Army Reserve Components:
Cost, Readiness, and Personnel Implications of Restructuring Agreement
NSIAD-95-76: Published: Mar 7, 1995. Publicly Released: Mar 7, 1995.
- Full Report:
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Offsite Agreement, a major restructuring of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, focusing on the agreement's: (1) implementation costs; (2) impact on readiness; (3) efforts to absorb displaced personnel; (4) effect on the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; and (5) impact on the Special Operations Command's training of special Guard forces.
GAO found that: (1) implementation of the Offsite Agreement could cost over $180 million; (2) the Army's latest cost estimate is about $85 million; (3) GAO believes that the Army's estimate excludes training costs that the Guard will likely incur and includes savings in operating costs that would have resulted regardless of the agreement; (4) it is too early to tell how the agreement will affect readiness for most units; (5) the Guard did not identify specific units that will assume the missions of 20 inactivating Reserve units; another 107 Reserve units are new and have 1 year to establish their readiness ratings; (6) GAO estimated the readiness impact for some units; 13 units will be replaced by units with lower readiness ratings, while 18 units will be replaced by units having the same or higher readiness ratings; (7) the Guard and Reserve have primarily left it up to the reserve component commands and individual units to help affected persons find new units; (8) in three areas already affected by the agreement (the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade, aviation units, and special operations units) some of the commands' and units' initiatives appear to be working well; (9) others, however, appear to discourage the transfer of personnel, even if a transfer would result in a more effective use of their skills; (10) senior and experienced officers and enlisted persons in inactivating units appear to have the most difficulty obtaining positions in other units in the Reserve and the Guard; (11) reserve helicopter pilots and technicians are also experiencing difficulties; and (12) GAO found no evidence indicating that the Special Operations Command will have problems exercising control over the training of Guard special operations forces.