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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:

August 2007:

Department Of Homeland Security:
Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions:
Homeland Security Progress Report:

GAO-07-454:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-07-454, a report to congressional requesters.

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) recent 4 year anniversary 
provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made since 
its establishment. DHS began operations in March 2003 with the mission 
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
vulnerabilities, minimize damages from attacks, and aid in recovery 
efforts. GAO has reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous 
management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of 
the effort made the challenge especially daunting and critical to the 
nation’s security. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions
found that successful transformations of large organizations, even 
those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at 
least 5 to 7 years to achieve. GAO was asked to report on DHS’s 
progress in implementing its mission and management areas and 
challenges DHS faces. This report also discusses key themes that have 
affected DHS’s implementation efforts.

How GAO Did This Study:

To assess DHS’s progress, GAO identified performance expectations for 
each mission and management area based on legislation, homeland 
security presidential directives, DHS and component agencies’ strategic 
plans, and other sources. 

GAO analyzed these documents to identify responsibilities for DHS and 
obtained and incorporated feedback from DHS officials on the 
performance expectations. On the basis of GAO’s and the DHS Office of 
Inspector General’s (IG) prior work and updated information provided by 
DHS, GAO determined the extent to which DHS has taken actions to 
generally achieve each performance expectation. An assessment of 
generally achieved indicates that DHS has taken actions to satisfy most 
elements of the expectation, and an assessment of generally not 
achieved indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most 
elements of the expectation. An assessment of generally not achieved 
may be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to 
satisfy some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we 
or the DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment 
or the information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine 
the extent to which DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we 
indicated no assessment made. Our assessment of DHS’s progress relative 
to each performance expectation is not meant to imply that DHS should 
have fully achieved the performance expectation by the end of its 
fourth year. On the basis of this analysis, GAO determined whether DHS 
has made limited, modest, moderate, or substantial progress in each 
mission and management area. The assessments of progress do not 
reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS’s 
actions have made the nation more secure in each area.

What GAO Found:

At the time of its creation in 2003 as one of the largest federal 
reorganizations in the last several decades, we designated the 
implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area due to the 
magnitude of the challenges it confronted in areas vital to the 
physical and economic well being of the nation. After 4 years into its 
overall integration effort, DHS has attained some level of progress in 
all of its mission and management areas. The rate of progress, however, 
among these areas varies, as shown in the table below.

Summary of Assessments of DHS’s Progress in Mission and Management 
Areas:

Mission/management area: Border security;
Number of performance expectations: 12;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 5;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 7;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.

Mission/management area: Immigration enforcement;
Number of performance expectations: 16;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 8;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 4;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 4; 
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Mission/management area: Immigration services;
Number of performance expectations: 14;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 5;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 9;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.

Mission/management area: Aviation security;
Number of performance expectations: 24;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 17;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 7;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Mission/management area: Surface transportation security;
Number of performance expectations: 5;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 3;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 2;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Mission/management area: Maritime security;
Number of performance expectations: 23;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 17;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 4;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 2; 
Overall assessment of progress: Substantial.

Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Number of performance expectations: 24;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 5;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 18;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 1; 
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
	
Mission/management area: Critical infrastructure protection;
Number of performance expectations: 7;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 4;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 3;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 9; 
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Mission/management area: Science and technology;
Number of performance expectations: 6;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 1;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 5;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.

Mission/management area: Acquisition management;
Number of performance expectations: 3;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 1;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 2;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.

Mission/management area: Financial management;
Number of performance expectations: 7;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 2;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 5;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.

Mission/management area: Human capital management;
Number of performance expectations: 8;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 2;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 6;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.

Mission/management area: Information technology management;
Number of performance expectations: 13;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 2;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 8;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 3; 
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.

Mission/management area: Real property management;
Number of performance expectations: 9;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 6;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 3;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 0; 
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Mission/management area: Total;
Number of performance expectations: 171;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 78;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 83;	
Number of expectations not assessed: 10; 
Overall assessment of progress:
	
Source: GAO analysis.

Definitions:

Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more 
than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations.
Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 
50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified performance 
expectations.

Modest progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 
25 percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance 
expectations.

Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25 percent 
or less of the identified performance expectations.

What GAO Recommends:

While this report contains no new recommendations, in past products, 
GAO has made approximately 700 recommendations to DHS designed to 
strengthen departmental operations. DHS has implemented some of these 
recommendations, has taken actions to address others, and has taken 
other steps to strengthen its mission and management activities. 
In its comments on a draft of this report, DHS took issues with our 
methodology and disagreed with our assessments for 42 of 171 
performance expectations. DHS’s five general concerns were with (1) 
perceived alteration of standards used to judge progress; (2) our 
binary approach to assess the performance expectations; (3) perceived 
changes in criteria after DHS provided additional information; (4) 
consistent application of our methodology; and (5) differences in the 
priority of performance expectations. We believe that we have fully 
disclosed and consistently applied our methodology and that it provides 
a sound basis for this progress report. 

Contents:

Letter:

Scope and Methodology:

Results in Brief:

Background:

DHS Has Made Varying Levels of Progress in Implementing its Core 
Mission and Management Functions, but Has Faced Difficulties in Its 
Implementation Efforts:

Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS's Implementation Efforts:

Concluding Observations:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Key GAO Contacts for DHS Mission and Management Areas:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Border Security 
Performance Expectations:

Table 2: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Enforcement 
Performance Expectations:

Table 3: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Services 
Performance Expectations:

Table 4: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Aviation Security 
Performance Expectations:

Table 5: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Surface Transportation 
Security Performance Expectations:

Table 6: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Maritime Security 
Performance Expectations:

Table 7: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Emergency Preparedness 
and Response Performance Expectations:

Table 8: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Resources Protection Performance Expectations:

Table 9: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Science and Technology 
Performance Expectations:

Table 10: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Acquisition Management 
Performance Expectations:

Table 11: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Financial Management 
Performance Expectations:

Table 12: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Human Capital Management 
Performance Expectations:

Table 13: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Information Technology 
Management Performance Expectations:

Table 14: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Real Property Management 
Performance Expectations:

Table 15: DHS Budget Authority for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 in 
Thousands of Dollars, as Reported by DHS as of January 2007:

Table 16: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Border 
Security:

Table 17: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Border Security:

Table 18: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration 
Enforcement:

Table 19: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Immigration Enforcement:

Table 20: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration 
Services:

Table 21: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Immigration Services:

Table 22: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation 
Security:

Table 23: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Aviation Security:

Table 24: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Surface 
Transportation Security:

Table 25: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Surface Transportation Security:

Table 26: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Maritime 
Security:

Table 27: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Maritime Security:

Table 28: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Emergency 
Preparedness and Response:

Table 29: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Table 30: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:

Table 31: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:

Table 32: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Science and 
Technology:

Table 33: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Science and Technology:

Table 34: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Acquisition 
Management:

Table 35: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Acquisition Management:

Table 36: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Financial 
Management:

Table 37: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Financial Management:

Table 38: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Human Capital 
Management:

Table 39: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Human Capital Management:

Table 40: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Information 
Technology Management:

Table 41: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Information Technology Management:

Table 42: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Real Property 
Management:

Table 43: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Real Property Management:

Figures:

Figure 1: Example of Performance Expectations for Border Security:

Figure 2: Selected Key Events That Have Affected Department of Homeland 
Security Implementation:

Abbreviations:

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: 
EDS: explosive detection system: 
ETD: explosive trace detection: 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 
IG: Inspector General: 
INS: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service: 
OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 
SBI: Secure Border Initiative: 
TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 
USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 
US-VISIT: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology:

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:

August 17, 2007:

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives:

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently passed its 4 year 
anniversary, and this anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on 
the progress it has made since its establishment, determine challenges 
the department has faced in implementing its mission and management 
areas, and identify issues that will be important for the department to 
address as it moves forward. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, DHS began operations in March 2003 with missions that include 
preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States, 
reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing the damages from 
attacks that occur, and helping the nation recover from any attacks. 
Over the past 4 years, the department has initiated and continued the 
implementation of various policies and programs to address these 
missions as well as its nonhomeland security functions.[Footnote 1] In 
particular, DHS has implemented programs to secure the border and 
administer the immigration system; strengthen the security of the 
transportation sector; and defend against, prepare for, and respond to 
threats and disasters. DHS has also taken actions to integrate its 
management functions and to transform its component agencies into an 
effective cabinet department.

