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    Results:

    Subject Term: "Cyber security"

    11 publications with a total of 63 open recommendations including 9 priority recommendations
    Director: Kirschbaum, Joseph W
    Phone: (202) 512-9971

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate DOD components, should update the department's cyber incident coordination training to incorporate the tenets of PPD-41.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should maintain a list of senior DOD officials from organizations that could represent DOD during a Cyber Unified Coordination Group and that are trained in the National Incident Management System.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: David Wise
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Administrator of the General Services Administration should determine whether the beneficial owner of high-security space that GSA leases is a foreign entity and, if so, share that information with the tenant agencies so they can adequately assess and mitigate any security risks.

    Agency: General Services Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Gregory C. Wilshusen
    Phone: (202) 512-6244

    17 open recommendations
    including 7 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should update security assessment plans for selected systems to ensure they include the test procedures to be performed.

    Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: NASA concurred with our recommendation. The agency has implemented a system to support updates of security assessment plans that include the test procedures to be performed. Subsequent to NASA informing us that security assessment plans for selected systems include these test procedures, we plan to verify the agency's actions.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should re-evaluate security control assessments for selected systems to ensure that they comprehensively test technical controls.

    Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: NASA concurred with our recommendation, and will re-evaluate the selected systems' security control assessments to ensure that technical controls will be comprehensively tested. NASA officials said that they expect to complete this action by January 15, 2018. Subsequent to NASA informing us that it has implemented the recommendation, we plan to verify the agency's actions.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should update remedial action plans for selected systems, to include responsible organization, estimated funding, source of funding, and updated milestones and completion dates.

    Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: NASA concurred with our recommendation. The agency has implemented a system that generates plans of actions and milestones (POA&Ms), but has not yet provided sufficient examples of remedial action plans for the selected systems. Subsequent to NASA informing us that it has updated POA&Ms for the selected systems to include responsible organization, estimated funding, source of funding, and updated milestones and completion dates, we plan to verify these actions.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should update the continuous monitoring strategy to include metrics, ongoing status monitoring of metrics, and reporting of security status.

    Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: NASA concurred with our recommendation. The agency has issued an updated continuous monitoring strategy, but this strategy does not clearly identify specific metrics to be used. Subsequent to NASA informing us that the strategy includes metrics, ongoing status monitoring of metrics, and reporting of security status, we plan to verify these actions.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should re-evaluate security control assessments to ensure that they comprehensively test technical controls.

    Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: NRC concurred with our recommendation. NRC supplied documents regarding its cybersecurity assessment process, but has not yet provided evidence of re-evaluating assessments to ensure that technical controls were comprehensively tested.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should update remedial action plans for selected systems, to include responsible organization, estimated funding, funding source, and scheduled completion dates.

    Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: NRC concurred with our recommendation. The agency provided evidence that it is including the responsible organization and scheduled completion dates in its plans of action and milestones (POA&Ms). While the estimated funding and source of funding do not appear in the POA&Ms, the agency has indicated that this data is available elsewhere. We are following up with NRC to verify this information.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should update the standard that addresses continuous monitoring to include metrics and ongoing status monitoring.

    Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: NRC concurred with our recommendation. The agency expects to publish a revised computer security standard in 2018.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management should update security plans for selected systems to ensure that all controls specific to high-impact systems are addressed, including a rationale if the control is not implemented, and where other plans are cross-referenced, ensure that the other system's plan appropriately addresses the control.

    Agency: Office of Personnel Management
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: OPM concurred with our recommendation. The agency intends to migrate security plans to an automated system in order to improve management of security controls.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management should provide and track specialized training for all individuals, including contractors, who have significant security responsibilities.

    Agency: Office of Personnel Management
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: OPM partially concurred with our recommendation. OPM is in the process of reviewing its procedures for identifying employees and contractors who directly access its information systems and reviewing the training requirements for those individuals, as well as specialized training requirements, and how compliance is tracked.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management should re-evaluate security control assessments to ensure that they comprehensively test technical controls.

