This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-837 entitled 'Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed' which was released on June 23, 2008. This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Report to Congressional Committees: United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: June 2008: Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed: GAO-08-837: GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-08-837, a report to congressional committees. Why GAO Did This Study: Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of this for operations in Iraq. In January 2007, the President announced The New Way Forward to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. GAO discusses progress in meeting key goals in The New Way Forward: (1) improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces; and help the Iraqi government (3) enact key legislation, (4) spend capital budgets, and (5) provide essential services. GAO also discusses U.S. strategies for Iraq. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, the United Nations, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since May 2003, GAO has issued over 130 Iraq- related audits, which provided baseline information for this assessment. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority. What GAO Found: The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior strategies that prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army’s declaration of a cease fire. Average daily attacks were at higher levels in March and April before declining in May 2008. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,000 in May 2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the Department of Defense reported in March 2008 that the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained at about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the development of capable security forces, including the lack of a single unified force, sectarian and militia influences, and continued dependence on U.S. and coalition forces. The Iraqi government has enacted key legislation to return some Ba’athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. However, it has not yet enacted other important legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections. Efforts to complete the constitutional review have also stalled. A goal of The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis’ efforts to enact all key legislation by the end of 2007. Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq’s central ministries, responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007—down from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq’s efforts to spend its capital budgets. Although oil production has improved for short periods, the May 2008 production level of about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) was below the U.S. goal of 3 mbpd. The daily supply of electricity met only about half of demand in early May 2008. Conversely, State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq’s water sector are close to being reached. The unstable security environment, corruption, and lack of technical capacity have contributed to the shortfalls. The Departments disagreed with our recommendation, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains valid but the strategy shall be reviewed and refined as necessary. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy given the important changes that have occurred in Iraq since January 2007. An updated strategy should build on recent gains, address unmet goals and objectives and articulate the U.S. strategy beyond July 2008. What GAO Recommends: GAO recommends that the Departments of Defense and State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-837]. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. [End of section] Contents: Letter: Results in Brief: Background: Evolution of U.S. Strategies for Iraq: Improving Security Conditions: Developing Iraqi Security Forces: Enacting Key Iraqi Legislation: Spending Capital Budgets: Delivering Essential Services: U.S. Efforts to Update Strategies to Stabilize and Rebuild Iraq: Conclusion: Recommendation for Executive Action: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: Appendix II: Comparison of Current GAO Reporting Objectives with 18 Iraq Benchmarks: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Treasury: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: Tables: Table 1: The Administration's Comparison of Key Assumptions in The New Way Forward and Prior U.S. Strategy: Table 2: Number of Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008: Table 3: Iraq Investment Budget and Expenditures, 2005-2007: Table 4: Comparison of Current GAO Reporting Objectives with 18 Iraq Benchmarks Assessed in GAO September 2007 Report: Figures: Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008: Figure 2: Average Daily Attacks, May 2003 to May 2008: Figure 3: Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq for Selected Provinces, August 2005 through Early May 2008: Figure 4: U.S. Forces in Iraq, March 2003 to July 2008: Figure 5: Location of Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in Baghdad Security Districts, as of August 2007: Figure 6: Number of Trained Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005 through 2010: Figure 7: Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness Levels, January 2007 and March 2008: Figure 8: Provinces That Have Transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control, as of April 2008: Figure 9: Timeline for Transfer of Security Responsibilities to Provincial Iraqi Control: Figure 10: Status of Iraqi Legislation to Promote National Reconciliation: Figure 11: Iraqi Budget Execution Ratios for Total Government and Selected Ministries, 2005 to 2007: Figure 12: Iraq's Reported Crude Oil Production, Exports, and U.S. Goals, June 2003 through May 2008: Figure 13: Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq, January 2004 through May 2008: Abbreviations: AQI: al Qaeda in Iraq: CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority: CRC: Constitutional Review Committee: DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency: DOD: Department of Defense: IDP: internally displaced person: KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government: MANPADS: man-portable air defense system: mbpd: million barrels per day: MNF-I: Multinational Force-Iraq: MWH: megawatt hour: NSC: National Security Council: NSVI: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: ORA: Operational Readiness Assessment: SIGIR: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction: UN: United Nations: UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund: USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: [End of section] United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: June 23, 2008: Congressional Committees: In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem the high levels of violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions for national reconciliation. The Administration stated that the security and political conditions in Iraq were more difficult than it had anticipated earlier in the war. To improve these conditions, The New Way Forward established near-term (12 to 18 months) goals that the Administration stated were achievable in this time period. In addition, the strategy reasserted the Administration's long- term goal or end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror. In support of this new strategy, the United States increased its military presence and financial commitments for operations in Iraq. U.S. troops and civilian personnel have performed courageously under dangerous and difficult circumstances. In April 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) testified before congressional committees on conditions in Iraq. They stated that significant progress had been made toward achieving U.S. goals but that progress was fragile and reversible. From fiscal year 2001 through December 2007, Congress has provided about $635.9 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on Terrorism.[Footnote 1] The majority of this amount has been for military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the cost of equipping, maintaining, and supporting our deployed forces. Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $45 billion[Footnote 2] was provided to DOD and several other U.S. agencies for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing Iraq's capacity to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and water sectors, among others. This report discusses progress in meeting key U.S. goals outlined in The New Way Forward, specifically, (1) improving security conditions; (2) developing Iraqi security forces' capabilities and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government; (3) facilitating Iraqi government efforts to draft, enact, and implement key legislative initiatives; (4) assisting Iraqi government efforts to spend budgets; and (5) helping the Iraqi government provide key essential services to its people. In addition, we discuss U.S. strategies for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. We are concurrently issuing a classified report on the Joint Campaign Plan--the U.S. operational plan for Iraq.[Footnote 3] The Chairmen of the Senate's Armed Services Committee, Appropriations Committee, and Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, requested that GAO complete this work. Due to broad congressional interest in Iraq issues, we prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This report updates and builds upon an extensive body of GAO work, including our September 2007 report assessing Iraq's progress toward meeting 18 legislatively mandated benchmarks.[Footnote 4] To complete this work, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; MNF-I and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents. In support of this work, we extensively utilized staff stationed in Baghdad from January through March 2008. See appendix I for a more complete description of our scope and methodology. Appendix II contains a crosswalk between the 18 benchmarks and the five objectives we address in this report. We provided drafts of this report to the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Defense for review and comment. We received written comments from all three agencies, which are included in appendixes III, IV, and V. We conducted this performance audit from March to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Results in Brief: The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior strategies that prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated in The New Way Forward. For example, overall violence in Iraq has declined and Iraq has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government and give amnesty to detained Iraqis. However, we agree with assessments that progress made in Iraq is fragile and many unmet goals and challenges remain. For example, although The New Way Forward stated that the Iraqi government would take responsibility for security in all 18 provinces by November 2007, only 9 of 18 provinces had transitioned to Iraqi control as of May 2008. In addition, Iraq has spent only 24 percent of the funds it budgeted for reconstruction. Future U.S. strategies should build on recent security and legislative gains and address the remaining challenges for the near and long term. Improving Security Conditions: Establishing a basic level of security is a key component of The New Way Forward. Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008--primarily due to decreases in violence in Baghdad and Anbar provinces. Fighting continues throughout Iraq. Average daily attack levels were higher during March and April before declining in May 2008. Further, the influence and areas of operation of al Qaeda in Iraq have been degraded, although the United States has not achieved its goal of defeating al Qaeda in Iraq and ensuring that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease fire. However, the security environment remains volatile and dangerous. Developing Iraqi Security Forces: The New Way Forward set the goal of transferring security responsibilities to all 18 Iraqi provinces by the end of 2007. Since 2003, the United States has provided more than $20 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased from about 323,000 in January 2007 to about 478,000 in May 2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, DOD reports that the number of Iraqi security force units deemed capable of performing operations without coalition assistance has remained at about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the development of capable Iraqi security forces, including the lack of a single unified force, sectarian and militia influences, continued dependence on U.S. and coalition forces for logistics and combat support, and training and leadership shortages. In addition, the time frame for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi provincial governments now extends into 2009. As of May 2008, 9 of 18 provincial governments had lead responsibility for security in their provinces. Enacting Legislation: To facilitate national reconciliation, The New Way Forward identified legislation that the Iraqi government committed to enact with U.S. support. The Iraqi government has enacted de-Ba'athification reform, amnesty, and provincial powers legislation after considerable debate and compromise among Iraq's political blocs. However, questions remain about how the laws will be implemented and whether the intended outcomes can be achieved. For example, the government has not yet established the commission needed to reinstate former Ba'athists in the government. In addition, the government has not enacted legislation that will provide a legal framework for managing its oil resources, distributing oil revenues, or disarming militias. The Iraqi government also faces logistical and security challenges in holding the scheduled 2008 provincial elections--a key element of reconciliation for Sunnis. Finally, the government has not completed its constitutional review to resolve issues such as the status of disputed territories and the balance of power between federal and regional governments. A goal of The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis' efforts to enact all key legislation by the end of 2007. Spending Capital Budgets: The New Way Forward emphasizes the need to build capacity in Iraq's ministries and help the government execute its capital investment budgets; this need is particularly important, as the $45 billion in U.S. funding for Iraq reconstruction projects is nearing completion. However, Ministry of Finance expenditure data show that between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. Specifically, Iraq's central ministries spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007, a decline from similarly low spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Spending rates for critical ministries varied from the 41 percent spent by the Water Resources Ministry in 2007 to the less than 1 percent spent by the Ministries of Oil and Electricity. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq's efforts to spend capital budgets and thereby contribute to its own rebuilding. GAO recommended that U.S. agencies develop an integrated plan for developing competent Iraqi ministries that can execute their budgets and effectively deliver government services.[Footnote 5] As of June 2008, an integrated strategy had not been developed. Providing Essential Services: Providing essential services to all Iraqi areas and communities and helping Iraq maintain and expand its oil exports are key goals of The New Way Forward. Overall crude oil production has increased or improved for short periods; however, production has not reached the U.S. goal of an average crude oil production capacity of 3 million barrels per day (mbpd) and export levels of 2.2 mbpd. In May 2008, oil production was about 2.5 mbpd and exports were 1.96 mbpd. Meanwhile, the daily supply of electricity met only 52 percent of demand in June 2008. The State Department (State) reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached. Since April 2006, U.S. efforts have focused on producing enough clean water to reach up to an additional 8.5 million Iraqis. As of March 2008, State reported that U.S.-funded projects had provided an additional 8 million Iraqis with access to potable water. Several factors present challenges in delivering essential services, including an unstable security environment, corruption, a lack of technical capacity, and inadequate strategic planning. GAO will issue a separate report on Iraq's estimated unspent and projected oil revenues from 2003 through 2008. As of the end of May 2008, Iraqi crude oil was selling at about $104 per barrel, higher than the $57 per barrel used to develop Iraq's 2008 budget. Oil exports generate over 90 percent of government revenues. As The New Way Forward and the military surge end in July 2008, an updated strategy is needed for how the United States will help Iraq achieve key security, legislative, and economic goals. This strategy should build on recent security and legislative gains, address the remaining unmet goals and challenges for the near and long term, and clearly articulate goals, objectives, roles and responsibilities, and the resources needed. In this report, GAO is recommending that DOD and State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself. The departments of State and Defense disagreed with our recommendation to develop an updated strategic plan for Iraq, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains valid. They did, however, state that they will review and refine the strategy as necessary. DOD also stated that the classified MNFI-U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is a comprehensive, government wide plan that guides the effort to achieve an Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself. An updated strategy is needed for several reasons. First, much has changed in Iraq since January 2007, when the President announced The New Way Forward. Violence is down but U.S. surge forces are leaving. In addition, the United States is negotiating a status of forces agreement with Iraq. Second, The New Way Forward only articulates U.S. goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July 2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward are contained in disparate documents rather than a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the classified Joint Campaign Plan is not a strategic plan; it is an operational plan with limitations that we discuss in the classified report we are issuing concurrently with this report. We affirm our recommendation that DOD and State should update the U.S. strategy for Iraq, given the importance of the war effort to U.S. national security interests, the expenditure of billions of dollars for U.S. military and civilian efforts in Iraq, and the continued deployment of at least 140,000 troops in Iraq. Background: Evolution of U.S. Strategies for Iraq: Since late 2003, the United States has employed numerous strategies to address the security and reconstruction needs of Iraq. First, the multinational force's security transition strategy called for Iraqi security forces to assume security responsibilities on an accelerated basis during spring 2004. This strategy failed when Iraqi security forces performed poorly during an insurgent uprising. Second, a series of campaign plans and a strategy document attempted to integrate U.S. military and civilian efforts in Iraq but did not anticipate the escalation in violence during 2006. Third, to address the high levels of violence, the administration announced a new strategy, The New Way Forward. Multinational Force's Strategy Assumed Capable Iraqi Forces Could Begin to Take Over Security Responsibilities in Spring 2004: In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces.[Footnote 6] The four phases were (1) mutual support, where the multinational force established conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces; (2) transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area assumed responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where Iraqi forces were responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to strategic overwatch, where Iraqi forces on a national level were capable of maintaining a secure environment against internal and external threats, with broad monitoring from the multinational force. The plan's objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq's insurgency and second with the development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not succeed in this effort. In March 2004, Iraqi security forces numbered about 203,000, including about 76,000 police, 78,000 facilities protection officers, and about 38,000 in the civilian defense corps.[Footnote 7] Police and military units performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent attacks against the coalition in April 2004. According to a July 2004 executive branch report to Congress, many Iraqi security forces around the country collapsed during this uprising. Some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces. Other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and, in some cases, assisted the insurgency. A number of problems contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces, including problems in training, equipping, and vetting them. U.S. Strategy Revisions Did Not Anticipate Escalation of Violence in 2006: After the collapse of the Iraqi security forces in the spring of 2004, the Administration completed three key documents that outlined the evolving U.S. strategy for Iraq, none of which anticipated the level of sectarian violence that occurred after the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006. First, during the summer of 2004, MNF-I completed a campaign plan that elaborated on and refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces at the local, regional, and national levels. Further details on this campaign plan are classified.[Footnote 8] Second, in November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's existing strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq.[Footnote 9] Third, in April 2006, MNF-I and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad issued the first joint campaign plan, which attempted to integrate U.S. political, military, and economic efforts in Iraq. Further details of this campaign plan are classified.[Footnote 10] In July 2006, we reported that the NSVI represented an incomplete strategy. The desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy are purpose, scope, and methodology; detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats; the desired goal, objectives, activities, and outcome-related performance measures; description of future costs and resources needed; delineation of U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; and a description of the strategy's integration among and with other entities. On the one hand, the NSVI's purpose and scope were clear because the strategy identified U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and Iraq as a central front in the war on terror. The strategy also discussed the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provided a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic goals and objectives in Iraq over the short term, medium term, and long term. However, the NSVI only partially identified the agencies responsible for implementing it, the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, and Iraq's contribution to its future needs. [Footnote 11] The strategy also did not anticipate that security conditions in Iraq would deteriorate as they did in 2006, as evidenced by the increased numbers of attacks and the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian strife that followed the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. Enemy- initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners increased through October 2006 and remained at high levels through the end of the year. During 2006, according to State and United Nations (UN) reports, insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against civilians, largely on a sectarian basis. In addition, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) in Iraq sharply increased, primarily as a result of sectarian intimidation and violence that forced many people from their homes. By the end of 2006, according to the UN, many Baghdad neighborhoods had become divided along Sunni and Shi'a lines and were increasingly controlled by armed groups claiming to act as protectors and defenders of these areas. According to the President, the violence in Iraq--particularly in Baghdad--overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. The New Way Forward Addressed Escalating Violence: In response to the escalating violence, the President in January 2007 announced a new strategy--The New Way Forward--that established a new phase in U.S. operations for the near term of 12 to 18 months, or until July 2008. According to State and DOD officials, the Administration did not revise the NSVI strategy document when it announced The New Way Forward. Instead, four documents outline the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward: (1) NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, January 2007; (2) the President's address to the nation, January 10, 2007; (3) Fact Sheet: New Way Forward in Iraq, January 10, 2007; (4) Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, January 10, 2007. According to the NSC document, the new strategy altered the administration's assumptions regarding the security and political conditions in Iraq and how they would help or hinder the achievement of U.S. goals. For example, the Administration previously believed that the Iraqi elections in 2005 would lead to a national compact for democratic governance shared by all Iraqis and the continued training and equipping of Iraqi security forces would facilitate reductions in U.S. military forces. The New Way Forward acknowledged that national reconciliation might not take the form of a comprehensive national compact but could come from piecemeal efforts (see table 1). Similarly, The New Way Forward stated that while many Iraqi security forces were leading military operations, they were not yet ready to handle security challenges independently. Table 1: The Administration's Comparison of Key Assumptions in The New Way Forward and Prior U.S. Strategy: Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * Primary challenge is a Sunni-based insurgency; New Way Forward: * Primary challenge is violent extremists from multiple communities; the center is eroding and sectarianism is spiking. Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * Political progress will help defuse the insurgency and dampen levels of violence; New Way Forward: * While political progress, economic gains, and security are intertwined, political and economic progress is unlikely absent a basic level of security. Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * Iraqi security forces are gaining in strength and ability to handle Iraq's security challenges; New Way Forward: * Many elements of Iraqi security forces are in the lead but not yet ready to handle Iraqi security challenges independently. Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * A national compact is within the grasp of Iraqi leaders and will have meaningful impact on security; New Way Forward: * Effective national reconciliation may not take the form of a comprehensive package deal; it could come about as the product of piecemeal efforts. Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * Majority of Iraqis will support the coalition and Iraqi efforts to build a democratic state; New Way Forward: * Iraqis are increasingly disillusioned with coalition efforts. Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * Majority of Iraqis and Iraqi leaders see their interests as best advanced by a unified Iraq; New Way Forward: * While still committed to a unified Iraq, many Iraqis are also advancing sectarian agendas. Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * Dialogue with insurgent groups will help reduce violence; New Way Forward: * Dialogue with insurgent groups has not improved security and may not produce strategic gains in current context. Key assumptions: Prior strategy: * Region has a strategic interest in the stabilization of Iraq; New Way Forward: * Many Arab states remain wary of throwing their full support behind the Iraqi government. Source: National Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, January 2007. [End of table] The January 2007 strategy documents defined the original goals and objectives that the Administration believed were achievable by the end of this phase in July 2008. For example, the President pledged to increase the number of U.S. military forces in Iraq to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to reduce sectarian violence and bring security to Baghdad and other areas of the country. The strategy also called for MNF-I to transfer security responsibilities to all 18 Iraqi provinces by the end of 2007. Further, the President committed to hold the Iraqi government to its pledges to (1) enact and implement key legislation to promote national reconciliation, (2) execute its capital budget, and (3) provide essential services to all Iraqi areas and communities and help Iraq maintain and expand its oil exports. Improving Security Conditions: The following section provides information on security conditions in Iraq from mid-2007 through May 2008, including factors affecting these conditions. Security Conditions Improved from Mid-2007 through Early 2008: Establishing a basic level of security is a key goal of The New Way Forward. Figure 1 shows that the overall levels of violence in Iraq--as measured by enemy-initiated attacks--decreased about 70 percent from June 2007 to February 2008, a significant reduction from the high levels of violence in 2006 and the first half of 2007. Similarly, as depicted in figure 2, the average daily number of enemy-initiated attacks declined from about 180 in June 2007 to about 60 in November 2007 and declined further to about 50 in February 2008. From 2003 through 2007, enemy-initiated attacks had increased around major political and religious events, such as Iraqi elections and Ramadan. In 2007, attacks did not increase during Ramadan.