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Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department's Previous Cost Estimates

GAO-08-1108R Published: Sep 22, 2008. Publicly Released: Sep 22, 2008.
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Highlights

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, combating terrorism has been one of the nation's highest priorities. As part of that effort, preventing nuclear and radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States--perhaps to be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon or in a radiological dispersal device (a "dirty bomb")--has become a key national security objective. On April 15, 2005, the president directed the establishment, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), whose duties include acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation detection equipment. In October 2006, Congress enacted the SAFE Port Act, which made DNDO responsible for the development, testing, acquisition and deployment of a system to detect radiation at U.S. ports of entry. An important component of this system is the deployment of radiation portal monitors, large stationary detectors through which cargo containers and trucks pass as they enter the United States. Prior to DNDO's creation, another DHS agency--U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--managed programs for deployment of radiation detection equipment. In 2002, CBP began the radiation portal monitor project, deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. This program initially deployed portal monitors, known as polyvinyl toluene monitors (PVT), and handheld detection technologies, such as radioactive isotope identification devices (RIID). CBP also established a system of standard operating procedures to guide its officers in the use of this equipment. Current procedures include conducting primary inspections with PVTs to detect the presence of radioactivity, and secondary inspections with PVTs and RIIDs to confirm and identify the source and determine whether it constitutes a threat. After its creation, DNDO assumed responsibility for the development, testing, and deployment of radiation detection equipment, while CBP maintained its role of operating the equipment at U.S. ports of entry. Currently deployed PVTs are capable of detecting radiation, but they have an inherent limitation because they are unable to identify specific radioactive isotopes and therefore cannot distinguish between dangerous and benign materials. CBP officers also use RIIDs to identify different types of radioactive material. However, RIIDs are limited in their ability to identify nuclear material. DNDO believes that these deficiencies may delay legitimate commerce at ports of entry, and that CBP may use an inordinate amount of inspection resources for radiation detection at the expense of other missions, such as drug interdiction.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Director of DNDO to work with the Commissioner of CBP to update the projection execution plan to guide the entire radiation detection program at U.S. ports of entry. The new project execution plan should be based on documented requirements, and it should provide the agencies a flexible roadmap to acquiring, deploying, and using the most appropriate and cost-effective equipment available.
Closed – Implemented
According to DNDO officials, the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Project Execution Plan (PEP) (Revision 0) was accepted and approved by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in December 2006. It defined the work scope, schedules, costs, and required funding to deploy radiation detection systems at CBP posts of entry (POEs). The PEP was intended to be a living document that would be reviewed and updated as necessary as the project progresses. Accordingly, since the completion of Phase 4 of the RPM Deployment Schedule (Southern Border Crossings), and in lieu of the outdated PEP, the CBP and DNDO RPM team has been deploying Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) in accordance with a jointly-developed (DNDO and CBP) RPM Deployment Schedule. The RPM Deployment Schedule indicates the priority of RPMs to be deployed and the locations at which the systems will be deployed, subject to the availability of funding. According to DNDO officials, the Dec 2006 PEP is still in force, but as updated and amended in the current RPM deployment schedule. Th's provides both DNDO and CBP with a roadmap for deploying the most appropriate radiation portal monitors in light of current equipment and budgetary resources available as DHS continues to deploy and update currently deployed PVTs in the wake of the cancellation of the ASP program.
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Director of DNDO to revise DNDO's estimate of the program's cost and ensure that the estimate considers all the costs--design and development, sustainment, maintenance, deployment, and procurement--associated with its project execution plan.
Closed – Implemented
DHS/DNDO ultimately embraced the cost estimated done by GAO cited in this report. This GAO comprehensive cost estimate, which was based on the most recent and ultimately final project execution plan done by DHS/DNDO for the ASP program, provided an estimate that considered all the costs associated with the ASP program -- including design and development, sustainment, maintenance, deployment, and procurement. This cost estimate information, according to DHS officials, informed the Secretary's eventual decision to terminate the ASP program -- a decision that was first announced during Congressional testimony by the director of DNDO in July 2011 and confirmed in an October 3, 2011 letter from Secretary Napolitano to the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee.
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Director of DNDO to Communicate this revised estimate to the Congress so that it is fully apprised of the program's scope and funding requirements.
Closed – Implemented
DHS/DNDO ultimately embraced the cost estimated done by GAO cited in this report. This GAO comprehensive cost estimate, which was based on the most recent and ultimately final project execution plan done by DHS/DNDO for the ASP program, provided an estimate that considered all the costs associated with the ASP program -- including design and development, sustainment, maintenance, deployment, and procurement. This cost estimate information was communicated to Congress in this report, and, according to DHS officials, informed the Secretary's eventual decision to terminate the ASP program. Because of the Secretary's decision to terminate the program -- first announced in Director Stern's July 2011 testimony before a House Homeland Security subcommittee and confirmed by Secretary Napolitano's October 3, 2011 letter to the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee -- the program's scope was eliminated and there would be no further funding requirements.

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Topics

Combating terrorismCost analysisCost overrunsData collectionDefense capabilitiesDefense procurementHomeland securityNational defense operationsNuclear materialsNuclear radiation monitoringProgram evaluationProgram managementProtective equipmentRadiation monitoringRadiation safetyRadioactive materialsStandardsStrategic planningTerrorismCost awarenessCost estimatesCost objectivesProgram costs