    Agency: Office of Personnel Management
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: OPM did not concur with our recommendation. OPM is developing additional standards for evaluating technical-controls testing and will incorporate these standards into its oversight of security assessments, once the standards are complete.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management should update remedial action plans for selected systems, to include source of funding and updated completion dates.

    Agency: Office of Personnel Management
    Status: Open

    Comments: OPM concurred with our recommendation. OPM is in the process of migrating POA&Ms to a new automated system that will allow the source of funding to be included in plans of action and milestones.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans should update security plans for selected systems to ensure that all controls specific to high-impact systems are addressed, including a rationale if the control is not implemented.

    Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
    Status: Open

    Comments: VA concurred with our recommendation. VA stated that all high-impact security controls have been addressed, and the agency expects to include all controls in one plan. Subsequent to the agency informing us that it has implemented the recommendation, we plan to verify its actions.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans should provide and track specialized training for all individuals who have significant security responsibilities.

    Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
    Status: Open

    Comments: VA concurred with our recommendation. VA provided limited evidence that it is tracking specialized training for staff who have significant security responsibilities. GAO plans to request further documentation and verify the completeness of VA's actions.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans should conduct security control assessments for the two selected systems and ensure the procedures comprehensively test technical controls.

    Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
    Status: Open

    Comments: VA concurred with our recommendation. VA has assessed technical controls, but has not yet provided evidence of re-evaluating assessments to ensure that technical controls were comprehensively tested.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans should update remedial action plans for selected systems, to include estimated funding and funding source.

    Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
    Status: Open

    Comments: VA concurred with our recommendation. VA provided limited evidence that it is including more information in its remedial action plans for selected systems, but did not demonstrate that it is including estimated funding and funding sources in these plans.
    Recommendation: To improve agency information security programs, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans should develop a continuous monitoring strategy that addresses organization-defined metrics, frequency of monitoring metrics, ongoing status monitoring of metrics, and reporting of security status.

    Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
    Status: Open

    Comments: VA concurred with our recommendation. VA is developing a new framework to address the people, processes, technology, and performance monitoring mechanisms identified in the Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) Maturity Model. This framework and supporting program plan are linked to the Department of Homeland Security Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) phase 1 deployment that is ongoing and anticipated to be completed by the fourth quarter of 2017. VA's ISCM program plan and framework have been delayed to accommodate these changes.
    Recommendation: To improve security over federal systems, including those considered to be high impact, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget should issue plan and practices specified in the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan.

    Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
    Status: Open

    Comments: OMB concurred with our recommendation. On December 9, 2016, OMB issued memorandum M-17-09, Management of Federal High Value Assets, which lists some existing policies and guidance and other actions that agencies need to take to protect IT assets. In addition OMB provided limited access to a document describing best practices for federal security operation centers. GAO is requesting further access to this document on best practices in order to determine whether OMB has adequately addressed the recommendation.
    Director: Joseph W. Kirschbaum
    Phone: (202) 512-9971

    1 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To help improve DOD's planning and processes for supporting civil authorities in a cyber incident, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue or update guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities for relevant entities and officials--including the DOD components, supported and supporting commands, and dual-status commander--to support civil authorities as needed in a cyber incident.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendation and indicated that, in response, it would update existing agency guidance (e.g., doctrine, directives, instructions) or develop new guidance as appropriate. As of October 2016, DOD has not provided additional information concerning the status of this recommendation.
    Director: Gregory C. Wilshusen
    Phone: (202) 512-6244