[Footnote 12] In a March 2008 report, DOD noted that reductions in violence across Iraq have enabled a return to normal life and growth in local economies. Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008: [Refer to PDF for image] This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following data: Attacks on: Coalition; Civilians; Iraqi security forces; Total attacks. Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, May 2008. [End of figure] Figure 2: Average Daily Attacks, May 2003 to May 2008: [Refer to PDF for image] This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data: Average daily attacks on civilians; Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces; Average daily attacks on coalition; Total average daily attacks. Also depicted is the timeframe of the New Way Forward, which began in January, 2007. Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, May 2008. [End of figure] However, data for March 2008 show an increase in violence in Iraq. Security conditions deteriorated in March 2008, with the average number of attacks increasing from about 50 per day in February 2008 to about 70 attacks per day in March--about a 40 percent increase (see fig. 2). According to an April 2008 UN report,[Footnote 13] the increase in attacks resulted from Shi'a militias fighting Iraqi security forces throughout southern Iraq, as well as an increase in incidents of roadside bomb attacks against Iraqi security forces and MNF-I in Baghdad. The average number of attacks declined to about 65 per day in April and to about 45 per day in May. The enemy-initiated attacks counted in the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) reporting include car, suicide, and other bombs; ambushes; murders, executions, and assassinations; sniper fire; indirect fire (mortars or rockets); direct fire (small arms or rocket- propelled grenades); surface-to-air fire (such as man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS); and other attacks on civilians. They do not include violent incidents that coalition or Iraqi security forces initiate, such as cordon and searches, raids, arrests, and caches cleared. According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not account for all violence throughout Iraq. For example, they may underreport incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other and attacks against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other areas with few or no coalition forces. DIA officials stated, however, that they represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation. According to DOD reports, the reduction in overall violence resulted primarily from steep declines in violence in Baghdad and Anbar provinces, though the violence in Baghdad increased in March 2008 (see fig. 3). These two provinces had accounted for just over half of all attacks in Iraq around the time the President announced The New Way Forward. As of February 2008, during one of the lowest periods for attacks in Iraq since the start of The New Way Forward, about one-third of all attacks in Iraq occurred in Baghdad and Anbar provinces. Figure 3: Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq for Selected Provinces, August 2005 through Early May 2008: [Refer to PDF for image] This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data for ten specific timeframes: Average daily attacks per Province: Ninewa; Diyala; Salah ad Din; Al Anbar; Baghdad. Note: Each data point represents the average number of daily attacks for the specified period of time, as reported in DOD's quarterly reports to Congress. [End of figure] Security Conditions Remain Volatile and Dangerous: Despite improvements in the security situation, an April 2008 UN report found that violence has continued throughout Iraq and could rapidly escalate. According to the UN, toward the end of 2007, suicide bombings, car bombs, and other attacks continued with devastating consequences for civilians. While security improved in Baghdad and other locations, it deteriorated elsewhere, including in the city of Mosul in Ninewa province and in Diyala province. According to the UN report, religious and ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups were victims of violent attacks. Armed groups also carried out assassinations of government or state officials, religious figures, professional groups, and law enforcement personnel. The violence in Iraq continues to result in the displacement of many Iraqis from their homes. In late March 2008, the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Working Group[Footnote 14] reported that the number of IDPs remained very high, but new displacement was occurring at a lower rate. The working group attributed the lower rate of displacement to, among other things, the increasing ethnic homogenization within Iraq; the decrease in security incidents in some areas of Baghdad; and restrictions on freedom of movement in many Iraqi provinces. During April 2008, according to UN and International Organization for Migration reports, hundreds of Iraqi families fled their homes in the Sadr City area of Baghdad, with the majority returning by early June 2008. The IDP Working Group estimated that over 2.77 million people were displaced inside Iraq, of which more than 1.5 million were displaced from 2006 through March 20, 2008. [Footnote 15] Further, the IDP Working Group estimated that 2 million additional Iraqis have left the country, including 1.2 million to 1.5 million who went to Syria and 450,000 to 500,000 who went to Jordan.[Footnote 16] The IDP Working Group also reported that as of March 20, 2008, large- scale return movements have not occurred.[Footnote 17] According to a May 2008 State Department report, more Iraqis were entering Syria in early 2008 than were returning to Iraq. State also reported that overall conditions for refugees in the region and Iraqis internally displaced continue to deteriorate. Moreover, the dangerous and volatile security conditions continue to hinder the movement and reconstruction efforts of international civilian personnel throughout Iraq. For example, according to a March 2008 DOD report, security concerns continue to discourage international investors and hinder private sector growth in most parts of the country. Due to the dangerous security conditions, State Department-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams continue to rely heavily on military assets for movement security and quick reaction force support, among other areas. Further, in April 2008, the UN reported that it has limited access throughout Iraq due to security constraints that hinder UN movement and daily activities. The United Nations also reported an increase in attacks against secure facilities that house and employ international diplomatic and military personnel. For example, from October 2007 through mid-March 2008, the indirect fire attacks aimed at the International Zone were less than a dozen. However, during the last week of March, the International Zone received 47 separate indirect fire barrages consisting of 149 rounds of 122-millimeter and 107- millimeter rockets and at least three larger 240-millimeter rockets, one of which hit the UN compound. In addition, according to the UN report, the incidence of indirect fire attacks on Basra air station, the British military base that also houses U.S. and other international civilian personnel, rose steadily during the first 3 months of 2008, with 48 attacks from January to March. Al Qaeda in Iraq Has Sustained Significant Losses but Remains Resilient: The New Way Forward has the goal of defeating al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its supporters and ensuring that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. According to MNF-I, DOD, and State reports, rejection of al Qaeda in Iraq by significant portions of the population and operations to disrupt AQI networks have helped decrease violence in Iraq; however, AQI is not defeated and maintains the ability to carry out high-profile attacks. According to MNF-I's Commanding General, the loss of local Sunni support for AQI had substantially reduced the group's capability, numbers, areas of operation, and freedom of movement. DOD reported in March 2008 that AQI lost strength and influence in Anbar province, Baghdad, the belts around Baghdad, and many areas of Diyala province. The report notes, however, that AQI remains highly lethal and maintains a significant presence in parts of the Tigris River Valley, Ninewa province, and other areas of Iraq. According to an MNF- I report, AQI is now predominately based in northern Iraq, especially in Mosul, where frequent high-profile attacks continue. Three Key Factors Contributed to Security Gains: DOD, State, and UN reports attribute the reductions in violence in Iraq to three key actions: (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the establishment of nongovernmental Iraqi security forces, and (3) the cease-fire declaration of the Mahdi Army leader. U.S. Surge Allowed a Change in Tactics for The New Way Forward: In announcing The New Way Forward in January 2007, the President cited two primary reasons for ordering an increase in U.S. forces in Iraq. First, the President acknowledged that earlier efforts to provide security in Baghdad had failed, in part, due to an insufficient number of U.S. and Iraqi troops to secure neighborhoods cleared of terrorists and insurgents. He therefore called for an increase of over 20,000 U.S. combat and other forces, including an additional 5 brigades. The vast majority of these troops would help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods and protect the local population. Second, to support local tribal leaders who had begun to show a willingness to take on AQI, the President ordered the deployment of 4,000 U.S. troops to Anbar province. Figure 4 shows the increase of U.S. forces in Iraq from about 132,000 in December 2006 to about 169,000 in August 2007, an overall increase of about 37,000 troops-- almost 30 percent above the December 2006 force level. Figure 4: U.S. Forces in Iraq, March 2003 to July 2008: [See PDF for image] This figure is a line graph depicting the following data: Date: March-03; Number of troops: 93,850. Date: April-03; Number of troops: 145,675. Date: May-03; Number of troops: 147,370. Date: June-03; Number of troops: 149,415. Date: July-03; Number of troops: 146,000. Date: August-03; Number of troops: 130,312. Date: September-03; Number of troops: 136,940. Date: October-03; Number of troops: 131,345. Date: November-03; Number of troops: 123,715. Date: December-03; Number of troops: 126,895. Date: January-04; Number of troops: 108,430. Date: February-04; Number of troops: 119,620. Date: March-04; Number of troops: 131,705. Date: April-04; Number of troops: 139,815. Date: May-04; Number of troops: 144,265. Date: June-04; Number of troops: 140,615. Date: July-04; Number of troops: 144,265. Date: August-04; Number of troops: 137,725. Date: September-04; Number of troops: 134,585. Date: October-04; Number of troops: 135,930. Date: November-04; Number of troops: 142,600. Date: December-04; Number of troops: 152,285. Date: January-05; Number of troops: 161,250. Date: February-05; Number of troops: 147,800. Date: March-05; Number of troops: 147,925. Date: April-05; Number of troops: 139,980. Date: May-05; Number of troops: 141,130. Date: June-05; Number of troops: 139,260. Date: July-05; Number of troops: 139,175. Date: August-05; Number of troops: 143,730. Date: September-05; Number of troops: 149,975. Date: October-05; Number of troops: 159,840. Date: November-05; Number of troops: 156,165. Date: December-05; Number of troops: 155,080. Date: January-06; 139,275. Date: February-06; Number of troops: 133,460. Date: March-06; Number of troops: 132,525. Date: April-06; Number of troops: 132,260. Date: May-06; Number of troops: 130,330. Date: June-06; Number of troops: 127,280. Date: July-06; Number of troops: 133,540. Date: August-06; Number of troops: 143,445. Date: September-06; Number of troops: 142,630. Date: October-06; Number of troops: 151,190. Date: November-06; Number of troops: 136,950. Date: December-06; Number of troops: 131,515. Date: January-07 (New Way Forward speech); Number of troops: 138,300. Date: February-07; Number of troops: 141,230. Date: March-07; Number of troops: 147,865. Date: April-07; Number of troops: 147,075. Date: May-07; Number of troops: 145,000. Date: Jun-07; Number of troops: 159,565. Date: Jul-07; Number of troops: 161,400. Date: Aug-07; Number of troops: 169,100. Date: Sep-07 (U.S. troop drawdown announcement); Number of troops: 164,700. Date: Oct-07; Number of troops: 167,600. Date: Nov-07; Number of troops: 165,700. Date: Dec-07; Number of troops: 159,700. Date: Jan-08; Number of troops: 158,400. Date: Feb-08; Number of troops: 158,100. Date: Mar-08; Number of troops: 160,500. Date: Apr-08; Number of troops: 162,300. Date: May-08; Number of troops: 158,900. Date: June-08; Number of troops: 149,450. Date: July-08 (Projected U.S. drawdown to 140,000 troops; end of New Way Forward); Number of troops: 140,000. Source: DOD, Joint Staff and State Department data. Note: For all months prior to February 2008, DOD provided GAO with end- of-month data for the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. In February 2008, DOD began to provide GAO with data from the beginning of the month. [End of figure] In September 2007, the President announced that the United States would withdraw the surge forces by July 2008--the end of The New Way Forward-- resulting in a decline in U.S. brigade combat teams from 20 to 15 and a projected force level of about 140,000 U.S. troops. The MNF-I Commanding General reported in April 2008 that he would need 45 days after the surge brigades leave Iraq to consolidate his forces and