establish a procedure for the informal resolution of violations at the local level, or follow the existing regulations by sending a notice of unauthorized use for each potential violation as provided by 43 C.F.R. 4150.2(a) (2005).

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of November 2016, GAO is awaiting action by the agency to implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of BLM's efforts to track and deter unauthorized grazing, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of BLM to record all incidents of unauthorized grazing, including those resolved informally.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of November 2016, GAO is awaiting action by the agency to implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of BLM's efforts to track and deter unauthorized grazing, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of BLM to revise the agency's Unauthorized Grazing Use Handbook to make it consistent with 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100 (2005).

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of November 2016, GAO is awaiting action by the agency to implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of the Forest Service's efforts to track and deter unauthorized grazing, the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Chief of the Forest Service to amend the regulations on range management--36 C.F.R. pt. 222--to provide for nonmonetary settlement when the unauthorized or excess grazing is non-willful and incidental, or follow the existing regulations by determining and charging a grazing use penalty for all unauthorized and excess use when it is identified as provided by 36 C.F.R. 222.50(a) and (h).

    Agency: Department of Agriculture
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of November 2016, GAO is awaiting action by the agency to implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of the Forest Service's efforts to track and deter unauthorized grazing, the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Chief of the Forest Service to record all incidents of unauthorized grazing, including those resolved informally.

    Agency: Department of Agriculture
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of November 2016, GAO is awaiting action by the agency to implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of the Forest Service's efforts to track and deter unauthorized grazing, the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Chief of the Forest Service to adopt an unauthorized grazing penalty structure that is based, similar to BLM's, on the current commercial value of forage.

    Agency: Department of Agriculture
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of November 2016, GAO is awaiting action by the agency to implement this recommendation.
    Director: Diana C. Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to help ensure that ATF adheres to its policies and facilitates industry compliance with requirements, the Deputy Director of ATF should align the MS deletion policy, MS system design, and the timeliness of deletion practices to improve ATF's compliance with the policy.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
    Status: Open

    Comments: In September 2016, ATF reported that it deleted all purchaser names within those multiple sale records GAO identified as having been retained beyond time limits specified by ATF?s policy. In addition, ATF stated that it is in the process of implementing protocols to ensure that purging purchaser names within multiple sale records aligns with ATF policy. As of March 2017, ATF reported changing its query code to result in an improved match ratio with the MS system. In July 2017, ATF reiterated its deletion of affected purchaser names and its change in query code. However, given the longstanding nature of this issue, ATF needs to provide more documentation to demonstrate that the change in query code will identify all records eligible for deletion.
    Director: Marcia Crosse
    Phone: (202) 512-7114

    10 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To increase awareness of the health and legal consequences of FGM/C among visa recipients, the Secretary of State should update the Foreign Affairs Manual to require posts located in countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced to directly provide information about FGM/C to nonimmigrant visa recipients in the same manner as is done for immigrant visa recipients.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will expand the pool of visa applicants who will receive information on FGM/C. Specifically, once its transition to providing paperwork electronically during the visa application process is complete, State will directly distribute the fact sheet on FGM/C to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients. According to State, both immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients will have to certify that they have read and understood the fact sheet on FGM/C before signing and submitting their respective visa applications. As of August 2017, State has not yet completed these actions.
    Recommendation: To increase awareness of the health and legal consequences of FGM/C among visa recipients, the Secretary of State should update the Foreign Affairs Manual to require posts located outside of the countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced to directly provide information on FGM/C to immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients who are nationals of countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will expand the pool of visa applicants who will receive information on FGM/C. Specifically, once its transition to providing paperwork electronically during the visa application process is complete, State will directly distribute the fact sheet on FGM/C to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients who are from or were nationals of a country where FGM/C is commonly practiced. State noted that this change will ensure the widest distribution possible by providing all individuals from countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced with access to the fact sheet on FGM/C regardless of place of application or visa recipient type. As of August 2017, State has not yet completed these actions.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Education (Education) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will develop a written plan for disseminating relevant FGM/C resources to the agency?s key stakeholder groups. As of August 2017, Education reported that action is still pending.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that various HHS offices and agencies are working together to develop a written plan for its approaches to addressing FGM/C. In August 2017, HHS reported that once a key leadership position has been filled, it will provide more information on developing a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Justice (DOJ) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of its Criminal Division is taking the lead on developing a written plan on its FGM/C outreach and awareness efforts. As of August 2017, DOJ has not yet developed a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) did not concur with our recommendation, and, as of August 2017, has not indicated that it would implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Education (Education) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will develop a written plan for disseminating relevant FGM/C resources to the agency?s key stakeholder groups and will explore how to best communicate and coordinate efforts at the federal level. As of August 2017, Education reported that action is still pending.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that various HHS offices and agencies are working together to develop a written plan for its approaches to addressing FGM/C. HHS also noted that it would share this plan with other federal partners and key stakeholders. In August 2017, HHS reported that once a key leadership position has been filled, it will provide more information on disseminating a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Justice (DOJ) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of its Criminal Division is taking the lead on developing a written plan on its FGM/C outreach and awareness efforts. DOJ also noted that it would communicate its written plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate. As of August 2017, DOJ has not yet disseminated a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) did not concur with our recommendation, and, as of August 2017, has not indicated that it would implement this recommendation.
    Director: Diana C. Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    2 open recommendations
    including 2 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To allow for more efficient use of data on missing and unidentified persons contained in the NCIC's Missing Persons and Unidentified Persons files and NamUs, the Directors of the FBI and NIJ should evaluate the feasibility of sharing certain information among authorized users, document the results of this evaluation, and incorporate, as appropriate, legally and technically feasible options for sharing the information.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In commenting on GAO's June 2016 report, DOJ disagreed with our recommendation, because DOJ believes it does not have the legal authority to fulfill the corrective action as described in the proposed recommendation. Specifically, DOJ stated that the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs) does not qualify, under federal law, for access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and is not an authorized user to receive NCIC data. Therefore, DOJ does not believe there is value in evaluating the technical feasibility of integrating these two databases. In March 2017, DOJ reiterated its position that any such sharing was prohibited by law. We understand the legal framework placed on NCIC and that it may be restricted from fully integrating with a public database. However, this statutory restriction does not preclude DOJ from exploring options to more efficiently share information within the confines of the current legal framework. Until DOJ studies whether such feasible mechanisms exist, it will be unable to make this determination, risking continued inefficiencies through fragmentation and overlap.
    Recommendation: To allow for more efficient use of data on missing and unidentified persons contained in the NCIC's Missing Persons and Unidentified Persons files and NamUs, the Directors of the FBI and NIJ should evaluate the feasibility of sharing certain information among authorized users, document the results of this evaluation, and incorporate, as appropriate, legally and technically feasible options for sharing the information.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs: National Institute of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In commenting on GAO's June 2016 report, DOJ disagreed with our recommendation, because DOJ believes it does not have the legal authority to fulfill the corrective action as described in the proposed recommendation. Specifically, DOJ stated that the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs) does not qualify, under federal law, for access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and is not an authorized user to receive NCIC data. Therefore, DOJ does not believe there is value in evaluating the technical feasibility of integrating these two databases. In March 2017, DOJ reiterated its position that any such sharing was prohibited by law. We understand the legal framework placed on NCIC and that it may be restricted from fully integrating with a public database. However, this statutory restriction does not preclude DOJ from exploring options to more efficiently share information within the confines of the current legal framework. Until DOJ studies whether such feasible mechanisms exist, it will be unable to make this determination, risking continued inefficiencies through fragmentation and overlap.
    Director: Seto Bagdoyan
    Phone: (202) 512-6722