    9 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct Network Security Deployment (NSD) to determine the feasibility of enhancing NCPS's current intrusion detection approach to include functionality that would detect deviations from normal network behavior baselines.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 Update: In Feb. 2017, DHS officials stated that they have continued pilot activities that will enable DHS to identify suspicious network activity based on anomalous behavior and reputation and have collected lessons learned that are being tracked by the NCPS Program Management Office. Officials added that DHS had identified a contractor to support the transition of the pilot, including drafting an implementation plan; however, it had yet to award a contract due to lack of resources. As such, the agency did not have an estimated date on the completion of a draft plan for how the transition would be implemented. We requested that DHS provide a copy of the draft implementation plan for our review, when it became available. We will continue to monitor DHS's progress in addressing this recommendation.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct NSD to determine the feasibility of developing enhancements to current intrusion detection capabilities to facilitate the scanning of traffic not currently scanned by NCPS.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 update: In Feb. 2017, DHS officials stated that the NCPS Program Management Office is working with participating Internet Service Providers (ISP) to develop plans to support IPv6 for Traffic Aggregation, DNS redirection, and SMTP quarantining capabilities. Officials stated that an implementation plan that would include all ISP schedules for all planned intrusion prevention services would be available in the third quarter of fiscal year 2017. Additionally, regarding encrypted traffic, officials stated that it is conducting an analysis of Security on Encrypted Traffic (SonET) to better understand options for addressing the challenges, viability of options, and how the issue is being addressed at a broader industry level. The study is scheduled to continue through the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017. We asked DHS to provide the ISP implementation plans (when finalized) and any findings from the ongoing SCADA and Encrypted traffic studies. We will continue to monitor DHS's progress in addressing this recommendation.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to update the tool it uses to manage and deploy intrusion detection signatures to include the ability to more clearly link signatures to publicly available, open-source data repositories.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 update: In Feb. 2017, DHS stated that the NCPS PMO is working with participating Internet Service Providers (ISP) to develop plans to support IPv6 for Traffic Aggregation, DNS redirection, and SMTP quarantining capabilities. Officials stated that an implementation plan that would include all ISP schedules for all planned intrusion prevention services would be available in the third quarter of fiscal year 17. Additionally, officials stated that NSD is conducting an analysis on Security on Encrypted Traffic (SonET) to better understand options for addressing the challenges, viability of options, how the issue is being addressed at a broader industry level. The study will continue through the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017. We asked DHS to provide the ISP implementation plans (when finalized) and any output/results (findings) from the ongoing studies DHS has related to SCADA and Encrypted traffic. We will continue to monitor DHS's progress in addressing this recommendation.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct US-CERT to consider the viability of using vulnerability information, such as data from the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program as it becomes available, as an input into the development and management of intrusion detection signatures.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 update: In Feb. 2017, DHS officials stated that enhancements were made so that Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program (CDM) data can be viewed with the Cyber Indicators Analysis Program (CIAP). Officials stated that the CDM data now may be combined with known vulnerability findings from NCATS and known threats collected from the CIAP system to further prioritize signature development as necessary. We have requested a meeting with DHS to observe the described enhancements. We believe that we will be able to close this recommendation, once we observe the claimed enhancements.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct US-CERT to develop a timetable for finalizing the incident notification process, to ensure that customer agencies are being sent notifications of potential incidents, which clearly solicit feedback on the usefulness and timeliness of the notification.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 Update: In Feb. 2017, DHS stated that US-CERT is in the process of developing a targeted survey of EINSTEIN customers (based off of a prior survey). Additionally, US-CERT has updated the Incident Reporting Guidelines to address previously mentioned process concerns. We have requested a copy of these guidelines and will review the modifications made within. Additionally, DHS stated that modifications to the Remedy ticketing system are underway that would allow for the inclusion of user feedback. These changes are anticipated to be implemented by October 2017. We likely would not be able to close this recommendation until we could review the results of the modifications.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications to develop metrics that clearly measure the effectiveness of NCPS's efforts, including the quality, efficiency, and accuracy of supporting actions related to detecting and preventing intrusions, providing analytic services, and sharing cyber-related information.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 update: In Feb. 2017, DHS officials stated that the Office of Cyber Security and Communications (CS&C) had developed, refined, and were baselining a first set of measures that relate to the Einstein 3A program. Further, they are considering adding one of these measures as an addition to the measures tracked in support of the yearly Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) required reporting in FY 2018. Additionally, DHS officials stated they are developing information sharing related measures, including exploring how its public and private sector recipients of information measure the value cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. In March 2017, we requested a copy of the developed measures, when they became available. This recommendation will remain open until we are able to review the developed metrics and the subsequent data they are to measure.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications to develop clearly defined requirements for detecting threats on agency internal networks and at cloud service providers to help better ensure effective support of information security activities.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 update: In Feb. 2017, DHS provided memos that gave an overview of the planned enhancements to the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program that included references to cloud providers. However, DHS did not provide any specific requirements for us to review. We have requested a follow-up meeting to review the specific requirements developed in support of the planned enhancements described in the provided memos. We will not be able to close this recommendation until we can review the developed requirements and determine that cloud providers are appropriately covered.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct NSD to develop processes and procedures for using vulnerability information, such as data from the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program as it becomes available, to help ensure DHS is using a risk-based approach for the selection/development of future NCPS intrusion prevention capabilities.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 update: In Feb. 2017, DHS stated that the NCPS Program Management Office has made enhancements to the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) dashboard, but had yet to fully develop the CDM/NCPS data correlation. In March 2017, we asked for update on the status of data correlation, once available. In order to close this recommendation, we would need to review this model and determine how, if at all, the vulnerability information was used as part of a risk-based approach to intrusion prevention.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct NSD to work with their customer agencies and the Internet service providers to document secure routing requirements in order to better ensure the complete, safe, and effective routing of information to NCPS sensors.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: April 2017 update: In Feb. 2017, DHS officials stated that the agency worked with the Office of Management and Budget to develop a draft Trusted Internet Connections Reference Architecture. This architecture is to serve as the new guidance for agencies on perimeter security capabilities as well as alternative routing strategies. In March 2017, we requested a copy of the guidance to review the alternative routing guidance. This recommendation will remain open until we have been able to review the information above.
    Director: Gregory C. Wilshusen
    Phone: (202) 512-6244

