Reports & Testimonies

  • GAO’s recommendations database contains report recommendations that still need to be addressed.

    GAO’s recommendations help congressional and agency leaders prepare for appropriations and oversight activities, as well as help improve government operations. Recommendations remain open until they are designated as Closed-implemented or Closed-not implemented. You can explore open recommendations by searching or browsing.

    GAO's priority recommendations are those that we believe warrant priority attention. We sent letters to the heads of key departments and agencies, urging them to continue focusing on these issues. These recommendations are labeled as such. You can find priority recommendations by searching or browsing our open recommendations below, or through our mobile app.

  • Browse Open Recommendations

    Explore priority recommendations by subject terms or browse by federal agency

    Search Open Recommendations

    Search for a specific priority recommendation by word or phrase



  • Governing on the go?

    Our Priorities for Policy Makers app makes it easier for leaders to search our recommendations on the go.

    See the November 10th Press Release


  • Have a Question about a Recommendation?

    • For questions about a specific recommendation, contact the person or office listed with the recommendation.
    • For general information about recommendations, contact GAO's Audit Policy and Quality Assurance office at (202) 512-6100 or apqa@gao.gov.
  • « Back to Results List Sort by   

    Results:

    Subject Term: "Criminal investigations"

    22 publications with a total of 70 open recommendations including 8 priority recommendations
    Director: Brenda S. Farrell
    Phone: (202) 512-3604

    6 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should issue a Security Executive Agent Directive for continuous evaluation to formalize the program, which includes, among other things, an expanded definition of continuous evaluation in advance of the next phase of implementation. (Recommendation 1)

    Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should, in coordination with the Continuous Evaluation Working Group, develop an implementation plan for continuous evaluation across the executive branch that includes a schedule with timeframes and expectations for agencies, such as the requirements (e.g., the size of the enrolled population in continuous evaluation) for future phases of implementation. (Recommendation 2)

    Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should develop a plan for monitoring continuous evaluation performance, to include assessing continuous evaluation at various phases of implementation. (Recommendation 3)

    Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should develop performance measures for continuous evaluation that agencies must track and determine a process and schedule for agencies to regularly report those measures to ODNI. At minimum, these performance measures should be clear, quantifiable, objective, and linked to measurable goals. (Recommendation 4)

    Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, conduct an evidence-based review of the timeliness goal of 195 days for completing the fastest 90 percent of periodic reinvestigations and the associated goals for the different phases of periodic reinvestigations, and adjust the goal if appropriate, taking into consideration available resources, the additional workload of continuous evaluation, and the risks associated with individuals retaining access to classified information without determining their continued eligibility. (Recommendation 5)

    Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should, once ODNI has further defined the continuous evaluation program, to include issuing a Security Executive Agent Directive and developing an implementation plan, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, assess the potential effects of continuous evaluation on agency resources and develop a plan, in consultation with implementing agencies, to address those effects, such as modifying the scope of periodic reinvestigations, changing the frequency of periodic reinvestigations, or replacing periodic reinvestigations for certain clearance holders. (Recommendation 6)

    Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Beryl H. Davis
    Phone: (202) 512-2623

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: SIGAR, in collaboration with the DOD IG, as Lead IG, should document agreed-upon roles and responsibilities related to interagency collaboration with DOD OIG to address overlapping areas included in their required reports and update them, as needed. (Recommendation 1)

    Agency: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The DOD IG, as Lead IG, in collaboration with SIGAR, should document agreed-upon roles and responsibilities related to interagency collaboration with SIGAR to address overlapping areas included in their required reports and update them, as needed. (Recommendation 2)

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Inspector General
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Thomas Melito
    Phone: (202) 512-9601

    3 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs should work with other U.S. federal entities participating in the CHCC to develop goals for the CHCC and its working groups. (Recommendation 1)

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: In its written comments on our report, State concurred with this recommendation. State noted its agreement with the need for outcomes and accountability and stated that the Cultural Heritage Coordinating Committee (CHCC) working groups aim to draft mission statements and objectives.
    Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs should work with other U.S. federal entities participating in the CHCC to clarify participants' roles and responsibilities in the CHCC and its working groups. (Recommendation 2)

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: In its written comments on our report, State concurred with this recommendation. State noted that following the adoption of the Cultural Heritage Coordinating Committee (CHCC) working groups' mission statements and objectives, State foresees clarifying roles and responsibilities of CHCC participants.
    Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs should work with other U.S. federal entities participating in the CHCC to document agreement about how the CHCC and its working groups will collaborate, such as their goals and participants' roles and responsibilities. (Recommendation 3)

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: In its written comments on our report, State concurred with this recommendation. State noted that once participants reach accord on the goals of the Cultural Heritage Coordinating Committee (CHCC) and its working groups, State could foresee documenting such goals through memoranda of understanding.
    Director: Chris Currie
    Phone: (404) 679-1875

