B-62267, JANUARY 15, 1947, 26 COMP. GEN. 488

B-62267: Jan 15, 1947

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RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION OF EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY BETWEEN THE CANAL ZONE AND THE UNITED STATES REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE IS NO IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN SAID PROVISIONS AND THOSE OF SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2. IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL OR THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY WHO WERE APPOINTED WHILE IN THE CANAL ZONE. IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS REQUIRING PERSONS WHO WERE APPOINTED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF SAID ACT TO POSITIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE WITH THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY. WHO ALREADY WERE IN THE CANAL ZONE. IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER HE WAS PLACED ON FURLOUGH OR LEAVE WITHOUT PAY OR WHETHER HE WAS ACTUALLY SEPARATED FROM THE ROLLS AT THE TIME HE ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE.

B-62267, JANUARY 15, 1947, 26 COMP. GEN. 488

TRAVELING EXPENSES; TRANSPORTATION OF DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS - EMPLOYEES APPOINTED FOR OVERSEAS DUTY - ACT OF AUGUST 2, 1946 THE PROVISIONS OF THE CANAL ZONE CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 3 OF THE ACT OF JULY 9, 1937, AND EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS THEREUNDER, RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION OF EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY BETWEEN THE CANAL ZONE AND THE UNITED STATES REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE IS NO IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN SAID PROVISIONS AND THOSE OF SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, RELATING TO THE EXPENSES OF TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS OF EMPLOYEES, GENERALLY, APPOINTED FOR OVERSEAS DUTY, OR EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS THEREUNDER. THE TERM "ACTUAL RESIDENCE AT TIME OF ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES," AS USED IN SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, TO DESIGNATE THE PLACE TO WHICH THE RETURN EXPENSES OF AN EMPLOYEE APPOINTED FOR OVERSEAS DUTY MAY BE PAID, MEANS, GENERALLY, THE PLACE AT WHICH HE PHYSICALLY RESIDED AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT; HOWEVER, IT NEED NOT BE SO RESTRICTED UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, SO THAT, IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL OR THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY WHO WERE APPOINTED WHILE IN THE CANAL ZONE, SUCH TERM MAY BE CONSIDERED AS INCLUDING "LEGAL RESIDENCE" OR "DOMICILE.' THE PROVISION OF SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, REQUIRING NEW APPOINTEES FOR DUTY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES TO AGREE IN WRITING TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR TWELVE MONTHS FOLLOWING APPOINTMENT, AS A CONDITION TO ENTITLEMENT TO EXPENSES OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM OVERSEAS POSTS OF DUTY, IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS REQUIRING PERSONS WHO WERE APPOINTED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF SAID ACT TO POSITIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE WITH THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY, AND WHO ALREADY WERE IN THE CANAL ZONE, TO EXECUTE SUCH AGREEMENT. VETERANS RESTORED AFTER MILITARY SERVICE TO POSITIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE WITH THE PANAMA CANAL OR THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY, PURSUANT TO THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, AS AMENDED, MAY NOT COUNT MILITARY SERVICE, OR THE TIME ALLOWED FOR MAKING APPLICATION FOR RESTORATION, IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING RESTORATION TOWARD THE 12 MONTHS' SERVICE WHICH, PURSUANT TO SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, MAY BE REQUIRED OF APPOINTEES FOR DUTY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AS A CONDITION TO PAYMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF RETURN TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. ORDINARILY, THE RESTORATION OF A VETERAN TO HIS FORMER POSITION OR ONE OF LIKE SENIORITY, STATUS, AND PAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A NEW APPOINTMENT, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER HE WAS PLACED ON FURLOUGH OR LEAVE WITHOUT PAY OR WHETHER HE WAS ACTUALLY SEPARATED FROM THE ROLLS AT THE TIME HE ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE. VETERANS RESTORED IN THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS WITH THE PANAMA CANAL OR THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY, OR TO LIKE POSITIONS, FOR DUTY IN THE CANAL ZONE, PURSUANT TO THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, AS AMENDED, ARE NOT TO BE REGARDED AS "NEW APPOINTEES" TO WHOM MAY BE PAID UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, THE EXPENSES OF THEIR TRAVEL FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR POSTS OF DUTY. IN APPLYING THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, THAT A NEW APPOINTEE FOR OVERSEAS DUTY, TO BE ENTITLED TO EXPENSES OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM THE OVERSEAS STATION, AGREE TO RENDER 12 MONTHS' SERVICE,"UNLESS SEPARATED FOR REASONS BEYOND HIS CONTROL," AN APPOINTEE OF THE PANAMA CANAL MAY BE REGARDED AS ENTITLED TO SUCH TRAVEL EXPENSE BENEFITS ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT TO REMAIN IN SERVICE FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD OF LESS THAN 12 MONTHS OR THE DURATION OF A PARTICULAR JOB, IF SUPPORTED BY AN ADVANCE ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION THAT THE APPOINTEE'S SERVICE FOR A LONGER PERIOD WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED. EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL OR THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY WHO RESIGN AND RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE OR WHO RESIGN WHILE ON APPROVED LEAVE OF ABSENCE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE ENTITLED, GENERALLY, UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, TO HAVE THEIR DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, LEFT BEHIND IN THE CANAL ZONE, RETURNED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, PROVIDED THERE HAS BEEN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LENGTH-OF-SERVICE REQUIREMENT IN THEIR CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT. WHERE, AT THE TIME OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE CANAL ZONE BY THE PANAMA CANAL, AN EMPLOYEE GAVE AS HER LEGAL RESIDENCE AND MAILING ADDRESS THE LEGAL RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES OF HER HUSBAND, WHOM SHE MARRIED IN THE CANAL ZONE, SUCH PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE REGARDED AS HER "ACTUAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE AT TIME OF ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES" TO BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE MAXIMUM ALLOWANCE UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, FOR RETURN TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES, NOTWITHSTANDING SHE THEN HAD BEEN DIVORCED AND HER EMPLOYMENT RECORD CONTAINS REFERENCE TO SEVERAL OTHER PLACES. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, AUTHORIZING PAYMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF TRAVEL OF NEW APPOINTEES AND TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO AND FROM OVERSEAS POSTS OF DUTY ARE NOT MANDATORY, SO THAT IT IS WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE PANAMA CANAL TO DENY PAYMENT OF SUCH EXPENSES OF APPOINTEES RECRUITED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR DUTY IN THE CANAL ZONE WHEN IT IS DETERMINED TO BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DO SO. THE AUTHORITY PROVIDED BY SECTION 1 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, FOR PAYMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF AN EMPLOYEE'S TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF HIS DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS ON CHANGE OF STATION IN CONNECTION WITH A "TRANSFER" FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER APPLIES ONLY TO PROPER CASES OF TRANSFER PURSUANT TO AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED IN CONNECTION WITH ADMINISTRATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND NOT TO CASES WHERE FORMAL RESIGNATIONS ARE SUBMITTED TO THE ONE AGENCY AND NEW APPOINTMENTS ISSUED BY THE OTHER, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THERE IS A BREAK IN SERVICE OF ONE OR MORE DAYS. EMPLOYEES WHO, AFTER RESIGNATION FROM OTHER AGENCIES, WERE APPOINTED BY THE PANAMA CANAL BETWEEN AUGUST 2, AND NOVEMBER 1, 1946--- THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF SECTION 1 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, AUTHORIZING PAYMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF EMPLOYEES' TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS ON CHANGE OF STATION IN CONNECTION WITH ,TRANSFER" FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER--- ARE TO BE REGARDED AS "NEW APPOINTEES" TO WHOM MAY BE PAID UNDER SECTION 7 OF SAID ACT--- WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE AUGUST 2, 1946--- EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO THEIR OVERSEAS STATION, RATHER THAN AS TRANSFEREES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SAID SECTION 1. AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE APPOINTMENT FOR DUTY WITH THE PANAMA CANAL IN THE CANAL ZONE WAS CONSUMMATED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STATUTE OF AUGUST 2, 1946, IS NOT ENTITLED UNDER SECTION 7 OF SAID ACT TO TRANSPORTATION OF DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE CANAL ZONE EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT BEGIN TRAVEL FROM THE PORT OF EMBARKATION IN THE UNITED STATES, AND HIS COMPENSATION DID NOT COMMENCE, UNTIL AFTER AUGUST 2, 1946--- THE DATE OF CONSUMMATION OF APPOINTMENT BEING THE CONTROLLING DATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE RIGHT TO SUCH TRANSPORTATION UNDER SAID SECTION 7.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL WARREN TO THE GOVERNOR, THE PANAMA CANAL, JANUARY 15, 1947:

THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERED YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 25, 1946, REQUESTING DECISION ON 16 SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION PROVISIONS OF THE ACT APPROVED AUGUST 2, 1946, PUBLIC LAW 600, 60 STAT. 806, TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL IN THE CANAL ZONE. THE INTRODUCTORY PART OF YOUR LETTER--- INCLUDING QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 --- IS AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600, 79TH CONGRESS, APPROVED AUGUST 2, 1946, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:

"APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENTS SHALL BE AVAILABLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, FOR EXPENSES OF TRAVEL OF NEW APPOINTEES, EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILIES AND EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS FROM PLACES OF ACTUAL RESIDENCE AT TIME OF APPOINTMENT TO PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, AND FOR SUCH EXPENSES ON RETURN OF EMPLOYEES FROM THEIR POSTS OF DUTY OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES: PROVIDED, THAT SUCH EXPENSES SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED NEW APPOINTEES UNLESS AND UNTIL THE PERSON SELECTED FOR APPOINTMENT SHALL AGREE IN WRITING TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT, UNLESS SEPARATED FOR REASONS BEYOND HIS CONTROL. IN CASE OF A VIOLATION OF SUCH AGREEMENT ANY MONEYS EXPENDED BY THE UNITED STATES ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS A DEBT DUE BY THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS SECTION SHALL NOT APPLY TO APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FOREIGN SERVICE, STATE DEPARTMENT.'

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE CANAL ZONE IS ESSENTIALLY A GOVERNMENT RESERVATION AND RESIDENCE IN THE CANAL ZONE IS LIMITED BY TREATY TO EMPLOYEES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND A FEW RELATED ENTERPRISES DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE OPERATION OF THE CANAL, SUBSTANTIALLY ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY, OTHER THAN EMPLOYEES WHO ARE PAID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LOCAL, NATIVE PREVAILING WAGE RATES ARE RECRUITED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ON THE TERMINATION OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT BY RESIGNATION, RETIREMENT, OR OTHERWISE, SUCH EMPLOYEES USUALLY MUST RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES.

PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF PUBLIC LAW 600 THE COST OF THE TRANSPORTATION TO THE CANAL ZONE OF EMPLOYEES APPOINTED IN THE UNITED STATES WAS PAID BY THE PANAMA CANAL UNDER SECTION 3 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888 OF FEBRUARY 2, 1914, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 3182 OF NOVEMBER 25, 1919, AND AS SUPPLEMENTED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 9064 OF FEBRUARY 16, 1942, AND THE EXPENSE OF RETURN TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES WAS PAID BY THE PANAMA CANAL IN CERTAIN CASES UNDER SECTION 15 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888 OF FEBRUARY 2, 1914, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 8215 OF JULY 25, 1939, AND AS SUPPLEMENTED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 9212 OF AUGUST 1, 1942. THESE EXECUTIVE ORDERS WERE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY CONTAINED ORIGINALLY IN SECTION 4 OF THE PANAMA CANAL ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, NOW INCORPORATED IN SECTION 81 OF TITLE 2 OF THE CANAL ZONE CODE, AS AMENDED BY THE ACT OF JULY 9, 1937 (50 STAT. 487).

UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888 OF FEBRUARY 2, 1914, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 3182 OF NOVEMBER 25, 1919, AND AS SUPPLEMENTED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 9064 OF FEBRUARY 16, 1942, NEW EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY HAVE BEEN FURNISHED TRANSPORTATION FROM THEIR HOMES IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE PORT OF DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED STATES, AT WHICH PORT THE COMPENSATION OF SUCH EMPLOYEES, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, BEGINS AT THE TIME OF THEIR DEPARTURE. THE PAYMENT OF THE COST OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EMPLOYEE'S FAMILY OR OF HIS HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE CANAL ZONE WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR IN THESE ORDERS. ALL NEW EMPLOYEES APPOINTED IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER JULY 1943 WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN AGREEMENTS TO REMAIN IN THE SERVICE FOR ONE YEAR UNLESS SOONER RELEASED BY AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR, AND ON RESIGNATION AT AN EARLIER DATE IN VIOLATION OF THAT AGREEMENT THE EMPLOYEE WAS REQUIRED TO REPAY THE COST OF HIS TRANSPORTATION TO THE CANAL ZONE.

