B-25771, JUNE 1, 1942, 21 COMP. GEN. 1073

B-25771, JUNE 1, 1942, 21 COMP. GEN. 1073

TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS IN ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES - SUPERINTENDENT OF ARMY NURSE CORPS; WOMEN GENERALLY THE AUTHORITY IN THE ACT OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1941, TO MAKE TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES "FROM AMONG QUALIFIED PERSONS" REFERS TO AND CONTEMPLATES MEN EXCLUSIVELY, AND MAY NOT BE REGARDED AS AUTHORITY FOR COMMISSIONING WOMEN AS OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS WHOSE PAY, ADDITIONAL MONEY ALLOWANCE, AND "RELATIVE RANK" ARE FIXED BY STATUTE IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF A COLONEL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, TO WHICH OFFICE SHE WAS APPOINTED, IN ADDITION TO HER APPOINTMENT AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, UNDER COLOR OF THE AUTHORITY IN THE ACT OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1941, TO MAKE TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES "FROM AMONG QUALIFIED PERSONS.'

ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL ELLIOTT TO COL. W. M. DIXON, U.S. ARMY, JUNE 1, 1942:

THERE HAS BEEN RECEIVED, BY REFERENCE FROM THE CHIEF OF FINANCE, YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 3, 1942, AS FOLLOWS:

ATTACHED HERETO IS A VOUCHER IN FAVOR OF COLONEL JULIA O. FLIKKE, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE AMOUNT OF $245.02 COVERING PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 14, 1942, TO MARCH 31, 1942, WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO THE UNDERSIGNED, A DISBURSING OFFICER, FOR PAYMENT.

SECTION 13, ACT OF JUNE 10, 1922 (42 STAT. 631) PROVIDES THAT SUPERINTENDENTS OF THE NURSE CORPS SHALL RECEIVE A MONEY ALLOWANCE AT THE RATE OF $2,500 A YEAR IN ADDITION TO THEIR PAY AS NURSES.

THE ACT OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1941, PUBLIC LAW 252, 77TH CONGRESS, PROVIDES THAT," DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES MAY BE MADE, UNDER SUCH REGULATIONS AS THE PRESIDENT MAY PRESCRIBE, FROM AMONG QUALIFIED PERSONS WITHOUT APPOINTING SUCH PERSONS AS OFFICERS IN ANY PARTICULAR COMPONENT OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. * * * PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT ANY PERSON APPOINTED AS AN OFFICER IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT SHALL RECEIVE THE SAME PAY AND ALLOWANCES AND BE ENTITLED TO THE SAME RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND BENEFITS AS MEMBERS OF THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS OF THE SAME GRADE AND LENGTH OF ACTIVE SERVICE.'

PARAGRAPH 4 OF COPY OF LETTER OF APPOINTMENT DATED MARCH 13, 1942, ATTACHED HERETO STATES," THIS APPOINTMENT IS IN ADDITION TO YOUR APPOINTMENT AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, THE DUTIES OF WHICH OFFICE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM.'

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED LAW PROVIDING FOR A SPECIFIC RATE OF PAY FOR THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, THE UNDERSIGNED IS IN DOUBT AS TO WHETHER COLONEL FLIKKE IS ENTITLED TO THE PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF A COLONEL, AND YOUR DECISION IN THE MATTER IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED.

ENCLOSED WITH YOUR SUBMISSION IS A COPY OF A "TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT" OF MARCH 13, 1942, AS FOLLOWS:

1. BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE TEMPORARILY APPOINTED IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, EFFECTIVE THIS DATE, IN THE GRADE AND SECTION SHOWN IN ADDRESS ABOVE. YOUR SERIAL NUMBER AND LENGTH OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN YOUR PRESENT OR ANY HIGHER GRADE ARE SHOWN AFTER A AND B RESPECTIVELY.

2. THIS COMMISSION TO CONTINUE IN FORCE DURING THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE TIME BEING, AND FOR THE DURATION OF THE PRESENT EMERGENCY AND SIX MONTHS THEREAFTER UNLESS SOONER TERMINATED.

3. THERE IS INCLOSED HEREWITH A FORM FOR OATH OF OFFICE WHICH YOU ARE REQUESTED TO EXECUTE AND RETURN PROMPTLY TO THE AGENCY FROM WHICH IT WAS RECEIVED BY YOU. THE EXECUTION AND RETURN OF THE REQUIRED OATH OF OFFICE CONSTITUTE AN ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR APPOINTMENT. NO OTHER EVIDENCE OF ACCEPTANCE IS REQUIRED. THIS LETTER SHOULD BE RETAINED BY YOU AS EVIDENCE OF YOUR APPOINTMENT AS NO COMMISSIONS WILL BE ISSUED DURING THE WAR.