    7 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, informed by the sectors' updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, information technology, and nuclear sectors' cybersecurity progress.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: DHS has released updated sector-specific plans for the chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, information technology, and nuclear reactors sectors. The plans include a section on measuring effectiveness based on the plan development guidance. The plans provide expected metrics to track the progress of sector activities and state that the outcomes will be reported through the National Annual Reporting process as well as through the quadrennial plan update. Because the metrics are new and annual reporting has not yet occurred, DHS has not provided evidence of metrics data collected and reported to address the challenges. We will continue to follow-up to determine how performance measures have been implemented and what reporting is available based on those measures.
    Recommendation: To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, informed by the sectors' updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the Secretary of the Treasury should direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the financial services sector's cybersecurity progress.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury
    Status: Open

    Comments: The 2015 sector-specific plan for the financial services sector includes a section on measuring the effectiveness of sector activities; however, the plan does not include specific metrics. The plan refers to working groups and meetings of sector stakeholders as mechanisms to track sector progress. No specific metrics and associated reports of outcomes have been provided to address overcoming the challenges of monitoring the sector's cybersecurity progress. We will continue to monitor financial services sector activities and determine any specific metrics and related reports developed and implemented to track and report on the sector's cybersecurity progress.
    Recommendation: To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, informed by the sectors' updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services (as co-SSAs) should direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the food and agriculture sector's cybersecurity progress.