UNDER SECTION 15 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888 OF FEBRUARY 2, 1914, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 8215 OF JULY 25, 1939, AND AS SUPPLEMENTED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 9212 OF AUGUST 1, 1942, THE FURNISHING OF TRANSPORTATION FROM THE ISTHMUS TO THE UNITED STATES WAS DEPENDENT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EMPLOYEE'S TERMINATION AND THE LENGTH OF HIS SERVICE AT THE TIME OF TERMINATION. AN EMPLOYEE WHO WAS TERMINATED BY REDUCTION OF FORCE WAS FURNISHED RETURN TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT REGARD TO THE LENGTH OF HIS SERVICE, AND AN EMPLOYEE WHO SERVED FOR THREE YEARS OR MORE WAS ENTITLED TO RETURN TRANSPORTATION WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS TERMINATION. SUCH RETURN TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES WAS FURNISHED ONLY TO THE PORT OF ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES AND NOT TO THE EMPLOYEE'S ULTIMATE DESTINATION, AND NO PROVISION WAS MADE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE COST OF TRANSPORTATION OF HIS FAMILY OR PERSONAL EFFECTS AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS.

UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 IT IS APPARENTLY NECESSARY THAT AN EMPLOYEE HAVE AN "ACTUAL RESIDENCE" IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES ON THE TERMINATION OF HIS SERVICE. SUCH A RESTRICTIVE PROVISION RAISES A DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN CONSTRUCTION IN THE CASES OF EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY WHO ARE EMPLOYED WHILE ON THE ISTHMUS, EITHER TRANSIENTLY OR FOLLOWING TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR BY A NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCY ON THE ISTHMUS, AND IN THE CASES OF THE CHILDREN OF PANAMA CANAL EMPLOYEES WHO THEMSELVES ARE EMPLOYED AFTER HAVING BEEN BORN ON THE ISTHMUS OR HAVING BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ISTHMUS BY THEIR PARENTS AT AN EARLY AGE SO AS TO NEVER HAVE HAD AN "ACTUAL RESIDENCE" IN THE UNITED STATES OTHER THAN THE ACTUAL RESIDENCE OF THEIR PARENTS. IN MANY OF THESE CASES THE SECOND GENERATION EMPLOYEES CONTINUE THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND REMAIN ON THE ISTHMUS AFTER THE RETIREMENT OR OTHER TERMINATION OF THEIR PARENTS, AND HENCE THE PROVISION OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE COST OF TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE FAMILIES OF THE PARENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT FURNISH A PRACTICABLE MEANS FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE COST OF RETURN TRANSPORTATION OF THE EMPLOYED CHILDREN.

AS INDICATED ABOVE, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888 AS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED, THE FACT THAT THE EMPLOYEE MAY HAVE HAD NO ACTUAL RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT IS IMMATERIAL IN RESPECT TO THE PAYMENT OF THE COST OF THE EMPLOYEE'S RETURN TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES, SINCE IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE EMPLOYEE AND BY THE PANAMA CANAL THAT ON TERMINATION OF HIS SERVICE HE MAY NOT CONTINUE TO RESIDE IN THE CANAL ZONE BUT IN MOST CASES MUST RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES, THE RIGHT TO FREE TRANSPORTATION TO A PORT OF THE UNITED STATES DEPENDING SOLELY ON THE LENGTH OF HIS SERVICE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS TERMINATION.

IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED THAT THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 WAS TO ACHIEVE UNIFORMITY IN THE PAYMENT OF THE COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONS FOR SERVICE OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, BUT IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROVISION IN THE LAW OR REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY REPEALING AND RESCINDING PRIOR STATUTORY AND EXECUTIVE ORDER AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF SUCH TRANSPORTATION COSTS, AND IN VIEW OF THE RESTRICTIVE EFFECT OF THE REFERENCE IN PUBLIC LAW 600 TO THE PLACE OF THE ACTUAL RESIDENCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT IT MAY BE PROPER TO CONSTRUE THE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888 TOGETHER WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 SO THAT WHERE IT APPEARS THAT AN EMPLOYEE HAD NO ACTUAL RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION MAY BE FURNISHED TO A PORT OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE LESS COMPREHENSIVE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888; THAT IS, TRANSPORTATION MAY BE FURNISHED TO THE EMPLOYEE TO A PORT OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT FURNISHING TRANSPORTATION FOR THE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY OR FOR HIS HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS.

IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT A DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN EMPLOYEES ON THE BASIS INDICATED WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIABLE AS A PERMANENT POLICY AND THAT LEGISLATION SHOULD BE OBTAINED TO EXTEND THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 TO ALL EMPLOYEES WHO ARE EMPLOYED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES CONTEMPLATING THEIR RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES ON THE TERMINATION OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT PENDING THE ENACTMENT OF SUCH LEGISLATION THE EMPLOYEES CONCERNED WOULD BE LESS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY SUCH DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT THAN BY COMPLETE EXCLUSION FROM THE BENEFITS OF BOTH SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 AND THE PRE-EXISTING EXECUTIVE ORDER PROVISIONS.

QUESTION 1: DOES SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 SUPERSEDE THE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888, AS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED, SO AS TO PRECLUDE THE PAYMENT OF TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER THAT ORDER IN CASES IN WHICH SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 MAY BE INAPPLICABLE BY REASON OF THE REFERENCE THEREIN TO THE PAYMENT OF TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES TO AND FROM THE ,PLACES OF ACTUAL RESIDENCE" OF THE EMPLOYEES AT TIME OF APPOINTMENT?

QUESTION 2: DOES THE TERM "ACTUAL RESIDENCE," AS USED IN SECTION 7, INCLUDE THE "LEGAL RESIDENCE" OR "DOMICILE" OF AN EMPLOYEE WHO IS APPOINTED WHILE ON THE ISTHMUS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OUTLINED IN THE SIXTH PARAGRAPH HEREOF?

REPEALS BY IMPLICATION ARE NOT FAVORED AND A LATER LAW WILL NOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPEALING AN EARLIER LAW UNLESS THE TWO LAWS ARE IN IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT OR UNLESS THE LATER LAW COVERS THE WHOLE GROUND OCCUPIED BY THE EARLIER AND IS CLEARLY INTENDED TO BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR IT. THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE TO REPEAL SHOULD BE CLEAR AND MANIFEST. GENERALLY, A LAW IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS REPEALING ANOTHER LAW UNLESS THERE IS NO OTHER REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION. IF BOTH LAWS CAN BE MADE EFFECTIVE BY REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION, SUCH CONSTRUCTION WILL BE ADOPTED. UNITED STATES V. TYNEN, 11 WALL. 88, 92; HENDERSON'S TOBACCO, 11 WALL 652, 657; KING V. CORNELL, 106 U.S. 395, 396; RED ROCK V. HENRY, 106 U.S. 596; POSADAS V. NATIONAL CITY BANK, 296 U.S. 497, 503; UNITED STATES V. JACKSON, 302 U.S. 628, 631; WEST INDIA OIL COMPANY V. DOMENECH, 311 U.S. 20, 29; WALLING V. PATTON TULLEY TRANSP. CO., 134 F.2D 945, 948; EX PARTE BERKOFF, 65 F.1SUPP. 976, 980. ALSO, IT IS WELL SETTLED THAT A GENERAL ACT IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS APPLYING TO CASES COVERED BY A PRIOR SPECIAL ACT UPON THE SAME SUBJECT, UNLESS IT CONTAINS AN EXPRESS REPEAL PROVISION OR THERE IS AN IRRECONCILABLE REPUGNANCY BETWEEN THE ACTS, OR THE NEW LAW IS EVIDENTLY INTENDED TO SUPERSEDE ALL PRIOR ACTS ON THE MATTER IN HAND AND TO COMPRISE IN ITSELF THE SOLE AND COMPLETE SYSTEM OF LEGISLATION ON THE SUBJECT. 19 COMP. DEC. 632, 635; 19 COMP. GEN. 492, AND CASES THEREIN CITED. SEE ALSO HOME OWNERS' LOAN CORPORATION V. CREED, 108 F.2D 153, 155.

