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    Federal Agency: "Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation"

    6 publications with a total of 11 open recommendations including 5 priority recommendations
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better ensure that the FBI Laboratory obtains additional transcripts, the FBI Director should require that the FBI Laboratory's procedure for tracking and obtaining transcripts routinely captures and uses additional information and data critical to transcript acquisition, such as the reason a transcript is unavailable, when it is expected to be available, the court jurisdiction, and a point of contact for the transcript.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: The FBI Laboratory has made progress in implementing this recommendation. Specifically, as of November 2017, the FBI Laboratory has added the following fields to its Testimony Tracker System: (1) court jurisdiction; (2) point of contact for the transcript (person that the examiner spoke to); (3) reason (for why the transcript is not available); and (4) the expected date for the transcript to become available. It has also updated its Testimony Monitoring policy to reflect the changes and provided training to staff on how to enter and use data in these and other data in the Tracker system to obtain transcripts. This recommendation will remain open pending evidence of reports from the Tracker system for at least four quarters showing that the policy has been implemented. GAO is monitoring the status of this recommendation.
    Director: Gretta L. Goodwin
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help the NICS Section achieve its mission to enhance national security and public safety by providing the timely and accurate determination of a person's eligibility to possess firearms, the Director of the FBI should monitor NICS check outcomes for specific categories of prohibited individuals to assess timeliness and provide this information to other DOJ entities for use in establishing priorities and tools to assist states in submitting more complete records for use during NICS checks.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Diana C. Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    1 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To allow for more efficient use of data on missing and unidentified persons contained in the NCIC's Missing Persons and Unidentified Persons files and NamUs, the Directors of the FBI and NIJ should evaluate the feasibility of sharing certain information among authorized users, document the results of this evaluation, and incorporate, as appropriate, legally and technically feasible options for sharing the information.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In commenting on GAO's June 2016 report, DOJ disagreed with our recommendation, because DOJ believes it does not have the legal authority to fulfill the corrective action as described in the proposed recommendation. Specifically, DOJ stated that the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs) does not qualify, under federal law, for access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and is not an authorized user to receive NCIC data. Therefore, DOJ does not believe there is value in evaluating the technical feasibility of integrating these two databases. In March 2017, DOJ reiterated its position that any such sharing was prohibited by law. We understand the legal framework placed on NCIC and that it may be restricted from fully integrating with a public database. However, this statutory restriction does not preclude DOJ from exploring options to more efficiently share information within the confines of the current legal framework. Until DOJ studies whether such feasible mechanisms exist, it will be unable to make this determination, risking continued inefficiencies through fragmentation and overlap.
    Director: Diana Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    4 open recommendations
    including 4 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition capabilities are being used in accordance with privacy protection laws and policy requirements, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct audits to determine the extent to which users of NGI-IPS and biometric images specialists in FACE Services are conducting face image searches in accordance with Criminal Justice Information Services Division policy requirements.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In March 2017, DOJ provided us with the audit plan the CJIS Audit Unit developed in June 2016 for NGI-IPS users. In addition, DOJ reported that the CJIS Audit Unit began assessing NGI-IPS requirements at participating states in conjunction with its triennial National Identity Services audit and that, as of February 2017, the unit had conducted NGI-IPS audits of four states. Further, DOJ officials said CJIS developed an audit plan of the FACE Services Unit to coincide with the existing triennial FBI internal audit for 2018. However, DOJ did not provide the audit plan for the FACE Services Unit. DOJ officials said the methodology would be the same as the audit plan for NGI-IPS, but that methodology does not describe oversight on use of information obtained from external systems accessed by FACE Services employees. Therefore, we believe DOJ is making progress towards meeting the recommendation, but has not fully implemented our recommendation.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct tests of NGI-IPS to verify that the system is sufficiently accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes, and ensure that the detection and false positive rate used in the tests are identified.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In comments on our draft report in 2016, and reiterated during recommendation follow-up, as of March 2017, DOJ did not concur with this recommendation. DOJ officials stated that the FBI has performed accuracy testing to validate that the system meets the requirements for the detection rate, which fully satisfies requirements for the investigative lead service provided by NGI-IPS. We disagree with DOJ. A key focus of our recommendation is the need to ensure that NGI-IPS is sufficiently accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes. Although the FBI has tested the detection rate for a candidate list of 50 photos, NGI-IPS users are able to request smaller candidate lists (between 2 and 50 photos). FBI officials stated that they do not know, and have not tested, the detection rate for other candidate list sizes. According to these officials, a smaller candidate list would likely lower the detection rate because a smaller candidate list may not contain a likely match that would be present in a larger candidate list. However, according to the FBI Information Technology Life Cycle Management Directive, testing needs to confirm the system meets all user requirements. Because the accuracy of NGI-IPS's face recognition searches when returning fewer than 50 photos in a candidate list is unknown, the FBI is limited in understanding whether the results are accurate enough to meet NGI-IPS users' needs. DOJ officials also stated that searches of NGI-IPS produce a gallery of likely candidates to be used as investigative leads, not for positive identification. As a result, according to DOJ officials, NGI-IPS cannot produce false positives and there is no false positive rate for the system. We disagree with DOJ. The detection rate and the false positive rate are both necessary to assess the accuracy of a face recognition system. Generally, face recognition systems can be configured to allow for a greater or lesser number of matches. A greater number of matches would generally increase the detection rate, but would also increase the false positive rate. Similarly, a lesser number of matches would decrease the false positive rate, but would also decrease the detection rate. Reporting a detection rate of 86 percent without reporting the accompanying false positive rate presents an incomplete view of the system's accuracy. As a result, the recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually that includes an assessment of the accuracy of face recognition searches to determine if it is meeting federal, state, and local law enforcement needs and take actions, as necessary, to improve the system.