We have evaluated many of DHS's programs and management functions since 
the department's establishment. We have issued over 400 products on 
major departmental programs in the areas of border security and 
immigration; transportation security; defense against, preparedness 
for, and response to threats and disasters; and the department's 
management functions--including acquisition, financial, human capital, 
information technology, and real property management. In November 2006, 
we provided congressional leadership with a list of government 
programs, functions, and activities that warrant further congressional 
oversight. Among the issues included were border security and 
immigration enforcement, security of transportation modes, 
preparedness and response for catastrophic threats, and DHS 
implementation and transformation.[Footnote 2] We have also reported on 
broad themes that have underpinned DHS's implementation efforts, 
including agency transformation, strategic planning and results 
management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and 
coordination. We have made about 700 recommendations to DHS on ways to 
improve its operations and address these key themes, such as to develop 
performance measures and set milestones for key programs, allocate 
resources based on assessments of risk, and develop and implement 
internal controls to help ensure program effectiveness. DHS has 
implemented some of these recommendations, taken actions to address 
others, and taken other steps to strengthen its mission activities and 
facilitate management integration. However, we have reported that the 
department still has much to do to ensure that it conducts its missions 
efficiently and effectively while simultaneously preparing to address 
future challenges that face the department and the nation.

In 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as 
high-risk because it represented an enormous undertaking that would 
require time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner.[Footnote 
3] Additionally, the components merged into DHS already faced a wide 
array of existing challenges, and any DHS failure to effectively carry 
out its mission could expose the nation to potentially serious 
consequences. The area has remained on our high-risk list since 
2003.[Footnote 4] Most recently, in our January 2007 high-risk update, 
we reported that although the department had made some progress 
transforming its 22 agencies into an effective, integrated 
organization, DHS had not yet developed a comprehensive management 
integration strategy and its management systems and functions--
especially related to acquisition, financial, human capital, and 
information management--were not yet fully integrated and wholly 
operational. We also noted that DHS faces a number of challenges to 
effectively carry out its program activities and enhance partnerships 
with private and public sector entities to leverage resources. We 
concluded that this array of management and programmatic challenges 
continues to limit DHS's ability to fulfill its homeland security roles 
in an effective, risk-based way. Furthermore, in 2005 we designated 
information sharing for homeland security as high-risk,[Footnote 5] and 
in 2006 we identified the National Flood Insurance Program as high-
risk.[Footnote 6] In 2003 we expanded the scope of the high-risk area 
involving federal information security, which was initially designated 
as high-risk in 1997, to include the protection of the nation's 
computer-reliant critical infrastructure. We identified information 
sharing for homeland security as high-risk because of the lack of 
strategic plans; established processes, procedures, and mechanisms; and 
incentives for sharing information. We identified the National Flood 
Insurance Program as high-risk because it was highly unlikely that the 
program would generate sufficient revenues to repay funds borrowed from 
the Treasury to cover claims during catastrophic loss years and because 
of concerns related to the program's financial resources, compliance 
with mandatory purchase requirements, and the costly impact of 
repetitive loss properties. We expanded the scope of the federal 
information security high-risk area to include the protection of the 
nation's computer-reliant critical infrastructure because, as the focal 
point of federal efforts, DHS had not yet completely fulfilled any of 
its key responsibilities for enhancing cyber security.

In designating the implementation and transformation of DHS as high-
risk, we noted that the creation of DHS was an enormous management 
challenge.[Footnote 7] The size, complexity, and importance of the 
effort made the challenge especially daunting and incomparably critical 
to the nation's security. We noted that building an effective 
department would require consistent and sustained leadership from top 
management to ensure the needed transformation of disparate agencies, 
programs, and missions into an integrated organization. Our prior work 
on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the creation of DHS, 
found that successful transformations of large organizations, even 
those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take 5 to 
7 years to achieve. We reported that in successful transformations, 
organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more 
results-oriented, client-and customer-oriented, and collaborative in 
nature. To successfully transform, an organization must fundamentally 
reexamine its processes, organizational structures, and management 
approaches. Organizational changes such as these are complex and cannot 
be accomplished overnight. In the case of DHS, it will likely take at 
least several more years for the department to complete its 
transformation efforts. We also have recommended that Congress continue 
to monitor whether it needs to provide additional leadership 
authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for Management or create a Chief 
Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer position that could help 
elevate, integrate, and institutionalize DHS's management initiatives. 
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 
enacted in August 2007, designates the Under Secretary for Management 
as the Chief Management Officer and principal advisor on management-
related matters to the Secretary.[Footnote 8] Under the Act, the Under 
Secretary is responsible for developing a transition and succession 
plan for the incoming Secretary and Under Secretary to guide the 
transition of management functions to a new administration. The Act 
further authorizes the incumbent Under Secretary as of November 8, 2008 
(after the next presidential election), to remain in the position until 
a successor is confirmed to ensure continuity in the management 
functions of DHS.

You asked us to review our past work on DHS and provide an assessment 
of DHS's progress and challenges during its first 4 years. This report 
addresses the following questions: (1) What progress has DHS made in 
implementing key mission and core management functions since its 
inception, and what challenges has the department faced in its 
implementation efforts? (2) What key themes have affected DHS's 
implementation of its mission and management functions?[Footnote 9]

DHS's major mission and management areas include border security; 
immigration enforcement; immigration services; aviation security; 
surface transportation security; maritime security; emergency 
preparedness and response; critical infrastructure and key resources 
protection; science and technology; and acquisition, financial, human 
capital, information technology, and real property management. This 
report also identifies the key cross-cutting themes that have affected 
the department's efforts to implement its mission and management areas. 
These key themes include agency transformation, strategic planning and 
results management, risk management, information sharing, and 
partnerships and coordination.

Scope and Methodology:

This report is based primarily on work that we and the DHS Office of 
Inspector General (IG) have completed since the establishment of DHS in 
March 2003 and updated information and documentation provided by the 
department in March 2007 through July 2007. To determine the progress 
DHS has made in implementing various mission and management areas, we 
first identified key areas. To identify these mission and management 
areas, we analyzed the critical mission areas for homeland security 
identified in legislation, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
the goals and objectives set forth in the DHS Strategic Plan and 
homeland security presidential directives, and areas identified in our 
reports along with studies conducted by the DHS IG and other 
organizations and groups, such as the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (9-11 Commission) and the Century 
Foundation. We analyzed these documents to identify common mission and 
management areas and discussed the areas we identified with our subject 
matter experts[Footnote 10] and DHS officials.[Footnote 11] The mission 
and management areas we identified are:

1. Border security:

2. Immigration enforcement:

3. Immigration services:

4. Aviation security:

5. Surface transportation security:

6. Maritime security:

7. Emergency preparedness and response:

8. Critical infrastructure and key resources protection:

9. Science and technology:

10. Acquisition management:

11. Financial management:

12. Human capital management:

13. Information technology management:

14. Real property management:

To determine the level of progress made by DHS in each mission and 
management area, we identified performance expectations for each area. 
We define performance expectations as a composite of the 
responsibilities or functions--derived from legislation, homeland 
security presidential directives and executive orders, DHS planning 
documents, and other sources--that the department is to achieve or 
satisfy in implementing efforts in its mission and management areas. 
The performance expectations are not intended to represent performance 
goals or measures for the department.[Footnote 12] Figure 1 provides an 
example of performance expectations for the border security mission 
area:

Figure 1: Example of Performance Expectations for Border Security:

DHS Mission and Management Areas:

1. Border security: Performance Expectations: Implement a biometric 
entry system to prevent unauthorized border crossers from entering the 
United States through ports of entry; Implement a biometric exit system 
to collect information on border crossers leaving the United States 
through ports of entry; Develop a program to detect and identify 
illegal border crossings between ports of entry; Implement a program to 
detect and identify illegal illegal border crossings between ports of 
entry.
2. Immigration enforcement:
3. Immigration services:
4. Aviation security:
5. Surface transportation security:
6. Maritime security:
7. Emergency preparedness and response:
8. Critical infrastructure and key resources protection:
9. Science and technology:
10. Acquisition management:
11. Financial management:
12. Human capital management:
13. Information technology management:
14. Real property management:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

We primarily focused the performance expectations on DHS's homeland 
security-related functions. We generally did not identify performance 
expectations related to DHS's nonhomeland security functions, although 
we did identify some performance expectations that relate to these 
functions. We also did not apply a weight to the performance 
expectations we developed for DHS, although qualitative differences 
between the expectations exist. We recognize that these expectations 
are not time bound, and DHS will take actions to satisfy these 
expectations over a sustained period of time. Therefore, our assessment 
of DHS's progress relative to each performance expectation refers to 
the progress made by the department during its first 4 years. Our 
assessment of DHS's progress relative to each performance expectation 
is not meant to imply that DHS should have fully achieved the 
performance expectation by the end of its fourth year.