assess how the reduced U.S. military presence will affect conditions on the ground. After that time, he would assess whether U.S. forces could be further reduced. According to DOD reporting, the additional surge forces allowed MNF-I to increase its operational tempo and change tactics in providing security to the Iraqi people. Specifically, the additional troops enabled MNF-I to maintain a continuous presence in Baghdad and surrounding areas by establishing about 60 joint security stations with Iraqi forces and combat outposts outside of its large operating bases as of August 2007 (see fig. 5). In May 2008, the former commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq reported that the number of joint security stations and combat outposts had since increased to 75. Figure 5: Location of Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in Baghdad Security Districts, as of August 2007: [See PDF for image] This figure is a map of the Baghdad Security districts indicating the locations of the following types of stations and outposts: District JSS; Satellite JSS; COP (Occupied). Source: Multilateral Division-Baghdad. [End of figure] In March 2008, DOD reported that these security stations and outposts had a stabilizing effect along ethnic fault lines, complemented MNF-I's efforts to reconcile former insurgents, and helped maintain pressure on domestic and external insurgent elements. Over time, according to the DOD report, MNF-I will transfer the joint security stations and combat outposts to Iraqi forces as it draws down and moves to a support role. Nongovernmental Security Forces Have Opposed AQI but Generally Have Not Reconciled with the Iraqi Government: According to DOD and MNF-I reports, the establishment of local nongovernmental security forces that oppose AQI has helped decrease the levels of violence in parts of Iraq, most notably in Anbar province, but these groups by and large have not yet reconciled with the Iraqi government. The groups, including those now known as the Sons of Iraq, began forming in Anbar province in late 2006, with the movement spreading to other areas of Iraq during 2007 and 2008. As Sons of Iraq, these former insurgents take an oath to be law-abiding citizens and work with MNF-I and, in some cases, the Iraqi government to protect their local communities. Most work on MNF-I contracts. Overall, according to an April 2008 MNF-I report, the various Sons of Iraq groups consisted of about 105,000 members. Sons of Iraq groups do not have a national or regional structure, as local groups are generally organized along sectarian lines based on the neighborhoods in which they operate. In March 2008, DOD reported that the Sons of Iraq program has helped to improve security at the local level by involving local citizens in the security of their communities. According to the DOD report, the Sons of Iraq are a key component of the counterinsurgency fight due to their knowledge of the local populace and their ability to report activities that might otherwise escape the attention of MNF-I and Iraqi forces. These groups also provide security for roads, municipal buildings, power lines, and other key facilities in their local communities under the direction of MNF-I or Iraqi forces, thereby allowing MNF-I and Iraqi forces to pursue and engage the enemy. While the Sons of Iraq are playing an important role at the local level to quell violence, DOD reported that they also pose some challenges for the Iraqi government and the coalition. These challenges include the potential for infiltration by insurgents,[Footnote 18] the possible distortions in the local economy if salaries are not carefully managed, and the lack of a cohesive Iraqi plan to transition the Sons of Iraq to the Iraqi forces or civilian employment. According to DOD reporting, the Iraqi government continues to debate the future of the Sons of Iraq, raising concerns over infiltration by irreconcilable elements, the merits of supporting or employing a large number of former insurgents, and the methods for transitioning Sons of Iraq members into the Iraqi forces, private sector employment, or educational programs. Further, according to the April 2008 UN report, despite their relative success and growing numbers, during early 2008 some tribal security forces temporarily withdrew their support of MNF- I and the Iraqi security forces in Diyala and Babil provinces. Fraying relations between these groups and the Iraqi government in Anbar province caused a spike in violence in this area. As of March 2008, DOD reported that about 20,000 Sons of Iraq had already transitioned to the Iraqi security forces or civil employment. Declared Cease-fire of the Mahdi Army Is Tenuous: According to DOD and UN reports, the cease-fire declared in August 2007 by the leader of the Mahdi Army, an extremist Shi'a militia, contributed significantly to the decline in violence in the second half of 2007. However, the cease-fire appears tenuous as the militia recently increased attacks against other Shi'a militias, the coalition, and Iraqi security forces before declaring another cease- fire on May 11. The Mahdi Army and its affiliated special groups remain the largest and most dangerous Shi'a militia in Iraq, according to an MNF-I report, with a combined nationwide strength of approximately 25,000 to 40,000 active members supported by a large body of non-active supporters. According to DOD and UN reports, the cease-fire showed signs of fraying in late 2007, as tensions increased in southern Iraq among the various Shi'a militia factions. These tensions led the various Shi'a militia factions to begin routinely launching attacks against each other's interests and periodically engaging in open conflict lasting several days, or even weeks, before Iraqi security forces and MNF-I intervened. In February 2008, according to the UN report, there were numerous public demonstrations against the political and security leadership in Basra. Despite the reaffirmation of the Mahdi Army ceasefire in February, the Iraqi government launched an offensive against criminal and militia elements in Basra in late March 2008, which sparked widespread fighting in Baghdad, Basra, and other southern cities. According to a UN report, violence declined in Basra in April as the Iraqi government and various armed groups reached agreement to stop fighting, but violence continued in Sadr City, a Mahdi Army- controlled area of 2.5 million people. Moreover, the Iraqi security forces have conducted operations targeting the Mahdi Army in Nassiriyah, al-Amarah, al-Kut, and Hillah, thus escalating the level of violence in these cities. Najaf and Karbala also suffered explosive attacks in the last week of March, which, according to the UN, are rare occurrences in these two cities. On May 20, 2008, the International Organization for Migration reported that the security situation had improved somewhat in Sadr City due to a truce between the Mahdi Army and government forces on May 11. Developing Iraqi Security Forces: This section discusses the strength and capabilities of Iraqi security forces and efforts to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi government. Iraqi Military and Police Force Levels Have Increased: The New Way Forward set the goal of developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the government of Iraq. Since 2003, the United States has provided more than $20 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi security forces comprise Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces that vary in size. Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel has increased from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 445,000 in April 2008.[Footnote 19] The number of Iraqi security forces is almost three times that of the 162,300 U.S. forces in Iraq as of April 2008. The Iraqi total includes about 203,000 under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and about 238,000 under the Ministry of Interior. Table 2 provides the force levels for the major components of the Iraq security forces in March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces had grown to about 478,000 as of May 2008. Table 2: Number of Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008: Ministry: Defense; Component: Iraqi Army; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 59,880; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 132,700[C]; April 2008 trained[B]: 200,013[D]. Ministry: Defense; Component: Air Force; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 186; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 900; April 2008 trained[B]: 1,370. Ministry: Defense; Component: Navy; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]:517; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 1,100; April 2008 trained[B]: 1,194. Ministry: Defense; Subtotal; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 60,583[E]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 134,700[E]; April 2008 trained[B]: 202,577. Ministry: Interior; Component: Iraqi Police Service; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 55,015[F]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 135,000; April 2008 trained[B]: 166,037. Ministry: Interior; Component: Other Ministry of Interior forces; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; April 2008 trained[B]: [Empty]. Ministry: Interior; Component: National police; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 24,400; April 2008 trained[B]: 44,156. Ministry: Interior; Component: Border enforcement; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; April 2008 trained[B]: Ministry: 28,023. Ministry: Interior; Subtotal: March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 26,874; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 53,300; April 2008 trained[B]: 72,179. Ministry: Subtotal; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 81,889[G]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 188,300[G]; April 2008 trained[B]: 238,216. Ministry: Counterterrorism Bureau; Component: Special Operations; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; April 2008 trained[B]: 3,709. Ministry: Counterterrorism Bureau; Subtotal; March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty]; April 2008 trained[B]: 3,709. Total: March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 142,472; January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 323,000[H]; April 2008 trained[B]: 444,502[I]. Sources: U.S. State Department and Multinational Security Transition Command Reports. Notes: [A] The term "operational" refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term "trained and equipped" refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from the State Department's March 9, 2005 and January 31, 2007 Iraq Weekly Status Report and Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi Security Forces Update, January 26, 2007. [B] The term "trained" refers to Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Counterterrorism Bureau forces. Numbers are from April 30, 2008 Iraq Weekly Status Report. [C] Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces. [D] Army numbers include support forces. [E] Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers. [F] The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway patrol forces. [G] Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers. [H] Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 ministries. [I] Numbers reflect total Iraqi security forces trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, absence without leave, and normal separation. [End of table] Ministry of Defense forces consist of 12 Iraqi army divisions and a small air force and navy. These forces have grown by more than 230 percent since March 2005. Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of Iraqi police--which, as of April 2008, represent about 70 percent of personnel within the Ministry of Interior--and other units, specifically, the national police (formerly the special police), Department of Border Enforcement, and Center for Dignitary Protection. Iraqi police precincts are under the operational control of their local municipality and the corresponding provincial government. Ministry of Interior forces have grown by more than 200 percent since March 2005. Future projections show that the Iraqi security forces will continue to grow. DOD reported that Iraqi security forces--military, police, and special operations forces--could reach 646,000 by 2010 (see figure 6). Specifically, the Ministry of Interior is projected to grow to about 389,000 employees in the Iraqi police service, national police, and Directorate of Border Enforcement. Ministry of Defense forces will include 13 army divisions (12 infantry, 1 armored) along with supporting forces, 1,500 navy personnel, 4,000 air force personnel, and 5,750 counterterrorism forces. Figure 6: Number of Trained Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005 through 2010: [See PDF for image] This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following data: Date: March 2005; Number of troops, Ministry of Defense: 60,580; Number of troops, Ministry of Interior: 82,000 Number of troops, Counter Terrorism Bureau: 0; Number of troops, Total: 142,580. Date: January 2007; Number of troops, Ministry of Defense: 134,700; Number of troops, Ministry of Interior: 188,000; Number of troops, Counter Terrorism Bureau: 0; Number of troops, Total: 322,700. Date: April 2008; Number of troops, Ministry of Defense: 202,580; Number of troops, Ministry of Interior: 238,000; Number of troops, Counter Terrorism Bureau: 4,000; Number of troops, Total: 444,580. Date: 2010 (projected); Number of troops, Projected Total: 646,000. Source: GAO analysis of U.S. State Department, Multinational Security Transition Command, and Department of Defense Reports. [End of figure] The number of trained Iraqi security forces may overstate the number of troops present for duty. According to DOD, the number of trained troops includes personnel who are deceased or absent without leave.[Footnote 20] For example, DOD reported that approximately 24,500 soldiers were dropped from the Iraqi Army rolls in 2007 because they deserted or were absent without leave. However, these troops are still counted in trained numbers. An April 2008 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction report confirmed that a substantial number of Iraqi personnel still on the payroll were not present for duty for various reasons, such as being on leave, absent without leave, injured, or killed.