Electronic Warfare: Navy/Air Force Still Developing Separate, Costly Radar Warning Receivers
NSIAD-87-167
Published: Jul 01, 1987. Publicly Released: Jul 01, 1987.
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Highlights
GAO reviewed Air Force and Navy radar warning receiver (RWR) programs, focusing on the: (1) Department of Defense's (DOD) lack of response to prior recommendations for achieving commonality in RWR acquisition programs; and (2) Air Force's and Navy's continued acquisition of separate receivers and the adverse effects resulting from this acquisition.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should select the best RWR equipment, based on cost and effectiveness, for maximum common use on existing Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD has determined that near-term commonality of RWR is too costly and intends to solve the problem of RWR proliferation through the development of the Integrated Electronic Warfare System (INEWS) for the next generation tactical aircraft. A future review is planned.
|
| Department of Defense | Until the selection of the common RWR, the Secretary of Defense should slow production and delay further contract awards for RWR until operational tests provide reasonable assurance that their performance will be satisfactory. |
Closed – Not Implemented
DOD believes that if current production is slowed, new aircraft could be delivered without installed RWR. In their view, the INEWS system will solve the problem for the future.
|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should stop those RWR programs that cannot be demonstrated as cost-effective. |
Closed – Not Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation.
|
| Department of Defense | To ensure selection of the best RWR, the cost-effectiveness analyses performed should not be restricted to short-term cost, but should consider the life-cycle costs, including expected savings to result from commonality. |
Closed – Implemented
The Office of the Secretary of Defense required the Navy to prepare a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) for the AN/ALR-67 advanced special receiver and also suggested that the Navy deter the development of the receiver because the Air Force already developed a receiver with the latest technology. The Navy is proceeding with its own new development program.
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Air defense systemsAir Force procurementAircraft componentsCombat readinessConcurrencyMilitary communicationNaval procurementRadar equipmentTestingWarning systems