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    Results:

    Subject Term: "Acquisition strategy"

    12 publications with a total of 22 open recommendations including 1 priority recommendation
    Director: Jennifer Grover
    Phone: (202) 512-7141

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better position the Coast Guard to effectively plan its Arctic operations, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop measures, as appropriate, for gauging how the agency's actions have helped to mitigate the Arctic capability gaps.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2016, we reviewed and reported on the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts in the Arctic. We found that the Coast Guard had taken actions to implement its Arctic strategy and conduct Arctic operations, which may help the Coast Guard to better understand and mitigate identified Arctic capability gaps. Further, we found that the Coast Guard was tracking, or had plans to track, its various activities in the Arctic, but that it had not developed measures to systematically assess how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. We recommended that the Coast Guard develop measures, as appropriate, for gauging how the agency's actions have helped to mitigate the Arctic capability gaps. In response to our recommendation, in August 2016, the Coast Guard reported that specific measures for some activities would be developed and included as part of the Coast Guard's update to its implementation plan for its Arctic strategy. In March 2017, the Coast Guard reported that it completed an annual review of its implementation plan in January 2017. However, officials stated that technology updates and modifications to its tracking tool are required to better represent the completion percentage. To fully address this recommendation, the Coast Guard will need to finalize the development of its measures to gauge how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps.
    Recommendation: To better position the Coast Guard to effectively plan its Arctic operations, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should design and implement a process to systematically assess the extent to which actions taken agency-wide have helped mitigate the Arctic capability gaps for which it has responsibility.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
    Status: Open

