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Javelin Antitank Weapon: Quantity and Identification Capability Need to Be Reassessed

NSIAD-92-330 Published: Sep 14, 1992. Publicly Released: Sep 24, 1992.
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Highlights

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Army's Javelin antitank weapon system program, focusing on the: (1) causes for cost increases and schedule delays and the likelihood of further increases and delays; (2) the Army's reassessment of the number of Javelins it needs, based on current threat assessments; and (3) Javelin's improved capability for distinguishing friend from foe.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of the Army The Secretary of the Army should reassess the quantity of Javelin missiles and command launch units needed in light of the current threat assessments and Army force structure reduction plans.
Closed – Implemented
In preparation for the Low-Rate Initial Production Decision Defense Acquisition Board, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has asked the Army to update its Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). In December 1993, because of force reductions and budgetary constraints, the Army reduced its planned procurements of Javelin missiles and command launch units. The Army reduced planned missile procurements from 58,000 to 25,126, or by 56.7 percent, and planned command launch unit procurements from 5,000 to 3,855 units, or 41.2 percent.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should determine whether the Javelin should be capable of positive target identification and, if so, define the capability as part of the system's operational requirement.
Closed – Implemented
The Javelin is not required to have the capability to distinguish friend from foe. The Army evaluated the Javelin's capability in this area during developmental and operational tests. The Army found that the Javelin has some inherent capabilities. The gunner can, to some extent, identify target images produced by the Javelin's infrared optics to distinguish friend from enemy. However, the gunner's ability to accomplish this task will be dependent on (1) the weather, (2) distance from the target, and (3) training. Because of the number of friendly fire deaths during Operation Desert Storm, the Army is developing identification equipment. Its current expectation is that this equipment, suitable for use with the Javelin, will be available about 5 years after the Javelin is first provided to the soldier.

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Topics

Antitank weaponsArmy procurementCost analysisCost overrunsDefense economic analysisMilitary cost controlMissilesTestingWeapons systemsMilitary forces