A-30764, MARCH 25, 1930, 9 COMP. GEN. 414

A-30764: Mar 25, 1930

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MILEAGE TRAVEL PERFORMED BY AN OFFICER OF THE NAVY TO BE ADMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IS NOT TRAVEL ON PUBLIC BUSINESS WITHIN THE MILEAGE LAWS. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO YOUR PRESENT DUTIES AND UPON THE COMPLETION THEREOF YOU WILL RETURN TO YOUR STATION: WASHINGTON. IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT RIGHT OF AN OFFICER OF THE NAVAL OR MILITARY SERVICE TO MILEAGE FOR TRAVEL PERFORMED UNDER ORDERS DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE TRAVEL IS ON PUBLIC BUSINESS. AS NO PUBLIC INTEREST IS ADVANCED BY IT. IT IS CONSENTED TO FOR THE ADVANTAGE OR PLEASURE OF THE TWO OFFICERS. THIS IS JUST AND REASONABLE. COMMANDER GIBSON TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WAS A MATTER PERSONAL TO THAT OFFICER.

A-30764, MARCH 25, 1930, 9 COMP. GEN. 414

MILEAGE TRAVEL PERFORMED BY AN OFFICER OF THE NAVY TO BE ADMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IS NOT TRAVEL ON PUBLIC BUSINESS WITHIN THE MILEAGE LAWS.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL MCCARL TO LIEUT. A. M. JONES, UNITED STATES NAVY, MARCH 25, 1930:

BY DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, IN FOURTH INDORSEMENT, FEBRUARY 21, 1930, THERE HAS BEEN RECEIVED YOUR REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF DISALLOWANCE BY SETTLEMENT K-27236-N, MAY 29, 1928, OF CREDIT FOR PAYMENT OF $33.44 TO LIEUT. COMMANDER EDWARD B. GIBSON, UNITED STATES NAVY, AS MILEAGE FOR TRAVEL FROM NAVAL OPERATING BASE, HAMPTON ROADS, VA., TO WASHINGTON, D.C., AND RETURN, UNDER ORDERS OF OCTOBER 12, 1927, AS FOLLOWS:

SUBJECT: TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL DUTY.

1 PROCEED TO THE PLACE (OR PLACES, IN THE ORDER GIVEN) INDICATED BELOW, FOR TEMPORARY DUTY. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO YOUR PRESENT DUTIES AND UPON THE COMPLETION THEREOF YOU WILL RETURN TO YOUR STATION:

WASHINGTON, D.C., REPORTING 10 OCTOBER 1927, TO THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW BEFORE THE SUPREME AND APPELLATE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

(S) R. H. LEIGH.

IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT RIGHT OF AN OFFICER OF THE NAVAL OR MILITARY SERVICE TO MILEAGE FOR TRAVEL PERFORMED UNDER ORDERS DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE TRAVEL IS ON PUBLIC BUSINESS. BARKER V. UNITED STATES, 19 CT.CLS. 288; PERRIMOND V. UNITED STATES, ID. 509; MCCAULEY V. UNITED STATES, 50 ID. 105; 4 COMP. GEN. 821. AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. PHISTERER, 94 U.S. 219, 221, HAS ALSO INDICATED THE NECESSITY FOR A "PUBLIC INTEREST" IN THE TRAVEL OF AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY TO ENTITLE TO MILEAGE IN THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:

IF A. AT ONE STATION AND B. AT ANOTHER DESIRE TO EXCHANGE STATIONS OR REGIMENTS OR COMPANIES WITH EACH OTHER, AND PREFER A REQUEST TO THAT EFFECT, THE PROVISION (OF ARMY REGULATIONS) ASSUMES THAT THE COMMANDING OFFICER MAY, IN HIS DISCRETION, GRANT IT; BUT, AS NO PUBLIC INTEREST IS ADVANCED BY IT, AND IT IS CONSENTED TO FOR THE ADVANTAGE OR PLEASURE OF THE TWO OFFICERS, THEY MUST BEAR THEIR OWN EXPENSE OF TRANSPORTATION IN MAKING THE EXCHANGE. THIS IS JUST AND REASONABLE.

THE ADMISSION OF LIEUT. COMMANDER GIBSON TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WAS A MATTER PERSONAL TO THAT OFFICER, IT WAS NOT TRAVEL ON PUBLIC BUSINESS WITHIN THE MILEAGE LAWS.