    Comments: In June 2016, we reviewed and reported on the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts in the Arctic. We found that the Coast Guard had taken actions to implement its Arctic strategy and conduct Arctic operations, which may help the Coast Guard to better understand and mitigate identified Arctic capability gaps. Further, we found that the Coast Guard was tracking, or had plans to track, its various activities in the Arctic, but that it had not systematically assessed how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. We recommended that the Coast Guard design and implement a process to systematically assess the extent to which actions taken agency-wide have helped mitigate the Arctic capability gaps for which it has responsibility, so that it will better understand the status of these gaps and be better positioned to effectively plan its Arctic operations. In August 2016, the Coast Guard reported that through its annual review of its implementation plan for its Arctic Strategy, that it will systematically assess how its actions have mitigated capability gaps for which it is the lead agency under the Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. In March 2017, the Coast Guard reported that it completed an annual review of its implementation plan in January 2017 which resulted in the consolidation, removal, and addition of Arctic initiatives. Further, officials stated that the Coast Guard will continue to work with the Arctic Executive Steering Committee to provide information for the tracking and measurement of national capabilities, needs and gaps, and impacts in the Arctic Region. To fully address this recommendation, the Coast Guard will need to assess how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps, and provide documentation that identifies the progress it has made in helping to mitigate Arctic capability gaps.
    Director: Mackin, Michele
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should, before the downselect decision for the frigates, require the program to submit appropriate milestone documentation as identified by OSD, which could include an Independent Cost Estimate, an Acquisition Program Baseline, and a plan to incorporate the frigate into SAR updates.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, noting that the Navy views the LCS transition to the frigate as an incremental upgrade as opposed to a new acquisition program. DOD also stated that the Navy would be required to provide key documentation related to the seaframe, including an independent cost estimate and an updated acquisition program baseline. In 2017, the Navy decided to pursue a different frigate acquisition strategy, and according to the program office, the frigate is now considered a new, distinct acquisition program and will have milestone decisions and require the applicable milestone documentation and OSD oversight and reporting as the program moves toward an award decision in fiscal year 2020. The program office also noted that the specific milestone documentation that will be required is currently being assessed and the program plans to have a frigate Selected Acquisition Report. Once more details are finalized for the program, the planned actions would meet the intention of our recommendation. We will keep this recommendation open until the program's approach has been better defined.
    Director: Michele Mackin
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    3 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To ensure that the Navy has provided a clear direction for the future of the program before committing funding to construct additional ships, Congress should consider, given the uncertainties over the long term about the ship's survivability and lethality and proposed changes to future ships, consider not fully funding the Navy's request for future LCS ships beyond fiscal year 2016, pending the completion and analysis of the final survivability assessments for both variants due in 2018.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: Although Congress did not take action on this Matter for Congressional Consideration in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA, we will continue to monitor this matter to see if Congress implements future restrictions prior to the final survivability assessments being completed. The Navy's final survivability assessment report is planned for fiscal year 2018, with DOT&E's assessment to follow.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition approach moving forward, the Secretary of Defense should require the Navy to solicit an independent technical assessment from an organization like a ship classification society on the survivability of the Independence variant seaframe and its ability to meet its applicable requirements.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOD did not concur with our recommendation advocating an independent technical assessment by a classification society, stating that such an organization could not provide an independent look and was not technically competent to conduct such an evaluation. To fully implement this recommendation, we continue to believe that an independent assessment performed by the American Bureau of Shipping, or some other independent entity with relevant subject matter expertise would be valuable to understanding seaframe performance, which remains a significant uncertainty. Although the Navy has conducted rough water, ship shock, and total ship survivability testing, it has not demonstrated that the ship will achieve survivability requirements. Completion of the final survivability assessment report is anticipated in fiscal year 2018. Further, although the Navy has not completed its analytical reports of the rough water events, both Littoral Combat Ship variants sustained some damage, and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has expressed concern with the testing and results from full ship shock trials and total ship survivability testing. An independent technical assessment of the Independence variant's survivability would help solidify the Navy's understanding of the ship's expected performance, and takes on added relevance given that the Navy's plans for a frigate award in fiscal year 2020 may include a downselect decision to a Littoral Combat Ship-based seaframe design. In July 2017, the LCS Program Office indicated that there is no additional information to provide, as the Navy maintains its non-concurrence with this recommendation. We will continue monitoring this recommendation to see if the Navy solicits such an evaluation, given continuing concerns about the ships survivability from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
    Recommendation: To ensure that the program has requirements that are testable and measurable and to improve realism of LCS operational testing, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to investigate resourcing and conducting more operationally stressing SUW mission package testing onboard LCS, to include testing in a clutter environment and diverse weather and tactical scenarios to help ensure that the ships can operate effectively in their intended environment.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendation, stating it will provide sufficient test resources but does not believe that testing 'every aspect' of weather and tactics is necessary. The Navy has since received DOT&E approval of a partial update to the LCS Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), which was required before March 2016 by a restriction included in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016. According to the department, the update included changes to the scope of SUW mission package testing. The LCS Program Office stated that a full LCS TEMP is expected to be approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the last quarter of fiscal year 2017. OSD approval of the TEMP would likely meet the intent of our recommendation; however, until it is approved, we will monitor the TEMP status and keep this recommendation open.
    Director: Cristina Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should convene an independent task force comprising experts from other military services and defense agencies with substantial knowledge and expertise to provide an assessment to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics of the OCX program and concrete guidance for addressing the OCX program's underlying problems, particularly including: (1) A detailed engineering assessment of OCX defects to determine the systemic root causes of the defects; (2) Whether the contractor's software development procedures and practices match the levels described in the OCX systems engineering and software development plans; and (3) Whether the contractor is capable of executing the program as currently resourced and structured.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Prior to the program declaring a Nunn-McCurdy breach on June 30, 2016, the only independent assessment was conducted by Defense Digital Services and was limited in focus to software development. Air Force notes a completion date of independent assessment on Sept 29, 2017. Once received, we will evaluate whether that meets the intent of the recommendation.
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should develop high confidence OCX cost and schedule estimates based on actual track record for productivity and learning curves.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Prior to the program declaring a Nunn-McCurdy breach on June 30, 2016, no high confidence cost assessment was completed. The Air Force and contractor provided schedule assessments that were not evaluated and considered low-risk, but were directed to execute a 24 month schedule extension with no assessment of its feasibility and that did not take into account past contractor performance. Pending Nunn-McCurdy documentation and repeat of Milestone B, there is no evidence a high confidence cost or schedule has been put in place. Once we receive documentation on approval of Milestone B, we will reevaluate.
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Air Force to retain experts from the independent task force as a management advisory team to assist the OCX program office in conducting regular systemic analysis of defects and to help ensure OCX corrective measures are implemented successfully and sustained.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Prior to the program declaring a Nunn-McCurdy breach on June 30, 2016, Defense Digital Services were initially retained for a month and subsequently remain embedded with contractor software developers to provide advice on development and process improvements. Upon completion of the Nunn-McCurdy review and continued involvement of Defense Digital Services, we will examine the extent to which the program has met this recommendation if the program is recertified to determine if this recommendation was met. Air Force did not provide an update to this recommendation in 2017, but program still has not had Milestone B approved and the Defense Digital Services group is no longer engaged on OCX.
    Recommendation: To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, the Secretary of Defense should put in place a mechanism for ensuring that the knowledge gained from the OCX assessment is used to determine whether further programmatic changes are needed to strengthen oversight.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. Senior quarterly reviews continue of the OCX program and have been in place since December 2015. Documentation still pending on Milestone B to see if these reviews have informed programmatic changes that better position DOD to complete this acquisition.
    Director: Cristina Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: When planning for the next phase of national security space launches, Phase 2, the Secretary of the Air Force should consider using an incremental approach to the next launch services acquisition strategy. Planning for acquisitions on a short term basis will help ensure that the Air Force does not commit itself to a strategy until the appropriate amount of data is available to make an informed decision, and will allow for flexibility in responding to a changing launch industry.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation but has not yet completed actions necessary to implement it. The acquisition strategy for the next phase of national security launches, Phase 2, has not yet been finalized by the Air Force. The EELV program office expects it to be completed in the summer of 2018.
    Director: Carol R. Cha
    Phone: (202) 512-4456

