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entitled 'Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air 
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These 
Efforts Can Be Strengthened' which was released on May 11, 2007. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2007: 

Aviation Security: 

Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance 
Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened: 

GAO-07-729: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-729, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to evaluate 
the security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the 
United States are of great importance, particularly considering that 
flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to 
be targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated by the 
alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. 

For this review, GAO evaluated the results of foreign airport and air 
carrier evaluations; actions taken and assistance provided by TSA when 
security deficiencies were identified; TSA’s oversight of its foreign 
airport and air carrier evaluation programs; and TSA’s efforts to 
address challenges in conducting foreign airport and air carrier 
evaluations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport and air 
carrier evaluation results and interviewed TSA officials, foreign 
aviation security officials, and air carrier representatives. 

What GAO Found: 

Of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, 
TSA found that about 36 percent complied with all applicable security 
standards, while about 64 percent did not comply with at least one 
standard. The security deficiencies identified by TSA at two foreign 
airports were such that the Secretary of Homeland Security notified the 
public that the overall security at these airports was ineffective. Of 
the 529 overseas air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 
2005, for about 71 percent, TSA did not identify any security 
violations, and for about 29 percent, TSA identified at least one 
security violation. TSA took enforcement action—warning letters, 
correction letters, or monetary fines—for about 18 percent of the air 
carrier security violations. TSA addressed most of the remaining 82 
percent of security violations through on-site consultation. 

TSA assisted foreign officials and air carrier representatives in 
addressing identified deficiencies through on-site consultation, 
recommendations for security improvements, and referrals for training 
and technical assistance. However, TSA’s oversight of the foreign 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be 
strengthened. For example, TSA did not have adequate controls in place 
to track whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually 
conducted, deferred, or canceled. TSA also did not always document 
foreign officials’ progress in addressing security deficiencies 
identified by TSA. Further, TSA did not always track what enforcement 
actions were taken against air carriers with identified security 
deficiencies. TSA also did not have outcome-based performance measures 
to assess the impact of its assessment and inspection programs on the 
security of U.S.-bound flights. Without such controls, TSA may not have 
reasonable assurance that the foreign airport assessment and air 
carrier inspection programs are operating as intended. 

TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its 
ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, including a lack of available inspectors, concerns 
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of 
frequent airport visits by TSA and others, and host government concerns 
regarding sovereignty. In October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-
based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, which should 
allow TSA to focus its limited inspector resources on higher-risk 
airports. TSA is also exploring opportunities to conduct joint airport 
assessments with the European Commission and use the results of airport 
assessments conducted by the European Commission to potentially adjust 
the frequency of TSA airport visits. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In an April 2007 report that contained sensitive information, GAO 
recommended, and the Department of Homeland Security agreed, that TSA 
develop controls for tracking and documenting information and establish 
outcome-based performance measures to strengthen oversight of its 
foreign airport and air carrier evaluation programs. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-729]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 
512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Complied with All 
Aviation Security Standards, and When Deemed Necessary, DHS and TSA 
Took Enforcement Action on Those That Did Not: 

TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representatives in 
Addressing Security Deficiencies, but Can Strengthen Oversight of the 
Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its 
Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Results of Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to Noncompliance: 

Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies and 
Oversight of Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Efforts: 

Challenges That Affected TSA's Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport 
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections and Actions Taken to Address 
those Challenges: 

Appendix II: International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and 
Recommended Practices Used by TSA to Conduct Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign 
Airport Assessments: 

Appendix III: TSA Security Requirements for U.S.-Based and Foreign 
Carriers Operating Out of Foreign Airports: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Government Aviation Security Training and Technical 
Assistance Programs for Foreign Entities: 

Department of State: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program: 

U.S. Trade and Development Agency: 

Department of Transportation--Safe Skies for Africa Program: 

Department of State--Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs--Organization of American States Inter-American 
Committee against Terrorism: 

Department of State--Western Hemisphere Affairs--Organization of 
American States--Inter-American Committee against Terrorism: 

Department of Justice-International Criminal Investigative Training and 
Assistance Program: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Positions That Play a Key Role in TSA's Foreign Airport and 
Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

Table 2: Comparison of the Severity of Security Deficiencies and 
Corrective Action Taken at One Secretarial Action Airport and One Non- 
Secretarial Action Airport: 

Table 3: Budgeted and Available International Inspectors by IFO, by 
Month for Fiscal Year 2005: 

Table 4: Budgeted Number of Inspectors, Total Scheduled Foreign Airport 
Visits, and Average Number of Scheduled Foreign Airport Visits per 
Inspector, by IFO, for Fiscal Year 2005: 

Table 5: Description and Status of TSA-European Commission Aviation 
Security Working Groups: 

Table 6: Elements of the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 
Applicable to International Operations: 

Table 7: Elements of the Foreign Air Carrier Model Security Program 
Applicable to International Operations: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Airport Assessment Activities: 

Figure 2: Process for Taking Secretarial Action against a Foreign 
Airport: 

Figure 3: Air Carrier Inspection Process: 

Abbreviations: 

AEA: Association of European Airlines: 

AOSSP: Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program: 

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Conference: 

ATA: Anti-Terrorism Assistance: 

CICTE: Inter-American Committee against Terrorism: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

ECAC: European Civil Aviation Conference: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FAARS: Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System: 

FSD: Federal Security Director: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 

IATA: International Air Transport Association: 

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization: 

ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program: 

IFO: international field office: 

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

IPSI: International Principal Security Inspector: 

OAS: Organization of American States: 

PARIS: Performance and Results Information System: 

PART: Performance Assessment Rating Tool: 

PSI: Principal Security Inspector: 

SOP: standard operating procedures: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

TSAR: Transportation Security Administration Representative: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

USTDA: United States Trade and Development Agency: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 11, 2007: 

The Honorable John L. Mica: 
Ranking Republican Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to 
be targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated in August 
2006 when British officials uncovered an alleged terrorist plot to 
detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft departing from the 
United Kingdom for the United States. Similar terrorist activity was 
uncovered in December 2003 when U.S. intelligence officials identified 
terrorists' intent on carrying out attacks on U.S.-bound flights 
originating from foreign airports. Such conditions highlight the 
continued need for the United States to coordinate efforts with foreign 
governments to help ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights. Given 
that there were more than 650,000 flights to the United States from 
foreign locations during calendar year 2005, the security of foreign 
airports and air carriers that service the United States is integral to 
the security of U.S. commercial aviation. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency 
with primary responsibility for securing the nation's civil aviation 
system,[Footnote 1] has several efforts under way with other nations to 
help ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights. For example, TSA, 
through its foreign airport assessment program, determines whether 
foreign airports that provide service to the United States are 
maintaining and carrying out effective security measures. Additionally, 
TSA, through its air carrier inspection program, determines whether air 
carriers, U.S.-based or foreign, that service the United States are 
complying with applicable security requirements. According to TSA 
officials, the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs enable TSA to inform the public about foreign airports that do 
not maintain and carry out effective security measures so that the 
public can make informed decisions when planning their travel. 

TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports 
using the aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).[Footnote 2] 
ICAO standards and recommended practices address operational issues at 
an airport, such as ensuring that passengers and baggage are properly 
screened and that unauthorized individuals do not have access to 
restricted areas of an airport. ICAO standards also address 
nonoperational issues, such as ensuring that a foreign government has 
implemented a national civil aviation security program for regulating 
security procedures at its airports and ensuring that airport officials 
implementing security controls go through background investigations, 
are appropriately trained, and are certified according to a foreign 
government's national civil aviation security program. Member states 
have agreed to comply with ICAO standards, and are strongly encouraged 
to comply with ICAO recommended practices. While TSA is authorized 
under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments at intervals it 
considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment of security 
measures at a foreign airport without permission from the host 
government. TSA also conducts security inspections of foreign and U.S.- 
based air carriers with service to the United States from foreign 
countries to ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, 
including those set forth in the air carriers' TSA-approved security 
programs.[Footnote 3] As of October 2006, there were a total of 924 air 
carrier stations located in 268 airports around the world that service 
the United States and that TSA may seek to inspect.[Footnote 4] 

Considering the high volume of flights arriving in the United States 
from foreign locations and the history of terrorist threats against 
commercial aviation, TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs are important elements in ensuring the security of 
inbound flights. Given the vulnerability of U.S.-bound flights to acts 
of terrorism, this report addresses the following questions: (1) What 
were the results of TSA's fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessments 
and air carrier inspections, and what actions were taken, if any, when 
TSA identified that foreign airports and air carriers were not 
complying with security standards? (2) How, if at all, did TSA assist 
foreign countries and air carriers in addressing any deficiencies 
identified during foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, and to what extent did TSA provide oversight of its 
assessment and inspection efforts? (3) What challenges, if any, 
affected TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections, and what actions have TSA and others taken to 
address these challenges? In April 2007, we issued a report that 
contained sensitive security information regarding TSA's foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections. This report provides 
the results of our April 2007 report with the sensitive security 
information removed. 

To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed TSA guidance for 
conducting and reporting the results of foreign airport assessments and 
air carrier inspections. We also obtained and analyzed the results of 
128 foreign airport assessments and 529 air carrier inspections 
conducted by TSA during fiscal year 2005 to determine the extent to 
which foreign airports and air carriers operating overseas complied 
with aviation security standards.[Footnote 5] We assessed the 
reliability of TSA's air carrier inspection data for fiscal year 2005 
and concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of our review. We also interviewed TSA's Office of Security Operations 
and its Transportation Sector Network Management officials, both in 
headquarters and the field,[Footnote 6] who are responsible for 
planning, coordinating, overseeing, and carrying out foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections, to obtain information on TSA's 
efforts to help foreign officials address airport security deficiencies 
and TSA's efforts to overcome challenges identified by TSA officials in 
conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. 
Additionally, we visited three European, three Asian, and one other 
North American country where we met with host government aviation 
security officials, air carrier representatives, airport officials, 
aviation industry representatives, and TSA officials to obtain their 
perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs. We also accompanied TSA officials during an 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection at an airport in the 
Caribbean. In addition, we interviewed 16 foreign aviation security 
officials stationed in their countries' embassies in Washington, D.C., 
to obtain their perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and 
air carrier inspection programs. However, information obtained from our 
interviews with host government and aviation industry representatives 
cannot be generalized beyond those contacted because we did not use a 
probability sampling method to select these officials for interviews. 
We also conducted phone interviews with four Federal Security Directors 
(FSD)[Footnote 7] and seven TSA aviation security inspectors based in 
U.S. airports to discuss their involvement in foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections. Information from these 
interviews cannot be generalized to all FSDs in U.S. airports or to 
domestic inspectors who support foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections because we did not use a probability sampling 
method to select these officials for interviews. We also met with 
officials from ICAO, the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA), the European Commission, the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) regarding their perspectives on TSA's 
foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs and the 
process and standards they use, if any, to conduct their own airport 
assessments.[Footnote 8] Additionally, we interviewed officials from 
the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of 
Transportation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to learn 
about the aviation security training and technical assistance they 
provide to foreign governments. 

