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    Subject Term: "Banking regulation"

    4 publications with a total of 33 open recommendations including 1 priority recommendation
    Director: Lawrance L. Evans, Jr.
    Phone: (202) 512-8678

    17 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help improve the consistency of federal banking regulators' stress test requirements and help ensure that institutions overseen by different regulators receive consistent regulatory treatment, the heads of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency should harmonize their agencies' approach to granting extensions and exemptions from stress test requirements.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help improve the consistency of federal banking regulators' stress test requirements and help ensure that institutions overseen by different regulators receive consistent regulatory treatment, the heads of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency should harmonize their agencies' approach to granting extensions and exemptions from stress test requirements.

    Agency: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help improve the consistency of federal banking regulators' stress test requirements and help ensure that institutions overseen by different regulators receive consistent regulatory treatment, the heads of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency should harmonize their agencies' approach to granting extensions and exemptions from stress test requirements.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help provide stronger incentives for companies to perform company-run stress tests in a manner consistent with Federal Reserve goals, the Federal Reserve should remove company-run stress tests from the CCAR quantitative assessment.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To increase transparency and improve CCAR effectiveness, the Federal Reserve should publicly disclose additional information that would allow for a better understanding of the methodology for completing qualitative assessments, such as the role of ratings and rankings and the extent to which they affect final determination decisions.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To increase transparency and improve CCAR effectiveness, the Federal Reserve should, for future determinations to object or conditionally not object to a company's capital plan on qualitative grounds, disclose additional information about the reasons for the determinations.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To increase transparency and improve CCAR effectiveness, the Federal Reserve should publicly disclose, on a periodic basis, information on capital planning practices observed during CCAR qualitative assessments, including practices the Federal Reserve considers stronger or leading practices.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To increase transparency and improve CCAR effectiveness, the Federal Reserve should improve policies for official responses to CCAR companies by establishing procedures for notifying companies about time frames relating to Federal Reserve responses to company inquiries.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To strengthen the scenario design process, the Federal Reserve should assess--and adjust as necessary--the overall level of severity of its severely adverse scenario by establishing a process to facilitate proactive consideration of levels of severity that may fall outside U.S. postwar historical experience.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To strengthen the scenario design process, the Federal Reserve should assess--and adjust as necessary--the overall level of severity of its severely adverse scenario by expanding consideration of the trade-offs associated with different degrees of severity.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve understanding of the range of potential crises against which the banking system would be resilient and the outcomes that might result from different scenarios, the Federal Reserve should assess whether a single severe supervisory scenario is sufficient to inform CCAR decisions and promote the resilience of the banking system. Such an assessment could include conducting sensitivity analysis involving multiple severe supervisory scenarios--potentially using CCAR data for a cycle that is already complete, to avoid concerns about tailoring the scenario to achieve a particular outcome.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that Federal Reserve stress tests do not amplify future economic cycles, the Federal Reserve should develop a process to test its proposed severely adverse scenario for procyclicality annually before finalizing and publicly releasing the supervisory scenarios.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should apply its model development principles to the combined system of models used in the supervisory stress tests.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should create an appropriate set of system-level model documentation, including an overview of how component models interact and key assumptions made in the design of model interactions.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should design and implement a process to test and document the sensitivity and uncertainty of the model system's output--the post-stress capital ratios used to make CCAR quantitative assessment determinations--including, at a minimum, the cumulative uncertainty surrounding the capital ratios and their sensitivity to key model parameters, specifications, and assumptions from across the system of models.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should design and implement a process to communicate information about the range and sources of uncertainty surrounding the post-stress capital ratio estimates to the Board during CCAR deliberations.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should design and implement a process for the Board and senior staff to articulate tolerance levels for key risks identified through sensitivity testing and for the degree of uncertainty in the projected capital ratios.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Lawrance L. Evans, Jr.
    Phone: (202) 512-8678

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that foreclosure prevention principles are being incorporated into servicers' practices, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System should ensure that the planned activities to oversee the foreclosure prevention principles include evaluation and testing of servicers' implementation of the principles.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
    Status: Open

    Comments: In October 2016, Federal Reserve staff indicated that examiners are continuing to review servicers' efforts to incorporate the foreclosure prevention principles into their practices. Our assessment of the extent to which those reviews include evaluation and testing of servicers' implementation of the principles is pending additional discussions with the Federal Reserve.
    Director: Clowers, Angela N
    Phone: (202) 512-8678

