Skip to main content

F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals

NSIAD-99-55 Published: Mar 15, 1999. Publicly Released: Mar 15, 1999.
Jump To:
Skip to Highlights

Highlights

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO followed up on its report on the Air Force's F-22 engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) program, focusing on whether: (1) the Air Force is likely to complete the EMD program without exceeding the cost limitation established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998; and (2) GAO had access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on matters covered by this report.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to formulate a more realistic avionics development schedule. In doing so, the Secretary should consider the progress to date, the Joint Estimating Team's avionics schedule, and the impact a more realistic schedule would have on the EMD programs' estimated cost.
Closed – Not Implemented
DOD did not believe that additional direction from the Secretary of Defense was warranted. DOD stated that it believed that mechanisms already in place to monitor the F-22 program are adequate to ensure that the status of program cost and the development schedule, particularly avionics development and integration, are fully understood prior to the production decision. The recommendation should be closed.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should evaluate how decisions regarding C-130J production are likely to impact F-22 EMD and assess the Air Force's ability to negate additional overhead costs that may be allocated to F-22 EMD.
Closed – Implemented
Although DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, it indicated that such evaluations and assessments would only be speculation, and did not promise any action, except to negotiate overhead rates in the normal course of business. However, following this report, the DCMA did a review of the overhead rates for the F-22, assessing the impacts of changing business base caused by the C-130 J program. The result showed that the F-22 would have to absorb a larger share of the overhead costs. GAO reported this information to Congress the following year in NSIAD-00-68.

Full Report

Office of Public Affairs

Topics

Air Force procurementAvionicsDefense capabilitiesFighter aircraftFuture budget projectionsMilitary budgetsMilitary cost controlOperational testingProcurement planningWeapons systems