

June 2009

PRIVACY AND SECURITY

Food and Drug Administration Faces Challenges in Establishing Protections for Its Postmarket Risk Analysis System





Highlights of GAO-09-355, a report to congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for assessing the safety of certain medical products after approval (a process called postmarket risk surveillance). To this end, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 required that FDA establish a postmarket risk identification and analysis system based on electronic health data. In May 2008, FDA began its Sentinel initiative, intended to fulfill this requirement. Additionally, the Act established a requirement for GAO to review FDA's planned system. GAO's specific objectives were to (1)describe the current status of FDA's implementation of the Sentinel system and (2) identify the key privacy and security challenges associated with FDA's plans for the Sentinel system. To do so, GAO analyzed available system documentation; reviewed key privacy and security laws, guidance, standards, and practices: and obtained and analyzed the views of privacy and security experts.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Commissioner of FDA develop a plan, including milestones, for developing the Sentinel system and for addressing privacy and security challenges. In written comments on this report, FDA agreed with GAO's recommendation, but noted concerns with GAO's representation of the program which FDA stated would lead readers to believe that their protected health information was at risk.

View GAO-09-355 or key components. For more information, contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov.

PRIVACY AND SECURITY

Food and Drug Administration Faces Challenges in Establishing Protections for Its Postmarket Risk Analysis System


What GAO Found

The Sentinel system is still in the early planning stages, with key decisions about development and milestones yet to be made. In planning for Sentinel, FDA has held outreach meetings with stakeholders, established a senior management team to solicit input from agency components; established a working group to share information with federal partners; and sought input from projects involving both public and private sector entities that are meant to refine research approaches and identify challenges and concerns. Although FDA has developed a preliminary design of the Sentinel process for making medical product safety-related queries (see below), key decisions such as developing a governance model for oversight and enforcement of relevant policies, establishing an architecture, and setting privacy and security policies have not yet been made. Further, FDA has not yet developed a plan or set of milestones for when it expects to have these issues addressed.

Because the Sentinel system will rely on sensitive electronic health data, FDA will likely be faced with several significant privacy and security challenges as it continues to develop the Sentinel system including

- ensuring that appropriate legal mechanisms are established to protect privacy and implement security consistently across the Sentinel system;
- defining a clear and specific purpose for the system and ensuring that partners use personal health information only for specified purposes;
- ensuring public involvement and effectively informing the public of the program's planned uses of their personal health information;
- ensuring that de-identified information—data stripped of fields that uniquely identify individuals—is not re-identified;
- establishing adequate security controls to protect the personal health information associated with Sentinel; and
- establishing sufficient oversight and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that privacy and security requirements are consistently implemented.

FDA has yet to develop a plan or set milestones for addressing these challenges.



Source: GAO based on FDA data.

^a Pharmaceutical companies are potential partners in the system, but may be limited in their capabilities. According to FDA officials, partners in the pharmaceutical industry are not to have access to personal health information but may be provided access to results summaries.

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Abbreviations			
CMS eHI FDA FDAAA FISMA HHS HIPAA HITECH MMA NIST OECD OMB PIA	Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services eHealth Initiative Food and Drug Administration Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 Department of Health and Human Services Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 National Institute of Standards and Technology Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Office of Management and Budget privacy impact assessment		
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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

June 1, 2009

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy Chairman The Honorable Michael B. Enzi Ranking Member Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions United States Senate

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Chairman The Honorable John D. Dingell Chair Emeritus The Honorable Joe L. Barton Ranking Member Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a component of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has the responsibility to approve medications and certain other medical products for public use and then continue to assess the products' risks and benefits after they have been made available to the public (a process called postmarket risk surveillance). With increased attention to improving the safety and quality of health care, there has been growing interest in leveraging the large amounts of electronic health data being collected on a regular basis to enhance surveillance of postmarket risk.