    5 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that practitioners who may be ineligible do not possess a controlled substance registration and that practitioners who pose an increased risk of illicit diversion are identified, the Acting Administrator of DEA should take additional actions to strengthen verification controls. Specifically, the Acting Administrator of DEA should develop a legislative proposal requesting authority to require SSNs for all individuals, regardless of whether they hold an individual or business registration.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In August 2016, DEA told us it is exploring the possibility and practicality of implementing policy or rule changes that would require Social Security Numbers (SSN) from all persons applying for a DEA Registration as a practitioner or mid-level practitioner. We will continue to monitor DEA's progress in implementing this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that practitioners who may be ineligible do not possess a controlled substance registration and that practitioners who pose an increased risk of illicit diversion are identified, the Acting Administrator of DEA should take additional actions to strengthen verification controls. Specifically, the Acting Administrator of DEA should develop policies and procedures to validate SSNs and apply the policies and procedures to all new and existing SSNs in the CSA2; such an approach could involve collaborating with SSA to assess the feasibility of checking registrants' SSNs against the Enumeration Verification System.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In August 2016, DEA told us that it had initiated discussions with the Social Security Administration (SSA) to determine the legality and feasibility of using SSA's Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify SSNs provided during the registration process. DEA stated that SSA has informed both GAO and DEA that its current legislative authorities do not authorize SSA to provide the information to DEA. As a a result, DEA stated that legislative action will be required to allow DEA additional access to EVS. As stated in our report, the use of EVS is one possible approach to validate SSNs. We will continue to monitor DEA's progress in implementing this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that practitioners who may be ineligible do not possess a controlled substance registration and that practitioners who pose an increased risk of illicit diversion are identified, the Acting Administrator of DEA should take additional actions to strengthen verification controls. Specifically, the Acting Administrator of DEA should develop a legislative proposal to request access to SSA's full death file.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In August 2016, DEA told us that the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that it cannot provide data from the full death file to DEA under existing law for use in administering the DEA Registration Process. DEA also said that if legislative changes allow DEA full access to SSA's full death file, DEA will work with SSA to ensure implementation of the new legislative authority. We continue to believe that DEA should develop a legislative proposal to request access to SSA's full death file and we will continue to monitor DEA's progress in implementing this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that practitioners who may be ineligible do not possess a controlled substance registration and that practitioners who pose an increased risk of illicit diversion are identified, the Acting Administrator of DEA should take additional actions to strengthen verification controls. Specifically, the Acting Administrator of DEA should identify and implement a cost-effective approach to monitor state licensure and disciplinary actions taken against its registrants; such an approach could include using data sources that contain this information, such as the National Practitioner Data Bank or the Federation of State Medical Boards.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In August 2016, DEA told us that currently, the Controlled Substance Act and its implementing regulations do not specifically give DEA authority to access state medical licensing boards' databases. DEA also said that it met with representatives of the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) to develop a process that will allow DEA to accomplish the objectives GAO articulated in the draft report. Specifically, DEA said that it is exploring use of the FSMB service to verify the existence and status of state licenses to ensure all applicants for registration who are Doctors of Medicine and Doctors of Osteopathy, or Physician Assistants (in the states that provide this data to FSMB), meet the requirements to possess a DEA Registration. To implement the above described actions, DEA stated it will need to enter into an agreement with FSMB to provide this data in a format that allows real-time access to the data and accommodates the large numbers of applicants for DEA Registrations. DEA also said it obtained information from FSMB to begin the agreement process and is currently obtaining information on data elements that can be used to test user account codes to flag records in the FSMB. We will continue to monitor DEA's progress in implementing this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that practitioners who may be ineligible do not possess a controlled substance registration and that practitioners who pose an increased risk of illicit diversion are identified, the Acting Administrator of DEA should take additional actions to strengthen verification controls. Specifically, the Acting Administrator of DEA should assess the cost and feasibility of developing procedures for monitoring registrants' criminal backgrounds, such as conducting matches against federal law-enforcement databases, and document decisions about the approach chosen.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In August 2016, DEA told us they are in the process of determining the feasibility of implementing actions that would permit DEA to comply with the recommendation utilizing the current legal framework and within reasonable cost parameters. DEA also said that the large volume of DEA registrations and the large number of applications received monthly present extensive technical and fiscal challenges with addressing this recommendation. We will continue to monitor DEA's progress in implementing this recommendation.
    Director: Diana Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    6 open recommendations
    including 6 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve transparency and better ensure that face recognition capabilities are being used in accordance with privacy protection laws and policy requirements, the Attorney General should assess the PIA development process to determine why PIAs were not published prior to using or updating face recognition capabilities, and implement corrective actions to ensure the timely development, updating, and publishing of PIAs before using or making changes to a system.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOJ officials did not concur with this recommendation, and stated that the FBI has established practices that protect privacy and civil liberties beyond the requirements of the law. DOJ officials stated that it will internally evaluate the PIA process as part of the Department's overall commitment to improving its processes, not in response to our recommendation. In March 2017, we followed up with DOJ to obtain its current position on our recommendation. DOJ continues to believe that its approach in designing the NGI system was sufficient to meet legal privacy requirements and that our recommendation represents a "checkbox approach" to privacy. We disagree with DOJ's characterization of our recommendation. We continue to believe that the timely development and publishing of future PIAs would increase transparency of the department's systems. We recognize the steps the agency took to consider privacy protection during the development of the NGI system. We also stand by our position that notifying the public of these actions is important and provides the public with greater assurance that DOJ components are evaluating risks to privacy when implementing systems. As a result, the recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Recommendation: To improve transparency and better ensure that face recognition capabilities are being used in accordance with privacy protection laws and policy requirements, the Attorney General should assess the SORN development process to determine why a SORN was not published that addressed the collection and maintenance of photos accessed and used through NGI for the FBI's face recognition capabilities prior to using NGI-IPS, and implement corrective actions to ensure SORNs are published before systems become operational.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOJ agreed, in part, with our recommendation and submitted the SORN for publication to the Federal Register on April 21, 2016, and it was published on May 5, 2016. DOJ did not agree that the publication of a SORN is required by law. We disagree with DOJ's interpretation regarding the legal requirements of a SORN. The Privacy Act of 1974 requires that when agencies establish or make changes to a system of records, they must notify the public through a SORN published in the Federal Register. DOJ's comments on our draft report acknowledge that the automated nature of face recognition technology and the sheer number of photos now available for searching raise important privacy and civil liberties considerations. DOJ officials also stated that the FBI's face recognition capabilities do not represent new collection, use, or sharing of personal information. We disagree. We believe that the ability to perform automated searches of millions of photos is fundamentally different in nature and scope than manual review of individual photos, and the potential impact on privacy is equally fundamentally different. By assessing the SORN development process and taking corrective actions to ensure timely development of future SORNs, the public would have a better understanding of how personal information is being used and protected by DOJ components. As a result, the recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition capabilities are being used in accordance with privacy protection laws and policy requirements, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct audits to determine the extent to which users of NGI-IPS and biometric images specialists in FACE Services are conducting face image searches in accordance with Criminal Justice Information Services Division policy requirements.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In March 2017, DOJ provided us with the audit plan the CJIS Audit Unit developed in June 2016 for NGI-IPS users. In addition, DOJ reported that the CJIS Audit Unit began assessing NGI-IPS requirements at participating states in conjunction with its triennial National Identity Services audit and that, as of February 2017, the unit had conducted NGI-IPS audits of four states. Further, DOJ officials said CJIS developed an audit plan of the FACE Services Unit to coincide with the existing triennial FBI internal audit for 2018. However, DOJ did not provide the audit plan for the FACE Services Unit. DOJ officials said the methodology would be the same as the audit plan for NGI-IPS, but that methodology does not describe oversight on use of information obtained from external systems accessed by FACE Services employees. Therefore, we believe DOJ is making progress towards meeting the recommendation, but has not fully implemented our recommendation.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct tests of NGI-IPS to verify that the system is sufficiently accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes, and ensure that the detection and false positive rate used in the tests are identified.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In comments on our draft report in 2016, and reiterated during recommendation follow-up, as of March 2017, DOJ did not concur with this recommendation. DOJ officials stated that the FBI has performed accuracy testing to validate that the system meets the requirements for the detection rate, which fully satisfies requirements for the investigative lead service provided by NGI-IPS. We disagree with DOJ. A key focus of our recommendation is the need to ensure that NGI-IPS is sufficiently accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes. Although the FBI has tested the detection rate for a candidate list of 50 photos, NGI-IPS users are able to request smaller candidate lists (between 2 and 50 photos). FBI officials stated that they do not know, and have not tested, the detection rate for other candidate list sizes. According to these officials, a smaller candidate list would likely lower the detection rate because a smaller candidate list may not contain a likely match that would be present in a larger candidate list. However, according to the FBI Information Technology Life Cycle Management Directive, testing needs to confirm the system meets all user requirements. Because the accuracy of NGI-IPS's face recognition searches when returning fewer than 50 photos in a candidate list is unknown, the FBI is limited in understanding whether the results are accurate enough to meet NGI-IPS users' needs. DOJ officials also stated that searches of NGI-IPS produce a gallery of likely candidates to be used as investigative leads, not for positive identification. As a result, according to DOJ officials, NGI-IPS cannot produce false positives and there is no false positive rate for the system. We disagree with DOJ. The detection rate and the false positive rate are both necessary to assess the accuracy of a face recognition system. Generally, face recognition systems can be configured to allow for a greater or lesser number of matches. A greater number of matches would generally increase the detection rate, but would also increase the false positive rate. Similarly, a lesser number of matches would decrease the false positive rate, but would also decrease the detection rate. Reporting a detection rate of 86 percent without reporting the accompanying false positive rate presents an incomplete view of the system's accuracy. As a result, the recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually that includes an assessment of the accuracy of face recognition searches to determine if it is meeting federal, state, and local law enforcement needs and take actions, as necessary, to improve the system.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of March 2017, FBI officials stated they implemented the recommendation by submitting a paper to solicit feedback from users through the Fall 2016 Advisory Policy Board Process. Specifically, officials said the paper requested feedback on whether the face recognition searches of the NGI-IPS are meeting their needs, and input regarding search accuracy. According to FBI officials, no users expressed concern with any aspect of the NGI-IPS meeting their needs, including accuracy. Although FBI's action of providing working groups with a paper presenting GAO's recommendation is a step, the FBI's actions do not fully meet the recommendation. The FBI's paper was presented as informational, and did not result in any formal responses from users. We disagree with the FBI's conclusion that receiving no responses on the informational paper fulfills the operational review recommendation, which includes determining that NGI-IPS is meeting user's needs. As such, we continue to recommend the FBI conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should take steps to determine whether each external face recognition system used by FACE Services is sufficiently accurate for the FBI's use and whether results from those systems should be used to support FBI investigations.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In comments on our draft report in 2016, and reiterated during recommendation follow-up in 2017, DOJ officials did not concur with this recommendation and had no plans to implement it. DOJ officials stated that the FBI has no authority to set or enforce accuracy standards of face recognition technology operated by external agencies. In addition, DOJ officials stated that the FBI has implemented multiple layers of manual review that mitigate risks associated with the use of automated face recognition technology. Further, DOJ officials stated there is value in searching all available external databases, regardless of their level of accuracy. We disagree with the DOJ position. We continue to believe that the FBI should assess the quality of the data it is using from state and federal partners. We acknowledge that the FBI cannot and should not set accuracy standards for the face recognition systems used by external partners. We also do not dispute that the use of external face recognition systems by the FACE Services Unit could add value to FBI investigations. However, we disagree with FBI's assertion that no assessment of the quality of the data from state and federal partners is necessary. We also disagree with the DOJ assertion that manual review of automated search results is sufficient. Even with a manual review process, the FBI could miss investigative leads if a partner does not have a sufficiently accurate system. By relying on its external partners' face recognition systems, the FBI is using these systems as a component of its routine operations and is therefore responsible for ensuring the systems will help meet FBI's mission, goals and objectives. The recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Director: Michael J. Courts
    Phone: (202) 512-8980