We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More 
details about the scope and methodology of our work are contained in 
appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Based on the results of TSA's fiscal year 2005 foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections, some foreign airports and air 
carriers complied with all relevant aviation security standards, while 
others did not, and when deemed necessary, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and TSA took enforcement action against those that were not in 
compliance. Of the 128 foreign airports with air carriers that provide 
service to the United States and that TSA assessed during fiscal year 
2005, TSA found that at the completion of the assessment, 46 (about 36 
percent) complied with all ICAO standards and recommended practices, 
whereas 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard 
or recommended practice. The most common area of noncompliance for 
foreign airports was related to quality control--mechanisms to assess 
and address security vulnerabilities at airports. For example, one 
airport did not meet quality control standards because it did not have 
a mechanism in place to ensure that airport officials implementing 
security controls were appropriately trained and able to effectively 
perform their duties. According to TSA, access control measures and 
passenger and checked baggage screening are critical elements of 
effective security at foreign airports because these measures are 
intended to prevent terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as 
weapons and explosives, onto aircraft. However, even if a foreign 
airport does not meet multiple aviation security standards, including 
critical standards, TSA may determine that such deficiencies do not 
warrant review by the Secretary of Homeland Security.[Footnote 9] 
Nonetheless, if TSA determines that secretarial action may be warranted 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on TSA's assessment, 
determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out 
effective security measures, then he or she must take action. These 
actions may include issuing a letter to foreign government officials 
stating that they have 90 days to improve security measures to meet 
ICAO standards or notifying the public that a foreign airport does not 
maintain and carry out effective security measures. For example, during 
fiscal year 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security determined that 2 
of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed were not maintaining and 
carrying out effective security measures. In response, DHS notified the 
general public of these determinations by the Secretary. During fiscal 
year 2005, of the 529 inspections of air carriers operating out of 
foreign airports, there were 373 inspections (about 71 percent) for 
which TSA did not identify any security violations and 156 inspections 
(about 29 percent) for which TSA found that the air carrier did not 
comply with at least one TSA security requirement. There were a total 
of 419 instances of noncompliance identified during these 156 
inspections.[Footnote 10] In some cases, the security deficiencies 
identified during these inspections were corrected or addressed 
immediately. When security deficiencies were not resolved immediately, 
TSA inspectors, at times, recommended enforcement action. Enforcement 
action included issuing letters of warning or correction to air 
carriers or imposing civil penalties--monetary fines--on air carriers. 
Of the 419 security violations identified during fiscal year 2005 air 
carrier inspections, 259 (about 62 percent) were corrected or addressed 
immediately, and 76 (about 18 percent) were recommended for enforcement 
action. TSA could not readily identify the enforcement actions that 
were taken for the remaining 84 (20 percent) security violations. 
Enforcement actions taken by TSA as a result of fiscal year 2005 air 
carrier inspections consisted of 26 enforcement actions and 14 letters 
of correction.[Footnote 11] Civil penalties ranging from $18,000 to 
$25,000 were recommended for 7 enforcement actions. Although TSA has 
not conducted its own analysis of foreign airport assessment and air 
carrier inspection results, TSA officials stated that our analysis of 
the results was consistent with their assumptions regarding the most 
prominent security deficiencies identified among foreign airports and 
air carriers. However, TSA officials stated that it is difficult to 
draw conclusions about the results--such as whether the results are 
generally positive or negative--considering the differences in the 
capabilities and willingness of foreign officials to address security 
deficiencies. TSA officials further stated that the cumulative results 
of the assessments and inspections may be helpful in identifying the 
aviation security training needs of foreign aviation security 
officials. While TSA does not have its own program to provide aviation 
security training and technical assistance to foreign aviation security 
officials, TSA officials stated that they could use the results of 
TSA's foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials to 
training and technical assistance programs offered by ICAO and several 
other U.S. government agencies. 

During fiscal year 2005, TSA helped improve security at foreign 
airports by assisting foreign officials and air carrier representatives 
in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments 
and inspections. However, TSA's oversight of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be strengthened. 
TSA assisted foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies 
identified during airport assessments in various ways, including 
providing on-site consultation to help foreign officials immediately 
address security deficiencies, making recommendations to help foreign 
officials sustain security improvements, and helping foreign 
governments obtain aviation security training and technical assistance. 
To help air carriers address security deficiencies that were 
identified, TSA often provided on-site consultation. For example, 
during one inspection, TSA inspectors identified a security deficiency 
related to catering carts, after which the inspectors immediately 
notified the air carrier of the deficiency and made a recommendation 
for better securing catering carts in the future.[Footnote 12] TSA also 
assigned a principal security inspector to each U.S. carrier and 
foreign carrier that provides service to the United States whose 
responsibility was to counsel air carriers and provide clarification on 
TSA security requirements when necessary. TSA has several controls in 
place to ensure that the agency is meeting internal requirements for 
implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs, such as requiring inspectors to use standard operating 
procedures for coordinating with host government officials for 
scheduling, conducting, and reporting the results of foreign airport 
assessments. However, additional controls--including controls for 
tracking, documenting, and measuring the impact of TSA's assessment and 
inspection activities--would help strengthen its oversight of these 
programs. First, TSA does not have controls in place to track the 
status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, including whether the assessments and inspections were 
actually conducted or whether they were deferred or canceled, which 
could make it difficult for TSA to ensure that scheduled assessments 
and inspections are completed. Second, TSA does not always document the 
results of follow-up conducted by TSA international staff to determine 
progress made by foreign governments in addressing security 
deficiencies identified by TSA. Documentation of such follow-up would 
enable TSA to have access to updated information on the security of 
foreign airports that provide service to the United States. Third, TSA 
does not always track the status of air carrier inspections from 
initiation through completion, which prevents TSA from determining 
whether appropriate action was taken against air carriers that violated 
security requirements. Finally, TSA does not have outcome-based 
performance measures in place to measure the impact that its efforts 
have had on helping foreign airport officials and air carrier 
representatives comply with aviation security standards and 
requirements. Federal standards for internal controls and associated 
guidance suggest that agencies should document key decisions in a way 
that is complete and accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced 
from initiation, through processing, to after completion. Starting in 
August 2006, TSA officials began to develop controls for tracking the 
status of scheduled foreign airport visits, such as tracking the number 
of days remaining until inspectors are to visit a particular foreign 
airport. However, in February 2007, TSA officials acknowledged that 
additional refinements to the tracking system were needed. TSA 
officials also stated that developing performance measures to assess 
the impact of assessment and inspection-related efforts on security at 
foreign airports would be useful, but they identified several concerns 
about developing such measures. For example, TSA officials stated that 
whether foreign officials improve security at their airports is not 
within TSA's control and, therefore, developing a performance measure 
related to TSA's contributions to improving foreign airport security 
may not be appropriate. However, other federal agencies, such as the 
Department of State, have developed performance measures for foreign 
assistance programs for which the outcome is not entirely within the 
agency's control. Even without full control over such measures, it 
would be useful for TSA to develop outcome-based measures for its 
foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs--such as 
the percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a result 
of TSA on-site assistance and TSA recommendations for corrective 
action--to identify any aspects of these programs that need 
improvement. Also, with additional oversight of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs, TSA would have better 
assurance that these programs are operating as intended. 

TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its 
ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, including a lack of available inspectors, concerns 
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of 
frequent airport visits by TSA and others, and concerns unique to 
specific host governments, such as sovereignty--more specifically, 
concerns that TSA assessments and inspections infringe upon a host 
government's authority to regulate airports and air carriers within its 
borders. According to TSA officials, TSA deferred approximately 30 
percent of the foreign airport visits--including airport assessments 
and air carrier inspections--that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005, 
due to the lack of available inspectors and concerns raised by host 
government officials. TSA officials stated that two key factors 
affected the availability of inspectors during fiscal year 2005. First, 
TSA was operating with fewer inspectors than the agency budgeted for 
fiscal year 2005. Specifically, three of the five international field 
offices were operating with fewer inspectors than they were budgeted 
during at least 9 months out of the fiscal year. According to TSA, the 
shortage of inspectors was due to the high turnover rate for inspectors 
and the lengthy process for hiring additional inspectors to fill vacant 
positions. Second, TSA scheduled more foreign airport visits--which 
includes both airport assessments and air carrier inspections--than the 
budgeted number of inspectors could have reasonably conducted. 
According to TSA, each inspector can reasonably conduct between 8 and 
12 foreign airport visits per year depending on the amount of time 
inspectors remain on site to help foreign authorities address any 
security deficiencies. However, all five international field offices 
scheduled more than 12 foreign airport visits per inspector during 
fiscal year 2005; one international field office scheduled more than 24 
visits per inspector. TSA officials said that their internal policy 
regarding the frequency with which the agency is to conduct foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections drove their decision to 
schedule more foreign airport visits than inspectors could reasonably 
have conducted. According to TSA officials, this internal policy was 
developed by the Federal Aviation Administration, which was responsible 
for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections 
prior to TSA. TSA officials also stated that the Federal Aviation 
Administration had more available inspectors to conduct assessments and 
inspections than TSA. Given the lack of available international 
inspectors, TSA also used domestic inspectors--that is, inspectors who 
typically conduct security inspections at U.S. airports--to conduct 33 
percent of the scheduled foreign airport visits for fiscal year 2005. 
However, TSA officials stated that the use of domestic inspectors is 
undesirable because these inspectors lack experience conducting 
assessments in the international environment. During October 2006, TSA 
began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport 
assessments to better allocate its limited inspector resources by 
focusing on foreign airports that pose the greatest security risk to 
U.S.-bound air travel. Another potential benefit to TSA's new risk- 
based approach to scheduling is that it may allow TSA to reduce its 
reliance on domestic inspectors. Our analysis shows that TSA's risk- 
based approach is consistent with generally accepted risk management 
principles. TSA has also taken steps to address concerns regarding the 
resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent 
airport visits. Host government officials in three of the seven foreign 
countries we visited, and representatives of various air carrier 
associations, stated that countries are subjected to multiple 
assessments and inspections each year by TSA, ICAO, the European 
Commission, and others, and because foreign government officials and 
air carrier representatives have to escort the various inspectors 
during the assessment and inspections, the frequency of airport visits 
is burdensome on the host government and air carriers. TSA's risk-based 
approach for scheduling airport assessments should help address some 
host governments' concerns regarding the resource burden. TSA has also 
begun to explore other opportunities to alleviate the resource burden 
placed on host governments. Specifically, when the opportunity is 
available, TSA is considering conducting joint assessments and using 
the results of some host government or third party assessments to 
adjust the frequency of TSA visits; collectively, these efforts may 
reduce the number of airport visits experienced by some countries. 
However, TSA officials stated that they are cautious about using the 
results of other entities' assessments because TSA has not 
independently evaluated the quality of the assessments conducted by 
these other entities and because these other entities base their 
assessments on different aviation security standards than TSA. TSA 
headquarters officials stated that working with host governments to 
harmonize aviation security standards as well as the process used to 
conduct assessments--that is, developing similar standards and 
assessment processes that provide the same level of security--would 
facilitate TSA's use of host government and third party assessment 
results. TSA has made efforts to harmonize security standards and 
inspection processes with the European Commission, although, as of 
February 2007, a time frame for completion of these efforts had not yet 
been established. TSA has also harmonized some security standards-- 
particularly those related to the screening of liquids, gels, and 
aerosols--with several European countries, Australia, and Canada. In 
addition to working to address concerns regarding the resource burden 
placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits, TSA 
has taken steps to address some country-specific challenges that have 
limited TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport visits. For example, 
TSA said that officials from one country viewed TSA's airport 
assessments as an infringement on their country's sovereignty, and 
therefore would not allow TSA to conduct assessments of airports in 
their country. However, TSA officials negotiated with officials in this 
country so that assessments are conducted under the guise of a TSA 
"visit" to--versus an "assessment" of--the airport, although officials 
from that country prohibit TSA inspectors from assessing airport 
perimeter security and the contents of their national aviation security 
programs. TSA officials stated that when unique concerns arise in the 
future, they will continue to work with countries on a case-by-case 
basis to try to address their concerns. 