[Footnote 21] Iraqi Security Forces Capabilities Have Shown Limited Improvement: In September 2007, GAO assessed the Iraqi government's progress in increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. This was a benchmark established by the U.S. Congress and derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006. The number of independent Iraqi security forces as measured by Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) level 1 continues to be an important measure of the capabilities of Iraqi security forces. Although Iraqi security forces have grown in number and many are leading counterinsurgency operations, MNF-I assessments of their readiness levels show limited improvements. MNF-I uses ORA to determine when Iraqi units can assume the lead for security operations.[Footnote 22] The ORA is a classified joint assessment prepared monthly by the unit's coalition and Iraqi commanders. For the Iraqi army, commanders use the ORA process to assess a unit's personnel, command and control, equipment, sustainment and logistics, and training and leadership capabilities. ORA level 1 is a unit capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations;[Footnote 23] level 2 is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Iraqi security force or coalition force assistance; level 3 is partially capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition force assistance; level 4 is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations. In April 2008, the Commanding General of MNF-I reported that more Iraqi security force battalions were leading security operations in Iraq. He stated that MNF-I handed over the lead security responsibility to 19 additional Iraqi army battalions between January 2007 and March 2008, as displayed in figure 7. Figure 7: Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness Levels, January 2007 and March 2008: [Refer to PDF for image] This figure is a combination of two stacked vertical bar graphs depicting the number of battalions in each of four categories indicating the Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness Levels for the National Police and Iraqi Army: ORA level 1 - capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations; ORA level 2 - capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Iraqi security force or coalition force assistance; ORA level 3 - partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units; ORA level 4 - forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations. Source: GAO analysis of data presented in testimony by the Commanding General of MNF-I and MNC-I documents. [End of figure] While 65 percent of the Iraqi units were in the lead in counterinsurgency operations as of March 2008, the number of Iraqi army battalions rated at the highest readiness level accounts for less than 10 percent of the total number of Iraqi army battalions. While the number of battalions "in the lead"--that is, leading counterinsurgency operations with or without coalition support--increased from 93 in January 2007 to 112 in March 2008, MNF-I is now including some units at ORA level 3 as in the lead, which are assessed as partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations. In contrast, the January 2007 report did not include ORA Level 3 units as in the lead. GAO is completing work assessing the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces at each ORA level. According to DOD, the Iraqi national police battalions, organized under the Ministry of Interior, generally have been less capable and have shown less progress than Iraqi army battalions. While the number of Iraqi national police battalions increased from 27 in January 2007 to 36 in March 2008, no units achieved ORA level 1, and about 11 units were at ORA level 2. Several Factors Have Complicated the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces: The United States faces several challenges in enhancing the capabilities of Iraq's security forces: (1) the lack of a single unified force; (2) sectarian and militia influences; (3) continued dependence upon U.S. and coalition forces for logistics and combat support; and (4) training and leadership shortages. First, Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. Only one major component of the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi army, has counterinsurgency as its primary mission. The Iraqi army represents about 45 percent of 445,000 trained Iraqi security forces.[Footnote 24] The Iraqi local police represent 37 percent of total trained security forces and have civilian law enforcement as a primary mission. The Iraqi national police account for 10 percent of total trained Iraqi forces. According to the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, the national police are not a viable organization, as they face significant challenges, including public distrust, real and perceived sectarianism, and uncertainty as to whether it is a military or police force.[Footnote 25] The commission recommended that the national police be disbanded and reorganized under the Ministry of Interior. As a smaller organization with a different name, it would be responsible for specialized police tasks such as explosive ordnance disposal, urban search and rescue, and other functions. Second, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of the Iraqi security forces. In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom[Footnote 26] reported that Iraq's Shi'a- dominated government has engaged in sectarian-based human rights violations and has tolerated abuses committed by Shi'a militias with ties to political factions in the governing coalition. According to the commission, the Iraqi government, through its security forces, has committed arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without due process, targeted executions, and torture against non-Shi'a Iraqis. In September 2007, we determined that the Iraqi government had not eliminated militia control over local security forces and that sectarianism in the Iraqi security forces was a serious problem in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. According to DOD, in March 2008, sectarianism and corruption continue to be significant problems within the Ministries of Interior and Defense. For example, some army units sent to Baghdad have had ties to Shi'a militias, making it difficult to target Shi'a extremist networks. According to the March 2008 State Department Human Rights Report, the effectiveness of Ministry of Interior forces, particularly the national police, was seriously compromised by militia influence. [Footnote 27] Third, as we reported in November 2007, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities.[Footnote 28] The Ministries of Defense and Interior were not capable of accounting for, supporting, or fully controlling their forces in the field, nor do the Iraqi security forces have critical enablers such as intelligence and logistics systems and processes that permit independent planning and operations. Due to Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and police units will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and logistics support through 2008. Further, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq stated that the Iraqi Army remains heavily dependent on contracted support to satisfy day-to-day requirements, and it appears that contracted logistics support in some form will be necessary for 2 to 3 years. Fourth, shortfalls in training, leadership, personnel, and sustainment have contributed to the limited progress in the number of Iraqi battalions capable of operating independently, according to DOD reports. To address this problem, the Iraqi government has expanded its training capacity. According to DOD's March 2008 report, the Ministry of Interior has expanded the number of its training facilities from 4 to 17 over the past year and is implementing its first annual strategic plan. In addition, the Iraqi army plans to develop training centers in 2008 that will train an additional 2,000 soldiers per cycle. However, DOD noted that Ministry of Interior and Defense basic combat and police training facilities are at or near capacity and that the shortage of leaders in the Iraqi security forces will take years to address. Furthermore, the influx of about 20,000 of the 105,000 Sons of Iraq who are currently working with coalition forces will place an additional strain on the capacity of the Iraqis to train their forces, particularly the police. Transfer of Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Control Has Not Met Expected Time Frames: The ability of a province to transfer from MNF-I to provincial Iraqi control is dependent on security and governance in each province. Due to increased levels of violence and the lack of capable Iraqi security forces, the projected transition dates for the completion of the provincial Iraqi control process have shifted over time. In June 2005, Iraq's Prime Minister announced a joint decision between the government of Iraq and MNF-I to systematically hand over security responsibility in Iraq's 18 provinces under the control of the province's governor. The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility was commissioned in July 2005 to develop a set of conditions assessing the readiness of each province for Iraqi control. Four conditions are used to determine whether a province should be transferred to provincial Iraqi control. These conditions include (1) the threat level of the province, (2) Iraqi security forces' capabilities, (3) the governor's ability to oversee security operations, and (4) MNF-I's ability to provide reinforcement if necessary. According to MNF-I, as these conditions are met, MNF-I forces will then leave all urban areas and assume a supporting role to Iraq's security forces. In January 2007, The New Way Forward stated that the Iraqi government would take responsibility for security in all 18 provinces by November 2007. However, this date was not met, as only 8 of 18 provinces had transitioned to Iraqi control at that time. According to DOD, in September 2007, the principal cause for the delay in transitioning provinces to Iraqi control was the inability of the Iraqi police to maintain security in the provinces. For example, as a result of the February 2007 Baghdad Security Plan, an increased number of terrorists, insurgents, and members of illegal militia fled Baghdad for other provinces, and the Iraqi police were unable to handle these threats. As of May 2008, nine provincial governments have lead responsibility for security in their province. Six of the nine provinces that have assumed security responsibilities are located in southern Iraq, where the British forces had the lead and have continued to draw down their forces. The remaining three provinces are located in northern Iraq, in the area controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Figure 8 displays the degree to which the provinces had achieved provincial Iraqi control as of May 2008. Figure 8: Provinces That Have Transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control, as of May 2008: [See PDF for image] This figure is a map of Iraq depicting provinces that have transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, as of May 2008. The following data is depicted: Province: Baghdad; Status: Partially ready. Province: Dahuk; Status: Transitioned. Province: Irbil; Status: Transitioned. Province: Sulaymaniyah; Status: Transitioned. Province: Ninewa; Status: Partially ready. Province: Ta'mim; Status: Partially ready. Province: Salah Ad Din; Status: Partially ready. Province: Diyala; Status: Partially ready. Province: Babil; Status: Partially ready. Province: Wasit; Status: Partially ready. Province: Qadisiyah; Status: Projected within 6 months. Province: Anbar; Status: Projected within 6 months. Province: Karbala; Status: Transitioned. Province: An Najaf; Status: Transitioned. Province: Muthanna; Status: Transitioned. Province: Dhi Qar; Status: Transitioned. Province: Maysan; Status: Transitioned. Province: Basra; Status: Transitioned. Source: GAO analysis of MNF-I data. [End of figure] According to the MNF-I Commanding General, eight of the nine remaining provinces are expected to transition to provincial Iraqi control by early 2009. One of the provinces (Ta'mim) has no expected transition date. Figure 9 shows the projected timelines for transferring security responsibilities to the remaining provincial governments. [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Figure 9: Timeline for Transfer of Security Responsibilities to Provincial Iraqi Control: [See PDF for image] This figure is a timeline for transfer of security responsibilities to Provincial Iraqi Control, as follows: Completed: Muthanna; Date: July 2006. Completed: Dhi Qar; Date: September 2006. Completed: An Najaf; Date: December 2006. Completed: Maysan; Date: April 2007. Completed: Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk. Date: May 2007. Completed: Karbala; Date: October 2007. Completed: Basra; Date: December 2007. Projected: Anbar; Date: June 2008. Projected: Qadisiyah; Date: July 2008. Projected: Wasit and Babil; Date: November 2008. Projected: Diyala and Baghdad; Date: December 2008. Projected: Salah An Din and Ninewa; Date: January 2009. Ta'mim has no projected date for transitioning to provincial Iraqi control. Source: GAO analysis of MNF-I data. [End of figure] According to the MNF-I Commanding General, the coalition continues to provide assistance even after security responsibilities have transferred to provincial Iraqi control. For example, the coalition continues to support Iraqi-led operations in those provinces with planning, logistics, close air support, intelligence, and embedded transition teams. Enacting Key Iraqi Legislation: This section describes progress toward the U.S. goal of helping Iraq enact key legislation that would promote national reconciliation. Iraq Has Enacted Some Legislation to Promote National Reconciliation, but Critical Laws Are Still Being Debated: To promote national reconciliation and unify the country, the Iraqi government, with U.S. support, committed in 2006 to address political grievances among Iraq's Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd populations. The U.S. and Iraqi governments believed that fostering reconciliation through political compromise and the passage of legislation, such as reintegrating former Ba'athists and sharing hydrocarbon resources equitably, were essential. In 2007, in The New Way Forward, the U.S. government identified legislation that the Iraqi government committed to enact by December 31, 2007.[Footnote 29] The United States also promoted Iraq's reconciliation by assisting the country in its constitutional referendum and legislative elections and building the capacity of Iraq's legislature.