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entitled 'Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address 
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy 
Commodity Tankers' which was released on January 10, 2008.

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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:

December 2007:

Maritime Security:

Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and 
Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers:

GAO-08-141:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-08-141, a report to Congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study:

U. S. energy needs rest heavily on ship-based imports. Tankers bring 55 
percent of the nation’s crude oil supply, as well as liquefied gases 
and refined products like jet fuel. This supply chain is potentially 
vulnerable in many places here and abroad, as borne out by several 
successful overseas attacks on ships and facilities. GAO’s review 
addressed (1) the types of threats to tankers and the potential 
consequences of a successful attack, (2) measures taken to protect 
tankers and challenges federal agencies face in making these actions 
effective, and (3) plans in place for responding to a successful attack 
and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding. GAO’s review 
spanned several foreign and domestic ports, and multiple steps to 
analyze data and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders. 

What GAO Found:

The supply chain faces three main types of threats—suicide attacks such 
as explosive-laden boats, “standoff” attacks with weapons launched from 
a distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as 
liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely 
scenario, explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also 
have environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply 
chain could have a severe economic impact.

Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers 
and facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite 
international agreements calling for certain protective steps, 
substantial disparities exist in implementation. The United States 
faces limitations in helping to increase compliance, as well as 
limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable transport routes. 
Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for 
maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self 
imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied 
natural gas. Some units’ workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied 
natural gas facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not 
developed plans for shifting resources among units. 

Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but 
stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First, 
plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally 
separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans 
simultaneously to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports 
generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as 
prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The 
President’s maritime security strategy calls for such plans. Third, 
some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry 
out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been 
directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more 
comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about 
the need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a 
lack of performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in 
response. 

Figure: Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen: 

[See PDF for image] 

This is a photograph of the tanker Limburg after terrorist attack near 
Yemen. 

Source: AFP. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that cognizant agencies (1) plan for meeting a growing 
security workload for protecting liquefied natural gas shipments, (2) 
help ensure that ports plan for dealing with economic consequences of 
an attack, (3) integrate terrorism and spill response plans at the 
national and (4) local level, and (5) work to develop performance 
measures for emergency response. The agencies generally agreed with our 
recommendations, but the Department of Homeland Security took the 
final recommendation under advisement. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-141]. For more information, contact 
Stephen Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov or Mark 
Gaffigan at 202-512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Energy Commodity Shipments Face Varied Threats, and a Successful Attack 
Could Have Substantial Consequences:

Although Stakeholders Are Taking Protective Measures, Implementation 
Challenges Pose Difficulty Both Abroad and at Home:

Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face 
Several Challenges in Integrating Them:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments:

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Selected Energy Commodities Transported by Tanker into 
United States:

Appendix III: Recent High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers 
and Energy Infrastructure:

Appendix IV: Assessing and Managing Risks Using a Risk Management 
Approach:

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

Appendix VI: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: Selected International Stakeholders with Maritime Security 
Activities:

Table 2: Selected Domestic Stakeholders with Maritime Security 
Activities:

Table 3: Federal and Port-level Plans and Agreements Governing Response 
to Spills on Water and Terrorist Attacks:

Table 4: High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers and Energy 
Infrastructure by Target and Attack Method since 2002:

Figures:

Figure 1: Oil Tanker at Al-Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal, Persian Gulf:

Figure 2: Tanker with Insert of Double Hull:

Figure 3: Top Exporters of Petroleum to the United States in 2005 
(Millions of barrels per day):

Figure 4: Top Exporters of Natural Gas to United States in 2005 
(Millions of cubic feet per day):

Figure 5: Regional Significance of Petroleum Commodities:

Figure 6: Oil Flows and Strategic Shipping Chokepoints:

Figure 7: Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen:

Figure 8: Tanker Approaching an Iraqi Oil Loading Terminal as U.S. 
Warship Patrols Nearby:

Figure 9: U.S. Warship Engaging Suspected Pirate Vessel near Somalia:

Figure 10: Safety and Security Escort for LNG Tanker:

Figure 11: Coast Guard Enforcing Security Zone around Moored LNG Tanker:

Figure 12: Location of Operating, Planned, and Proposed LNG Marine 
Terminals by U.S. Coast Guard District:

Figure 13: Relationship of Spill and Terrorism Response Plans and 
Agreements:

Figure 14: Incident Response Sequence When an Attack Occurs Resulting 
in a Spill:

Figure 15: Potential Actions Taken to Respond to an Attack on an Energy 
Commodity Tanker:

Figure 16: Firefighters Preparing for a Maritime Terrorism Training 
Exercise:

Figure 17: Examples of Marine Firefighting Response:

Figure 18: Firefighters Training to Combat an Aviation Fuel Fire:

Figure 19: Risk Management Framework:

Abbreviations:

ACP: Area Contingency Plan:

AMSC: Area Maritime Security Committee:

AMSP: Area Maritime Security Plan:

BLEVE: boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion:

CBP: Customs and Border Protection:

CDC: certain dangerous cargo:

COTP: Captain of the Port:

CSF: Critical Skill Factor:

DHS: Department of Homeland Security:

DOD: Department of Defense:

DOJ: Department of Justice:

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:

ICS: incident command system:

IMO: International Maritime Organization:

ISPS: International Ship and Port Facility Code:

LNG: liquefied natural gas:

LOOP: Louisiana Offshore Oil Port:

LPG: liquefied petroleum gas:

MARSEC: Maritime Security Condition System:

MIRP: Maritime Incident Recovery Plan:

MLA: Maritime Liaison Agent:

MOTR: Marine Operational Threat Response Plan:

MTR: Maritime Transportation Response:

MTSA: Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002:

NCP: National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan:

NIMS: National Incident Management System:

NRP: National Response Plan:

NSFCC: National Strike Force Coordination Center:

ONS: Operation Neptune Shield:

OPA 90: Oil Pollution Act of 1990:

SAFE Port Act: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006:

SONS: Spill of National Significance:

USCG: United States Coast Guard:

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:

December 10, 2007:

The Honorable John D. Dingell: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joe Barton: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter King: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edward J. Markey: 
House of Representatives:

This is a public version of a report we issued in March 2007 that 
contained Sensitive Security Information related to the transportation 
of energy commodities by tanker. Specific details regarding the nature 
of security conditions and operations at specific ports, and specific 
findings related to response plans and results of exercises that are 
sensitive were removed. We worked with the cognizant agencies to ensure 
that this version would not contain Sensitive Security Information. No 
additional audit work was performed for the completion of this version. 
The conclusions and recommendations of our March 2007 report remain 
generally unchanged.

The United States economy is dependent on oil, gas, and other energy 
commodities that are transported from overseas by ship.[Footnote 1] For 
example, in 2005, approximately 55 percent of the nation's crude oil 
supply--one of the main sources of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, 
heating oil, and many other petroleum products--and approximately 3 
percent of the natural gas supply, was imported by tanker. Daily ship- 
based imports of crude oil averaged about 8.5 million barrels, or the 
equivalent of about four supertankers arriving at U.S. terminals each 
day.[Footnote 2] In addition to crude oil, the United States also 
imports highly combustible liquid energy products, such as gasoline, 
jet fuel, and liquefied gases, such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
and liquefied natural gas (LNG).[Footnote 3] Natural gas is converted 
to LNG by cooling it to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point it 
becomes a liquid. In its liquid form, natural gas reduces to more than 
1/600th of its volume as a gas, making it feasible to transport over 
long distances. Daily ship-based imports of LNG now average about 1.7 
billion cubic feet, or the equivalent of two LNG tankers arriving at a 
U.S. port every 3 days. This already extensive reliance on imported 
energy commodities is expected to increase--and for LNG, to grow 
substantially. The Energy Information Administration forecasts that by 
2015, the amount of crude oil imported into the United States will 
increase by nearly 4 percent, while the amount of imported LNG will 
grow more than 400 percent.

Transporting these often hazardous commodities by sea involves a global 
supply chain with many players. For energy commodities imported by the 
United States, this supply chain has three main activities: loading it 
aboard a ship at a foreign facility, shipping it across oceans and 
waterways, and unloading it at a facility in this country. Waterborne 
shipments originate at facilities in a variety of countries--for crude 
oil, primarily in Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria, and for 
LNG, primarily in Algeria and Trinidad and Tobago.[Footnote 4] Overseas 
facilities where tankers are loaded are owned by the private sector, 
governments, or combinations of the two. Foreign governments play a 
substantial role in overseeing the security of energy export 
operations. Shipment of these commodities likewise involves vessels 
owned by many different companies, as well as transportation routes 
across international waters that no government controls. In 2006, there 
were approximately 3,550 registered crude oil tankers of 300 gross tons 
or more, along with 200 registered LNG tankers. Most of these vessels 
are registered in countries other than the United States, which means 
the United States has limited oversight authority over these vessels' 
crews or condition until they enter U.S. waters. Once the crude oil or 
LNG tanker arrives in the United States, it is unloaded at terminals 
that may be on the Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific coasts. LNG is currently 
unloaded at one of five locations.[Footnote 5] As demand for natural 
gas grows, the number of domestic LNG unloading locations is expected 
to increase. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which must 
approve each onshore LNG terminal siting and construction application, 
has already approved 11 additional terminals, and dozens more have been 
proposed.[Footnote 6]

This supply chain, while critical, is also vulnerable to disruption by 
terrorists. Port facilities are inherently vulnerable, because they 
must provide access by land and sea and because they are sprawling 
installations, often close to population centers. Likewise, the ships 
that transport these products are vulnerable because they travel on 
direct routes that are known in advance and, for part of their journey, 
they may have to travel through waters that do not allow them to 
maneuver away from possible attacks. Since so many different players 
are involved, terrorists have room to probe the supply chain for the 
weakest link. Despite an often heavy security presence, terrorists have 
attempted--and in some cases carried out--several attacks on this 
supply chain since September 11, 2001. To date, these attacks have 
included attempts to damage tankers or disrupt loading operations in or 
near overseas ports. For example, in 2004 terrorists coordinated an 
attack against two offshore oil terminals in Iraq where tankers were 
loading, and in 2002 terrorists conducted a suicide boat attack against 
the French supertanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen.

Much of the international framework for protecting this supply chain 
and preventing pollution from vessels is laid out in international 
conventions. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code was adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 
[Footnote 7] In accordance with the SOLAS Convention as amended in 
2002, the code establishes requirements for contracting governments of 
countries where ports are located, contracting governments of countries 
where ships are registered, operators of port facilities, and operators 
of vessels traveling on the high seas.[Footnote 8] Individual nations 
can set higher standards for facilities on their soil and for vessels 
registered in that country. The United States has chosen to set higher 
standards, largely through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 (MTSA).[Footnote 9] Enacted after the September 11, 2001, attacks, 
MTSA places much of the responsibility for coordinating and overseeing 
security efforts with the federal government--and more specifically 
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its agencies, such 
as the U.S. Coast Guard. Another international agreement developed 
under IMO auspices is the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, which entered into force in 1983 and was 
intended to prevent pollution of the marine environment by ships from 
operational or accidental causes. Included in its provisions was 
pollution by oil, chemicals, and harmful substances. In the United 
States, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) 
following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.[Footnote 10] OPA 90 
addressed prevention, response, and compensation for oil pollution from 
vessels and facilities in U.S. waters and the shoreline. OPA 90 greatly 
increased federal oversight of maritime oil transportation by setting 
new requirements for vessel construction and crew licensing and 
manning, mandating contingency planning, enhancing federal response 
capability, broadening enforcement authority, and increasing 
penalties.[Footnote 11]

In setting U.S. policy with regard to homeland security, both Congress 
and the Administration have endorsed making decisions on the basis of 
risk--that is, on identifying critical infrastructure, determining what 
is most at risk, and applying sound measures designed to make cost-
effective use of resources and funding. As groups such as the 9/11 
Commission have pointed out, no amount of money can totally insulate 
seaports from attack by a well-funded and determined enemy. Managing on 
the basis of risk acknowledges the trade-offs inherent in deciding how 
finite resources should be spent.