4. THIS APPOINTMENT IS IN ADDITION TO YOUR APPOINTMENT AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, THE DUTIES OF WHICH OFFICE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: THERE WAS ALSO ENCLOSED A COPY OF "ORDERS" OF MARCH 13, 1942, TO " COLONEL JULIA O. FLIKKE," THROUGH THE SURGEON GENERAL, AS FOLLOWS:

BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, YOU ARE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY WITH THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, EFFECTIVE MARCH 13, 1942. ON THAT DATE YOU WILL PROCEED FROM TAKOMA PARK, MARYLAND TO WASHINGTON, D.C., REPORTING TO THE SURGEON GENERAL FOR DUTY. YOU WILL RANK FROM MARCH 13, 1942. THE TRAVEL DIRECTED IS NECESSARY IN THE MILITARY SERVICE AND IS CHARGEABLE TO FD 1499 P1-06 A 10410-2 AND QM 1601 P61-07 A 10525-2.

IT APPEARS THAT MRS. FLIKKE HAS BEEN SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS--- AND PRESUMABLY STILL CONTINUES TO HOLD THAT POSITION--- AND THAT HER "APPOINTMENT" AS COLONEL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES PURPORTS TO BE "IN ADDITION TO YOUR APPOINTMENT AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, THE DUTIES OF WHICH OFFICE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM.' IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ALL OTHER OBJECTION, MRS. FLIKKE COULD NOT, IN ANY EVENT, CONTINUE TO DRAW THE PAY AND ALLOWANCES PROVIDED BY LAW FOR THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NURSE CORPS, AND, AT THE SAME TIME, HAVE THE PAY AND ALLOWANCES PROVIDED BY LAW FOR A COLONEL IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

BRIEFLY, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, REFERRED TO HEREINAFTER AS SUPERINTENDENT, IS APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR, AND AT HIS DISCRETION, MAY BE REMOVED BY HIM. ACT OF JULY 9, 1918, CHAPTER V, 40 STAT. 879. BY VIRTUE OF HER TENURE AS SUPERINTENDENT, SHE HAS "RELATIVE RANK" AS MAJOR; AND,"AS REGARDS MEDICAL AND SANITARY MATTERS AND ALL OTHER WORK" WITHIN THE LINE OF HER PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, SHE HAS AUTHORITY, IN AND ABOUT MILITARY HOSPITALS, NEXT AFTER THE OFFICERS OF THE MEDICAL CORPS. ACT OF JUNE 4, 1920, 41 STAT. 767. IN ADDITION TO HER PAY AS A NURSE SHE IS ENTITLED TO A MONEY ALLOWANCE AT THE RATE OF $2,500 A YEAR. ACT OF JUNE 10, 1922, 42 STAT. 631. OTHER BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE POSITION OF SUPERINTENDENT ARE NOT MATERIAL HERE. HER ANNUAL RATE OF PAY, HER ANNUAL ADDITIONAL MONEY ALLOWANCE, AND HER "RELATIVE RANK" ARE FIXED BY POSITIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS, CLEAR, CONCISE, AND UNMISTAKABLE. AND IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY ENACTMENT NO LESS CLEAR AND CONCISE, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS AS SUCH AND WHILE PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE POSITION CANNOT BE PAID OR ALLOWED ANY GREATER AMOUNT, AND CANNOT BE "PROMOTED" EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO ANY HIGHER RANK,"RELATIVE" OR OTHER, THAN THE MAXIMUM PRESCRIBED. CF. 20 COMP. GEN. 558, ADHERED TO UPON FURTHER CONSIDERATION B-14985, MAY 5, 1942; B-23524, MARCH 16, 1942. TO HOLD OTHERWISE WOULD BE NOT ONLY WITHOUT STATUTORY SANCTION, BUT IN CONTRAVENTION OF EXPRESS STATUTORY MANDATE.

HOWEVER, YOUR SUBMISSION, INDICATING AS IT DOES, AN ADMINISTRATIVE MISINTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE, PROMPTS A SOMEWHAT MORE DETAILED CONSIDERATION THAN WOULD BE NECESSARY OTHERWISE.

THE "TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT" OF MRS. FLIKKE IN THE GRADE OF COLONEL "IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES" APPARENTLY WAS UNDER COLOR OF PUBLIC LAW 252--- 77TH CONGRESS, APPROVED SEPTEMBER 22, 1941, ENTITLED " A JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS OF OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES," WHICH IS AS FOLLOWS:

THAT DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES MAY BE MADE, UNDER SUCH REGULATIONS AS THE PRESIDENT MAY PRESCRIBE, FROM AMONG QUALIFIED PERSONS WITHOUT APPOINTING SUCH PERSONS AS OFFICERS IN ANY PARTICULAR COMPONENT OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. ALL PERSONS SO APPOINTED AS OFFICERS SHALL BE COMMISSIONED IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND MAY BE ORDERED INTO THE ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES TO SERVE THEREIN FOR SUCH PERIODS OF TIME AS THE PRESIDENT MAY PRESCRIBE. SUCH APPOINTMENTS IN GRADES BELOW THAT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SHALL BE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT ALONE, AND GENERAL OFFICERS BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: PROVIDED, THAT ANY APPOINTMENT MADE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT MAY BE VACATED AT ANY TIME BY THE PRESIDENT AND, IF NOT SOONER VACATED, SHALL CONTINUE DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY AND SIX MONTHS THEREAFTER: PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT ANY PERSON APPOINTED AS AN OFFICER IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT SHALL RECEIVE THE SAME PAY AND ALLOWANCES AND BE ENTITLED TO THE SAME RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND BENEFITS AS MEMBERS OF THE OFFICERS'RESERVE CORPS OF THE SAME GRADE AND LENGTH OF ACTIVE SERVICE:AND PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT NOTHING CONTAINED IN THIS ACT SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS IN THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS.

