Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $109 billion in its tactical air forces between 2007 and 2013. Long term, DOD plans to replace aging legacy aircraft with fewer, more expensive but more capable and stealthy aircraft. Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces within today's constrained budget environment is a formidable challenge. DOD has already incurred substantial cost and schedule overruns in its acquisition of new systems, and further delays could require billions of dollars in additional investments to keep legacy aircraft capable and sustainable. Because of the large investments and risk, GAO was asked to review investment planning for tactical aircraft. This report describes the current status of DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs; identifies current impacts on legacy aircraft modernization programs and retirement schedules; and assesses DOD's overall investment plan for tactical aircraft.
DOD's efforts to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces have been blunted by cost and schedule overruns in its new tactical aircraft acquisition programs: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Air Force F-22A, and the Navy F/A-18E/F. Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about $400 billion--with about three-fourths still to be invested. The JSF program, which is expected to make up the largest percentage of the new fleet, has more than 90 percent of its investments still in the future. Increased costs and extended development times have reduced DOD's buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy aircraft with about one-third fewer new aircraft compared to original plans at each program's inception. The outcomes of these acquisition programs directly impact existing tactical aircraft systems. Until new systems are acquired in sufficient quantities to replace legacy fleets, legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant. Continual schedule slips and reduced buys of new aircraft--particularly in the F-22A and JSF programs--make it difficult for program managers to allocate funds for modifying legacy aircraft to meet new requirements or to set retirement dates for legacy aircraft. Lengthening the life of legacy systems also impacts DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threats and reduces the department's flexibility to invest in new weapons. DOD's tactical aircraft investments are driven by the services' separate acquisition planning. Moving forward, these plans are likely unexecutable given competing demands from future defense and non defense budgets. The EA-6B--providing tactical radar jamming capabilities for all services and one of the few examples of a joint asset--is also expected to be replaced by separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Without a joint, DOD-wide strategy for tactical aircraft investments, it is difficult to identify potential areas where efficiencies might be achieved or where capability gaps might occur in DOD's tactical aircraft acquisitions.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Michael J. Sullivan
Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management
(937) 258-7915
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical air forces that reflect what is needed and affordable from a joint service perspective and that has high confidence of being executed as planned, the Secretary of Defense should take decisive actions to shorten cycle times in delivering needed combat capabilities to the warfighter including adopting a time-certain development cycle that can deliver an increment of new capability within 5 to 6 years after the start of system design and development, and reassessing requirements for ongoing weapon system acquisition programs to identify ways to reduce requirements and speed up delivery of initial capabilities.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Closed - implemented
Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and has since instituted several changes in policy and management direction that essentially meet the intent of this recommendation from a policy and procedural perspective, if not always in actual practice. In December 2008, DOD revised its acquisition policy DODI 5000.02 to establish criteria for exiting the technology development phase and entering the engineering and manufacturing development phase when "an affordable program or increment of militarily useful capability has been identified...a system or increment can be developed for production within a short timeframe (normally less than 5 years for weapon systems). This policy emphasis implements the recommendation of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report that DOD adopt a time certain development strategy (6 or less years) for new acquisitions to deliver an initial increment of capability to the warfighter. Furthermore, the revised policy more clearly defines incremental product development as the preferred DOD investment approach and that each increment should be managed like its own program with separate decision milestones, cost, and schedules. DOD also recently implemented the integrated priority list as a "fast track" way for combatant commanders to acquire needed capabilities expeditiously. The successful acquisition of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles to meet an urgent need in the War on Terror is a prime example. On April 6, 2009 the Secretary of Defense testified before Congress and outlined sweeping changes aimed at reducing or eliminating poor performing programs in DOD's weapon system acquisition portfolio while plussing up other urgent capabilities such as reconnaissance systems. These proposed changes, which include restructuring the Army's Future Combat Systems program, indicate that the department is taking steps in the right direction.
Recommendation: In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical air forces that reflect what is needed and affordable from a joint service perspective and that has high confidence of being executed as planned, the Secretary of Defense should develop an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy that is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of potential and viable alternative solutions, considering not only new acquisitions but also modifications to legacy aircraft to achieve this balance within realistic and affordable budget projections for DOD; strikes a balance between maintaining near-term readiness and addressing long-term needs; and considers the contributions of bombers, long range strike aircraft, unmanned aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in the inventory and those planned that can be employed to attack the same type targets as the tactical aircraft.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: Although DOD has taken some positive steps to institute a more integrated, enterprise- level investment strategy for tactical air forces and other capabilities, we are keeping this recommendation open pending completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review and our new engagement on tactical air force recapitalization to provide a more comprehensive view of DOD actions and outcomes on this recommendation. In September 2008, DOD issued Directive 7045.20 "Capability Portfolio Management", which established policy and assigned responsibilities to advise the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Heads of the DoD components and optimize capability investments in new and modified systems across the defense enterprise. Although this policy is new and has not been fully implemented, we believe this new policy does give DOD leaders the forum to develop integrated enterprise-level investment decisions. In addition, 10 USC 2366 and DOD's acquisition policy 5000.02 were both recently amended to encourage more collaboration and jointness in acquisition decisions and to ensure investments for new and modernized systems meet valid needs, are appropriate and affordable within enterprise-wide priorities and funding levels. Recent actions specific to tactical air forces also show more cross-service views and outcomes. Examples of enterprise-wide thinking include: the decision to terminate F-22A production due to affordability; accelerate retirements of legacy Air Force, Navy, and Marines Corps fighters while accepting near-term increase in risks in order to afford new capabilities; speed up acquisition of the Joint Strike Fighter to ameliorate some of the risk from retiring legacies; and recognize contributions from unmanned aircraft and bombers in prosecuting tactical air missions.