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To strengthen DHS's ability to fulfill legislative requirements for the VWP and protect the security of the United States and its citizens, the Secretary of Homeland Security should specify time frames for working with VWP countries to institute the additional VWP security requirements, including the requirement that the countries fully implement agreements to share information about known or suspected terrorists through the countries' Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 arrangements and Preventing and Combating Serious Crime agreements with the United States.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: In April 2017, DHS reported that nearly all VWP countries have begun sharing information on known or suspected terrorists through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 arrangements and that DHS also made progress in fully implementing Preventing and Combating Serious Crime agreements. According to DHS, all VWP countries were informed of the new VWP requirements in July 2016. In its initial response, DHS stated that it planned to conduct a comprehensive assessment of VWP countries' compliance with the new VWP requirements and establish a time frame for each VWP country to reach full compliance as part of each country's next formal review. However, as of April 2017, DHS needs to provide documentation to GAO to support all of these actions. GAO will continue to monitor DHS efforts to fully address this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To strengthen DHS's ability to fulfill legislative requirements for the VWP and protect the security of the United States and its citizens, the Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to improve DHS's timeliness in reporting to Congress, within the statutory time frame, the department's determination of whether each VWP country should continue participating in the program and any effects of the country's participation on U.S. law enforcement and security interests.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: Since 2016, DHS has issued several reports on VWP countries to Congress that have addressed several of the overdue reports identified in 2016, but some gaps remain. As of April 2017, DHS reported plans to deliver additional reports in 2017 to address these gaps. In its initial response, DHS reported that the department had taken steps to ensure timely reporting to Congress and committed to providing Congress with advance notification of any delays in delivering future reports. To fully address this recommendation, DHS needs to issue reports to Congress on VWP countries that have not been covered within the last two years. GAO will continue to monitor DHS efforts.
    Director: Brian J. Lepore
    Phone: (202) 512-4523

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: Recognizing that DOD has recently revised its disposition guidance, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Director, DLA, to further reassess DOD's disposal process to determine whether additional changes are needed in the priority given to recipients within the process, including potential changes to the categories and quantities of property that special programs may obtain, and revise its guidance reflecting those priorities accordingly to better enable DOD to fulfill the disposal program's objectives.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In September 2017, DOD officials stated that the department has been coordinating with the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property (NASASP) to identify classes of non-controlled property that state and local law enforcement agencies would no longer be able to obtain during the reutilization (first) stage of the disposal process. The Defense Logistics Agency is reviewing NASASP's proposed list of property items, and DOD officials said that the department planned to issue a policy memorandum that would specify which items would be removed from those that law enforcement agencies could obtain during the reutilization stage. Because DOD has not yet completed its review or issued updated guidance, this recommendation remains open.
    Director: Lori Rectanus
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    7 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help improve the accuracy of Drive-thru data to allow agencies to better manage their leased-vehicle fleet data, the Administrator of GSA should evaluate the 9,999-mile/month electronic safeguard for Drive-thru odometer readings to determine if a lower threshold could improve the accuracy of customer data and adjust this safeguard accordingly.

    Agency: General Services Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In January 2017, GSA reported that it had examined the reported monthly miles for all GSA Fleet leased vehicles for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. Analysis showed that there are a number of vehicles that consistently report mileage between 5,000-9,999 miles per month and that changing the threshold to 7,999 would require an average of 226 customers per month to override the electronic safeguard. GSA will not change the safeguard but will add a warning message when the monthly mileage exceeds 4,999 per month and is more than 3 times the vehicle's monthly average.
    Recommendation: To provide better assurance that Fleet Service Representatives (FSR) are having conversations with leasing customers about utilization in accordance with GSA expectations, the Administrator of GSA should develop a mechanism to help ensure that these conversations occur.

    Agency: General Services Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In January 2017, GSA stated that it had reviewed the Customer Visit Checklist which FSRs use, and had codified a checklist to be used for all visits between FSRs and GSA Fleet customers. GSA provided GAO with a copy of the revised checklist. The new checklist includes a requirement to discuss vehicle utililization and the need to "right-size" a vehicle fleet.
    Recommendation: To help strengthen the leased-vehicle justification processes across federal agencies, the Administrator of GSA should examine the Federal Property Management Regulations to determine if these regulations should be amended to require that vehicle justifications are clearly documented and readily available, and adjust them accordingly.

