Defense Acquisitions

Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems

GAO-09-520, Jul 30, 2009

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From 2008 through 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest over $16 billion to develop and procure additional unmanned aircraft systems. To more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, DOD recognizes that it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft programs. Doing so, however, requires certain trade-offs and complex budget, cost, and schedule interactions. GAO was asked to assess the progress of selected unmanned aircraft acquisition programs, examine the extent to which the services are collaborating and identifying commonality among those programs, and identify key factors impacting the effectiveness their collaboration. GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and performance data for eight unmanned aircraft systems--accounting for over 80 percent of DOD's total planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013--and two payload programs.

While proving successful on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft acquisitions continue to incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative development costs for the 10 programs GAO reviewed increased by over $3.3 billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates--with nearly $2.7 billion attributed to the Air Force's Global Hawk program. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 programs experienced significant growth ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. These outcomes are largely the result of changes in program requirements and system designs. Procurement funding requirements have also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in the number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities that had been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, with unit cost increases of 25 percent or more for 3 aircraft programs. Finally, several programs have experienced significant delays in achieving initial operating capability, ranging from 1 to nearly 4 years. Several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs GAO reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Marine Corps chose to procure the Army's Shadow system after it determined Shadow could meet its requirements, and was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver capability to the warfighter. Also, the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system will use a modified Global Hawk airframe. However, other programs have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies. The Army's Sky Warrior--which is a variant of the Air Force's Predator, is being developed by the same contractor, and will provide similar capabilities--was initiated as a separate development program in 2005. Sky Warrior development is now estimated to cost nearly $570 million. DOD officials continue to press for more commonality in the two programs, but the aircraft still have little in common. Although several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration are key factors that have inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. For example, the Army chose to develop a new sensor payload for its Sky Warrior, despite the fact that the sensor currently used on the Air Force's Predator is comparable and manufactured by the same contractor. To support their respective requirements, the services also make resource allocation decisions independently. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. To maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems.

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Recommendations for Executive Action

Recommendation: To more effectively leverage resources and increase the efficiency in unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs, the Secretary of Defense should direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements for current unmanned aircraft programs, develop a strategy for making systems and subsystems among those programs more common, and report the findings of this analysis to Congress. At a minimum, this analysis should quantify the costs and benefits of alternative approaches, identify specific actions that need to be taken, and summarize the status of DOD's various ongoing unmanned aircraft-related studies.

Agency Affected: Department of Defense

Status: Open

Comments: Since the issuance of our report in July 2009, DOD has conducted several studies and analyses aimed at identifying opportunities for greater commonality and efficiency among its unmanned aircraft system (UAS) programs. For example, DOD's UAS task force coordinated with the Joint Staff to conduct a review of the Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) and Air Force Global Hawk programs and evaluate opportunities for achieving greater commonality and joint efficiencies between those systems. UAS task force officials believe that DOD's BAMS and Global Hawk efforts are beginning to pay off, emphasizing that the Navy and Air Force have achieved increased commonality in both system and ground control station development. In addition, DOD has also been working to define joint interoperability requirements related to UAS. UAS task force officials have noted that efforts to define interoperability requirements are comprehensive, looking across the entire UAS portfolio. DOD has also continued to update its Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap that provides information about UAS initiatives and addresses various efforts to increase commonality and efficiency. Recent GAO work has found that DOD is making progress in achieving commonality among ground control stations, but not necessarily among aircraft or payloads.

Recommendation: To more effectively leverage resources and increase the efficiency in unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs, and prior to initiating any new unmanned aircraft program, the Secretary of Defense should require the military services to identify and document in their acquisition plans and strategies specific areas where commonality can be achieved, take an open systems approach to product development, conduct a quantitative analysis that examines the costs and benefits of various levels of commonality, and establish a collaborative approach and management framework to periodically assess and effectively manage commonality.

Agency Affected: Department of Defense

Status: Open

Comments: DOD believes that recent acquisition policy revisions and other reform efforts address the intent of our recommendation. However, DOD has not yet had an opportunity to institute the new policies and procedures for commonality because no major UAS programs have been initiated recently. However, there are several new UAS programs that will likely be initiated in the near term: a carrier based UAS, a couple of vertical take off and landing UAS, and a next generation UAS, currently known as MQ-X. OSD officials anticipate that these new programs will be required to take a collaborative approach to commonality and regularly report their progress to the defense acquisition executive. We will continue to monitor DOD's efforts and reassess this recommendation next year.