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Comments on the Impoundment Control Act

B-200685 Published: Nov 20, 1981. Publicly Released: Jun 04, 1985.
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Highlights

GAO was asked to present its views on the Impoundment Control Act and on changes to the act which would improve its operation. GAO believes that the basic framework of the act is sound. Its enactment constituted an important step in reassertion by Congress of greater control over the federal budget. The act requires that all impoundments be reported to Congress and gives Congress ultimate control through endorsement or denial of reported proposals. There are two types of impoundments, rescissions and deferrals. Congress should retain an effective method for dealing with proposed impoundments. S. 384 would allow a President to rescind budget authority without congressional action. The net effect would be to allow the President alone to override previously enacted legislation and to require that Congress relegislate existing law for it to prevail. S. 384 places the burden on Congress to reject rescission proposals, limits Congress' opportunity to disapprove to the 45-day period, and contains no provision for congressional action after that period. Under the bill, if Congress failed to act in 45 days, any later action to negate a rescission proposal would be subject to Presidential veto thereby further eroding congressional control. GAO suggested an alternative to the bill to retain essentially the balanced relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Under the alternative, provisions of the act concerning rescission would be repealed, and all withholding of funds would be proposed as deferrals with the President indicating which of the deferred budget authorities he wished to have rescinded. The alternative would also amend the current law to require that: (1) for each deferral of fiscal year funds, the President specify a date beyond which it would be impractical to obligate the funds involved; and (2) the funds be made available for obligation on the specified date if there has been no final legislative action on a request to have budget authority rescinded. The alternative would retain two basic elements of the present act: (1) rescission would result only with the concurrence of Congress; and (2) withholdings of budget authority could be defeated by either House. Administration of the act would be simplified by eliminating the need to distinguish between deferrals and rescissions and by eliminating the need for Congress to respond within a fixed time. A number of refinements to the act were also suggested.

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Budget authorityBudget authority rescissionBudgetingCongressional powersexecutive relationsExecutive powersFiscal policiesImpoundmentProposed legislationImpoundment control