[Footnote 30] Since September 2007, the Iraqi government has enacted three laws that could address some Sunni concerns--de-Ba'athification reform, amnesty for certain detainees in Iraq's justice system, and provincial powers. These three laws were enacted after considerable debate and compromise and, according to State and DOD reports, represented positive signs of political progress. De-Ba'athification and amnesty laws are steps to address Sunni and Sadrist concerns that they had been removed from government service or detained and arrested. According to the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, the number of Iraqis currently held in detention is a significant problem. The provincial powers law established a date for new provincial elections, which could address Sunni under representation in several provincial governments. However, three additional laws considered critical for national reconciliation have not been enacted. These include laws that set the rules for Iraq's provincial elections, define the control and management of Iraq's oil and gas resources, and provide for disarmament and demobilization of Iraq's armed groups. According to U.S. reports, the oil law and law on disarmament and demobilization are stalled. According to U.S. and other officials and documents, although the process is evolving, enacting legislation generally includes the following steps: The Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers have authority to draft laws, and the Iraqi legislature-- either a committee or 10 members--has the authority to propose laws. Laws drafted by the Presidency Council or Council of Ministers are reviewed for legal soundness and subject matter by the Shura Council, an institution in the Ministry of Justice. Laws drafted by the legislature must first pass through its Legal Committee. The legislation then proceeds through three readings. The legislation is presented at the first reading. The relevant committee may amend the law, and the Speaker's Office places it on the calendar. After the first reading, the legislature discusses the proposed law at a second reading. At the third reading, a final vote is taken article by article. Laws that receive an affirmative vote are sent to the Presidency Council, which can disapprove the law. The legislature can override the disapproval with a three-fifths majority. This ratification process only applies during the transition period when the Presidency Council is in existence. Final laws are published in the Official Gazette and become effective on the date of publication in the Gazette unless stipulated otherwise. Figure 10 shows the law enacted since September 2007, identifies the steps left to enact the remaining legislation, and indicates the status of implementation, which will be discussed in the next section. [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Figure 10: Status of Iraqi Legislation to Promote National Reconciliation: [See PDF for image] This figure is a table depicting the status of Iraqi legislation to promote national reconciliation, as follows: De-Ba'athification: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: Enacting: First reading completed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Second reading completed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: Third reading completed; vote taken: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Ratification procedures: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Law published in gazette: step taken since September 2007; Implementing: Not implemented. Mandatory Commission not established. Amnesty: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: First reading completed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Second reading completed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Third reading completed; vote taken: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Ratification procedures: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Law published in gazette: step taken since September 2007; Implementing: Implementation in process. Thousands approved for amnesty. Provincial powers: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: Third reading completed; vote taken: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Ratification procedures: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Law published in gazette: step taken since September 2007; Implementing: Takes effect once provincial elections occur.[A] Elections: Electoral commission: Implementing: Implemented. Elections: Provincial election law: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: First reading completed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Second reading completed: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Third reading completed; vote taken: Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty]; Implementing: [Empty]. Hydrocarbon laws: Framework: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: step taken since September 2007; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty]; Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty]; Implementing: [Empty]. Hydrocarbon laws: Revenue sharing: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty]; Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty]; Implementing: [Empty]. Hydrocarbon laws: Ministry of Oil Restructuring: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty]; Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty]; Implementing: [Empty]. Hydrocarbon laws: Iraqi National Oil Company: Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: No legislation drafted; Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty]; Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office: Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty]; Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty]; Implementing: [Empty]. Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, UN and Iraqi government data. [A] The provincial powers law set an October 1, 2008, deadline for holding provincial elections. [End of figure] Since we last reported on legislation to promote national reconciliation in September 2007, the Iraqi government has passed the following laws. * As of September 2007, drafts of de-Ba'athification reform legislation were under initial review by the Council of Representatives. After extensive debate, the Iraqi legislature passed the de-Ba'athification reform law on January 12, 2008. The Presidency Council approved the law in February 2008 and it was published in the Official Gazette. According to a March 2008 DOD report, if implemented in the spirit of reconciliation, this law could allow some former Ba'athist party members, many of whom were Sunni, to return to government. The new law establishes a national commission to complete the removal of former high-level officials of the Ba'athist party, consistent with measures outlined in the law. The law, however, allows some lower-ranking members of the Ba'athist party to return to or continue working for the government. In May 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1 provided for investigation and removal of even junior members of the party from government, universities, and hospitals.[Footnote 31] * As of September 2007, the Iraqi government had not drafted an amnesty law. After considerable negotiation among the political blocs, the legislation was combined with other pieces of legislation and passed as part of an overall package in February 2008. According to a March 2008 DOD report, the law represents an important step toward addressing a long-standing demand for detainee releases, but the ultimate effect on national reconciliation will depend on its implementation. The law provides for amnesty and release of Iraqis sentenced to prison and those under investigation or trial, provided they are not involved in certain crimes such as kidnapping, murder, embezzling state funds, smuggling antiquities, or terrorism that results in killing or permanently disabling victims. The law also requires the Iraqi government to undertake the necessary measures to transfer those detained in the MNF-I facilities to Iraqi facilities so that the provisions of this law can be applied to them. This law is important to Sunnis and Sadrists, according to State and USIP officials, as many were detained or held without trial. * As of September 2007, the Iraqi legislature had completed the second reading of a draft of the provincial powers legislation. In February 2008, after considerable negotiation, the Iraqi government passed the provincial powers legislation as part of an overall legislative package and after an initial veto by the Shi'a vice president of the Presidency Council was withdrawn. According to a March 2008 DOD report, the law is an important step toward establishing a balance between adequate central government authority and strong local governments, some of which represent provinces with large or majority Sunni populations. The law outlines the specific powers of the provinces and provides the structure of government for the provincial and local councils. The law also sets the date for provincial council elections as no later than October 1, 2008. Other key legislation has not passed, including the provincial elections law, hydrocarbon laws, and disarmament and demobilization. * As of September 2007, a provincial elections law had not been drafted. Since then, the Prime Minister's Office has drafted a provincial elections law and presented it to the Iraqi legislature, where it has completed its second reading. As of May 2008, the Iraqi legislature is debating its provisions. This draft law would provide the rules for holding provincial elections, which are critical to promote national reconciliation. According to a DOD report, new elections would enhance reconciliation by enabling the creation of provincial councils that are more representative of the populations they serve. Many Sunnis did not vote in the 2005 provincial elections, resulting in underrepresentation of Sunnis in some provincial councils. In Baghdad, for example, the population is about 40 percent Sunni, but the council has 1 Sunni representative out of 51, according to a March 2008 State report. * As of September 2007, the Iraqi government had drafted three of the four separate but interrelated pieces of legislation needed to establish control and management of Iraq's hydrocarbon resources and ensure equitable distribution of revenues. Since that time, only the hydrocarbon framework draft, which establishes the control and management of the oil sector, has progressed to the Council of Representatives. The three additional laws include legislation to establish revenue sharing, restructure the Ministry of Oil, and establish the Iraqi National Oil Company. According to State officials, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government disagree on many areas of the proposed legislation, particularly on the issue of how much control the KRG will have in managing its oil resources. For example, the KRG has passed its own oil and gas law. Furthermore, the KRG has negotiated an estimated 25 contracts with foreign oil firms, which the Iraqi federal government claims are illegal. * As of September 2007, the Iraqi legislature had not drafted legislation on disarmament and demobilization of militias and armed groups. Since then, no progress has been made on drafting legislation. According to the United Nations, minimum requirements for a successful disarmament and demobilization program in Iraq include a secure environment, the inclusion of all belligerent parties, an overarching political agreement, sustainable funding, and appropriate reintegration opportunities. As of May 2008, these conditions were not present. For example, the United Nations reported that since March 27, 2008, intense fighting in Sadr City has occurred among militias linked to Muqtada Al Sadr and the Iraqi security forces and MNF-I. According to the Iraqi government, between late March 2008 and the end of April 2008, 925 persons were killed and 2,600 persons injured during the military operation. Iraqi Government Faces Challenges Implementing Legislation and Outcomes Are Uncertain: Although Iraq has enacted some legislation it judged important for national reconciliation, implementation of the legislation and its outcomes are uncertain. For example, the amnesty legislation is currently being implemented as detainees have been approved for release, but a limited number have been set free as of May 2008. Moreover, implementation of the de-Ba'athification law has stalled, and holding free and fair provincial elections poses logistical and security challenges. Implementation of the amnesty law began on March 2, 2008. According to the Iraq Higher Juridical Council, as of May 1, 2008, almost 17,000 prisoners and detainees have been approved for release. According to State officials, the law is implemented at the provincial level by committees of provincial judges. These committees are more likely to implement the law, according to State officials, because several are located in provinces with large Sunni populations where many detainees are located. However, according to the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, the process of releasing prisoners and detainees is slow, and, according to State, approximately 1,600 have been released to date. The legislation does not provide a time frame for the approximately 25,000 MNF-I detainees to be turned over to Iraqi custody. Although the de-Ba'athification law was enacted in February 2008, implementation of the law has stalled, delaying the possible reinstatement of an estimated 30,000 former government employees. The Iraqi government has yet to appoint members of the Supreme National Commission on Accountability and Justice, which has primary responsibility for implementing the law. According to State officials, Sunnis are concerned about the law's implementation and the choice of commissioners. The Iraqi government faces challenges in holding provincial elections by October 2008, as required by the provincial powers law. According to State officials, a provincial election law has not been enacted and the draft law contains confusing and contentious issues. For example, the draft law states that any political entity that possesses an armed militia is prohibited from participating in the election. According to State, this provision could eliminate some political parties, such as the Sadrist Trend. According to a UN report and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials, there are challenges for the Iraqi government to hold these elections by late 2008. UN and IFES reports estimate that it would take about 8 months to prepare for the elections, and State estimates that elections could probably be held 4- 5 months after an elections law is passed.