Nuclear Security: Improvements Needed in DOE's Safeguards and Security Oversight
RCED-00-62
Published: Feb 24, 2000. Publicly Released: Mar 15, 2000.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) oversight activities for nuclear laboratories' safety and security programs, focusing on: (1) the monitoring and tracking of findings resulting from DOE's oversight activities; (2) the correction, validation, and closing of findings resulting from such activities; and (3) the consistency of various DOE assessments of the laboratories' safeguard and security programs.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Energy | To improve the oversight of safeguards and security activities at DOE's laboratories, the Secretary of Energy should require that DOE's safeguards and security information system contain IOPA's and operations offices' safeguards and security findings. To the extent practical, the key findings of other organizations, such as DOE's Inspector General, should be included. |
Closed – Implemented
A March 2000 change to DOE Order 470.2A, "Security and Emergency Management Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance Program," now requires that IOPA findings and associated corrective actions be tracked in the Safeguards and Security Information Management System.
|
| Department of Energy | To improve the oversight of safeguards and security activities at DOE's laboratories, the Secretary of Energy should provide for access to the system by DOE's area-office and laboratory safeguards and security staff with a legitimate need. Such access should be in accordance with DOE's security restrictions. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE agrees with the spirit of this recommendation, but states that implementing it creates a number of practical and security-related concerns. The Office of Security Affairs is currently training DOE area office personnel who will be provided access to the system. Prior to providing contractors access to the system, the Office of Security Affairs is conducting an evaluation to compare the cost of reconfiguring the system to control need-to-know versus the benefits of this change.
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| Department of Energy | To improve the oversight of safeguards and security activities at DOE's laboratories, the Secretary of Energy should require IOPA to verify and validate correction of its findings and continue its involvement in developing corrective actions for findings resulting from its inspections. The Secretary should also make these responsibilities binding by incorporating them into the DOE directives system. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE Order 470.2A, entitled "Security and Emergency Management Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance Program" was revised as of March 1, 2000, to formalize DOE's corrective action plan process, including establishing a role for the Independent Oversight Office in verifying and validating corrective actions.
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| Department of Energy | To improve the oversight of safeguards and security activities at DOE's laboratories, the Secretary of Energy should ensure, to the extent possible, that rating criteria used by the various safeguards and security oversight organizations are more consistent and accurately reflect the effectiveness of safeguards and security at all DOE's nuclear facilities. |
Closed – Implemented
In the report, GAO noted that some action was already underway to correct the problem. Contract performance criteria, on some contracts, is now more closely linked to rating and the results of IOPA inspections and operations office surveys. The Office of Security Affairs has also taken steps to ensure that ratings included in the Annual Report to the President are derived from the results of IOPA inspections and operations office surveys. However, it not clear when or if all contracts will contain performance criteria that can be linked to security ratings.
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Topics
Homeland securityManagement information systemsNuclear facility safetyNuclear facility securityNuclear weaponsPerformance measuresRisk assessmentSafeguardsSafety standardsTerrorismRoot cause analysis