    4 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: FSOC and OFR should clarify responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor threats to financial stability across FSOC and OFR, including FSOC members and member agencies, to better ensure that the monitoring and analysis of the financial system are comprehensive and not unnecessarily duplicative.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of October 2016, FSOC staff have said FSOC and its members, including OFR, understand their responsibilities, saying that meetings of FSOC's Systemic Risk Committee help to ensure that FSOC member agencies have clarity on their responsibilities and noted that the committee operated under a charter. However, our review of the charter found that it does not clarify responsibilities for monitoring threats to financial stability. They also stated that actions OFR and the Federal Reserve (both of which serve on the Systemic Risk Committee) agreed to take in response to a recommendation in a GAO report issued in February 2016 would help to clarify these responsibilities. However, these represent just two of FSOC's member agencies; similar collaborative steps by other agencies would support the clarity of roles for monitoring threats to financial stability. We maintain that more specific action from FSOC and OFR, including FSOC member and member agencies, is needed to address this recommendation that ensures clarity of roles and responsibilities in proactively and comprehensively monitoring for potential emerging threats in the financial system. Our past work has shown that the lack of clear roles and coordination can lead to duplication, confusion, and regulatory gaps.
    Recommendation: FSOC and OFR should clarify responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor threats to financial stability across FSOC and OFR, including FSOC members and member agencies, to better ensure that the monitoring and analysis of the financial system are comprehensive and not unnecessarily duplicative.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council: Office of Financial Research
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of March 2017, OFR has taken some steps to work with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, a member agency of FSOC, to organize semi-annual meetings to jointly discuss views from their respective monitoring of the financial system for risks. We continue to monitor FSOC and OFR actions that would be responsive to clarifying responsibilities for monitoring threats to financial stability across all the agencies that are members of FSOC.
    Recommendation: To strengthen accountability and collaboration in FSOC's decision making, FSOC should establish a collaborative and comprehensive framework for assessing the impact of its decisions for designating FMUs and nonbank financial companies on the wider economy and those entities. This framework should include assessing the effects of subjecting designated FMUs and nonbank financial companies to new regulatory standards, requirements, and restrictions; establishing a baseline from which to measure the effects; and documenting the approach.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council
    Status: Open

    Comments: In response to an April 2017 presidential memorandum, Treasury is conducting a review of FSOC's designation process, including an assessment of the effects of designating FMUs and nonbank financial companies. This review will result in a report. We will update the status of this recommendation after we have reviewed the report.
    Recommendation: To strengthen accountability and collaboration in FSOC's decision making, FSOC should develop more systematic forward-looking approaches for reporting on potential emerging threats to financial stability in annual reports. Such an approach should provide methodological insight into why certain threats to financial stability are included or excluded over time, separate current or past threats from those that are potentially emerging, and prioritize the latter.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council
    Status: Open

    Comments: When FSOC publishes its annual report for 2017 and we have reviewed it, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Clowers, Angela N
    Phone: (202)512-3000

    11 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their efforts, the federal financial regulators have begun to take steps to address challenges associated with promulgating hundreds of new rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act. To strengthen the rigor and transparency of their regulatory analyses, the federal financial regulators should take steps to better ensure that the specific practices in OMB's regulatory analysis guidance are more fully incorporated into their rulemaking policies and consistently applied.

    Agency: National Credit Union Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2016, NCUA told us that it is nearing completion of agency internal policies that standardize and institutionalize the rulemaking process within NCUA. According to agency officials, these policies will document NCUA's current practice related to OMB's regulatory analysis guidance. The policies will be issued to appropriate staff by the end of 2016. At that time, we will review the policies to review the extent to which they incorporate the practices in OMB's regulatory analysis guidance.
    Recommendation: In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their efforts, the federal financial regulators have begun to take steps to address challenges associated with promulgating hundreds of new rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act. To maximize the usefulness of the required retrospective reviews, the federal financial regulatory agencies should develop plans that determine how they will measure the impact of Dodd-Frank Act regulations--for example, determining how and when to collect, analyze, and report needed data.