    6 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to improve employee misconduct policies and procedures, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to document policies and procedures to address potential Surge Capacity Force misconduct.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had developed and documented misconduct policies and procedures for most employees, but not its entire workforce. Specifically, FEMA had not documented misconduct policies and procedures for Surge Capacity Force members, who may augment FEMA's workforce in the event of a catastrophic disaster. As a result, we recommended that FEMA document policies and procedures to address potential Surge Capacity Force misconduct. In September 2017, FEMA officials reported taking action to address this recommendation. Specifically, FEMA distributed a memorandum to Federal Coordinating Officers and Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinators providing guidance on how and to whom to report allegations of misconduct by Surge Capacity Force members, coordination efforts regarding investigations, and how to address the member's duty status during the course of an investigation. FEMA stated that it will further address this recommendation by updating the FEMA Human Capital Plan for the Surge Capacity Force. FEMA expects to complete this effort by June 30, 2018. This recommendation will remain open until the Human Capital Plan is updated.
    Recommendation: In order to improve employee misconduct policies and procedures, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to document Reservist disciplinary options and appeals policies and procedures that are currently in practice at the agency.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) policies and procedures for Reservist employees did not outline disciplinary options to address misconduct or address the appeals process available for Reservists. As a result, we recommended that FEMA document Reservist disciplinary options and appeals policies and procedures that are currently in practice at the agency. In September 2017, FEMA reported that the Office of Response and Recovery was drafting an addendum to the FEMA Reservist program manual. FEMA expects to complete this action by December 31, 2017. This recommendation will remain open until the addendum is complete.
    Recommendation: In order to improve employee misconduct policies and procedures, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to communicate the range of penalties for specific misconduct offenses to all employees and supervisors.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not communicate a range of offenses and penalties for misconduct to its entire workforce. Rather, such information was communicated to supervisors and employees on a case-by-case basis. To improve transparency we recommended that FEMA communicate the range of penalties for specific misconduct offenses to all supervisors and employees. As of September 2017, FEMA officials reported that they had drafted a new table of penalties, which was undergoing internal review within FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA expects this process to be complete by December 31, 2017. This recommendation will remain open until the table is finalized and communicated to supervisors and employees.
    Recommendation: In order to better identify and address trends in employee misconduct, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to improve the quality and usefulness of the misconduct data it collects by implementing quality control measures, such as adding additional drop-down fields with standardized entries, adding unique case identifier fields, developing documented guidance for data entry, or considering the adoption of database software.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We found limitations related to the quality and usefulness of employee misconduct data collected by the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA). For example, we found data collection differed across the agency, there was limited standardization of data fields, and a lack of documented guidance on data entry. As a result, we recommended that FEMA improve its employee misconduct data by implementing quality control measures or considering the adoption of database software that would help standardize data collection across FEMA. In September 2017, FEMA officials reported they had secured funding to purchase hardware and software for a case management system to track misconduct complaints. If implemented, this system should improve FEMA's ability to more efficiently and effectively manage and track case information. FEMA estimates that it will complete this action by March 31, 2018. This recommendation will remain open until the new case management system is in place and operational.
    Recommendation: In order to better identify and address trends in employee misconduct, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to, once the quality of the data is improved, conduct routine reporting on employee misconduct trends.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not regularly conduct trend analysis on misconduct cases, and that quality of the data restricted the agency's ability to identify and address trends. As a result, we recommended that, once steps were taken to improve the quality of the data, FEMA should conduct routine reporting on employee misconduct trends. In September 2017, FEMA officials reported they were procuring a case management system to track misconduct complaints. If implemented, this system should improve FEMA's ability to analyze misconduct data and identify and report on trends. FEMA estimates that it will complete this action by March 31, 2018. This recommendation will remain open until FEMA generates trend analysis and reports from the new system.
    Recommendation: In order to ensure that all allegations of employee misconduct referred by DHS OIG are reviewed and addressed, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to develop reconciliation procedures to consistently track referred cases.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not establish effective procedures to ensure that all misconduct cases referred to FEMA by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) were accounted for and subsequently reviewed and addressed. As a result, we recommended that FEMA develop reconciliation procedures to consistently track referred cases. In September 2017, FEMA officials reported they had secured funding to purchase hardware and software for a case management system to track misconduct complaints. In addition, officials reported that they are working with DHS OIG to coordinate case management coding across systems. FEMA estimates that it will complete these actions by March 31, 2018. If implemented, the new system should improve FEMA's ability to track OIG referred cases. In order to fully address this recommendation, FEMA must complete these steps and also demonstrate that reconciliation procedures are in place.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better ensure that the FBI Laboratory obtains additional transcripts, the FBI Director should require that the FBI Laboratory's procedure for tracking and obtaining transcripts routinely captures and uses additional information and data critical to transcript acquisition, such as the reason a transcript is unavailable, when it is expected to be available, the court jurisdiction, and a point of contact for the transcript.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: The FBI Laboratory has made progress in implementing this recommendation. Specifically, as of November 2017, the FBI Laboratory has added the following fields to its Testimony Tracker System: (1) court jurisdiction; (2) point of contact for the transcript (person that the examiner spoke to); (3) reason (for why the transcript is not available); and (4) the expected date for the transcript to become available. It has also updated its Testimony Monitoring policy to reflect the changes and provided training to staff on how to enter and use data in these and other data in the Tracker system to obtain transcripts. This recommendation will remain open pending evidence of reports from the Tracker system for at least four quarters showing that the policy has been implemented. GAO is monitoring the status of this recommendation.
    Director: Gretta L. Goodwin
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that DOJ is contributing to efforts to improve data collection and service provision to Native Americans, the Director of OVW should require grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served using grant funding, and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs: Violence Against Women Office
    Status: Open

    Comments: In responding to a draft of our report, DOJ agreed to require their grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served, but did not agree to require them to track Native American status of those victims as appropriate, citing victim confidentiality and other reasons. In June 2017, following our report's publication, DOJ provided a status update, reporting that OVW already collects consolidated data on the number of American Indian and Alaska Native victims served who are victims of all crimes and it is in the process of revising grantee forms to collect information on the number of people served who are victims of sex trafficking. We continue to believe that collecting grantee information on both the number and Native American status of victims served is important and will continue to monitor implementation.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that DOJ is contributing to efforts to improve data collection and service provision to Native Americans, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs should direct OVC and OJJDP to require their grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served using grant funding, and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs
    Status: Open

    Comments: In responding to a draft of our report, DOJ agreed to require its grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served, but did not agree to require them to track Native American status of those victims as appropriate, citing victim confidentiality and other reasons. In June 2017, following our report's publication, DOJ provided a status update, reporting that OJJDP human trafficking grantees will be required to report the number of human trafficking victims served, beginning with progress reports ending December 31, 2017, and that OJJDP will update applicable solicitations beginning in fiscal year 2018 to reflect this new measure. DOJ reported no new efforts from OVC, and maintained that it will not require grantees to report on the Native American status of their victims served using grant funding because of the concerns it cited initially. We continue to believe that collecting grantee information on both the number and Native American status of victims served is important and will continue to monitor implementation.
    Director: Brenda S. Farrell
    Phone: (202) 512-3604