Federal actions to prevent attacks against the energy supply chain 
involve coordination with the many players involved, including foreign 
governments; foreign and domestic corporations that own and operate the 
ships that carry energy commodities; companies that import, refine, and 
market petroleum and liquefied gases; and a host of state and local 
governmental agencies. At the state and local levels, fire and police 
departments would be the first responders, with support from emergency 
management, environmental, and transportation departments. Private 
sector agencies, such as oil or gas facility terminal operators, vessel 
management companies, and oil spill response organizations, would also 
be involved. Finally, multiple federal agencies would also respond. In 
particular, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) would have primary responsibility for leading the 
response effort.

To help evaluate how secure the maritime energy supply chain is and how 
the United States would respond in the event of a terrorist attack, you 
asked us to review security and safety efforts taken to date.[Footnote 
12] This report addresses three questions:

* What are the types of terrorist threats to tankers carrying energy 
commodities and the potential consequences of a successful attack?

* What measures are being taken to protect these tankers, and what 
challenges do federal agencies face in making these actions effective?

* If a terrorist attack succeeds despite these protective measures, 
what plans are in place to respond and what are the potential 
challenges in responding to an attack?

To address these objectives, we conducted a wide range of activities 
overseas and in the United States. Overseas, we met with officials from 
the IMO, foreign government security agencies, vessel and facility 
operators, international industry associations, vessel and cargo 
insurers, and risk management companies. We conducted our overseas work 
primarily in five countries, which we selected for specific reasons 
related to their role in the supply chain, the sophistication of their 
security procedures, or the presence of key stakeholders. In the United 
States, we met with officials in many federal departments and agencies, 
including the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, State, Energy, 
Transportation, and Justice; the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; 
and the Environmental Protection Agency. We met with a variety of state 
and local government officials dealing with homeland security, 
emergency response, and law enforcement, as well as with operators of 
oil cleanup organizations, petroleum tankers, liquefied gas carriers, 
and their attendant unloading facilities. We also visited field units 
of the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the FBI, and a 
nonprobability sample of petroleum and liquefied gas import and export 
facilities.[Footnote 13] In these visits we observed security practices 
firsthand, and conducted interviews with officials. We obtained and 
reviewed studies on the consequences of an attack, obtained additional 
views from experts, and specifically convened a panel of academic and 
industry experts to determine the potential consequences of an incident 
involving LNG.[Footnote 14] We analyzed databases, progress reports, 
regulations, and guidance documents we obtained from the Coast Guard 
and Federal Energy Regulatory Administration. We obtained necessary 
information from the Coast Guard to review the reliability of the 
information contained in the databases used in this report. Appendix I 
contains a more detailed discussion of our methodology. We conducted 
our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards from April 2005 through February 2007.

Results in Brief:

Attacks overseas show that tankers face several major types of threats 
that, if carried out domestically, could have serious consequences. 
Overseas, terrorists have demonstrated the ability to carry out at 
least three main types of threats. First--and overall of greatest 
concern to officials we spoke with--is a suicide attack, such as the 
2002 suicide boat attack on the tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen. 
This attack killed 1 person, injured 17, and spilled 90,000 barrels of 
oil. A second major type of threat, known as a "standoff attack," uses 
a rocket or other weapon launched at a sufficient distance to allow the 
attackers to evade defensive fire. A third type of threat is an armed 
assault. For example, well-armed bands have used small boats to attack 
tankers, loading facilities, and oil workers. Many other types of 
potential attacks exist, such as internal crew conspiracies and 
collisions with other vessels piloted by terrorists. To date, no such 
attacks have occurred on tankers in U.S. waters or on loading 
facilities in U.S. ports, and intelligence officials report there is 
currently no specific credible threat to tankers or terminals on the 
domestic front. Nonetheless, these successful attacks abroad, the 
expressed desire by terrorists to target U.S. economic interests, and 
the potential outcome of a terrorist attack on a tanker have led 
Congress and the Administration to conclude that protective efforts are 
warranted. A successful attack on an energy commodity tanker could have 
substantial public safety, environmental, and economic consequences. 
Public safety and environmental consequences of an attack vary by 
commodity. For instance, highly combustible commodities like LNG and 
LPG have the potential to catch fire, or in a more unlikely scenario-- 
if they are trapped in a confined space such as under a dock--explode, 
posing a threat to public safety. Crude oil and heavy petroleum 
products remain in the environment after they are spilled and must be 
removed, potentially causing significant environmental damage. Finally, 
the economic consequences of a major attack could include a temporary 
price spike reflecting fears of further attacks, and supply disruptions 
associated with delays of shipments if major transit routes, key 
facilities, or key ports are closed. The loss of one cargo of an energy 
commodity might not have a significant, sustained price impact. 
However, if an attack results in port closures for multiple days or 
weeks, price responses and higher costs could mean losses in economic 
welfare to consumers, businesses, and government amounting to billions 
of dollars.

Much is being done, both internationally and domestically, to protect 
energy commodity tankers and their attendant facilities from attack, 
but notwithstanding these actions, significant challenges may still 
leave tankers and facilities at risk. Internationally, many foreign 
governments and facility operators are taking such actions as improving 
physical security at facilities and conducting offshore patrols. For 
example, port facilities report compliance with ISPS Code requirements, 
tanker operators report strengthening their security posture while 
loading and at sea, and the Coast Guard visits foreign exporting ports 
to assess the effectiveness of the anti-terrorism measures in place. 
Navies of various countries, including the United States, are also 
patrolling threatened waters, such as the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Aden, due to attacks on ships, including tankers, and port facilities. 
International stakeholders face challenges, however, in implementing 
this security framework. Our visits to overseas facilities showed that 
some port facilities had put extensive security measures in place, 
while at other facilities, we found such problems as unattended gates 
and downed fences. Although facilities may report they are complying 
with the ISPS Code, there is no mechanism currently in place to verify 
compliance, and Coast Guard activities abroad are limited by and 
dependent on conditions set by host nations, including the locations 
the Coast Guard can visit. For tankers in transit in international 
waters, the primary challenge involves patrolling the lengthy travel 
routes and frequent danger spots with a limited number of naval 
vessels. Because of the challenges and limitations faced 
internationally, security efforts taken domestically carry increased 
importance. Here, federal agencies such as the Coast Guard and Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) have taken a variety of steps to protect 
the energy supply chain. Both agencies monitor arriving ships and 
crews, and the Coast Guard also conducts security activities, such as 
pre-entry security boardings, escorts, and patrols. The prioritization 
of the Coast Guard's security activities is based upon its established 
risk-based decision-making processes. These activities are often 
reinforced by local law enforcement units that, in some cases, receive 
financial support from facility operators. Despite these domestic 
efforts, challenges persist. Coast Guard records document that at some 
ports, a lack of resources has hindered some Coast Guard units from 
meeting their self-imposed requirements for security activities, such 
as escorts and boardings. To better align security requirements with 
its resources, the Coast Guard recently revised some of its security 
standards, such as those for protecting vessels carrying a number of 
hazardous liquids and liquefied gases. Although the Coast Guard 
reported that it based this action on the consequences of an attack, it 
could not provide us any analyses that covered all commodities 
involved. As a result, it is unclear if security requirements were 
reduced for the commodities with the lowest associated risk. The Coast 
Guard is currently performing such an analysis. In the future, the 
Coast Guard faces additional challenges at some domestic ports, where 
workload demands are likely to rise substantially as new LNG facilities 
come on line and LNG shipments increase. These increased demands could 
cause the Coast Guard to continue to be unable to meet the standards it 
has set for keeping U.S. ports secure.

Should a terrorist attack succeed despite the protective measures in 
place, the United States and designated ports have developed plans for 
responding but could face several challenges in implementing these 
plans effectively. Specifically, ports face challenges in integrating 
both national-and port-level spill and terrorism response plans, 
mitigating economic consequences, and obtaining necessary resources to 
respond. Regarding the plans, at the national level, the National 
Response Plan lays out the broad parameters of the federal role, both 
in spill response (that is, taking steps to contain a spill and 
mitigate its environmental damage, regardless of how it occurred) and 
in terrorism response (that is, for the attack, taking security-related 
actions and conducting an investigation). The plan designates the Coast 
Guard as the primary agency for spill response on water and the FBI as 
the primary agency for terrorism response, and it calls on the two 
agencies to coordinate their responses if the incident involves an 
attack on energy commodity tankers. Other federal plans and agreements 
also come into play, each with information about coordinating responses 
among the various agencies involved or taking specific action. At the 
port level, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002, Coast Guard's Captain of the Port 
is to establish separate plans for spill and terrorism responses, 
working with local agencies, which are subsequently approved by Coast 
Guard districts. For both types of response plans, the agencies may 
include port authorities, fire departments, and facilities in the port. 
Some stakeholders, such as private oil spill response organizations, 
participate only in spill response planning, while other stakeholders, 
such as police departments, participate mainly in terrorism response 
planning. While national-and port-level plans exist, federal agencies 
and ports could face challenges in using them effectively.[Footnote 15] 
First, the separate spill and terrorism response plans should be 
integrated for responding to an attack on an energy commodities tanker. 
At the federal level, the Coast Guard and the FBI should ensure that 
they have a detailed operational plan to integrate the spill and 
terrorism response sections of the National Response Plan. Port 
stakeholders should integrate spill and terrorism response plans to 
address response coordination. The Coast Guard has recommended joint 
exercises when feasible to test stakeholders' spill and terrorism 
response plans. Second, the President's strategy for maritime security 
recommends that ports develop plans to mitigate the economic 
consequences of an attack, such as determining priorities for allowing 
vessels to enter or leave the port after it reopens. While such plans 
could be developed under the leadership of the Coast Guard's Captain of 
the Port at the port level, there was no national-level guidance about 
what economic mitigation plans should contain at the time of our 
review. Finally, some ports we visited may not have the resources 
needed to promptly respond to an attack. For instance, some local 
firefighters said that they may not be able to effectively respond to 
marine fires because they do not have enough fire boats or are not 
sufficiently trained for shipboard firefighting. Port officials also 
said they lacked resources for improving emergency response 
capabilities. According to DHS officials, federal grant funding for 
response activities may become more available as DHS moves toward a 
more comprehensive risk-based process for allocating grant funds. 
However, DHS may not be able to effectively allocate grants on the 
basis of reducing risk because it does not have performance measures 
showing how much of a given resource is needed to conduct a response. 
Without such performance measures, the federal government cannot 
effectively set priorities for acquiring needed response resources.

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Attorney General designed to build on efforts already under way and 
make these efforts more effective. For protecting against threats, we 
recommend developing a national resource allocation plan for meeting 
security requirements posed by proposed expansion in the number of LNG 
facilities and shipments. For responding to actual attacks, these 
recommendations include ensuring that a detailed operational plan has 
been developed that integrates the different spill and terrorism 
response sections of the National Response Plan, as well as ensuring 
the integration of local spill and terrorism planning and exercises at 
ports that receive energy commodities; developing national-level 
guidance that ports can use for mitigating economic consequences, 
particularly in the case of port closures; and developing specific 
performance measures for determining the resources needed to 
effectively respond to attacks on tankers carrying energy commodities. 
The responsible agencies generally agreed with our recommendations. 
DHS, however, stated it was taking the final recommendation (on 
performance measures) under advisement.

Background:

Many Stakeholders Are Involved in Securing the Maritime Energy Supply 
Chain:

Numerous international and domestic organizations play a role in the 
security of maritime energy commodities. The list of stakeholders 
outside the United States is quite diverse. They include international 
organizations, governments of nations where tankers load or where 
tankers are registered, and owners and operators of tankers or 
facilities (see table 1).

Table 1: Selected International Stakeholders with Maritime Security 
Activities:

Agency, International organizations: International Maritime 
Organization (IMO); IMO is an organization responsible for regulating 
international shipping with 167 governments as members; 
Selected mission-related activities: Develops and maintains a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping; Develops international 
standards for port and vessel security. 

Agency, International organizations: International Maritime Bureau; The 
International Maritime Bureau is a division of the International 
Chamber of Commerce that works to suppress piracy around the world; 
Selected mission-related activities: The International Maritime 
Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center broadcasts a daily bulletin of piracy 
attacks directly to ships at sea; Provides piracy updates and 
comprehensive reports on a regular basis; Reports piracy incidents to 
law enforcement authorities. 

Agency, International organizations: Intertanko; Intertanko is an 
association of independent tanker owners and operators; 
Selected mission-related activities: Intertanko maintains a database 
that includes reports of security conditions at ports of call 
throughout the world. 

