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Why Some Weapon Systems Encounter Production Problems While Others Do Not: Six Case Studies

NSIAD-85-34 Published: May 24, 1985. Publicly Released: May 24, 1985.
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Highlights

GAO identified the causes of early production problems six weapons systems experienced and how such problems might be avoided in future acquisitions. The programs reviewed were the: (1) Copperhead projectile; (2) Black Hawk Helicopter; (3) High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM); (4) Tomahawk cruise missile; (5) F-16 fighter; and (6) Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM).

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense When establishing those elements of a new weapons system development program which directly affect the balance between technical concerns and production concerns, such as technical performance requirements and the terms of competition, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that provisions are also made to induce an adequate level of production preparations to be conducted early and continuously throughout the weapon's development.
Closed – Implemented
DOD has published a detailed manual, 4245.7-M, to accompany DOD Directive 4245.7 on Transition to Production. The manual emphasizes a balanced technical approach to weapons development, and GAO has seen evidence of such balance in some new programs like the LHX Helicopter.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that, when contemplating decisions which have known production risks in weapon programs such as those regarding requirements changes and funding reductions, decisionmakers explicitly assess those risks before making decisions.
Closed – Implemented
GAO has seen a renewed emphasis on production criteria employed at decision points and has been present at DOD courses of instruction which are emphasizing this to new program managers.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should employ production readiness reviews as a tool for managing production preparations to progressively reduce production risks, beginning early and repeating them at intervals during full-scale development.
Closed – Implemented
DOD has begun to apply production readiness more seriously and consistently. Recently, such a review on a critical Army Aquila subsystem revealed major production concerns over 1 year before the scheduled production decision.

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Topics

National Defense
Airborne operationsBallistic missilesDefense cost controlMilitary aircraftNational defense operationsProduction engineeringResearch and development costsWeapons systemsMilitary forcesEngineering