In our April 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, 
we made several recommendations to assist TSA in strengthening 
oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs. These include developing and implementing controls to track 
the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections from initiation through completion, including reasons why 
assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled; developing and 
implementing a standard process for tracking and documenting host 
governments' progress in addressing security deficiencies identified 
during airport assessments; and developing performance measures to 
evaluate the impact that TSA assistance and enforcement actions have 
had on improving foreign airport and air carrier compliance with 
applicable aviation security standards. We provided a draft of this 
report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for review. DHS, in 
its written comments, concurred with our findings and recommendations, 
and stated that the recommendations will help strengthen TSA's 
oversight of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. 
DHS described some actions that TSA is taking to implement these 
recommendations, including enhancing its tracking system to include the 
reason for deferment or cancellation of an airport assessment or an air 
carrier inspection; developing a system whereby outstanding 
deficiencies noted during an assessment will be tracked along with 
deficiency specific information, deadlines, and current status; and 
developing outcome-based performance measures for the foreign airport 
assessment program and air carrier inspection activities. 

Background: 

DHS Responsibilities for Ensuring the Security of U.S.-Bound Flights 
from Foreign Countries: 

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress 
passed, and the President signed into law, the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, which established TSA and gave the agency 
responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including the 
nation's civil aviation system, which includes domestic and 
international commercial aviation operations.[Footnote 13] In 
accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44907, TSA assesses the effectiveness of 
security measures at foreign airports served by a U.S. air carrier, 
from which a foreign air carrier serves the United States, that pose a 
high risk of introducing danger to international air travel, and at 
other airports deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.[Footnote 14] This provision of law also identifies measures 
that the Secretary must take in the event that he or she determines 
that an airport is not maintaining and carrying out effective security 
measures based on TSA assessments.[Footnote 15] TSA also conducts 
inspections of U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers servicing the 
United States from foreign airports pursuant to its authority to ensure 
that air carriers certificated or permitted to operate to, from, or 
within the United States meet applicable security requirements, 
including those set forth in an air carrier's TSA-approved security 
program.[Footnote 16] 

The Secretary of DHS delegated to the Assistant Secretary of TSA the 
responsibility for conducting foreign airport assessments but retained 
responsibility for making the determination that a foreign airport does 
not maintain and carry out effective security measures. Currently, 
TSA's Security Operations and Transportation Sector Network Management 
divisions are jointly responsible for conducting foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections. Table 1 highlights the roles 
and responsibilities of certain TSA positions within these divisions 
that are responsible for implementing the foreign airport assessment 
and air carrier inspection programs. 

Table 1: Positions That Play a Key Role in TSA's Foreign Airport and 
Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

Office/division: Security Operations; 
Position: Aviation Security Inspector; 
Duties: Inspectors are primarily responsible for performing and 
reporting the results of both foreign airport assessments and the air 
carrier inspections, and will provide on-site assistance and make 
recommendations for security enhancements. Inspectors are also deployed 
in response to specific incidents or to monitor for identified threats. 
Inspectors are based in one of TSA's five international field offices 
(IFO)[A.]. 

Office/division: Transportation Sector Network Management; 
Position: Transportation Security Administration Representative (TSAR); 
Duties: TSARs communicate with foreign government officials to address 
transportation security matters and to conduct foreign airport 
assessments. Specifically, the TSARs serve as on-site coordinators for 
TSA responses to terrorist incidents and threats to U.S. assets at 
foreign transportation modes. TSARs also serve as principal advisors on 
transportation security affairs to U.S. ambassadors and other embassy 
officials responsible for transportation issues to ensure the safety 
and security of the transportation system. For the foreign airport 
assessment program, TSARs are often involved in arranging pre- 
assessment activities, assessment visits, and follow-up visits. 
Additionally, TSARs are responsible for completing portions of the 
airport assessment reports and reviewing completed assessment reports. 
TSARs also help host government officials address security deficiencies 
that are identified during assessments. 

Office/division: Transportation Sector Network Management; 
Position: International Security Principal Inspector (IPSI); 
Duties: IPSIs are responsible for assisting foreign air carriers in 
complying with TSA security requirements by providing counseling and 
clarification to airlines on TSA requirements and providing requested 
information to TSA about these air carriers. 

Office/division: Transportation Sector Network Management; 
Position: Principal Security Inspector (PSI); 
Duties: PSIs are responsible for assisting U.S.-based air carriers in 
complying with TSA security requirements by providing oversight to 
airlines on TSA requirements and providing requested information to TSA 
about these air carriers. 

Source: TSA. 

[A] IFO managers are responsible for the overall planning of assessment 
visits that take place in their respective regions. TSA's IFOs are 
located in Dallas, Miami, Frankfurt, Singapore and Los Angeles. 

[B] TSARs are located in Athens, Bangkok, Beijing, Brussels, Buenos 
Aires, Dallas, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Manila, Miami, Paris, Rome, 
Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. 

[End of table] 

TSA's Process for Assessing Aviation Security Measures at Foreign 
Airports: 

TSA conducts foreign airport assessments to determine the extent to 
which foreign airports maintain and carry out effective security 
measures in order to ensure the security of flights bound for the 
United States. Specifically, TSA assesses foreign airports using 86 of 
the 106 aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted 
by ICAO, a United Nations organization representing nearly 190 
countries.[Footnote 17] (See app. II for a description of the 86 ICAO 
standards and recommended practices TSA uses to assess security 
measures at foreign airports.[Footnote 18]) While TSA is authorized 
under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments at intervals it 
considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment of security 
measures at a foreign airport without permission from the host 
government. During fiscal year 2005, TSA scheduled assessments by 
categorizing airports into two groups. Category A airports--airports 
that did not exhibit operational issues in the last two TSA 
assessments--were assessed once every 3 years, while category B 
airports--airports that did exhibit operational issues in either of the 
last two TSA assessments, or were not previously assessed--were 
assessed annually. Based on documentation provided by TSA, during 
fiscal year 2005, TSA assessed aviation security measures in place at 
128 foreign airports that participated voluntarily in TSA's Foreign 
Airport Assessment Program.[Footnote 19] 

TSA's assessments of foreign airports are conducted by a team of 
inspectors, which generally includes one team leader and one team 
member. According to TSA, it generally takes 3 to 7 days to complete a 
foreign airport assessment. However, the amount of time required to 
conduct an assessment varies based on several factors, including the 
size of the airport, the number of air carrier station inspections to 
be conducted at the airport,[Footnote 20] the threat level to civil 
aviation in the host country, and the amount of time it takes 
inspectors to travel from the international field office (IFO) to the 
airport where the assessment will take place. An additional 2 weeks is 
required for inspectors to complete the assessment report after they 
return to the IFO. 

As shown in figure 1, regarding the process for conducting a foreign 
airport assessment, before TSA can assess the security measures at a 
foreign airport, the Transportation Security Administration 
Representative (TSAR) must first obtain approval from the host 
government to allow TSA to conduct an airport assessment and to 
schedule the date for an on-site visit to the foreign airport. During 
the assessment, the team of inspectors uses several methods to 
determine a foreign airport's level of compliance with international 
security standards, including conducting interviews with airport 
officials, examining documents pertaining to the airport's security 
measures, and conducting a physical inspection of the airport. For 
example, the inspectors are to examine the integrity of fences, 
lighting, and locks by walking the grounds of the airport. Inspectors 
also make observations regarding access control procedures, such as 
looking at employee and vehicle identification methods in secure areas, 
as well as monitoring passenger and baggage screening procedures in the 
airport. At the close of an airport assessment, inspectors brief 
foreign airport and government officials on the results of the 
assessment. TSA inspectors also prepare a report summarizing their 
findings on the airport's overall security posture and security 
measures, which may contain recommendations for corrective action and 
must be reviewed by the TSAR, the IFO manager, and TSA headquarters 
officials. 

Figure 1: Airport Assessment Activities: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA. 

[End of figure] 

If the inspectors report that an airport's security measures do not 
meet minimum international security standards, particularly critical 
standards, such as those related to passenger and checked baggage 
screening and access controls, TSA headquarters officials are to inform 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.[Footnote 21] If the Secretary, 
based on TSA's airport assessment results, determines that a foreign 
airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, he 
or she must, after advising the Secretary of State, take secretarial 
action. Figure 2 describes in detail the types of secretarial action 
the Secretary may take during such instances. There are three basic 
types of secretarial action: 

* 90-day action--The Secretary notifies foreign government officials 
that they have 90 days to address security deficiencies that were 
identified during the airport assessment and recommends steps necessary 
to bring the security measures at the airport up to ICAO 
standards.[Footnote 22] 

* Public notification--If, after 90 days, the Secretary finds that the 
government has not brought security measures at the airport up to ICAO 
standards, the Secretary notifies the general public that the airport 
does not maintain and carry out effective security measures.[Footnote 
23] 

* Modification to air carrier operations--If, after 90 days, the 
Secretary finds that the government has not brought security measures 
at the airport up to ICAO standards: 

- The Secretary may withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on the 
operating authority of U.S.-based and foreign air carriers operating at 
that airport, following consultation with appropriate host government 
officials and air carrier representatives, and with the approval of the 
Secretary of State. 