    Agency: General Services Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2017, GSA reported that it had reviewed the Federal Property Management Regulations and determined that the section that relates to vehicle utilization (101-39.301) needs to be rewritten. GSA will draft a rewritten section of the FPMR. The draft will then undergo further a public review and comment period.
    Recommendation: To improve the justification process, the Secretary of the Department of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to modify the current process to ensure that each leased vehicle in the agency's fleet meets the agency's utilization criteria or has readily available justification documentation.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2017, DOD provided GAO with a copy of a DOD memo that requires vehicles to meet utilization criteria or to have justifications electronic format or in hard copy with other vehicle information.
    Recommendation: To improve their justification process, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs should direct the Under Secretary for Health to modify the current process to ensure that each leased vehicle in the agency's fleet meets the agency's utilization criteria or has readily available justification documentation.

    Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of March 2017, VA stated that they were still working to address these recommendations.
    Recommendation: To facilitate the elimination of unnecessary vehicles, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior should direct the NPS Director to take corrective action to address each leased vehicle that has not met the agency's utilization criteria or passed the justification process. This corrective action could include (1) reassigning vehicles within the agency to ensure they are utilized or (2) returning vehicles to GSA.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2016, DOI provided documentation of steps it has taken to ensure vehicles have utilization or justification documentation as well as documentation of corrective action taken to address vehicles that have not passed these processes.
    Recommendation: To facilitate the elimination of unnecessary vehicles, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs should direct the Under Secretary for Health to take corrective action to address each leased vehicle that has not met the agency's utilization criteria or passed the justification process. This corrective action could include (1) reassigning vehicles within the agency to ensure they are utilized or (2) returning vehicles to GSA.

    Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of March 2017, VA was in the process of working with GSA to ensure that VA's new fleet management system could produce reports on utilization. VA is also in the process of amending its current fleet policy to reflect utilization criteria.
    Director: Jessica Farb
    Phone: (202) 512-6991

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To enhance U.S. agencies' performance monitoring of counter-firearms trafficking activities, the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives should establish and document performance targets for the bureau's key counter-firearms trafficking activities in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
    Status: Open

    Comments: ATF concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to implement it. According to ATF officials, ATF has engaged in an overview of performance measures in Mexico and, when applicable, in Guatemala and Belize, and planned to implement a more structured annual system of performance targeting and evaluation for operations in these jurisdictions in fiscal year 2017. As of October 2017, we are continuing to follow up with ATF on its efforts to implement the new performance evaluation system.
    Recommendation: To enhance U.S. agencies' performance monitoring of counter-firearms trafficking activities, the Secretary of State should work with other U.S. agencies and implementers to help ensure that quarterly progress reports identify key challenges and plans to address them.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State concurred with this recommendation and stated that it planned to work with other agencies to implement it. State officials noted that the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau's quarterly reporting template for interagency partners currently contains a segment entitled "Problems or Challenges and Corrective Action Plan/Risk Identification Mitigation" in which the interagency partner is expected to detail any problems or challenges in implementing any of the program components and activities. State officials stated they will continue to remind interagency partners of this requirement and assist with correct completion of the reporting templates.
    Director: Jessica Farb
    Phone: (202) 512-6991

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure effective implementation of the strategic objective of the Weapons Chapter of the Strategy, the ONDCP Director should establish a more comprehensive indicator, or set of indicators, that more accurately reflects progress made by ATF and ICE in meeting the strategic objective.

    Agency: Office of National Drug Control Policy
    Status: Open

    Comments: As part of ONDCP's comments on our draft report, the agency concurred with our recommendation to establish a more comprehensive set of indicators for the Weapons Chapter of the National Southwest Border Counternarcotic Strategy. ONDCP indicated that it would work with ICE and ATF to develop additional indicators to evaluate their progress. ONDCP agreed that the indicators developed through this collaborative process would be used in future iterations of the Strategy. However, in its July 26, 2017 letter to the relevant congressional committees leadership ONDCP explained that a decision has not been made on whether a new iteration of Strategy will be released, or if the current Administration will take different approach to address this issue. We will need to wait until an update of the Strategy is available for us to review to determine if our recommendation has been implemented.
    Director: Jennifer Grover
    Phone: (202) 512-7141

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Attorney General should direct ODAG to document a plan specifying DOJ's process for monitoring the effects of marijuana legalization under state law, in accordance with DOJ's 2013 marijuana enforcement policy guidance, to include the identification of the various data ODAG will use and their potential limitations for monitoring the effects of state marijuana legalization, and how ODAG will use the information sources in its monitoring efforts to help inform decisions on whether state systems are effectively protecting federal marijuana enforcement priorities.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: The agency concurred with the recommendation and reported plans to implement it. Subsequent to the agency stating that it has taken action, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.
    Recommendation: The Attorney General should direct ODAG to use existing mechanisms to share DOJ's monitoring plan with appropriate officials from DOJ components responsible for providing information DOJ reports using regarding the effects of state legalization to ODAG, obtain feedback, and incorporate the feedback into its plan.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: The agency concurred with the recommendation and reported plans to implement it. Subsequent to the agency stating that it has taken action, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.
    Director: John Pendleton
    Phone: (202) 512-3489

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that resources are being efficiently applied to meet the National Guard counterdrug program's objectives, the Secretary of Defense should direct the National Guard Bureau in consultation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats to subsequently collect and use performance information to help inform funding distribution decisions to state programs and to conduct oversight of the training offered by the counterdrug schools.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: The National Guard counterdrug program has plans to implement performance information into its fiscal year 2017 annual assessments of the state programs and counterdrug schools. The fiscal year 2017 annual assessments are scheduled to be complete by December 2017. The recommendation will remain open until performance information has been included in the annual assessments.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that agencies' policies and oversight are fully consistent with The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants, the Assistant Secretary of ICE and the Commandant of USCG should update their respective agencies' informant policies and corresponding monitoring processes to explicitly address the Guidelines' provisions on oversight of informants' illegal activities.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    Status: Open

    Comments: In December 2016, ICE issued a memo regarding changes to its policies for the registration and suitability of confidential informants. The memo included updated forms to oversee those aspects of confidential informant oversight. In April 2017, ICE officials informed GAO that a working group is in the process of updating the Informants Handbook and the Undercover Operations Handbook. ICE expects to finalize drafts of the handbooks in September 2017 and implement them by December 2017. When the updated handbooks are available for GAO's review, we will assess the extent to which they address our recommendation.
    Director: Kimberly Gianopoulos
    Phone: (202)512-8612

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To strengthen agency performance measurement related to deterring child smuggling, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to establish annual performance targets associated with the performance measures it has established for its Transnational Criminal Investigative Units.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: In its comments on the report in July 2015, the Department of Homeland Security stated that it concurred with this recommendation, and that it would work with host nation partners to establish goals to measure these units' investigative activities and capacity development. In September 2015, DHS noted that it planned to use law enforcement data to measure TCIU success rates and inform efforts going forward. GAO has followed up with DHS--most recently in June 2017--on the status of its efforts to establish performance targets, but has not yet received a response.
    Director: Lawrance Evans
    Phone: (202) 512-8678

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that NCUA has adequate authority to determine the safety and soundness of credit unions, Congress should consider modifying the Federal Credit Union Act to grant NCUA authority to examine technology service providers of credit unions.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we suggested that Congress modify the Federal Credit Union Act to grant NCUA authority to examine technology service providers of credit unions. As of October 2016, Congress had not granted NCUA such authority.
    Recommendation: To improve their ability to assess the adequacy of the information security practices at medium and small institutions, the heads of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and NCUA should routinely categorize IT examination findings and analyze this information to identify trends that can guide areas of review across institutions.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we recommended that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and other federal financial institution regulators conduct trend analysis of their IT examination findings to improve their ability to assess the adequacy of information security practices at medium and small institutions. In September 2015, OCC stated that it is taking two actions to respond to our recommendation. First, the agency is integrating the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (Tool), developed by OCC and other federal financial institution regulators, into OCC's ongoing IT examinations of national banks and federal savings associations. Officials believe that the Tool will provide OCC with a repeatable and measurable process for assessing both the level of risk and the maturity of risk management processes within and across OCC-supervised institutions. Also, officials believe that data gathered in this process will allow OCC to monitor industry trends and identify new or emerging weaknesses where additional guidance or supervisory actions may be needed. Furthermore, the Tool will help OCC allocate examiner resources and better target examiner training. OCC began integrating the Tool in selected examinations in December 2015. Second, OCC stated that it enhanced its guidance and procedures for examiners to identify and aggregate supervisory concerns into matters requiring attention (MRAs), which are the mechanism OCC uses to communicate supervisory concerns to bank management and directors. OCC believes that the enhancements will facilitate systemic categorization of supervisory concerns that strengthen recording, monitoring, and analyzing of volumes and trends across bank portfolios. Also, the enhanced guidance discusses the relationship between MRAs, interagency ratings, OCC's risk assessment system, and enforcement actions. OCC believes that these process enhancements combined with the integration of the Tool, will improve its ability to assess information security practices at medium and small institutions. We will continue to monitor OCC's progress in implementing the Tool and the resulting trend analyses that the Tool is intended to facilitate.
    Recommendation: To improve their ability to assess the adequacy of the information security practices at medium and small institutions, the heads of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and NCUA should routinely categorize IT examination findings and analyze this information to identify trends that can guide areas of review across institutions.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we recommended that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) and other federal financial institution regulators conduct trend analysis of their IT examination findings to improve their ability to assess the adequacy of information security practices at medium and small institutions. As of October 2016, the Board had not provided an update on its efforts to address this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve their ability to assess the adequacy of the information security practices at medium and small institutions, the heads of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and NCUA should routinely categorize IT examination findings and analyze this information to identify trends that can guide areas of review across institutions.