    6 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that program staff are being used in an effective and efficient manner, and to facilitate the consideration and identification of total force solutions for staffing sexual assault prevention and response and Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) programs throughout the Department of the Army, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve, to conduct an evaluation of staffing approaches used to administer the sexual assault prevention and response program, and consider opportunities to leverage resources across all Army components. This evaluation should include an assessment of the number and allocation of full-time and collateral-duty personnel, the fill rates for program positions, and the types of positions used.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that Army National Guard and Army Reserve program staff have the necessary information to develop their budgets and to help ensure the efficient and effective use of program funds, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Army National Guard SHARP Program Office to communicate and disseminate its guidance on budget development and execution for the SHARP program to all full-time SHARP program personnel.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that Army National Guard and Army Reserve program staff have the necessary information to develop their budgets and to help ensure the efficient and effective use of program funds, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Army Reserve SHARP Program Office to develop clear guidance on budget development and execution for the SHARP program and disseminate this guidance to its full-time SHARP program personnel.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that Army National Guard and Army Reserve program staff have the necessary information to develop their budgets and to help ensure the efficient and effective use of program funds, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Director of the Army SHARP Program Office to expand the scope of the midyear review to include monitoring and providing oversight of SHARP program expenditures at the Army National Guard state and Army Reserve command level.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that sexual assault crimes involving Army National Guard members are investigated in a timely manner, with a full investigation of the offense regardless of the reserve component or duty status of the victim, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in collaboration with the secretaries of the military departments as appropriate, to reassess the Office of Complex Administrative Investigation's (OCI) timeliness and resources to determine how to improve the timeliness of processing sexual assault investigations involving members of the Army National Guard, and identify the resources needed to improve the timeliness of these investigations.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that victims of sexual assault in the Army Reserve have timely access to medical and mental health-care services without having to pay for their care upfront, if they are eligible for care paid for or provided by DOD, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Chief of the Army Reserve to develop and implement an expedited line-of-duty determination process for Army Reserve sexual assault victims, along with a method for tracking the length of time to make the determinations. When developing this process, the Chief should ensure that it allows soldiers who wish to file a confidential or restricted report to go through the determination process without disclosing their circumstances to the chain of command.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Tim Persons
    Phone: (202) 512-6412

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security--in consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation--should conduct a formal bioforensics capability gap analysis to identify scientific and technical gaps and needs in bioforensics capabilities to help guide current and future bioforensics investments and update its analysis periodically.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Beryl H. Davis
    Phone: (202) 512-2623

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To provide increased oversight of AOC and to keep the Architect and the Congress fully and currently informed, the AOC OIG should revise and implement policies and procedures to provide audit reports that are based on planning that includes an assessment of risk and the assignment of priorities, consistent with requirements in CIGIE's Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.

    Agency: Architect of the Capitol
    Status: Open

    Comments: The AOC OIG has met the intent of GAO recommendation related to "revising" policies and procedures. We have verified that AOC OIG's policies (dated February 2017) have been revised and now require an assessment of risk and the assignment of priorities, consistent with requirements in CIGIE's Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General. However, we do not believe AOC OIG has met the intent of GAO recommendation related to "implementing" policies and procedures. In June 2017, the AOC OIG informed us that it plans to complete a risk assessment in August 2017 and use the results from the risk assessment to aid in developing the AOC OIG fiscal year 2018 audit plan, which AOC OIG plans to complete by October 1, 2017. To fully implement the recommendation, we believe AOC OIG still needs to (1) complete the risk assessment and (2) show how it used the results of the risk assessment to improve the scope of what needs to be audited. We will continue to monitor AOC OIG's actions to address this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To reduce the risk that fraud, waste, and abuse and criminal activities are not detected or fully addressed, the AOC OIG should (1) work with CIGIE to obtain a peer review from another federal OIG of the AOC OIG's overall investigative operations, including consideration of the OIG's reliance on investigations performed by other entities, and (2) make any needed changes in its operating procedures based on the results of the review to help ensure that investigations of AOC are conducted in accordance with CIGIE standards for investigations and AOC Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act) requirements.

    Agency: Architect of the Capitol
    Status: Open

    Comments: On April 27, 2017, the OIG informed us that it has scheduled with CIGIE an external peer review of AOC investigative operations. The Federal Housing Finance Agency OIG is scheduled to perform this review in August 2017. This external review will also include assessing the AOC OIG's reliance on other OIGs and the U.S. Capitol Police to complete certain investigations. Further, AOC OIG indicated that after they receive the results of this peer review, they will make needed changes in operating procedures consistent with the GAO recommendation. We will continue to monitor AOC OIG's actions to address this recommendation.
    Director: Gregory C. Wilshusen
    Phone: (202) 512-6244

