B-131092, JUL. 24, 1957

B-131092: Jul 24, 1957

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YOUR CLAIM WAS FOR PER DIEM FOR ONE-FOURTH DAY. YOU WERE ISSUED ORDERS TO TRAVEL FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS. USE OF A PRIVATELY-OWNED CONVEYANCE WAS AUTHORIZED BUT REIMBURSEMENT WAS LIMITED TO COST BY COMMON CARRIER. YOU WERE ADMINISTRATIVELY ALLOWED CONSTRUCTIVE PER DIEM FROM 12:28 P.M. YOU MAINTAIN THAT YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO DEPART FROM YOUR HOME. THE TIME OF DEPARTURE FROM AND ARRIVAL AT A PLACE WILL BE THE TIME AT WHICH THE TRAIN. THE TRANSPORTATION TIME TO OR FROM A REGULAR TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL AT THE EMPLOYEE'S DUTY STATION WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN PER DIEM COMPUTATIONS.'. YOUR REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF YOUR CLAIM IS. APPARENTLY YOU HAVE DISREGARDED THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 35D (1) OF AFM 40-10.

B-131092, JUL. 24, 1957

TO MR. C. D. WAMBSGANS:

YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 7, 1957, REQUESTS RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACTION TAKEN IN OUR SETTLEMENT OF MAY 22, 1957, WHICH DISALLOWED YOUR CLAIM FOR PER DIEM IN LIEU OF SUBSISTENCE.

YOUR CLAIM WAS FOR PER DIEM FOR ONE-FOURTH DAY, $2.25, ON AUGUST 4, 1956. YOU WERE ISSUED ORDERS TO TRAVEL FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS, GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI, TO SAMPSON AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK, AND RETURN. USE OF A PRIVATELY-OWNED CONVEYANCE WAS AUTHORIZED BUT REIMBURSEMENT WAS LIMITED TO COST BY COMMON CARRIER. YOU WERE ADMINISTRATIVELY ALLOWED CONSTRUCTIVE PER DIEM FROM 12:28 P.M., AUGUST 4, THE SCHEDULED DEPARTURE BY RAIL FROM GULFPORT. YOU MAINTAIN THAT YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO DEPART FROM YOUR HOME, BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI, AT 11:40 A.M. THAT DATE AND THE PER DIEM SHOULD BE ALLOWED FROM THE TIME OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE DEPARTURE FROM YOUR HOME BY TAXICAB.

YOU CONTEND THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE CIVILIAN TRAVEL MANUAL, AFM 40-10, CHAPTER 9, CITED BY YOU, SUPPORT YOUR FEELING THAT TRAVEL OFFICIALLY BEGINS AND ENDS FROM EITHER THE EMPLOYEE'S PLACE OF RESIDENCE OR HIS OFFICIAL DUTY STATION.

PARAGRAPH 35D OF AFM 40-10, ABOVE, STATES AS FOLLOWS:

"/1) ACTUAL TIME. FOR PER DIEM COMPUTATION PURPOSES, THE TIME OF DEPARTURE FROM AND ARRIVAL AT A PLACE WILL BE THE TIME AT WHICH THE TRAIN, PLANE, OR OTHER MODE OF TRANSPORTATION USED BY THE TRAVELER ACTUALLY LEAVES OR ARRIVES AT ITS REGULAR TERMINAL. THE TRANSPORTATION TIME TO OR FROM A REGULAR TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL AT THE EMPLOYEE'S DUTY STATION WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN PER DIEM COMPUTATIONS.'

YOUR REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF YOUR CLAIM IS, YOU SAY, BASED ON YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE,"OTHER MODE OF TRANSPORTATION" AS USED IN THE ABOVE REGULATION. YOU FEEL THAT PER DIEM SHOULD BEGIN AT THE TIME A TRAVELER BOARDS A TAXICAB, OR ANY OTHER CONVEYANCE, AT HIS RESIDENCE OR OFFICIAL DUTY STATION EN ROUTE TO THE TEMPORARY DUTY STATION. APPARENTLY YOU HAVE DISREGARDED THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 35D (1) OF AFM 40-10, ABOVE, WHICH PRECLUDES THE INCLUSION OF TRANSPORTATION TIME TO OR FROM A REGULAR TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL AT THE EMPLOYEE'S DUTY STATION IN COMPUTING PER DIEM.

THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 35D (1) ARE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THOSE OF SECTION 6.9C OF THE STANDARDIZED GOVERNMENT TRAVEL REGULATIONS WHICH READ AS FOLLOWS:

"THE TIME OF ARRIVAL AT AND DEPARTURE FROM A PLACE WILL BE CONSIDERED AS THE HOUR AT WHICH THE TRAIN, BOAT, OR OTHER CONVEYANCE USED BY THE TRAVELER ACTUALLY LEAVES OR ARRIVES AT ITS REGULAR TERMINAL.'

OUR VIEW IS THAT SECTION 6.9C RESTRICTS THE PER DIEM TO TIME OF DEPARTURE FROM THE REGULAR TERMINAL AND APPLIES IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE TERMINAL OR PLACE OF RESIDENCE IS WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE EMPLOYEE. ACCORDINGLY, PER DIEM IS NOT ALLOWABLE FOR THE PERIOD OF LOCAL TRAVEL FROM RESIDENCE TO THE REGULAR TERMINAL OF THE CONVEYANCE USED BY THE TRAVELER. THE SAME RULE IS FOR APPLICATION IN CASE OF CONSTRUCTIVE PER DIEM WHERE TRAVEL IS BY AUTOMOBILE, LIMITED TO COST OF TRAVEL BY COMMON CARRIER.

THEREFORE, OUR SETTLEMENT OF MAY 22, 1957, IS SUSTAINED.

THE ABOVE CONCLUSION IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS A DETERMINATION OF AN EMPLOYEE'S STATUS WHILE EN ROUTE FROM HIS RESIDENCE TO THE COMMON CARRIER TERMINAL FOR EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION PURPOSES IN CASE OF INJURY, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING A MATTER FOR HANDLING BY THE BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.