- The President may prohibit a U.S.-based or foreign air carrier from 
providing transportation between the United States and any foreign 
airport that is the subject of a secretarial determination. 

* Suspension of service--The Secretary, with approval of the Secretary 
of State, shall suspend the right of any U.S.-based or foreign air 
carrier to provide service to or from an airport if the Secretary 
determines that a condition exists that threatens the safety or 
security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from the 
airport, and the public interest requires an immediate suspension of 
transportation between the United States and that airport.[Footnote 24] 

Figure 2: Process for Taking Secretarial Action against a Foreign 
Airport: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA. 

[End of figure] 

TSA's Process for Inspecting Air Carriers with Service to the United 
States from Foreign Airports: 

Along with conducting airport assessments, the same TSA inspection team 
also conducts air carrier inspections when visiting a foreign airport 
to ensure that air carriers are in compliance with TSA security 
requirements.[Footnote 25] Both U.S. and foreign air carriers with 
service to the United States are subject to inspection. As of February 
2007, TSA guidance required TSA to inspect each U.S. air carrier 
station once a year, except for those airports in which TSA has 
determined to be an "extraordinary" location,[Footnote 26] where 
inspections are to occur twice a year. Foreign air carriers are to be 
inspected twice in a 3-year period at each foreign airport, except in 
extraordinary locations, where they are to be inspected 
annually.[Footnote 27] According to documentation provided by TSA, 
during fiscal year 2005, TSA conducted 529 inspections of foreign and 
U.S. air carriers serving the United States from foreign airports. When 
conducting inspections, TSA inspectors examine compliance with 
applicable security requirements, including TSA-approved security 
programs,[Footnote 28] emergency amendments to the security programs, 
and security directives.[Footnote 29] Air carrier security programs are 
based on the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program for U.S.-based 
air carriers and the Model Security Program for foreign air carriers, 
which serve as guidance for what an air carrier needs to include in its 
own security program. The Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 
is designed to provide for the safety of passengers and their 
belongings traveling on flights against acts of criminal violence, air 
piracy, and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and 
other prohibited items onboard an aircraft. Likewise, the Model 
Security Program is designed to prevent prohibited items from being 
carried aboard aircraft, prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes, 
ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized carrier 
representative, and ensure the proper handling of cargo to be loaded 
onto passenger flights. When TSA determines that additional security 
measures are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or to a 
specific threat against civil aviation, TSA may issue a security 
directive or an emergency amendment to an air carrier security program 
that sets forth additional mandatory security requirements.[Footnote 
30] Air carriers are required to comply with each applicable security 
directive or emergency amendment issued by TSA, along with the 
requirements already within their security programs and any other 
requirements set forth in applicable law. Appendix III provides 
additional information on security requirements for U.S. and foreign 
air carriers serving the United States from foreign airports. 

Although U.S.-based and foreign air carriers are guided by different 
standards within the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program and 
the Model Security Program, inspections for both of these entities are 
similar. As in the case of airport assessments, air carrier inspections 
are conducted by a team of inspectors, which generally includes one 
team leader and one team member. An inspection of an air carrier 
typically takes 1 or 2 days, but can take longer depending on the 
extent of service by the air carrier. Inspection teams may spend 
several days at a foreign airport inspecting air carriers if there are 
multiple airlines serving the United States from that location. During 
an inspection, inspectors are to review applicable security manuals, 
procedures, and records; interview air carrier station personnel; and 
observe air carrier employees processing passengers from at least one 
flight from passenger check-in until the flight departs the gate to 
ensure that the air carrier is in compliance with applicable 
requirements. Inspectors evaluate a variety of security measures, such 
as passenger processing including the use of No-Fly and Selectee 
lists,[Footnote 31] checked baggage acceptance and control, aircraft 
security, and passenger screening. Inspectors record inspection results 
into TSA's Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) system, a 
database containing security compliance information on TSA-regulated 
entities. If an inspector finds that an air carrier is violating any 
applicable security requirements, additional steps are to be taken to 
record those specific violations and, in some cases, pursue them with 
further investigation. Figure 3 provides an overview of the air carrier 
inspection and documentation process, including the options for what 
type of penalty, if any, should be imposed on air carriers for 
identified security violations. 

Figure 3: Air Carrier Inspection Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA. 

[End of figure] 

When an inspector identifies a violation of a security requirement, a 
record of the violation is opened in PARIS. According to guidance 
issued by TSA to inspectors, there are various enforcement tools 
available to address instances of noncompliance discovered during an 
inspection: 

* On-the-spot counseling is generally to be used for noncompliance that 
is minor and technical in nature, and can be remedied immediately at 
the time it is discovered. When this course of action is taken, the 
inspector notes that the noncompliance issue was closed with TSA 
counseling in the finding record and no further action is required. 

* Administrative action is generally to be used for violations or 
alleged violations that are unintentional, not the result of 
substantial disregard for security, where there are no aggravating 
factors present, or first-time violations. An administrative action 
results in either a letter of correction or a warning notice being 
issued to the air carrier. 

* Civil penalties in the form of fines are generally to be used in 
response to cases involving egregious violations, gross negligence, or 
where administrative action and counseling did not adequately resolve 
the noncompliance. Fines can range between $2,500 and $25,000 based on 
the severity of the violation.[Footnote 32] If the violation is severe 
enough, TSA may also recommend revocation of the air carrier's 
certification to fly into the United States, but this action has not 
yet been taken by TSA. 

If a violation is resolved with on-the-spot counseling, that fact is 
recorded in the finding record of PARIS and the matter is closed. 
However, if the inspector opts to pursue administrative action or a 
civil penalty against the air carrier, an enforcement investigation 
record is opened, and an investigation is conducted. Based on the 
investigation findings, the inspector recommends either an 
administrative action or a civil penalty, depending on the finding and 
the circumstances. If the investigation does not provide evidence that 
a violation occurred, the matter is closed with no action taken. 

If the inspector makes a recommendation for an administrative action, 
the supervisory inspector or IFO manager will typically review the 
recommendation and, if appropriate, approve and issue the action. The 
supervisory inspector may also recommend that the action be changed to 
no action or to a civil penalty. In the case of the latter, the case 
will be referred to the Office of Chief Counsel for further review. 

In those cases where the inspector recommends that a civil penalty be 
assessed on the air carrier, it is referred to the Office of Chief 
Counsel for review. The office is responsible for ensuring that the 
action is legally sufficient, and that the recommended fine is 
consistent with agency guidelines. TSA's Office of Chief Counsel makes 
the final determination for any legal enforcement action. The office 
may approve the proposed action or make a recommendation for other 
actions, including administrative action or no action at all. 

TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Complied with All 
Aviation Security Standards, and When Deemed Necessary, DHS and TSA 
Took Enforcement Action on Those That Did Not: 

Based on the results of TSA's foreign airport assessments, during 
fiscal year 2005, some foreign airports and air carriers complied with 
all relevant aviation security standards, while others did not. The 
most common area of noncompliance for foreign airports was related to 
quality control--mechanisms to assess and address security 
vulnerabilities at airports. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
determined that the security deficiencies at two foreign airports 
assessed during fiscal year 2005 were so serious that he subsequently 
notified the general public that these airports did not meet 
international aviation security standards. In addition to assessing the 
security measures implemented by the airport authority at foreign 
airports, TSA also inspected the security measures put in place by air 
carriers at foreign airports. When security deficiencies identified 
during air carrier inspections could not be corrected or addressed 
immediately, TSA inspectors recommended enforcement action. TSA 
officials stated that while it is difficult to determine whether the 
assessment and inspection results are generally positive or negative, 
the cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
results may be helpful in identifying the aviation security training 
needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does not have its own 
program through which aviation security training and technical 
assistance are formally provided to foreign aviation security 
officials. However, TSA officials stated that they could use the 
results of TSA's foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials 
to training and technical assistance programs offered by ICAO and 
several other U.S. government agencies. 

TSA Data Identified That More than One-Third of Foreign Airports 
Complied with All Relevant ICAO Standards during Fiscal Year 2005, and 
the Remaining Airports Had Security Deficiencies: 

Of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA 
data show that at the completion of these assessments, 46 (about 36 
percent) complied with all ICAO standards reviewed by TSA,[Footnote 33] 
while 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard 
reviewed by TSA.[Footnote 34] For these 82 foreign airports, the 
average number of standards not met was about 5, and the number of 
standards not met by an individual airport ranged from 1 to 22. Foreign 
airports were most frequently not meeting ICAO standards related to 
quality control. TSA data show that about 39 percent of foreign 
airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not comply with at least 
one ICAO quality control standard, which include mechanisms to assess 
and address security vulnerabilities at airports. For example, one 
airport did not meet an ICAO quality control standard because it did 
not have a mechanism in place to ensure that airport officials 
implementing security controls were appropriately trained and able to 
effectively perform their duties. In another instance, an airport did 
not comply with an ICAO quality control standard because, during its 
previous two assessments, inspectors found that the airport did not 
require or have records of background investigations conducted for 
individuals implementing security controls at the airport. Another area 
in which airports were not meeting ICAO quality control standards was 
the absence of a program to ensure the quality and effectiveness of 
their National Civil Aviation Security Program. TSA officials stated 
that quality control deficiencies may be prevalent among foreign 
airports in part because there is no international guidance available 
to aviation security officials to help them develop effective quality 
control measures. However, TSA officials stated that ICAO and other 
regional aviation security organizations offer training courses to help 
aviation security officials worldwide in developing effective quality 
control measures. 

TSA data also identified that at the completion of the assessment, 
nearly half of the foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 
did not meet at least one of the 17 ICAO standards that TSA 
characterized as "critical" to aviation security.[Footnote 35] 
According to TSA, access control, screening of checked baggage, and 
screening of passengers and their carry-on items are critical aspects 
of aviation security because these measures are intended to prevent 
terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as weapons and 
explosives, onto aircraft. TSA data identified that some foreign 
airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet at least one 
access control standard. TSA data also identified that some foreign 
airports did not meet ICAO standards related to checked baggage 
screening. One of the baggage screening deficiencies TSA identified 
involved foreign airports not taking steps to prevent checked baggage 
from being tampered with after the baggage had been screened, prior to 
the baggage being placed on the aircraft. TSA data also identified that 
some foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet 
ICAO standards related to passenger screening. One of the passenger- 
screening problems identified by TSA involved screening personnel not 
resolving hand-held metal detector or walk-through metal detector 
alarms to determine whether the individuals being screened were 
carrying prohibited items. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security Took Action against Foreign Airports 
That Did Not Maintain and Carry Out Effective Security Measures: 

Even if a foreign airport does not meet multiple aviation security 
standards, including critical standards, TSA may determine that such 
deficiencies do not warrant review by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. However, if TSA determines that secretarial action may be 
warranted and the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on TSA's 
assessment, determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and 
carry out effective security measures, he or she must take secretarial 
action. Since the inception of DHS in March 2003, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security has taken action against five foreign airports he 
determined were not maintaining and carrying out effective security 
measures, four of which received 90-day action letters. The Secretary 
notified the public of his determination with respect to two of these 
airports--Port-au-Prince Airport in Haiti[Footnote 36] and Bandara 
Ngurah Rai International Airport in Bali, Indonesia[Footnote 37]--both 
of which were assessed during fiscal year 2005. 