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of March 2017, FBI officials stated they implemented the recommendation by submitting a paper to solicit feedback from users through the Fall 2016 Advisory Policy Board Process. Specifically, officials said the paper requested feedback on whether the face recognition searches of the NGI-IPS are meeting their needs, and input regarding search accuracy. According to FBI officials, no users expressed concern with any aspect of the NGI-IPS meeting their needs, including accuracy. Although FBI's action of providing working groups with a paper presenting GAO's recommendation is a step, the FBI's actions do not fully meet the recommendation. The FBI's paper was presented as informational, and did not result in any formal responses from users. We disagree with the FBI's conclusion that receiving no responses on the informational paper fulfills the operational review recommendation, which includes determining that NGI-IPS is meeting user's needs. As such, we continue to recommend the FBI conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should take steps to determine whether each external face recognition system used by FACE Services is sufficiently accurate for the FBI's use and whether results from those systems should be used to support FBI investigations.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In comments on our draft report in 2016, and reiterated during recommendation follow-up in 2017, DOJ officials did not concur with this recommendation and had no plans to implement it. DOJ officials stated that the FBI has no authority to set or enforce accuracy standards of face recognition technology operated by external agencies. In addition, DOJ officials stated that the FBI has implemented multiple layers of manual review that mitigate risks associated with the use of automated face recognition technology. Further, DOJ officials stated there is value in searching all available external databases, regardless of their level of accuracy. We disagree with the DOJ position. We continue to believe that the FBI should assess the quality of the data it is using from state and federal partners. We acknowledge that the FBI cannot and should not set accuracy standards for the face recognition systems used by external partners. We also do not dispute that the use of external face recognition systems by the FACE Services Unit could add value to FBI investigations. However, we disagree with FBI's assertion that no assessment of the quality of the data from state and federal partners is necessary. We also disagree with the DOJ assertion that manual review of automated search results is sufficient. Even with a manual review process, the FBI could miss investigative leads if a partner does not have a sufficiently accurate system. By relying on its external partners' face recognition systems, the FBI is using these systems as a component of its routine operations and is therefore responsible for ensuring the systems will help meet FBI's mission, goals and objectives. The recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve transparency and ensure the effective use of automation fees for the CJIS fingerprint checks fees, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should publish in the Federal Register, or other documents such as annual reports, how much is assessed for automation and cost recovery in each transaction to better communicate the cost of the service to customers and stakeholders.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: In fiscal year 2015, we found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sets its Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) fingerprint checks fees to collect two parts--the cost recovery portion and the automation portion, but does not provide transparency in how much is assessed for each portion of the fee. As a result, we recommended that FBI publish in the Federal Register, or other documents such as annual reports, how much is assessed for automation and cost recovery in each transaction to better communicate the cost of the service to customers and stakeholders. In July 2016, FBI published a notice in the Federal Register announcing a CJIS fingerprint checks fees rate change effective on October 1, 2016. However, the notice did not include an explanation of how much is assessed for the cost recovery or the automation portion of the fee. According to a Department of Justice (DOJ) liaison, FBI included a breakout of the revised rates in its CJIS Information Letter, which services as written notification of a rate change to state and federal stakeholders. GAO requested a copy of the CJIS Information Letter, but as of February 2017, DOJ has not provided the letter. Further, while the CJIS Information Letter might provide transparency to stakeholders on how much FBI assesses for each portion of the fee, FBI has not relayed how it intends to be transparent with customers. To fully address this recommendation, FBI needs to demonstrate that it is being transparent with stakeholders and with customers. Until it does so, this recommendation will remain open.
    Recommendation: To improve transparency and ensure the effective use of automation fees for the CJIS fingerprint checks fees, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should develop a policy to analyze the unobligated balances coming from the automation portion of the fee to inform program needs, including improving methods for anticipating automation collections, and establishing a range of appropriate carryover amounts to support program needs.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: In fiscal year 2015, we found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had a growing unobligated balance from the automation portion of its Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) fingerprint checks fees but did not evaluate the appropriate range of its carryover amounts, nor had it developed a policy to do so. As a result, we recommended that FBI develop a policy to analyze the unobligated balances coming from the automation portion of the fee to inform program needs, including improving methods for anticipating automation collections, and establishing a range of appropriate carryover amounts to support program needs. In September 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that FBI is taking steps to develop and implement a multi-year investment plan that will be reviewed and updated annually, and that will address key questions from the GAO report titled "Budget Issues: Key Questions to Consider When Evaluating Balances in Federal Accounts." Additionally, the multi-year investment plan will include both an annual analysis of current and projected revenue from the automation portion of the fee, and the evaluation of the resource requirements needed to support the development of technological enhancement of fingerprint identification and criminal justice services. According to DOJ officials, the 2017 plan will be the first to include this information; however GAO has not yet received a copy of the 2017 plan. We will continue to monitor FBI's progress on this recommendation.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve disposition reporting that would help states update and complete criminal history records, the Director of the FBI should task the FBI Advisory Policy Board to establish a plan with time frames and milestones for achieving its Disposition Task Force's stated goals.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To better equip states to meet the regulatory requirement to notify individuals of their rights to challenge and update information in their criminal history records, and to ensure that audit findings are resolved, the Director of the FBI--in coordination with the Compact Council-- should determine why states do not comply with the requirement to notify applicants and use this information to revise its state educational programs accordingly.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.