    5 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of HHS guidance and oversight of privacy and security for health information the Secretary of Health and Human Services should update security guidance for covered entities and business associates to ensure that the guidance addresses implementation of controls described in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: HHS concurred with the recommendation and plans to implement it. Subsequent to the agency stating that is has taken action, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of HHS guidance and oversight of privacy and security for health information the Secretary of Health and Human Services should update technical assistance that is provided to covered entities and business associates to address technical security concerns.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: HHS concurred with the recommendation and plans to implement it. Subsequent to the agency stating that is has taken action, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of HHS guidance and oversight of privacy and security for health information the Secretary of Health and Human Services should revise the current enforcement program to include following up on the implementation of corrective actions.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: HHS neither concurred nor nonconcurred with the recommendation but plans to implement it. Subsequent to the agency stating that is has taken action, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of HHS guidance and oversight of privacy and security for health information the Secretary of Health and Human Services should establish performance measures for the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) audit program.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: HHS concurred with the recommendation and plans to implement it. Subsequent to the agency stating that is has taken action, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.
    Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of HHS guidance and oversight of privacy and security for health information the Secretary of Health and Human Services should establish and implement policies and procedures for sharing the results of investigations and audits between OCR and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to help ensure that covered entities and business associates are in compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: HHS neither concurred nor nonconcurred with the recommendation but plans to implement it. Subsequent to the agency stating that is has taken action, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.
    Director: Diana C. Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to help ensure that ATF adheres to its policies and facilitates industry compliance with requirements, the Deputy Director of ATF should align the MS deletion policy, MS system design, and the timeliness of deletion practices to improve ATF's compliance with the policy.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
    Status: Open

    Comments: In September 2016, ATF reported that it deleted all purchaser names within those multiple sale records GAO identified as having been retained beyond time limits specified by ATF?s policy. In addition, ATF stated that it is in the process of implementing protocols to ensure that purging purchaser names within multiple sale records aligns with ATF policy. As of March 2017, ATF reported changing its query code to result in an improved match ratio with the MS system. In July 2017, ATF reiterated its deletion of affected purchaser names and its change in query code. However, given the longstanding nature of this issue, ATF needs to provide more documentation to demonstrate that the change in query code will identify all records eligible for deletion.
    Director: Marcia Crosse
    Phone: (202) 512-7114

    10 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To increase awareness of the health and legal consequences of FGM/C among visa recipients, the Secretary of State should update the Foreign Affairs Manual to require posts located in countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced to directly provide information about FGM/C to nonimmigrant visa recipients in the same manner as is done for immigrant visa recipients.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will expand the pool of visa applicants who will receive information on FGM/C. Specifically, once its transition to providing paperwork electronically during the visa application process is complete, State will directly distribute the fact sheet on FGM/C to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients. According to State, both immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients will have to certify that they have read and understood the fact sheet on FGM/C before signing and submitting their respective visa applications. As of August 2017, State has not yet completed these actions.
    Recommendation: To increase awareness of the health and legal consequences of FGM/C among visa recipients, the Secretary of State should update the Foreign Affairs Manual to require posts located outside of the countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced to directly provide information on FGM/C to immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients who are nationals of countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will expand the pool of visa applicants who will receive information on FGM/C. Specifically, once its transition to providing paperwork electronically during the visa application process is complete, State will directly distribute the fact sheet on FGM/C to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients who are from or were nationals of a country where FGM/C is commonly practiced. State noted that this change will ensure the widest distribution possible by providing all individuals from countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced with access to the fact sheet on FGM/C regardless of place of application or visa recipient type. As of August 2017, State has not yet completed these actions.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Education (Education) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will develop a written plan for disseminating relevant FGM/C resources to the agency?s key stakeholder groups. As of August 2017, Education reported that action is still pending.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that various HHS offices and agencies are working together to develop a written plan for its approaches to addressing FGM/C. In August 2017, HHS reported that once a key leadership position has been filled, it will provide more information on developing a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Justice (DOJ) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of its Criminal Division is taking the lead on developing a written plan on its FGM/C outreach and awareness efforts. As of August 2017, DOJ has not yet developed a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each develop a written plan that describes the agency's approach for conducting education and outreach to key stakeholders in the United States regarding FGM/C.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) did not concur with our recommendation, and, as of August 2017, has not indicated that it would implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Education (Education) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that it will develop a written plan for disseminating relevant FGM/C resources to the agency?s key stakeholder groups and will explore how to best communicate and coordinate efforts at the federal level. As of August 2017, Education reported that action is still pending.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that various HHS offices and agencies are working together to develop a written plan for its approaches to addressing FGM/C. HHS also noted that it would share this plan with other federal partners and key stakeholders. In August 2017, HHS reported that once a key leadership position has been filled, it will provide more information on disseminating a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Justice (DOJ) concurred with this recommendation, and noted in a September 2016 update that the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of its Criminal Division is taking the lead on developing a written plan on its FGM/C outreach and awareness efforts. DOJ also noted that it would communicate its written plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate. As of August 2017, DOJ has not yet disseminated a written plan.
    Recommendation: To make the best use of federal resources directed toward combating FGM/C in the United States, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State should each communicate the plan with other relevant federal agencies and stakeholder groups, as appropriate.