However, increased analytical use of personal health information raises concerns about the privacy and security of that information. According to the National Research Council, medical information is often the most privacy-sensitive information that individuals provide to others about themselves and protecting the privacy of that information has long been recognized as an essential element in the administration of health care systems. Further, industry groups and professional associations have called for stronger protections for personal health information.

The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) requires that FDA develop methods for the establishment of a postmarket risk identification and analysis system of electronic health data. In response, FDA announced the start of its Sentinel initiative in May 2008.

The initiative includes planning for the development of an integrated system to analyze electronic health data in order to identify potential risks and assess the safety of medical products after they have been made available to the public.

FDAAA mandated that no later than 18 months after the date of its enactment we (1) evaluate the data privacy, confidentiality, and security issues related to accessing, transmitting, and maintaining data for the FDA Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis System and (2) make recommendations regarding the need for further legislative actions to ensure the privacy, confidentiality, and security of the system or otherwise address privacy, confidentiality, and security issues to ensure the effective operation of the system.

As agreed with your offices, we fulfilled the FDAAA mandate through a briefing provided on March 24, 2009. The specific objectives for our study were to (1) describe the current status of FDA's implementation of the Sentinel system and (2) identify the key privacy and security challenges associated with FDA's plans for the Sentinel system. To address the first objective, we

- analyzed available documentation and plans for system design and development;
- reviewed the statements of work in contracts to assess specific aspects of future Sentinel system development, such as governance structures and data sources;
- reviewed information on current demonstration projects to assess their status and their potential contribution to future Sentinel development; and
- analyzed prior GAO reports to assess prior FDA activities related to postmarket risk evaluation.

To address the second objective, we

- obtained and analyzed the views of privacy and security experts from the World Privacy Forum, the Health Law & Policy Institute, the Health Privacy Project at the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the SANS Institute;
- obtained and analyzed the views of a privacy and information policy consultant;

- obtained and analyzed the views of FDA officials and representatives from related projects;
- analyzed independent studies and previous GAO reports to corroborate challenges identified by experts; and
- analyzed provisions of key privacy and security laws, guidance, standards, and practices with respect to FDA's plans for the Sentinel system and challenges identified by privacy and security experts.

We conducted this performance audit at FDA in the Washington D.C., metropolitan area from May 2008 to May 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This report summarizes the information we provided to your staff during our March 24, 2009, briefing, with revisions to reflect information obtained through agency comments. The full briefing, including our objectives, scope, and methodology, can be found in appendix I. In summary, our briefing made the following points:

The Sentinel system is still in the early planning stages, with key decisions about development and milestones yet to be made. FDA has had several outreach meetings with a variety of stakeholders, such as the health care industry and patient and consumer advocacy groups, and has established an FDA senior management team to provide input from various agency components. FDA has also established a working group to share information with federal partners, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, and discuss issues related to relevant efforts being carried out by federal agencies, and has sought input from several projects involving both public and private sector entities that are meant to refine research approaches and identify challenges and concerns with launching a large-scale public-private partnership for postmarket surveillance. Because the Sentinel system is still in such an early stage of planning, FDA has yet to make key decisions related to major aspects of program development such as developing a governance model for oversight and enforcement of relevant policies, and establishing an architecture. While FDA has asserted that privacy risks will be reduced because Sentinel participants will not routinely exchange personal health

information, the agency has not yet set policies to ensure the protection of privacy and security. Further, FDA has not yet developed a plan or set milestones for when it expects to have these issues addressed.

In ensuring that the design of the Sentinel system provides adequate privacy and security protections, FDA will likely be faced with several significant challenges. These challenges include

- ensuring that appropriate legal mechanisms are established to protect privacy and implement security consistently across all elements associated with the Sentinel system;
- defining a clear and specific purpose for the system and ensuring that partners with varying interests and business missions use personal health information only for specified purposes;
- ensuring public involvement and effectively informing the public of the program's planned uses of their personal health information and privacy protections that will be applied to it;
- ensuring that de-identified information—data stripped of fields that uniquely identify individuals—is not re-identified and that the use of personal health information in individually identifiable form is minimized and adequately protected;
- establishing adequate security controls to protect the personal health information associated with Sentinel from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction; and
- establishing sufficient oversight and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that privacy and security requirements are consistently implemented across Sentinel's wide range of partners.

