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    Subject Term: "Biological warfare"

    5 publications with a total of 7 open recommendations
    Director: Tim Persons
    Phone: (202) 512-6412

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security--in consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation--should conduct a formal bioforensics capability gap analysis to identify scientific and technical gaps and needs in bioforensics capabilities to help guide current and future bioforensics investments and update its analysis periodically.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Joseph Kirschbaum
    Phone: (202) 512-9971

    3 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve the identification, alignment, and management of DOD's chemical and biological defense infrastructure and to fully institutionalize the use of risk assessments to support future investment decisions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to update the roles and responsibilities guidance in DOD Directive 5160.05E to identify which organizations are responsible for conducting and participating in CBDP Enterprise risk assessments.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not yet completed actions to implement it. As of August 2017, DOD was still waiting to release the final version of DOO Directive 5160.05E.
    Recommendation: To improve the identification, alignment, and management of DOD's chemical and biological defense infrastructure and to fully institutionalize the use of risk assessments to support future investment decisions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to update the CBDP Enterprise's portfolio planning process, to include when risk assessments will be conducted.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not yet completed actions to implement it. On 6/8/16, DOD reported that the risk assessment process was initially piloted in 2014 to determine its utility for informing CBDP Enterprise portfolio planning and guidance. Moving forward, the CBDP Enterprise plans to conduct risk assessments annually to support portfolio planning and guidance. As of August 2017, DOD reported that the department was beginning an approximately 12-month process to revise the CBDP Business Plan, which would likely be published as a DOD Instruction. This plan should address the risk assessment recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve the identification, alignment, and management of DOD's chemical and biological defense infrastructure and to enhance PAIO's ongoing analysis of potential infrastructure duplication in the CBDP Enterprise and gain potential efficiencies, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to identify, request, and consider any information from existing infrastructure studies from other federal agencies with chemical and biological research and development and test and evaluation infrastructure.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not yet completed actions to implement it. As of July 2017, DOD has requested, but not received, such studies from other federal agencies. However, DOD is currently engaged in phase two of a three-phase effort regarding its chemical and biological defense infrastructure program (CBDP), which includes a review of the department's interagency roles and responsibilities for its chemical and biological defense Infrastructure Manager. Targeted completion for this phase is December 2017, at which time, DOD may have obtained relevant information from other federal agencies.
    Director: Joseph Kirschbaum
    Phone: (202) 512-9971

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that DOD's investments are being applied toward developing medical countermeasures to respond to the most serious and likely biological threat agents, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate DOD officials to develop and implement a process to update and validate DOD's list of biological threats, as required by DOD Directives 5160.05E and 6205.3, or implement a process that aligns with the department's current policies, practices, and priorities as reflected in the 2001 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews .

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. DOD has been reviewing directives addressing biological warfare threats and is in the process of revising DOD Directive 5160.05E to ensure that the directive appropriately captures and institutionalizes the use of risk assessments to support research, development, and acquisition of chemical and biological defense capabilities. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) piloted the risk assessment process in 2014 and will continue to conduct annual risk assessments to support portfolio planning and guidance. In addition to this revision, the CBDP continues to improve stakeholder awareness and discussions on threats through the utilization of an annual threat day review and on-going Joint Service discussions on chemical and biological threats and capabilities to address those threats. Alignment of the threat information and medical countermeasure capabilities are discussed through the CBDP Medical Prime/Non-Prime Working Group, which was established in February 2015 to ensure the CBDP medical portfolio is addressing the highest priority threats considering available candidates and resources. The group meets quarterly to address key programmatic changes, discuss program strategic guidance, and to address information presented and discussed at the annual threat review sessions. In total, these efforts have improved the Department's ability to ensure biological threats are aligned and considered through holistic, threat-informed, risk-based assessments. DOD is also taking actions to improve the development of medical countermeasures against priority threats through a number of actions such as developing a process guide, holding threat days, and performing in-depth analyses on medical science and technology solutions. Once DOD completes and issues Directive 5160.05E, we will assess the extent to which DOD's combined actions address the recommendation.
    Director: Currie, Christopher
    Phone: (404)679-3000

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to help build and maintain a national biosurveillance capability in a manner that accounts for the particular challenges and opportunities of reliance on state and local partnerships, we recommend the Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Staff to take the following action as part of its implementation of our previous recommendation for a national biosurveillance strategy: Ensure that the national biosurveillance strategy (1) incorporates a means to leverage existing efforts that support nonfederal biosurveillance capabilities, (2) considers challenges that nonfederal jurisdictions face in building and maintaining biosurveillance capabilities, and (3) includes a framework to develop a baseline and gap assessment of nonfederal jurisdictions' biosurveillance capabilities.

    Agency: Executive Office of the President: Homeland Security Council
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2010, GAO recommended a national biosurveillance strategy to provide a framework for building and maintaining a national biosurveillance capability. In October 2011, building on that recommendation, we called for such a strategy to address key challenges we identified in state and local biosurveillance by accounting for the need to leverage nonfederal resources. In July 2012, the White House released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance. A strategic implementation plan was to be published within 120 days of strategy issuance. The July 2012 strategy did not adequately address the issues we raised related to state and local biosurveillance and acknowledged but did not meaningfully address the need to leverage nonfederal resources. As of March 14, 2013 the implementation plan has not been released.
    Director: Currie, Christopher
    Phone: (404)679-3000

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to help build and maintain a national biosurveillance capability---an inherently interagency enterprise---the Homeland Security Council should direct the National Security Staff to, in coordination with relevant federal agencies, charge this focal point with the responsibility for developing, in conjunction with relevant federal agencies, a national biosurveillance strategy that: 1) defines the scope and purpose of a national capability; 2) provides goals, objectives and activities, priorities, milestones, and performance measures; 3) assesses the costs and benefits associated with supporting and building the capability and identifies the resource and investment needs, including investment priorities; 4) clarifies roles and responsibilities of leading, partnering, and supporting a national capability; and 5) articulates how the strategy is integrated with and supports other related strategies' goals, objectives, and activities.

    Agency: Executive Office of the President: Homeland Security Council
    Status: Open

    Comments: In July 2012, the White House released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance to describe the U.S. government's approach to strengthening biosurveillance. A strategic implementation plan was to be completed within 120 days of the strategy issuance. As we testified in September 2012, the strategy did not fully meet the intent of our recommendation; however, when the implementation plan is complete, it may meet our recommendation. Specifically, the strategy did not provide the mechanism GAO recommended to identify resource and investment needs, including investment priorities. As of September 2015, GAO has not received a copy of the implementation plan for review and has not been able to confirm that it has been finalized and is considered operational by the White House and the key interagency partners.