To identify the performance expectations, we examined responsibilities 
set for the department by Congress, the Administration, and department 
leadership. In doing so, we reviewed homeland security-related 
legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004,[Footnote 13] the Homeland Security Act of 2002,[Footnote 
14] the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,[Footnote 15] the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,[Footnote 
16] and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.[Footnote 17] We 
also reviewed DHS appropriations acts and accompanying conference 
reports for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. We did not consider 
legislation enacted since September 2006 in developing the performance 
expectations. To identify goals and measures set by the Administration, 
we reviewed relevant homeland security presidential directives and 
executive orders. For the goals and measures set by the department, we 
analyzed the DHS Strategic Plan, Performance Budget Overviews, 
Performance and Accountability Reports, and component agencies' 
strategic plans. For management areas, we also examined effective 
practices identified in our prior reports.[Footnote 18] We analyzed 
these documents to identify common or similar responsibilities for DHS 
mission and management areas and synthesized the responsibilities 
identified in the various documents to develop performance expectations 
for DHS. We obtained and incorporated feedback from our subject matter 
experts on these performance expectations. We also provided the 
performance expectations to DHS for review and incorporated DHS's 
feedback.

Based primarily on our prior work and DHS IG work, as well as updated 
information provided by DHS between March and June 2007, we examined 
the extent to which DHS has taken actions to achieve the identified 
performance expectations in each area and make a determination as to 
whether DHS has achieved the key elements of each performance 
expectation based on the criteria listed below:

* Generally achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has taken actions to 
satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation but may 
not have satisfied all of the elements.

* Generally not achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has not yet taken 
actions to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance 
expectation but may have taken steps to satisfy some of the elements.

* No assessment made: Neither we nor the DHS IG have completed work 
and/or the information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly assess 
DHS's progress in achieving the performance expectation. Therefore, we 
have no basis for making an assessment of the extent to which DHS has 
taken actions to satisfy the performance expectation.[Footnote 19]

An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation; 
however, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions 
to satisfy most elements of the performance expectation. An assessment 
of "generally not achieved" may be warranted even where DHS has put 
forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not most elements of an 
expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have not completed work 
upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to satisfy a 
performance expectation and/or the information DHS provided did not 
enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has achieved the 
performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment made." We analyzed 
the extent of our work, the DHS IG's work, and DHS's updated 
information and conferred with our subject matter experts to determine 
whether the work and information were sufficient for a making a 
determination of generally achieved or generally not achieved.

Between March and June 2007, we obtained updated information from DHS 
and met with program officials to discuss DHS's efforts to implement 
actions to achieve the performance expectations in each mission and 
management area. We incorporated DHS's additional information and 
documentation into the report and, to the extent that DHS provided 
documentation verifying its efforts, considered them in making our 
assessments of DHS's progress.

For each performance expectation, an analyst on our staff reviewed our 
relevant work, DHS IG reports, and updated information and 
documentation provided by DHS, including information received during 
meetings with DHS officials. On the basis of this review, the analyst 
made a determination that either DHS generally achieved the performance 
expectation or generally did not achieve the performance expectation, 
or the analyst identified that no determination could be made because 
neither we nor the DHS IG had completed work and DHS did not provide us 
with updated information and documentation. A second analyst then 
reviewed each determination to reach concurrence on the assessment for 
each performance expectation by reviewing the first analyst's summary 
of our reports, relevant DHS IG reports, and DHS's updated information 
and documentation. In cases when the first and second analyst 
disagreed, the two analysts reviewed and discussed the assessments and 
relevant documents to reach concurrence. Then, our subject matter 
experts reviewed the summary of our reports, relevant DHS IG reports, 
and DHS's updated information and documentation to reach concurrence on 
the assessment for each performance expectation.

To develop criteria for assessing DHS's progress in each mission and 
management area, we analyzed criteria used for ratings or assessments 
in our prior work, in DHS IG reports, and in other reports and studies, 
such as those conducted by the 9-11 Commission and the Century 
Foundation. We also reviewed our past work in each mission and 
management area and obtained feedback from our subject matter experts 
and DHS officials on these criteria. Based on this analysis, we 
developed the following criteria for assessing DHS's progress in each 
mission and management area:

* Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more 
than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations.

* Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more 
than 50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified performance 
expectations.

* Modest progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 
25 percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance 
expectations.

* Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25 
percent or less of the identified performance expectations.

After making a determination as to whether DHS has generally achieved 
or generally not achieved the identified performance expectations, we 
added up the number of performance expectations that we determined DHS 
has generally achieved. We divided this number by the total number of 
performance expectations for each mission and management area, 
excluding those performance expectations for which we could not make an 
assessment. Based on the resulting percentage, we identified DHS's 
overall progress in each mission and management area, as (1) 
substantial progress, (2) moderate progress, (3) modest progress, or 
(4) limited progress. Our subject matter experts reviewed the overall 
assessments of progress we identified for DHS in each mission and 
management area.

Our assessments of the progress made by DHS in each mission and 
management area are based on the performance expectations we 
identified. The assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they 
intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS's actions have made the 
nation more secure in each area. For example, in determining that DHS 
has made modest progress in border security, we are not stating or 
implying that the border is modestly more secure than it was prior to 
the creation of DHS. In addition, we are not assessing DHS's progress 
against a baseline in each mission and management area. We also did not 
consider DHS component agencies' funding levels or the extent to which 
funding levels have affected the department's ability to carry out its 
missions. We also did not consider the extent to which competing 
priorities and resource demands have affected DHS's progress in each 
mission and management area relative to other areas, although competing 
priorities and resource demands have clearly affected DHS's progress in 
specific areas.

In addition, because we and the DHS IG have completed varying degrees 
of work (in terms of the amount and scope of reviews completed) for 
each mission and management area, and because different DHS components 
and offices provided us with different amounts and types of 
information, our assessments of DHS's progress in each mission and 
management area reflect the information available for our review and 
analysis and are not necessarily equally comprehensive across all 14 
mission and management areas. For example, as a result of the post-
September 11, 2001, focus on aviation, we have conducted more reviews 
of aviation security, and our methodology identified a much larger 
number of related performance expectations than for the department's 
progress in surface transportation security. Further, for some 
performance expectations, we were unable to make an assessment of DHS's 
progress because (1) we had not conducted work in that area, (2) the 
DHS IG's work in the area was also limited, and (3) the supplemental 
information provided by DHS was insufficient to form a basis for our 
analysis. Most notably, we were unable to make an assessment for four 
performance expectations in the area of immigration enforcement. This 
affected our overall assessment of DHS's progress in that area as there 
were fewer performance expectations to tally in determining the overall 
level of progress.

We conducted our work for this report from September 2006 through July 
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.

Results in Brief:

At the time of its creation in 2003 as one of the largest federal 
reorganizations in the last several decades, we designated the 
implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area due to the 
magnitude of the challenges it confronted in areas vital to the 
physical and economic well being of the nation. After 4 years into its 
overall integration effort, DHS has attained some level of progress in 
all of its major mission and management areas. The rate of progress, 
however, among these areas varies.

* DHS's border security mission includes detecting and preventing 
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States; 
facilitating the orderly and efficient flow of legitimate trade and 
travel; interdicting illegal drugs and other contraband; apprehending 
individuals who are attempting to enter the United States illegally; 
inspecting inbound and outbound people, vehicles, and cargo; and 
enforcing pertinent laws of the United States at the border. As shown 
in table 1, we identified 12 performance expectations for DHS in the 
area of border security and found that DHS has generally achieved 5 of 
them and has generally not achieved 7 others.