    Agency: National Credit Union Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we recommended that the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and other federal financial institution regulators conduct trend analysis of their IT examination findings to improve their ability to assess the adequacy of information security practices at medium and small institutions. In July 2016, NCUA told us that it and the other federal financial institution regulators issued the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (Tool) in June 2015 to provide a comprehensive method for institutions to benchmark their cybersecurity programs. Officials believe that the Tool will allow examiners to consistently and methodically look at credit union risks and trends, as well as collect detailed information on the risks and mitigating controls employed by credit unions. When the Tool is fully implemented, officials expect to be able to aggregate risk indicators and program gaps across the credit union industry to improve resource deployment and enhance cybersecurity supervisory oversight. NCUA plans to begin pilot testing the Tool in late 2016 with program integration targeted for July 2017. We will continue to monitor NCUA's progress with this program and revisit our recommendation in July 2017.
    Director: Linda Kohn
    Phone: (202) 512-7114

    3 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen DEA's communication with and guidance for registrants and associations representing registrants, as well as supporting the Office of Diversion Control's mission of preventing diversion while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply of controlled substances for legitimate medical needs, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Diversion Control should identify and implement means of cost-effective, regular communication with distributor, pharmacy, and practitioner registrants, such as through listservs or web-based training.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration: Operations Division: Office of Diversion Control: Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Diversion Control
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of March 2017, DEA officials reported that the agency was taking steps towards addressing this recommendation. In particular, DEA officials reported that they were in the process of developing a method to deliver information about registrant responsibilities through DEA's registration website, which registrants could access annually when they update their registration. DEA officials also reported that they would consider a method for registrants to subscribe to get email updates when new information is posted to Diversion Control Division website. We plan to continue to monitor the agency's efforts in this area, and this recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen DEA's communication with and guidance for registrants and associations representing registrants, as well as supporting the Office of Diversion Control's mission of preventing diversion while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply of controlled substances for legitimate medical needs, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Diversion Control should solicit input from distributors, or associations representing distributors, and develop additional guidance for distributors regarding their roles and responsibilities for suspicious orders monitoring and reporting.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration: Operations Division: Office of Diversion Control: Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Diversion Control
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2017, DEA officials reported that the agency had worked with its Suspicious Orders Task Force to develop a draft Suspicious Orders regulation. They reported that the draft regulation was undergoing internal DEA review, but that it was uncertain when the draft regulation would be published in the Federal Register. We plan to continue to monitor the agency's efforts in this area, and this recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen DEA's communication with and guidance for registrants and associations representing registrants, as well as supporting the Office of Diversion Control's mission of preventing diversion while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply of controlled substances for legitimate medical needs, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Diversion Control should solicit input from pharmacists, or associations representing pharmacies and pharmacists, about updates and additions needed to existing guidance for pharmacists, and revise or issue guidance accordingly.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration: Operations Division: Office of Diversion Control: Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Diversion Control
    Status: Open

    Comments: In April 2016, DEA reported that it had worked with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy regarding issues raised during stakeholder discussions, which resulted in a March 2015 consensus document published by stakeholders entitled "Stakeholders' Challenges and Red Flag Warning Signs Related to Prescribing and Dispensing Controlled Substances." Additionally, in December 2016 DEA also described other ways in which the agency had been working with pharmacists or associations representing pharmacists to discuss their responsibilities, such as during regional one-day Pharmacy Diversion Awareness Conferences, and quarterly meetings with two pharmacy associations. In March 2017, DEA officials reported that while an update to the Pharmacist's Manual was still under way, they did not have an estimated completion date. We plan to continue to monitor the agency's efforts in this area, as well, and consequently this recommendation remains open.
    Director: Susan Fleming,
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of NHTSA to identify actions--in addition to the agency's currently planned efforts--to support state efforts to increase public awareness of the dangers of drug-impaired driving. This effort should be undertaken in consultation with ONDCP, HHS, state highway-safety offices, and other interested parties as needed.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: NHTSA met with ONDCP, HHS, and GHSA in March 2016 and discussed what consumer research has been done and education materials have been used in raising awareness for the drug-impaired driving issue. NHTSA completed marijuana creative concept focus group market research in the Fall of 2016; however, the findings from this research were inconclusive. NHTSA plans to determine next steps and develop a new strategy in communicating on this challenging topic by Spring 2017. NHTSA anticipates conducting additional market research that will provide the direction for the development of creative materials by Fall 2017.
    Director: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
    Phone: (202) 512-7331