TSA officials told us that the decision to take secretarial action 
against an airport is not based solely on the number and type of 
security deficiencies identified during TSA airport 
assessments.[Footnote 38] Rather, the secretarial action decision is 
based on the severity of the security deficiencies identified, as well 
as past compliance history, threat information, and the capacity of the 
host government to take corrective action.[Footnote 39] For example, 
there were other foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 that 
did not comply with about the same number and type of critical ICAO 
standards as the five airports that received secretarial action. 
However, according to the former Deputy Director of TSA's Compliance 
Division, secretarial action was not taken against these airports 
either because the security deficiencies were determined to be not as 
severe, the host country officials were capable of taking immediate 
corrective action to address the deficiencies, or TSA did not perceive 
these airports to be in locations at high risk of terrorist activity. 
Table 2 demonstrates how two foreign airports--one for which 
secretarial action was taken and the other for which no secretarial 
action was taken--have about the same number and types of critical 
deficiencies, but differ in the severity of the deficiencies and their 
capability to take immediate corrective action to address identified 
deficiencies. 

Table 2: Comparison of the Severity of Security Deficiencies and 
Corrective Action Taken at One Secretarial Action Airport and One Non- 
Secretarial Action Airport: 

ICAO standard not met by the airport; 
Secretarial action airport: 4.7.1--Each Contracting State shall ensure 
that security restricted areas are established at each airport serving 
international civil aviation and that procedures and identification 
systems are implemented in respect of persons and vehicles. 

Severity of the deficiency;
Secretarial action airport: 
* Security guards failed to check identification (ID) badges properly 
for pedestrians and vehicles entering restricted areas; 
* Guards allowed 54 vehicles to enter a restricted area requiring 
vehicles operators to only show a letter identifying them as a very 
important person (VIP); 
* Guards were not conducting walking or mobile patrols of areas around 
or in the airport; 
* Guards did not prevent persons without proper identification from 
entering restricted areas; 
* The airport did not have a program in place to audit the 
identification system; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* Vehicles that did not have proper permits were parked in a restricted 
area; 
* A door that leads from the ticket counter to the airside was left 
open and unattended. 

Immediate corrective action taken by the airport to address the 
deficiency; 
Secretarial action airport: 
* No immediate action was taken to address the deficiency; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* The airport director immediately removed the vehicles from the 
restricted area and informed vehicle operators that they would not be 
allowed to park in the restricted area until they obtained an 
authorized vehicle permit. 

ICAO standard not met by the airport; 
Secretarial action airport: 4.3.1--Each Contracting State shall 
establish measures to ensure that originating passengers and their 
cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft engaged in 
international civil aviation operations. 

Severity of the deficiency; 
Secretarial action airport: 
* Screeners allowed individuals who set off walk-through metal detector 
alarms to pass through the screening checkpoint without determining the 
cause for the alarms; 
* Screeners were not using the hand-held metal detector correctly; 
* Screeners were conducting full-body pat-down searches incorrectly; 
* X-ray screeners were inattentive and did not routinely identify carry-
on bags for further inspection; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* Screeners allowed individuals who set off walk-through metal detector 
alarms to pass through the screening checkpoint without determining the 
cause for the alarms; 
* Screeners were not using the hand-held metal detector correctly; 
* Screeners did not physically inspect all cell phones; 
* Screeners did not rotate positions at the checkpoint; 
* The airport did not sufficiently staff the security checkpoint. 

Immediate corrective action taken by the airport to address the 
deficiency; 
Secretarial action airport: 
* Even after TSA inspectors demonstrated how to properly screen 
passengers and resolve metal detector alarms, screeners were still not 
able to screen passengers and carry-on items correctly; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* After TSA inspectors demonstrated how to properly resolve metal 
detector alarms, prior to the completion of the assessment, the 
inspectors observed that screeners were screening passengers and their 
carry-on items correctly. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA foreign airport assessment results. 

[End of table] 

According to TSA, secretarial actions are lifted when the Secretary, in 
part based on TSA's assessment of the airport, determines that the 
airport is carrying out and maintaining effective security measures. 
TSA lifted the secretarial action at Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti in 
July 2006, 19 months after the public notification was issued. During 
this 19-month period, TSA assisted Haitian officials in developing a 
national civil aviation security plan and provided training on how to 
properly screen passengers and their carry-on baggage. According to the 
former Deputy Director of TSA's Compliance Division, although TSA 
determined earlier during 2006 that all of the security deficiencies at 
the airport had been addressed by Haitian officials, based on specific 
intelligence information regarding threats to the airport in Haiti, the 
Secretary delayed lifting the secretarial action until July 2006. As of 
February 2007, the public notification for the airport in Bali was 
still in place. TSA officials stated that they are in frequent contact 
with Indonesian officials to discuss Indonesia's progress in addressing 
security deficiencies at the airport. TSA officials also stated that 
they are awaiting Indonesian officials' request for TSA to conduct an 
airport assessment to determine whether the security deficiencies at 
the airport in Bali have been addressed. 

More than Two-Thirds of Fiscal Year 2005 Air Carrier Inspections 
Identified Compliance with All TSA Security Requirements, while the 
Remaining Inspections Identified Some Security Deficiencies: 

In addition to assessing the security measures implemented by the 
airport authority at foreign airports, TSA also inspected the security 
measures put in place by air carriers at foreign airports. According to 
air carrier inspection data maintained by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, 
of the 529 inspections of air carriers operating out of foreign 
airports, there were 373 inspections (about 71 percent) for which the 
air carrier complied with all TSA security requirements, and 156 
inspections (about 29 percent) for which the air carrier did not comply 
with at least one TSA security requirement.[Footnote 40] For these 156 
inspections, the average number of TSA requirements not met was about 
3, and the number of TSA requirements not met by an individual 
inspected air carrier ranged from 1 to 18. The total number of security 
requirements against which air carriers were inspected generally ranged 
from about 20 to 80, depending on the location of the foreign airport 
in which the air carrier operated, the extent of a carrier's operation 
at the airport, and whether the carrier was a U.S.-based or foreign- 
based carrier.[Footnote 41] During fiscal year 2005 air carrier 
inspections, TSA identified security deficiencies in several areas, 
including aircraft security and passenger and checked baggage 
screening.[Footnote 42] 

Because TSA has authority to regulate air carriers that provide service 
to the United States from foreign airports, TSA inspected air carriers 
against specific security requirements established by TSA and included 
in the air carriers' TSA-approved security programs. TSA officials told 
us that they view operational security requirements for air carriers as 
critical--as opposed to documentary requirements associated with the 
air carrier's approved security program--because these requirements are 
designed to prevent terrorists from carrying weapons, explosives, or 
other dangerous items onto aircraft. 

TSA Took Enforcement Action against Some Air Carriers with Security 
Deficiencies That Could Not Be Addressed Immediately: 

When TSA inspectors identify deficiencies that cannot be corrected or 
addressed immediately, the inspectors are to recommend enforcement 
action. Based on data provided by TSA, TSA inspectors identified 419 
violations (security deficiencies) as a result of the 156 air carrier 
inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005 where TSA identified at 
least one security deficiency. Data from TSA showed that 259 violations 
(about 62 percent) were corrected or addressed immediately. TSA 
inspectors submitted 76 violations (about 18 percent) for investigation 
because the violations were considered serious enough to warrant an 
enforcement action.[Footnote 43] TSA can impose three types of 
enforcement action on air carriers that violate security requirements-
-a warning letter, a letter of correction, or a monetary civil penalty. 
Based on information included in TSA's investigation module within 
PARIS, for the 47 investigations we could link to fiscal year 2005 
inspections,[Footnote 44] warning letters were issued in 26 cases, and 
letters of correction were issued in 14 cases. Fines ranging from 
$18,000 to $25,000 were recommended in the 7 cases where inspectors 
recommended civil penalties be imposed. Of those, fines ranging from 
$4,000 to $15,000 were ultimately levied in 3 cases, in 1 case a 
warning notice was issued instead of a civil penalty, and in 2 cases no 
action was taken.[Footnote 45] As of December 2006, 1 case remained 
unresolved. 

TSA Officials Cite Difficulties in Drawing Conclusions about Foreign 
Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Results: 

TSA officials stated that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
results--such as whether the results are generally positive or 
negative--because the primary concern is not whether security 
deficiencies are identified. Instead, TSA officials are more concerned 
about whether foreign countries have the capability and willingness to 
address security deficiencies. According to TSA, some foreign countries 
do not have the aviation security expertise or financial resources to 
adequately address security deficiencies. TSA officials also stated 
that some foreign countries do not regard aviation security as a high 
priority, and therefore do not intend to correct security deficiencies 
identified during TSA assessments. Further, TSA officials stated that 
foreign officials' capability and willingness also influence the extent 
to which air carriers comply with security requirements. Although TSA 
has not conducted its own analysis of foreign airport assessment and 
air carrier inspection results, TSA officials stated that our analysis 
of the results was consistent with their assumptions regarding the most 
prominent security deficiencies identified at foreign airports and 
among air carriers. Additionally, TSA officials stated that the 
cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
results may be helpful in identifying the aviation security training 
needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does not have an 
internally funded program in place that is specifically intended to 
provide aviation security training and technical assistance to foreign 
aviation security officials. However, TSA officials stated that they 
coordinate with other federal agencies, such as the Department of State 
and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, to identify global and 
regional training needs and provide instructors for the aviation 
security training courses these federal agencies offer to foreign 
officials. (See app. IV for a description of the aviation security 
training and technical assistance programs offered by U.S. government 
agencies.) While TSA does not always determine which foreign countries 
would receive aviation security training and technical assistance 
offered by other federal agencies, TSA officials stated that they could 
use the cumulative results of TSA's foreign airport assessments to 
refer foreign officials to these assistance programs. 

TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representatives in 
Addressing Security Deficiencies, but Can Strengthen Oversight of the 
Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

TSA used various methods to help foreign officials and air carrier 
representatives address security deficiencies identified during TSA 
assessments and inspections. However, opportunities remain for TSA to 
enhance oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs. To help foreign airport officials and host 
government officials address security deficiencies identified during 
foreign airport assessments, TSA inspectors provided on-site 
consultation to help address security deficiencies in the short term, 
made recommendations for addressing security deficiencies over the long 
term, and recommended aviation security training and technical 
assistance opportunities for foreign officials to help them meet ICAO 
standards. During fiscal year 2005, TSA resolved 259 of the 419 
security deficiencies identified during TSA inspections through on-site 
consultation. Additionally, TSA assigned all U.S. air carriers and 
foreign air carriers to a principal security inspector and 
international principal security inspector, respectively, to provide 
counseling or clarification regarding TSA security requirements. 
Although TSA has assisted foreign airport officials and air carrier 
representatives in addressing security deficiencies, TSA did not track 
the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, document foreign governments' progress in addressing 
security deficiencies at foreign airports, track enforcement actions 
taken in response to air carrier violations, and measure the impact of 
the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs on 
security. Such information would have provided TSA better assurance 
that the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs 
are operating as intended. 

TSA Assisted Foreign Officials in Addressing Security Deficiencies at 
Foreign Airports in Various Ways, and Foreign Officials Generally 
Viewed TSA's Assistance as Beneficial: 

TSA officials stated that while the primary mission of the foreign 
airport assessment program is to ensure the security of U.S.-bound 
flights by assessing whether foreign airports are complying with ICAO 
standards, a secondary mission of the program is to assist foreign 
officials in addressing security deficiencies that TSA identified 
during its foreign airport assessments. As part of the foreign airport 
assessment program, TSA officials assisted foreign authorities in 
addressing security deficiencies in various ways, including: 

* providing on-site consultation to help airport officials or the host 
government immediately address security deficiencies, 

* making recommendations to airport officials or the host government 
for corrective action intended to help sustain security improvements, 
and: 

* helping to secure aviation security training and technical assistance 
for foreign governments. 

On-Site Consultation and Recommendations for Corrective Action: 

Based on our review of TSA foreign airport assessment reports, during 
fiscal year 2005, TSA provided on-site consultation to help foreign 
officials immediately address security deficiencies that were 
identified during airport assessments and made recommendations to help 
foreign officials sustain security improvements in the longer term. One 
type of security deficiency identified during TSA's fiscal year 2005 
foreign airport assessments involved a particular passenger checkpoint 
screening function.[Footnote 46] As a short-term solution to this 
security deficiency, on at least two occasions, TSA inspectors provided 
on-site training to instruct screeners on proper passenger screening 
techniques. As a longer-term solution, the assessment reports identify 
that in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended that the airport conduct 
remedial training for screeners and routinely test screeners who work 
at the passenger checkpoint to determine if they are screening 
passengers correctly. Another security deficiency identified at foreign 
airports during fiscal year 2005 related to the security of airport 
perimeters.[Footnote 47] After identifying this deficiency, inspectors 
consulted with foreign airport officials who, in a few cases, took 
immediate action to address the deficiency. According to the assessment 
reports, in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended measures that would 
help the airport sustain perimeter security in the longer term. In 
cases when a short-term solution may not be feasible, TSA inspectors 
may have only recommended longer-term corrective action. For example, 
in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended that foreign airport 
officials embark upon a longer-term construction project to address a 
particular type of security deficiency.[Footnote 48] 

Aviation Security Training and Technical Assistance: 

During fiscal year 2005, TSA also assisted foreign governments in 
securing training and technical assistance provided by TSA and other 
U.S. government agencies to help improve security at foreign airports, 
particularly at airports in developing countries. For example, four of 
the seven TSA Representatives--TSARs---with whom we met said that they 
had assisted foreign governments in obtaining training either through 
the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program or through the 
U.S. Trade and Development Agency's aviation security assistance 
programs. The goals of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program are to (1) 
build the capacity of foreign countries to fight terrorism; (2) 
establish security relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to 
strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; and (3) share modern, 
humane, and effective anti-terrorism techniques. The State Department 
addresses the capacity-building goal of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
Program by offering a selection of 25 training courses to foreign 
officials, 1 of which focuses on airport security. The State Department 
provided the airport security course, which is taught by TSA 
instructors, to seven foreign countries during fiscal year 2005-- 
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Qatar, 
and United Arab Emirates. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency also 
provides aviation security training and technical assistance to help 
achieve its goal of facilitating economic growth and trade in 
developing countries. During fiscal year 2005, the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency provided aviation security training for government 
officials in Haiti, Malaysia, and sub-Saharan Africa. During the same 
year, the agency held regional workshops for various countries 
worldwide on developing quality control programs. Government officials 
from two of the five countries we visited identified the importance of 
obtaining quality control training, particularly given that they have 
not yet established their own quality control function. Appendix IV 
includes a detailed description of aviation security training and 
technical assistance provided to foreign officials by the State 
Department and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, as well as other 
U.S. government agencies. 

Foreign Officials We Contacted Generally Viewed TSA's Assistance as 
Beneficial: 

Government and airport officials from five of the seven foreign 
countries we visited and officials from 5 of the 16 foreign embassies 
we visited stated that TSA's airport assessments and the resulting 
assistance provided by TSA have helped strengthen airport security in 
their countries. For example, officials from one country said that TSA 
assessments enabled them to identify and address security deficiencies. 
Specifically, officials stated that the government could not 
independently identify security deficiencies because it did not have 
its own airport assessment program--a condition that TSA officials told 
us exists in many countries. Airport officials in another country 
stated that TSA's airport assessments and on-site assistance led to 
immediate improvements in the way in which passengers were screened at 
their airport, particularly with regard to the pat-down search 
procedure. Embassy officials representing another country also stated 
that TSA's assessments reinforce the results of other assessments of 
their airports. In addition, these officials stated that they 
appreciated the good rapport and cooperative relationships they have 
with TSA inspection officials. Airport officials in another country we 
visited stated that TSA assisted them in developing their aviation 
security management program, and that the results of TSA's assessments 
provided them with examples of where they need to concentrate more 
efforts on meeting ICAO standards. Government officials in this same 
country said that the TSAR has helped them to comply with ICAO 
standards related to the contents of a member state's national aviation 
security program. At the recommendation of the TSAR, these officials 
also planned to participate in an aviation security workshop provided 
by the Organization of American States,[Footnote 49] which they also 
felt would be beneficial in helping the government formulate its 
national aviation security programs and associated security 
regulations. 

TSA Provided Assistance to Air Carriers That Did Not Comply with 
Applicable Security Requirements: 

In addition to assisting foreign officials in addressing security 
deficiencies identified during airport assessments, TSA also assisted 
air carrier representatives in addressing security deficiencies that 
were identified during air carrier inspections. Of the 419 instances in 
which TSA inspectors identified noncompliance with TSA security 
requirements during fiscal year 2005, TSA data show 259 were resolved 
through counseling--that is, the security deficiencies were resolved as 
a result of on-site assistance or consultation provided by TSA. For 
example, during one inspection, TSA observed that the security 
contractor employed by the air carrier was not properly searching the 
aircraft cabin for suspicious, dangerous, or deadly items prior to 
boarding. TSA instructed the contractor to fully inspect those 
locations that were not searched properly, and obtained assurance that 
the air carrier would provide information to the contractors to ensure 
proper searches were conducted. In another instance, inspectors 
identified a security deficiency related to catering carts. The 
inspectors notified appropriate catering facility officials, who stated 
that the security deficiency was highly unusual and that it would not 
happen again. The inspectors also informed the air carrier of the 
finding and recommended that during the carrier's internal audits, they 
ensure that catering carts are properly secured. 

In addition to counseling provided by inspectors when deficiencies are 
identified, TSA assigns each air carrier to either a PSI, for U.S.- 
based air carriers, or an IPSI, for foreign air carriers with service 
to the United States, to assist air carriers in complying with TSA 
security requirements. Although PSIs and IPSIs do not participate in 
air carrier inspections, they do receive the inspection results for the 
air carriers that they work with. According to the three PSIs and four 
IPSIs with whom we met, PSIs and IPSIs provide counsel to the air 
carriers and provide clarification when necessary on TSA security 
requirements. For example, they provide air carriers with clarification 
on the requirements contained in security directives and emergency 
amendments issued by TSA. Several of the foreign air carriers we met 
with told us that the IPSIs are generally responsive to their requests. 
In other instances, when an air carrier cannot comply with a TSA 
security requirement--such as when complying with a TSA security 
requirement would cause the air carrier to violate a host government 
security requirement--the air carrier will work with the IPSI or PSI to 
develop alternative security procedures that are intended to provide a 
level of security equivalent to the level of security provided by TSA's 
requirements, according to the PSIs and IPSIs with whom we met. These 
alternative procedures are reviewed by the PSI or IPSI and then 
approved by TSA headquarters officials.[Footnote 50] 

Opportunities Exist for TSA to Strengthen Oversight of the Foreign 
Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

TSA has several controls in place to ensure that the agency is 
implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs as intended. However, there are opportunities for TSA to 
improve its oversight of these programs to help ensure that the status 
and disposition of scheduled foreign airports assessments and air 
carrier inspections is documented and to assess the impact of the 
assessment and inspection programs. Regarding the foreign airport 
assessment program, TSA required inspectors and TSARs to follow 
standard operating procedures when scheduling and conducting foreign 
airport assessments. These procedures outline the process for 
coordinating with host government officials to schedule assessments, 
conduct foreign airport assessments, and report the results of the 
assessments. TSA also provided inspectors with a job aide to help them 
ensure that all relevant ICAO standards are addressed during an 
assessment. The job aide prompts inspectors as to what specific 
information they should obtain to help determine whether the foreign 
airport is meeting ICAO standards. For example, in assessing measures 
related to passenger-screening checkpoints, the job aide prompts the 
inspector to describe the means by which the airport ensures there is 
no mixing or contact between screened and unscreened passengers. In 
addition to the standard operating procedures and the job aide, TSA 
requires inspectors to use a standard format for reporting the results 
of foreign airport assessments and has implemented a multilayered 
review process to help ensure that airport assessment reports are 
complete and accurate. 

With regard to the air carrier inspection program, TSA uses the 
automated Performance and Results Information System to compile 
inspection results. PARIS contains results of air carrier inspections 
conducted by TSA at airports in the United States as well as 
inspections conducted at foreign airports. For air carrier inspections 
conducted at foreign airports, a series of prompts guides inspectors 
regarding what security standards U.S. carriers and foreign carriers 
operating overseas must meet. PARIS also includes a review process 
whereby completed inspection results can be reviewed by a supervisory 
inspector before being approved for release into the database. 

While TSA has controls such as these in place for the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs to ensure consistent 
implementation and documentation, we identified four additional 
controls that would strengthen TSA's oversight of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs: 

* tracking the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, 

* documenting foreign governments' progress in addressing security 
deficiencies, 

* tracking air carrier violations, and: 

* measuring the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air 
carrier inspection programs. 