THE STATUTE HERE INVOLVED, 60 STAT. 806, CONTAINS NO GENERAL REPEAL PROVISION, AND NONE OF THE SPECIFIC REPEAL PROVISIONS CONTAINED THEREIN HAS REFERENCE TO SECTION 7 OF THE ACT, 60 STAT. 808, OR TO PRIOR LAWS ON SUBJECTS SIMILAR TO THAT COVERED BY SECTION 7; NEITHER DO I FIND ANY INDICATION IN THE ACT OR ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF A CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO HAVE SECTION 7 COMPRISE IN ITSELF THE SOLE AND COMPLETE SYSTEM OF LEGISLATION ON THE SUBJECT COVERED THEREBY. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED, IN ANSWER TO QUESTION 1, THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 81 OF TITLE 2, OF THE CANAL ZONE CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 3 OF THE ACT OF JULY 9, 1937, 50 STAT. 487, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED THEREUNDER, RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION STILL ARE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE IS NO IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN SAID PROVISIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 OR SUCH REGULATIONS AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN THAT SECTION.

WITH RESPECT TO QUESTION 2, THE TERM "ACTUAL RESIDENCE" AS USED IN SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600, QUOTED IN YOUR LETTER, GENERALLY WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN THE PLACE AT WHICH THE APPOINTEE PHYSICALLY RESIDES AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE TERM WAS INTENDED TO BE SO RESTRICTED UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES; AND IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYEES WHO ARE APPOINTED WHILE ON THE ISTHMUS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OUTLINED IN THE SIXTH PARAGRAPH OF YOUR LETTER, SUPRA, THE TERM "ACTUAL RESIDENCE" MAY BE HELD TO INCLUDE THE "LEGAL RESIDENCE"OR DOMICILE" OF SUCH AN EMPLOYEE. SEE ANSWER TO QUESTION 10, INFRA.

THE REMAINING 14 QUESTIONS WILL BE ANSWERED IN THE ORDER PRESENTED, AND EACH ANSWER WILL BE PRECEDED BY A QUOTATION FROM YOUR LETTER OF THE FACTS INVOLVED IN EACH QUESTION AS WELL AS THE STATED QUESTION: APART FROM THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888, AS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED, A FURTHER QUESTION HAS ARISEN AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE PROVISO IN SECTION 7 THAT SUCH EXPENSES SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED "NEW APPOINTEES UNLESS AND UNTIL THE PERSON SELECTED SHALL AGREE IN WRITING TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR THE 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT UNLESS SEPARATED FOR REASONS BEYOND HIS CONTROL.' IN VIEW OF THE FACT INDICATED ABOVE, THAT PANAMA CANAL AND PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY EMPLOYEES ARE PRACTICALLY ALL DRAWN FROM THE UNITED STATES, A LARGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES WERE IN SERVICE ON AUGUST 2, 1946 UNDER APPOINTMENTS MADE WITHIN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THAT DATE. SUCH EMPLOYEES WHEN APPOINTED IN THE UNITED STATES HAD SIGNED AGREEMENTS TO REMAIN IN THE SERVICE OF THE CANAL OR RAILROAD FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND TO PAY TO THE CANAL THE COST OF THEIR TRANSPORTATION TO THE CANAL ZONE IN THE EVENT OF THEIR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF ONE YEAR UNLESS SOONER RELEASED BY AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR. IN VIEW OF THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 THAT "NEW APPOINTEES" SHALL SIGN AN AGREEMENT TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR THE 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING THEIR APPOINTMENT, IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE PROVISO DOES NOT APPLY TO EMPLOYEES APPOINTED PRIOR TO AUGUST 2, 1946, SO THAT TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES MAY BE FURNISHED TO SUCH EMPLOYEES NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEY MAY NOT HAVE SERVED FOR ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THEIR TERMINATION.

QUESTION 3: DOES THE PROVISO IN SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 REFERRING TO "NEW EMPLOYEES," INCLUDE EMPLOYEES APPOINTED PRIOR TO AUGUST 2, 1946?

THE PROVISO CONTAINED IN SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 SHOULD NOT BE SO CONSTRUED AS TO REQUIRE PERSONS APPOINTED PRIOR TO THE DATE THE ACT WAS APPROVED, AND WHO ALREADY WERE IN THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE, TO EXECUTE THE AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATED BY THE PROVISO.

EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY WERE FORMALLY TERMINATED UPON ENTERING THE MILITARY SERVICE FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSES, AMONG OTHERS, OF ENABLING SUCH EMPLOYEES TO COMMUTE THEIR CUMULATIVE LEAVE INTO CASH AND TO WITHDRAW THEIR RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS, IN EVENT THEY ELECTED TO DO SO. UPON REEMPLOYMENT (RESTORATION AS PROVIDED BY THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, 54 STAT. 890) SUCH EMPLOYEES RECEIVED FORMAL APPOINTMENTS AND WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN THE USUAL AGREEMENT TO REMAIN IN THE SERVICE ONE YEAR UNLESS SOONER RELEASED BY AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR AND IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE EMPLOYEE WAS APPOINTED IN THE UNITED STATES FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THE ISTHMUS WAS PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888 AS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED, IN A LIKE MANNER AS FOR NEW EMPLOYEES. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT APPEARS REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT VETERANS REAPPOINTED (RESTORED) TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS OR POSITIONS OF LIKE SENIORITY, STATUS, AND PAY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS NEW EMPLOYEES AT THE TIME OF REAPPOINTMENT INSOFAR AS THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 ARE CONCERNED AND IN THIS CONNECTION THERE HAVE NOT BEEN OVERLOOKED THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 8 (C) OF THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, WHICH PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:

"ANY PERSON WHO IS RESTORED TO A POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITHE THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH (A) OR (B) OF SUBSECTION (B) SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING BEEN ON FURLOUGH OR LEAVE OF ABSENCE DURING HIS PERIOD OF TRAINING AND SERVICE IN THE LAND OR NAVAL FORCES, SHALL BE SO RESTORED WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY, SHALL BE ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN INSURANCE OR OTHER BENEFITS OFFERED BY THE EMPLOYER PURSUANT TO ESTABLISHED RULES AND PRACTICES RELATING TO EMPLOYEES ON FURLOUGH OR LEAVE OF ABSENCE IN EFFECT WITH THE EMPLOYER AT THE TIME SUCH PERSON WAS INDUCTED INTO SUCH FORCES, AND SHALL NOT BE DISCHARGED FROM SUCH POSITION WITHOUT CAUSE WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER SUCH RESTORATION.'