    Agency: National Credit Union Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2016, NCUA noted that all of the agency's regulations are reviewed at least every three years, during an established rotation, so that every year one-third of the agency's regulations are open to comment from the public. NCUA reported that it recently launched a comprehensive multi-year project to update the agency's main data collection and analytic systems. Agency officials stated that the updates will ensure that the agency collects the data needed to assess the effectiveness and impact of applicable regulations. We will continue to monitor NCUA's progress in updating its information systems for purposes of retrospective reviews.
    Recommendation: In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their efforts, the federal financial regulators have begun to take steps to address challenges associated with promulgating hundreds of new rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act. To maximize the usefulness of the required retrospective reviews, the federal financial regulatory agencies should develop plans that determine how they will measure the impact of Dodd-Frank Act regulations--for example, determining how and when to collect, analyze, and report needed data.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2017, the federal banking regulators sent Congress their report of the second Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (EGRPRA). Under EGRPRA, the regulators must jointly conduct a review of their regulations every 10 years and consider whether any of the regulations are outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome. The regulators included within their review's scope some regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. To carry out the EGRPRA review, the regulators generally solicited public comments on their covered regulations through Federal Register notices and public outreach meetings. Although the regulators addressed some of the issues raised by EGRPRA commenters to reduce regulatory burden, they generally focused on identifying regulatory burdens, as required by the law, and not on measuring the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act regulations to assess the extent to which they are achieving their intended purposes. For this reason, our recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their efforts, the federal financial regulators have begun to take steps to address challenges associated with promulgating hundreds of new rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act. To strengthen the rigor and transparency of their regulatory analyses, the federal financial regulators should take steps to better ensure that the specific practices in OMB's regulatory analysis guidance are more fully incorporated into their rulemaking policies and consistently applied.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: We sought information from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in May 2016 regarding the status of the recommendation, but did not receive any new information. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their efforts, the federal financial regulators have begun to take steps to address challenges associated with promulgating hundreds of new rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act. To maximize the usefulness of the required retrospective reviews, the federal financial regulatory agencies should develop plans that determine how they will measure the impact of Dodd-Frank Act regulations--for example, determining how and when to collect, analyze, and report needed data.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: In March 2017, the federal banking regulators sent Congress their report of the second Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (EGRPRA). Under EGRPRA, the regulators must jointly conduct a review of their regulations every 10 years and consider whether any of the regulations are outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome. The regulators included within their review's scope some regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. To carry out the EGRPRA review, the regulators generally solicited public comments on their covered regulations through Federal Register notices and public outreach meetings. Although the regulators addressed some of the issues raised by EGRPRA commenters to reduce regulatory burden, they generally focused on identifying regulatory burdens, as required by the law, and not on measuring the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act regulations to assess the extent to which they are achieving their intended purposes. For this reason, our recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: To enhance interagency coordination on regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC should work with the federal financial regulatory agencies to establish formal coordination policies that clarify issues such as when coordination should occur, the process that will be used to solicit and address comments, and what role FSOC should play in facilitating coordination.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council
    Status: Open

    Comments: In May 2015, FSOC created the Regulations and Resolutions Committee to identify potential gaps in regulation that could pose risks to the U.S. financial stability. The committee's duties include serving as a forum for information sharing and coordination among the FSOC staff, member agencies and other federal and state agencies, as appropriate, regarding domestic financial services policy development, and consulting, as appropriate, on the development of regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority. While the committee's duties should help promote greater collaboration, they do not constitute a formal rulemaking coordination policy addressing, for example, when coordination should occur, processes for soliciting and addressing comments, and FSOC role in facilitating coordination among and between the financial regulators. In its 2010 comment letter, FSOC noted that it provides a forum for interagency collaboration and consultation, in part through its committees, and has not indicated any plans to develop a formal rulemaking coordination policy as we recommended, in part because of its need to preserve the independence of the regulators. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: To enhance interagency coordination on regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC should work with the federal financial regulatory agencies to establish formal coordination policies that clarify issues such as when coordination should occur, the process that will be used to solicit and address comments, and what role FSOC should play in facilitating coordination.

    Agency: Federal Reserve System
    Status: Open

    Comments: In May 2015, FSOC created the Regulations and Resolutions Committee to identify potential gaps in regulation that could pose risks to the U.S. financial stability. The committee's duties include serving as a forum for information sharing and coordination among the FSOC staff, member agencies and other federal and state agencies, as appropriate, regarding domestic financial services policy development, and consulting, as appropriate, on the development of regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority. While the committee's duties should help promote greater collaboration, they do not constitute a formal rulemaking coordination policy addressing, for example, when coordination should occur, processes for soliciting and addressing comments, and FSOC role in facilitating coordination among and between the financial regulators. In its 2010 comment letter, FSOC noted that it provides a forum for interagency collaboration and consultation, in part through its committees, and has not indicated any plans to develop a formal rulemaking coordination policy as we recommended, in part because of its need to preserve the independence of the regulators. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: To enhance interagency coordination on regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC should work with the federal financial regulatory agencies to establish formal coordination policies that clarify issues such as when coordination should occur, the process that will be used to solicit and address comments, and what role FSOC should play in facilitating coordination.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
    Status: Open