    Agency: Department of Agriculture
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services released an update to the food and agriculture sector-specific plan for 2015. The plan states the sector's lack of an overarching mechanism to measure and evaluate risk mitigation activities and the challenge of obtaining performance measurement data from non-federal partners. However, the plan notes a goal of evaluating the progress of individual protective programs and strategies. No metrics or reports of outcomes have been provided to address the challenge of monitoring the sector's cybersecurity progress. We will continue to follow up to determine whether USDA and HHS have developed and implemented mechanisms to measure the outcomes of their sector cybersecurity-related activities.
    Recommendation: To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, informed by the sectors' updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services (as co-SSAs) should direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the food and agriculture sector's cybersecurity progress.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services released an update to the food and agriculture sector-specific plan for 2015. The plan states the sector's lack of an overarching mechanism to measure and evaluate risk mitigation activities and the challenge of obtaining performance measurement data from non-federal partners. However, the plan notes a goal of evaluating the progress of individual protective programs and strategies. No metrics or reports of outcomes have been provided to address the challenge of monitoring the sector's cybersecurity progress. We will continue to follow up to determine whether HHS has developed and implemented mechanisms to measure the outcomes of its sector cybersecurity-related activities.
    Recommendation: To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, informed by the sectors' updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Transportation (as co-SSAs) should direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the transportation systems sector's cybersecurity progress.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: The co-Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) for the Transportation Systems Sector, DHS (TSA and Coast Guard) and the Department of Transportation, provided an update on efforts to develop sector cybersecurity metrics. The update described measures under consideration such as tracking the number of sector stakeholders receiving cybersecurity products, monitoring the usefulness of products through satisfaction surveys, and tracking attendance at sector events and seminars encompassing cybersecurity. The co-SSAs plan to report sector cyber activities, progress, and relevant metrics annually through the Critical Infrastructure National Annual Report and through quadrennial updates to the sector-specific plan. The latest sector-specific plan was released in 2015. The proposed metrics have not been formalized in a strategy or plan. We will continue to monitor and evaluate efforts to formalize and implement the proposed metrics to determine whether they address the intent of the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, informed by the sectors' updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Transportation (as co-SSAs) should direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the transportation systems sector's cybersecurity progress.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: The co-Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) for the Transportation Systems Sector, DHS (TSA and Coast Guard) and the Department of Transportation, provided an update on efforts to develop sector cybersecurity metrics. The update described measures under consideration such as tracking the number of sector stakeholders receiving cybersecurity products, monitoring the usefulness of products through satisfaction surveys, and tracking attendance at sector events and seminars encompassing cybersecurity. The co-SSAs plan to report sector cyber activities, progress, and relevant metrics annually through the Critical Infrastructure National Annual Report and through quadrennial updates to the sector-specific plan. The latest sector-specific plan was released in 2015. The proposed metrics have not been formalized in a strategy or plan. We will continue to monitor and evaluate efforts to formalize and implement the proposed metrics to determine whether they address the intent of the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, informed by the sectors' updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the water and wastewater systems sector's cybersecurity progress.

    Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
    Status: Open

    Comments: The 2015 water and wastewater sector-specific plan includes a segment on measuring the effectiveness of sector activities that describes the overall principles for collecting data and using the National Annual Report data calls as a tool for assessing performance and reporting on progress within the sector. However, the plan does not state specific measures and the agency acknowledged in its response to our report that it does not collect performance metrics on the effectiveness of its cybersecurity programs for the sector. According to agency officials, the development of performance metrics in collaboration with sector partners is underway. We will continue to follow up to identify any specific metrics developed and implemented and resulting outcome-based reports.
    Director: Lawrance Evans
    Phone: (202) 512-8678

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that NCUA has adequate authority to determine the safety and soundness of credit unions, Congress should consider modifying the Federal Credit Union Act to grant NCUA authority to examine technology service providers of credit unions.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we suggested that Congress modify the Federal Credit Union Act to grant NCUA authority to examine technology service providers of credit unions. As of October 2016, Congress had not granted NCUA such authority.
    Recommendation: To improve their ability to assess the adequacy of the information security practices at medium and small institutions, the heads of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and NCUA should routinely categorize IT examination findings and analyze this information to identify trends that can guide areas of review across institutions.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we recommended that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and other federal financial institution regulators conduct trend analysis of their IT examination findings to improve their ability to assess the adequacy of information security practices at medium and small institutions. In September 2015, OCC stated that it is taking two actions to respond to our recommendation. First, the agency is integrating the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (Tool), developed by OCC and other federal financial institution regulators, into OCC's ongoing IT examinations of national banks and federal savings associations. Officials believe that the Tool will provide OCC with a repeatable and measurable process for assessing both the level of risk and the maturity of risk management processes within and across OCC-supervised institutions. Also, officials believe that data gathered in this process will allow OCC to monitor industry trends and identify new or emerging weaknesses where additional guidance or supervisory actions may be needed. Furthermore, the Tool will help OCC allocate examiner resources and better target examiner training. OCC began integrating the Tool in selected examinations in December 2015. Second, OCC stated that it enhanced its guidance and procedures for examiners to identify and aggregate supervisory concerns into matters requiring attention (MRAs), which are the mechanism OCC uses to communicate supervisory concerns to bank management and directors. OCC believes that the enhancements will facilitate systemic categorization of supervisory concerns that strengthen recording, monitoring, and analyzing of volumes and trends across bank portfolios. Also, the enhanced guidance discusses the relationship between MRAs, interagency ratings, OCC's risk assessment system, and enforcement actions. OCC believes that these process enhancements combined with the integration of the Tool, will improve its ability to assess information security practices at medium and small institutions. We will continue to monitor OCC's progress in implementing the Tool and the resulting trend analyses that the Tool is intended to facilitate.
    Recommendation: To improve their ability to assess the adequacy of the information security practices at medium and small institutions, the heads of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and NCUA should routinely categorize IT examination findings and analyze this information to identify trends that can guide areas of review across institutions.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we recommended that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) and other federal financial institution regulators conduct trend analysis of their IT examination findings to improve their ability to assess the adequacy of information security practices at medium and small institutions. As of October 2016, the Board had not provided an update on its efforts to address this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve their ability to assess the adequacy of the information security practices at medium and small institutions, the heads of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and NCUA should routinely categorize IT examination findings and analyze this information to identify trends that can guide areas of review across institutions.