QUESTION 4: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, MAY MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDING THE TIME ALLOWED FOR MAKING APPLICATION FOR RESTORATION) IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE RESTORATION OF A VETERAN TO HIS FORMER POSITION WITH THE PANAMA CANAL OR PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY UNDER APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, BE COUNTED TOWARD THE 12 MONTHS' SERVICE REQUIRED BY THE PROVISO IN SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600?

QUESTION 5: MAY VETERANS WHO WERE REEMPLOYED (RESTORED) IN THE UNITED STATES, EITHER PRIOR TO AUGUST 2, 1946, OR THEREAFTER, FOR DUTY ON THE ISTHMUS AND WHO WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY GRANTED LEAVE OF ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY IN ORDER TO ATTEND COLLEGE BEFORE REPORTING FOR ACTUAL DUTY, BE FURNISHED FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THE ISTHMUS UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR COLLEGE WORK, AND, IF SO, SHOULD SUCH TRANSPORTATION BE FURNISHED UNDER REGULATIONS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF REEMPLOYMENT OR AT THE TIME THE EMPLOYEE ACTUALLY TRAVELED TO THE ISTHMUS?

QUESTION 4 IS ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, AND WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTION 5, IT MAY BE SAID THAT, ORDINARILY, THE RESTORATION OF A VETERAN TO HIS FORMER POSITION OR TO A POSITION OF LIKE SENIORITY, STATUS, AND PAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 8 (C) OF THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, 54 STAT. 890, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A NEW APPOINTMENT. 25 COMP. GEN. 786; 22 ID. 825. THIS IS SO IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO THE EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME HE ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE, THAT IS, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER HE WAS PLACED ON FURLOUGH OR LEAVE WITHOUT PAY OR WHETHER HE WAS ACTUALLY SEPARATED FROM THE ROLLS. ACCORDINGLY, VETERANS RESTORED TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS WITH THE PANAMA CANAL OR PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY, OR TO POSITIONS OF LIKE SENIORITY, STATUS, AND PAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 8 (C) OF THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, AS AMENDED, MAY NOT BE REGARDED AS "NEW APPOINTEES" UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 AND, THEREFORE, ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INCUR AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES AUTHORIZED FOR "NEW APPOINTEES" UNDER THAT SECTION. HENCE, THE FIRST PART OF QUESTION 5 IS ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, RENDERING UNNECESSARY ANY ANSWER TO THE SECOND PART OF THAT QUESTION.

IT HAS BEEN CUSTOMARY TO APPOINT A NUMBER OF EXTRA EMPLOYEES FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD OF LESS THAN 12 MONTHS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PERIODIC LOCKS OVERHAUL WORK. A FEW OF SUCH EMPLOYEES CAN BE OBTAINED LOCALLY. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES FOR THE SHORT PERIODS OF TIME IN WHICH THIS WORK IS REQUIRED TO BE PERFORMED, MANY OF THE EMPLOYEES MUST BE RECRUITED IN THE UNITED STATES AND PROVIDED FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THE ISTHMUS AND RETURN) SUCH FREE TRANSPORTATION WAS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888, AS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED. HOWEVER, EMPLOYEES APPOINTED LOCALLY FOR TEMPORARY WORK WERE NOT FURNISHED FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES UPON TERMINATION OF THEIR SERVICES. A GENERAL LOCKS OVERHAUL IS CONTEMPLATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND SINCE ACTION IS NOW BEING TAKEN TO RECRUIT THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL A QUESTION HAS ARISEN AS TO THE PROPRIETY OF REQUIRING NEW EMPLOYEES APPOINTED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR TEMPORARY DUTY OF LESS THAN 12 MONTHS ON THE ISTHMUS, TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT TO REMAIN IN THE SERVICE FOR THE 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING THEIR APPOINTMENT IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THE ISTHMUS AND RETURN.

QUESTION 6: UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY FREE TRANSPORTATION BE FURNISHED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 600 TO EMPLOYEES RECRUITED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR TEMPORARY DUTY ON THE ISTHMUS OF LESS THAN 12 MONTHS WITHOUT REQUIRING SUCH EMPLOYEES TO AGREE IN WRITING TO REMAIN IN THE SERVICE FOR 12 MONTHS?

QUESTION 7: IF FREE TRANSPORTATION MAY NOT BE FURNISHED WITHOUT A WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR 12 MONTHS' SERVICE, MAY TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES PROPERLY BE REQUIRED TO AGREE IN WRITING TO REMAIN IN THE SERVICE 12 MONTHS?

QUESTION 8: WILL EMPLOYEES APPOINTED LOCALLY FOR TEMPORARY PERIODS OF LESS THAN 12 MONTHS BE ENTITLED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THEIR PLACES OF ACTUAL RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES UPON TERMINATION OF THEIR SERVICES FOR REASONS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL WITHIN 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING THEIR APPOINTMENT IF THEY ARE REQUIRED TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600?

THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE PROVISO TO SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 PROVIDES: "THAT SUCH EXPENSES SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED NEW APPOINTEES UNLESS AND UNTIL THE PERSON SELECTED FOR APPOINTMENT SHALL AGREE IN WRITING TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT, UNLESS SEPARATED FOR REASONS BEYOND HIS CONTROL.' (ITALICS SUPPLIED.) THE REQUIREMENT OF AN AGREEMENT BY A NEW APPOINTEE TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT UNLESS SEPARATED FOR REASONS BEYOND HIS CONTROL IS SOLELY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. THE SENTENCE CLEARLY CONTEMPLATES THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION THAT, IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SERVICES OF AN APPOINTEE FOR A FULL PERIOD OF 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED. HENCE, IT SHOULD BE IMMATERIAL WHETHER SUCH DETERMINATION IS MADE SUBSEQUENT OR PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT, AND THE SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE SO CONSTRUED AS TO REQUIRE THE EXECUTION OF AN AGREEMENT BY A NEW APPOINTEE TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR THE 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT WHERE IT DEFINITELY IS KNOWN PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT THAT THE SERVICES OF THE APPOINTEE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED FOR THE 12-MONTH PERIOD. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AN APPOINTEE PROPERLY MAY AGREE IN WRITING TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE EITHER FOR THE 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT OR FOR SUCH LESSER PERIOD OF TIME AS IT DEFINITELY HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT HIS SERVICES WILL BE REQUIRED. THEREFORE, IT MAY BE STATED THAT WHERE A NEW APPOINTEE EXECUTES AN AGREEMENT TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD OF LESS THAN 12 MONTHS OR FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED TO PERFORM A PARTICULAR JOB OR TASK AND SUCH AGREEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE STATEMENT THAT IT WAS DETERMINED PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT DO NOT REQUIRE THE SERVICES OF THE APPOINTEE FOR ANY LONGER PERIOD THAN STATED IN THE AGREEMENT, THIS OFFICE WILL NOT OBJECT TO OTHERWISE PROPER PAYMENTS OF EXPENSES INCURRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600. QUESTION 6 IS ANSWERED ACCORDINGLY, THUS RENDERING A SPECIFIC ANSWER TO QUESTIONS 7 AND 8 UNNECESSARY. SEE, GENERALLY, THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 11, NFRA.