FDA has yet to develop a plan or set milestones for addressing these challenges. If these challenges are not adequately addressed, the privacy and security of personal health information could be compromised.

Recommendation for Executive Action

We are not making recommendations for further legislative actions. However, given the significant privacy and security challenges we have identified, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA develop a plan, including milestones, for developing the Sentinel system and for addressing the privacy and security challenges associated with:

	• ensuring consistent application of protections to all Sentinel partners,
	• limiting use of personal health information to a clear and specific purpose,
	• involving the public in the development of the system and informing the public of the program's planned uses of personal health information and privacy protections,
	• using de-identified data,
	• establishing adequate security controls, and
	• overseeing and enforcing key privacy and security requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation	In written comments on a draft of this report transmitted by the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislation at the Department of Health and Humar Services, the Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs stated that protecting the privacy and security of protected health information was of paramount concern to FDA and agreed with our recommendation to develop a plan with milestones for the Sentinel system, noting that this recommendation was consistent with ongoing FDA efforts. The letter is reprinted in appendix II.
	In its comments, FDA also raised concerns that the report contained inaccuracies that seriously misrepresent the program and would lead readers to believe that their protected health information was at risk. However, we believe the report accurately characterizes the potential privacy and security risks with the Sentinel program and related analysis. The program is still in its early stages, and while FDA has stated its intention to establish controls for privacy and security, no specific implementation plans have yet been developed. Moreover, FDA officials acknowledged that the concerns raised in our report could be relevant to secondary analysis precipitated by Sentinel. It will be critical that these concerns are fully addressed as FDA moves forward with the Sentinel initiative.
	In explaining its position, the agency maintained that transactions that it foresees occurring within the Sentinel program would not pose a risk to protected health information. FDA noted that it envisions developing Sentinel as a distributed network, wherein protected health information would not be exchanged but would remain under the control of its owners and be protected by the controls they already have in place. As

participants in Sentinel, these data owners would separately perform analysis on their own data and share only summaries of their results with other entities. We agree with FDA that its stated intent for conducting basic analysis under Sentinel is designed to minimize risk to privacy, and we believe that this approach, if implemented as FDA envisions it, could reduce privacy concerns. However, we do not believe it is appropriate to focus narrowly on just the transactions that FDA classifies as being within Sentinel, because other related transactions could pose greater risks. Specifically, FDA has acknowledged that there may be a need for secondary analysis based on results obtained through Sentinel, stating that this analysis would occur outside of Sentinel. Such secondary analysis could involve the sharing of protected health information, and many of the concerns raised in our report apply in these circumstances. It will be critical that these concerns are fully addressed as FDA moves forward with the Sentinel initiative.

In its comments, FDA also noted that privacy and security are of paramount concern to the agency, and that the agency had engaged with individuals in the privacy and security field to examine privacy and security issues. FDA stated that Sentinel would be subject to the security requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) and would implement policies and procedures to ensure computer security. While FDA's stated commitment to investigating privacy issues and implementing rigorous security controls is important, until specific privacy and security safeguards have been implemented, concerns remain. Further, at this early stage of development, it is important to highlight areas in which potential compromises could occur so that attention can be focused on them. Identifying and assessing such concerns can help better ensure that planning for the system incorporates a comprehensive set of effective privacy and security controls.

Finally, FDA expressed concern that the figure that appears in the Highlights and on page 24 could mislead readers, and it provided an alternate figure with modified labels and alternate illustrations for the elements of the system. We have made adjustments to the labels to address concerns raised by FDA. However, in addition to wording changes, FDA expressed concern that the illustrations in our figure give the impression that Sentinel is a fully automated system that does not include human participation and expertise. We believe the graphic—which portrays individuals, systems, and symbols for institutions—accurately portrays the nature of the Sentinel system, which is expected to include automated systems as well as human and institutional involvement.