    Comments: In May 2015, FSOC created the Regulations and Resolutions Committee to identify potential gaps in regulation that could pose risks to the U.S. financial stability. The committee's duties include serving as a forum for information sharing and coordination among the FSOC staff, member agencies and other federal and state agencies, as appropriate, regarding domestic financial services policy development, and consulting, as appropriate, on the development of regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority. While the committee's duties should help promote greater collaboration, they do not constitute a formal rulemaking coordination policy addressing, for example, when coordination should occur, processes for soliciting and addressing comments, and FSOC role in facilitating coordination among and between the financial regulators. In its 2010 comment letter, FSOC noted that it provides a forum for interagency collaboration and consultation, in part through its committees, and has not indicated any plans to develop a formal rulemaking coordination policy as we recommended, in part because of its need to preserve the independence of the regulators. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: To enhance interagency coordination on regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC should work with the federal financial regulatory agencies to establish formal coordination policies that clarify issues such as when coordination should occur, the process that will be used to solicit and address comments, and what role FSOC should play in facilitating coordination.

    Agency: United States Securities and Exchange Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: In May 2015, FSOC created the Regulations and Resolutions Committee to identify potential gaps in regulation that could pose risks to the U.S. financial stability. The committee's duties include serving as a forum for information sharing and coordination among the FSOC staff, member agencies and other federal and state agencies, as appropriate, regarding domestic financial services policy development, and consulting, as appropriate, on the development of regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority. While the committee's duties should help promote greater collaboration, they do not constitute a formal rulemaking coordination policy addressing, for example, when coordination should occur, processes for soliciting and addressing comments, and FSOC role in facilitating coordination among and between the financial regulators. In its 2010 comment letter, FSOC noted that it provides a forum for interagency collaboration and consultation, in part through its committees, and has not indicated any plans to develop a formal rulemaking coordination policy as we recommended, in part because of its need to preserve the independence of the regulators. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: To enhance interagency coordination on regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC should work with the federal financial regulatory agencies to establish formal coordination policies that clarify issues such as when coordination should occur, the process that will be used to solicit and address comments, and what role FSOC should play in facilitating coordination.

    Agency: Commodity Futures Trading Commission
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2016, CFTC officials stated that FSOC has written protocols for consulting on rules for which coordination is required under the Dodd-Frank Act. Specifically, in May 2015, FSOC created the Regulations and Resolutions Committee to identify potential gaps in regulation that could pose risks to the U.S. financial stability. The committee's duties include serving as a forum for information sharing and coordination among the FSOC staff, member agencies and other federal and state agencies, as appropriate, regarding domestic financial services policy development, and consulting, as appropriate, on the development of regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority. While the committee's duties should help promote greater collaboration, they do not constitute a formal rulemaking coordination policy addressing, for example, when coordination should occur, processes for soliciting and addressing comments, and FSOC role in facilitating coordination among and between the financial regulators. In its 2010 comment letter, FSOC noted that it provides a forum for interagency collaboration and consultation, in part through its committees, and has not indicated any plans to develop a formal rulemaking coordination policy as we recommended, in part because of its need to preserve the independence of the regulators. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.
    Recommendation: To enhance interagency coordination on regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC should work with the federal financial regulatory agencies to establish formal coordination policies that clarify issues such as when coordination should occur, the process that will be used to solicit and address comments, and what role FSOC should play in facilitating coordination.

    Agency: National Credit Union Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2016, NCUA stated that it continues to work closely with the other federal financial agencies regarding rulemaking, and formally coordinates with them during joint rulemaking initiatives. Agency officials said they would comply with any future coordination guidance provided by FSOC. In May 2015, FSOC created the Regulations and Resolutions Committee to identify potential gaps in regulation that could pose risks to the U.S. financial stability. The committee's duties include serving as a forum for information sharing and coordination among the FSOC staff, member agencies and other federal and state agencies, as appropriate, regarding domestic financial services policy development, and consulting, as appropriate, on the development of regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority. While the committee's duties should help promote greater collaboration, they do not constitute a formal rulemaking coordination policy addressing, for example, when coordination should occur, processes for soliciting and addressing comments, and FSOC role in facilitating coordination among and between the financial regulators. In its 2010 comment letter, FSOC noted that it provides a forum for interagency collaboration and consultation, in part through its committees, and has not indicated any plans to develop a formal rulemaking coordination policy as we recommended, in part because of its need to preserve the independence of the regulators. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.