Table 1: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Border Security 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 5.

Performance expectation: Implement a biometric entry system to prevent 
unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States through 
ports of entry; 
Performance expectation: Develop a program to detect and identify 
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
Performance expectation: Develop a strategy to detect and interdict 
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States; 
Performance expectation: Provide adequate training for all border 
related employees; 
Performance expectation: Develop staffing plans for hiring and 
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's border 
security mission. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 7.

Performance expectation: Implement a biometric exit system to collect 
information on border crossers leaving the United States through ports 
of entry;
Performance expectation: Implement a program to detect and identify 
illegal border crossings between ports of entry; 
Performance expectation: Implement a strategy to detect and interdict 
illegal flows of cargo, drugs and other items into the United States; 
Performance expectation: Implement effective security measures in the 
visa issuance process; 
Performance expectation: Implement initiatives related to the security 
of certain documents used to enter the United States;
Performance expectation: Ensure adequate infrastructure and facilities; 
Performance expectation: Leverage technology, personnel, and 
information to secure the border. 

Overall assessment of progress: Modest.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's immigration enforcement mission includes apprehending, 
detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and 
dismantling organized smuggling of humans and contraband as well as 
human trafficking; investigating and prosecuting those who engage in 
benefit and document fraud; blocking and removing employers' access to 
undocumented workers; and enforcing compliance with programs to monitor 
visitors. As shown in table 2, we identified 16 performance 
expectations for DHS in the area of immigration enforcement and found 
that DHS has generally achieved 8 of them and has generally not 
achieved 4 others. For 4 performance expectations, we could not make an 
assessment.

Table 2: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Enforcement 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 8.

Performance expectation: Develop a program to ensure the timely 
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal 
from the United States; 
Performance expectation: Assess and prioritize the use of alien 
detention resources to prevent the release of aliens subject to 
removal; 
Performance expectation: Develop a program to allow for the secure 
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens; 
Performance expectation: Develop a prioritized worksite enforcement 
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed; 
Performance expectation: Develop a comprehensive strategy to interdict 
and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the United States; 
Performance expectation: Develop a law enforcement strategy to combat 
criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border criminal 
activity; 
Performance expectation: Develop a program to screen and respond to 
local law enforcement and community complaints about aliens who many be 
subject to removal; 
Performance expectation: Develop staffing plans for hiring and 
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's immigration 
enforcement mission. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 4.

Performance expectation: Implement a program to ensure the timely 
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal 
from the United States; 
Performance expectation: Ensure the removal of criminal aliens; 
Performance expectation: Implement a prioritized worksite enforcement 
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed; 
Performance expectation: Implement a comprehensive strategy to 
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the 
United States. 

Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 4.

Performance expectation: Implement a program to allow for the secure 
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens; 
Performance expectation: Implement a law enforcement strategy to combat 
criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border criminal 
activity;
Performance expectation: Disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money 
laundering and financial crimes; 
Performance expectation: Provide training, including foreign language 
training, and equipment for all immigration enforcement personnel to 
fulfill the agency's mission. 

Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's immigration services mission includes administering immigration 
benefits and working to reduce immigration benefit fraud. As shown in 
table 3, we identified 14 performance expectations for DHS in the area 
of immigration services and found that DHS has generally achieved 5 of 
them and has generally not achieved 9 others.

Table 3: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Services 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 5.

Performance expectation: Institute process and staffing reforms to 
improve application processes; 
Performance expectation: Establish online access to status information 
about benefit applications; 
Performance expectation: Establish revised immigration application 
fees based on a comprehensive fee study; 
Performance expectation: Communicate immigration-related information 
to other relevant agencies; 
Performance expectation: Create an office to reduce immigration benefit 
fraud.

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 9.

Performance expectation: Eliminate the benefit application backlog and 
reduce application completion times to 6 months; 
Performance expectation: Establish a timetable for reviewing the 
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration 
benefit applications; 
Performance expectation: Institute a case management system to manage 
applications and provide management information; 
Performance expectation: Develop new programs to prevent future 
backlogs from developing; 
Performance expectation: Establish online filing for benefit 
applications; 
Performance expectation: Capture biometric information on all benefits 
applicants; 
Performance expectation: Implement an automated background check system 
to track and store all requests for applications; 
Performance expectation: Establish training programs to reduce fraud in 
the benefits process; 
Performance expectation: Implement a fraud assessment program to reduce 
benefit fraud. 

Overall assessment of progress; Total: Modest.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's aviation security mission includes strengthening airport 
security; providing and training a screening workforce; prescreening 
passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, 
baggage, and cargo. As shown in table 4, we identified 24 performance 
expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security and found that 
DHS has generally achieved 17 of them and has generally not achieved 7 
others.

Table 4: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Aviation Security 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 17.

Performance expectation: Implement a strategic approach for aviation 
security functions; 
Performance expectation: Ensure the screening of airport employees 
against terrorist watch lists; 
Performance expectation: Hire and deploy a federal screening workforce; 
Performance expectation: Develop standards for determining aviation 
security staffing at airports; 
Performance expectation: Establish standards for training and testing 
the performance of airport screener staff; 
Performance expectation: Establish a program and requirements to allow 
eligible airports to use a private screening workforce; 
Performance expectation: Train and deploy federal air marshals on high-
risk flights; 
Performance expectation: Establish standards for training flight and 
cabin crews; 
Performance expectation: Establish a program to allow authorized flight 
deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or 
criminal acts; 
Performance expectation: Establish policies and procedures to ensure 
that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk or 
threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate action; 
Performance expectation: Develop and implement processes and procedures 
for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints; 
Performance expectation: Develop and test checkpoint technologies to 
address vulnerabilities; 
Performance expectation: Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS) and 
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage for 
explosives; 
Performance expectation: Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage 
screening equipment at airports; 
Performance expectation: Pursue the deployment and use of in-line 
baggage screening equipment at airports; 
Performance expectation: Develop a plan for air cargo security; 
Performance expectation: Develop and implement procedures to screen air 
cargo. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 7.

Performance expectation: Establish standards and procedures for 
effective airport perimeter security; 
Performance expectation: Establish standards and procedures to 
effectively control access to airport secured areas; 
Performance expectation: Establish procedures for implementing 
biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access control; 
Performance expectation: Develop and implement an advanced prescreening 
system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger information to the 
Selectee List and No Fly List; 
Performance expectation: Develop and implement an international 
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to 
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure; 
Performance expectation: Deploy checkpoint technologies to address 
vulnerabilities; 
Performance expectation: Develop and implement technologies to screen 
air cargo. 

Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's surface transportation security mission includes establishing 
security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of 
surface transportation modes, which include passenger and freight rail; 
mass transit; highways, including commercial vehicles; and pipelines. 
As shown in table 5, we identified 5 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of surface transportation security and found that DHS has 
generally achieved 3 of them and has generally not achieved 2.

Table 5: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Surface Transportation 
Security Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 3.

Performance expectation: Develop and adopt a strategic approach for 
implementing surface transportation security functions; 
Performance expectation: Conduct threat, criticality, and 
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets; 
Performance expectation: Administer grant programs for surface 
transportation security. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 2.

Performance expectation: Issue standards for securing surface 
transportation modes; 
Performance expectation: Conduct compliance inspections for surface 
transportation systems. 

Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's maritime security responsibilities include port and vessel 
security, maritime intelligence, and maritime supply chain security. As 
shown in table 6, we identified 23 performance expectations for DHS in 
the area of maritime security and found that DHS has generally achieved 
17 of them and has generally not achieved 4 others. For 2 performance 
expectations, we could not make an assessment.

Table 6: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Maritime Security 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 17.