In addition, FDA provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Commissioner of FDA. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6244 or at wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Heyong C. Wilshusen

Gregory C. Wilshusen Director, Information Security Issues

Appendix I: Briefing to Congressional Committees



Privacy and Security: Food and Drug Administration Faces Challenges in Establishing Protections for Its Postmarket Risk Analysis System

Briefing to Congressional Committees

March 24, 2009

G A O Accountability * Integrity * Reliability	Contents
Introduction	
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology	
Results in Brief	
Background	
System Is in the Early Stages of Development	
FDA Faces Privacy and Security Challenges	
Conclusions	
Recommendation for Executive Action	
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation	
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


Introduction


The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a component of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has the responsibility to approve medical products for public use and then continue to assess the products' risks and benefits after they have been made available to the public (a process called postmarket risk surveillance). With increased attention to improving the safety and quality of health care, there has been growing interest in leveraging the large amounts of electronic health data being collected on a regular basis to enhance surveillance of postmarket risk.


However, increased analytical use of personal health information¹ raises concerns about the privacy and security of that information. According to the National Research Council, medical information is often the most privacy-sensitive information that patients provide to others about themselves, and protecting the privacy of that information has long been recognized as an essential element in the regulations of health care systems. Further, industry groups and professional associations have called for stronger protections for personal health information.


¹Personal health information in this briefing refers to information relating to the health or health care of an individual and that identifies, or can be used to identify, the individual.





²Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 905,121 Stat. 823, 944 (Sept. 27, 2007).

















In comments on a draft of this briefing provided via e-mail, FDA generally agreed with our recommendation. FDA asserted that privacy and security challenges raised by the use and transfer of personal health information would be largely alleviated by current plans for the Sentinel system—which call for all personal health information to remain with the entities that have custody of it and only analytical results to be shared—but acknowledged that secondary analysis involving personal health information may be necessary and that the privacy challenges we identified would be relevant to such analysis. FDA also noted that its ongoing contracts will help to set achievable milestones.


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requirements.












Acc	countability * Integrity * Reliability	
an "activ	FDAAA mandated that the Secretary of HHS "establishe postmarket risk identification and analysis system." Secretary develop a system that	
•	provides standardized reporting of data on all serious a	adverse events;
·	provides active adverse event surveillance from federa private sector health-related data, and other data deen Secretary to identify adverse events and potential drug	ned necessary by the
	dentifies adverse event trends and patterns from the haccesses;	nealth-related data the system
ä	provides reports on a regular basis to the Secretary co and patterns, rate of occurrence, and other information appropriate, which may include data on comparative na and	the Secretary deems
	allows the program to export data in a form appropriate statistical analysis, and reporting.	e for further aggregation,
	sets the goal of having access to data from 25 million pon patients by July 1, 2012.	patients by July 1, 2010, and
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








basis of privacy laws and related policies in many countries, including the United States, Germany, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the European Union. The widely adopted version developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is shown in the table on the following page.

Table 1: Fair Information Practices				
Principle	Description			
Collection limitation	The collection of personal information should be limited, should be obtained by lawful and fair means, and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the individual.			
Data quality	Personal information should be relevant to the purpose for which it is collected, and should be accurate, complete, and current as needed for that purpose.			
Purpose specification	The purposes for the collection of personal information should be disclosed before collection and upon any change to that purpose, and its use should be limited to those purposes and compatible purposes.			
Use limitation	Personal information should not be disclosed or otherwise used for other than a specified purpose without consent of the individual or legal authority.			
Security safeguards	Personal information should be protected with reasonable security safeguards against risks such as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.			
Openness	The public should be informed about privacy policies and practices, and individuals should have ready means of learning about the use of personal information.			
Individual participation	Individuals should have the following rights: to know about the collection of personal information, to access that information, to request correction, and to challenge the denial of those rights.			
Accountability	Individuals controlling the collection or use of personal information should be accountable for taking steps to ensure the implementation of these principles.			
	Source: OECD.			