Additional Controls Are Needed to Track the Status of Scheduled Airport 
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections: 

TSA has established some controls for tracking the status of scheduled 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections, but additional 
controls are needed. TSA provided us with a list of foreign airport 
assessments that were scheduled to take place during fiscal year 2005 
and identified which of the assessments were actually conducted and 
which assessments were deferred or canceled. We compared the list of 
scheduled assessments provided by TSA to the fiscal year 2005 airport 
assessment reports we reviewed and identified several discrepancies. 
Specifically, there were 10 airport assessments that TSA identified as 
having been conducted, but when we asked TSA officials to provide the 
reports for these assessments, they could not, and later categorized 
these assessments as deferred or canceled. Conversely, there was 1 
airport assessment that TSA identified as having been deferred, but 
according to the assessment reports we reviewed, this assessment was 
actually conducted during fiscal year 2005. There were also five 
foreign airports for which TSA provided us with the fiscal year 2005 
assessment report, but were not included on TSA's list of assessments 
scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Further, there were three foreign 
airports listed under one IFO as having been deferred, whereas these 
same airports were listed under another IFO as having been canceled 
during fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 51] TSA also did not maintain 
accurate information on the status of air carrier inspections scheduled 
for fiscal year 2005. TSA provided us with a list of all air carrier 
inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005. We compared the list to 
the results contained in the PARIS database and found numerous 
inconsistencies. Specifically, we identified 46 air carrier inspections 
at 18 airports that were not included on TSA's list, but were included 
in PARIS as having been conducted during fiscal year 2005. 

Federal standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest 
that agencies should document key decisions in a way that is complete 
and accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced from initiation, 
through processing, to after completion. TSA officials acknowledged 
that they have not always maintained accurate and complete data on the 
status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
assessments, in part due to the lack of a central repository in which 
to maintain assessment information and the lack of standardization in 
the way in which each IFO manager maintains assessment information. 
Additionally, IFOs had not always documented the reasons why 
assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled. TSA officials 
stated that in August 2006 they began standardizing and refining the 
existing databases used by IFO staff for tracking the status of foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections by including data 
elements such as the dates of previous and planned assessments. TSA 
officials also stated that IFO staff are now encouraged to identify the 
reasons why assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled in 
the comment section of the database. While TSA has made some 
improvements to the way in which it tracks the status of scheduled 
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, there are 
opportunities for additional refinements to TSA's tracking system. For 
example, according to our review of TSA's fiscal year 2007 foreign 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection schedules, TSA did not 
provide an explanation for why 13 of 34 foreign airport visits--that 
is, either assessments or inspections--had not been conducted according 
to schedule. TSA officials acknowledged that their assessment and 
inspection tracking system is a work in progress and that they need to 
make additional decisions regarding the tracking system, such as which 
data elements to include. Without adequate controls in place for 
tracking which scheduled assessments and inspections were actually 
conducted and which were deferred or canceled, it may be difficult for 
TSA to ensure that all scheduled airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections are actually conducted. 

TSA Did Not Consistently Document Foreign Governments' Progress in 
Addressing Security Deficiencies: 

TSARs--the primary liaisons between the U.S. government and foreign 
governments on transportation security issues--are responsible for 
following up on progress made by foreign officials in addressing 
security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Although the 
TSARs we interviewed stated that they conducted such follow-up, the 
TSARs did not consistently document the progress foreign governments 
had made in addressing airport security deficiencies. We found 199 
instances in the 128 fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment 
reports we reviewed where it was written that the TSAR would follow up 
or was recommended to follow up on the progress made by foreign 
officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during airport 
assessments. However, TSA may not be able to determine whether TSARs 
had actually followed up on these security deficiencies because TSARs 
did not consistently document their follow-up activities. We 
interviewed 8 of the 20 TSARs stationed at embassies throughout the 
world and one Senior Advisor and DHS attaché. Six of those TSARs stated 
that they followed up on outstanding security deficiencies in various 
ways,[Footnote 52] depending on the severity of the deficiency and the 
confidence that the TSAR had in the host government's ability to 
correct the deficiency. For example, one TSAR told us that for less 
critical security deficiencies, she may inquire about the foreign 
government's status in addressing the deficiency via electronic mail or 
telephone call. On the other hand, for a critical deficiency, the TSAR 
said she may follow up in person on the host government's progress in 
addressing the deficiency. However, another TSAR stated that she only 
follows up on the foreign government's progress in addressing national 
program issues. She stated that she does not follow up on operational 
security deficiencies--such as screening of passengers and checked 
baggage--because she believes this is the responsibility of the TSA 
inspection staff. While 4 of the 8 TSARs we interviewed told us that 
they were able to follow up on the status of most or all security 
deficiencies within their area of responsibility, not all of these 
TSARs reported the results of their follow-up to TSA inspection staff, 
in part because they were not required to do so. In addition, TSARs 
stated that when they did document the results of their follow-up, it 
was not done consistently. For example, follow-up results were 
sometimes documented in weekly trip reports (generally electronic mail 
messages) TSARs send to their immediate supervisor in TSA headquarters 
or in action plans.[Footnote 53] In addition, these weekly reports did 
not always contain information from the TSARs' follow-up activities 
with host government or airport officials. Federal standards for 
internal controls and associated guidance suggest that agencies should 
document key activities in such a way that maintains the relevance, 
value, and usefulness of these activities to management in controlling 
operations and making decisions. TSA headquarters officials 
acknowledged that it is important to consistently document foreign 
governments' status in addressing security deficiencies identified 
during TSA assessments, because this information could be helpful to 
TSA inspection staff when determining where to focus their attention 
during future assessments. Additionally, documenting foreign 
governments' progress toward addressing deficiencies would enable TSA 
to have current information on the security status of foreign airports 
that service the United States. TSA established a working group in 
September 2006 to explore how the results of TSAR follow-up should be 
documented and used by TSA inspection staff. Because of the logistical 
challenges of coordination among working group members who are located 
around the world, TSA has not set a time frame for when the working 
group is expected to complete its efforts. 

TSA Did Not Adequately Maintain Information to Link Enforcement Actions 
with Specific Air Carrier Security Violations: 

TSA does not maintain air carrier inspection data in a way that would 
enable the agency to determine what enforcement actions were taken in 
response to identified security violations and thus could not readily 
determine whether appropriate penalties, if any, were given to air 
carriers that violated security requirements. We found two factors that 
contributed to this situation. First, information on violations and 
findings was not consistently recorded, and second, TSA does not link 
enforcement actions to inspection findings. For example, when an 
inspector identifies a violation during an inspection, that information 
is recorded in the inspections database in PARIS and a record is to be 
opened in the findings database.[Footnote 54] The findings database 
record includes information related to the violation, including whether 
the violation was closed with counseling or an investigation was 
opened. However, we found that information is not maintained in a way 
that enables TSA to readily determine the enforcement action that was 
taken in response to a particular violation. For example, the findings 
database did not include information on the action taken by TSA 
inspectors for all security violations that were identified in the 
inspections database. Specifically, the inspections database indicated 
that during fiscal year 2005, 419 air carrier violations were 
identified during 156 inspections. However, the findings database only 
identified the actions taken by TSA inspectors for 335 violations. On 
further analysis we found that of the 156 inspections where violations 
were identified, the number of violations for 79 (51 percent) of those 
inspections were not properly recorded in the findings database. We 
determined that for 66 inspections, the number of violations identified 
in the findings database was less than the number of violations 
identified in the inspections database. Therefore, there is no record 
of what action was taken, if any, by TSA inspectors to address the 
additional violations identified during these inspections. We also 
determined that for 13 inspections, the number of violations identified 
in the findings database was greater than the number of violations 
identified in the inspections database. Another reason TSA could not 
readily identify what enforcement actions were taken in response to 
specific security violations was that TSA often issued one enforcement 
action for multiple security violations, where inspectors were not 
required to identify each individual violation that was addressed by a 
particular enforcement action. Without being able to readily identify 
what enforcement action was taken in response to specific security 
violations, TSA has limited assurance that the inspected air carriers 
received appropriate penalties, if deemed necessary, and that 
identified security violations were resolved. TSA officials told us 
that they are currently developing updates to PARIS that will 
automatically open a finding each time a violation is recorded in the 
inspection database. By doing so, this will require a link between a 
violation and the planned course of action to resolve the violation. 
However, TSA has not established a time frame for when these updates 
will be implemented. 

TSA Did Not Have Outcome-Based Performance Measures to Assess the 
Impact of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection 
Programs: 

TSA is taking steps to assess whether the goals of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs are being met, but 
identified several concerns about doing so. As previously discussed, 
the goal of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs are to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by evaluating 
the extent to which foreign governments and air carriers are complying 
with applicable security requirements. The Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 requires executive branch departments to use 
performance measures to assess progress toward meeting program goals 
and to help decision makers assess program accomplishments and improve 
program performance. Performance measures can be categorized either as 
outcome measures, which describe the intended result of carrying out a 
program or activity, or as output measures, which describe the level of 
activity that will be provided over a period of time, or as efficiency 
measures, which show the relationship between outcome or output of a 
program and the resources used to implement program activities--inputs. 

TSA developed the following output and efficiency measures to evaluate 
its international aviation regulatory and enforcement efforts, which 
include foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections: 

* percentage of countries with last-point-of-departure service to the 
United States that are provided aviation security assistance at the 
national or airport level, 

* percentage of countries that do not have last-point-of-departure 
service to the United States that are provided aviation security 
assistance at the national or airport level, and: 

* average number of international inspections conducted annually per 
inspector. 

While output measures are useful in determining the number of foreign 
countries for which TSA has provided aviation security assistance and 
the rate at which such assistance is being provided, outcome-based 
measures would be particularly useful because they could be used to 
determine the extent to which TSA has helped to improve security at 
foreign airports that service the United States. However, TSA officials 
identified several challenges in developing outcome measures, 
particularly measures for the foreign airport assessment program. TSA 
officials said that it is difficult to develop meaningful outcome 
measures because TSA does not have control over whether foreign 
authorities implement and meet ICAO standards. Additionally, TSA 
officials stated that if the agency develops outcome measures for the 
foreign airport assessment program, it would suggest that TSA has 
control over whether foreign airports meet ICAO standards, which these 
officials believe may give the appearance that TSA does not respect the 
sovereignty of the countries it assesses. TSA officials further stated 
that if foreign officials perceive that TSA has no regard for their 
country's sovereignty, foreign officials may prohibit TSA from 
conducting assessments in their countries. We recognize that whether or 
not foreign governments meet ICAO standards is not within TSA's control 
and that foreign officials' concerns about sovereignty are important. 
However, TSA officials have acknowledged that the assistance the agency 
provides and, in rare cases, secretarial actions contribute to whether 
foreign governments meet ICAO standards. Also, there is precedent 
within the federal government for developing outcome-oriented 
performance measures to evaluate efforts that are not within an 
agency's control but can be influenced by the agency. For example, the 
State Department developed performance measures and targets for its 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to evaluate the agency's impact on 
helping foreign countries improve their anti-terrorism capabilities. 
Specifically, during fiscal year 2006, the State Department set a 
performance target that two of the six countries that received 
assistance through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program would achieve 
a capability to effectively deter, detect, and counter terrorist 
organizations and threats and sustain those capabilities. Another 
performance target for the program that is beyond the State 
Department's control is for all 191 United Nations member states to 
implement a particular United Nations resolution that requires all 
states to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism. 