IT IS ASSUMED THAT EMPLOYEES WHO VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED AFTER 12 MONTHS' SERVICE AND RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE AND THOSE EMPLOYEES WHO RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES ON APPROVED LEAVE OF ABSENCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY RESIGNED WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THEIR TRAVEL.

QUESTION 9: IN SUCH CASES WHERE THE EMPLOYEE'S FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS WERE LEFT BEHIND ON THE ISTHMUS AND REQUEST IS MADE WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED IN THE PRESIDENT'S REGULATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF AN EMPLOYEE'S FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, MAY SUCH TRANSPORTATION BE PROVIDED?

THIS QUESTION IS ANSWERED, GENERALLY, IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, PROVIDING, OF COURSE, THAT WITH RESPECT TO THOSE EMPLOYEES WHO RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES ON APPROVED LEAVE OF ABSENCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY RESIGNED WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES, THERE HAS BEEN COMPLIANCE WITH THE STIPULATION IN THEIR CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT AS TO THE LENGTH OF TIME TO BE SERVED IN PANAMA.

AN APPLICATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM AN EMPLOYEE WHO IS TERMINATING HER SERVICES EFFECTIVE AT THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS NOVEMBER 26, 1946, FOR FREE TRANSPORTATION TO LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, VIA NEW YORK. THIS EMPLOYEE WAS EMPLOYED ON THE ISTHMUS JULY 28, 1941 AND WAS TERMINATED EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 16, 1941 ON ACCOUNT OF EXPIRATION OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT. SHE WAS REEMPLOYED LOCALLY FEBRUARY 2, 1942 AND VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED JUNE 3, 1942. SHE WAS AGAIN REEMPLOYED LOCALLY EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1942 AND HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY EMPLOYED TO DATE. THE INFORMATION OF RECORD DISCLOSES THAT SHE WAS BORN IN EL PASO, TEXAS AND THAT SHE ARRIVED ON THE ISTHMUS JANUARY 14, 1939 WITH HER PARENTS, HER FATHER BEING EMPLOYED AS A CONSTRUCTION SUPERINTENDENT ON ARMY BARRACKS. SHE APPARENTLY CAME FROM LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, WHERE SHE ATTENDED VARIOUS SCHOOLS FROM 1931 THROUGH 1937. BEFORE BEING EMPLOYED BY THE PANAMA CANAL IN 1941 SHE WAS EMPLOYED ON THE ISTHMUS BY VARIOUS PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AND FIRMS. SHE WAS MARRIED ON THE ISTHMUS DECEMBER 9, 1939 TO AN EMPLOYEE OF THE THE PANAMA CANAL AND AT THE TIME SHE WAS EMPLOYED BY THE PANAMA CANAL IN 1941 SHE GAVE DELAWARE, OHIO AS HER LEGAL RESIDENCE AND MAILING ADDRESS, WHICH PLACE HER HUSBAND CLAIMED AS HIS LEGAL RESIDENCE. SHE WAS DIVORCED IN 1944 BUT THE RECORD DOES NOT DISCLOSE THAT SHE HAS CLAIMED ANY LEGAL ADDRESS OTHER THAN THAT GIVEN AT THE TIME OF HER ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT. SHE STATED IN CONNECTION WITH HER FIRST AND SECOND EMPLOYMENTS WITH THE PANAMA CANAL THAT SHE HAD A SISTER RESIDING IN FRESNO, CALIFORNIA, AND IN JANUARY 1945 SHE STATED THAT HER FATHER'S ADDRESS WAS ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO.

QUESTION 10: IF THE EMPLOYEE REFERRED TO IS ENTITLED TO FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600, WHAT IS THE PROPER BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE MAXIMUM TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCE WHICH MAY BE AUTHORIZED? QUESTION 11: ARE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 REGARDING FREE TRANSPORTATION FOR AN EMPLOYEE'S FAMILY AND HIS HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS MANDATORY TO THE EXTENT THAT AN EMPLOYEE WHO HAS ACCEPTED AN INDEFINITE APPOINTMENT AND PROCEEDED TO THE ISTHMUS ALONE MAY WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED IN THE PRESIDENT'S REGULATIONS TRANSPORT HIS FAMILY TO THE ISTHMUS AND RETURN AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OR MAY THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT USE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND REFUSE TO AUTHORIZE SUCH TRANSPORTATION WHEN IT IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT, AS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT THE EMPLOYEE'S SERVICES ARE TO BE TERMINATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

QUESTION 12: IS IT MANDATORY THAT FREE TRANSPORTATION TO THE ISTHMUS BE PROVIDED IN CONNECTION WITH EACH REEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES REGARDLESS OF THE TIME ELAPSED SINCE THE EMPLOYEE WAS PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED FREE TRANSPORTATION TO OR FROM THE ISTHMUS AND REGARDLESS OF THE LENGTH OF THE PRECEDING SERVICES?