⁷FISMA, Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (Dec. 17, 2002).



Background Relevant Laws and Guidance

A number of other laws and regulations also set requirements concerning the privacy and security of personal health information.⁸ For example, individual state laws may set constraints and other requirements on the use of personal health information by certain Sentinel partners. These laws include areas such as mental health and HIV/AIDS treatment. For example, Massachusetts state law⁹ prohibits the disclosure of HIV/AIDS test results or the identity of the test subject to anyone other than the subject without written authorization.

Finally, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) established technical guidance and standards used by government, industry, and academia. Key publications relevant to Sentinel include guidance for planning, establishing, and terminating system interconnections;¹⁰ standards for categorizing information and information systems;¹¹ and minimum security requirements for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of federal information systems and the information processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems.¹²


⁸The recently enacted Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act contains provisions relating to the promotion and testing of health information technology, and privacy and security protections for health information technology. HITECH Act Title XIII, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 (Feb.17, 2009).


⁹Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70F.


¹⁰NIST, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems, Special Publication 800-47 (Washington D.C., August 2002).


¹¹NIST, *Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems*, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199 (Washington D.C., February 2004).


¹²NIST, *Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems*, FIPS 200 (Washington D.C., March 2006).














GAO Accountability * Integrity * Reliability	Sentinel Is in the Early Stages of Development
has not yet been deve and security safeguard protections. As part of health care profession concerns related to the to research and analyz requirements related to	work for the privacy and security of personal health information eloped. FDA acknowledges the importance of strong privacy ds, and it is assessing how to implement appropriate its efforts to obtain the views of patients, consumers, and hals regarding, among other things, privacy and security e use of personal health information, FDA contracted with eHI ze existing or proposed policies, rules, regulations, and other o the protection of privacy and security and recommend g the participation of patients, consumers, and health care
issued contracts to various ent	I research and evaluation are needed in these areas and have tities to address these needs. According to FDA, these Iy fall 2008, and final reports are to be available starting in
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



Establishing privacy and security requirements that apply consistently to all entities is key to ensuring that no particular entity with inadequate protections compromises the overall privacy and security of personal health information. In this regard, the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics¹⁴—a key advisory committee—has made recommendations in the past aimed at ensuring that HIPAA Privacy Rule protections are applied consistently across all entities handling personal health information.


¹⁴The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics was established in 1949 as a public advisory committee that is statutorily authorized to advise the Secretary of HHS on health data, statistics, and national health information policy, including the implementation of health information technology standards.


















Limiting Use to Clear and Specific Purposes

Officials from eHI and privacy experts have stated that establishing how Sentinel's uses appropriately fall into these purpose categories will be difficult because distinctions between public health and research are very subtle. However, as indicated, the decision could have ramifications for the extent of legal requirements in place for protecting personal health information. For example, there may be ambiguities relating to authorization and individual consent, which are treated differently depending on the category.



As we previously reported in our 2006 report on the use of commercial data, consolidating large databases poses the risk that the use of data goes beyond the original system scope and intended uses.¹⁵ Sentinel could face this risk if the program seeks to bring together disparate, large databases of personal health information to be analyzed by multiple entities.

¹⁵GAO, *Personal Information: Agency and Reseller Adherence to Key Privacy Principles*, GAO-06-421 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006).








Ensuring public confidence. A third challenge that FDA faces is to build public trust through mechanisms that will ensure public involvement and also appropriately inform the public of the program's planned uses of their personal health information as well as the privacy protections that will be applied to it.


Regarding public involvement, privacy experts acknowledge that it would be extremely difficult or impractical to obtain individual consent for Sentinel's planned use of personal health information, given the vast number of records involved and the need for timely results. Further, HIPAA specifically allows for the use of such information without individual consent or authorization for purposes of promoting public health.