Agency, International organizations: BIMCO; The Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) represents over 65 percent of 
world's tanker fleet;
Selected mission-related activities: BIMCO coordinates with 
international organizations, governments, and members to improve port 
and ship security, address piracy and stowaway problems, and secure an 
adequate supply of well-trained seafarers. 

Agency, Overseas governmental agencies: ISPS designated authorities; 
Government agencies responsible for implementing ISPS requirements. In 
the United States the authority is the United States Coast Guard; 
Selected mission-related activities: Set security levels at a country's 
ports; Review vessel and facility security plans and oversees 
compliance with these plans. 

Agency, International private sector: Overseas port facility operators; 
Selected mission-related activities: Implement facility security plans 
that meet local port security standards. 

Agency, International private sector: Vessel owners and operators; 
Selected mission-related activities: Implement vessel security plans 
that meet ISPS Code and flag state security standards. 

Agency, International private sector: Lloyd's Market Association; 
Support and research organization for Lloyd's insurance underwriters; 
Selected mission-related activities: Lists area endangered by war, 
strikes, terrorism, and related perils--areas for which underwriters 
can charge higher premiums for vessels. 

Source: GAO.

[End of table] 

On the domestic side, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency 
and is responsible for a wide array of maritime safety and security 
activities. Other U.S. government agencies support the Coast Guard's 
maritime security mission by addressing a wide range of issues that 
affect the flow of cargo and people into the United States. State and 
local governments and the private sector also have responsibilities to 
secure domestic ports. Table 2 lists key federal agencies and other 
stakeholders on the domestic side, together with examples of the kinds 
of maritime security activities performed.

Table 2: Selected Domestic Stakeholders with Maritime Security 
Activities:

Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Homeland Security: U.S. 
Coast Guard; 
Selected mission-related activities: Conducts vessel escorts, boardings 
of selected vessels, and security patrols of key port areas; Ensures 
vessels in U.S. waters comply with domestic (MTSA) and international 
(ISPS Code) maritime security standards; Reviews U.S. vessel and 
facility security plans and oversees compliance with these plans; Meets 
with foreign governments and visits foreign port facilities to observe 
security conditions. 

Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Homeland Security: 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 
Selected mission-related activities: Screens vessel, crew, passenger, 
and cargo information prior to vessel arrival in the United States; 
Boards all vessels that arrive from foreign ports to review personnel 
and cargo documentation. Ensures that all have appropriate documents to 
gain access to the United States; If concerns about crew or cargo 
exist, takes action to deny entrance to the United States. 

Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI); 
Selected mission-related activities: FBI Maritime Liaison Agents, 
stationed at key ports in the United States, help disseminate maritime 
intelligence to port stakeholders; Leads Joint Terrorism Task Forces; 
Has lead role in investigating maritime terrorism incidents. 

Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Defense: U.S. Navy; 
Selected mission-related activities: Provides support to Department of 
Homeland Security as requested for maritime homeland security 
operations; Maintains a credible maritime interdiction capability to 
deal with identified hostile ships at any location when authorized to 
do so; Builds relationships with partner nations' navies to enhance 
cooperation and information sharing. 

Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of State: Bureau of 
Consular Affairs - Visa Services; 
Selected mission-related activities: Reviews visa applications and 
issues nonimmigrant visas for crew members, including recognizing 
falsified documents on visa applications. 

Stakeholders, Federal government: State and local governments: Law 
enforcement agencies; 
Selected mission-related activities: Conduct land-based patrols of port 
facilities; If agency operates a marine unit, support Coast Guard role 
through water patrols and possibly escorts. 

Stakeholders, Federal government: Private sector: Facility operators; 
Selected mission-related activities: Develop and implement facility 
security plans that meet MTSA standards. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table]

All of these international and domestic stakeholders help to ensure the 
safety and security of a global supply chain that brings energy 
commodities to the United States. This supply chain spans the globe and 
reaches many regions of the world. Each day, the United States imports 
many different energy commodities from overseas suppliers in Africa, 
Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America. Excluding Canada, 
which supplies petroleum and natural gas to the United States via 
pipeline, the vast majority of these varied imports arrive by tanker.

Tankers Transport Energy Commodities around the World:

The various types of energy commodities require different handling 
methods, and as a result, various kinds of tankers have been built to 
accommodate them. An LNG carrier is designed for transporting LNG at 
minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, when gas liquefies and shrinks 
drastically in volume. The cargo is transported in special tanks 
insulated to minimize evaporation. LNG carriers are up to 1,000 feet 
long and have a draft (depth below the water line) of 40 feet when 
fully loaded. The global LNG fleet is expected to double from 200 in 
2006 to over 400 by 2010. According to industry reports, the existing 
fleet has completed more than 33,000 voyages without a substantial 
spill. Oil tankers are more numerous and vary greatly in size. Tankers 
transporting crude oil from the Middle East generally consist of Very 
Large Crude Carriers, which typically carry more than 2 million barrels 
of oil per voyage.[Footnote 16] These ships are over 1,000 feet long, 
nearly 200 feet wide, and have a draft of over 65 feet.[Footnote 17] 
Figure 1 shows a typical Very Large Crude Carrier. These ships are too 
big for most U.S. ports and must transfer their loads to smaller 
tankers (a process called lightering) or unload at an offshore 
terminal. At present, the United States has only one such offshore 
terminal--the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP).[Footnote 18] Most 
tankers transporting cargos from the Caribbean and South America, by 
contrast, are smaller than Very Large Crude Carriers and can enter U.S. 
ports directly.

Figure 1: Oil Tanker at Al-Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal, Persian Gulf:

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of an oil tanker at Al-Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal, Persian 
Gulf. 

[End of figure]

There are generally two enforcement systems aimed at ensuring that 
these vessels are in compliance with applicable regulations, laws, and 
conventions: flag state control and port state control. The flag state 
is the country in which the vessel is registered. Flag state control 
can extend anywhere in the world where the vessel operates. For 
example, a flag state's requirements set the standards for the 
operation and maintenance of all vessels flying that flag. If the flag 
state is a contracting government to the SOLAS Convention, these 
standards are required to be at least as stringent as those included in 
the ISPS Code. The port state is the country where the port is located. 
Port state control is the process by which a nation exercises its 
authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters subject to 
its jurisdiction. It is intended to ensure that vessels comply with all 
domestic requirements for ensuring safety of the port, environment, and 
personnel. Thus, when a foreign-flagged oil tanker enters a U.S. port, 
the U.S. port state control program, administered by the U.S. Coast 
Guard, becomes the primary means of marine safety enforcement. For 
example, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires that all tankers built 
after 1994 coming to the United States must have double hulls--that is, 
a two-layered hull to help prevent spills resulting from a collision or 
grounding (see fig. 2).[Footnote 19]

Figure 2: Tanker with Insert of Double Hull:

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of a tanker with insert of a double 
hull. The double hull encompasses the cargo area. All tankers built 
after 1994 must have double hulls in order to enter U.S. ports. The 
double hull (shown here in a cross-section view) prevents spills if the 
outer hull is breached. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure]

Energy Commodities Originate in a Variety of Locations:

According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States 
consumes more than 20 million barrels of petroleum every day.[Footnote 
20] Of that amount, over 65 percent comes from foreign sources. The top 
suppliers of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States in 
2005 were Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria--each 
supplying over 1 million barrels of petroleum per day (see fig. 3). 
Iraq, Algeria, Angola, Russia, and the United Kingdom are also major 
energy suppliers with daily imports to the United States of up to 
500,000 barrels per day. These top 10 energy suppliers accounted for 
approximately 75 percent of all U.S. petroleum imports in 2005. All 
petroleum imports to the United States from those countries arrive on 
tankers, except those from Canada.

Figure 3: Top Exporters of Petroleum to the United States in 2005 
(Millions of barrels per day):

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph that illustrates the top exporters 
of petroleum to the United States in 2005 (millions of barrels per 
day). The vertical axis of the graph represents petroleum imports, 2005 
(millions of barrels per day) and the horizontal axis of the graph 
represents countries. The following data is depicted: 

Exporter: Canada; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 2.18; 

Exporter: Mexico; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.66. 

Exporter: Saudi Arabia; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.54. 

Exporter: Venezuela; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.53. 

Exporter: Nigeria; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.17. 

Exporter: Iraq; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.53. 

Exporter: Algeria; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.48. 

Exporter: Angola; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.47. 

Exporter: Russia; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.41. 

Exporter: United Kingdom; 
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.40. 

Source: Energy Information Administration. 

[End of figure]

Imports are a growing portion of the natural gas supply in the United 
States. With consumption of natural gas growing faster than domestic 
production, imports of natural gas will almost certainly continue to 
rise, according to the Energy Information Administration. Today, Canada 
is the primary supplier of natural gas to the United States and all of 
natural gas imports from Canada are carried by pipeline.[Footnote 21] 
Approximately 3 percent of all natural gas imports to the United States 
is LNG. Trinidad and Tobago is the single largest supplier of LNG to 
the United States, supplying 70 percent of all LNG imported into this 
country (see fig. 4). Other LNG suppliers in 2005 included Algeria, 
Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, and Oman.

Figure 4: Top Exporters of Natural Gas to United States in 2005 
(Millions of cubic feet per day):

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph that illustrates the top exporters 
of natural gas to the United States in 2005 (millions of cubic feet per 
day). The vertical axis of the graph represents natural gas imports, 
2005 (millions of cubic feet per day) and the horizontal axis of the 
graph represents countries. The following data is depicted: 

Exporter: Canada; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 10,138. 

Exporter: Trinidad; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 1,203. 

Exporter: Algeria; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 266. 

Exporter: Egypt; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 199. 

Exporter: Mexico; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 26. 

Exporter: Malaysia; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 24. 

Exporter: Nigeria; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 22. 

Exporter: Qatar; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 8. 

Exporter: Oman; 
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 7. 

Source: Energy Information Administration. 

[End of figure]

Key Domestic Ports Handle Vast Majority of Energy Imports:

The United States imports about 65 percent of its crude oil and 
petroleum products as well as about 3 percent of its natural gas 
needs.[Footnote 22] As shown in figure 5, certain energy commodities 
are imported into particular regions of the country. Appendix II 
provides detailed descriptions of U.S. energy commodity imports 
transported by tanker. For example, in 2004:

* Ports along the Gulf Coast imported 62 percent of the crude oil 
imported to the United States.

* Ports along the East Coast imported 95 percent of the gasoline and 75 
percent of the LNG.

* Ports along the West Coast imported 60 percent of all jet fuel.

Figure 5: Regional Significance of Petroleum Commodities:

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the regional significance of 
petroleum commodities. The figure is a map of the continental United 
States, and depicts the following data: 

West Coast ports: 
Jet Fuels: 60%. 

Gulf Coast ports: 
Crude Oil: 62%; 
LPG: 39%. 

East Coast ports: 
Gasoline: 95%; 
Residential fuel oil: 78%; 
LNG: 75%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Energy Information Administration data. 

[End of figure]

Characteristics of Maritime Supply Chain Make It Vulnerable to 
Terrorist Attack:

The global maritime environment through which the energy supply chain 
operates is constrained by physical geography and influenced by 
regional political dynamics. The physical geography of the continents, 
for example, forces shipping lanes to pass through certain narrow 
channels, or chokepoints. There are approximately 200 such locations, 
but only a handful are of strategic importance for the global energy 
supply (see fig. 6). A chokepoint by definition tends to be shallow and 
narrow, resulting in impaired navigation and congestion from other 
tankers, cargo ships, and other smaller vessels, which can impede the 
free and efficient flow of goods. Moreover, several key chokepoints are 
surrounded by more than one sovereign nation, resulting in a complex 
security environment within a constrained physical space. Managing 
security in this environment requires significant coordination among 
these countries to successfully manage the security in these locations. 
According to the Energy Information Administration, chokepoints are 
susceptible to pirate attacks and shipping accidents in their narrow 
channels. In addition, chokepoints can be blocked, mined, or rendered 
inaccessible by foreign naval forces, with potentially devastating 
consequences for the flow of oil and goods around the world and into 
the United States.

Figure 6: Oil Flows and Strategic Shipping Chokepoints:

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the oil flows and strategic shipping 
chokepoints across the globe. The figure is a world map that 
illustrates the position of shipping lanes across the globe and the 
flow in terms of millions of barrels per day, with various size lines 
indicating flows in the amounts of 15 million, 10 million, 3 million, 
and 1 million barrels per day. The following chokepoints are specific 
depicted: 

Chokepoint: Straight of Hormus; 
millions of barrels per day: 16.5. 

