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Nuclear Security: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained

GAO-09-321 Published: Mar 16, 2009. Publicly Released: Apr 15, 2009.
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Highlights

In April 2008, the Department of Energy's (DOE) security inspection at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) found significant weaknesses, particularly in LLNL's protective force's ability to assure the protection of weapons-grade (special) nuclear material. LLNL is overseen by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, and managed by a contractor. NNSA is planning to remove most of the special nuclear material from LLNL. GAO was asked to (1) characterize security deficiencies identified in the 2008 inspection; (2) determine the factors that contributed to these deficiencies; (3) identify LLNL's corrective actions to address security deficiencies; and (4) assess LLNL's plan to permanently remove the riskiest special nuclear material from its site. To conduct this work, GAO visited LLNL, reviewed numerous documents and plans, and interviewed LLNL and NNSA security officials.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
National Nuclear Security Administration To improve and sustain federal oversight of security performance at LLNL, the Administrator of NNSA and the LSO Manager should develop a detailed plan and budget for implementing LSO's proposed security training program.
Closed – Implemented
At the time we issued our report, the Livermore Site Office (LSO) was implementing a new program to better train security officials to perform security assessments and recognize deficiencies; however, according to LSO officials, LSO did not have a specific budget to implement this new security training program. After our report was issued in March 2009, NNSA determined that all safeguards and security professionals, including those at LSO, should be enrolled in a headquarters-based technical training program, and Site Office Managers were requested to take the appropriate steps to ensure that enrollment and completion occurred. All LSO federal safeguards and security personnel were enrolled in the headquarters-based program on February 26, 2010 and had 18 months from this date to complete the program. As such, the LSO-specific program was canceled, but NNSA's actions meet the intent of our recommendation.
National Nuclear Security Administration To improve and sustain federal oversight of security performance at LLNL, the Administrator of NNSA and the LSO Manager should incorporate financial incentives into future performance evaluation plans, as allowed by the new LLNS management and operating contract, for sustaining security improvements at LLNL through the completion of the laboratory's Category I and II special nuclear material de-inventory.
Closed – Implemented
In March 2009, GAO recommended that to improve and sustain federal oversight of security performance at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the National Nuclear Security Administrator should incorporate financial incentives into future performance evaluation plans for sustaining security improvements at LLNL through the completion of the laboratory's Category I and II special nuclear material de-inventory. LLNL planned to complete this de-inventory by the end of fiscal year 2012. As such, NNSA had the opportunity to incorporate relevant financial incentives into its fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012 performance evaluation plans. On September 21, 2012, NNSA announced that LLNL had met its goal of completing removal of all Category I and II special nuclear material. GAO reviewed NNSA's relevant performance evaluation plans for LLNL and found that all three contained incentives to sustain security improvements through completion of de-inventory. Further, meeting the completion criteria to achieve the incentive would enable the LLNL contractor to earn an extension to its contract term. As such, GAO is closing this recommendation as implemented.

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AccountabilityFacility securityInformation classificationInspectionInteragency relationsInternal controlsInvestigations into federal agenciesLaboratoriesNoncomplianceNuclear facilitiesNuclear facility safetyNuclear facility securityNuclear materialsNuclear weaponsNuclear weapons plant securityPerformance measuresPhysical securityProgram evaluationProgram managementSafeguardsSecurity assessmentsSecurity investigationsSecurity threatsSurveysCorrective actionExecutive agency oversight