Performance expectation: Develop national plans for maritime security; 
Performance expectation: Develop national plans for maritime response; 
Performance expectation: Develop national plans for maritime recovery; 
Performance expectation: Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
security; 
Performance expectation: Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
response; 
Performance expectation: Ensure port facilities have completed 
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans; 
Performance expectation: Ensure that vessels have completed 
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans; 
Performance expectation: Exercise security, response, and recovery 
plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance security, response, and 
recovery efforts; 
Performance expectation: Implement a port security grant program to 
help facilities improve their security capabilities; 
Performance expectation: Establish operational centers to monitor 
threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port 
level; 
Performance expectation: Collect information on incoming ships to 
assess risks and threats; 
Performance expectation: Develop a vessel-tracking system to improve 
intelligence and maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S. waters; 
Performance expectation: Collect information on arriving cargo for 
screening purposes; 
Performance expectation: Develop a system for screening and inspecting 
cargo for illegal contraband; 
Performance expectation: Develop a program to work with foreign 
governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S. 
ports; 
Performance expectation: Develop a program to work with the private 
sector to improve and validate supply chain security; 
Performance expectation: Develop an international port security program 
to assess security at foreign ports. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 4.

Performance expectation: Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
recovery; 
Performance expectation: Implement a national facility access control 
system for port secured areas; 
Performance expectation: Develop a long-range vessel-tracking system to 
improve maritime domain awareness; 
Performance expectation: Develop a program to screen incoming cargo for 
radiation. 

Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 2.

Performance expectation: Develop a national plan to establish and 
improve maritime; intelligence; 
Performance expectation: Develop standards for cargo containers to 
ensure their physical security. 

Overall assessment of progress: Substantial.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's emergency preparedness and response mission includes preparing 
to minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks and 
disasters; helping to plan, equip, train, and practice needed skills of 
first responders; and consolidating federal response plans and 
activities to build a national, coordinated system for incident 
management. As shown in table 7, we identified 24 performance 
expectations for DHS in the area of emergency preparedness and response 
and found that DHS has generally achieved 5 of them and has generally 
not achieved 18 others. For 1 performance expectation, we could not 
make an assessment.

Table 7: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Emergency Preparedness 
and Response Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 5.

Performance expectation: Establish a program for conducting emergency 
preparedness exercises; 
Performance expectation: Develop a national incident management system; 
Performance expectation: Provide grant funding to first responders in 
developing and implementing interoperable communications capabilities; 
Performance expectation: Administer a program for providing grants and 
assistance to state and local governments and first responders; 
Performance expectation: Allocate grants based on assessment factors 
that account for population, critical infrastructure, and other risk 
factors. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 18.

Performance expectation: Establish a comprehensive training program for 
national preparedness; 
Performance expectation: Conduct and support risk assessments and risk 
management capabilities for emergency preparedness; 
Performance expectation: Ensure the capacity and readiness of disaster 
response teams; 
Performance expectation: Coordinate implementation of a national 
incident management system; 
Performance expectation: Establish a single, all-hazards national 
response plan; 
Performance expectation: Coordinate implementation of a single, all-
hazards response plan; 
Performance expectation: Develop a complete inventory of federal 
response capabilities; 
Performance expectation: Develop a national, all-hazards preparedness 
goal; 
Performance expectation: Develop plans and capabilities to strengthen 
nationwide recovery efforts;
Performance expectation: Develop the capacity to provide needed 
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner; 
Performance expectation: Provide timely assistance and services to 
individuals and communities in response to emergency events; 
Performance expectation: Implement a program to improve interoperable 
communications among federal, state, and local agencies; 
Performance expectation: Implement procedures and capabilities for 
effective interoperable communications;
Performance expectation: Increase the development and adoption of 
interoperability communications standards; 
Performance expectation: Develop performance goals and measures to 
assess progress in developing interoperability; 
Performance expectation: Provide guidance and technical assistance to 
first responders in developing and implementing interoperable 
communications capabilities; 
Performance expectation: Provide assistance to state and local 
governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities; 
Performance expectation: Develop a system for collecting and 
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to emergency 
responders. 

Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 1.

Performance expectation: Support citizen participation in national 
preparedness efforts. 

Overall assessment of progress: Limited.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's critical infrastructure and key resources protection activities 
include developing and coordinating implementation of a comprehensive 
national plan for critical infrastructure protection, developing 
partnerships with stakeholders and information sharing and warning 
capabilities, and identifying and reducing threats and vulnerabilities. 
As shown in table 8, we identified 7 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of critical infrastructure and key resources protection and 
found that DHS has generally achieved 4 of them and has generally not 
achieved 3 others.

Table 8: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Resources Protection Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 4.

Performance expectation: Develop a comprehensive national plan for 
critical infrastructure protection; 
Performance expectation: Develop partnerships and coordinate with other 
federal agencies, state and local, governments, and the private sector; 
Performance expectation: Identify and assess threats and 
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure; 
Performance expectation: Support efforts to reduce threats and 
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 3.

Performance expectation: Improve and enhance public/private 
information sharing involving attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities; 
Performance expectation: Develop and enhance national analysis and 
warning capabilities for critical infrastructure; 
Performance expectation: Provide and coordinate incident response and 
recovery planning efforts for critical infrastructure.

Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's science and technology efforts include coordinating the federal 
government's civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures 
to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging 
terrorist threats. As shown in table 9, we identified 6 performance 
expectations for DHS in the area of science and technology and found 
that DHS has generally achieved 1 of them and has generally not 
achieved 5 others.

Table 9: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Science and Technology 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 1.

Performance expectation: Coordinate with and share homeland security 
technologies with federal, state, local, and private sector entities. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 5.

Performance expectation: Develop a plan for departmental research, 
development, testing, and evaluation activities; 
Performance expectation: Assess emerging chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threats and homeland security 
vulnerabilities; 
Performance expectation: Coordinate research, development, and testing 
efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to address chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist 
threats; 
Performance expectation: Coordinate deployment of nuclear, biological, 
chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and other 
countermeasures;
Performance expectation: Assess and evaluate nuclear, biological, 
chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and other 
countermeasures.

Overall assessment of progress: Limited.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's acquisition management efforts include managing the use of 
contracts to acquire goods and services needed to fulfill or support 
the agency's missions, such as information systems, new technologies, 
aircraft, ships, and professional services. As shown in table 10, we 
identified 3 performance expectations for DHS in the area of 
acquisition management and found that DHS has generally achieved 1 of 
them and has generally not achieved 2 others.

Table 10: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Acquisition Management 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 1.

Performance expectation: Assess and organize acquisition functions to 
meet agency needs.

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 2.

Performance expectation: Develop clear and transparent policies and 
processes for all acquisitions;
Performance expectation: Develop an acquisition workforce to implement 
and monitor acquisitions.

Overall assessment of progress: Modest.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

*DHS's financial management efforts include consolidating or 
integrating component agencies' financial management systems. As shown 
in table 11, we identified 7 performance expectations for DHS in the 
area of financial management and found that DHS has generally achieved 
2 of them and has generally not achieved 5 others.

Table 11: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Financial Management 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 2.

Performance expectation: Designate a department Chief Financial Officer 
who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; 
Performance expectation: Prepare corrective action plans for internal 
control weaknesses.

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 5.

Performance expectation: Subject all financial statements to an annual 
financial statement audit; 
Performance expectation: Obtain an unqualified financial statement 
audit opinion; 
Performance expectation: Substantially comply with federal financial 
management system requirements, applicable federal accounting 
standards, and the U.S. Standard General Ledger at the transaction 
level; 
Performance expectation: Obtain an unqualified opinion on internal 
control over financial reporting;
Performance expectation: Correct internal control weaknesses.

Overall assessment of progress: Modest.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's key human capital management areas include pay, performance 
management, classification, labor relations, adverse actions, employee 
appeals, and diversity management. As shown in table 12, we identified 
8 performance expectations for DHS in the area of human capital 
management and found that DHS has generally achieved 2 of them and has 
generally not achieved 6 others.

Table 12: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Human Capital Management 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 2.

Performance expectation: Develop a results-oriented strategic human 
capital plan; 
Performance expectation: Create a comprehensive plan for training and 
professional development.

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 6.

Performance expectation: Implement a human capital system that links 
human capital planning to overall agency strategic planning; 
Performance expectation: Develop and implement processes to recruit and 
hire employees who possess needed skills; 
Performance expectation: Measure agency performance and make strategic 
human capital decisions; 
Performance expectation: Establish a market-based and more performance-
oriented pay system; 
Performance expectation: Seek feedback from employees to allow for 
their participation in the decision-making process; 
Performance expectation: Implement training and development programs in 
support of DHS's mission and goals. 