Chokepoint: Straight of Malacca; 
millions of barrels per day: 11.7. 

Chokepoint: Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline; 
millions of barrels per day: 3.8. 

Chokepoint: Bosporus; 
millions of barrels per day: 3.1. 

Chokepoint: Bab el-Mandeb; 
millions of barrels per day: 3.0. 

Chokepoint: Panama Canal; 
millions of barrels per day: 0.5. 

Source: GAO analysis of Energy Information Administration (2004) data. 

[End of figure]

The Straits of Hormuz and Malacca are two critical maritime shipping 
chokepoints that tankers pass through regularly. The Strait of Hormuz, 
which connects the oil fields of the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman 
and the Indian Ocean, is the most important chokepoint in the world in 
terms of the global energy supply, with about 20 percent of the world 
oil supply, including 17 percent of U.S. petroleum imports passing 
through it. Tankers with oil from the Persian Gulf must navigate 
through this chokepoint in order to access the principal international 
shipping lanes toward the United States. Another chokepoint, the Strait 
of Malacca, links the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean (and oil coming 
from the Middle East) with the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean 
(and major consuming markets in Asia). The Strait of Malacca is located 
among Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore and about 600 vessels pass 
through it each day. Piracy and political instability in the region, 
especially in Indonesia, are issues of concern for shipping operations 
in the strait. The Energy Information Administration identified other 
important maritime chokepoints, including the Bab el-Mandab passage 
from the Arabian Sea, the Panama Canal connecting the Pacific and 
Atlantic Oceans, the Suez Canal connecting the Red Sea to the 
Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus Straits linking the Black Sea to 
the Mediterranean Sea.

Besides facing vulnerabilities while in transit, vessels can be 
vulnerable while moored at facilities where they are receiving or 
unloading their cargoes, and the energy-related infrastructure located 
in ports can also be vulnerable to attack. Vessels transiting into and 
out of ports and their attendant infrastructure can be vulnerable in a 
number of ways. During transit into and out of port, these vessels 
travel slowly, which increases their exposure. Tankers follow 
timetables that are easy to track in advance and they follow a fixed 
set of maritime routes. Once tankers arrive in this country, they must 
wait offshore for pilots to navigate the ship channels into many of the 
nation's ports.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, increased national 
attention has been focused on the potential vulnerability of the 
nation's 361 major seaports to terrorist attack. According to the 
National Strategy for Maritime Security, the infrastructure and systems 
that span the maritime domain have increasingly become both targets of 
and potential conveyances for dangerous and illicit 
activities.[Footnote 23] GAO has previously reported that ports are 
vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with complex 
transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and 
easily accessible.[Footnote 24] Ports and their maritime approaches, 
including waterways and coastal areas, facilitate freedom of movement 
and the flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and vessels to 
transit with relative anonymity. Some energy terminals are located in 
open seas where they are accessible by water or air, while others are 
located in metropolitan areas, along key shipping channels, or near 
pristine environmental sanctuaries where they may be accessible by 
water, air, or land.

Addressing Tanker Security Vulnerabilities Involves Setting Risks in 
the Context of Other Security and Nonsecurity Priorities:

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was 
widespread acknowledgement that numerous and substantial gaps existed 
in homeland security. There is also widespread acknowledgment, however, 
that resources for closing these gaps are limited and must compete with 
other national priorities. It is improbable that any security framework 
can successfully anticipate and thwart every type of potential 
terrorist threat that highly motivated, well-skilled, and adequately 
funded terrorist groups could perpetrate. While security efforts 
clearly matter, various groups like the 9/11 Commission have emphasized 
that total security cannot be bought no matter how much is spent on it. 
In short, the nation cannot afford to protect everything against all 
threats, even within the relatively narrow context of tanker security. 
Choices are clearly involved--including decisions about the relative 
vulnerability posed by attacks on energy commodity tankers as compared 
with attacks in other forms, such as air safety or security in crowded 
urban centers.

In this context, risk management has become a widely endorsed strategy 
for helping policymakers make decisions about allocating finite 
resources in such circumstances.[Footnote 25] It emphasizes the 
importance of assigning available resources to address the greatest 
risks, along with selecting those strategies that make the most 
efficient and effective use of resources. Risk management has received 
widespread support from Congress, the President, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as a tool that can help set priorities and inform 
decisions about mitigating risks.[Footnote 26]

Energy Commodity Shipments Face Varied Threats, and a Successful Attack 
Could Have Substantial Consequences:

Even though intelligence sources have reported that there are currently 
no specific credible threats to energy tankers in U.S. waters or their 
attendant facilities on U.S. soil, attacks overseas show that tankers 
face several major types of threats, and if a threat were to be 
successfully carried out domestically, it could have serious 
consequences. Overseas, terrorists have demonstrated the ability to 
carry out at least three types of threats.[Footnote 27] First, and of 
greatest concern, according to officials we spoke with, is a suicide 
attack against a tanker or attendant facility. Second is a standoff 
missile attack using a rocket or some other weapon launched from a 
distance. Third is an armed assault by terrorists or armed bands while 
a tanker is moored or in transit. There are additional types of 
threats, including internal crew conspiracies and collisions with a 
vessel piloted by terrorists. While attacks have so far occurred only 
overseas, two Coast Guard admirals testified before Congress that 
malicious maritime incursions into U.S. waters, such as immigrant or 
drug smuggling, occur regularly. If an attack on a commodity tanker 
were successful in U.S. waters or while docked at a U.S. unloading 
facility, substantial public safety, environmental, and economic 
consequences could result. Public safety and environmental consequences 
of an attack vary by commodity. For instance, LNG and LPG are highly 
combustible and pose a risk to public safety of fire or--in a more 
unlikely scenario in which they are in a confined space--explosion. The 
environmental impact, however, of LNG and LPG spills would be minimal 
since they dissipate in a short period of time. Crude oil and heavy 
petroleum products remain in the environment after they are spilled and 
must be removed, potentially causing significant environmental damage. 
Potential economic consequences of an attack include psychological 
market responses as well as significant delays and possible shortages 
if major transit routes, key facilities, or ports are closed.

No Credible Specific Threat of Attack at U.S. Ports to Date, but Events 
Overseas Indicate Reasons for Concern:

According to U.S. government intelligence sources, there have been no 
specific credible terrorist threats to tankers in U.S. waters or their 
unloading facilities on U.S. soil in the wake of the September 11 
attacks. Nonetheless, several events overseas and intelligence reports 
indicate ongoing concern about the potential for an attack against 
tankers or energy facilities.

* Heightened security threat levels in response to potential threats. 
The Coast Guard has raised the Maritime Security (MARSEC) level from 
Level 1 to Level 2 on several occasions in response to nonspecific 
threats based on intelligence or other warnings to the maritime 
sector.[Footnote 28] In the past, the Coast Guard has raised the MARSEC 
level due to general threats.

* Other intelligence indicating ports are targets under consideration. 
Security officials in the U.S. government are concerned about the 
possibility of a terrorist attack in a U.S. port in the future. For 
example, captured terrorist training manuals cite seaports as targets 
and instruct trainees to use covert means to obtain surveillance 
information for use in attack planning. Terrorist leaders have also 
stated their intent to attack infrastructure targets within the United 
States, including seaports, in an effort to cause physical and economic 
damage, and inflict mass casualties.

* Continued policy priority for port security. Four years after passage 
of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Congress remained 
sufficiently concerned about maritime security to again increase 
security efforts under the Security and Accountability Act for Every 
(SAFE) Port Act of 2006.[Footnote 29] This law (1) required the 
Department of Homeland Security to conduct terrorist watch list checks 
of newly hired port employees, (2) provided authority for risk-based 
funding through security grants to harden U.S. ports against terrorist 
attacks and enhance capabilities to respond to attacks and resume 
operations, and (3) required the Department of Homeland Security to 
develop protocols for resuming trade after a transportation security 
incident.

Officials Are Concerned about Three Primary Types of Threats:

Our discussions with officials of various agencies and our review of 
reports and other published documentation indicate that the following 
three types of attacks on tankers or attendant facilities are 
considered to be the most likely.

Suicide Attacks:

In the maritime domain, suicide attacks have been carried out using a 
small, explosive-laden boat or vehicle that the attacker rams into a 
tanker or energy facility. The intent of such an attack is maximum 
damage to human or physical targets without concern for the life of the 
attacker. Previous attack history underscores terrorist intentions and 
capability to use small boat attacks. Moreover, intelligence experts 
say that the suicide boat attack uses a proven, simple strategy that 
has caused significant loss of life and significant damage to 
commercial and military vessels.

Several suicide attacks have been carried out against tankers and 
energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region. They have taken place 
in restricted waterways where a ship's ability to maneuver or engage 
the attackers is hampered or when a ship has stopped or moored. For 
example:

* In April 2004 terrorists attacked the Al-Basrah and Khawr Al'Amaya 
offshore oil terminals in Iraq using vessels packed with explosives. 
Several oil tankers were either docked at or in the vicinity of the 
offshore terminals during the attack. Even though the speedboats 
detonated prematurely and missed striking the oil tankers and the 
offshore terminals, another small craft near the Khawr Al'Amaya 
terminal exploded when coalition forces attempted to intercept it, 
killing two U.S. Navy sailors and a U.S. Coast Guardsman. According to 
a recent study on maritime terrorism, the coordinated attack appears to 
have been part of an overall terrorist strategy to destabilize Iraq, 
and both terminals were shut down for 2 days, resulting in lost revenue 
of nearly $40 million.[Footnote 30]

* Another suicide attack occurred in October 2002 when terrorists 
rammed the French supertanker Limburg as it slowed for a pilot to 
approach the Ash Shihr Terminal off the coast of Yemen. (See fig. 7.) 
The resulting explosion breached the Limburg's double hull and ignited 
stored oil on board the vessel. An estimated 90,000 barrels of oil were 
spilled, 1 crewman was killed, and 17 were injured.

* In addition to maritime suicide attacks, terrorists have also 
targeted energy facilities on land. In February 2006, for example, 
terrorists attempted to drive vehicles packed with explosives through 
the gates of a major oil-processing facility in Saudi Arabia's eastern 
province. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed 
two Saudi guards and represented the first direct assault on a Saudi 
oil production facility.

Figure 7: Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen:

[See PDF for image] 

This is a photograph of the tanker Limburg after a terrorist attack 
near Yemen. 

Source: AFP. 

[End of figure]

Standoff Attacks:

A second type of threat against tankers and attendant maritime 
infrastructure is a standoff missile attack using a rocket, mortar, or 
rocket-propelled grenade launched from a sufficient distance to evade 
defensive fire. Standoff missile attacks have been aimed at military 
ships in ports in the Persian Gulf, but these kinds of attacks also 
represent a serious type of threat against tankers. Terrorists launched 
such an attack using Katyusha rockets in 2005, narrowly missing two 
U.S. naval ships moored at a Jordanian port. Compared to suicide 
attacks, standoff attacks are easier to execute, but are less likely to 
be as effective, according to intelligence experts. The range, size, 
and accuracy of explosive projectiles used in such an attack could vary 
considerably.

Armed Assaults:

Armed assaults, particularly at critical shipping chokepoints, 
represent a third major type of threat to tankers along the energy 
supply chain, according to the International Maritime Bureau. These 
attacks on tankers and energy infrastructure have taken place where 
maritime security is lacking and they have been carried out in most 
cases by pirates seeking to gain control of the ship for financial 
gain, including petty theft and kidnapping of crew for ransom.[Footnote 
31] Pirate attacks against tankers and cargo ships have taken place in 
numerous locations, including off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of 
Guinea and Persian Gulf, and along the Strait of Malacca. According to 
officials at the International Maritime Bureau, oil tankers account for 
about one-quarter of all pirate attacks. Pirate groups armed with 
automatic weapons have seized tankers in the Strait of Malacca and off 
the coast of Somalia. For example, in March 2006 pirates armed with 
automatic weapons hijacked a tanker off the coast of Somalia and 
demanded ransom payments for the release of the ship and its crew. 
Also, attacks on offshore oil facilities have become commonplace in 
Nigeria, where local rebel groups claim to be fighting the Nigerian 
government over control of oil revenue. While no attacks on 
international oil tankers off the coast of Nigeria have occurred to 
date, militant groups in the area have threatened to escalate the 
conflict by attacking ships.