This may lead to some instances of uses of personal health information that individuals may find objectionable. FDA has acknowledged that risk and is trying to ensure that the public's concerns are adequately addressed through public meetings and the creation of a transparent, inclusive process for the development of the system. Other mechanisms for public involvement in the development of the system could include adding privacy advocates and representatives of consumer organizations to governing boards to ensure that matters of public concern are raised and addressed.












De-identification is the process of stripping data of fields that uniquely identify individuals. According to the Privacy Rule, information is de-identified when the data fields are insufficient to identify an individual and when there is no reasonable basis to believe that the data can be used to re-identify an individual. According to the Privacy Rule, de-identification can be achieved by stripping out fields that uniquely identify individuals, including

- names,
- geographic subdivisions smaller than a state,
- Social Security numbers, and
- dates of birth.



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Establishing comprehensive security controls. FDA faces the challenge of determining the appropriate security controls that Sentinel will need to protect personal health information from loss or unauthorized disclosure to the extent that it is transferred between Sentinel partners. In doing so, FDA will need to establish a uniform set of security controls for all of its partners to ensure that potential weaknesses in controls at partner systems do not place personal health information in Sentinel at unnecessary risk of unauthorized disclosure, use, modification, or destruction. Such controls will need to demonstrate that the security of personal health information is protected both at rest and in transmission among Sentinel and its partners.


Safeguarding personal health information is critical because its loss or unauthorized disclosure can lead to serious adverse consequences for individuals. The confidentiality of personal health information could be threatened not only by the risk of improper access to stored information, but also by the risk of interception during electronic transmission of the information.




Establishing Comprehensive Security Controls

Through its planned distributed network of public and private partners, Sentinel queries may involve the exchange of electronic health information among partners in the public and private sector when secondary analysis is required. Although FDA does not anticipate that electronic health information will be routinely exchanged among partners, the large number of potential partners could provide many potential access points through which sensitive information could be compromised. Given this risk, FDAAA mandates that personal health information not be revealed in disclosing the results of analysis of drug safety signals and trends or responding to inquiries regarding drug safety signals and trends.

A basic objective for any organization is to protect the resources that support its critical operations from unauthorized access. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing access controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, and information. Inadequate access controls diminish the reliability of computerized information and increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction of sensitive information and the disruption of service. Such controls include protecting the physical boundary around a set of information resources, assigning unique user accounts to specific users to distinguish one user from another, and employing cryptography such as encryption to prevent unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, and information.






	A O * Integrity * Reliability	FDA Faces Privacy and Security Challenges Establishing Comprehensive Security Controls
can ex proper the da systen	pose the participating ly designed, security f ta that they store, proc	ST, ²⁰ interconnecting information technology systems organizations to risk. If the interconnection is not ailures could compromise the connected systems and cess, or transmit. Similarly, if one of the connected e interconnection could be used as a conduit to m and its data.
		ot implemented and maintained within the system and creased risk of unauthorized disclosure, use, modification,
	of personal health info	
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



Establishing oversight and enforcement. Finally, concerns about the wide range of expected Sentinel partners as well as the authority that a nonprofit entity would have over these entities highlight the challenge that FDA will face in creating and implementing an effective oversight and enforcement mechanism to ensure, among other things, the privacy and security of personal health information maintained by Sentinel.


Oversight and enforcement are key mechanisms for ensuring that security and privacy controls are consistently implemented and effective at mitigating risks. For example, federal agencies are subject to oversight, as required by FISMA.²¹ FISMA states that continuous monitoring of security controls is a key part of managing enterprise risk and maintaining an accurate understanding of security risks. Additional oversight is applied through reporting requirements to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress. In setting annual reporting requirements, OMB has directed agencies to provide details regarding their privacy protections for personally identifiable information as well as information security measures. An effective oversight and enforcement program is also consistent with the accountability principle, which states that individuals controlling the collection or use of personal information should be accountable for taking steps to ensure the implementation of the fair information practices.