PRESUMABLY, THE UNDERTAKING TO APPOINT MRS. FLIKKE AS COLONEL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES PROCEEDED UPON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE WORD "PERSON" USED IN THE ABOVE-QUOTED STATUTE INCLUDED WOMEN AS WELL AS MEN. IF SUCH WAS THE EXPLANATION (AND I CONCEIVE OF NO OTHER), I FIND NO SUPPORT FOR AND AM UNABLE TO AGREE WITH THAT VIEW. UNQUESTIONABLY THE WORD "PERSON," IN ITS BROADEST AND MOST COMPREHENSIVE SENSE EMBRACES ANY AND EVERY LIVING HUMAN BEING, BUT IT BY NO MEANS FOLLOWS THAT WHEN USED IN A STATUTE, IT IS ENTITLED TO OR PROPERLY MAY BE GIVEN SUCH ALL INCLUSIVE APPLICATION. ESTABLISHED CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ARE TO THE CONTRARY. IT HAS BEEN SAID BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

* * * IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO ASCERTAIN THE MEANING OF THE LEGISLATURE FROM THE WORDS USED IN THE STATUTE, AND THE SUBJECT-MATTER TO WHICH IT RELATES; AND TO RESTRAIN ITS OPERATION WITHIN NARROWER LIMITS THAN ITS WORDS IMPORT IF THE COURT ARE SATISFIED THAT THE LITERAL MEANING OF ITS LANGUAGE WOULD EXTEND TO CASES WHICH THE LEGISLATURE NEVER DESIGNED TO EMBRACE IN IT. ( ITALICS SUPPLIED.) MCKEE V. UNITED STATES, 164 U.S. 287, 293, CITING BREWER V. BLOUGHER, 14 PET. 178, 198; PETRI V. COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, 142 U.S. 644, 650.

THE SUBJECT MATTER TO WHICH THE PRESENT STATUTE RELATES IS, OF COURSE, THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS OFFICERS THEREIN. THE STATUTE MAKES NO PROVISION FOR THE PROMOTION OF OFFICERS OR ANY OTHER PERSON ALREADY IN THE MILITARY SERVICE AND IS AUTHORITY ONLY FOR TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM AMONG QUALIFIED PERSONS WITHOUT APPOINTING THEM TO ANY PARTICULAR COMPONENT OF SAID ARMY. THE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES ARE THE REGULAR ARMY, DEFINED BY STATUTE TO BE "THE PERMANENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS MAINTAINED BOTH IN PEACE AND WAR ACCORDING TO LAW" (ACT OF APRIL 22, 1898, 30 STAT. 361, 10 U.S.C. SECTION 3), THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL GUARD WHILE IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS (ACT OF JUNE 4, 1920, 41 STAT. 759, AS AMENDED JUNE 15, 1933, 48 STAT. 153, U.S.C., TITLE 10, SECTION 4, 1941 SUPP.). THEREFORE, THE JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZES TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM AMONG QUALIFIED PERSONS, WITHOUT APPOINTING THEM AS OFFICERS IN EITHER THE REGULAR ARMY, THE NATIONAL GUARD, OR THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS. BUT BY THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION, IT IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO AUTHORITY FOR APPOINTMENT AS AN OFFICER THAT THE APPOINTEE BE A QUALIFIED PERSON, THAT IS, THAT THE APPOINTEE BE A PERSON OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE TO APPOINTMENT AS AN OFFICER IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATION.

THE CASE OF COMMONWEALTH V. WELOSKEY ( MASSACHUSETTS), 177 N.E. 656, PRESENTED THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE WORD "PERSON" IN A STATUTE OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS INCLUDED WOMEN AS WELL AS MEN. IN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION, THE COURT SAID:

THE WORDS OF A STATUTE ARE THE MAIN SOURCE FOR THE ASCERTAINMENT OF A LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. THEY ARE TO BE CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO THEIR NATURAL IMPORT IN COMMON AND APPROVED USAGE. THE IMPERFECTIONS OF LANGUAGE TO EXPRESS INTENT OFTEN RENDER NECESSARY FURTHER INQUIRY. STATUTES ARE TO BE INTERPRETED, NOT ALONE ACCORDING TO THEIR SIMPLE, LITERAL OR STRICT VERBAL MEANING, BUT IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR DEVELOPMENT, THEIR PROGRESSION THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, THE HISTORY OF THE TIMES, PRIOR LEGISLATION, CONTEMPORARY CUSTOMS AND CONDITIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF POSITIVE LAW OF WHICH THEY ARE PART, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF THE COMMON LAW, TO THE END THAT THEY BE HELD TO COVER THE SUBJECTS PRESUMABLY WITHIN THE VISION OF THE LEGISLATURE AND, ON THE ONE HAND, BE NOT UNDULY CONSTRICTED SO AS TO EXCLUDE MATTERS FAIRLY WITHIN THEIR SCOPE, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, BE NOT STRETCHED BY ENLARGEMENT OF SIGNIFICATION TO COMPREHEND MATTERS NOT WITHIN THE PRINCIPLE AND PURVIEW ON WHICH THEY WERE FOUNDED WHEN ORIGINALLY FRAMED AND THEIR WORDS CHOSEN. GENERAL EXPRESSIONS MAY BE RESTRAINED BY RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING A LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT THEY BE NARROWED AND USED IN A PARTICULAR SENSE. QUOTING NUMEROUS AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AS THUS STATED. THE COURT SAID FURTHER:

AS MATTER OF STRICT AND ABSTRACT VERBAL INTERPRETATION, APART FROM CONTEXT, CIRCUMSTANCES, AND CONTEMPORARY AND ANTECEDENT HISTORY, THE LANGUAGE OF G.L. C. 234, SECTION 1 (THE STATUTE THERE UNDER CONSIDERATION), IS BROAD ENOUGH TO COMPRISE WOMEN. THE WORD "PERSON" WHEN USED IN AN UNRESTRICTED SENSE INCLUDES A WOMAN. IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT "THE WORD "PERSON," IN ITS NATURAL AND USUAL SIGNIFICATION, INCLUDES WOMEN AS WELL AS MEN.' * * * "THE NATURAL AND OBVIOUS MEANING OF THE WORD "PERSON" IS A LIVING HUMAN BEING.' * * * THE WORD "PERSON," LIKE MANY OTHER WORDS, HAS NO FIXED AND RIGID SIGNIFICATION, BUT HAS DIFFERENT MEANINGS DEPENDENT UPON CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS, THE CONNECTION IN WHICH IT IS USED, AND THE RESULT INTENDED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. IT HAS BEEN SAID TO BE "AN AMBIGUOUS WORD" AND MAY REFER TO THOSE OF EITHER OR BOTH SEXES. * * * IT HAS ALSO BEEN HELD NOT TO INCLUDE A WOMAN. * * * SEVERAL CASES HAVE ARISEN WHERE THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE WORD "PERSON," WHEN USED RESPECTING THE RIGHT TO HOLD OFFICE OR TO EXERCISE THE FRANCHISE, INCLUDED WOMEN. IN NAIRN V. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, (AN ENGLISH CASE) IT APPEARED THAT, BY ACTS OF PARLIAMENT OF 1868 AND 1881, THE UNIVERSITY FRANCHISE WAS CONFERRED UPON "EVERY PERSON" WHOSE NAME WAS ON THE REGISTER AND ON WHOM DEGREES HAD BEEN CONFERRED. AT THAT TIME WOMEN WERE NOT ADMITTED TO GRADUATION AND COULD NOT RECEIVE DEGREES. IN 1889, A FURTHER ACT WAS PASSED FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS WITH EXTENSIVE REGULATORY POWERS OVER UNIVERSITIES. THESE COMMISSIONERS ADOPTED AN ORDINANCE ENABLING THE UNIVERSITIES TO CONFER DEGREES ON WOMEN FOR SATISFACTORY ACADEMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THE APPELLANTS, HAVING RECEIVED DEGREES UPON GRADUATION, CONTENDED THAT THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO VOTE. REJECTING THAT CONTENTION, IT WAS SAID BY LORD LOREBURN, L.C., * * * "IT PROCEEDS UPON THE SUPPOSITION THAT THE WORD "PERSON" IN THE ACT OF 1868 DID INCLUDE WOMEN, THOUGH NOT THEN GIVING THEM THE VOTE, SO THAT AT SOME LATER DATE AN ACT PURPORTING TO DEAL ONLY WITH EDUCATION MIGHT ENABLE COMMISSIONERS TO ADMIT THEM TO THE DEGREE, AND THEREBY ALSO INDIRECTLY CONFER UPON THEM THE FRANCHISE. IT WOULD REQUIRE A CONVINCING DEMONSTRATION TO SATISFY ME THAT PARLIAMENT INTENDED TO EFFECT A CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE SO MOMENTOUS AND FAR REACHING BY SO FURTIVE A PROCESS. IT IS A DANGEROUS ASSUMPTION TO SUPPOSE THAT THE LEGISLATURE FORESEES EVERY POSSIBLE RESULT THAT MAY ENSUE FROM THE UNGUARDED USE OF A SINGLE WORD, OR THAT THE LANGUAGE USED IN STATUTES IS SO PRECISELY ACCURATE THAT YOU CAN PICK OUT FROM VARIOUS ACTS THIS AND THAT EXPRESSION AND, SKILLFULLY PIECING THEM TOGETHER, LAY A SAFE FOUNDATION FOR SOME REMOTE INFERENCE.' IT WAS HELD THAT THE STATUTORY WORD "PERSON" DID NOT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDE WOMEN. * * *

THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT CITED ANOTHER ENGLISH CASE, SAYING:

* * * IT WAS SAID BY LORD BIRKENHEAD IN THE COURSE OF AN EXHAUSTIVE STATEMENT REVIEWING MANY DECISIONS * * *: "A LONG STREAM OF CASES HAS ESTABLISHED THAT GENERAL WORDS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED SO AS, IN AN OLD PHRASE,"TO PURSUE THE INTENT OF THE MAKERS OF STATUTES" * * * AND SO AS TO IMPORT ALL THOSE IMPLIED EXCEPTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM A CLOSE CONSIDERATION OF THE MISCHIEFS SOUGHT TO BE REMEDIED AND OF THE STATE OF THE LAW AT THE MOMENT WHEN THE STATUTE WAS PASSED.' * * *

THIS BRIEF REVIEW OF AUTHORITIES DEMONSTRATES THAT "PERSON" BY ITSELF IS AN EQUIVOCAL WORD. ITS MEANING IN A STATUTE REQUIRES INTERPRETATION. * * * THE COURT HELD THAT THE WORD "PERSON" IN THE STATUTE THERE UNDER CONSIDERATION INCLUDED MEN, ONLY, AND NOT WOMEN.

I HAVE QUOTED SOMEWHAT LARGELY FROM THE CITED CASE BECAUSE, WHILE CITATIONS TO THE SAME EFFECT MIGHT BE MULTIPLIED, THAT WELL CONSIDERED AND EXHAUSTIVE OPINION APPEARS SUFFICIENT IMMEDIATELY TO IMPRESS THE POINT THAT THE WORD "PERSONS," OR RATHER THE EVEN MORE RESTRICTIVE PHRASE "QUALIFIED PERSONS" IN THE SUBJECT STATUTE CANNOT, BY REASONABLE PROCESS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION BE HELD TO INCLUDE WOMEN IN ITS PURVIEW.

EXAMINING THE ACT OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1941, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING RULES, AS TO THE ANTECEDENT HISTORY, IT SUFFICES TO SAY THAT THE AUTHORITY AND FUNCTION OF CONTROLLING AND REGULATING THE RAISING AND SUPPORT OF ARMIES--- THAT IS, THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE, AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY--- IS REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE CONGRESS; THAT THE STATUTES PASSED IN THE DISCHARGE OF THAT RESPONSIBILITY ARE LEGION; AND THAT EVERY ONE OF SUCH STATUTES DEALING WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY, ITS COMPOSITION, ITS CONDUCT AND ITS PERSONNEL, COMMISSIONED AND ENLISTED, FROM THE INCEPTION OF OUR GOVERNMENT UNTIL NOW, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION REFERS TO MEN AND DOES NOT INCLUDE, AND HAS NEVER BEEN INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE, WOMEN. THIS STATEMENT IS SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO THE SINGLE EXCEPTION OF STATUTES DEALING WITH THE ORGANIZATION, ETC., OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, WHICH IT NEED HARDLY BE SAID IS SUI GENERIS, THE STATUTES RELATIVE THERETO BEING EXPLICIT IN DETAIL AND DISTINCT FROM GENERAL STATUTES DEALING WITH THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NURSE CORPS, IN RELATION TO THE ARMY, BEING WELL UNDERSTOOD. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE ACT OF JULY 9, 1918, SUPRA, PROVIDED "THAT THE NURSE CORPS (FEMALE) OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SHALL HEREAFTER BE KNOWN AS THE ARMY NURSE CORPS," AND THAT "THE ANNUAL PAY OF FEMALE NURSES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY" IS PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 13 OF THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1922, 42 STAT. 631. THUS,"PRIOR LEGISLATION" WOULD APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENT TO EXCLUDE ANY VIEW THAT THE STATUTE HERE INVOLVED HAD REFERENCE TO OR WAS INTENDED TO INCLUDE WOMEN AS ELIGIBLE TO TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS AS COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

AS TO THE DEVELOPMENT--- THE "PROGRESSION THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, THE HISTORY OF THE IMES"--- IT APPEARS THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR WITH A LETTER OF JUNE 17, 1941, IN RELEVANT PART AS FOLLOWS:

THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION IS TO PROVIDE AUTHORITY, DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, FOR TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS OF OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM APPOINTMENTS IN THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS.

SOUND PERSONNEL POLICY DICTATES THAT THE OFFICER PERSONNEL OF THE REGULAR ARMY, THE NATIONAL GUARD, AND THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS BE CONSIDERED AT ALL TIMES AS SEPARATE CONTINUING BODIES OF OFFICERS AND THAT EACH BE MAINTAINED AT A PERMANENT STRENGTH LIMITED TO THE ARMY'S NEED AND NORMAL CAPACITY TO ADEQUATELY TRAIN DURING NORMAL TIMES OF PEACE SO THAT IN AN EMERGENCY THERE SHALL BE A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE AND WELL-TRAINED BODY OF OFFICERS TO MEET THE INITIAL OFFICER REQUIREMENTS OF MOBILIZATION. SUCH POLICY SHOULD ALSO CONTEMPLATE AN EXPANSION OF THE COMPOSITE GROUP OF OFFICERS DURING TIME OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND PROVIDE FOR A PLANNED RETURN TO NORMALCY AFTER SUCH WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY HAS TERMINATED.