    3 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve Transformation Program governance, the Secretary of DHS should direct the Under Secretary for Management to ensure that the Acquisition Review Board is effectively monitoring the Transformation Program's performance and progress toward a predefined cost and schedule; ensuring that corrective actions are tracked until the desired outcomes are achieved; and relying on complete and accurate program data to review the performance of the Transformation Program against stated expectations.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of August 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had demonstrated that it had taken steps to address this recommendation, but additional steps were needed. Since we issued this recommendation in May 2015, the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM), which serves as the Acquisition Review Board (ARB) executive secretariat and is to oversee DHS's acquisition portfolio, in coordination with the Office of the Chief Information Officer, has actively increased program oversight. For example, beginning in May 2015, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) demonstrated that it submitted data supporting cost, schedule, and technical performance metrics to DHS on a monthly basis. The ARB has also held a number of meetings to discuss the Transformation Program and issued associated Acquisition Decision Memoranda with related action items. In addition, in February 2016, PARM demonstrated that DHS developed a procedure to help ensure acquisition decision memorandum actions, including corrective actions, are tracked until the desired outcomes are achieved. However, as of August 2017, the USCIS Transformation Program was in breach of its previously approved schedule expectations and was taking a strategic pause in developing new software while working to re-baseline cost and schedule expectations. During this strategic pause, the program is working to complete various action items assigned by the Acquisition Review Board, including completing an updated Release Roadmap and submitting it to PARM no later than December 29, 2017; updated Lifecycle Cost Estimate and providing it to the Cost Analysis Division no later than December 29, 2017; updated Test and Evaluation Master Plan and submitting it to the Office of Test and Evaluation no later than January 31, 2018; and an updated Acquisition Program Baseline and providing it to PARM no later than December 29, 2017. We will continue to monitor DHS?s efforts to re-baseline the USCIS Transformation Program and the Acquisition Review Board's efforts to monitor the Transformation Program's performance and progress toward a predefined cost and schedule; ensure that corrective actions are tracked until the desired outcomes are achieved; and rely on complete and accurate program data to review the performance of the Transformation Program against stated expectations until and after a new baseline is established.
    Recommendation: To improve Transformation Program governance, the Secretary of DHS should direct the DHS Under Secretary for Management, in coordination with the Director of US Citizenship and Immigration Services, to ensure that the Executive Steering Committee is effectively monitoring the Transformation Program's performance and progress toward a predefined cost and schedule and relying on complete and accurate program data to review the performance of the Transformation Program against stated expectations.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of August 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had demonstrated that it had taken steps to address this recommendation, but additional steps were needed. More specifically, as of July 2016, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Transformation program office provided evidence that the Executive Steering Committee (ESC) continued to discuss cost, schedule, and operational performance metrics as part of the program's ESC meetings. However, as of August 2017, the USCIS Transformation Program was in breach of its previously approved schedule expectations and was taking a strategic pause in developing new software while working to re-baseline its cost and schedule expectations. During this strategic pause, the program is working to complete various action items assigned by the Acquisition Review Board, including completing an updated Release Roadmap and submitting it to the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) no later than December 29, 2017; updated Lifecycle Cost Estimate and providing it to the Cost Analysis Division no later than December 29, 2017; updated Test and Evaluation Master Plan and submitting it to the Office of Test and Evaluation no later than January 31, 2018; and an updated Acquisition Program Baseline and providing it to PARM no later than December 29, 2017. In addition, according to the program?s August 2017 Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the ESC has been transformed into a component-only body with no headquarters involvement, and the program was to establish a Program Management Integrated Product Team, which was to meet bi-weekly beginning in September 2017. We will continue to monitor DHS's efforts to re-baseline the USCIS Transformation Program, the impact of changes to the ESC, and the ESC?s efforts to effectively monitor the Transformation Program's performance and progress toward a predefined cost and schedule and rely on complete and accurate program data to review the performance of the Transformation Program against stated expectations until and after a new program baseline is established.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that assessments prepared by the Office of the Chief Information Officer in support of the department's updates to the federal IT Dashboard more fully reflect the current status of the Transformation Program, the Secretary of DHS should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to use accurate and reliable information, such as operational assessments of the new architecture and cost and schedule parameters approved by the Under Secretary of Management.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of September 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had demonstrated that it had taken steps to address this recommendation, but additional steps were needed. In particular, in February 2016, the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), in coordination with the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM), had consolidated the department's Investment Management System and Next Generation Periodic Reporting System tools into a single enterprise information management and repository system named Investment Evaluation, Submission, and Tracking (INVEST). According to the department, this effort should improve the reliability of the metrics used by OCIO's Enterprise Business Management Office (EBMO), as well as the other line of business and component program offices, and ensure data integrity. The data reported in INVEST include cost, schedule, and operational performance metrics that are to align with the OMB's Information Technology (IT) Dashboard reporting requirements. In addition, as of September 2017, the program was listed as a high-risk program on the federal IT dashboard, in contrast to its April 2015 rating of medium risk. However, as of August 2017, the program was in breach of its previously approved schedule expectations and was taking a strategic pause in developing new software while working to re-baseline its cost and schedule expectations. We will continue to monitor DHS?s efforts to re-baseline the USCIS Transformation Program and the Office of the Chief Information Officer's efforts to use accurate and reliable information to update the federal IT dashboard until and after a new program baseline is established.
    Director: Kathleen M. King
    Phone: (202) 512-7114