Other Types of Threats Are Considered Less Likely:

There are other types of threats besides the three above, but 
assessments we reviewed and officials we met with indicated these other 
scenarios were less likely to occur. Two examples cited were the 
following:

* Crew conspiracies. Coast Guard intelligence reports suggest a 
hypothetical possibility that crew members (or persons posing as crew 
members) could conspire to commandeer a tanker with the intent of using 
the vessel as a weapon or disrupting maritime commerce. Vessel 
operators and industry groups do not consider this to be a serious 
threat, especially given the technical complexity of modern gas 
carriers and large oil tankers and the extensive vetting process for 
crew on these kinds of vessels. Crew conspiracy could also result in 
situations where oil tankers or gas carriers could be used to transport 
terrorists. Intelligence officials estimate that the number of overall 
stowaways on all vessels entering U.S. ports was expected to average 30 
per month in 2005. There have been cases of stowaways with suspected 
terrorist connections on board U.S.-bound vessels since 2000.

* Collisions. One scenario related to armed assaults involves pirates 
or terrorists hijacking a large ship and ramming it into a tanker, an 
energy facility, or critical infrastructure such as a bridge. Although 
such scenarios require gaining control of a ship, terrorists' 
successful takeover of aircraft in the September 11 attacks demonstrate 
that such plans could be feasible. To date, there have been no known 
cases of terrorists intentionally using a vessel as a weapon, but there 
have been some close calls in pirate-prone areas. Security experts 
point to an example in 2003 in which a group of pirates gained control 
of the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in the Strait of Malacca. Once at 
the tanker's helm, the pirates altered the ship's speed, disabled 
communications, and steered the ship for over 1 hour before escaping 
with equipment and technical documents.

Intelligence Reviews Indicate Threats Are Likely to Persist:

Reports we reviewed and assessments we received indicate that the 
threat of seaborne terrorist attack on maritime energy tankers and 
infrastructure is likely to persist. The information we reviewed and 
discussions we had with agency officials indicate the greatest degree 
of concern remains overseas. For example, in October 2006 it was 
reported that there were threats against Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil 
terminal, which is the world's biggest offshore oil facility, as well 
as a refinery in Bahrain. As part of its mission in the area, the U.S. 
Navy, together with coalition forces, continues to patrol areas 
containing critical maritime energy infrastructure to ensure their 
security, and works with regional navies in the Persian Gulf to improve 
their ability to enforce maritime security. In addition, Coast Guard 
maritime threat assessments we reviewed consider the threat of 
terrorists attacking vessels outside U.S. territorial waters to be 
significant. According to these reports, future maritime terrorist 
attacks are most likely to occur in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, 
Mediterranean Sea, and Southeast Asia.

Domestically, intelligence reports and other assessments continue to 
disclose incidents that demonstrate the need for continued concern 
about potential terrorist threats. For example, two Coast Guard 
admirals testified that the nation is subject to an estimated four 
malicious maritime incursions around the country each week.[Footnote 
32] These incursions represent opportunities to infiltrate homeland 
security and could cause widespread human, economic, and environmental 
damage in our nation's maritime points of entry. Most of these 
incursions to date have involved vessels bringing illegal immigrants, 
drugs, or other contraband into the country.

Possible Consequences of an Attack Include Public Safety, 
Environmental, and Economic Impacts:

A successful attack on an energy commodity tanker could have 
substantial public safety, environmental, and economic consequences. 
Public safety and environmental consequences vary by commodity. LNG and 
LPG are highly combustible and pose a risk to public safety of fire and 
explosions, but their environmental impact would be minimal since they 
dissipate in a short period of time. Crude oil and heavy petroleum 
products do not dissipate quickly and must be removed from the water, 
posing a greater environmental than public safety risk. Economic 
consequences of an attack could be substantial, not so much because of 
the loss of a tanker or its cargo, but because of the greater shock to 
the economy, particularly if major transit routes, key facilities, or 
ports are closed. Price spikes that reflect fears or expectations about 
the price and supply of energy commodities could also be significant.

Public Safety and Environmental Consequences Vary by Commodity:

LNG and LPG spills pose primarily a public safety hazard to structures 
and people because of the potential for fires and explosions. These 
gaseous energy commodities are transported as liquids either by cooling 
or by pressurizing the gas. If spilled, they will return to their 
gaseous state, causing vapor to form above the spill. It is these 
vapors that will burn. Further, the vapors will drift away from the 
site of the spill if not immediately ignited by a source such as an 
open flame or strong static charge. Once ignited, the fire will travel 
back through the vapors toward the initial spill site and, if fuel 
remains, continue to burn near the tanker.

One of the key elements of how a fire will affect the public is the 
amount of heat that is radiated away from the fire. The amount of heat 
radiated away from a fire is related to how smoky the fire burns--fires 
with a great deal of smoke radiate much less heat because the dark 
smoke absorbs the radiation. LNG and LPG vapor fires burn very cleanly, 
with little smoke, and thus emit more heat than light petroleum product 
or crude oil fires.

Besides the danger of fire, there is also a danger of explosions if LNG 
or LPG vapors are ignited in a confined area, such as under a dock. If 
the attack on a tanker occurred in a congested port area, an explosion 
could damage infrastructure or harm people located nearby. In addition 
to potential explosions of confined vapors, a particular type of 
explosion--called a boiling-liquid-expanding-vapor explosion--can occur 
on tankers that carry pressurized cargoes, such as some LPG 
tankers.[Footnote 33] In these tankers, the individual tanks carrying 
the LPG may rupture violently if they are compromised by heat or 
explosion. Since LNG is not transported in pressurized tanks, this type 
of explosion is not likely to occur.

Finally, people who come in contact with spilled refrigerated liquefied 
gases could be burned due to the cryogenic (freeze) nature of the 
liquid. LNG and LPG are both transported internationally in 
refrigerated tankers that keep the gas so cold that it retains a liquid 
form. A spill of either LNG or LPG could expose people close to the 
spill to the cold liquid and cause cryogenic burns or frostbite. This 
is not likely to affect the public, but could affect the crew on the 
tanker or other people located close to the tanker.

LNG and LPG spills pose little threat to the environment because they 
almost entirely vaporize in a matter of minutes or hours and disperse 
into the atmosphere. If an LNG or LPG spill were ignited, there could 
be localized impacts on wildlife near the fire, but few other 
environmental effects.

Spills of light petroleum products, such as gasoline, diesel, and jet 
fuel, can have both public safety and environmental consequences. Light 
petroleum products produce flammable vapors when they are spilled. 
These vapors can be ignited and could result in large, damaging fires. 
Further, the vapors could drift away from the site of the spill if not 
immediately ignited by a source such as an open flame or strong static 
charge. Once ignited, the fire will travel back through the vapors 
toward the initial spill site and, if fuel remains, continue to burn 
near the tanker. Besides the danger of fire, there is also a danger of 
explosions if light petroleum product vapors are ignited in a confined 
area, such as under a dock. If the attack on a tanker occurred in a 
congested port area, an explosion could damage infrastructure or harm 
people located nearby.

Spills of light petroleum products have varying environmental impacts, 
depending on conditions. Light petroleum products evaporate--almost all 
of the spill can evaporate in a few hours or up to a day. Consequently, 
light petroleum products generally do not persist in the environment 
for long unless the spill is churned by significant wave action. In 
that case, such products can mix with water and will linger in the 
environment for much longer periods of time. A 1996 spill highlighted 
the damage that can occur when a light distillate oil is spilled in 
heavy wave conditions, resulting in much of the oil mixing with water 
rather than evaporating. In this case, a tank barge carrying home 
heating oil was grounded in the middle of a storm near Point Judith, 
Rhode Island, spilling approximately 20,000 barrels of heating oil. An 
estimated 80 percent of the release was mixed into the water, with only 
about 12 percent evaporating and about 10 percent staying on the 
surface of the water.[Footnote 34] The spill affected animals and 
plants living on the sea bed, with an estimated mortality of 9 million 
lobsters, 19.4 million clams, 7.6 million rock and hermit crabs, and 
4.2 million fish. The oil spill resulted in a fishing closure for about 
250 square miles in Block Island Sound for a period of 5 months.

Spills of crude oil and heavy petroleum products could result in 
significant environmental consequences. Since these types of spills do 
not readily evaporate, they can linger in the environment. 
Environmental cleanup of crude oil and heavy petroleum product spills 
can take several years and in some cases cost billions of dollars. 
According to ExxonMobil, the company spent $2.2 billion on the Exxon 
Valdez cleanup. Crude oil and heavy petroleum products can mix with 
water, particularly in the presence of waves, causing small drops of 
water to be trapped inside the spilled oil. This is called an emulsion 
and can hamper cleanup by making the spilled oil difficult to skim off 
the water. This will greatly increase the volume of the spill, since 
the water trapped within the oil also has to be removed. In addition, 
residual oils are sometimes more dense than water, allowing them to 
sink and contaminate bottom sediments. Finally, crude oil and heavy 
petroleum products can coat birds and marine mammals, both smothering 
the organisms and exposing them to them to hypothermia as their 
feathers and fur lose the ability to insulate.

While crude oil and heavy petroleum products evaporate, they produce 
few flammable vapors. For instance, less than half of a crude oil spill 
and 10 percent of heavy petroleum product spills will evaporate into 
vapors that could burn or explode. While fire always raises concerns 
about public safety, the smaller volume of vapors available to burn 
would result in small fires that are less likely to endanger the public.

Blockage of Key Transit Routes, Key Facilities, or Ports Could Cost 
Billions:

Although the Exxon Valdez accident demonstrates that even one spill can 
create substantial environmental cost, an attack that affects only a 
single tanker is unlikely to have significant consequences on the 
overall economy, other than a relative short-term market price 
increase. One tanker carries a small percentage of the total daily 
demand for a commodity. As mentioned above, Very Large Crude Carriers 
typically carry more than 2 million barrels of oil per voyage, which is 
about 10 percent of U.S. daily oil consumption. In most cases, the 
relatively small volume in an individual tanker could be replaced with 
other imports or from domestic storage. Two examples show the 
relatively small effect on supply if the broader supply network is not 
substantially affected:

* The approximately 240,000 barrels of oil released into Prince William 
Sound by the Exxon Valdez represented about 20 minutes of total U.S. 
oil consumption in 1989. The spill's actual disruption was somewhat 
greater: According to the Department of Energy, the incident actually 
resulted in an oil supply disruption of 13 million barrels of oil over 
13 days, because the spill restricted tanker transport in Prince 
William Sound and the volume of oil piped from the Alaskan North Slope 
also had to be reduced. Still, even this 13 million barrel disruption 
represented only about 18 hours of total national consumption.[Footnote 
35]

* More recently, an approximately 6,300-barrel oil spill in November 
2004 significantly reduced tanker traffic on a stretch of the Delaware 
River for more than a week. As a result, a nearby refinery had to 
reduce production of refined products because of reduced crude oil 
availability. The oil spill also threatened to contaminate the water 
intake system of a nuclear power plant along the river, which was 
temporarily shut down. Despite these reductions in energy supply, 
gasoline prices actually dropped in the days after the oil spill.

The loss of a tanker carrying crude oil or heavy petroleum commodities 
will pose additional economic costs for ship replacement and 
environmental cleanup. Tankers can cost about $150 million, and the 
lost cargo could cost over $100 million dollars more. The Delaware 
River oil spill cleanup cost about $175 million over the course of 1 
year. As the $2.2 billion Exxon Valdez spill cleanup illustrates, a 
larger spill or a spill in a more sensitive ecological zone could cost 
much more.

A much more significant impact could occur if an attack on a tanker 
resulted in the closure of a port, damage to a key facility, or long 
interruption of a key transit route. A successful attack while a tanker 
was docked, for example, could result in damage to a key facility. Even 
if a port were not closed altogether, the Coast Guard could increase 
the MARSEC level at one or more ports or industries to MARSEC 3--the 
highest level. The Coast Guard noted in the Federal Register that 
MARSEC Level 3 will involve significant restriction of maritime 
operations that could result in the temporary closure of individual 
facilities, ports, and waterways, in either a region or the entire 
nation. Depending on the nature of the specific threat, this highest 
level of maritime security may have a considerable impact on the 
stakeholders in the affected ports or maritime areas. The ability to 
estimate the costs to business and government for even a short period 
at MARSEC Level 3 is difficult to do with any level of accuracy or 
analytical confidence due to the infinite range of threats and 
scenarios that could trigger MARSEC Level 3. The Coast Guard also noted 
that the length and the duration of the increased security level to 
MARSEC Level 3 will be entirely dependent on the scope of 
transportation security incidents or disasters that have already 
occurred. The Coast Guard expects MARSEC Level 3 to increase the direct 
costs to businesses attributable to increased personnel or modified 
operations, and it also expects indirect costs to society of the 
"ripple effects" associated with sustained port closures would greatly 
outweigh the direct costs to individual businesses.

