Homeland Defense
Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace
GAO-09-184, Jan 27, 2009
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According to U.S. intelligence, the threat to U.S airspace remains. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is to defend U.S. air space and the U.S. Air Force has 18 sites in the United States that conduct air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. ASA operations support fighter aircraft in conducting homeland air defense operations. GAO examined the extent to which (1) NORAD has adopted a risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD), NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance; (3) the Air Force assesses the readiness of units conducting ASA operations; and (4) the Air Force faces challenges in sustaining ASA operations for the future and what plans, if any, it has to address such challenges. GAO reviewed relevant ASA guidance, directives, and planning documents; and interviewed DOD officials, including the commanders of all 18 ASA sites.
Responding to individual requests from DOD, NORAD has done some assessments to determine ASA operational requirements. NORAD has not adopted a risk-based approach to determining ASA requirements, including routine risk assessments. Although GAO previously reported on the benefits to organizations that routinely do risk assessments to determine program requirements, NORAD does not conduct such assessments because DOD does not require NORAD to do so. However, such assessments could enhance NORAD's ability to determine and apply the appropriate levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft for the ASA mission. The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations in accordance with DOD, NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance, which instruct the Air Force to establish ASA as a steady-state (ongoing and indefinite) mission. The Air Force has not implemented the 140 actions it identified to establish ASA as a steady-state mission, which included integrating ASA operations into the Air Force's planning, programming, and funding cycle. The Air Force has instead been focused on other priorities, such as overseas military operations. While implementing ASA as a steady-state mission would not solve all of the challenges the units must address, it would help them mitigate some of the challenges associated with conducting both their ASA and warfighting missions. NORAD has partially assessed the readiness of ASA units; however the Air Force has not evaluated personnel, training, and quantity and quality of equipment. Readiness measures are designed to ensure that DOD forces are properly trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct their assigned missions. For example, while NORAD evaluated the extent to which aircraft were maintained for ASA operations and the units' ability to respond to an alert and to locate and intercept aircraft, it did not evaluate training. Because the Air Force has not implemented ASA as a steady-state mission or formally assigned the mission to the units, it does not assess ASA readiness. By assessing the readiness of units that consistently conduct ASA operations, DOD would be better assured that these units are organized, trained, and equipped to perform ASA operations. The Air Force faces two challenges to sustaining its ASA capabilities over the long term--(1) replacing or extending the service life of aging fighter aircraft and (2) replacing ASA units with equipment and trained personnel when they deploy. For example, if aircraft are not replaced by 2020, 11 of the 18 current air sovereignty alert sites could be without aircraft. The Air Force has not developed plans to mitigate these challenges because it has been focused on other priorities. Plans would provide the Air Force information that could assist it in ensuring the long-term sustainability of ASA operations and the capability of ASA units to protect U.S. airspace.
Status Legend:
Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
- In Process
- Open
- Closed - implemented
- Closed - not implemented
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of the U.S. command element of NORAD to routinely conduct risk assessments to determine ASA requirements, including the appropriate numbers of ASA sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA operations.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD stated that it partially concurred with our draft report recommendation to employ a risk-based management approach. However, DOD also stated that it believes that sufficient guidance and a longstanding risk-based process currently guide its decisions on ASA operations and, therefore, it does not plan on taking any additional actions until additional requirements are identified through its current process. The process described in DOD?s response does not include a critical component of a risk-based management approach?the use of routine risk assessments that incorporate threat, vulnerability, and consequence, and is used to develop scenarios and help inform actions that are best suited to prevent an attack or mitigate vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack. As such, we adjusted our recommendation to clarify the need to routinely conduct a risk assessment specific to ASA operations. Specifically, we have revised the recommendation to suggest that DOD routinely conduct risk assessments to determine ASA requirements, including the appropriate numbers of ASA sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA operations. We believe that this clarification would be consistent with NORAD and Air Force officials responsible for ASA operations, who told us that a routine risk assessment that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality would be beneficial to enhance their ability to determine the appropriate level and types of resources?including units, personnel, and aircraft?for ASA operations. We also continue to believe our work shows that such assessments would benefit DOD, Congress, and the National Guard Bureau by clearly demonstrating the basis for future investments in ASA operations. In an April 2009 hearing before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, DOD told Congress that it would implement this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services with units that consistently conduct ASA operations to formally assign ASA duties to these units and then ensure that the readiness of these units is fully assessed, to include personnel, training, equipment, and ability to respond to an alert.