Summary
DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's CBRNE consequence management plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal plans; (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance; (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared for their mission; and (4) DOD has CCMRF funding plans that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. GAO also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities have not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. We previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and schedule to complete the planning system. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify all requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities are spread across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with funding also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements and funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains challenged.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
| Director: |
Davi M. Dagostino |
| Team: |
Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management |
| Phone: |
No phone on record |
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: In the absence of completed plans under the Integrated Planning System or other specific guidance on DOD's expected contribution to the federal response to a domestic CBRNE-related incident, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to work with DHS, FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on interim goals, objectives, and planning assumptions for DOD's role in responding to one or more simultaneously occurring CBRNE incidents in the United States.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: In the absence of completed plans under the Integrated Planning System or other specific guidance on DOD's expected contribution to the federal response to a domestic CBRNE-related incident, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to work with DHS, FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on the specific types and quantities of capabilities that DOD is expected to contribute and the time frames in which those capabilities are to be provided.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: In order to ensure that DOD's plans are consistent with stated program goals, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of NORTHCOM and the military services to align plans for all parts of CCMRF, including specialized and general-purpose units, with stated objectives for CCMRF, and include in their planning efforts the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response requirements and stated CCMRF mission goals.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: In order to ensure that DOD's plans are consistent with stated program goals, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of NORTHCOM and the military services to work with the state governors through the states' Adjutants General and the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing CCMRF and ensure that the agreements being established between DOD and state governors include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty and response status.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: In order to increase the assurance that CCMRF can effectively provide CBRNE consequence management in support of civil authorities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of NORTHCOM--in coordination with the military services--to include in the CCMRF training program requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct a joint field training exercise as part of its mission validation.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: In order to increase the assurance that CCMRF can effectively provide CBRNE consequence management in support of civil authorities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of NORTHCOM--in coordination with the military services--to include in the CCMRF training program requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice deployment readiness exercise annually.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and the Service Secretaries to determine the time needed by units to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF training.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and the Service Secretaries to examine sourcing options that would ensure that units had adequate time to train prior to mission assumption once they had all required personnel and equipment.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: In order to provide a departmentwide understanding of requirements, priorities, and resource shortfalls and to identify potential redundancies and gaps in CCMRF resourcing, the Secretary of Defense should, in coordination with the Commander of NORTHCOM, the Secretaries of the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and the heads of participating defense agencies, determine the total requirements for CCMRF, including unique, nonstandard equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises CCMRF, and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: In order to provide a departmentwide understanding of requirements, priorities, and resource shortfalls and to identify potential redundancies and gaps in CCMRF resourcing, the Secretary of Defense should, in coordination with the Commander of NORTHCOM, the Secretaries of the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and the heads of participating defense agencies, develop an overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating this strategy.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