TSA headquarters officials, including the Director of Compliance and 
Area Directors, who oversee implementation of the foreign airport 
assessment program, questioned whether it would be appropriate to 
measure improvements made by foreign countries as a result of the 
assessment program. They stated that the primary purpose of the foreign 
airport assessment program is not to help foreign officials improve 
security at their airports; rather, the primary purpose of the foreign 
airport assessment program is to identify--not correct--security 
deficiencies at foreign airports and inform the Secretary of Homeland 
Security of such deficiencies. These officials also stated that the 
agency's efforts to assist foreign officials in addressing security 
deficiencies are voluntary and, therefore, do not warrant performance 
measurement. Although TSA may not be required to assist foreign 
officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during foreign 
airport assessments, TSA is in fact using its inspector and TSAR 
resources to this end. Consistent with the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993, developing performance measures and associated 
targets, such as the percentage of security deficiencies that were 
addressed as a result of TSA on-site assistance and TSA recommendations 
for corrective action, would enable TSA to evaluate the impact of its 
assistance on improving security at foreign airports and be held more 
accountable for the way in which it uses its resources. TSA could also 
evaluate the impact that secretarial actions have on helping foreign 
airports address security deficiencies in order to meet ICAO standards. 

Another challenge faced by TSA officials in developing outcome-based 
measures for the foreign airport assessment program is the lack of an 
automated system to collect and compile assessment results. TSA 
officials stated that in the absence of an automated system to input 
data and information obtained from airport assessments, they do not 
have enough resources to manually compile and analyze airport 
assessment data that could be used to feed into outcome measures. 
Currently, TSA headquarters maintains airport assessment reports either 
electronically or in hard copy, which makes it difficult to conduct 
systematic analysis of assessment results across foreign airports and 
over time to evaluate the impact TSA's airport assessment program has 
had on helping foreign countries meet ICAO standards. TSA officials 
told us that $1 million was budgeted to develop a secured, automated 
database--the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System--to track 
airport assessment results. However, TSA officials stated that the 
development of the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System has been 
slow due to challenges TSA has experienced in linking the existing 
electronic systems in which previous airport assessment reports are 
stored with the new database. However, upon completion of the Foreign 
Airport Assessment Reporting System, which is scheduled for fiscal year 
2008, TSA expects that the database will enhance standardization of 
assessment reports as well as accessibility to the results of previous 
foreign airport assessments. TSA also expects that the Foreign Airport 
Assessment Reporting System will enable TSA to conduct analysis of 
foreign airport assessment results. 

As with the foreign airport assessment program, TSA has also not 
developed outcome-based performance measures for its overseas air 
carrier inspection program. However, TSA officials have begun to 
collect and analyze data on air carrier inspections that could be used 
to measure the impact of TSA's inspection program on helping air 
carriers comply with TSA security requirements. During fiscal year 
2006, TSA officials who manage PARIS began analyzing air carrier 
inspection results in an effort to assist the agency in evaluating the 
impact that enforcement actions--including on-site counseling, 
administrative actions, and civil penalties--have had on ensuring air 
carrier compliance with TSA security requirements. These officials plan 
to assess whether there is a relationship between the severity of civil 
penalties and the reoccurrence of security violations. The analysis 
that is being conducted by these officials is consistent with our 
reviews of agency compliance inspection programs, which have cited the 
need for evaluations of enforcement activities and the effectiveness of 
using sanctions such as civil penalties to increase 
compliance.[Footnote 55] However, while the TSA officials managing 
PARIS are conducting such analysis of performance information, 
officials who manage the air carrier inspection program did not intend 
to use the results of this analysis to develop performance measures or 
to influence program decisions. According to TSA officials, considering 
that overall compliance rates are very high among air carriers, and the 
number of enforcement actions taken by TSA is relatively low, there may 
not be enough data to conduct meaningful analysis of the impact of 
enforcement actions. In addition, TSA officials said that they were not 
convinced that air carrier compliance is influenced by enforcement 
actions, especially since air carriers are known to intentionally set 
aside funds when developing their annual budgets in anticipation that 
they will be fined for some type of security violation during the year. 
One TSA official stated that air carrier compliance with TSA security 
requirements is not always within the air carrier's control and is 
largely influenced by the security measures in place at the airport, as 
well as restrictions placed on air carriers by host government laws and 
regulations. When analyzing the fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspection 
results, we identified only one instance where noncompliance due to a 
conflict between TSA requirements and host government law resulted in 
an inspector requesting that enforcement action be taken against the 
air carrier.[Footnote 56] However, TSA chose not to take enforcement 
action against the air carrier and instead decided to work with the 
host government to resolve the conflict. Despite the concerns raised by 
TSA officials, using the analysis of air carrier inspection results to 
develop performance measures, TSA managers may not be able to identify 
which approaches for improving air carrier compliance are working well 
and which approaches could be improved upon. 

TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its 
Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections: 

TSA is taking action to address challenges--particularly the lack of 
available inspectors and various host government concerns--that have 
limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections according to schedule. TSA has developed a risk- 
based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, and is in the 
process of developing a risk-based approach for scheduling air carrier 
inspections, to enhance the agency's ability to focus its limited 
inspector resources on higher-risk airports. The risk-based scheduling 
approach is also expected to reduce the number of visits TSA conducts 
at low-risk foreign airports, which may help address some host 
governments' concerns regarding the resource burden that results from 
frequent airport assessments by TSA and others. Harmonization--that is, 
mutual recognition and acceptance--of TSA, host government, and third 
party (e.g., European Commission) aviation security standards and 
assessment and inspection processes may also help TSA address host 
government concerns regarding resource burden. Specifically, when the 
opportunity is available, TSA is considering conducting joint 
assessments with some host governments or third parties, such as the 
European Commission, which would reduce the number of airport visits 
experienced by some countries. In addition to addressing concerns 
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of 
frequent airport visits, TSA has taken steps to address some country- 
specific challenges that have limited TSA's ability to conduct foreign 
airport visits. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance its Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport 
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections on Schedule, but Staffing 
Challenges Remain: 

Various challenges have affected TSA's ability to maintain its schedule 
of conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. 
The ability to conduct these assessments and inspections as scheduled 
is important, according to TSA officials, because foreign airport and 
air carrier compliance with applicable security requirements may 
deteriorate significantly between assessments. As time between visits 
increases, the likelihood may also increase that security deficiencies 
at foreign airports and among air carriers may arise and go undetected 
and unaddressed. TSA officials also stated that conducting assessments 
and inspections on a consistent basis helps to ensure that foreign 
countries continue to comply with ICAO standards and are operating with 
effective security measures. TSA data show that the agency deferred 90 
of the 303 (about 30 percent) foreign airport visits that were 
scheduled for fiscal year 2005, which include both foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections.[Footnote 57] According to TSA, 
these deferments resulted primarily from a lack of available inspectors 
to conduct the assessments and inspections. Our analysis identified 
that the reported shortage of available inspectors reflected the fact 
that (1) the inspector staff available to conduct the assessments and 
inspections was less than the number authorized at each of TSA's five 
IFOs at some point during fiscal year 2005 and (2) TSA scheduled more 
foreign airport visits during the fiscal year than available inspectors 
could complete. 

TSA officials cited several reasons why the IFOs operated in fiscal 
year 2005 with fewer inspectors than had been budgeted. First, TSA 
officials stated that due to State Department limitations on the number 
of inspectors that can be staffed at IFOs overseas, TSA did not have 
the budgeted number of inspectors on board to complete assessments and 
inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 58] Second, TSA 
officials stated that significant turnover among international 
inspectors and the subsequent lengthy process for filling vacant 
inspector positions also contributed to the lack of available 
inspectors. TSA officials attributed the turnover of international 
inspectors to various factors, including TSA's policy that limits the 
term of international inspectors at overseas IFOs to 4 years, the lack 
of opportunities for career advancement when stationed at an IFO, and 
unique difficulties inspectors experience when living and working 
overseas, such as disruptions to family life. As of January 2007, TSA 
officials did not have any specific efforts under way to help reduce 
turnover of international inspectors. Further, TSA officials stated 
that it takes an average of about 6 months to fill a vacant inspector 
position, due to the lengthy process for vetting newly hired 
inspectors. Specifically, once hired, international inspectors must be 
processed through the State Department, which entails applying for and 
receiving medical clearances, security clearances, a diplomatic 
passport, and visas. TSA officials stated that expediting the process 
of filling vacant positions is largely outside of TSA's control. 
However, TSA assigned a headquarters official to oversee this process 
to identify opportunities for accelerating it. Table 3 shows the number 
of inspectors budgeted for and available at the IFOs each month during 
fiscal year 2005. 

Table 3: Budgeted and Available International Inspectors by IFO, by 
Month for Fiscal Year 2005: 

Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 5; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4. 

Month: October; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 15; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 5; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: November; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: December; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: January; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: February; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: March; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: April; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: May; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 9; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: June; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 9; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: July; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2. 

Month: August; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 1. 

Month: September; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: The bold numbers represent months when, according to TSA, IFOs 
operated below their budgeted number of inspectors. 

[End of table] 

Even if TSA had been operating at its budgeted inspector staffing 
level, the agency may still have deferred some of the foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005 
because, according to TSA officials, internal policy required them to 
schedule more foreign airport visits than the budgeted number of 
inspectors could reasonably have conducted. According to TSA officials, 
this internal policy was developed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, which was responsible for conducting foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections prior to TSA. TSA officials 
also stated that the Federal Aviation Administration had more available 
inspectors to conduct assessments and inspections than TSA. TSA 
officials stated that each international inspector should reasonably be 
able to conduct between 8 and 12 foreign airport visits per 
year,[Footnote 59] depending on the amount of time inspectors remain on 
site to assist foreign officials and air carrier representatives in 
addressing security deficiencies that are identified during assessments 
and inspections. However, according to data provided by TSA, each of 
the 5 IFOs scheduled more than 12 foreign airport visits per inspector 
for fiscal year 2005. Table 4 shows the average number of foreign 
airport visits scheduled per international inspector for fiscal year 
2005. 

Table 4: Budgeted Number of Inspectors, Total Scheduled Foreign Airport 
Visits, and Average Number of Scheduled Foreign Airport Visits per 
Inspector, by IFO, for Fiscal Year 2005: 

IFO: Brussel