[Footnote 32] Although some elections preparations have begun, numerous tasks remain and some cannot begin until the election rules are set by law. According to USAID and IFES, the tasks remaining included establishing voter registration lists; making voting provisions for internally displaced persons; registering candidates for the councils, including vetting them through the de- Ba'athification process; designing and printing ballots; identifying polling sites; and providing time for the candidates to campaign in their districts. According to U.S. officials, holding provincial elections will face security challenges due to likely sectarian violence, insurgent attacks, and political party militias. Elections in several areas may be fiercely contested as militias and sectarian groups may fight for control of the provincial councils and their financial resources, according to State and USAID officials. State and USAID officials said MNF-I is working with the Iraqi government to help provide support for the election.[Footnote 33] Iraq Has Made Little Progress in Completing the Constitutional Review Process: Iraq's Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October 2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, including the powers of the presidency, claims over disputed areas such as oil- rich Kirkuk, and the relative powers of the regions versus the federal government.[Footnote 34] According to State officials, these unresolved issues were core points of dispute among Iraq's Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd political blocs. According to the United Nations, Iraqi leaders included a compromise provision in the draft constitution that required the formation of the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) to review the Constitution and propose necessary amendments. Since September 2007, the constitutional review process has made little progress. The CRC recommended a draft package of amendments to the Council of Representatives in May 2007, but these have not moved forward. Since then, the CRC has received multiple extensions to complete its work, but has not proposed a new package of amendments. According to a March 2008 DOD report, Kurdish leaders have prevented progress in the review process until the issue of disputed territories, especially Kirkuk, is settled. The following summarizes three key issues in the Constitution that have not been resolved. * Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a member of the Sunni bloc, believes that the Presidency Council should have greater power in relation to the prime minister to allow for better power sharing among Iraq's political groups. According to the Iraqi Constitution, in the current electoral term, a presidency council consisting of a president and 2 vice-presidents exercises the powers of the presidency. The Presidency Council--currently a Shi'a, a Sunni, and a Kurd--can approve or disapprove legislation in the current electoral term.[Footnote 35] However, the legislature can adopt disapproved legislation by a three-fifths majority vote. On the other hand, the prime minister, selected from the legislature's largest political bloc and currently a Shi'a, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, names the ministers for each ministry, and directs the Council of Ministers, which directs the work of all government ministries and departments, develops their plans, and prepares the government budget. * Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Kurdistan Regional Government officials want a referendum to be held in Kirkuk to determine its status. Even though the deadline for holding the referendum was December 31, 2007, the KRG and the Iraqi government agreed to a 6-month extension on implementation. While KRG officials wanted a referendum to be held as soon as practical, other Iraqi legislators believe that a referendum should be deferred due to border disputes and displacement of people in the area. The United Nations is currently consulting with various groups about the status of other disputed territories, such as the districts of Akre and Makhmour currently in Ninewa province. According to the UN, there is no agreed upon listing of disputed areas and their boundaries. If these discussions succeed, it could be a model for determining the status of Kirkuk, according to the UN. * Power of the federal government versus regions. Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish political blocs disagree over fundamental questions of federalism--relative power among the federal, regional, and provincial governments. The CRC proposed several amendments to better define and clarify the relative powers but has not achieved compromise among major political factions. The Kurdish bloc rejected the proposed changes, stating it would decrease regional power while concentrating power in the federal government. Spending Capital Budgets: This section discusses Iraq's progress toward spending its capital budget and U.S. efforts to improve Iraqi budget execution. Iraq Has Made Little Progress Spending Capital Investment Budgets: The New Way Forward emphasized the need to build capacity in Iraq's ministries and help the government execute its capital investment budgets. This U.S. goal is particularly important as current U.S. expenditures on Iraq reconstruction projects are nearing completion. However, Iraq continues to spend small percentages of its capital investment budgets[Footnote 36] needed to improve economic growth. Iraq's inability to spend its considerable resources limits the government's efforts to further economic development, advance reconstruction projects, and, at the most basic level, deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. In recognition of this critical need, U.S. capacity development efforts have shifted from long-term institution-building projects to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital investment budgets. As U.S. funding for Iraq reconstruction totaling $45 billion is almost 90 percent obligated ($40 billion) and about 70 percent disbursed ($31 billion) as of April 2008, the need for Iraq to spend its own resources becomes increasingly critical to economic development. Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq budgeted about $27 billion in capital investments for its own reconstruction effort, as shown in table 3. However, the government spent about 24 percent of the amount budgeted. According to Ministry of Finance total expenditure reports displayed in figure 11, Iraq has spent low percentages of capital investment budgets between 2005 and 2007 in several key categories. Total government spending for capital investments increased slightly from 23 percent in 2005 to 28 percent in 2007. However, Iraq's central ministries spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007--a decline from similarly low spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Last, spending rates for ministries critical to the delivery of essential services varied from the 41 percent spent by the Water Resources Ministry in 2007 to the less than 1 percent spent by the Ministries of Oil and Electricity. Table 3: Iraq Investment Budget and Expenditures, 2005-2007 (Dollars in millions): Total Government[A]: 2005: Budget: $6,316; 2005: Expenditures: $1,432; 2006: Budget: $8,312; 2006: Expenditures: $1,615; 2007: Budget: $12,168; 2007: Expenditures: $3,435; Total 2005-2007: Budget: $26,796; Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $6,482. Central Government Ministries[B]: 2005: Budget: $5,720; 2005: Expenditures: $825; 2006: Budget: $7,688; 2006: Expenditures: $1,003; 2007: Budget: $8,086; 2007: Expenditures: $896; Total 2005-2007: Budget: $21,494; Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $2,724. Selected Ministries: Water Resources; 2005: Budget: $184; 2005: Expenditures: $120; 2006: Budget: $200; 2006: Expenditures: $91; 2007: Budget: $262; 2007: Expenditures: $109; Total 2005-2007: Budget: $646; Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $320. Selected Ministries: Oil; 2005: Budget: $3,001; 2005: Expenditures: $111; 2006: Budget: $3,106; 2006: Expenditures: $143; 2007: Budget: $2,383; 2007: Expenditures: $0.8; Total 2005-2007: Budget: $8,491; Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $254. Selected Ministries: Electricity; 2005: Budget: $297; 2005: Expenditures: $142; 2006: Budget: $1,167; 2006: Expenditures: $268; 2007: Budget: $1,389; 2007: Expenditures: $0.8; Total 2005-2007: Budget: $2,853; Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $411. Source: GAO analysis of Ministry of Finance data. Note: The 2005-2007 time frame represents fiscal year spending for January through December. [A] The total government budget includes the central government ministries, provinces and Kurdistan region. [B] The central government ministries include the ministries of oil, water, oil, electricity, public works, health, housing and construction, and other spending units. [End of table] Figure 11: Iraqi Budget Execution Ratios for Total Government and Selected Ministries, 2005 to 2007: [See PDF for image] This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: Total government: 2005: 23%; 2006: 19%; 2007: 28%. Central ministries: 2005: 14%; 2006: 13%; 2007: 11%. Water resources: 2005: 65%; 2006: 46%; 2007: 41%. Oil: 2005: 4%; 2006: 5%; 2007: 0.03%. Electricity: 2005: 48%; 2006: 23%; 2007: 0.06%. Source: GAO analysis of official Ministry of Finance budget and expenditure data. [End of figure] As discussed in the next section, low spending rates for the oil, electricity, and water sectors are problematic since U.S. investments in these sectors have ended and increased production goals for these sectors have consistently not been met. Iraq will have additional resources for capital investments in 2008. Iraq's 2008 budget was developed with the assumption that Iraq would receive $57 per barrel for oil exports. As of May 2008, Iraqi crude oil was selling at about $104 per barrel. Oil exports generate about 90 percent of total government revenues each year. GAO will issue a separate report on Iraq's estimated unspent and projected oil revenues for 2003 through 2008. Iraqi Special Reports Show High Budget Execution Rates: In March 2008,[Footnote 37] DOD reported that preliminary Iraqi budget execution data for the period January to October 2007 show that the government spent 45 percent of its capital budget, and central ministries executed 47 percent of their capital budgets. Further, in commenting on a draft of this report, the Treasury Department stated that the Iraqi government spent and committed about 63 percent of its investment budget in 2007, as documented in special reports developed by the Ministry of Finance. The special reports include Iraqi commitments to spend as well as actual expenditures. "Commitments" is defined under Iraq's Financial Management Law, as "an undertaking to make an expenditure following the conclusion of a binding agreement that will result in payment." We did not use the special reports for our analyses for two reasons: (1) Treasury Department officials stated in our meetings with them that the special reports contain unreliable data, and (2) the special reports do not define commitments, measure them, or describe how or when these commitments would result in actual expenditures. In addition, our reviews of these special reports show inconsistent use of poorly defined budget terms, as well as columns and rows that do not add up. In addition, we note that the Iraqi government operates on a cash basis in which expenditures are reported when paid. Commitments, such as signed contracts, would normally not be included in expenditures until paid. Given the security and capacity challenges currently facing Iraq, many committed contracts may not be executed and would not result in actual expenditures, according to U.S. agency officials. Iraq Faces Many Challenges in Attempting to Spend Its Capital Investment Budgets: U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified a number of factors that challenge the Iraqi government's efforts to fully spend its budget for capital projects. These challenges include violence and sectarian strife, a shortage of trained staff, and weak procurement and budgeting systems. First, U.S., coalition, and international officials have noted that violence and sectarian strife remain major obstacles to developing Iraqi government capacity, including its ability to execute budgets for capital projects. The high level of violence has contributed to a decrease in the number of workers available and can increase the amount of time needed to plan and complete capital projects. The security situation also hinders U.S. advisors' ability to provide the ministries with assistance and monitor capital project performance. Second, U.S., coalition, and international agency officials have observed the relative shortage of trained budgetary, procurement, and other staff with technical skills as a factor limiting the Iraqi government's ability to plan and execute its capital spending. The security situation and the de-Ba'athification process have adversely affected available government and contractor staffing. Officials report a shortage of trained staff with budgetary experience to prepare and execute budgets and a shortage of staff with procurement expertise to solicit, award, and oversee capital projects. According to State and other U.S. government reports and officials, there has been decay for years in core functions of Iraqi's government capacity, including both financial and human resource management. Finally, weak procurement, budgetary, and accounting systems are of particular concern in Iraq because these systems must balance efficient execution of capital projects while protecting against reported widespread corruption. A World Bank report notes that corruption undermines the Iraqi government's ability to make effective use of current reconstruction assistance.