IN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 14, 1946, B-61379, 26 COMP. GEN. 322, TO YOU, INVOLVING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 TO A SOMEWHAT RELATED SITUATION, IT WAS STATED:

IT IS NOTED THAT THE PROVISION FOR RETURN OF EMPLOYEES TO THIS COUNTRY AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE IS NOT DIRECTLY COUPLED WITH AUTHORITY TO PAY THE EXPENSES OF THEIR OUTWARD JOURNEY. ALSO, IT IS IMMATERIAL TO THE PURPOSE OF SUCH PROVISION (REPATRIATION) WHETHER THE SEPARATED EMPLOYEE RETURNS TO THE IDENTICAL PLACE OF ACTUAL RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF ASSIGNMENT TO FOREIGN DUTY. IT WOULD SEEM RATHER THAT THE MENTION OF PLACE OF ACTUAL RESIDENCE WAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIXING THE MAXIMUM EXPENSE TO THE UNITED STATES IN THAT CONNECTION. ACCORDINGLY, YOU ARE ADVISED THAT (EXCEPT WHERE SUCH ACTION IS FORECLOSED BY APPLICABLE STATUTORY OR REGULATORY INHIBITION IN THAT CONNECTION) IN CASES SUCH AS REFERRED TO IN YOUR LETTER THIS OFFICE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO OBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF EXPENSES, IF OTHERWISE PROPER, OF TRANSPORTATION TO A PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES OTHER THAN THE PLACE OF THE EMPLOYEE'S ACTUAL RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY IN THE CANAL ZONE SO LONG AS THE EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN THAT CONNECTION IS NO GREATER.

IN APPLYING THAT DECISION TO THE FACTS HERE PRESENTED, THERE IS FOR CONSIDERATION ONLY THE PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS THE EMPLOYEE'S "ACTUAL RESIDENCE AT TIME OF ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.' AT THE TIME OF HER EMPLOYMENT OR ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY, THE EMPLOYEE GAVE AS HER LEGAL RESIDENCE AND MAILING ADDRESS, THE LEGAL RESIDENCE OF HER HUSBAND, NAMELY, DELAWARE, OHIO. THAT ADDRESS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS HER "ACTUAL RESIDENCE AT TIME OF ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THOSE WORDS AS USED IN THE STATUTE, AND MAY BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE MAXIMUM TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCES WHICH MAY BE AUTHORIZED UNDER THE TERMS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600. THIS ANSWERS QUESTION 10.

AS TO QUESTION 11, THERE IS NOTHING IN SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 WHICH WOULD WARRANT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THAT SECTION ARE MANDATORY IN THE SENSE INDICATED BY THIS QUESTION. THE SECTION SIMPLY PROVIDES THAT APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENTS SHALL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE EXPENSES PROVIDED FOR IN THAT SECTION "IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT.' NONE OF THE REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT ( EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9778 OF SEPTEMBER 10, 1946, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9805 OF NOVEMBER 25, 1946) PRECLUDES THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO AUTHORIZE SUCH TRANSPORTATION AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE. ACCORDINGLY, IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT PAYMENT FOR SUCH TRANSPORTATION MAY BE DENIED IN ANY CASE WHEN IT IS ADMINISTRATIVELY DETERMINED TO BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DO SO. SEE CULP V. UNITED STATES, 76 C.1CLS. 507.

SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 CONTAINS AN AUTHORIZATION FOR EXPENSES OF TRAVEL OF NEW APPOINTEES BUT DOES NOT PRESCRIBE THAT SUCH EXPENSES MUST BE ALLOWED. THEREFORE, QUESTION 12 IS ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE.

DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST 2 TO OCTOBER 31, 1946, INDEFINITE APPOINTMENTS WERE GIVEN BY THE PANAMA CANAL TO SEVERAL EMPLOYEES WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED BY ANOTHER FEDERAL AGENCY. IN SOME INSTANCES THERE WAS NO BREAK IN SERVICE, WHEREAS IN OTHER INSTANCES MORE THAN 30 DAYS ELAPSED BETWEEN THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE EMPLOYEE'S RESIGNATION IN THE OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE PANAMA CANAL. HOWEVER, NONE OF THE EMPLOYEES IN QUESTION WAS EMPLOYED IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY DURING THE BREAK IN SERVICE. DUE TO DIFFERENT LEAVE SYSTEMS, RETIREMENT ACTS, ETC. BEING INVOLVED, THE CUSTOMARY PROCEDURE WAS FOLLOWED BY HAVING THE EMPLOYEES FORMALLY RESIGN THEIR POSITIONS WITH THE OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND FORMAL NEW APPOINTMENTS WERE ISSUED. ALSO, THE EMPLOYEES WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN THE USUAL AGREEMENT TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR 12 MONTHS FOLLOWING THEIR APPOINTMENT, UNDER THE SAME PROCEDURE AS REQUIRED IN THE CASE OF A NEW EMPLOYEE. IN SOME CASES THE EMPLOYEE TOOK THE INITIAL STEP TO OBTAIN THE POSITION WITH THE PANAMA CANAL, WHEREAS IN OTHER CASES THE PANAMA CANAL CONTACTED THE EMPLOYEE THROUGH HIS DEPARTMENT WITH THE OBJECT OF RECRUITING QUALIFIED PERSONNEL FUR DUTY ON THE ISTHMUS. IN SOME INSTANCES THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE EMPLOYEE RESIGNED HIS FORMER POSITION FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRANSFERRING TO THE PANAMA CANAL. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SECTION 1 OF PUBLIC LAW 600 DID NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL NOVEMBER 1, 1946, IT IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER EMPLOYEES RECRUITED FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON AND AFTER AUGUST 2 AND PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1, 1946, ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THEIR FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TRANSPORTED TO THE ISTHMUS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE.

QUESTION 13: UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OUTLINED, MAY SUCH EMPLOYEES BE CONSIDERED AS "NEW EMPLOYEES" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600?

QUESTION 14: IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 13 DEPENDS ON WHETHER THERE IS A BREAK IN SERVICE, WHAT IS THE LENGTH OF THE BREAK WHICH MAY OCCUR AND THE EMPLOYEE STILL BE CONSIDERED AS A TRANSFEREE WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 1 OF PUBLIC LAW 600?

SECTION 1 OF PUBLIC LAW 600, 60 STAT. 806, WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF SECTION 20 OF THAT ACT, BECAME EFFECTIVE THE FIRST DAY OF THE THIRD CALENDAR MONTH FOLLOWING THE DATE OF THE ENACTMENT, OR NOVEMBER 1, 1946, PROVIDES IN PART:

THAT (A) UNDER SUCH REGULATIONS AS THE PRESIDENT MAY PRESCRIBE, ANY CIVILIAN OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO, IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT, IS TRANSFERRED FROM ONE OFFICIAL STATION TO ANOTHER, INCLUDING TRANSFER FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER, FOR PERMANENT DUTY, SHALL, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED HEREIN, WHEN AUTHORIZED, IN THE ORDER DIRECTING THE TRAVEL, BY SUCH SUBORDINATE OFFICIAL OR OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT CONCERNED AS THE HEAD THEREOF MAY DESIGNATE FOR THE PURPOSE, BE ALLOWED AND PAID FROM GOVERNMENT FUNDS THE EXPENSES OF TRAVEL OF HIMSELF AND THE EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY (OR A COMMUTATION THEREOF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACT OF FEBRUARY 14, 1931) AND THE EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION, PACKING, CRATING, TEMPORARY STORAGE, DRAYAGE, AND UNPACKING OF HIS HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS (NOT TO EXCEED SEVEN THOUSAND POUNDS IF UNCRATED OR EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY POUNDS IF CRATED OR THE EQUIVALENT THEREOF WHEN TRANSPORTATION CHARGES ARE BASED ON CUBIC MEASUREMENT): * * * PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT NO PART OF SUCH EXPENSES (INCLUDING THOSE OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE) SHALL BE ALLOWED OR PAID FROM GOVERNMENT FUNDS WHERE THE TRANSFER IS MADE PRIMARILY FOR THE CONVENIENCE OR BENEFIT OF THE OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OR AT HIS REQUEST: PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT IN CASE OF TRANSFER FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER SUCH EXPENSES SHALL BE PAYABLE FROM THE FUNDS OF THE DEPARTMENT TO WHICH THE OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IS TRANSFERRED.

