Navy Shipbuilding Programs:

Nuclear Attack Submarine Issues

T-NSIAD-95-162: Published: May 16, 1995. Publicly Released: May 16, 1995.

Additional Materials:

Contact:

Office of Public Affairs
(202) 512-4800
youngc1@gao.gov

GAO discussed the continuing production of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). GAO noted that: (1) there are less costly alternatives for maintaining the Navy's required SSN force structure; (2) the Navy could maintain low-rate production of the submarines or defer production until after year 2000; (3) the cost savings from deferring production would be offset by reconstitution costs for existing submarines; (4) the Navy based its approach on the perceived need to maintain a competitive industrial base for the submarines; (5) there is no consensus on the threat posed by Russian submarines because Russian operating capabilities, force readiness, and defense plans are uncertain; (6) although one shipbuilder's premise that consolidating shipbuilding at one shipyard would save money, there is insufficient time and information to validate its assumption; and (7) by consolidating shipbuilding operations, the Navy could order new ships as needed rather than providing sustained production.

May 21, 2015

May 20, 2015

May 18, 2015

May 14, 2015

May 7, 2015

May 6, 2015

Looking for more? Browse all our products here