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    Subject Term: "Ballistic missiles"

    6 publications with a total of 14 open recommendations including 2 priority recommendations
    Director: Cristina Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisition efforts and strengthen oversight, and to increase traceability and insight into MDA's test program, the Secretary of Defense should require MDA to (a) include a detailed crosswalk of changes to each test, such as names, planned execution dates, test types, targets, and other modifications, in each iteration of its Integrated Master Test Plan; (b) address deficiencies in its test scheduling policy by better aligning it with best practices for scheduling, including the use of a schedule work breakdown structure (WBS) that clearly traces each activity to the cost WBS, properly assigning resources to schedules, and clarifying guidance on when and how to conduct schedule risk analysis; (c) rectify deficiencies in its element and test level cost estimates by requiring the use of the common test WBS, documenting the traceability of source data, and codifying the processes and associated information for the software application Test Resource Mission Planning-Tool used to create the test level cost estimates in policy; and (d) break out funding requests by test in the BMDS Accountability Report and other budget documentation submitted during the annual budget submission.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisition efforts and strengthen oversight, and to improve MDA's requirement-setting process and ensure it includes an appropriate balance between MDA and warfighter priorities, the Secretary of Defense should require MDA to develop a plan to transition operational requirements analysis currently performed within MDA's Achievable Capabilities List to the U.S. Combatant Commanders, with U.S. Strategic Command as the lead entity and, in the interim, require MDA to obtain their concurrence of the Achievable Capabilities List prior to its release.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisition efforts and strengthen oversight, and to ensure that the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) acquisition strategy continues to remain viable, promotes effective competition, and addresses concerns raised by DOD components, the Secretary of Defense should require the Director, DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to perform a comprehensive review of the RKV acquisition strategy and provide any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that the Director deems necessary and appropriate to obtain CAPE's concurrence for the RKV program's acquisition strategy. Any decision to award a full-rate production contract should be delayed until after MDA has received approval from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L) to proceed to full-rate production.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisition efforts and strengthen oversight, and to ensure that future acquisition strategies MDA develops for its new efforts reflect an appropriate balance between timeliness, affordability, reliability, and effectiveness and achieve department-wide buy-in, the Secretary of Defense should require MDA to produce acquisition strategies for all its major new efforts that are subject to review by the Director, CAPE and review and approval by the USD(AT&L).