The scale of these effects can perhaps be seen in several hypothetical 
examples, both international and domestic.

* Strait of Hormuz. Each day, tankers transport 20 percent of global 
daily oil consumption--about 17 million barrels of oil--through the 
Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that connects the Persian Gulf 
with the Arabian Sea. While there are some limited alternatives for 
exporting oil from the Persian Gulf without going through the strait, 
these alternatives could not make entirely for the amount of oil lost 
by closure of the strait. While the United States and other oil-
importing countries have reserves of crude oil that they could use to 
mitigate the loss of supply from the Persian Gulf, oil could not be 
withdrawn fast enough to entirely make up the lost volumes. For 
example, while the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve has 688 million 
barrels of oil, the send-out capacity of the reserves is only 4.4 
million barrels per day. Other countries face similar constraints. 
Additionally, if closure of Hormuz lasted for an extended period of 
time, strategic reserves could run out or become so low as to be unable 
to mitigate any additional petroleum supply disruptions.

* Northeast United States. An attack on a key port in the northeastern 
United States, such as Boston, could result in energy commodity 
shortages or price spikes. For instance, the LNG facility near Boston 
(in Everett, Massachusetts), is the only facility importing liquefied 
natural gas in the Northeast. LNG is very important to the Northeast 
during heating season because natural gas movement into the Northeast 
is constrained during the winter because existing pipelines to New 
England are fully utilized. A report prepared by the Power Planning 
Committee of the New England Governor's Conference, Inc., concluded 
that if LNG from the Everett facility and satellite operations 
elsewhere in the region is not available on a peak winter day, the 
region could have insufficient gas supply to meet the needs of all 
customers for space heating and some key electric generators. An attack 
that damages the Everett LNG facility during a cold winter could result 
in natural gas shortages or price spikes.

* LOOP. A loss of import capacity at the LOOP could increase the price 
of crude oil and refined products. LOOP is a key energy facility--a 
terminal in the Gulf of Mexico that, according to DOE, accounts for 
more than 10 percent of total U.S. crude oil imports. LOOP and its 
storage terminals are connected to more than 50 percent of the refining 
capacity in the United States. LOOP is also the only facility in the 
United States that can receive tankers of the ultra-large and very 
large types. Counteracting the impact of losing LOOP could involve 
release of oil from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and lightering 
in other U.S. ports.[Footnote 36]

While we did not find any studies on the economic consequences of 
closures to energy facilities at ports, other broader reviews of port 
closures identified possible loses in the billions of dollars. One 
study of the 2002 West Coast port shutdown, a 11-day closure of all 
West Coast ports due to a labor dispute, developed estimates (based on 
models) for the costs of the shutdown based on the losses in income by 
U.S. workers, consumers, and producers based on trade flow, ability to 
ship goods, and the inclination of consumers and industries to 
substitute for other, available goods[Footnote 37]. The study found 
that for a shutdown lasting 4 weeks (which was longer than the actual 
11-day shutdown) total loses to the U.S. economy would be about $4.7 
billion, with industrial consumers bearing the majority of that burden. 
[Footnote 38] 

Other studies have attempted to model the economic impact of terrorist 
attacks on ports. For example, one study examined the potential effects 
of a 15-day port closure at Los Angeles-Long Beach due to a 
radiological bomb. It concluded that such a closure would result in 
regional impacts of $138 million in lost economic output and 1,258 
person-years of lost employment.[Footnote 39] The study also analyzed 
the potential effects of a simultaneous attack on key bridges in the 
port area. The study assumed such an attack would cause a longer port 
closure and limited truck access to the port for 120 days, and under 
that scenario, it estimated the national economic impact at $34 billion 
and 212,000 person-years of employment lost. This analysis did not 
consider the potential mitigating effects of other modes of 
transportation for moving goods out of the port (i.e., using rail 
instead of trucks), or potential trade diversion to other ports during 
the crisis.

Economic Consequences from the Psychological Market Reaction to an 
Attack Could Be Severe:

Finally, psychological ramifications of an attack could affect prices 
and supply. Researchers have noted that psychological market reactions 
to the consequences of an event may cause individuals and firms to 
change their decision-making processes, potentially causing 
consequences to ripple outward from the incident itself. If the 
incident affects key facilities, indirect effects could be magnified 
and also include businesses that are unable to operate both in the port 
and elsewhere if they are dependent on goods that move through the 
port. There is also the potential for unemployment of indirectly 
affected businesses.

The movement of gasoline prices after the Exxon Valdez spill is an 
illustration. Although the actual disruption in supply was relatively 
small, the oil spill sent shock waves through oil markets, particularly 
those most dependent on oil from the Alaskan North Slope along the West 
Coast. In the first week after the oil spill, spot market prices of 
unleaded regular gasoline increased $0.50 from $0.68 per gallon to 
$1.18 per gallon, a 74 percent increase due to fears of an extended 
closure of oil from the Alaskan North Slope. In the following weeks, 
however, prices began to decrease, hitting $0.99 on April 7 (2 weeks 
after the spill) and $0.82 on April 14 (3 weeks after the spill). Thus 
as markets realized that the supply shortage would be short lived, 
prices dropped sharply. The Department of Energy concluded in its 
analysis of the incident that the temporary loss of Alaskan North Slope 
supplies resulted in a perception of tight oil markets rather than a 
significant change in fundamental supply and demand factors.[Footnote 
40]

Although Stakeholders Are Taking Protective Measures, Implementation 
Challenges Pose Difficulty Both Abroad and at Home:

Many efforts are under way, both internationally and domestically, to 
protect energy commodity tankers and their attendant facilities, but 
significant challenges to the success of these efforts may limit the 
effectiveness of these actions. These challenges are evident in 
protecting the loading and transit of tanker shipments. In these 
settings, a broad range of international stakeholders is involved, 
including IMO, foreign governments, vessel and facility operators, and 
U.S. government agencies. To help protect the international maritime 
supply chain, signatory governments are responsible for implementing 
the requirements of IMO's ISPS Code into law, many facility and vessel 
operators have taken steps to implement ISPS Code requirements, various 
industry organizations have reported security conditions in ports 
around the world to better inform their members, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard and Navy have also established their presence overseas. 
Challenges are evident, however, when examining how this framework has 
been implemented to date. Our limited reviews at foreign facilities 
showed wide disparity in the quality and extent of security. The Coast 
Guard is limited in the degree to which it can bring about improvements 
abroad when security is substandard, in part because its activities are 
limited by conditions set by host nations. The Navy takes actions that 
help to prevent attacks on tankers in transit, but is limited in the 
areas where it can patrol. In U.S. ports and waterways, a wide array of 
stakeholders is taking steps to protect arriving vessels, but 
challenges persist here as well. Key participants include the Coast 
Guard, CBP, and local law enforcement agencies. In some locations, 
however, the Coast Guard has had difficulty meeting its own self-
imposed requirements for security activity. The completion of new LNG 
facilities planned for a number of ports could further exacerbate the 
Coast Guard's ability to meet current requirements with its current 
resources.

In Spite of the Widespread Adoption of the ISPS Code, the Primary 
Challenge Overseas Involves Overcoming Disparities in Security at 
Different Locations:

The ISPS Code lays out the international regime for securing port 
facilities and commercial vessels. Signatory governments of port and 
flag states are responsible for ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code 
at port facilities and vessels under their jurisdiction. Port states 
enter the compliance status of their facilities directly into an IMO 
database. While the ISPS Code was adopted under the auspices of IMO, 
IMO officials told us they have no way of knowing if a country's port 
facilities are truly in compliance. IMO merely reports information 
submitted by member governments and does not verify its accuracy. 
Additionally, there is no other internationally recognized mechanism 
for third party review to verify actual compliance at port facilities. 
Without third party compliance review, it is extremely difficult to 
determine if ports are secure against terrorism.

Within some countries, the actual security measures can vary greatly 
from port facility to port facility, as indicated both by our own 
visits to foreign facilities and our discussions with agency and 
shipping officials. For example,

* In one country we visited, we observed varying degrees of 
implementation of measures to control access at different port 
facilities. One facility we visited had security cameras, fences, 
guards checking perimeter security, and identification checks for 
access control. Here, we were challenged by guards regularly as we 
passed through gates, even though facility officials were escorting us. 
At another facility, however, someone came to the guard station only 
when our escort signaled for him to come over, and fences were 
collapsed in some places and had holes in others.

* Vessel operators we met with also described differences in security 
at different ports where they load. These operators said they use many 
sources of intelligence to determine their security stance when 
entering a port. Some operators said they can call on the knowledge of 
their own intelligence sources in port states, including contacts with 
intelligence agencies. Members of Intertanko, an international industry 
organization, can access its database of port security conditions, a 
database made up of reports from vessel operators that experience these 
conditions when they stop at various ports. In this database, operators 
reported that some ports security conditions are substantially worse 
than would be expected for an ISPS Code-compliant facility. In such 
cases, they reported taking steps that went beyond ISPS requirements, 
such as keeping ships at security postures beyond those called for by 
the port state's declared security level.

The United States is attempting to deal with facility security lapses 
and inconsistent security conditions in some overseas ports with 
overseas efforts of its own. Because of congressional concern over the 
effectiveness of antiterrorism measures in place at foreign ports, the 
Coast Guard has implemented the International Port Security Program, 
which was designed in part to assess and help improve the security at 
foreign ports. This program reviews port states' implementation of port 
facility security measures using established security standards, 
particularly the ISPS Code. According to the Coast Guard, the ISPS Code 
is the benchmark against which the effectiveness of a country's anti-
terrorism measures will be assessed. The program also reviews the 
country's implementation of ship security provisions of the ISPS Code 
to help decide what actions to take in reviewing that country's vessels 
when they call in U.S. ports. Visits are conducted by Coast Guard 
personnel operating out of the Netherlands, Japan, Singapore, and the 
United States. According to program guidance, the Coast Guard officers 
making these visits are to exchange information with officials of the 
host country, visit port facilities, and share best practices.

The Coast Guard faces a number of challenges, however, in operating 
this program. The locations to be visited are negotiated with the host 
country; thus the Coast Guard team making the visit could be precluded 
from seeing locations that were not in compliance. Coast Guard 
officials said International Port Security Program officers typically 
make up to three visits to a country, each lasting about a week. Their 
assessments are thus based on conditions observed when their visits 
occur. We are currently conducting a separate review of the Coast 
Guard's international programs, and the report we issue will include a 
more complete review of the effectiveness of its International Port 
Security Program.

U.S. Military Presence Overseas Aimed at Helping Deter Maritime 
Terrorist Attacks:

In certain locations, the Navy and Coast Guard have also taken more 
direct action to protect oil terminals--most notably in Iraq. The Navy 
has set security zones (zones where unauthorized vessels will be fired 
upon) around Iraqi oil terminals and stationed warships and patrol 
boats around the terminals (see fig. 8). The Navy has also stationed 
security personnel on the terminal platforms.

Figure 8: Tanker Approaching an Iraqi Oil Loading Terminal as U.S. 
Warship Patrols Nearby:

[See PDF for image] 

This is a photograph of a tanker approaching an Iraqi oil loading 
terminal as U.S. warship patrols nearby. 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure]

State Department Officials Review Crew Member Visa Applications 
Overseas to Prevent Entry of Terrorists:

An additional protective measure taken overseas is the effort of State 
Department (State) officials to help ensure that terrorists cannot gain 
entry to the United States by working as seafarers on tankers or other 
vessels. State Department regulations eliminated crew list visas and 
required all crew members seeking to enter the United States to apply 
for individual crew visas.[Footnote 41] These visas are usually 
presented at U.S. ports of entry, but they can only be obtained abroad. 
Applicants must make appointments with State Department officials 
located at embassies and consulates and be interviewed. They must 
submit background information, fingerprints, and sufficient 
documentation to show they are employed by a shipping company. This 
information is then checked against a State Department database that 
contains records provided by numerous agencies and includes information 
on persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, criminal 
histories, and terrorism concerns. We reported in September 2005 steps 
State has taken since September 11, 2001, to improve the visa process 
as an antiterrorism tool as well as some of the additional actions that 
we believed State could take to further strengthen the 
process.[Footnote 42] According to the State Department, it has 
corrective actions under way that it believes will address the 
recommendations.