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD stated that it partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to formally assign ASA duties to units that consistently conduct ASA operations and ensure their readiness is fully assessed. DOD commented that the Secretary of Defense is furnishing clear direction through the EXORD, which it says formally assigns supported and supporting roles to multipleagencies. Further, DOD commented that the exclusive assignment of any specific Air Force units and sites would appear to be inconsistent with the flexibility and capabilities under the EXORD. Our original recommendation did not suggest that DOD modify the EXORD to assign the ASA mission exclusively to the Air Force; the EXORD does not replace the mission document statements issued by services to their operational units. Moreover, without a mission document statement and formal assignment of the mission to units, ASA readiness will not be assessed. DOD also commented that it wants to retain the flexibility to use military services other than the Air Force to conduct ASA operations. We had initially focused this recommendation on the Secretary of the Air Force because, at the time of our review, the units conducting ASA operations had historically been Air Force units. The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that such missions are clearly assigned to performing units and that readiness for these operations be fully assessed, regardless of which service performs them. Therefore, we have modified our recommendation to make it clearer that the Secretary of Defense should direct any of the military services that have units consistently conducting ASA operations to formally assign ASA duties to these units and ensure their readiness to conduct ASA operations is fully assessed. In an April 2009 hearing before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, a representative from the Air Force told Congress that it would implement this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation to implement ASA as a steadystate mission, but its comments did not state whether the Air Force will implement the ASA program action directive, nor did it address specific actions to implement ASA as a steady-state mission?an important step in helping to resolve ongoing difficulties that we identified in our report. Rather, DOD?s response indicated that the Air Force would review and update the ASA program action directive and other key policy documents by the end of fiscal year 2009. DOD also commented that it plans to identify, in the Future Years Defense Program, the impact of any changes to future plans and resources. DOD also commented that it would include a detailed budget display for the ASA mission to comply with ?354 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.35 However, since DOD did not include in its comments a time frame for implementing ASA as a steady-state mission, including implementing the ASA program action directive, we modified the recommendation to suggest that the Secretary of Defense direct that the Secretary of the Air Force establish a timetable for this purpose. DOD also commented that it plans to review and update, as required, policy, operations, doctrine, steady-state alert requirements, and concept of operations for the ASA mission, pending a review of the Operation NOBLE EAGLE Execution Order (EXORD). We acknowledge that the EXORD would impact ASA operations. However, since (1) DOD did not provide a timeframe for these different reviews and ASA units are currently experiencing difficulties conducting ASA operations as discussed in this report and (2) the Air Force could implement ASA operations as a steady-state mission without changing the EXORD, we continue to believe the Air Force needs to implement ASA as a steady-state mission.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to implement ASA as a steady-state mission according to NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance by (1) updating and implementing the ASA program action directive; {2) updating the Air Force homeland defense policy, homeland operations doctrine, and concept of operations to incorporate and define the roles and responsibilities for ASA operations; and (3) incorporating the ASA mission within the Air Force submissions for the 6-year Future Years Defense Program.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement a plan to address any projected capability gaps in ASA units due to the expected end of the useful service lives of their F-15s and F-16s.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Air Force develop and implement a plan to address fighter capability gaps in ASA operational units that we identified based on our analysis of Air Force data and plans. In its comments, DOD discussed the capabilities needed for the broader, multiservice air defense mission, but did not clearly agree to ensure the fighter gaps we identified would be addressed in Air Force plans. Our recommendation is directed specifically at the issue of future fighter aircraft capabilities for ASA operations, which are currently conducted by the Air Force and the ANG. We continue to believe that our evidence supports the need to address these capability gaps in Air Force planning.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement a formal method to replace deploying units that still provides unit commanders flexibility to coordinate replacements.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a formal method to include ASA unit commanders? flexibility to replace deploying units. If the ASA mission is formally assigned to the performing units, DOD?s plan should be responsive to our recommendation