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Cristina Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: In the event that operational test results for PDB-8 and PDB-8.1 reveal performance shortfalls that require additional development of the near and mid-term upgrades tested, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to establish mechanisms for overseeing those upgrades commensurate with other major defense acquisition programs, to include an initial report--similar to a Selected Acquisition Report--as soon as practical following operational testing for both PDB-8 and PDB-8.1, on the near and mid-term upgrades evaluated during these tests, including: (1) cost, schedule, and performance estimates for any additional development that is needed; and (2) an estimate of the amount of development costs it has incurred since 2013 for near- and mid-term Patriot upgrades operationally tested along with PDB-8 and PDB-8.1.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, however, it is too early to determine what, if any, actions the agency will take until the results of operational testing for PDB-8 are made available following its planned completion in late summer 2017.
    Recommendation: In the event that operational test results for PDB-8 and PDB-8.1 reveal performance shortfalls that require additional development of the near and mid-term upgrades tested, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to establish mechanisms for overseeing those upgrades commensurate with other major defense acquisition programs, to include annual updates to Congress comparing the latest cost and schedule estimates against the initial estimates and providing explanations for any major deviations until development is complete.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, however, it is too early to determine what, if any, actions the agency will take until the results of operational testing for PDB-8 are made available following its planned completion in late summer 2017.
    Director: Cristina Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisitions and help support oversight and, to the extent that MDA determines hardware or software modifications are required to address the September 2013 Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB failure, the Secretary of Defense should direct, (a) the Director of the MDA to verify the changes work as intended through subsequent flight testing, and (b) the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics to delay the decision to approve the program's full production until such testing demonstrates that the redesigned missile is effective and suitable.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the Department of Defense partially concurred with our recommendation to delay full production decision until flight testing the Standard Missile-3 Block IB (SM-3 Block IB) with modifications that resulted from a September 2013 test failure. MDA recently completed 2 non-intercept flight tests to assess the redesign, these were non-interceptor tests and thus the extent to which the tests stressed the redesign and how well the redesigned component responded is still not fully understood. The assessment is currently ongoing and Full Production is planned for Fiscal Year 2018, after the assessment is completed.
    Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisitions and help support oversight, and to demonstrate the Capability Enhancement-I's (CE-I) effectiveness against a longer range target in more challenging conditions and to confirm the design changes implemented to improve performance, as well as any changes needed to resolve the July 2013 CE-I flight test failure work as intended, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's Director to conduct a flight test of the CE-I interceptor once the cause of the failure has been determined and any mitigations have been developed.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD did not concur with the recommendation. In its response to the recommendation, DOD stated the decision to flight test a CE-I interceptor will be made by the Director, MDA, based on the judgment of stakeholders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders on the need to perform a test. This year, MDA has indicated no change in direction regarding plans to conduct another CE-I flight test in the near term. The next CE-I flight test is not planned to occur until Fiscal Year 2018. That test is not a re-test of FTG-07; rather, it is a salvo test. It is unclear whether MDA will remain committed to including the CE-I in the test, as MDA has previously indicated it may use a different type of interceptor for that test. In addition, MDA only implemented a partial mitigation to address the FTG-07 failure cause and as such, MDA is not implementing all necessary corrections.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    3 open recommendations
    including 2 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to add risk reduction non-intercept flight tests for each new type of target missiles developed.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: Despite partially concurring with our recommendation in 2013, MDA has not adjusted its test plans to include risk-reduction (i.e., non-intercept) flight tests for new target types prior to their inclusion in an intercept flight test. MDA officials have not done so because such decisions must be balanced against potential cost, schedule, and programmatic impacts and flight test preparation processes, like dry-runs and quality control checks, are sufficient to discover issues prior to an intercept test. While test preparation processes are valuable, they are not a substitute for risk reduction flight tests. This was proven in June 2015 when MDA launched a new intermediate-range target that had 6 different test preparation processes but not a risk-reduction flight test and the target failed, which resulted in significant cost, schedule, and programmatic impacts. Moving forward, despite the impacts from its recent target failure, MDA plans to use a new medium-range target during its third, and most complex operational test in the second quarter of fiscal year 2019. We maintain our stance that risk reduction flight tests would reduce the risk for the associated test and the overall flight test plan; however, MDA's action to-date suggest that it has no intention of including risk-reduction flight tests for new targets. However, we will continue to monitor its progress in this regard.
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to include in its resource baseline cost estimates all life cycle costs, specifically the operations and support costs, from the military services in order to provide decision makers with the full costs of ballistic missile defense systems.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that decisionmakers should have insight into the full lifecycle costs of MDA's programs. However, as of August 2017, MDA is still not including the military services' operations and sustainment costs--which are a part of the full lifecycle costs--in the resource baselines it reports in the Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report. MDA is trying to determine how to report the full lifecycle costs to decisionmakers, but has indicated that the Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report is not the appropriate forum for reporting the military services' operation and support costs. We continue to believe that including the full lifecycle costs of MDA's programs enables decisionmakers to make funding determinations that are based on a comprehensive understanding of the depth and breadth of each program's costs.
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to stabilize the acquisition baselines, so that meaningful comparisons can be made over time that support oversight of those acquisitions.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation regarding the need for MDA to stabilize its acquisition baselines, but also noted MDA's need to adjust its baselines to remain responsive to evolving requirements and threats; both of which are beyond MDA's control. Further, DOD highlighted the MDA Director's authority to make adjustments to the agency's programmatic baselines, within departmental guidelines. Our recommendation, however, is not designed to limit the Director's authority to adjust baselines or to prevent adjusting baselines as appropriate. Rather, our recommendation is designed to address traceability issues we have found with MDA's baselines, which are within its control. Specifically, for MDA to be able to effectively report longer-term progress of its acquisitions and provide the necessary transparency to Congress, it is critical that the agency stabilize its baselines so that once set, any revisions can be tracked over time. At this point we have not seen any indication that MDA is working to implement this recommendation. For example, in 2016, MDA's Director made changes to the Targets and Countermeasures program's baseline that omit the costs of some targets and may make tracking progress against prior years and the original baseline very difficult, and in some instances, impossible. We will continue to monitor MDA's baselines to determine any progress in this area or implementation of this recommendation.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202)512-3000

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts, and to improve clarity, consistency, and completeness of the baselines reported to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MDA, for resource baselines, obtain independent cost estimates for each baseline.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on our report, the agency concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken all actions necessary to implement it. Although the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has received independent cost estimates from its internal independent cost group for some programs and components that support the baselines provided in MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), MDA officials told us they have not yet completed independent estimates for all the BAR baselines. In addition, the independent estimates will not have full lifecycle costs which will hamper their effectiveness. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress over the course of our next annual review.
    Recommendation: To strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts, and to improve clarity, consistency, and completeness of the baselines reported to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MDA, for schedule baselines, in meeting new statutory requirements to report variances between reported acquisition baselines, also report variances between the test plan as presented in the previous acquisition baseline and the test plan as executed that explain the reason for any changes.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the Department of Defense concurred with our recommendation and has taken initial steps to report the test variances, by laying out the dates of the proposed changes. However, the variances do not include all changes to test objectives, detail when tests are deleted, nor when the altered objectives will be satisfied. MDA has initiated an effort with DOT&E and the OTA to track the movement of test objectives, however these changes are not reported and are only used internally. In addition, MDA utilizes a "mid-year" test change memorandum. The change explains the difference from the prior master test plan, but is not reported. Thus, changes that are included in the mid-year memorandum can not be tracked if one only receives the annual test plan. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress in fiscal year 2017 and determine whether MDA lays out the changes in its upcoming integrated master test plan.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202)512-3000

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct MDA to ensure that developmental hardware and software changes are not made to the operational baseline that disrupt the assessments needed to understand the capabilities and limitations of new BMDS developments.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation. In the June 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provided some operational baselines and continues to do so annually. Nonetheless, configuration changes continue to pose challenges to a thorough assessment of the BMDS architecture. For example, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the many configurations of the fielded ground-based interceptor inhibits a full evaluation of the GMD program. Moreover, some changes to BMDS elements are still delivered while testing of the architecture is already underway. We will continue to assess whether MDA fully adopts an approach allowing time for the warfighter and testers to fully understand hardware and software before placing it in the operational baseline.