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: CMS should conduct a formal analysis, using its experience and data it has collected since the implementation of the first MAC contracts, to determine whether alternative contracting approaches could be used--even if only for selected MAC contract responsibilities--to help promote improved contractor performance.

    Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Cristina T. Chaplain
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve technology planning and ensure planning efforts are clearly aligned with the SBIRS follow-on, the Secretary of the Air Force should establish a technology insertion plan as part of the SBIRS follow-on acquisition strategy that identifies obsolescence needs as well as specific potential technologies and insertion points.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation. DOD's planned action on the scope and focus of technology insertion will be based on the direction provided in the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Follow-on Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and will be executed through the SBIRS Space Modernization Initiative (SMI). The SBIRS AoA was completed in March 2016; however, as of June 2017, the SMI schedule has yet to show how technology will be inserted into the follow-on system.
    Director: Michele Mackin
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The legislated cost cap for Ford-class aircraft carrier construction provides a limit on procurement funds. However, the legislation also provides for adjustments to the cost cap. To understand the true cost of each Ford-class ship, Congress should consider revising the cost cap legislation to ensure that all work included in the initial ship cost estimate that is deferred to post-delivery and outfitting account is counted against the cost cap. If warranted, the Navy would be required to seek statutory authority to increase the cap.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: This recommendation remains open to allow Congress time to consider legislation amending the cost cap for the Ford class of aircraft carriers. The current version of the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810) does not amend the current cost cap legislation.
    Director: Cha, Carol R
    Phone: (202) 512-4456

