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    Subject Term: "Global positioning system"

    5 publications with a total of 13 open recommendations including 1 priority recommendation
    Director: Cristina Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as part of M-code receiver card acquisition planning, assign an organization with responsibility for systematically collecting integration test data, lessons learned, and design solutions and making them available to all programs expected to integrate M-code receiver cards.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Cristina Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should convene an independent task force comprising experts from other military services and defense agencies with substantial knowledge and expertise to provide an assessment to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics of the OCX program and concrete guidance for addressing the OCX program's underlying problems, particularly including: (1) A detailed engineering assessment of OCX defects to determine the systemic root causes of the defects; (2) Whether the contractor's software development procedures and practices match the levels described in the OCX systems engineering and software development plans; and (3) Whether the contractor is capable of executing the program as currently resourced and structured.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Prior to the program declaring a Nunn-McCurdy breach on June 30, 2016, the only independent assessment was conducted by Defense Digital Services and was limited in focus to software development. Air Force notes a completion date of independent assessment on Sept 29, 2017. Once received, we will evaluate whether that meets the intent of the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should develop high confidence OCX cost and schedule estimates based on actual track record for productivity and learning curves.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Prior to the program declaring a Nunn-McCurdy breach on June 30, 2016, no high confidence cost assessment was completed. The Air Force and contractor provided schedule assessments that were not evaluated and considered low-risk, but were directed to execute a 24 month schedule extension with no assessment of its feasibility and that did not take into account past contractor performance. Pending Nunn-McCurdy documentation and repeat of Milestone B, there is no evidence a high confidence cost or schedule has been put in place. Once we receive documentation on approval of Milestone B, we will reevaluate.
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Air Force to retain experts from the independent task force as a management advisory team to assist the OCX program office in conducting regular systemic analysis of defects and to help ensure OCX corrective measures are implemented successfully and sustained.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Prior to the program declaring a Nunn-McCurdy breach on June 30, 2016, Defense Digital Services were initially retained for a month and subsequently remain embedded with contractor software developers to provide advice on development and process improvements. Upon completion of the Nunn-McCurdy review and continued involvement of Defense Digital Services, we will examine the extent to which the program has met this recommendation if the program is recertified to determine if this recommendation was met. Air Force did not provide an update to this recommendation in 2017, but program still has not had Milestone B approved and the Defense Digital Services group is no longer engaged on OCX.
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should put in place a mechanism for ensuring that the knowledge gained from the OCX assessment is used to determine whether further programmatic changes are needed to strengthen oversight.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Senior quarterly reviews continue of the OCX program and have been in place since December 2015. Documentation still pending on Milestone B to see if these reviews have informed programmatic changes that better position DOD to complete this acquisition.
    Director: David C. Trimble
    Phone: (202) 512-3841

    1 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To ensure that the security of radiological sources at industrial facilities is reasonably assured, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should conduct an assessment of the T&R process--by which licensees approve employees for unescorted access--to determine if it provides reasonable assurance against insider threats, including (1) determining why criminal history information concerning convictions for terroristic threats was not provided to a licensee during the T&R process to establish if this represents an isolated case or a systemic weakness in the T&R process; and (2) revising, to the extent permitted by law, the T&R process to provide specific guidance to licensees on how to review a employee's background. NRC should also consider whether certain criminal convictions or other indicators should disqualify an employee from T&R or trigger a greater role for NRC.

    Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: On December 14, 2016, the NRC provided Congress with a report detailing its review of the effectiveness of the requirements in 10 CFR Part 37 to determine whether any additional security measures, guidance updates, rulemaking changes, or licensee outreach efforts are appropriate. The completion of the 10 CFR Part 37 program review included insights into the effectiveness of the T&R process. Specifically, the review generated recommendations for enhancements in the area of T&R, including, among other things, increased controls for protection of information related to individuals having access to Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive materials; improved guidance related to information individuals must disclose when applying for unescorted access; development of sample forms or templates for use in T&R evaluations; and improved coordination efforts with the FBI to share potential terrorist threat information involving individuals seeking approval for new or continued unescorted access to Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive materials. However, certain aspects of the NRC staff's assessment of the T&R process remain ongoing. Specifically, on November 25, 2016, the staff closed Temporary Instruction (TI) 2800/042, "Evaluation of Trustworthiness and Reliability Determinations," and is using the information gained from the TI to consider additional enhancements to the T&R process. As part of this continuing effort, the NRC will evaluate the potential use of disqualifying criteria in making T&R determinations and the incorporation of additional insider mitigation program features, such as requiring the self-reporting of legal actions, into the T&R process to which the individual has been subject. The NRC expects this evaluation to be completed in December 2017.
    Director: Goldstein, Mark L
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that the increasing risks of GPS disruptions to the nation's critical infrastructure are effectively managed, the Secretary of Homeland Security should increase the reliability and usefulness of the GPS risk assessment by developing a plan and time frame to collect relevant threat, vulnerability, and consequence data for the various critical infrastructure sectors, and periodically review the readiness of data to conduct a more data-driven risk assessment while ensuring that DHS's assessment approach is more consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: DHS officials had previously indicated that DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) have discussed an update of the GPS risk assessment, noting that such an update may be included in fiscal year 2017 planning documents. However, as of February 2017, no documentation had been provided that demonstrates such plans. Additionally, information from DHS shows that DHS has continued other efforts to collect potentially relevant threat, vulnerability, and consequence data for various GPS equipment in use. For example, according to DHS officials, DHS has conducted visits to major maritime, finance, wireless communications, and electricity firms to gauge their understanding of GPS vulnerabilities and of technology- and strategy-based efforts to improve GPS resilience, and DHS documentation shows that DHS has held events to test GPS receivers as part of assessing vulnerabilities. We will update the status of this recommendation after we receive additional information from DHS.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the increasing risks of GPS disruptions to the nation's critical infrastructure are effectively managed, the Secretary of Homeland Security should, as part of current critical infrastructure protection planning with Sector-Specific Agencys (SSAs) and sector partners, develop and issue a plan and metrics to measure the effectiveness of GPS risk mitigation efforts on critical infrastructure resiliency.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of February 2017, DHS documentation shows that DHS has worked with Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) and other interagency partners to help manage GPS risks and continues to communicate information on risks to critical infrastructure partners. For example, according to DHS officials, this included briefing field staff and developing questions for infrastructure surveys to gather information on GPS resilience at the facility level. According to DHS officials, at the national level DHS included GPS in discussions with SSAs on topics they could include in their Sector-Specific Plans (each SSA develops a Sector-Specific Plan to detail risk management in its critical infrastructure sector), but DHS has also indicated that sector-oriented metrics are not a viable means of assessing risk management actions. We will update the status of this recommendation after we receive additional information from DHS.
    Recommendation: To improve collaboration and address uncertainties in fulfilling the National Security Presidential Directive 39 (NSPD-39) backup-capabilities requirement, the Secretaries of Transportation and Homeland Security should establish a formal, written agreement that details how the agencies plan to address their shared responsibility. This agreement should address uncertainties, including clarifying and defining DOT's and DHS's respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities; establishing clear, agreed-upon outcomes; establishing how the agencies will monitor and report on progress toward those outcomes; and setting forth the agencies' plans for examining relevant issues, such as the roles of SSAs and industry, how NSPD-39 fits into the NIPP risk management framework, whether an update to the NSPD-39 is needed, or other issues as deemed necessary by the agencies.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of February 2017, the National Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Executive Steering group had established an interagency team called the "Complementary PNT Tiger Team" co-chaired by DHS, DOT, and DOD. This team was formed to manage the federal government's efforts to establish a national backup system to GPS. According to DHS officials, this organizational structure obviates the need for a formal, written agreement between DOT and DHS specific to GPS backup responsibilities. They also stated that, in a separate but related effort, DHS, DOT, and DOD are discussing a tri-lateral agreement that covers a broad spectrum of PNT-related responsibilities and activities. We will update the status of this recommendation after we receive additional information from DHS.
    Recommendation: To improve collaboration and address uncertainties in fulfilling the National Security Presidential Directive 39 (NSPD-39) backup-capabilities requirement, the Secretaries of Transportation and Homeland Security should establish a formal, written agreement that details how the agencies plan to address their shared responsibility. This agreement should address uncertainties, including clarifying and defining DOT's and DHS's respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities; establishing clear, agreed-upon outcomes; establishing how the agencies will monitor and report on progress toward those outcomes; and setting forth the agencies' plans for examining relevant issues, such as the roles of SSAs and industry, how NSPD-39 fits into the NIPP risk management framework, whether an update to the NSPD-39 is needed, or other issues as deemed necessary by the agencies.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of February 2017, the National Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Executive Steering group had established an interagency team--called the "Complementary PNT Tiger Team"--co-chaired by DHS, DOT, and DOD. This team was formed to manage the federal government's efforts to establish a national backup system to GPS. According to DHS officials, this organizational structure obviates the need for a formal, written agreement between DOT and DHS specific to GPS backup responsibilities. They also stated that, in a separate but related effort, DHS, DOT, and DOD are discussing a tri-lateral agreement that covers a broad spectrum of PNT-related responsibilities and activities. We will update the status of this recommendation after we receive additional information from DOT.
    Director: Mak, Marie A
    Phone: (202) 512-2527

    3 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better position the Department of Defense (DOD) as it continues pursuing more affordable GPS options, and to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to affirm the future GPS constellation size that the Air Force plans to support, given the differences in the derived requirement of the 24-satellite constellation and the 30-satellite constellations called for in each of the space segment options in the Air Force's report.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation, noting that the numbers of satellites required are affirmed annually in the President's Budget request. However, DOD continues to support a 30-satellite constellation, as established in each of the options its GPS study considered. Since the time of the report, DOD has not taken any action to reassess their approach to support a 24 or 30 GPS satellite constellation. Until they do, we believe this recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: To better position the DOD as it continues pursuing more affordable GPS options, and to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that future assessments of options include full consideration of the space, ground control, and user equipment segments, and are comprehensive with regard to their assessment of costs, technical and programmatic risks, and schedule.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation, noting that, while consideration of the space and ground control segments should be comprehensive in these areas, the user equipment segment should be included in future assessments when those assessments include the fielding of new user equipment capability. Since the time of our report, DOD has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of future GPS options that includes all segments. Until they do, we cannot determine if they will include full consideration of the space, ground control, and user equipment segments, and are comprehensive with regard to their assessment of costs, technical and programmatic risks, and schedule.
    Recommendation: To better position the DOD as it continues pursuing more affordable GPS options, and to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to engage stakeholders from the broader civilian community identified in positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) policy in future assessments of options. This input should include civilian GPS signals, signal quality and integrity, which signals should be included or excluded from options, as well as issues pertaining to other technical and programmatic matters.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation, noting that stakeholders from the broader civilian community identified in PNT policy should be engaged in future assessment of options that include changes to the Standard Positioning System performance standard or to agreements or commitments the DOD has already made with civil stakeholders. Until DOD conducts future assessments of options for GPS constellations, we cannot determine if they will include the views of stakeholders from the broader civilian GPS user community with respect to civilian GPS signals, signal quality and integrity, and other technical and programmatic matters.