Weaknesses in NRC's Security Clearance Program

T-RCED-89-14: Published: Mar 15, 1989. Publicly Released: Mar 15, 1989.

Additional Materials:

Contact:

Office of Public Affairs
(202) 512-4800
youngc1@gao.gov

GAO discussed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) personnel security clearance program. GAO found that NRC: (1) did not conduct required background investigations of its employees, which could cause potential security risks; (2) waived investigative requirements for about 99 percent of its employees because it took between 10 months and 1 year to complete security clearances, at an excessive cost; (3) failed to reinvestigate about 50 percent of its cleared employees and had no knowledge of whether they posed security risks; (4) applied its reinvestigation policies to all fuel facility employees, but failed to require reinvestigations for its employees with low-level clearances; (5) received information on drug- and alcohol-related problems among nuclear power plant employees, but failed to investigate or suspend clearances; and (6) lacked effective internal controls to manage its program and update its automated clearance database, which contained inaccurate and outdated information.

Sep 22, 2016

Sep 15, 2016

Aug 15, 2016

Aug 1, 2016

Jun 20, 2016

Jun 13, 2016

May 25, 2016

Apr 14, 2016

Mar 10, 2016

Looking for more? Browse all our products here