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve planning and execution of the next telecommunications transition, the Administrator of General Services, in coordination with the Office of Personnel Management, should examine potential government-wide telecommunications expertise shortfalls and use the study to shape the NS2020 strategic approach.

    Agency: General Services Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: The General Services Administration (GSA) has not addressed this recommendation. In June 2014, the agency reported that it had coordinated with OPM to incorporate key objectives in its NS2020 strategy to address and mitigate challenges with regards to government-wide expertise needed to execute the NS2020 program. However, as of May 2017, GSA had not demonstrated that it had studied potential government-wide telecommunications expertise shortfalls or used the study to shape the NS2020 strategic approach.
    Recommendation: To improve planning and execution of the next telecommunications transition, the Administrator of General Services should ensure that the lessons are applied, based on priority and available resources, to the next transition strategy.

    Agency: General Services Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: The General Services Administration has not implemented this recommendation but has taken steps to address it. In April 2014, the agency developed a strategy for transitioning to the next telecommunications contract vehicle. The strategy described the lessons learned that contributed to the delay in the prior transition and identified approaches the agency planned to take to apply the lessons learned. For example, it identified high level plans for addressing the need for improved management of the complex acquisition process and the need for technical and contracting telecommunications expertise across the government. As of August 2016, GSA had prioritized the lessons learned and considered the resources needed to apply them. However, as of May 2017, the agency had not demonstrated that it had ensured that the lessons were applied, based on priority and available resources, to the next transition strategy. We will continue to monitor GSA's efforts to implement the recommendation.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202)512-3000

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts, and to improve clarity, consistency, and completeness of the baselines reported to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MDA, for resource baselines, obtain independent cost estimates for each baseline.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on our report, the agency concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken all actions necessary to implement it. Although the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has received independent cost estimates from its internal independent cost group for some programs and components that support the baselines provided in MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), MDA officials told us they have not yet completed independent estimates for all the BAR baselines. In addition, the independent estimates will not have full lifecycle costs which will hamper their effectiveness. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress over the course of our next annual review.
    Recommendation: To strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts, and to improve clarity, consistency, and completeness of the baselines reported to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MDA, for schedule baselines, in meeting new statutory requirements to report variances between reported acquisition baselines, also report variances between the test plan as presented in the previous acquisition baseline and the test plan as executed that explain the reason for any changes.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the Department of Defense concurred with our recommendation and has taken initial steps to report the test variances, by laying out the dates of the proposed changes. However, the variances do not include all changes to test objectives, detail when tests are deleted, nor when the altered objectives will be satisfied. MDA has initiated an effort with DOT&E and the OTA to track the movement of test objectives, however these changes are not reported and are only used internally. In addition, MDA utilizes a "mid-year" test change memorandum. The change explains the difference from the prior master test plan, but is not reported. Thus, changes that are included in the mid-year memorandum can not be tracked if one only receives the annual test plan. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress in fiscal year 2017 and determine whether MDA lays out the changes in its upcoming integrated master test plan.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202)512-3000

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct MDA to ensure that developmental hardware and software changes are not made to the operational baseline that disrupt the assessments needed to understand the capabilities and limitations of new BMDS developments.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation. In the June 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provided some operational baselines and continues to do so annually. Nonetheless, configuration changes continue to pose challenges to a thorough assessment of the BMDS architecture. For example, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the many configurations of the fielded ground-based interceptor inhibits a full evaluation of the GMD program. Moreover, some changes to BMDS elements are still delivered while testing of the architecture is already underway. We will continue to assess whether MDA fully adopts an approach allowing time for the warfighter and testers to fully understand hardware and software before placing it in the operational baseline.