    Agency: Department of State
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of State (State) did not concur with our recommendation, and, as of August 2017, has not indicated that it would implement this recommendation.
    Director: Diana C. Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    2 open recommendations
    including 2 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To allow for more efficient use of data on missing and unidentified persons contained in the NCIC's Missing Persons and Unidentified Persons files and NamUs, the Directors of the FBI and NIJ should evaluate the feasibility of sharing certain information among authorized users, document the results of this evaluation, and incorporate, as appropriate, legally and technically feasible options for sharing the information.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In commenting on GAO's June 2016 report, DOJ disagreed with our recommendation, because DOJ believes it does not have the legal authority to fulfill the corrective action as described in the proposed recommendation. Specifically, DOJ stated that the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs) does not qualify, under federal law, for access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and is not an authorized user to receive NCIC data. Therefore, DOJ does not believe there is value in evaluating the technical feasibility of integrating these two databases. In March 2017, DOJ reiterated its position that any such sharing was prohibited by law. We understand the legal framework placed on NCIC and that it may be restricted from fully integrating with a public database. However, this statutory restriction does not preclude DOJ from exploring options to more efficiently share information within the confines of the current legal framework. Until DOJ studies whether such feasible mechanisms exist, it will be unable to make this determination, risking continued inefficiencies through fragmentation and overlap.
    Recommendation: To allow for more efficient use of data on missing and unidentified persons contained in the NCIC's Missing Persons and Unidentified Persons files and NamUs, the Directors of the FBI and NIJ should evaluate the feasibility of sharing certain information among authorized users, document the results of this evaluation, and incorporate, as appropriate, legally and technically feasible options for sharing the information.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs: National Institute of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In commenting on GAO's June 2016 report, DOJ disagreed with our recommendation, because DOJ believes it does not have the legal authority to fulfill the corrective action as described in the proposed recommendation. Specifically, DOJ stated that the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs) does not qualify, under federal law, for access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and is not an authorized user to receive NCIC data. Therefore, DOJ does not believe there is value in evaluating the technical feasibility of integrating these two databases. In March 2017, DOJ reiterated its position that any such sharing was prohibited by law. We understand the legal framework placed on NCIC and that it may be restricted from fully integrating with a public database. However, this statutory restriction does not preclude DOJ from exploring options to more efficiently share information within the confines of the current legal framework. Until DOJ studies whether such feasible mechanisms exist, it will be unable to make this determination, risking continued inefficiencies through fragmentation and overlap.
    Director: Diana Maurer
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    6 open recommendations
    including 6 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve transparency and better ensure that face recognition capabilities are being used in accordance with privacy protection laws and policy requirements, the Attorney General should assess the PIA development process to determine why PIAs were not published prior to using or updating face recognition capabilities, and implement corrective actions to ensure the timely development, updating, and publishing of PIAs before using or making changes to a system.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOJ officials did not concur with this recommendation, and stated that the FBI has established practices that protect privacy and civil liberties beyond the requirements of the law. DOJ officials stated that it will internally evaluate the PIA process as part of the Department's overall commitment to improving its processes, not in response to our recommendation. In March 2017, we followed up with DOJ to obtain its current position on our recommendation. DOJ continues to believe that its approach in designing the NGI system was sufficient to meet legal privacy requirements and that our recommendation represents a "checkbox approach" to privacy. We disagree with DOJ's characterization of our recommendation. We continue to believe that the timely development and publishing of future PIAs would increase transparency of the department's systems. We recognize the steps the agency took to consider privacy protection during the development of the NGI system. We also stand by our position that notifying the public of these actions is important and provides the public with greater assurance that DOJ components are evaluating risks to privacy when implementing systems. As a result, the recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Recommendation: To improve transparency and better ensure that face recognition capabilities are being used in accordance with privacy protection laws and policy requirements, the Attorney General should assess the SORN development process to determine why a SORN was not published that addressed the collection and maintenance of photos accessed and used through NGI for the FBI's face recognition capabilities prior to using NGI-IPS, and implement corrective actions to ensure SORNs are published before systems become operational.

