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Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance

GAO-06-356 Published: Mar 15, 2006. Publicly Released: Mar 15, 2006.
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Highlights

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is DOD's most expensive aircraft program. The program represents 90 percent of the remaining planned investment for recapitalizing DOD's aging tactical aircraft fleet. GAO is required by law to review the program annually for 5 years, beginning in fiscal year 2005. This is our second report and GAO assessed the program's acquisition approach--in terms of capturing knowledge for key investment decisions--and identified an alternative to improve outcomes.

Recommendations

Matter for Congressional Consideration

Matter Status Comments
DOD does not plan to change its business case or acquisition plan for developing and buying the JSF. Without changes, the acquisition plan will put at risk $50 billion for procuring JSF aircraft at the same time the program develops and tests the aircraft's expected performance capabilities over a 7-year, 12,000 hour flight test program. The JSF program has continually missed its cost and schedule targets over the 5 years it has been in development. If DOD were to make smaller, more manageable commitments in capabilities, it would make cost and schedule more predictable and deliver needed capabilities to the war fighter sooner. For these reasons, Congress may want to consider delaying authorizations and appropriations for procuring JSF aircraft until DOD develops a knowledge-based business case that matches requirements with proven technologies and design knowledge and available funding. Capabilities that demand technological advances not yet demonstrated should be part of future increments that are funded and managed separately once demonstrated.
Closed – Implemented
Congress reduced the fiscal year 2007 budget request by $561.030 million reducing the number of aircraft from 5 to 2 and the advanced procurement in fiscal year 2008 from 16 to 12 aircraft.
DOD does not plan to change its business case or acquisition plan for developing and buying the JSF. Without changes, the acquisition plan will put at risk $50 billion for procuring JSF aircraft at the same time the program develops and tests the aircraft's expected performance capabilities over a 7-year, 12,000 hour flight test program. The JSF program has continually missed its cost and schedule targets over the 5 years it has been in development. If DOD were to make smaller, more manageable commitments in capabilities, it would make cost and schedule more predictable and deliver needed capabilities to the war fighter sooner. For these reasons, Congress may want to consider delaying authorizations and appropriations for procuring JSF aircraft until DOD demonstrates the aircraft design qualities and integrated mission capabilities of the fully configured and integrated JSF variants work as designed based on actual flight testing.
Closed – Implemented
Congress reduced the fiscal year 2007 budget request by $561.030 million reducing the number of aircraft to be purchased in 2007 from 5 to 2 and reducing the advanced procurement of aircraft in 2008 from 16 to 12.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense To reduce program risk and increase the likelihood of successful program outcomes by delivering capabilities to the warfighter when needed and within available resources, the Secretary of Defense should delay the investment in production aircraft until sufficient testing has at least demonstrated the basic airframe design of each JSF variant in important parts of the flight envelope, including combinations of critical altitudes, speeds, and angles of attack.
Closed – Implemented
Because of the inherit risk of buying production aircraft before demonstrating that the aircraft will work as intended, the Congress reduced funding for the first two low rate initial production orders for JSF thereby slowing the ramp up of production. Subsequently DOD reduced the number of production aircraft it plans to buy during the flight test program by about 35 percent as compared to the original plan. This revised production plan allows for a more moderate production rate and with less program risk. The program does not plan to significantly increase its buy quantities now until it has captured additional test information about the capabilities of the aircraft.
Department of Defense To reduce program risk and increase the likelihood of successful program outcomes by delivering capabilities to the warfighter when needed and within available resources, the Secretary of Defense should, once the basic airframe design has been demonstrated, limit production quantities to the number of aircraft needed for operational testing and that can be produced using the current production capability (based on existing tooling, materials, and personnel) until a fully integrated aircraft (with advanced mission systems and predictive maintenance systems) demonstrates through flight testing the required capabilities.
Closed – Implemented
Because of the inherit risk of buying production aircraft before demonstrating that the aircraft will work as intended, the Congress reduced funding for the first two low rate initial production orders for JSF thereby slowing the ramp up of production. Subsequently DOD reduced the number of production aircraft it plans to buy during the flight test program by about 35 percent as compared to the original plan. This revised production plan allows for a more moderate production rate and with less program risk. The program does not plan to significantly increase its buy quantities now until it has captured additional test information about the capabilities of the aircraft.
Department of Defense To reduce program risk and increase the likelihood of successful program outcomes by delivering capabilities to the warfighter when needed and within available resources, the Secretary of Defense should plan an incremental acquisition strategy that follows the intent of DOD evolutionary acquisition policy and delivers a first increment that limits new content to proven technologies and design. The plan should be completed and reported to the Congress by July 2006, and include adjustments in associated programs as necessary to maintain needed capabilities.
Closed – Not Implemented
Although DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to plan an incremental acquisition strategy that follows the intent of DOD acquisition policy, it has taken no action to implement this recommendation and did not report its strategy to the Congress. While it stated the JSF Acquisition Strategy fully complies with policy and is a knowledge-based, incremental approach that includes three blocks of increasing degrees of warfighter capability, we believe DOD's strategy does not provide the benefits of an evolutionary approach as suggested by DOD's policy and best practices. DOD has not structured the JSF development program into increments managed as separate acquisitions with their own cost, schedule, and decision milestones making the likelihood of successful program outcomes low. The JSF strategy resembles other past major acquisition programs that have attempted to achieve the ultimate capability in a single development increment producing nearly all of the fleet with the fully required capability from the outset. If DOD were to make smaller, more manageable commitments in capabilities it would make cost and schedule more predictable and deliver needed capabilities to the war fighter sooner.

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Topics

Defense procurementFighter aircraftMilitary aircraftOperational testingProcurement planningProduct evaluationProgram evaluationTactical air forcesConcurrent development and productionAircraft acquisition program