While Vessels Are in Transit, the Primary Challenge Involves Patrolling 
the Vast Distances Involved:

Many countries help to protect energy commodity tankers by patrolling 
the sea transit routes. For example, Combined Task Force 150, which as 
of December 2006 included navies of the United States, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, conducted operations 
in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Red 
Sea to secure the waterways and prevent piracy and terrorism (see fig. 
9).[Footnote 43] Naval and coast guard forces of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore patrol the Strait of Malacca, a major choke point in the 
shipment of energy commodities. Improvements in security in the strait 
led to its removal from a list of areas in which Lloyds vessel insurers 
could raise premiums due to severe security risks. To protect their 
ships in areas of known danger, tanker operators said they are also 
modifying their normal practices. For example, tanker operators told us 
that they have directed their vessels to travel much further off the 
shore of Somalia than they would ordinarily. Near Somalia, the 
International Maritime Bureau recommended in 2005 that commercial 
vessels stay 200 miles away from the coast, and the U.S. Maritime 
Administration and Coast Guard issued similar guidance for U.S.-flagged 
vessels. In piracy-prone waters, such as the Strait of Malacca, actions 
include sailing with all lights on, using extra lookouts, and equipping 
crews with fire hoses to prevent or repel boarders.

Figure 9: U.S. Warship Engaging Suspected Pirate Vessel near Somalia:

[See PDF for image] 

This is a photograph of a U.S. warship engaging a suspected pirate 
vessel near Somalia. 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure]

While these actions have had some success in securing transit routes, 
the vast areas to be patrolled and the small number of ships available 
present the military forces of the world with great challenges in 
protecting the sea lanes. For example, a multinational task force of 
military vessels that patrols the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of 
Aden, and northwestern Indian Ocean is made up of about 15 ships. The 
navies of regional countries also patrol near their shores, but in 
areas such as the Horn of Africa this multinational task force is the 
only major presence. Because tankers travel so frequently and so few 
naval ships are available to be on station, naval protection cannot be 
offered for all those who travel in these waters.

Besides patrolling the waters, tracking the movement of tankers is 
another way to monitor them. A recently passed IMO requirement calls 
for most commercial vessels, including tankers, to begin transmitting 
identification and location information on or before December 31, 2008, 
to SOLAS contracting governments under certain specified circumstances. 
This will allow the vessels to be tracked over the course of their 
voyages. Under this requirement, information on the ship's identity, 
location, date, and time of the position will be made available to the 
ship's flag state, the ship's destination port state, and any coastal 
state within 1,000 miles of the ship's route. For ships approaching the 
United States, an extensive tracking program is already in place. The 
Coast Guard currently tracks ships as they approach the U.S. coastline 
and is developing programs for longer-range tracking.[Footnote 44]

In U.S. Waterways and Ports, the Primary Challenge Involves Coping with 
Limited Resources and a Growing Security Workload:

Domestically, many agencies and other stakeholders have taken steps to 
develop and implement plans for helping ensure the security of maritime 
energy commodity shipments. The Coast Guard's primary challenge is 
utilizing its limited resources to meet its security workload. Since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Coast Guard field units 
have seen a substantial increase in their security workload.[Footnote 
45] Coast Guard field units at some ports have not always been able to 
meet their maritime security activity requirements. Moreover, the Coast 
Guard's resource demands are expected to grow as more facilities for 
importing LNG come on line, increasing the number of shipments 
requiring Coast Guard protection.

The efforts to provide security over energy commodity shipments 
arriving at U.S. waterways and port facilities involve a wide range of 
federal and local agencies as well as owners and operators of the 
facilities that receive the shipments. Much of the framework for port 
security is contained in MTSA. DHS, which is the main agency 
responsible for homeland security responsibilities contained in MTSA, 
has assigned most of the responsibilities to the Coast Guard.[Footnote 
46] To carry out this responsibility, as well as the nation's port 
state oversight of foreign-flagged vessels, the Coast Guard's efforts 
range from boarding ships and escorting those shipments of greatest 
concern to patrolling port waters and overseeing the security actions 
undertaken by vessel and facility operators. CBP has the lead role in 
ensuring that only authorized persons onboard tankers come ashore when 
calling on U.S. ports and that no contraband is smuggled into the 
United States using the tankers.[Footnote 47] MTSA requires regular 
vulnerability assessments of port facilities, and facility owners and 
operators are required to develop and update regularly a plan for 
meeting basic security requirements. Facility security plans and 
updates to them are to be reviewed and approved by DHS.

Security Requirements Vary by Commodity:

Particularly for the Coast Guard, the security activities vary greatly 
depending on the type of energy commodity being carried by tankers. Two 
energy commodities, LNG and LPG, are on the list of what the Coast 
Guard has traditionally called Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC).[Footnote 
48] Coast Guard guidance requires its field units to take certain 
actions to protect LNG and LPG tankers in key port areas, which include 
high-population areas or areas with critical infrastructure, such as 
bridges or refineries.[Footnote 49] Beyond protecting LNG and LPG 
shipments in these key port areas, Coast Guard field units are required 
to implement security activities commensurate with the extent of 
critical infrastructure, extent of high-profile vessel traffic 
transiting through key port areas, and availability of support of non-
Coast Guard entities, such as state and local law enforcement agencies. 
According to senior Coast Guard field officials with LNG security 
responsibilities, LNG tanker transits have received the greatest 
attention of the two, due in large part to the much greater size of LNG 
tankers, the amount of hazardous cargo they are carrying, and the 
public perception of the danger of LNG shipments. Many of these 
security measures are now being implemented at existing LNG ports 
around the country. The security measures address two phases of LNG 
operations, including (1) the transit of an underway tanker through a 
port and (2) the period when a tanker is moored at a receiving terminal.

Figure 10: Safety and Security Escort for LNG Tanker:

[See PDF for image] 

This is a photograph of a safety and security escort for a LNG tanker. 

Source: Distrigas of Massachusetts, copyright 2006. 

[End of figure]

Figure 11: Coast Guard Enforcing Security Zone around Moored LNG Tanker:

[See PDF for image] 

This is a photograph of the Coast Guard enforcing a security zone 
around a moored LNG tanker. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure]

Coast Guard security activity requirements are less stringent for oil 
tankers or tankers carrying many other petroleum-based products, such 
as gasoline or crude oil, because they are not identified in the CDC 
list of hazardous marine cargo as posing the greatest human safety 
risks. However, field units do have discretion to take additional 
actions to protect oil tankers and associated waterside loading 
facilities that are determined to pose security concerns.

State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Play a Major Role in the 
Protection of Tankers and Facilities:

At many ports we visited or contacted, Coast Guard field units are 
receiving assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies for 
help in conducting port security operations.[Footnote 50] These 
partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies have been 
encouraged by Coast Guard headquarters. Coast Guard officials said the 
support has been particularly valuable in protecting LNG carriers. For 
example, field units at two of the four ports with onshore LNG 
importing facilities reported using regular escort support from state 
or local law enforcement agencies.

In addition to state and local law enforcement agencies, facility 
operators play a significant role in protecting against terrorist 
threats. For those key energy ports we visited, the Coast Guard 
reported that the waterfront energy facilities in those ports were 
taking actions to comply with the requirements the Coast Guard 
established pursuant to MTSA. Of the 19 domestic waterside petroleum 
facilities we visited, all were reported by the Coast Guard to be in 
compliance with MTSA regulations. Examples of steps taken include key- 
card access systems, closed-circuit television cameras and sensors 
along fencing, hardened perimeter fencing, and reinforced gates at most 
access control points. Facility operators told us they conduct regular 
security drills involving emergency and terrorism scenarios and they 
regularly share pertinent security information with other participants 
of the Area Maritime Security Committees.[Footnote 51] In some cases we 
observed steps that go beyond MTSA requirements, such as using radio 
frequency identification cards that can track the location of all 
persons on facility property.

The Coast Guard Faces Challenges Meeting Internal Security Guidance:

Coast Guard records show that its field units in several of the energy-
related ports we reviewed have been unable to accomplish many of the 
port security responsibilities called for in Coast Guard guidance. 
According to the data we obtained and our discussions with field unit 
officials, resource shortfalls were the primary reasons for not meeting 
these responsibilities.

The Coast Guard's Near-Term Efforts to Align Requirements with Field 
Unit Capacity Have Limitations:

We have noted in earlier work that the Coast Guard is ahead of many 
agencies in the degree to which it has developed a sound framework for 
managing its workload on the basis of risk.[Footnote 52] When carried 
out effectively, risk management offers a way to make informed 
decisions about how best to use limited resources. In the Coast Guard's 
case, its actions involve a balancing act both in deciding how best to 
meet its various security and nonsecurity missions agencywide, but also 
in weighing the pros and cons of investing additional resources in 
energy commodity tanker protection versus the wider range of other port 
activities that require protection. The Coast Guard uses the 
requirements laid out in its guidance to establish a port-specific 
security approach in which the workload varies based on such factors as 
the proximity of population centers to the port area, the extent of 
critical infrastructure at the port, the extent of high-profile vessel 
traffic transiting through key port areas, and the availability of 
support from other entities.

Given that the resource levels of some field units have limited their 
ability to achieve Coast Guard security standards, the Coast Guard has 
attempted to realign its security requirements to more closely match 
available resource levels. Coast Guard headquarters officials meet on 
an annual basis to review new risk assessments and current Coast Guard 
capacity to mitigate risk. The Coast Guard also receives 
recommendations from field unit commanders for introducing tactical 
efficiencies into security requirements. Over the past several years, 
the Coast Guard has revised its operational security guidance in two 
main ways:

* Revising the standards for the amount of activity required for 
conducting some security activities. In August 2006 the Coast Guard 
substantially reduced the types of CDC-carrying vessels that must be 
escorted. The Coast Guard developed a subset list of the CDC 
commodities--called Especially Hazardous Cargo--it determined as posing 
the greatest safety and security risks. This list included both LNG and 
LPG, meaning that the activities required to protect them remain 
unchanged. However, for CDC commodities not included on the Especially 
Hazardous Cargo list, such as vinyl chloride, escort requirements were 
eliminated during normal threat conditions--MARSEC I.[Footnote 53] In 
all, requirements were reduced for about 20 different CDC commodities 
carried in bulk. The August 2006 list of Especially Hazardous Cargo 
consisted of seven hazardous liquid gas or liquid commodities: 
acrylonitrile, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate/fuel oil, anhydrous 
ammonia, chlorine, LNG, and LPG.

* Providing greater operational flexibility for Area Commanders when 
resource constraints may limit the ability to meet requirements. The 
Coast Guard has introduced new tactical options that Area Commanders 
may utilize, in some cases, to accomplish resource intensive security 
activities.

The Coast Guard's methodology used to develop the Especially Hazardous 
Cargo has two substantial shortcomings, however. Our specific concerns 
are as follows:

* Lack of thoroughness. To identify the highest risk CDC commodities, 
senior Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they reviewed 
available consequence analysis assessments that had been conducted by 
the Coast Guard's Special Technical Assessment Program and also 
reviewed a 2004 consequence analysis of LNG by Sandia National 
Laboratories.[Footnote 54] They said they also incorporated the views 
of persons with expertise in CDC commodities, including Coast Guard 
field officials. However, the Coast Guard did not perform consequence 
assessments on many CDC commodities by the time it created the 
Especially Hazardous Cargo list, and as of January 1, 2007, it still 
had not done so.

* No systematic comparative analysis was conducted to identify and 
prioritize the highest-consequence commodities. Coast Guard 
headquarters officials acknowledged they did not conduct a relative 
risk assessment of the CDC commodities. Rather, officials told us they 
relied on the collective best judgment of Coast Guard experts from 
field units and headquarters that had significant experience dealing 
with various transportable energy and chemical commodities. By 
conducting a relative risk analysis of all CDC commodities, the Coast 
Guard would have had available more definitive input for determining 
which CDC vessels posed the greatest risks necessitating additional 
mitigation measures, which in this case would be an escort.