²¹FISMA, Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (Dec. 17, 2002).



















Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Regardless of whether secondary analysis using personal health information is within the bounds of the Sentinel system, such analysis remains a key element in an overall assessment of the data privacy, confidentiality, and security issues related to accessing, transmitting, and maintaining data for FDA's postmarket risk identification and analysis system. Any analysis involving the transfer of personal health information could introduce significant privacy and security risks, and would thus require privacy and security protections and oversight commensurate to this increased risk. Thus the privacy and security challenges we have identified remain of critical importance as planning for the Sentinel system moves forward.


FDA generally agreed with the recommendation made in this briefing, with the exception of the challenge associated with using de-identified data. Regarding this challenge, FDA asserted that activities involving the disclosure of personal health information would be outside the scope of the Sentinel system. However, as previously discussed, the use and disclosure of personal health information through secondary analysis is also an important consideration, and in this regard the challenge associated with using de-identified data will need to be addressed to ensure that risks to the privacy and security of personal health information are fully addressed.


FDA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the briefing as appropriate.

Appendix II: Comments from the Food and Drug Administration

s survices to a	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES	OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Wasa		Assistant Secretary for Legislation Washington, DC 20201
	MAY 1 9 2009	
Bregory C. V Director		
J.S. Govern	Security Issues ment Accountability Office	
41 G Street Vashington,	N.W. DC 20548	
Dear Mr. Wi	lshusen:	
rivacy and	comments on the U.S. Government According Security: Food and Drug Administration for its Postmarket Risk Analysis System (
The Departm	nent appreciates the opportunity to review	this report before its publication.
	Sincerely	
	Back	ana Pisaro Clark
		Pisaro Clark ssistant Secretary for Legislation
ttachment		

The DEPARTM	IENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Se -	Food and Drug Administration
	Silver Spring, MD 20993
DATE:	May 15, 2009
то:	Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislation
FROM:	Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs
SUBJECT:	FDA's General Comments to GAO's Draft Report Entitled, Privacy and Security—Food and Drug Administration Faces Challenges in Establishing Protections for its Postmarket Risk Analysis System (GAO- 09-355)
Office's dra Faces Chall	viding the attached general comments to the U.S. Government Accountability ft report entitled, Privacy and SecurityFood and Drug Administration lenges in Establishing Protections for its Postmarket Risk Analysis System
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FDA apprec published.	siates the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report before it is <u>Jum H Cum</u> for Joshua M. Sharfstein, M.D. Principal Deputy Commissioner Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs





Sentinel Coordinating Center-The drawing of a "server" does not adequately portray the responsibilities of the coordinating center. Coordinating center personnel will perform a number of key roles including determining appropriate methodologies and data sources for obtaining meaningful responses to a query. The coordinating center will not be just an IT architecture to administer queries and receive results. . Academic institutions and Federal and state government agencies-Without further qualification, this is potentially confusing. Only those academic institutions and federal and state government agencies with automated healthcare data will be recipients of queries. Results returned to coordinating center-This would be clearer if it read "Result summaries returned to Sentinel Coordinating Center." Results summaries will not include protected health information. Coordinating center returns results-This would be clearer if it read "Sentinel Coordinating Center returns summary results." Results summaries will not include protected health information. Results may potentially be shared with the public-This would be more accurate if it read "Result summaries will be used to help inform health care decisions" and was, as in FDA's figure, depicted by an image of people sitting around a table discussing documents. The summary results received in response to Sentinel queries will be considered with other available data to provide information about medical products to help inform their proper use. 3

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact	Gregory C. Wilshusen (202) 512-6244, or wilshuseng@gao.gov
Staff Acknowledgments	In addition to the individual named above, John de Ferrari, Assistant Director; Idris Adjerid; Monica Anatalio; Susan Czachor; Season Dietrich; Neil Doherty; Nancy Glover; and Rebecca Eyler made key contributions to this report.

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