THE MEANING OF THE WORD "TRANSFER" AS USED IN APPROPRIATION ACTS, INCLUDING APPROPRIATIONS AVAILABLE FOR EXPENSES OF TRAVEL PERFORMED ON TRANSFER FROM ONE OFFICIAL STATION TO ANOTHER, HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A NUMBER OF DECISIONS OF THIS OFFICE. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, 14 COMP. GEN. 564; 17 ID. 874; ID. 1108; ID. 1117; 18 ID. 188; 21 ID. 613; 25 ID. 731. UNDER THOSE DECISIONS THE WORD ,TRANSFER" AS CONTAINED IN APPROPRIATION ACTS HAS BEEN HELD TO BE OF LIMITED APPLICATION AND NOT TO EXTEND TO CASES WHERE THE PURPORTED TRANSFER IN EFFECT CONSTITUTES A NEW APPOINTMENT. WHILE UNDER SECTION 1 OF PUBLIC LAW 600, SUPRA, THE AUTHORITY PREVIOUSLY CONTAINED IN APPROPRIATION ACTS FOR INTRA-AGENCY TRANSFERS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE WAS EXTENDED SO AS TO INCLUDE TRANSFERS FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER, THE APPLICATION OF THAT SECTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEARLY EXPRESSED INTENTION TO THE CONTRARY, WOULD BE LIMITED TO PROPER CASES WHERE THE TRANSFER IS MADE PURSUANT TO AND IN ACCORDANCE WITHE THE TRANSFER PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE LAWS AND REGULATIONS. COMPARE 22 COMP. GEN. 873. THE AUTHORITY WOULD NOT EXTEND TO CASES SUCH AS ARE PRESENTED HERE, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THERE WAS A BREAK IN SERVICE OF ONE OR MORE DAYS, WHERE FORMAL RESIGNATIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO THE AGENCY IN WHICH THE EMPLOYEES FORMERLY WERE EMPLOYED AND NEW APPOINTMENTS ISSUED BY THE PANAMA CANAL. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, QUESTION 13 IS ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE RENDERING UNNECESSARY ANY ANSWER TO QUESTION 14.

THERE IS BEFORE THIS OFFICE FOR SETTLEMENT THE CLAIM OF A PANAMA CANAL EMPLOYEE WHO RECEIVED AN APPOINTMENT DATED JULY 10, 1946, FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF THE COST OF TRANSPORTATION OF HIS WIFE FROM CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, THE PLACE OF HIS APPOINTMENT, TO THE ISTHMUS. ALTHOUGH THIS EMPLOYEE WAS APPOINTED JULY 10 HE DID NOT DEPART FROM THE PORT OF EMBARKATION AT NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, UNTIL AUGUST 8, 1946, AT WHICH TIME HIS COMPENSATION BEGAN, SIX DAYS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF PUBLIC LAW 600. HIS WIFE LEFT CHICAGO ON SEPTEMBER 7 AND ARRIVED ON THE ISTHMUS SEPTEMBER 8, 1946, AND SINCE SHE WAS NOT FURNISHED A GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUEST WITH WHICH TO PROCURE HER TICKET, THE EMPLOYEE IS CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE COST OF HER TRANSPORTATION TO THE ISTHMUS. IT IS ASSUMED THAT PUBLIC LAW 600 IS NOT RETROACTIVE AND THEREFORE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES APPOINTED PRIOR TO AUGUST 2, 1946. SECTION 3 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1888, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 3182 DATED NOVEMBER 25, 1919, PROVIDES IN EFFECT THAT THE COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES APPOINTED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR DUTY ON THE ISTHMUS, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, WILL BEGIN UPON DATE OF EMBARKATION AT PORT OF DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED STATES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE HAS NOT BEEN OVERLOOKED YOUR DECISION DATED AUGUST 10, 1942, B-27768, RELATIVE TO THE APPLICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 9064 DATED FEBRUARY 16, 1942, EFFECTIVE AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 1942, WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT AN EMPLOYEE MAY BE REIMBURSED FOR TRANSPORTATION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE REGULATIONS AND PAID A PER DIEM IN LIEU OF SUBSISTENCE ONLY FOR THE PERIOD OF THE TRAVEL TIME AND WAITING TIME AT PORT OF EMBARKATION ON AND AFTER FEBRUARY 1, 1942. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THE FACTS HERE INVOLVED MAY REQUIRE A DIFFERENT RULING FROM THE ONE CONTAINED IN THAT DECISION.

QUESTION 15: UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IS THE DATE OF APPOINTMENT OR THE DATE ON WHICH COMPENSATION BEGINS THE CONTROLLING DATE FOR USE IN DETERMINING WHETHER AN EMPLOYEE'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS MAY BE TRANSPORTED TO THE ISTHMUS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 600?

QUESTION 16: IF THE DATE ON WHICH THE EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION BEGINS IS THE CONTROLLING DATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING WHETHER TRANSPORTATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 600 IS AUTHORIZED, MAY THE COST INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THAT PART OF A JOURNEY COMPLETED PRIOR TO THAT DATE BE PAID FROM GOVERNMENT FUNDS?

THE DATE OF THE CONSUMMATION OF THE APPOINTMENT IS THE CONTROLLING DATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING WHETHER AN EMPLOYEE'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, AND PERSONAL EFFECTS MAY BE TRANSPORTED TO THE ISTHMUS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600. ASSUMING, IN THE EXAMPLE GIVEN, THAT THE EMPLOYEE'S APPOINTMENT WAS CONSUMMATED, THAT IS, THAT AN APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN TENDERED TO THE EMPLOYEE AND ACCEPTED BY HIM PRIOR TO AUGUST 2, 1946, THEN HE WOULD NOT BE A NEW APPOINTEE WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7 OF PUBLIC LAW 600. VIEW OF THIS ANSWER TO QUESTION 15, AN ANSWER TO QUESTION 16 IS NOT REQUIRED.