Overall assessment of progress: Limited.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's information technology management efforts include developing 
and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an 
authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain system 
investments; defining and following a corporate process for informed 
decision making by senior leadership about competing information 
technology investment options; applying system and software development 
and acquisition discipline and rigor when defining, designing, 
developing, testing, deploying, and maintaining systems; establishing a 
comprehensive, departmentwide information security program to protect 
information and systems; having sufficient people with the right 
knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute each of these areas now and 
in the future; and centralizing leadership for extending these 
disciplines throughout the organization with an empowered Chief 
Information Officer. As shown in table 13, we identified 13 performance 
expectations for DHS in the area of information technology management 
and found that DHS has generally achieved 2 of them and has generally 
not achieved 8 others. For 3 performance expectations, we could not 
make an assessment.

Table 13: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Information Technology 
Management Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 2.

Performance expectation: Organize roles and responsibilities for 
information technology under the Chief Information Officer; 
Performance expectation: Develop policies and procedures to ensure 
protection of sensitive information.

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 8.

Performance expectation: Develop a strategy and plan for information 
technology management;
Performance expectation: Develop measures to assess performance in the 
management of information technology; 
Performance expectation: Implement a comprehensive enterprise 
architecture; 
Performance expectation: Develop a process to effectively manage 
information technology investments; 
Performance expectation: Implement a process to effectively manage 
information technology investments;
Performance expectation: Develop policies and procedures for effective 
information systems development and acquisition; 
Performance expectation: Implement policies and procedures for 
effective information systems development and acquisition; 
Performance expectation: Implement policies and procedures to 
effectively safeguard sensitive information.

Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 3.

Performance expectation: Strategically manage information technology 
human capital; 
Performance expectation: Develop a comprehensive enterprise 
architecture; 
Performance expectation: Provide operational capabilities for 
information technology infrastructure and applications.

Overall assessment of progress: Limited.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

* DHS's responsibilities for real property management are specified in 
Executive Order 13327, "Federal Real Property Asset Management," and 
include establishment of a senior real property officer, development of 
an asset inventory, and development and implementation of an asset 
management plan and performance measures. As shown in table 14, we 
identified 9 performance expectations for DHS in the area of real 
property management and found that DHS has generally achieved 6 of them 
and has generally not achieved 3 others.

Table 14: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Real Property Management 
Performance Expectations:

Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 6.

Performance expectation: Establish a Senior Real Property Officer who 
actively serves on the Federal Real Property Council; 
Performance expectation: Complete and maintain a comprehensive 
inventory and profile of agency real property;
Performance expectation: Provide timely and accurate information for 
inclusion in the governmentwide real property inventory database; 
Performance expectation: Develop an Office of Management and Budget-
approved asset management plan; 
Performance expectation: Establish an Office of Management and Budget-
approved 3-year rolling timeline with certain deadlines by which the 
agency will address opportunities and determine its priorities as 
identified in the asset management plan; 
Performance expectation: Establish real property performance measures. 

Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 3.

Performance expectation: Demonstrate steps taken toward implementation 
of the asset management plan; 
Performance expectation: Use accurate and current asset inventory 
information and real property performance measures in management 
decision making; 
Performance expectation: Ensure the management of agency property 
assets is consistent with the agency's overall strategic plan, the 
agency asset management plan, and the performance measures.

Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

A variety of cross-cutting themes have affected DHS's efforts to 
implement its mission and management functions. These key themes 
include agency transformation, strategic planning and results 
management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and 
coordination.

* In past work, we reported on the importance of integration and 
transformation in helping DHS ensure that it can implement its mission 
and management functions. We designated the implementation and 
transformation of DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that 
designation in our 2005 and 2007 updates. As of May 2007, we reported 
that DHS had yet to submit a corrective action plan to the Office of 
Management and Budget. We reported that the creation of DHS is an 
enormous management challenge and that DHS faces a formidable task in 
its transformation efforts as it works to integrate over 170,000 
federal employees from 22 component agencies. We noted that it can take 
a minimum of 5 to 7 years until organizations complete their 
transformations.

* We have identified strategic planning and the development and use of 
outcome-based performance measures as two of the key success factors 
for the management of any organization. DHS issued a departmentwide 
strategic plan that met most of the required elements for a strategic 
plan and is planning to issue an updated plan. However, we have 
reported that some component agencies have had difficulties in 
developing outcome-based goals and measures for assessing program 
performance. For example, in August 2005 we reported that U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had not yet developed outcome 
goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program, and in March 
2006 we reported that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
had not yet established performance goals and measures to assess its 
benefit fraud activities. We have also noted that DHS faces inherent 
challenges in developing outcome-based goals and measures to assess the 
affect of its efforts on strengthening homeland security.

* We have also reported on the importance of using a risk management 
approach to set homeland security priorities and allocate resources 
accordingly. The National Strategy for Homeland Security and DHS's 
strategic plan have called for the use of risk-based decisions to 
prioritize DHS's resource investments, and risk management has been 
widely supported by the President, Congress, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as a management approach for homeland security. In 
past work we found that while some DHS component agencies, such as the 
Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have 
taken steps to apply risk-based decision making in implementing some of 
their mission functions, other components have not utilized such an 
approach. For example, we reported that DHS has not applied a risk 
management approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific 
capabilities for preparing for and responding to catastrophic threats.

* In 2005 we designated information sharing for homeland security as 
high-risk. We recently reported that more than 5 years after September 
11, 2001, the nation still lacked an implemented set of governmentwide 
policies and processes for sharing terrorism-related information and 
the area remained high-risk. However, we noted that the federal 
government has issued a strategy for how it will put in place the 
overall framework and policies for sharing information with critical 
partners and that DHS has taken actions to implement its information 
sharing responsibilities. For example, DHS has implemented an 
information system to share homeland security information and has 
supported the efforts of states and localities to create information 
"fusion" centers. We have reported that DHS faces challenges in 
continuing to develop productive information sharing relationships with 
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.

* We have also reported on the important role that DHS plays in 
partnering and coordinating its homeland security efforts with federal, 
state, local, private sector, and international stakeholders. The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security underscores the importance of 
DHS partnering with other stakeholders, as the majority of the 
strategy's initiatives are intended to be implemented by three or more 
federal agencies. Our prior work has shown that, among other things, 
successful partnering and coordination involve collaborating and 
consulting with stakeholders to develop goals, strategies, and roles. 
DHS has taken steps to strengthen partnering frameworks and 
capabilities. For example, DHS has formed a working group to coordinate 
the federal response to cyber incidents of national significance. 
However, we have also reported on difficulties faced by DHS in its 
partnership efforts. For example, DHS faced challenges in coordinating 
with its emergency preparedness and response partners in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita due to, among other things, unclear 
designations of partners' roles and responsibilities.

Given DHS's dominant role in securing the homeland, it is critical that 
the department's mission and management programs are operating as 
efficiently and effectively as possible. DHS has taken important 
actions to secure the border and transportation sectors and to prepare 
for and respond to disasters. DHS has had to undertake these missions 
while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet 
department--a difficult task for any organization. As DHS moves 
forward, it will be important for the department to continue to develop 
more measurable goals to guide implementation efforts and to enable 
better accountability of its progress toward achieving desired 
outcomes. It will also be important for DHS to continually reassess its 
mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate 
progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine 
alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its 
missions.