[Footnote 38] According to a State Department document, widespread corruption undermines efforts to develop the government's capacity by robbing it of needed resources; by eroding popular faith in democratic institutions, perceived as run by corrupt political elites; and by spurring capital flight and reducing economic growth. Efforts Are Under Way to Improve Iraqi Budget Execution: In early 2007, U.S. agencies increased the focus of their assistance efforts on improving the Iraqi government's ability to effectively execute its budget for capital projects, although it is not clear what impact this increased focus has had, given the relatively low rates of spending. The new U.S. initiatives included greater coordination between the U.S. embassy and an Iraqi task force on budget execution, and the provision of subject matter experts to help the government track expenditures and provide technical assistance with procurement. According to U.S. officials, these targeted efforts also reflect an increased interest of senior Iraqi officials in improving capital budget spending. In addition, improving Iraqi government budget execution is part of a broader U.S. assistance effort to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government through automation of the financial management system, training, and advisors embedded with ministries. As we reported in October 2007, the development of competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. [Footnote 39] In 2005 and 2006, the United States provided funding of about $169 million for programs to help build the capacity of key civilian ministries and the Ministries of Defense and Interior. As part of The New Way Forward, the Administration sought an additional $395 million for these efforts in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Ministry capacity development refers to efforts and programs to advise and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to plan programs, execute their budgets, and effectively deliver government services such as electricity, water, and security. We found multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts and recommended that Congress consider conditioning future appropriations on the completion of an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts. In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department reiterated prior comments that it already had an integrated plan for building capacity in Iraq's ministries. In addition, State and Treasury cited a new Public Financial Management Action Group they were forming to help integrate and coordinate U.S. government assistance on improving budget execution. Adding a new program to the uncoordinated and multiple U.S. capacity development programs we found does little to address GAO's recommendation for an integrated strategy. The government of Iraq also has made recent efforts to address impediments to budget execution. For example, State reported in May 2008 that the Council of Ministers recently approved new regulations to lift the ceiling on the amounts ministerial contracting committees can approve. Committees in the ministries of Defense, Interior, Oil, Trade, Health, Electricity, Industry and Minerals, Water Resources, and Municipalities can now approve contracts up to $50 million. This represents a $30 million increase for Defense, Oil, Electricity and Trade and a $10 million increase for the other ministries. A newly formed Central Contracts Committee will approve contracts exceeding the $50 million limit. Delivering Essential Services: This section discusses the extent to which key U.S. goals for oil, electricity, and water production have been met. Crude Oil Output Has Consistently Fallen below U.S. Goals: Providing essential services to all Iraqi areas and communities and helping Iraq maintain and expand its oil export are key goals of The New Way Forward. The oil sector is critical to Iraq's economy, accounting for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and about 90 percent of its revenues. Iraq's crude oil reserves, estimated at a total of 115 billion barrels, are the third largest in the world. After 5 years of effort and $2.7 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, Iraqi crude oil output has improved for short periods but has consistently fallen below the U.S. goals of reaching an average crude oil production capacity of 3 million barrels per day and export levels of 2.2 mbpd [Footnote 40] (see figure 12). Figure 12: Iraq's Reported Crude Oil Production, Exports, and U.S. Goals, June 2003 through May 2008: [See PDF for image] This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data, im millions of barrels per day: Date: June 2003; Production exported: 0.2 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.396 mbpd; Total production: 0.596 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: July 2003; Production exported: 0.322 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.605 mbpd; Total production: 0.927 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: August 2003; Production exported: 0.646 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.762 mbpd; Total production: 1.408 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: September 2003; Production exported: 0.983 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.722 mbpd; Total production: 1.705 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: October 2003; Production exported: 1.149 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.897 mbpd; Total production: 2.046 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: November 2003; Production exported: 1.524 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.6 mbpd; Total production: 2.124 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: December 2003; Production exported: 1.541 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.737 mbpd; Total production: 2.278 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: January 2004; Production exported: 1.537 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.869 mbpd; Total production: 2.406 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: February 2004; Production exported: 1.382 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.907 mbpd; Total production: 2.289 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: March 2004; Production exported: 1.825 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.596 mbpd; Total production: 2.421 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: April 2004; Production exported: 1.804 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.641 mbpd; Total production: 2.445 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: May 2004; Production exported: 1.38 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.769 mbpd; Total production: 2.149 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: June 2004; Production exported: 1.148 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.751 mbpd; Total production: 1.899 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: July 2004; Production exported: 1.406 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.804 mbpd; Total production: 2.210 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: August 2004; Production exported: 1.114 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 1.034 mbpd; Total production: 2.148 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: September 2004; Production exported: 1.679 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.86 mbpd; Total production: 2.539 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: October 2004; Production exported: 1.607 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.828 mbpd; Total production: 2.435 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: November 2004; Production exported: 1.351 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.565 mbpd; Total production: 1.916 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: December 2004; Production exported: 1.607 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.549 mbpd; Total production: 2.156 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: January 2005; Production exported: 1.467 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.709 mbpd; Total production: 2.176 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: February 2005; Production exported: 1.431 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.672 mbpd; Total production: 2.103 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: March 2005; Production exported: 1.394 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.697 mbpd; Total production: 2.091 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: April 2005; Production exported: 1.398 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.723 mbpd; Total production: 2.121 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: May 2005; Production exported: 1.308 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.819 mbpd; Total production: 2.127 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: June 2005; Production exported: 1.44 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.7 mbpd; Total production: 2.14 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: July 2005; Production exported: 1.55 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.622 mbpd; Total production: 2.172 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: August 2005; Production exported: 1.504 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.649 mbpd; Total production: 2.153 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: September 2005; Production exported: 1.609 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.48 mbpd; Total production: 2.089 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: October 2005; Production exported: 1.239 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.705 mbpd; Total production: 1.944 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: November 2005; Production exported: 1.168 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.813 mbpd; Total production: 1.981 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: December 2005; Production exported: 1.071 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.907 mbpd; Total production: 1.978 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: January 2006; Production exported: 1.094 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.619 mbpd; Total production: 1.713 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: February 2006; Production exported: 1.473 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.356 mbpd; Total production: 1.829 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: March 2006; Production exported: 1.325 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.747 mbpd; Total production: 2.072 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: April 2006; Production exported: 1.596 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.587 mbpd; Total production: 2.183 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: May 2006; Production exported: 1.507 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.624 mbpd; Total production: 2.131 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: June 2006; Production exported: 1.702 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.519 mbpd; Total production: 2.221 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: July 2006; Production exported: 1.685 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.54 mbpd; Total production: 2.189 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: August 2006; Production exported: 1.582 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.656 mbpd; Total production: 2.238 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: September 2006; Production exported: 1.74 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.608 mbpd; Total production: 2.312 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: October 2006; Production exported: 1.511 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.737 mbpd; Total production: 2.239 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: November 2006; Production exported: 1.436 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.66 mbpd; Total production: 2.096 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: December 2006; Production exported: 1.45 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.706 mbpd; Total production: 2.156 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: January 2007; Production exported: 1.29 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.305 mbpd; Total production: 1.595 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: February 2007; Production exported: 1.49 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.59 mbpd; Total production: 2.018 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: March 2007; Production exported: 1.57 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.502 mbpd; Total production: 2.072 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: April 2007; Production exported: 1.49 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.65 mbpd; Total production: 2.14 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: May 2007; Production exported: 1.63 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.393 mbpd; Total production: 2.023 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: June 2007; Production exported: 1.47 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.19 mbpd; Total production: 1.66 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: July 2007; Production exported: 1.72 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.19 mbpd; Total production: 1.91 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: August 2007; Production exported: 1.69 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.25 mbpd; Total production: 1.94 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: September 2007; Production exported: 1.9 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.43 mbpd; Total production: 2.33 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: October 2007; Production exported: 1.91 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.44 mbpd; Total production: 2.35 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: November 2007; Production exported: 1.88 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.52 mbpd; Total production: 2.4 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: December 2007; Production exported: 1.928 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.51 mbpd; Total production: 2.438 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: January 2008; Production exported: 1.93 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.3 mbpd; Total production: 2.23 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: February 2008; Production exported: 1.93 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.54 mbpd; Total production: 2.47 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: March 2008; Production exported: 1.93 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.45 mbpd; Total production: 2.38 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: April 2008; Production exported: 1.88 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.52 mbpd; Total production: 2.4 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Date: May 2008; Production exported: 1.96 mbpd; Production for domestic use: 0.54 mbpd; Total production: 2.5 mbpd; Export goal: 2.2 mbpd; Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd. Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Oil data collected by State Department. [End of figure] In May 2008, crude oil production was 2.5 million barrels per day and exports were 1.96 million barrels per day, according to the State Department. Poor security, corruption and smuggling continue to impede the reconstruction of Iraq's oil sector. For example, according to State Department officials