How the Army Planned for Three New Divisions and How This Can Be Improved (Unclassified Digest of Classified Report)
LCD-76-454: Published: Aug 4, 1977. Publicly Released: Dec 3, 1982.
- Full Report:
The Army did not prepare a comprehensive plan detailing how it was going to put into operation, coordinate, and supervise the reorganization of its forces following the reduction in combat forces after the Vietnam War. As a result, the Army has had numerous problems, and further changes may be needed to set up the combat capability the Army seeks.
Planning was not adequate for accomplishing the reorganization and subsequent changes. The Army may have activated too many units too soon, and units activated over a year ago still do not have the proper mix of personnel and equipment to conduct effective training.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Comments: Please call 202/512-6100 for additional information.
Matter: The Secretary of Defense should require the Secretary of the Army to: improve the Army's planning process to correct existing problems; provide Congress with an updated, inclusive estimated cost of the reorganization to bring about full combat readiness; upgrade the level of organization of round out brigades so an entire division can proceed toward a comparable readiness goal; make provisions to provide the missing air defense batteries needed; apprise Congress of whether or not the new reduced support forces can provide adequate support; give the 7th Infantry Division priority over the other new divisions for noncommissioned officers with combat skills and equipment; establish a priority system so that each unit of each division receives necessary personnel and equipment, according to its priority, to conduct training and become combat ready as soon as possible; and establish a system assuring coordination between the Military Personnel Center, the Army Forces Command, and the Recruiting Command in planning the assignment of personnel to new units.