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Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities

GAO-09-856 Published: Sep 16, 2009. Publicly Released: Sep 16, 2009.
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Highlights

In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing and rapidly fielding a global Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of elements that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems. These elements are envisioned to be linked together to defend against a broad range of ballistic missile threats. In 2009, DOD began a broadly scoped review of missile defense policy and strategy intended to reassess the BMDS and set direction for the future. In response to congressional interest in missile defense requirements and operations, GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs and (2) established the units to operate elements that have been put into use. GAO reviewed key analyses, studies, plans, and other documents from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the services, combatant commands, and Joint Staff; and interviewed officials from across DOD.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense To establish the foundation needed to make effective policy, strategy, budgetary, and acquisition decisions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive analysis of the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors that are required for performing ballistic missile defense missions worldwide. The analysis should consider the integration of elements; risk assessments of the threat, capabilities and limitations of the BMDS, and redundancy requirements; allied contributions; the employment of elements that can perform multiple types of ballistic missile defense missions and other missions; and any other relevant factors identified by the department.
Closed – Implemented
We are closing this recommendation as implemented because DOD has conducted a number of comprehensive analyses and considered a range of factors required for performing ballistic missile defense (BMD) missions worldwide, as our recommendation intended. Since our report was issued, DOD has conducted numerous analyses of its BMD requirements worldwide, including the Joint Capabilities Mix Study (JCM III), 16 follow-on JCM III excursion studies, and at least 8 other BMD assessments. We found that the JCM III study and its 16 excursion studies incorporated factors we recommended that DOD include in its comprehensive analysis, including integration of elements, risk assessment of threat, BMDS capabilities and limitations, allied contributions, and employment of multi-mission platforms. DOD also has a number of completed and ongoing BMD assessments, including one examining BMD sensor requirements worldwide and a comprehensive portfolio review examining DOD's entire air and missile defense portfolio. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed a study on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system requirements in order to inform DOD?s budget request, and the Secretary of Defense directed this study to be used to inform annual program reviews, OSD resourcing, and the Army's process for determining overall force structure requirements. Because DOD conducted these studies as we recommended, the department has a more comprehensive analytic basis for making better policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic missile defense.
Department of Defense To establish the foundation needed to make effective policy, strategy, budgetary, and acquisition decisions, the Secretary of Defense should use this analysis as a foundation for evaluating DOD's ballistic missile defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget requests as well as its overall ballistic missile defense policy and strategy direction.
Closed – Implemented
In agreeing to this recommendation, DOD stated that its comprehensive analysis would shape ballistic missile defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget requests, and its overall ballistic missile defense policy, strategy, and future deployment options. Since our report was issued, DOD has conducted a number of analyses incorporating factors we recommended, such as the Joint Capabilities Mix Study III (JCM III), 16 excursions to the JCM III, and at least 8 other BMD assessments. According to DOD officials, the JCM III, excursion studies and other BMD assessments were among the factors used to make programmatic recommendations for acquiring specific numbers and types of launch platforms, interceptors, and sensors. Specifically, one of the Joint Capabilities Mix Study III goals included supporting the development of the FY13 budget submission and future budget submissions by conducting a sufficiency analysis of ballistic missile defense assets. In addition, findings from the JCM III study were presented to the Missile Defense Executive Board, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Deputy's Management Action Group to inform policy on procuring sufficient interceptors and to prioritize on specific BMD areas. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed a study on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system requirements in order to inform DOD's budget request, and the Secretary of Defense directed this study to be used to inform annual program reviews, OSD resourcing, and the Army's process for determining overall force structure requirements. Taken together, DOD's actions have the effect of implementing the intent of our recommendation.
Department of Defense To reduce the potential risks associated with operating ballistic missile defense elements with insufficient force structure, the Secretary of Defense should require, in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that operational units be established with the organizations, personnel, and training needed to perform all of their ballistic missile defense responsibilities before first making elements available for operational use.
Closed – Implemented
DOD closed this recommendation as implemented in February 2011, stating that, as part of the routine business of fielding systems, it requires operational units be established with the organizations, personnel, and training needed to perform of their ballistic missile defense responsibilities before elements are first made available for operational use. During our followup on this recommendation, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that, partly as a result of our report, DOD has established a standard process to ensure that ballistic missile defense elements are fielded with operational units, personnel, and training in place. Specifically, the officials told us that guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued in June 2011, creates a standard process for defining the conditions under which ballistic missile defense elements will be made available for operations for the first time. We reviewed three agreements prepared under this direction that cover elements that either have been deployed since our report was issued, or will be deployed at a future date, and determined that each agreement requires the services to prepare the forces needed for operations, as our recommendation intended. For example, the THAAD and AN/TPY-2 radar agreements both require the Army and MDA to meet Army full materiel release requirements when accepting operational responsibility for the element for the first time. Upon full materiel release, according to Army regulations, the Army has identified manpower and personnel requirements to operate and maintain the element, and determined that training is adequate. The THAAD agreement further specifies that the Army is required to train instructors and key personnel, and approve the unit's organizational requirements. The AN/TPY-2 agreement also requires the Army to organize and field radar detachments, and train soldiers and establish units for radar operations. Additionally, the agreement covering the Aegis Ashore element requires the Navy to develop the manpower, training, and infrastructure requirements needed for operations. The agreement also obligates the Navy to fund military pay and allowances, site and facility operations, and ensure that the Navy budget reflects operational funding requirements for Aegis Ashore sites at the time the system is first fielded. DOD's actions to develop this approach implements the intent of our recommendation and, as a result, mitigates potential risk as new ballistic missile defense elements are fielded for the first time.

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Topics

Ballistic missile defenseBallistic missilesCombat readinessDefense capabilitiesDefense procurementMilitary communicationMilitary research and developmentMissilesRequirements definitionStrategic planningWeapons systemsRadar equipmentMilitary trainingDefense contingency planningMilitary forcesFederal procurementAir defense systems