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: For elements identified in the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 that were not fully addressed in the strategy, the Secretary of State should provide the relevant congressional committees with information that would fully address these elements. In the absence of such information, State should explain to the congressional committees why it was not included in the strategy.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: In a letter dated December 23, 2014, the Department of State (State) noted that the elements identified in the GAO report as not being adequately addressed by State were matters where the consensus of the intelligence community was that there was not an identifiable threat to counter. GAO's report assessed that State did not address four specific elements identified in the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012. State's December 2014 letter provided explanations for these four elements, including the availability of information on existing agency websites, briefings provided to Congress, and State's lack of finding that foreign governments showed clear threats. We continue to maintain that the strategy did not include all of the elements that the law stated should be included, and State did not demonstrate that it provided relevant congressional committees with information that would fully address these elements. In December 2015, State noted that it remains in close contact with the relevant congressional committees across a range of security, economic and political with regard to the Western Hemisphere on a regular and continuing basis. State further noted that it provided an oral briefing along with its original submission of the report to Congress and answered questions posed by Congress. State officials said that they stand ready to provide further information in the appropriate setting should it be requested. However, State did not provide GAO with information about whether it had provided information to Congress specifically for the elements identified in the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 that were not fully addressed in the strategy, nor provide additional information about whether State explained to the congressional committees why any absence of such information was not included in the strategy. Furthermore, GAO learned from the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff that State and the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided a briefing to the committee regarding Iranian activities in Latin America on February 25, 2016. As of August 2016, GAO did not receive any documents related to the briefings because, according to State, the talking points document was considered deliberative and therefore could not be shared. According to State officials, they continue to monitor the issue and brief Congress as appropriate. As of June 2017, State noted that its position regarding this recommendation and the deliberative nature of the talking points document remains unchanged.
    Director: Rebecca Gambler
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    5 open recommendations
    including 3 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, when updating the schedules for the IFT, Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability programs, the Commissioner of CBP should ensure that scheduling best practices, as outlined in our schedule assessment guide, are applied to the three programs' schedules.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In March 2014, CBP concurred with our recommendation and in response, stated it planned to ensure that scheduling best practices are applied as far as practical when updating the three program schedules. In May 2016 CBP provided us with complete schedules for the IFT and RVSS programs. In December 2016, we provided CBP our assessment of the updated schedules for the IFT and RVSS programs. In January 2017 CBP provided us with a complete schedule for the MSC program and in March 2017, we provided CBP with our assessment of the MSC schedule. In April 2017, CBP provided additional clarifying information in regards to the MSC schedule. As of May 2017, based on our assessment of the updated schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs, CBP has made improvements in the quality of the schedules since our last report, but the program schedules have not met all characteristics of a reliable schedule.
    Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, the Commissioner of CBP should develop and maintain an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan that is consistent with scheduling best practices.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2014, CBP did not concur with this recommendation and maintained that an integrated master schedule for the Plan in one file undermines the DHS-approved implementation strategy for the individual programs making up the Plan, and that the implementation of this recommendation would essentially create a large, aggregated program, and effectively create an aggregated "system of systems". DHS further stated that a key element of the Plan has been the disaggregation of technology procurements. As of December 2016, CBP continues to non-concur with this recommendation and plans no further action. However, as we noted in the report, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona border with Mexico. Moreover, while the programs themselves may be independent of one another, the Plan's resources are being shared among the programs. As such, we continue to believe that developing an integrated master schedule for the Plan is needed. Developing and maintaining an integrated master schedule for the Plan could allow CBP insight into current or programmed allocation of resources for all programs as opposed to attempting to resolve any resource constraints for each program individually.
    Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, when updating Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs, the Commissioner of CBP should verify the Life-cycle Cost Estimates with independent cost estimates and reconcile any differences.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2014, DHS concurred with this recommendation. In May 2016 CBP provided us with updated life-cycle cost estimates for two of its highest-cost programs under the Plan--the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) and the Remote Video Surveillance (RVSS). Further, CBP officials stated that in fiscal year 2016, DHS's Cost Analysis Division started piloting DHS's independent cost estimate capability on the RVSS program. According to CBP officials, the pilot is an opportunity to assist DHS in developing its independent cost estimate capability and that CBP selected the RVSS program for the pilot because the program is at a point in its planning and execution process where it can benefit most from having an independent cost estimate performed as these technologies are being deployed along the southwest border, beyond Arizona. In August 2016, CBP officials provided an update stating that details for an estimated independent cost estimate schedule and analysis plan for the RVSS program had not yet been finalized. As of November 2016, CBP officials stated that the results of the independent cost estimate for the RVSS program are expected to be completed by January 31, 2017. Further, CBP officials have not detailed similar plans for the IFT. We continue to believe that independently verifying the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the estimates.
    Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, the Commissioner of CBP should revise the IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan to more fully test the IFT program, before beginning full production, in the various environmental conditions in which IFTs will be used to determine operational effectiveness and suitability, in accordance with DHS acquisition guidance.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In March 2014, DHS did not concur with this recommendation and stated that the Test and Evaluation Master Plan includes tailored testing and user assessments that will provide much, if not all, of the insight contemplated by the intent of the recommendation. According to CBP officials, acceptance testing was performed on the system in July 2015 and a limited user testing for the IFT system was conducted during October and November 2015. In May 2016, CBP reported that it had conditionally accepted seven out of 53 IFT systems in one area of responsibility. CBP also reported that it is working to deploy and test the remaining IFT unit systems to other areas of responsibility. In November 2016, CBP stated that they continue to non-concur with this recommendation and planned no further action. However, as we reported in March 2014, we continue to believe that revising the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to include more robust testing to determine operational effectiveness and suitability could better position CBP to (1) evaluate IFT capabilities before moving forward to full production for the system, (2) provide CBP with information on the extent to which the towers satisfy Border Patrol's user requirements, and (3) reduce potential program risks. Without conducting operational testing in accordance with DHS guidance, the IFT program may be at increased risk of not meeting Border Patrol operational needs.
    Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, once data on asset assists are required to be recorded and tracked, the Commissioner of CBP should analyze available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP's border security efforts.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In February 2015, Border Patrol officials provided documentation stating that the agency has yet to analyze data on asset assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics and indicators to determine the contributions of surveillance technologies to its mission. However, the Border Patrol plans to address this recommendation using the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) developed by Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab specifically for the Border Patrol. According to Border Patrol officials, the CGAP will enable the agency to examine the effects of technology and other Border Patrol assets such as agents, infrastructure, in the context of everyday border patrol operations. The data generated by the CGAP along with e3 apprehension and seizure data will better inform the nature of the contributions and impacts of surveillance technology on enforcement efforts. Border Patrol officials explained that capturing data on asset assists within the in e3 Processing database was the first step to determine the contribution of technology to detect, identify, and classify activity along the border. Further, the Border Patrol identified individual types of technology such as Integrated Fixed Towers, Mobile Video Surveillance System, Underground Sensors, etc. and grouped them into classes such as Fixed, Mobile and Relocatable to better distinguish the contribution of each class of technology. As the Border Patrol gains a better understanding through analysis, the agency plans to continue to refine the measures and the collection of the metrics. In November 2014, the Border Patrol proposed a timeline highlighting the agency's future efforts to capture and document the contributions of the different classes of technology to the Border Patrol's mission. In our March 2016 update on the progress made by agencies to address our findings on duplication and cost savings across the federal government, we reported that CBP had modified its time frame for developing baselines for each performance measure and that additional time would be needed to implement and apply key attributes for metrics. In March 2016, according to CBP officials, the actual completion was being adjusted pending test and evaluation results for recently deployed technologies on the southwest border. In addition, Border Patrol officials told us that they planned to have various qualitative and quantitative performance measures of technology completed by the end of fiscal year 2016. These measures would help profile different levels of situational awareness in different areas of the border. In September 2016, Border Patrol provided a case study that assessed CGAP data with technology assist data and other measures to determine contributions of surveillance technologies to its mission. While this is a start to developing performance measures, the case study is limited to one location along the border and the analysis limited to select technologies. As of April 2017, CBP had not conducted assessments of the deployments to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to the border security mission. Until CBP completes its efforts to fully develop and apply key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan, it will not be well positioned to fully assess its progress in implementing and determining the Plan and determine when mission benefits have been fully realized.
    Director: Fleming, Susan A
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    2 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To improve the CSA program, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to revise the SMS methodology to better account for limitations in drawing comparisons of safety performance information across carriers; in doing so, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to conduct a formal analysis that specifically identifies: (1) limitations in the data used to calculate SMS scores including variability in the carrier population and the quality and quantity of data available for carrier safety performance assessments, and (2) limitations in the resulting SMS scores including their precision, confidence, and reliability for the purposes for which they are used.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of October 2016, FMCSA continues to maintain that they do not agree with our methodology or conclusions. While FMCSA's position about our specific recommendation is unchanged, FMCSA noted that Section 5221 of the FAST Act directed the National Academies of Science (NAS) to conduct a safety correlation study of the CSA program, and specifically FMCSA's Safety Measurement System's (SMS) methodology. FMCSA stated that if the outcome of the NAS study results in recommendations for SMS changes, they will address those recommendations accordingly. We continue to believe this recommendation has merit and could help the agency better target FMCSA's resources to the carriers that pose the highest risk of crashing, as we demonstrate in our report. For example, we reported that FMCSA requires a minimum level of information for a carrier to receive an SMS score; however, this requirement is not strong enough to produce sufficiently reliable scores. As a result, GAO found that FMCSA identified many carriers as high risk that were not later involved in a crash, potentially causing FMCSA to miss opportunities to intervene with carriers that were involved in crashes. FMCSA's methodology is limited because of insufficient information, which reduces the precision of SMS scores. GAO found that by scoring only carriers with more information, FMCSA could better identify high risk carriers likely to be involved in crashes. This illustrative approach involves trade-offs; it would assign SMS scores to fewer carriers, but these scores would generally be more reliable and thus more useful in targeting FMCSA's scarce resources.
    Recommendation: To improve the CSA program, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to ensure that any determination of a carrier's fitness to operate properly accounts for limitations we have identified regarding safety performance information.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: While FMCSA does not agree with our methodology or conclusions, we believe this recommendation has merit and could help the agency better target FMCSA's resources to the carriers that pose the highest risk of crashing, as we demonstrate in our report. For example, we reported that FMCSA requires a minimum level of information for a carrier to receive an SMS score; however, this requirement is not strong enough to produce sufficiently reliable scores. As a result, GAO found that FMCSA identified many carriers as high risk that were not later involved in a crash, potentially causing FMCSA to miss opportunities to intervene with carriers that were involved in crashes. FMCSA's methodology is limited because of insufficient information, which reduces the precision of SMS scores. GAO found that by scoring only carriers with more information, FMCSA could better identify high risk carriers likely to be involved in crashes. This illustrative approach involves trade-offs; it would assign SMS scores to fewer carriers, but these scores would generally be more reliable and thus more useful in targeting FMCSA's scarce resources.
    Director: Brown, Kay E
    Phone: (202) 512-7215

