Skip to main content

Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed

GAO-08-187 Published: Jan 25, 2008. Publicly Released: Jan 25, 2008.
Jump To:
Skip to Highlights

Highlights

Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to identify and examine high-risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. GAO reported in 2003 and 2005 that CSI helped to enhance homeland security, and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations. To address these issues, GAO interviewed CBP officials and reviewed CSI evaluations and performance measures. GAO also visited selected U.S. and CSI seaports, and met with U.S. and foreign government officials.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Homeland Security To help ensure that CBP has the information needed to assess its achievement of CSI program goals to help enhance supply chain security--while at the same time balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of commerce--the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of U. S. Customs and Border Protection to strengthen CBP's process for evaluating CSI teams at overseas ports by (a) systematically capturing and maintaining all relevant evaluation data and documentation so that it can be used by CBP management to guide operating decisions, monitor program performance, and inform resource allocation decisions; (b) ensuring that CSI evaluation teams follow established evaluation procedures; and (c) monitoring the completion, within established time frames, of recommendations made in previous evaluations.
Closed – Implemented
We found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was not consistently collecting all available data to aid in its analysis of Container Security Initiative (CSI) team performance and we identified instances in which CBP did not reconcile contradictory information it had collected. As a result, we recommended steps to strengthen CBP's process for evaluating CSI teams at overseas ports. In response to our recommendation, CBP has enhanced its standardized Container Security Initiative Team Evaluation (CSITE) tool, which captures evaluation data through over 300 closed-ended questions. According to CBP, the tool's reporting and grading capabilities provide evaluators with feedback and analysis that identify any deficiencies, and furthermore the reporting functions enable CSI Division management to conduct initiative-wide analysis to identify systematic findings. Additionally, the CSITE tool includes questions that address whether recommendations were made in a prior evaluation report and whether the recommendations have been implemented. The enhancements to the CSITE tool prompt the user to verify that each question is answered prior to answering subsequent questions. This enhancement ensures that the CSITE tool can be used as a way to monitor the completion of recommendations made in previous evaluations. These measures are consistent with the intent of our recommendation.
Department of Homeland Security To help ensure that CBP has the information needed to assess its achievement of CSI program goals to help enhance supply chain security--while at the same time balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of commerce--the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of U. S. Customs and Border Protection to, in collaboration with host government officials, improve the information gathered about the host governments' examination systems--which includes people, processes, and equipment--at each CSI port by (a) establishing general guidelines and technical criteria regarding the minimal capability and operating procedures for an examination system that can provide CBP with a basis for determining the reliability of examinations and related CSI activities; (b) systematically collecting data for that purpose; and (c) analyzing the data against the guidelines and technical criteria to determine what, if any, mitigating actions or incentives CBP should take to help ensure the desired level of security.
Closed – Implemented
We found that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not have a sound basis for determining the reliability of the examination systems used at Container Security Initiative (CSI) seaports. As a result, we recommended that CBP improve the information gathered about the host governments' examination systems. In response to our recommendation, CBP enhanced its Container Security Initiative Team Evaluation (CSITE) tool, which includes questions that allow evaluators to note any concerns about examinations that need to be resolved. According to CBP officials, CBP also uses several methods to ensure that examinations of high-risk U.S.-bound cargo containers can reliably detect and identify potential weapons of mass destruction, including (1) conducting an initial assessment at a foreign port prior to establishing CSI operations at that port, (2) maintaining working relationships between CBP officers and host government customs officials/targeters, (3) reviewing information on inspection equipment (and their capabilities) used at the CSI ports, and (4) gathering information through the CSITE evaluations. According to CBP officials, all but four or five pieces of equipment used overseas are also equipment that CBP purchases for domestic scanning purposes; for equipment that is not used domestically, CBP has information on the specifications for that equipment. Additionally, CBP provided GAO with a copy of a database it maintains of the equipment used at CSI ports and the equipments' specifications to ensure that standards are met. These measures are consistent with the intent of our recommendation.
Department of Homeland Security To help ensure that CBP has the information needed to assess its achievement of CSI program goals to help enhance supply chain security--while at the same time balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of commerce--the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of U. S. Customs and Border Protection to enhance CSI performance measures to better assess CSI performance overall by (a) developing measures for all core CSI program functions designed to have a deterrent effect, (b) establishing annual performance targets--based on explicit assumptions--for all performance measures, and (c) revising how performance measures are calculated to take into account CSI program growth.
Closed – Implemented
We found that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had refined overall Container Security Initiative (CSI) performance measures, but had not fully developed performance measures and annual targets for core CSI functions, which could potentially limit the information available on overall CSI effectiveness. As a result, we recommended that CBP develop performance measures and targets for core CSI program functions. As of October 2010, CBP had established a performance measure, the percentage of requested examinations conducted, for which CBP established annual performance targets. According to CBP's Fiscal Year 2009 Performance and Accountability Report, this measure is an indication of the extent to which potential higher-risk cargo is satisfactorily inspected before it leaves the foreign port of origin. This annual performance report tracks this measure across fiscal years 2008 and 2009. The tracking of this performance measure is consistent with the intent of our recommendation.

Full Report

Office of Public Affairs

Topics

Cargo securityContainer securityHomeland securityPort securitySecurity assessmentsSecurity threatsSupply chain managementWeapons of mass destructionHuman capital managementPerformance measuresData collectionData integritySecurity regulationsStrategic planningHuman capital planningRisk assessmentRisk management