The Coast Guard is taking action to address the methodological 
limitations we note. Shortly after the Coast Guard released the 
Especially Hazardous Cargo list, we shared our concerns with Coast 
Guard officials. The Coast Guard has since begun efforts to broaden its 
studies of potential consequences to include a wide range of hazardous 
commodities. It contracted with the American Bureau of Shipping to 
perform a comparative analysis of the consequences of an attack on 
vessels carrying all commodities on the CDC list, including LNG and 
LPG. The product of this analysis is to be a ranking of the relative 
consequences of each of the CDC commodities. This study is scheduled to 
be completed in spring 2007. Coast Guard headquarters officials told us 
that following this analysis, and subject to available funding and 
other considerations, they may consider adding other commodities to the 
comparative analysis, such as gasoline and jet fuel.

Going beyond the consequence analyses of hazardous commodities, the 
Coast Guard has also developed a tool to compare the overall relative 
risk scores of different terrorist attacks at the nation's ports. Field 
units are developing risk scenarios for potential targets at their 
ports and possible attack types that could be used against those 
targets. Using the Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model, the units 
are to analyze the different risk scenarios in relation to three key 
elements of risk: reported threat of different types of attack, 
vulnerability of the targets (incorporating different protective 
actions taken by security stakeholders), and consequences of a 
successful attack (including human health, economic, and 
environmental).[Footnote 55] Each risk scenario is to receive a score. 
These risk scores are to be comparable within and between ports so that 
they can be used in risk management decisions both locally and 
nationally.

Additional LNG Facilities Set to Come On Line Will Likely Pose 
Additional Challenges for Meeting Mission Requirements:

In the longer term, plans for adding additional LNG facilities may 
require the Coast Guard to reassess its workload yet again. Currently 
the Coast Guard is faced with providing security for vessels arriving 
at four domestic onshore LNG import facilities, but the number of LNG 
tankers bringing shipments to these facilities will increase 
considerably because of expansions that are planned or under 
way.[Footnote 56] In addition, industry analysts expect approximately 
12 more LNG facilities will be built over the next decade (see fig. 
12). Consequently, Coast Guard field units will likely be required to 
significantly expand their security workloads to conduct new LNG 
security missions.

Figure 12: Location of Operating, Planned, and Proposed LNG Marine 
Terminals by U.S. Coast Guard District:

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the location of operating, planned, 
and proposed LNG Marine Terminals by U.S. Coast Guard District. The 
figure is a map of the United States with symbols indicating locations 
within each district. The following data is depicted: 

District: First; 
Operating LNG import terminal: 1; 
Operating LNG export terminal: 0; 
Planned LNG import terminal: 1; 
Proposed LNG import terminal: 5. 

District: Fifth; 
Operating LNG import terminal: 1; 
Operating LNG export terminal: 0; 
Planned LNG import terminal: 1; 
Proposed LNG import terminal: 1. 

District: Seventh; 
Operating LNG import terminal: 1; 
Operating LNG export terminal: 0; 
Planned LNG import terminal: 0; 
Proposed LNG import terminal: 1. 

District: Eighth; 
Operating LNG import terminal: 2; 
Operating LNG export terminal: 0; 
Planned LNG import terminal: 11; 
Proposed LNG import terminal: 4. 

District: Eleventh; 
Operating LNG import terminal: 0; 
Operating LNG export terminal: 0; 
Planned LNG import terminal: 0; 
Proposed LNG import terminal: 4. 

District: Thirteenth; 
Operating LNG import terminal: 0; 
Operating LNG export terminal: 0; 
Planned LNG import terminal: 0; 
Proposed LNG import terminal: 2. 

District: Seventeenth; 
Operating LNG import terminal: 0; 
Operating LNG export terminal: 1; 
Planned LNG import terminal: 0; 
Proposed LNG import terminal: 0. 

Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and GAO. 

[End of figure]

Recognizing this coming increase in demand on security resources at LNG 
ports, Coast Guard field units have been planning strategies to help 
meet this demand. We found evidence that, in their planning efforts, 
Coast Guard field units and affected locations are seeking assistance 
from a wide range of stakeholders and sources. In particular, 
stakeholders mentioned the following:

* Manpower from state and local law enforcement. Several field units 
plan to rely on state and local agencies to conduct a considerable 
share of the new LNG workloads. While state and local law enforcement 
agencies have generally agreed to participate in LNG security 
operations, such support was largely contingent upon their receiving 
funding to cover their own resource gaps. According to the Coast Guard, 
at some ports, law enforcement agencies required funding to cover new 
capital investments, such as additional patrol boats, as well as 
operational costs such as funding for additional manpower or fuel for 
the new boats.

* Financial help from facility operators. At some of the proposed LNG 
ports we reviewed, facility operators were also planning to contribute 
considerable financial resources to help fund new LNG security 
operations. In doing so, these companies planned to fund both 
operational and capital enhancement costs for state and local law 
enforcement agencies that had agreed in concept to support Coast Guard 
LNG security missions. At two ports where the Coast Guard had approved 
security arrangements for new LNG facilities, state and local law 
enforcement agencies had already developed, or were planning to 
develop, a cost-sharing agreement with the facilities. For example, at 
one port, a potential LNG facility operator made a commitment to fund 
most of the capital enhancements and operational costs of the state and 
local law enforcement agencies involved, including two patrol boats for 
state agencies, two tugboats, and communications equipment. Facility 
operators told us they were motivated to provide resources because they 
understood that doing so was essential to ensuring final approval of 
the LNG facilities. Some facility operators also told us that the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 required them to develop resource cost- 
sharing agreements to offset state and local government resources used 
specifically for the new LNG facilities.[Footnote 57]

* Financial help through federal grants. State and local law 
enforcement agencies also reported that they were relying, in part, on 
federal grants to obtain additional resources. Of the 15 state and 
local law enforcement agencies we contacted, 9 agencies reported 
applying for Port Security Grants or Urban Area Security Initiative 
grants. Law enforcement agency officials told us they planned to fund 
capital enhancements with this grant funding. Among those items 
officials planned to fund with their grants were new patrol boats, 
construction of a new boathouse and piers, helicopters, and security 
cameras to be placed along an LNG transit route.

While port security grants and resource sharing agreements are expected 
to address at least part of the resource needs of the Coast Guard's law 
enforcement partners, the Coast Guard is likely to require additional 
resources to fulfill its own new security responsibilities. To date, 
however, field units have made little progress in obtaining additional 
resources. Additionally, because federal law prohibits the Coast Guard 
from receiving resources for its own use from private sector companies, 
the Coast Guard cannot use resource-sharing partnerships to help fill 
its own resource needs. Consequently, Coast Guard headquarters 
officials told us they recognize that despite the efforts of Captains 
of the Port to develop local solutions to new security demands, some 
field units will continue to lack the resources necessary to meet their 
increasing LNG security workloads.

Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they were considering two 
general options to provide field units with the necessary resources to 
carry out their new LNG security workloads. These two options are as 
follows:

* Redistribute resources to units with new LNG activity. Coast Guard 
officials told us they are considering shifting resources from ports 
with surplus resources to ports with new or expanded LNG facilities. 
Coast Guard headquarters officials told us, however, that they have not 
yet determined which ports would, or even could, provide these excess 
resources. Coast Guard's Atlantic area--where most of the new LNG 
activity is expected--has ordered districts and field units to report 
any excess resource capacity. Guided by risk management, Coast Guard 
headquarters may redistribute any available excess capacity to ports 
with new LNG security workloads. The earliest that the Coast Guard 
could reprogram assets from within the Atlantic Area is fiscal year 
2009.

* Request new resources via budget proposals. Coast Guard officials 
also reported that they may request additional funding through the 
annual budget process to support the acquisition of additional boats 
and personnel to conduct vessel escorts and infrastructure patrols and 
the training of additional personnel.

As of January 1, 2007, Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they 
had not yet developed a plan--or blueprint--for how to proceed with 
these two options for addressing new LNG security resource demands. The 
decisions about how to proceed may involve difficult choices, because 
shifting resources to this growing need could involve trimming 
resources now tasked to other homeland security duties or traditional 
non-homeland security missions, and because seeking more resources 
involves asking Coast Guard decision makers to weigh important, but 
competing, priorities. A national plan that identifies the Coast 
Guard's nationwide LNG resource needs and identifies milestones and 
funding needs for meeting those needs can help the Coast Guard manage 
its limited resources and communicate resource needs to Congress. It is 
important to complete this plan and address in it key elements and 
issues so that it is both comprehensive and useful to decision makers 
who must make difficult policy and budget choices.

Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face 
Several Challenges in Integrating Them:

To mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker carrying 
energy commodities, the United States has multiple plans that address 
actions to be taken at the national, port, facility, and vessel levels. 
To translate these plans into effective response actions, stakeholders 
could face at least three main challenges. First, if an attack were to 
occur, the stakeholders would need to integrate current, separate plans 
for the two types of responses necessary for mitigating the 
consequences of an attack--spill and terrorism responses. Second, port-
level plans to mitigate the potentially substantial economic 
consequences of an attack, such as plans that set priorities for the 
movement of vessels after a port reopens, could be useful. Third, 
stakeholders may need to obtain resources to ensure that they can carry 
out the plans. At the port level, this challenge may extend to response 
equipment, training, and communications equipment. To date, federal 
grants for port security have been directed mostly to prevention rather 
than response, but now DHS is moving toward a more comprehensive risk-
based decision-making process for allocating grant funds. At the time 
of our review, DHS did not have performance measures for determining 
how to allocate resources to ensure ports can effectively respond to an 
energy commodities spill caused by terrorism.

Planning for Spill Response Is Largely Separate from Planning for 
Terrorism Response:

The planning framework for responding to spills and terrorism incidents 
is extensive, involving multiple federal plans and memorandums of 
understanding, port-specific plans, as well as plans for individual 
facilities and vessels. As figure 13 shows, at the national level these 
plans are carried out under the general framework of the National 
Response Plan (NRP) but are developed into two separate lines of 
effort--one for spill response, the other for terrorism response.

Figure 13: Relationship of Spill and Terrorism Response Plans and 
Agreements:

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a schematic illustration of the relationship of spill 
and terrorism response plans and agreements. There are two levels of 
response, national level and port level. The illustration depicts the 
following relationships: 

National Response Plan (main plan): 
Includes the following, oil spill related: 
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP); 
* Emergency Support Function #10 (subplan); 
Includes the following, terrorism related: 
* Terrorism related: Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and 
Investigation Annex (subplan). 

National level, Oil Spill related: Emergency Support Function #10 
(subplan); 
Relates directly to: National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP). 

National level, Terrorism related: Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement 
and Investigation Annex (subplan); 
National level, National Incident Management System (main plan): 
Relates directly to: 
* Emergency Support Function #10; 
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP); 
* Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex. 

National level, National Strategy for Maritime Security (main plan), 
Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (subplan): 
Relates directly to: 
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP); 
* Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex. 

National level and Port level, Memorandums of Understanding (main 
plan): 
Relates directly to: 
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP); 
* Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex (subplan); 
* Area Contingency Plan, oil spill related (port level); 
* Area Maritime Security plan, terrorism related (port level). 

Port level, Area Contingency Plan, oil spill related: 
Relates directly to: 
* Vessel Response Plan, oil spill related; 
* Facility Response Plan, oil spill related; 

* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP)(national level). 

Port level, Area Maritime Security plan, terrorism related: 
Relates directly to: 
* Vessel Security Plan, terrorism related; 
* Facility Security Plan, terrorism related. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure]

The NRP designates the Coast Guard as the primary agency for spill 
response on water and the FBI as the primary agency for terrorism 
response, and it calls on the two agencies to coordinate their 
responses if the terrorist attack involves energy commodities. For this 
type of incident, FBI officials stated, crime scene investigation and 
preservation would take place at the same time as the environmental 
response activities that would be initiated to contain the likely 
spill. In this situation, the NRP notes that spill responders will 
provide assistance, investigative support, and intelligence analysis 
for oil and hazardous materials response in coordination with the law 
enforcement and criminal investigation activities of the FBI.

As the figure shows, beneath the NRP, spill responses are coordinated 
by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP), while terrorism responses are coordinated by the Terrorism 
Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.[Footnote 58] Also at 
the federal level, various other federal plans and agreements, such as 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Marine Operational 
Threat Response Plan (MOTR), and interagency memorandums of agreement 
also help guide the response. The spill and terrorism responses 
continue into port-level p