    Agency: Department of Justice
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOJ agreed, in part, with our recommendation and submitted the SORN for publication to the Federal Register on April 21, 2016, and it was published on May 5, 2016. DOJ did not agree that the publication of a SORN is required by law. We disagree with DOJ's interpretation regarding the legal requirements of a SORN. The Privacy Act of 1974 requires that when agencies establish or make changes to a system of records, they must notify the public through a SORN published in the Federal Register. DOJ's comments on our draft report acknowledge that the automated nature of face recognition technology and the sheer number of photos now available for searching raise important privacy and civil liberties considerations. DOJ officials also stated that the FBI's face recognition capabilities do not represent new collection, use, or sharing of personal information. We disagree. We believe that the ability to perform automated searches of millions of photos is fundamentally different in nature and scope than manual review of individual photos, and the potential impact on privacy is equally fundamentally different. By assessing the SORN development process and taking corrective actions to ensure timely development of future SORNs, the public would have a better understanding of how personal information is being used and protected by DOJ components. As a result, the recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition capabilities are being used in accordance with privacy protection laws and policy requirements, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct audits to determine the extent to which users of NGI-IPS and biometric images specialists in FACE Services are conducting face image searches in accordance with Criminal Justice Information Services Division policy requirements.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In March 2017, DOJ provided us with the audit plan the CJIS Audit Unit developed in June 2016 for NGI-IPS users. In addition, DOJ reported that the CJIS Audit Unit began assessing NGI-IPS requirements at participating states in conjunction with its triennial National Identity Services audit and that, as of February 2017, the unit had conducted NGI-IPS audits of four states. Further, DOJ officials said CJIS developed an audit plan of the FACE Services Unit to coincide with the existing triennial FBI internal audit for 2018. However, DOJ did not provide the audit plan for the FACE Services Unit. DOJ officials said the methodology would be the same as the audit plan for NGI-IPS, but that methodology does not describe oversight on use of information obtained from external systems accessed by FACE Services employees. Therefore, we believe DOJ is making progress towards meeting the recommendation, but has not fully implemented our recommendation.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct tests of NGI-IPS to verify that the system is sufficiently accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes, and ensure that the detection and false positive rate used in the tests are identified.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In comments on our draft report in 2016, and reiterated during recommendation follow-up, as of March 2017, DOJ did not concur with this recommendation. DOJ officials stated that the FBI has performed accuracy testing to validate that the system meets the requirements for the detection rate, which fully satisfies requirements for the investigative lead service provided by NGI-IPS. We disagree with DOJ. A key focus of our recommendation is the need to ensure that NGI-IPS is sufficiently accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes. Although the FBI has tested the detection rate for a candidate list of 50 photos, NGI-IPS users are able to request smaller candidate lists (between 2 and 50 photos). FBI officials stated that they do not know, and have not tested, the detection rate for other candidate list sizes. According to these officials, a smaller candidate list would likely lower the detection rate because a smaller candidate list may not contain a likely match that would be present in a larger candidate list. However, according to the FBI Information Technology Life Cycle Management Directive, testing needs to confirm the system meets all user requirements. Because the accuracy of NGI-IPS's face recognition searches when returning fewer than 50 photos in a candidate list is unknown, the FBI is limited in understanding whether the results are accurate enough to meet NGI-IPS users' needs. DOJ officials also stated that searches of NGI-IPS produce a gallery of likely candidates to be used as investigative leads, not for positive identification. As a result, according to DOJ officials, NGI-IPS cannot produce false positives and there is no false positive rate for the system. We disagree with DOJ. The detection rate and the false positive rate are both necessary to assess the accuracy of a face recognition system. Generally, face recognition systems can be configured to allow for a greater or lesser number of matches. A greater number of matches would generally increase the detection rate, but would also increase the false positive rate. Similarly, a lesser number of matches would decrease the false positive rate, but would also decrease the detection rate. Reporting a detection rate of 86 percent without reporting the accompanying false positive rate presents an incomplete view of the system's accuracy. As a result, the recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually that includes an assessment of the accuracy of face recognition searches to determine if it is meeting federal, state, and local law enforcement needs and take actions, as necessary, to improve the system.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of March 2017, FBI officials stated they implemented the recommendation by submitting a paper to solicit feedback from users through the Fall 2016 Advisory Policy Board Process. Specifically, officials said the paper requested feedback on whether the face recognition searches of the NGI-IPS are meeting their needs, and input regarding search accuracy. According to FBI officials, no users expressed concern with any aspect of the NGI-IPS meeting their needs, including accuracy. Although FBI's action of providing working groups with a paper presenting GAO's recommendation is a step, the FBI's actions do not fully meet the recommendation. The FBI's paper was presented as informational, and did not result in any formal responses from users. We disagree with the FBI's conclusion that receiving no responses on the informational paper fulfills the operational review recommendation, which includes determining that NGI-IPS is meeting user's needs. As such, we continue to recommend the FBI conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually.
    Recommendation: To better ensure that face recognition systems are sufficiently accurate, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should take steps to determine whether each external face recognition system used by FACE Services is sufficiently accurate for the FBI's use and whether results from those systems should be used to support FBI investigations.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: In comments on our draft report in 2016, and reiterated during recommendation follow-up in 2017, DOJ officials did not concur with this recommendation and had no plans to implement it. DOJ officials stated that the FBI has no authority to set or enforce accuracy standards of face recognition technology operated by external agencies. In addition, DOJ officials stated that the FBI has implemented multiple layers of manual review that mitigate risks associated with the use of automated face recognition technology. Further, DOJ officials stated there is value in searching all available external databases, regardless of their level of accuracy. We disagree with the DOJ position. We continue to believe that the FBI should assess the quality of the data it is using from state and federal partners. We acknowledge that the FBI cannot and should not set accuracy standards for the face recognition systems used by external partners. We also do not dispute that the use of external face recognition systems by the FACE Services Unit could add value to FBI investigations. However, we disagree with FBI's assertion that no assessment of the quality of the data from state and federal partners is necessary. We also disagree with the DOJ assertion that manual review of automated search results is sufficient. Even with a manual review process, the FBI could miss investigative leads if a partner does not have a sufficiently accurate system. By relying on its external partners' face recognition systems, the FBI is using these systems as a component of its routine operations and is therefore responsible for ensuring the systems will help meet FBI's mission, goals and objectives. The recommendation remains open and unimplemented.
    Director: Frank Rusco
    Phone: (202) 512-3841

    8 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To address risks to the effectiveness of its investigations, environmental compliance, and enforcement capabilities, BSEE should complete policies outlining the responsibilities of its the Safety and Incident Investigations Division (SIID), Environmental Compliance Division, and Safety Enforcement Division and update and develop procedures to guide them.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to BSEE documentation, SIID, the Environmental Compliance Division, and the Safety Enforcement Division continue work to complete foundational policies for their respective areas. The target date has been extended to June 30, 2018, due to the need to align policy development with BSEE's new Directives System outlined in Bureau Manual Chapter 380.1, signed on May 18, 2017.
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its investigative capabilities, BSEE should establish a capability to review investigation policy and collect and analyze incidents to identify trends in safety and environmental hazards.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to BSEE documentation, the Safety and Incident Investigations Division (SIID) is working closely with the Office of Policy and Analysis and the Records, Delegations, and Directives Team to implement the requirements specified in the BSEE Directives System Manual Chapter and to convert a number of Bureau Interim Directives into Bureau Manual Chapters. An internal control review was initiated in fiscal year 2017 to assess compliance with the tiering process outlined in the National Investigations Handbook. SIID staff are currently reviewing the Handbook to assess the need for updates and are working with District staff to review District level investigations to determine what needs to be included in the narrative portion of District Form 2010. We anticipate completion of these actions by December 31, 2017.
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its investigative capabilities, BSEE should clearly communicate the purpose of the Investigations and Review Unit, as it will be assumed by the SIID, to industry operators.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to BSEE documentation, SIID, the Office of Public Affairs, the Office of Policy and Analysis, and regional offices will consult with the new BSEE Director to solicit input and discuss potential mechanisms for communicating the purpose of SIID to industry operators. Actions to implement this recommendation are expected to be completed by December 31, 2017.
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its investigative capabilities, BSEE should clarify policies and procedures for assigning panel investigation membership and referring cases of suspected criminal wrongdoing to the Interior's Office of Inspector General.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2016, BSEE issued two Bureau Interim Directives (BID) regarding the assignment of panel investigation membership and referral to Interior's Office of the Inspector General. However, the BID regarding panel investigation membership is not clear regarding how disagreements between regional management and headquarters investigation management are to be adjudicated. According to BSEE documentation, BID No. 2016-003N (Designation of Panel Chair and Panel Members) is being revised to clarify how disagreements between regional management and headquarters investigation management will be adjudicated. BSEE did not provide a time frame for completion.
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its environmental compliance capabilities, BSEE should conduct and document a risk analysis of the regional-based reporting structure of the Environmental Compliance Division, including actions to mitigate any identified risk.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to BSEE documentation, a risk analysis of the regional-based reporting structure of the Environmental Compliance Division was initiated in fiscal year 2017 using the Department of Interior's Integrated Risk Rating Tool (IRRT). The results of the analysis are currently being reviewed to assess whether the IRRT's design and methodology actually addressed the intent of the recommendation. BSEE did not provide a time frame for completion.
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its environmental compliance capabilities, BSEE should coordinate with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to consider the relevance of existing interagency agreements for monitoring operator compliance with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits on the Outer Continental Shelf and, if necessary, update them to reflect current oversight needs.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to BSEE documentation, BSEE, in coordination with EPA, has been reviewing the agreements. Given new leadership in both agencies, this effort has been delayed. BSEE did not provide a time frame for completion.
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its environmental compliance capabilities, BSEE should develop a plan to address documented environmental oversight staffing needs.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to BSEE documentation, the BSEE Director has ordered an assessment. In the meantime, inspectors are being trained to assist with environmental oversight responsibilities as appropriate. BSEE did not provide a time frame for completion.
    Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its enforcement capabilities, BSEE should develop a mechanism to ensure that it reviews the maximum daily civil penalty and adjust it to reflect increases in the Consumer Price Index within the time frame as directed by statute.