    Agency: National Credit Union Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2015, we recommended that the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and other federal financial institution regulators conduct trend analysis of their IT examination findings to improve their ability to assess the adequacy of information security practices at medium and small institutions. In July 2016, NCUA told us that it and the other federal financial institution regulators issued the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (Tool) in June 2015 to provide a comprehensive method for institutions to benchmark their cybersecurity programs. Officials believe that the Tool will allow examiners to consistently and methodically look at credit union risks and trends, as well as collect detailed information on the risks and mitigating controls employed by credit unions. When the Tool is fully implemented, officials expect to be able to aggregate risk indicators and program gaps across the credit union industry to improve resource deployment and enhance cybersecurity supervisory oversight. NCUA plans to begin pilot testing the Tool in late 2016 with program integration targeted for July 2017. We will continue to monitor NCUA's progress with this program and revisit our recommendation in July 2017.
    Director: David A. Powner
    Phone: (202) 512-9286

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of OMB streamlining efforts and ensure agency CIOs are better able to carry out their responsibilities in managing IT, including implementing OMB's IT reform initiatives, the Director of OMB should direct the Federal CIO, in collaboration with agency CIOs, to ensure there is a common understanding with agency CIOs on the priority of the current reporting requirements and related IT reform initiatives. This should include addressing underlying reasons cited by CIOs regarding the usefulness of requirements, including when department priorities are reportedly different than OMB's and the burdensome and duplicative nature of requirements.

    Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) neither agreed or disagreed with our recommendation. Subsequently, OMB has taken steps to address some aspects of our recommendation. Specifically, in January 2017, OMB worked with the Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council to issue a report entitled "State of Federal Information Technology (SOFIT)" which outlined current IT trends and their key challenges, and made recommendations to improve implementation efforts. Notably, the report also identified differences in priorities between OMB and agency CIOs on key IT reform initiatives and the need for improved reporting requirements. In addition, in June 2017, OMB staff reported that they met the CIO and head of each agency this past spring regarding their priorities and challenges. While these are positive steps toward ensuring a common understanding of these initiatives and reporting requirements, OMB still needs to take action to address the underlying reasons for these differences in priorities and reduce burdensome and duplicative requirements. Until OMB takes action in these areas, there is a risk that key IT reform initiatives may not fully succeed. We will continue to evaluate OMB's progress in addressing our recommendation.
    Director: Mark L. Goldstein
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with GSA, should develop and implement a strategy to address cyber risk to building and access control systems that, among other things: (1) defines the problem; (2) identifies roles and responsibilities; (3) analyzes the resources needed; and (4) identifies a methodology for assessing this cyber risk.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Stephen Caldwell
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: Within DHS, to promote efficiency and harmonize the various assessments to advance security and resilience across the spectrum of CI in a manner consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, PPD-21, and the NIPP, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate work with other DHS offices and components to develop and implement ways that DHS can facilitate data sharing and coordination of vulnerability assessments to minimize the risk of potential duplication or gaps in coverage.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: DHS has taken action in response to GAO's September 2014 recommendation to develop a department-wide process to facilitate data sharing and coordination among the various DHS components that conduct or require vulnerability assessments, but has not fully implemented the recommendation. DHS first reported to GAO in August 2015 that its Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the Sector Outreach and Programs Division Innovation Center had formed a vulnerability assessment working group comprised of a variety of federal stakeholders, both within and outside DHS, to enhance overall integration and coordination of vulnerability assessment efforts. In December 2015, DHS stated that IP was conducting pilot projects to expand access to its IPGateway portal--IP's system that houses infrastructure data and identifies facilities that have been assessed by IP. In a July 2016 update, DHS reported that IP had reached agreement with DHS components to expand access to its IP Gateway portal to those partners as a means to share IP's vulnerability assessment information and help coordinate assessment visits and related activities. DHS also noted in its update that IP had begun providing access to IP Gateway to components within DHS but did not provide a date as to when that step would be complete. These are positive steps toward implementing a systematic and integrated approach for facilitating data sharing and coordination of vulnerability assessments throughout the department. However, developing a department-wide process to facilitate data sharing and coordination among the DHS offices and components that conduct or require vulnerability assessments would better enable DHS to minimize the risk of potential duplication and gaps by its offices and components in the vulnerability assessments they conduct. Because DHS is still in the process of completing these steps, the recommendation has not yet been fully implemented.
    Recommendation: Regarding SSAs and other federal departments or agencies external to DHS with CI security-related responsibilities that offer or conduct vulnerability assessment tools and methods and building on our recommendation that DHS review its own vulnerability assessments, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate to work with SSAs and other federal agencies that have CI security responsibilities to identify key CI security-related assessment tools and methods used or offered by SSAs and other federal agencies.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of September 2016, DHS has established a Cross-Sector Integration and Innovation Center in conjunction with the Office of Infrastructure Protection, and has designed, created, and launched a Cross-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Working Group portal on the Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI). The Working Group, consisting of members from multiple departments and agencies, is collaborating to enhance the integration and coordination of vulnerability assessment efforts. This working group is intended to serve as an interagency forum to address several recommendations from GAO Report 14-507. However, the effort is ongoing and it is too early to determine if it will successfully address the recommendation.
    Recommendation: Regarding SSAs and other federal departments or agencies external to DHS with CI security-related responsibilities that offer or conduct vulnerability assessment tools and methods and building on our recommendation that DHS review its own vulnerability assessments, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate to work with SSAs and other federal agencies that have CI security responsibilities to analyze the key CI security-related assessment tools and methods offered by sector-specific agencies (SSA) and other federal agencies to determine the areas they capture.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of September 2016, DHS has established a Cross-Sector Integration and Innovation Center in conjunction with the Office of Infrastructure Protection, and has designed, created, and launched a Cross-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Working Group portal on the Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI). The Working Group, consisting of members from multiple departments and agencies, is collaborating to enhance the integration and coordination of vulnerability assessment efforts. This working group is intended to serve as an interagency forum to address several recommendations from GAO Report 14-507. However, the effort is ongoing and it is too early to determine if it will successfully address the recommendation.
    Recommendation: Regarding SSAs and other federal departments or agencies external to DHS with CI security-related responsibilities that offer or conduct vulnerability assessment tools and methods and building on our recommendation that DHS review its own vulnerability assessments, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate to work with SSAs and other federal agencies that have CI security responsibilities to develop and provide guidance for what areas should be included in vulnerability assessments of CI that can be used by DHS, SSAs, and other CI partners in an integrated and coordinated manner, among and across sectors, where appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of September 2016, DHS has established a Cross-Sector Integration and Innovation Center in conjunction with the Office of Infrastructure Protection, and has designed, created, and launched a Cross-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Working Group portal on the Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI). The Working Group, consisting of members from multiple departments and agencies, is collaborating to enhance the integration and coordination of vulnerability assessment efforts. This working group is intended to serve as an interagency forum to address several recommendations from GAO Report 14-507. However, the effort is ongoing and it is too early to determine if it will successfully address the recommendation.
    Director: Gregory C. Wilshusen
    Phone: (202) 512-6244

    16 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of Energy should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, a system test plan is developed.