In its comments on a draft of this report, DHS took issues with our 
methodology and disagreed with our assessments for 42 of 171 
performance expectations. DHS's five general issues were (1) 
perceptions that we altered our standards used to judge the 
department's progress; (2) concerns with the binary approach we used to 
assess the performance expectations; (3) concerns regarding perceived 
changes in criteria after DHS provided additional information; (4) 
concerns with consistency in our application of the methodology; and 
(5) concerns regarding our treatment of performance expectations as 
having equal weight. With regard to the first issue, as we communicated 
to DHS, we did not change our criteria; rather we made a change in 
language to better convey the intent behind the performance 
expectations that DHS achieve them instead of merely taken actions that 
apply or relate to them. Second, regarding our use of a binary standard 
to judge whether or not DHS generally met each of 171 performance 
expectations, we acknowledge the limitations of this standard, but 
believe it is appropriate for this review given the administration has 
generally not established quantitative goals and measures for the 171 
expectations, which are necessary to systematically assess where along 
a spectrum of progress DHS stood in achieving each performance 
expectation. We applied a scale to assess different levels of progress 
made by DHS for its overall mission and management areas. With regard 
to the third issue, what DHS perceives as a change in criteria for 
certain performance expectations is not a change in criteria but simply 
the process by which we disclosed our preliminary assessment to DHS, 
analyzed additional documents and information from DHS, and updated 
and, in some cases revised, our assessments based on this additional 
input. Fourth, regarding concerns with consistency in our methodology 
application, our core team of GAO analysts and managers reviewed all 
inputs from GAO staff to ensure consistent application of our 
methodology, criteria, and analytical process. Finally, regarding 
concerns with our treatment of performance expectations as having equal 
weight, we acknowledge that differences exist between expectations, but 
we did not weight the performance expectations because congressional, 
departmental and others' views on the relative priority of each 
expectation may be different and we did not believe it was appropriate 
to substitute our judgment for theirs.

With regard to DHS's disagreement with our assessments for 42 of the 
performance expectations, DHS generally contends that (1) we expected 
DHS to have achieved an entire expectation in cases when that ultimate 
achievement will likely take several more years, and (2) we did not 
adequately use or appropriately interpret additional information DHS 
provided. In general, we believe that it is appropriate, after pointing 
out the expectation for a multiyear program and documenting the 
activities DHS has actually accomplished to date, to reach a conclusion 
that DHS has not yet fully implemented the program. We also believe we 
have appropriately used the documents DHS has provided us. In some 
cases, the information and documents DHS provided were not relevant to 
the specific performance expectation; in these situations we did not 
discuss them in our assessment. In other cases, the information did not 
convince us that DHS had achieved the performance expectation as stated 
or as we had interpreted it. In the assessment portion of each 
performance expectation, we have described how we applied the 
information DHS provided to the performance expectation and describe 
the level of progress DHS has made.

Overall, we appreciate DHS's concerns and recognize that in a broad-
based endeavor such as this, some level of disagreement is inevitable, 
especially at any given point in time. However, we have been as 
transparent as possible regarding our purpose, methodology, and 
professional judgments.

Background:

In July 2002, President Bush issued the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. The strategy set forth overall objectives to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the 
recovery from attacks that may occur. The strategy set out a plan to 
improve homeland security through the cooperation and partnering of 
federal, state, local, and private sector organizations on an array of 
functions. The National Strategy for Homeland Security specified a 
number of federal departments, as well as nonfederal organizations, 
that have important roles in securing the homeland. In terms of federal 
departments, DHS was assigned a prominent role in implementing 
established homeland security mission areas.

In November 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted into 
law, creating DHS. This act defined the department's missions to 
include preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing 
U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damages, and 
assisting in the recovery from, attacks that occur within the United 
States. The act also specified major responsibilities for the 
department, including to analyze information and protect 
infrastructure; develop countermeasures against chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats; secure 
U.S. borders and transportation systems; and organize emergency 
preparedness and response efforts.

DHS began operations in March 2003. Its establishment represented a 
fusion of 22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the 
leadership of many homeland security activities under a single 
department.[Footnote 20] According to data provided to us by DHS, the 
department's total budget authority was about $39 billion in fiscal 
year 2004, about $108 billion in fiscal year 2005, about $49 billion in 
fiscal year 2006, and about $45 billion in fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 
21] The President's fiscal year 2008 budget submission requests 
approximately $46 billion for DHS. Table 15 provides information on 
DHS's budget authority, as reported by DHS, for each fiscal year from 
2004 though 2007.

Table 15: DHS Budget Authority for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 in 
Thousands of Dollars, as Reported by DHS:

DHS component agency/program: Departmental Operations; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $394,435; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $527,257; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $610,473; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $626,123.

DHS component agency/program: Analysis and Operations; 
Fiscal year 2004 
budget authority: 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $252,940; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $299,663.

DHS component agency/program: DHS IG; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $80,318; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $97,317; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $84,187; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: 98,685.

DHS component agency/program: U.S. Secret Service; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $1,334,128; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $1,375,758; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,423,489; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $1,479,158.

DHS component agency/program: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $5,994,287; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $6,520,698; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $7,970,695; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $9,344,781.

DHS component agency/program: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)[A]; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $328,053; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $340,000; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $336,600; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $362,494.

DHS component agency/program: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE); 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $3,669,615; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $4,244,228; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $4,206,443; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $4,726,641.

DHS component agency/program: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS); 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $1,549,733; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $1,775,000; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,887,850; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $1,985,990.

DHS component agency/program: Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA); 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $4,578,043; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $5,405,375; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $6,167,014; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $6,329,291.

DHS component agency/program: U.S. Coast Guard; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $7,097,405; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $7,853,427; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $8,782,689; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $8,729,152.

DHS component agency/program: National Protection and Programs 
Directorate/Preparedness Directorate[A]; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $678,395; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $618,577.

DHS component agency/program: Counter-Terrorism Fund; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $9,941; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $8,000; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,980; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: 

DHS component agency/program: Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA); 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $8,378,109; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $74,031,032; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $11,175,544; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $5,223,503.

DHS component agency/program: FEMA: Office of Grant Programs[B]; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $4,013,182; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $3,984,846; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $3,377,737; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $3,393,000.

DHS component agency/program: Science and Technology Directorate; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $912,751; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $1,115,450; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,487,075; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $973,109.

DHS component agency/program: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $480,968.

DHS component agency/program: Border and Transportation Security 
Directorate[A]; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $8,058; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $9,617; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: 

DHS component agency/program: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $191,643; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $226,807; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $304,534; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $275,279.

DHS component agency/program: Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate[A]; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $834,348; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $887,108; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: [Empty]; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: [Empty].

DHS component agency/program: Total; 
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $39,374,049; 
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $108,401,920[C]; 
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $48,747,645; 
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $44,946,414.

Source: DHS.

Note: Data are rounded to the nearest thousand. Fiscal year 2007 
amounts are as of January 31, 2007. The data reflect total budget 
authority amounts as reported to us by DHS. The amounts include annual 
and supplemental appropriations, rescissions, amounts reprogrammed or 
transferred, fee estimates, and mandatory amounts. The amounts do not 
reflect carryover or rescissions of unobligated balances.

[A] The Border and Transportation Security Directorate, the Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and the US-VISIT 
program are legacy organizations within DHS. The functions of these 
organizations have been realigned through DHS reorganizations. In 
particular, in March 2007 US-VISIT was reorganized under the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate. The Border and Transportation 
Security Directorate included U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Transportation Security 
Administration, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

[B] The Office of Grant Programs has undergone several realignments. It 
was previously known as the Office of Grants and Training in the 
Preparedness Directorate, the Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness, and the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness.

[C] The FEMA Fiscal Year 2005 Amount Includes About $45 Billion In 
Supplemental Funding For Hurricane Katrina.]

[End of table]

Since creating and issuing its first strategic plan, the department has 
undergone several reorganizations. Most notably, in July 2005, DHS 
announced the outcome of its Second-Stage Review, an internal study of 
the department's programs, policies, operations, and structures. As a 
result of this review, the department realigned several component 
agencies and functions. In particular, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security established a Directorate of Policy to coordinate 
departmentwide policies, regulations, and other initiatives and 
consolidated preparedness activities in one directorate, the 
Directorate for Preparedness. In addition, the Secretary established a 
new Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection composed of analysts from the former 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate. The 
Office of Infrastructure Protection was placed in the Directorate for 
Preparedness. The fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act provided for 
the further reorganization of functions within the department by, in 
particular, realigning DHS's emergency preparedness and response 
responsibilities.[Footnote 22]

In addition to these reorganizations, a variety of factors have 
affected DHS's efforts to implement its mission and management 
functions. These factors include both domestic and international 
events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and major homeland 
security-related legislation. Figure 2 provides a timeline of key 
events that have affected DHS's implementation.