FEDERAL STATUTES IN EFFECT IN TIME OF PEACE HAVE ENABLED THE WAR DEPARTMENT TO CARRY OUT THE ABOVE POLICY INSOFAR AS CONCERNS THE BUILDING UP OF A BODY OF OFFICERS TO MEET THE INITIAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN EMERGENCY AND OTHER STATUTES APPLICABLE ONLY IN TIME OF WAR WOULD ENABLE THE WAR DEPARTMENT TO EXPAND THIS COMPOSITE GROUP OF OFFICERS TO MEET THE TOTAL DEFENSE NEEDS OF THE NATION. THERE IS NO AUTHORITY, HOWEVER, TO MEET THE SITUATION CONFRONTING THE NATION TODAY FOR THOUGH WE ARE AT PEACE, WE MUST CARRY ON WITH THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND EXPANSION PROBLEMS INCIDENT TO TOTAL NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS TO MEET ANY SITUATION THAT MIGHT BE SUDDENLY THRUST UPON US. TO DO LESS THAN THIS WOULD INVITE DISASTER.

THE ENACTMENT OF THIS PROPOSED LEGISLATION WILL ENABLE THE WAR DEPARTMENT TO TEMPORARILY APPOINT AS OFFICERS, IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, CERTAIN SPECIALISTS WHOSE SERVICES ARE HIGHLY DESIRED IN CONNECTION WITH PARTICULAR PROJECTS DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, BUT WHOSE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE AND GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS WOULD NOT JUSTIFY THEIR RETENTION IN A COMPONENT OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE EMERGENCY HAS TERMINATED. IT WILL ALSO ENABLE THE WAR DEPARTMENT TO BUILD UP, DURING THE EMERGENCY, THE LARGE CORPS OF OFFICERS NECESSARY TO PROPERLY OFFICER OUR NATIONAL-DEFENSE FORCES SHOULD THE COUNTRY BECOME INVOLVED IN WAR, AND TO DO THIS WITHOUT OVEREXTENDING THE COMMISSIONED PERSONNEL OF THE REGULAR ARMY, THE NATIONAL GUARD, AND THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS.

SINCE THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION IS IN THE NATURE OF METHOD OF APPOINTMENT RATHER THAN AN AUTHORIZATION FOR A GREATER NUMBER OF APPOINTMENTS, ITS ENACTMENT INTO LAW WOULD NOT CAUSE ADDITIONAL COST TO THE GOVERNMENT. ITALICS SUPPLIED.)

THIS LETTER WOULD APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENT, IN ITSELF, TO MAKE THE MATTER PLAIN. BUT THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE, IN ITS REPORT ON THE MEASURE, EXPLAINED ITS PURPOSE AND STATED:

* * * THE OFFICERS APPOINTED WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MEET THE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS, AND RECEIVE THE SAME PAY AND ALLOWANCES AND WOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE SAME RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND BENEFITS AS MEMBERS OF THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS OF THE SAME GRADE AND LENGTH OF SERVICE. THE RESOLUTION ALSO SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT NOTHING CONTAINED THEREIN SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS IN THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING LAW.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT, IN SUBMITTING THIS MEASURE FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, POINTED OUT THAT EXISTING PROVISIONS OF LAW AUTHORIZE TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AS DISTINGUISHED FROM APPOINTMENTS IN THE COMPONENTS OF SUCH ARMY IN TIME OF WAR AND THAT THE ENACTMENT OF THIS JOINT RESOLUTION WOULD MERELY EXTEND SUCH AUTHORITY TO INCLUDE THE PRESENT EMERGENCY. IT APPEARS THAT THIS AUTHORITY WILL MATERIALLY ASSIST THE WAR DEPARTMENT IN THE MATTER OF CARRYING OUT ITS PROGRAM REGARDING COMMISSIONING THE GRADUATES OF THE OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS ORGANIZED AND CONDUCTED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND BENEFIT OF OUTSTANDING YOUNG MEN OF THE NATION WHO ARE NOW OR MAY HEREAFTER BE INDUCTED INTO ACTIVE FEDERAL SERVICE UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940. * * * ( ITALICS SUPPLIED.) THE REPORT STATED THAT THE ENACTMENT OF THE LAW WOULD ENABLE THE WAR DEPARTMENT TO APPOINT

* * * CERTAIN SPECIALISTS WHO, THOUGH HIGHLY DESIRED IN CONNECTION WITH PARTICULAR PROJECTS DURING A TIME OF WAR OR EMERGENCY DO NOT POSSESS THE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE AND GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THEIR RETENTION IN A COMPONENT OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE EMERGENCY HAS TERMINATED. * * *

IN DEBATE ON THE MEASURE IN THE SENATE, SENATOR WALSH OF MASSACHUSETTS CALLED ATTENTION TO WHAT HE TERMED THE "VERY SWEEPING LANGUAGE" OF THE RESOLUTION, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD ENABLE THE SECRETARY TO BESTOW COMMISSIONS UPON WHAT HE TERMED "FOOT-LOOSE" OFFICERS, AND INQUIRED "COULD THE SECRETARY OF WAR DESIGNATE ANY CIVILIAN AND SAY "YOU HAVE A COMMISSION IN THE ARMY? " " SENATOR THOMAS OF UTAH, IN CHARGE OF THE RESOLUTION, REPLIED: "NO. NOTHING LOOSE LIKE THAT COULD BE DONE. THE PERSON APPOINTED MUST MEET ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.' ( ITALICS SUPPLIED.) SENATOR WALSH CONTINUED IN PART:

* * * AS I READ THE JOINT RESOLUTION, IT SEEMS TO PROVIDE FOR "FOOT LOOSE" ARMY OFFICERS. I DO NOT MEAN TO USE THAT TERM OFFENSIVELY. SEEMS TO PROVIDE FOR ARMY OFFICERS WHO HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO ANY BRANCH, CORPS, OR GROUP IN THE ARMY. THAT IS WHAT TROUBLES ME ABOUT IT. I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARY OF WAR OUGHT TO HAVE AUTHORITY TO MAKE PROMOTIONS, BUT THE JOINT RESOLUTION SEEMS TO GO INTO THE FIELD OF GIVING COMMISSIONS TO CIVILIANS WHO THE SECRETARY OF WAR THINKS POSSESS CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS, WHICH MAY NOT BE THE QUALIFICATIONS FIXED BY THE REGULATIONS OF THE ARMY. SENATOR THOMAS REPLIED:

I CAN ASSURE THE SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS THAT ALL THE SAFEGUARDS PLACED AROUND APPOINTMENTS OF PERSONS IN THE ARMY WILL BE RESPECTED. THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN SET UP BY LAW. IT INCLUDES ALL THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS. NO ONE WOULD BE APPOINTED A LIEUTENANT OR A CAPTAIN IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT BEING DETAILED TO A PARTICULAR COMPONENT. ( ITALICS SUPPLIED.) SOME ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION WAS HAD IN DEBATE, SENATORS WALSH, THOMAS, DANAHER, AND TAFT PARTICIPATING (SEE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, AUGUST 11, 1941, PAGES 7131 7132), BUT THE FOREGOING EXCERPTS WOULD APPEAR TO TELL THE WHOLE STORY IN TERMS TOO SIMPLE TO ADMIT OF MISUNDERSTANDING, AND TO SHOW CONCLUSIVELY THAT IT WAS NOT IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE JOINT RESOLUTION SHOULD GO FURTHER THAN ITS OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE AND EFFECT AS SET OUT THEREIN AND IN THE LETTER OF REFERENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, AND THAT IT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE PROMOTION DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY OF ANY PERSON ALREADY IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, AND THAT IT WAS THE PURPOSE OF CONGRESS THAT APPOINTMENTS UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE (CIVILIANS) WHO COULD "MEET THE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS," AND ,THAT ALL THE SAFEGUARDS PLACED AROUND APPOINTMENTS OF PERSONS IN THE ARMY" SHOULD BE RESPECTED. THE "QUALIFICATIONS AND ELIGIBILITY" FOR MEMBERSHIP, ACCEPTANCE, OR APPOINTMENT IN THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS ARE SET FORTH IN U.S.C., TITLE 10, SECTION 353, AND IT MAY BE POINTED OUT THAT THE WORD "PERSON," USED SEVERAL TIMES IN THAT SECTION, CLEARLY HAS REFERENCE SOLELY TO MEN AND, SO FAR AS IS KNOWN, HAS NEVER BEEN SUGGESTED AS INCLUSIVE OF WOMEN. ALSO, THE STATUTORY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS ( U.S.C., TITLE 10, SECTION 381) PRESCRIBES TRAINING FOR ,PHYSICALLY FIT MALE STUDENTS" OF ACCEPTABLE INSTITUTIONS, BUT MAKES NO PROVISION FOR ENTRY OF FEMALE STUDENTS INTO THE RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS.

THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION FROM THE FOREGOING IS THAT THE WORD "PERSON" AS USED IN THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1941, REFERRED TO AND CONTEMPLATED MEN EXCLUSIVELY--- MEN WHO CAN OTHERWISE MEET THE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT AS OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY--- AND THAT IT DOES NOT INCLUDE WOMEN OR AUTHORIZE THEIR APPOINTMENT AS OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY. HAD THE CONGRESS PURPOSED SO REVOLUTIONARY AN UPSET OF THE ESTABLISHED MILITARY POLICY AND PRACTICE OF 150 YEARS OR MORE --- TO EFFECT A "CHANGE SO MOMENTOUS AND FAR REACHING" AS COMMISSIONING WOMEN AS OFFICERS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, IT MOST ASSUREDLY WOULD NOT HAVE DONE SO "BY SO FURTIVE A PROCESS," AS "THE UNGUARDED USE OF A SINGLE WORD" BUT WOULD HAVE DECLARED SUCH A PURPOSE IN UNMISTAKABLE TERMS, IN LANGUAGE SO PRECISELY ACCURATE AS TO LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT AND NO NECESSITY FOR ANY "REMOTE INFERENCE" TO THAT EFFECT. THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION AS ENACTED WAS, AS DECLARED BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND AS STATED IN THE REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, MERELY TO EXTEND TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT "TO INCLUDE THE PRESENT EMERGENCY" AS IT THEN EXISTED ( SEPTEMBER 22, 1941), THE AUTHORITY ALREADY HELD BY THAT DEPARTMENT IN TIME OF WAR, THAT IS, TO APPOINT CIVILIAN MEN OTHERWISE QUALIFIED AS TEMPORARY OFFICERS FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES, WITHOUT APPOINTING THEM SPECIFICALLY AS OFFICERS IN THE REGULAR ARMY, THE NATIONAL GUARD, OR THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS--- AND THE INTERVENTION OF THE STATE OF WAR WHICH NOW EXISTS ADDS NOTHING TO THE STATURE OF THE STATUTE. IT "IS IN THE NATURE OF METHOD OF APPOINTMENT RATHER THAN AUTHORIZATION FOR A GREATER NUMBER OF APPOINTMENTS" OR, IT MAY BE ADDED, ANY DIFFERENT CHARACTER OF APPOINTMENTS, FROM THOSE THERETOFORE AUTHORIZED BY LAW. AND THE STATUTE, WHEN READ IN CONNECTION WITH "THE SUBJECT-MATTER TO WHICH IT RELATES" AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ITS PASSAGE, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE PURPOSE INTENDED TO BE SERVED, BEING SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR, ITS SCOPE MAY NOT BE EITHER LIMITED OR EXTENDED BY ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES THE APPOINTMENT AS OFFICERS OF "QUALIFIED PERSONS" AND IT NEED HARDLY BE SAID THAT MRS. FLIKKE CANNOT BE CLASSED IN THAT CATEGORY, SINCE SHE COULD NOT MEET THE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT AS AN OFFICER OF THE REGULAR ARMY, THE NATIONAL GUARD, OR THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS. MOREOVER, IT MAY BE SAID WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST DISPARAGEMENT THAT MRS. FLIKKE HARDLY WOULD BE CLASSED AS AMONG "CERTAIN SPECIALISTS WHOSE SERVICES ARE HIGHLY DESIRED IN CONNECTION WITH PARTICULAR PROJECTS DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY," WITHIN THE PURPOSE OF STATUTE. SHE IS A TRAINED NURSE WHO, BY REASON OF POSSESSING CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE, AND BY VIRTUE OF APPOINTMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR, OCCUPIES THE POSITION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, IN WHICH HER PAY AND ALLOWANCES AND HER "RELATIVE RANK" ARE FIXED AND CANNOT BE CHANGED EXCEPT BY THE CONGRESS. BY VIRTUE OF HER POSITION AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NURSE CORPS, SHE HOLDS THE "RELATIVE RANK" AS MAJOR, BUT ONLY IN RELATION TO HER SUBORDINATES IN THE NURSE CORPS, AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CORPS AND THEN ONLY FOR PURPOSES PRESCRIBED IN THE STATUTE AND TO A LIMITED EXTENT. SHE HAS THE RANK AND, NO DOUBT, THE TITLE OF MAJOR, BUT DOES NOT HOLD THE OFFICE OF MAJOR IN THE ARMY. SEE WOOD V. UNITED STATES, 15 CT.1CLS. 151, AFFIRMED 107 U.S. 414. AS A COLONEL IN THE ARMY, SHE COULD NOT HOLD THE POSITION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF NURSES. AS SUPERINTENDENT OF NURSES SHE CANNOT BE PROMOTED OR APPOINTED TO THE OFFICE OF COLONEL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ALL OTHER OBJECTION TO SUCH APPOINTMENT. MOREOVER, INSOFAR AS MRS. FLIKKE CAN BE DESIGNATED AS A ,SPECIALIST" IN HER CHOSEN PROFESSION HER SERVICES, TO THE FULL, ALREADY WERE AVAILABLE TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND THERE COULD BE NO VALID CLAIM THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO COMMISSION HER IN THE ARMY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THEM. NO QUESTION NEED BE RAISED HERE AS TO THE VACATING OF MRS. FLIKKE'S POSITION AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NURSE CORPS BY HER ACCEPTANCE OF HER PURPORTED APPOINTMENT TO THE RANK OF COLONEL IN THE ARMY, SAVE TO SAY THAT U.S. CODE, TITLE 10, SECTION 513, WHICH PROVIDES THAT IN TIME OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY AS DETERMINED BY THE PRESIDENT ANY OFFICER OF THE REGULAR ARMY MAY BE APPOINTED TO HIGHER TEMPORARY GRADE WITHOUT VACATING HIS PERMANENT APPOINTMENT, HAS NO BEARING UPON THE CASE HERE PRESENTED, SINCE THE APPLICATION OF THAT PROVISION IS ONLY TO OFFICERS WHO HOLD A PERMANENT COMMISSION IN THE REGULAR ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND DOES NOT INCLUDE THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, WHO HOLDS HER RANK AND TITLE OF MAJOR SOLELY BY VIRTUE OF HER POSITION, FROM WHICH SHE MAY BE REMOVED BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR AT ANY TIME IN HIS DISCRETION, IN WHICH EVENT HER "RELATIVE RANK" WOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED.

IT NECESSARILY FOLLOWS THAT MRS. FLIKKE'S PURPORTED "APPOINTMENT" AS A COLONEL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT ENTITLE HER TO THE PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF A COLONEL.

ACCORDINGLY, YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE PAYMENT ON THE VOUCHER SUBMITTED, WHICH IS RETAINED IN THIS OFFICE.