    Agency: Department of Energy
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. However, DOE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when DOE informs us that it has satisfactorily implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of Energy should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, a system test is fully executed.

    Agency: Department of Energy
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. However, DOE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when DOE informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of Energy should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, test results are reviewed by agency officials.

    Agency: Department of Energy
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. However, DOE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when DOE informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of State should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, security and privacy requirements are communicated to contractors.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State concurred with our recommendation and is planning to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated, contractor-owned system. However, STATE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when STATE informs us that it has satisfactorily implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of State should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, an independent assessor is selected to assess the system.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State concurred with our recommendation and is planning to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated, contractor-owned system. However, STATE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when STATE informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of State should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, a system test is fully executed.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State concurred with our recommendation and is planning to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated, contractor-owned system. However, STATE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when STATE informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of State should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, test results are reviewed by agency officials.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State concurred with our recommendation and is planning to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated, contractor-owned system. However, STATE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when STATE informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of State should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, plans of action and milestones with estimated completion dates and resources assigned for resolution are maintained.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State concurred with our recommendation and is planning to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated, contractor-owned system. However, STATE has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when STATE informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of Transportation should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, security and privacy requirements are communicated to contractors.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: In written comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed to consider our recommendations. We continue to believe that the department needs to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated system. DOT has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has taken these actions. We plan to validate the department's actions when DOT informs us that it has satisfactorily implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of Transportation should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, a system test is fully executed.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: In written comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed to consider our recommendations. We continue to believe that the department needs to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated system. DOT has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has taken these actions. We plan to validate the department's actions when DOT informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of Transportation should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, test results are reviewed by agency officials.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: In written comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed to consider our recommendations. We continue to believe that the department needs to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated system. DOT has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has taken these actions. We plan to validate the department's actions when DOT informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Secretary of Transportation should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, plans of action and milestones with estimated completion dates and resources assigned to resolution are maintained.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: In written comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed to consider our recommendations. We continue to believe that the department needs to develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for each contractor-operated system. DOT has not yet provided sufficient evidence that it has taken these actions. We plan to validate the department's actions when DOT informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, a system test is fully executed.

    Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
    Status: Open

    Comments: EPA concurred with our recommendation. However, EPA has not yet provided evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when EPA informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that, for each contractor-operated system, plans of action and milestones with estimated completion dates and resources assigned for resolution are maintained.

    Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
    Status: Open

    Comments: EPA concurred with our recommendation. However, EPA has not yet provided evidence that it has implemented the recommendation. We plan to validate the department's actions when EPA informs us that it has implemented the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the privacy and security controls of contractor-operated systems are being properly overseen, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management should develop, document, and implement oversight procedures for ensuring that a system test is fully executed for each contractor-operated system.

    Agency: Office of Personnel Management
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: OPM concurred with our recommendation. However, as of April 2017, OPM had not implemented the recommendation to develop, document and implement oversight procedures to ensure that a system test is fully executed for each contractor-operated system. We will monitor OPM's efforts and validate OPM actions when evidence discloses that the recommendation has been implemented.
    Recommendation: To be able to effectively assist agencies with their contractor oversight programs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in collaboration with the Secretary of Homeland Security, should develop and clarify reporting guidance to agencies for annually reporting the number of contractor-operated systems.

    Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
    Status: Open

    Comments: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Office of Management and Budget, but none were provided. In June 2017, OMB stated that its and DHS's annual reporting requirements now contain an expanded list of criteria for contractor-operated systems, including definitions in related guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. However, although the reporting requirements call for agencies to report on their total number of contractor-operated systems, neither the requirements or related guidance clarify which agency systems that have contractor relationships should be categorized as contractor-operated. The lack of clear instructions may continue to result in incomplete information regarding the number of contractor-operated systems within the government.