    Agency: Department of the Interior
    Status: Open

    Comments: In April 2016, BSEE issued a bureau manual chapter regarding the review and adjustment of civil penalty amounts but has not developed business practices to implement it. According to BSEE documentation, a Bureau Interim Directive, aligned with OMB guidance on Implementation of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, is currently being drafted to define business practices that include specific bureau roles, responsibilities, and timelines. This action is expected to be completed by December 31, 2017.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that agencies' policies and oversight are fully consistent with The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants, the Assistant Secretary of ICE and the Commandant of USCG should update their respective agencies' informant policies and corresponding monitoring processes to explicitly address the Guidelines' provisions on oversight of informants' illegal activities.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    Status: Open

    Comments: In December 2016, ICE issued a memo regarding changes to its policies for the registration and suitability of confidential informants. The memo included updated forms to oversee those aspects of confidential informant oversight. In April 2017, ICE officials informed GAO that a working group is in the process of updating the Informants Handbook and the Undercover Operations Handbook. ICE expects to finalize drafts of the handbooks in September 2017 and implement them by December 2017. When the updated handbooks are available for GAO's review, we will assess the extent to which they address our recommendation.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve disposition reporting that would help states update and complete criminal history records, the Director of the FBI should task the FBI Advisory Policy Board to establish a plan with time frames and milestones for achieving its Disposition Task Force's stated goals.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To better equip states to meet the regulatory requirement to notify individuals of their rights to challenge and update information in their criminal history records, and to ensure that audit findings are resolved, the Director of the FBI--in coordination with the Compact Council-- should determine why states do not comply with the requirement to notify applicants and use this information to revise its state educational programs accordingly.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Beryl H. Davis
    Phone: (202) 512-2623

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to ensure that the Commission receives effective oversight of its major programs and operations, the Commission IG, or the individual or entity that ultimately assumes IG oversight responsibilities for the Commission under an alternate structure, should conduct inspections that are fully in accordance with CIGIE's Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation and the OIG's policies and procedures.

    Agency: Denali Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Denali Commissions' office's directives include policies and procedures to address planning for, conduct of, and reporting on inspections and include a section on annual planning, risk assessments, and internal and external quality control processes and procedures. In March 2017, the Denali Commission's Inspector General (IG) provided us a template, which will be used to ensure that inspections are conducted in accordance with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation and the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) policies and procedures. We have reviewed this template and concluded that it meets the intent of our recommendation. However, this template was not available in time for use during the last inspection, which was performed in 2016 and issued in March 2017. We will obtain a copy of the next inspection report once issued to ensure this latest template was used before we consider closing our recommendation. We will continue to monitor the agency's actions to address this recommendation.
    Director: Maurer, Diana C
    Phone: (202) 512-9627

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better address obstacles that occur during the activation process and to help ensure that institutions are activated within estimated timeframes, including those institutions that do not currently have inmates, such as Administrative USP Thomson and USP Yazoo City, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons should develop and implement an activation schedule that incorporates the four characteristics of scheduling best practices.

    Agency: Department of Justice: Bureau of Prisons
    Status: Open

    Comments: On November 25, 2014, DOJ provided a written response to GAO-14-709 that stated that BOP was in the process of developing a new activation handbook and comprehensive schedule and that BOP would establish a multi-disciplinary working group of BOP subject-matter experts to work on this project. On June 3, 2015, BOP reported that it had assembled a multidisciplinary workgroup as planned, and based on BOP's March 16, 2016 status update, the workgroup's efforts were ongoing at the time. On September 20, 2016, BOP provided the schedule to us, as part of its newly developed activation handbook. While the Activation Handbook's schedule addresses in detail what needs to be done and who should do the work, it is not fully inclusive of the best practices related to scheduling that we outlined in our report. To fully address this recommendation, BOP would need to fully incorporate best practices. This includes creating a baseline schedule that incorporates all of the tasks identified in the responsibility matrix, determining the duration for each effort, and incorporating the appropriate predecessor and successor logic. Per scheduling best practices, BOP would also need to determine which activities make up the critical path and develop procedures for conducting a schedule risk analysis, ensuring that the schedule can be traced both horizontally and vertically, and that mechanisms are in place for maintaining the baseline schedule and an updated schedule as projects progress.
    Director: Rebecca Gambler
    Phone: (202) 512-8777