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to help inform federal, state, and local initiatives to prevent and respond to child sexual abuse by school personnel, the Secretary of Education should lead an effort, in collaboration with the Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General, to leverage resources, expertise, and capacities across the departments to determine the most cost-effective way to disseminate federal information so that relevant state and local educational agencies, child welfare agencies, and criminal justice entities are aware of and have access to it.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: In May 2016, the Department of Education reported that on November 16, 2015, the Office of Safe and Healthy Students within the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education convened a meeting with federal partners to explore ways in which the agencies can better support states and to devise dissemination strategies for sharing information and providing technical assistance in the most cost- effective ways to state and local educational agencies and child welfare agencies, and ensure that resources are accessible to the various stakeholders. It noted several next steps including creating and implementing a Federal dissemination plan for the new adult sexual misconduct guidance, repository of federal resources, and for information on all state-level mandates and policies addressing adult sexual misconduct in schools. GAO will consider this recommendation closed when the department provides timelines for the completion of these activities and documentation of their completion.
    Recommendation: In order to help inform federal, state, and local initiatives to prevent and respond to child sexual abuse by school personnel, the Secretary of Education should lead an effort, in collaboration with the Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General, to leverage resources, expertise, and capacities across the departments to identify mechanisms to better track and analyze the prevalence of child sexual abuse by school personnel through existing federal data collection systems, such as the School Survey on Crime and Safety, the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System, and the National Crime Victimization Survey.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Education reported that experts within the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) consulted with research partners in the Department of Justice and academic research experts to determine if an effective item or item set about this important issue could be derived. After review of extant sources and consultation with item development experts, a clear question that would result in meaningful information from school administrator respondents could not be developed. They also noted that they understand there is continuing interest on this issue and will continue studying item possibilities for the next School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) provided the collection is funded. As of May 2016, NCES does not have funds to field SSOCS after 2016, but there is a request in the 2016 budget to support a 2018 collection. GAO will consider this recommendation closed when the department has taken the above mentioned action to continue studying item possibilities for the next SSOCS if the collection is funded.
    Director: Grover, Jennifer A
    Phone: (202) 512-7141

    1 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To help ensure that security-related funding is directed to programs that have demonstrated their effectiveness, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the TSA Administrator to limit future funding support for the agency's behavior detection activities until TSA can provide scientifically validated evidence that demonstrates that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not concur with GAO's November 2013 recommendation to the TSA Administrator to limit future funding support for the agency's behavior detection activities until TSA can provide scientifically validated evidence that demonstrates that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security. However, as of July 2017, DHS has reduced funding for its behavior detection activities and taken some steps toward identifying additional evidence to support its use of behavioral indicators. TSA officials stated that GAO's recommendation contributed to DHS's decision to reduce the number of behavior detection officers (BDO) from 3,131 full-time equivalents in fiscal year 2013 to 2,393 full-time equivalents employed in fiscal year 2016. Further, in the summer of 2016 and consistent with the Aviation Security Act of 2016, the agency began assigning BDOs to other positions at passenger screening checkpoints where they are able to observe passengers while performing screening duties. According to TSA officials, all BDOs have now been converted into transportation security officers with behavior detection capabilities, which is expected to reduce the cost of the agency's behavior detection activities. As of August 2017, TSA does not yet have an estimate of any associated cost reductions. Since GAO's 2013 report, TSA has revised its list of behavioral indicators and taken some steps to identify evidence that these indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security. Specifically, TSA hired a contractor to search available literature for sources supporting its revised list of 36 behavioral indicators. However, in 2017, GAO reviewed all 178 sources TSA identified and found that 98 percent (175 of 178) did not provide valid evidence for specific behavioral indicators in its revised list and that the remaining 3 sources could be used as valid evidence to support 8 of the 36 indicators. GAO reported that TSA should continue to limit funding for the agency's behavior detection activities until TSA can provide valid evidence demonstrating that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security, consistent with the recommendation in its November 2013 report.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    3 open recommendations
    including 2 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To promote coordination as a practice to help avoid overlap, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of ONDCP should work through the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee (ISA IPC) or otherwise collaborate to develop a mechanism, such as performance metrics related to coordination, that will allow them to hold field-based information-sharing entities accountable for coordinating with each other and monitor and evaluate the coordination results achieved.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: The Department of Justice (DOJ), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), has made progress toward addressing GAO's April 2013 recommendation but has not included all of the relevant field-based information sharing entities in its efforts. Through their involvement in an interagency policy committee within the Executive Office of the President, DHS, DOJ, and ONDCP have developed a mechanism to hold state and urban area fusion centers, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers accountable for coordinating their analytical and investigative activities. However, the agencies have not fully addressed the action because DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and Field Intelligence Groups (FIG), two of the five field-based entities included in GAO's April 2013 report, have not participated in the assessment on which the mechanism is based. In December 2015, DHS developed a field-based partners report in which DHS, DOJ and ONDCP reported data for state and urban area fusion centers, RISS centers, and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers. These data were focused on field-based collaboration, including governance, colocation, and other information sharing, analytic, and deconfliction-focused topics. However, the report did not include data for DOJ's JTTFs or FIGs. DOJ has noted that JTTFs and FIGs are different from the other entities because JTTFs are operational law enforcement investigative entities and FIGs provide intelligence support to FBI Field Offices. However, GAO's April 2013 report identified areas in which the missions and activities of JTTFs and FIGs overlapped with those of the other entities and that coordination with other field based entities was important to prevent unnecessary overlap and potential duplication. Considering the exclusion of two of the five entities, the agencies do not have a collective mechanism that can hold FIGS and JTTFs accountable for coordinating with the other field-based information sharing entities and allow the agencies to monitor progress and evaluate results across entities. Such a mechanism can help entities maintain effective relationships when new leadership is assigned and avoid unnecessary overlap in activities, which in turn can help entities to leverage scarce resources. As of March 2017, DOJ had provided no new updates. GAO will continue to monitor DOJ's progress in this area.
    Recommendation: To help identify where agencies and the field-based entities they support could apply coordination mechanisms to enhance information sharing and reduce inefficiencies resulting from overlap, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of ONDCP should work through the ISA IPC or otherwise collaborate to identify characteristics of entities and assess specific geographic areas in which practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary overlap, such as cross-entity participation on governance boards and colocation of entities, could be further applied. The results of this assessment could be used by the agencies to provide recommendations or guidance to the entities to create coordinated governance boards or colocate entities, which can result in increased efficiencies through shared facilities and resources and reduced overlap through coordinated or collaborative products, activities, and services.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: The Department of Justice (DOJ), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), has made progress toward addressing GAO's April 2013 recommendation but has not included all of the relevant field-based information sharing entities in its efforts. The three agencies have taken the necessary steps to assess the extent to which practices that can enhance coordination are being implemented at state and urban area fusion centers, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers through their involvement in an interagency policy committee within the Executive Office of the President. However, the assessment did not include DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) or Field Intelligence Groups (FIG), two of the five field-based entities included in GAO's April 2013 report. In December 2015, DHS, DOJ, and ONDCP developed a field-based partners report in which DOJ and ONDCP collected and reported data elements for RISS centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers similar to those DHS uses in its annual fusion center assessment. These data were focused on field-based collaboration, including governance, colocation, and other information sharing, analytic, and deconfliction-focused topics. However, the report did not include data for DOJ's FBI JTTFs or FIGs. A collaborative assessment of where practices that enhance coordination can be applied to reduce overlap, collaborate, and leverage resources for all five field-based information-sharing entities would allow the agencies to provide recommendations or guidance to the entities on implementing these practices. As of March 2017, DOJ had provided no new updates. GAO will continue to monitor DOJ's progress in this area.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that an assessment of practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary overlap is shared and used to further enhance collaboration and efficiencies across agencies, the Program Manager, with input from the ISA IPC collaborating agencies, should report in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) annual report to Congress the results of the assessment, including any additional coordination practices identified, efficiencies realized, or actions planned.

    Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Program Manager--Information Sharing Environment
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information. Status last updated August 31, 2017.
    Director: Larence, Eileen
    Phone: (202)512-6510

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that USNCB and ICE are providing more comprehensive information to their respective foreign counterparts regarding registered sex offenders traveling internationally, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to help ensure that USNCB and ICE have information on the same number of registered sex offenders as well as the same level of detail on registered sex offenders traveling internationally. Such steps could include USNCB and ICE copying each other on their notifications to their foreign counterparts or USNCB receiving information directly from the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC).

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We reported that U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not have information on the same registered sex offenders or the same level of detail on registered sex offenders traveling internationally, which affected their ability to notify their respective foreign counterparts. In part, this is because the two agencies rely on different information sources and do not share information with one another. We recommended that DOJ and DHS develop mechanisms that would enable these two agencies to have access to the same information on traveling sex offenders. In August 2013, ICE provided documentation showing that it copied several U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) officials on notifications that ICE sent to other countries regarding registered sex offenders traveling internationally. However, ICE did not copy USNCB on these notifications. ICE explained that it thought sharing information on traveling sex offenders with USMS and relying on USMS to pass that information along to USNCB was the most efficient way to share information with USNCB. However, we analyzed notifications from ICE, USNCB, and USMS regarding sex offenders who initiated international travel in February 2014 and found that USMS only passed along about 30 percent of the notifications it received from ICE to USNCB. We provided the results of this analysis to all three agencies in July 2014. We met with relevant U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), ICE, USMS, and USNCB officials in September 2014 to discuss options for ensuring that USNCB receives more comprehensive information regarding traveling sex offenders. ICE officials stated that since CBP is the source of the information ICE receives on traveling sex offenders, as well as one of the information sources for USMS, that it may be best for CBP to provide information directly to USNCB. USNCB officials also stated that their preference was to receive information directly from CBP, and it was their understanding that CBP and USNCB were in the process of developing an MOU that would allow for this. In October 2015, CBP confirmed that the MOU would enable CBP to share information with USNCB regarding traveling sex offenders. CBP also stated that the MOU had been approved by CBP and sent to USNCB for review. In an April 2016 update, CBP reported that the MOU had been tentatively approved by USNCB and is expected to be finalized and signed in July 2016. In August 2016, CBP stated that the completion date for the MOU was pushed back to September 30, 2016, to allow time for CBP and USNCB to negotiate additional edits. We followed up with CBP about the status of the MOU in February 2017. We are awaiting a response.
    Director: Goldstein, Mark L
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, the Secretary of Homeland Security should develop and implement a new comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to FPS officials, as of September 2017, FPS is currently reviewing proposals and preparing to make a decision for the final contract award for a Post Tracking System (PTS). According to FPS, this PTS will allow FPS to comprehensively and reliability mange its contract guards. Once the contract is awarded in late 2017 FPS will begin to implement the PTS system. GAO is keeping this recommendation open pending successful implementation of this system.
    Recommendation: Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, the Secretary of Homeland Security should verify independently that FPS's contract guards are current on all training and certification requirements.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to FPS officials, as of September 2017, FPS plans to address this recommendation through the implementation of FPS?s Training Academy and Management System (TAMS). FPS reported that this system should allow it to verify independently that FPS's contract guards are current on all training and certification requirements. FPS is currently taking various steps to finalize the system and anticipates full implementation of TAMS by August 2018. GAO is leaving this recommendation open pending successful implementation of TAMS.
    Director: Martin, Belva M
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better inform management and resource allocation decisions, effectively manage limited export control enforcement resources, and improve the license determination process, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, as they implement efforts to track resources expended on export control enforcement activities, should use such data to make resource allocation decisions.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOJ had identified plans to make continual improvements to the investigative and prosecutorial data to allow better tracking and refined resource allocation decisions going forward. However, we have not been able to obtain status information from Justice despite our attempts.
    Recommendation: To better inform management and resource allocation decisions, effectively manage limited export control enforcement resources, and improve the license determination process, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the departmental representatives of the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, including Commerce, Justice, State, and the Treasury should (1) leverage export control enforcement resources across agencies by building on existing agency efforts to track resources expended, as well as existing agency coordination at the local level; (2) establish procedures to facilitate data sharing between the enforcement agencies and intelligence community to measure illicit transshipment activity; and (3) develop qualitative and quantitative measures of effectiveness for the entire enforcement community to baseline and trend this data.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: To help track resources expended and coordination of enforcement resources, the E2C2 has ratified and implemented the investigative deconfliction protocol. The Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2) has also ratified and implemented the dispute resolution protocol and it is being used by all E2C2 partners. These are two of seven standard operating procedures planned to be in use by the E2C2. The Intelligence Community engagement/information protocols are being addressed through the E2C2 Export Enforcement Intelligence Working Group to help facilitate data sharing, and ICE, through the E2C2, is still in the process of establishing interagency agreement on procedures to facilitate data sharing between the enforcement agencies and intelligence community to assist in measuring illicit transshipment activity. The E2C2 Intel Cell White Paper is complete, but the Cell is not staffed or operational. This Cell is to serve as the primary interagency conduit for defining, establishing, and implementing protocols and facilitating information sharing between the IC and export enforcement community. The white paper outlines the E2C2 Intel Cell's mission, general roles and functions, recommended tasks and structure to facilitate enhanced coordination and intelligence sharing. When established, the Cell will develop standard operating procedures but this has not yet occurred. In late August 2016, the Department of Commerce assigned a new Assistant Director and one analyst to the E2C2. Efforts to formalize an intelligence analytical unit and draft a corresponding SOP are ongoing as of the summer of 2017.
    Director: White, James R
    Phone: (202)512-5594

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should establish an IRS-wide strategy with goals, which may need to be developed incrementally, to coordinate and plan ongoing and future efforts to identify and pursue network tax evasion. The strategy should include: (1) assessing the effectiveness of network analysis tools, such as yK-1; (2) determining the feasibility and benefits of increasing access to existing IRS data, such as scanning additional data from Schedule K-1, or collecting additional data for use in its network analysis efforts; (3) putting the development of analytical techniques and tools that focus on networks as the unit of analysis, such as GraphQuery, on a specific time schedule; and (4) deciding how network efforts will be managed across IRS, such as whether a core program team or management group is needed.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of March 2017, IRS had not created a documented, agency-wide strategy to manage network noncompliance efforts. However, IRS has developed elements of the strategy, as GAO recommended in September 2010. For example, IRS has made and continues to focus on making iterative improvements to its network analysis tools. Although these improvements are not contained within an IRS-wide strategy, they relate to assessing effectiveness. For example, IRS has taken steps to assess its most predominantly used network analysis tool. As part of an annual survey, IRS asked users of this tool about its effectiveness and to suggest improvements. IRS also certified the tool as conforming to agency guidelines and requirements for usefulness. However, IRS has not created a strategic approach on managing network compliance efforts across IRS that includes time frames for network analysis tool development, and the agency has no plans to do so.
    Director: Powner, David A
    Phone: (202)512-6408

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: Congress may wish to consider requiring the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury to collaborate on the development and implementation of a joint radio communications solution. Specifically, Congress may wish to consider requiring the departments to (1) establish an effective governance structure that includes a formal process for making decisions and resolving disputes, (2) define and articulate a common outcome for this joint effort, and (3) develop a joint strategy for improving radio communications.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: Congress enacted legislation and introduced a few other bills in the House of Representatives during the last Congress that were aimed at improving interoperable communications. However, Congress has not yet passed legislation that would require all three departments to collaborate on a joint communications solution. As a result, GAO maintains that Congress should consider requiring the three departments to collaborate on the development and implementation of a joint radio communications solution in order to improve the interoperability of radio communications systems and potentially achieve savings.