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better ensure DSOs' and students' compliance with OPT requirements, and strengthen efforts to identify and assess potential risks in OPT, the Director of ICE should direct SEVP to develop and distribute guidance to DSOs on how to determine whether a job is related to a student's area of study and require DSOs to provide information in SEVIS to show that they took steps, based on this guidance, to help ensure that the student's work is related to the area of study.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of April 2015, SEVP has made progress in developing employment guidance to support DSOs in determining whether a job is related to a student's area of study and requiring DSOs to provide such information in SEVIS. SEVP stated that it has drafted such guidance and it is being reviewed by SEVP subject matter experts. In addition, SEVP stated that it is developing information requirements for DSOs to attest that they adhered to the new employment guidance document in SEVIS, which requires system enhancements. In May 2016, the new STEM OPT regulation went into effect and, among other things, SEVP officials stated that it requires much greater detail on the scope of the employment and how it is related to the earned degree. As of October 2016, SEVP expects that non-STEM guidance on field of study would be finalized by the second quarter of fiscal year 2017. In May 2017, SEVP officials stated they had been revising the guidance and that it was undergoing final revisions, as planned. However, according to SEVP officials, due to the Executive Order on regulatory reform, ICE guidance updates were placed on hold with no clear date as to when SEVP would be able to publish the guidance. To fully address this recommendation, ICE should develop and distribute non-STEM-related guidance on determining whether a job is related to a student's area of study and require DSOs to provide relevant information in SEVIS.
    Director: Brown, Kay E
    Phone: (202) 512-7215

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to help inform federal, state, and local initiatives to prevent and respond to child sexual abuse by school personnel, the Secretary of Education should lead an effort, in collaboration with the Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General, to leverage resources, expertise, and capacities across the departments to determine the most cost-effective way to disseminate federal information so that relevant state and local educational agencies, child welfare agencies, and criminal justice entities are aware of and have access to it.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: In May 2016, the Department of Education reported that on November 16, 2015, the Office of Safe and Healthy Students within the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education convened a meeting with federal partners to explore ways in which the agencies can better support states and to devise dissemination strategies for sharing information and providing technical assistance in the most cost- effective ways to state and local educational agencies and child welfare agencies, and ensure that resources are accessible to the various stakeholders. It noted several next steps including creating and implementing a Federal dissemination plan for the new adult sexual misconduct guidance, repository of federal resources, and for information on all state-level mandates and policies addressing adult sexual misconduct in schools. GAO will consider this recommendation closed when the department provides timelines for the completion of these activities and documentation of their completion. The agency did not provide an update on the agency's progress in FY17.
    Recommendation: In order to help inform federal, state, and local initiatives to prevent and respond to child sexual abuse by school personnel, the Secretary of Education should lead an effort, in collaboration with the Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General, to leverage resources, expertise, and capacities across the departments to identify mechanisms to better track and analyze the prevalence of child sexual abuse by school personnel through existing federal data collection systems, such as the School Survey on Crime and Safety, the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System, and the National Crime Victimization Survey.

    Agency: Department of Education
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Department of Education reported that experts within the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) consulted with research partners in the Department of Justice and academic research experts to determine if an effective item or item set about this important issue could be derived. After review of extant sources and consultation with item development experts, a clear question that would result in meaningful information from school administrator respondents could not be developed. They also noted that they understand there is continuing interest on this issue and will continue studying item possibilities for the next School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) provided the collection is funded. As of May 2016, NCES does not have funds to field SSOCS after 2016, but there is a request in the 2016 budget to support a 2018 collection. GAO will consider this recommendation closed when the department has taken the above mentioned action to continue studying item possibilities for the next SSOCS if the collection is funded. The agency did not provide an update on the agency's progress in FY17.
    Director: Larence, Eileen
    Phone: (202)512-6510

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that USNCB and ICE are providing more comprehensive information to their respective foreign counterparts regarding registered sex offenders traveling internationally, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to help ensure that USNCB and ICE have information on the same number of registered sex offenders as well as the same level of detail on registered sex offenders traveling internationally. Such steps could include USNCB and ICE copying each other on their notifications to their foreign counterparts or USNCB receiving information directly from the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC).

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: We reported that U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not have information on the same registered sex offenders or the same level of detail on registered sex offenders traveling internationally, which affected their ability to notify their respective foreign counterparts. In part, this is because the two agencies rely on different information sources and do not share information with one another. We recommended that DOJ and DHS develop mechanisms that would enable these two agencies to have access to the same information on traveling sex offenders. In August 2013, ICE provided documentation showing that it copied several U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) officials on notifications that ICE sent to other countries regarding registered sex offenders traveling internationally. However, ICE did not copy USNCB on these notifications. ICE explained that it thought sharing information on traveling sex offenders with USMS and relying on USMS to pass that information along to USNCB was the most efficient way to share information with USNCB. However, we analyzed notifications from ICE, USNCB, and USMS regarding sex offenders who initiated international travel in February 2014 and found that USMS only passed along about 30 percent of the notifications it received from ICE to USNCB. We provided the results of this analysis to all three agencies in July 2014. We met with relevant U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), ICE, USMS, and USNCB officials in September 2014 to discuss options for ensuring that USNCB receives more comprehensive information regarding traveling sex offenders. ICE officials stated that since CBP is the source of the information ICE receives on traveling sex offenders, as well as one of the information sources for USMS, that it may be best for CBP to provide information directly to USNCB. USNCB officials also stated that their preference was to receive information directly from CBP, and it was their understanding that CBP and USNCB were in the process of developing an MOU that would allow for this. In October 2015, CBP confirmed that the MOU would enable CBP to share information with USNCB regarding traveling sex offenders. CBP also stated that the MOU had been approved by CBP and sent to USNCB for review. In an April 2016 update, CBP reported that the MOU had been tentatively approved by USNCB and is expected to be finalized and signed in July 2016. In August 2016, CBP stated that the completion date for the MOU was pushed back to September 30, 2016, to allow time for CBP and USNCB to negotiate additional edits. We followed up with CBP about the status of the MOU in February 2017. We are awaiting a response.