Figure 2: Selected Key Events That Have Affected Department of Homeland 
Security Implementation:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

DHS Has Made Varying Levels of Progress in Implementing its Core 
Mission and Management Functions, but Has Faced Difficulties in Its 
Implementation Efforts:

Based on the performance expectations we identified, DHS has made 
progress in implementing its mission and management functions, but 
various challenges have affected its efforts. Specifically, DHS has 
made limited progress in the areas of emergency preparedness and 
response; science and technology; and human capital and information 
technology management. We found that DHS has made modest progress in 
the areas of border security; immigration services; and acquisition and 
financial management. We also found that DHS has made moderate progress 
in the areas of immigration enforcement, aviation security, surface 
transportation security; critical infrastructure and key resources 
protection, and real property management, and that DHS has made 
substantial progress in the area of maritime security.

DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Border Security:

The United States shares a 5,525 mile border with Canada and a 1,989 
mile border with Mexico, and all goods and people traveling to the 
United States must be inspected at air, land, or sea ports of entry. In 
2006, more than 400 million legal entries were made to the United 
States--a majority of all border crossings were at land border ports of 
entry. Within DHS, CBP is the lead agency responsible for implementing 
the department's border security mission. Specifically, CBP's two 
priority missions are (1) detecting and preventing terrorists and 
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, and (2) facilitating 
the orderly and efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP's 
supporting missions include interdicting illegal drugs and other 
contraband; apprehending individuals who are attempting to enter the 
United States illegally; inspecting inbound and outbound people, 
vehicles, and cargo; enforcing laws of the United States at the border; 
protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests 
and diseases; regulating and facilitating international trade; 
collecting import duties; and enforcing U.S. trade laws. Within CBP, 
the United States Border Patrol is responsible for border security 
between designated official ports of entry, and CBP's Office of Field 
Operations enforces trade, immigration, and agricultural laws and 
regulations by securing the flow of people and goods into and out of 
the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade at U.S. 
ports of entry.

As shown in table 16, we identified 12 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of border security and found that overall DHS has made 
modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found 
that DHS has generally achieved 5 of its performance expectations and 
has generally not achieved 7 of its performance expectations.

Table 16: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Border 
Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Implement a biometric entry system to 
prevent unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States 
through ports of entry; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 2. Implement a biometric exit system to 
collect information on border crossers leaving the United States 
through ports of entry; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 3. Develop a program to detect and identify 
illegal border crossings between ports of entry; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Implement a program to detect and identify 
illegal border crossings between ports of entry; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 5. Develop a strategy to detect and interdict 
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 6. Implement a strategy to detect and 
interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs and other items into the United 
States; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 7. Implement effective security measures in 
the visa issuance process; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 8. Implement initiatives related to the 
security of certain documents used to enter the United States; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Provide adequate training for all border 
related employees; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 10. Develop staffing plans for hiring and 
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's border 
security mission; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 11. Ensure adequate infrastructure and 
facilities; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 12. Leverage technology, personnel, and 
information to secure the border; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: Total; 
Assessment: Generally achieved: 5; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 7; 
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

Table 17 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS 
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in 
the area of border security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken 
steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance 
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most 
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).

Table 17: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Border Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Implement a biometric entry system to 
prevent unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States 
through ports of entry; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. According to DHS, 
the entry portion of US-VISIT has been deployed at 154 of 170 land 
ports of entry, 115 airports, and 14 seaports, as of December 2006. 
With regard to 14 of the 16 land ports of entry where US-VISIT was not 
installed, CBP and US-VISIT program office officials told us there was 
no operational need for US-VISIT because visitors who are required to 
be processed into US-VISIT are, by regulation, not authorized to enter 
the United States at these locations. We reported that US-VISIT needs 
to be installed at the remaining 2 ports of entry in order to achieve 
full implementation as required by law, but both of these locations 
present significant challenges to installation of US-VISIT. These ports 
of entry do not currently have access to appropriate communication 
transmission lines to operate US-VISIT. CBP officials told us that, 
given this constraint, they determined that they could continue to 
operate as before. CBP officials told us that having US-VISIT biometric 
entry capability generally improved their ability to process visitors 
required to enroll in US-VISIT because it provided them additional 
assurance that visitors are who they say they are and automated the 
paperwork associated with processing the I-94 arrival/departure form. 
For more information, see Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces 
Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of 
Entry, GAO-07-248; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Implement a biometric exit system to 
collect information on border crossers leaving the United States 
through ports of entry; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has faced challenges in 
deploying a biometric exit system at ports of entry. Legislation 
required US-VISIT to collect biometric exit data from all individuals 
who are required to provide biometric entry data, but did not set a 
specific deadline for this requirement. Although US-VISIT had set a 
December 2007 deadline for implementing exit capability at the 50 
busiest land ports of entry, US-VISIT has since determined that 
implementing an exit capability by this date is no longer feasible. A 
new date for exit implementation has not been set. In March 2007, we 
reported that DHS has devoted considerable time and resources toward 
establishing an operational exit capability. Over the last 4 years, it 
has committed over $160 million to pilot test and evaluate an exit 
solution at 12 air, 2 sea, and 5 land ports of entry. Despite this 
considerable investment of time and resources, the US-VISIT program 
still does not have either an operational exit capability or a viable 
exit solution to deploy to all air, sea, and land ports of entry. With 
regard to air and sea ports of entry, we reported that although US-
VISIT has pilot tested a biometric exit capability for these ports of 
entry, it has not been available at all ports. A pilot test in 2004 
through 2005 identified issues that limited the operational 
effectiveness of the solution, such as the lack of traveler compliance 
with the processes. According to program officials, US-VISIT is now 
developing a plan for deploying a comprehensive, affordable exit 
solution at all ports of entry. However, no time frame has been 
established for this plan being approved or implemented. There are 
interrelated logistical, technological, and infrastructure constraints 
that have precluded DHS from achieving this mandate, and there are cost 
factors related to the feasibility of implementation of such a 
solution. With regard to land ports of entry, for example, we reported 
that the major constraint to performing biometric verification upon 
exit at this time, in the US-VISIT Program Office's view, is that the 
only proven technology available would necessitate mirroring the 
processes currently in use for US-VISIT at entry. The US-VISIT Program 
Office concluded in January 2005 that the mirror-imaging solution was 
"an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but not 
limited to, the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure 
requirements, and potential trade and commerce impacts." US-VISIT 
officials stated that they believe that technological advances over the 
next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative 
technologies that provide biometric verification of persons exiting the 
country without major changes to facility infrastructure and without 
requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles, thereby 
precluding traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. For more 
information, see GAO-07-248 and Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program 
Faces Operational, Technological and Management Challenges, GAO-07-
632T.
 
DHS updated information: Between March and June 2007, DHS told 
us that, it expected that further land exit testing may be conducted in 
fiscal year 2008. DHS reported that it provided an exit strategy to 
Congress in the spring of 2007; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally not achieved this performance expectation. Although DHS 
is continuing to explore various possibilities for implementing an exit 
capability, the department has not yet implemented a biometric exit 
system at land, air, and sea ports of entry. 

Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Develop a program to detect and identify 
illegal border crossings between ports of entry; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress toward 
developing a program to detect illegal border crossings between ports 
of entry. In February 2007, we reported that the Secure Border 
Initiative is a comprehensive, multiyear program established in 
November 2005 by the Secretary of Homeland Security to secure U.S. 
borders and reduce illegal immigration. The Secure Border Initiative's 
mission is to promote border security strategies that help protect 
against and prevent terrorist attacks and other transnational crimes. 
Elements of the Secure Border Initiative will be carried out by several 
organizations within DHS. One element of the Secure Border Initiative 
is SBInet, the program within CBP responsible for developing a 
comprehensive border protection system. SBInet is responsible for 
leading the effort to ensure that the proper mix of personnel, tactical 
infrastructure, rapid response capability, and technology is deployed 
along the border. According to DHS, the SBInet solution is to include a 
variety of sensors, communications systems, information technology, 
tactical infrastructure (roads, barriers, and fencing), and command and 
control capabilities to enhance situational awareness of the responding 
officers. The solution is also to include the development of a common 
operating picture that provides uniform data, through a command center 
environment, to all DHS agencies and is interoperable with stakeholders 
external to DHS. We have ongoing work to further assess the Secure 
Border Initiative. For more information, see GAO-07-248 and Secure 
Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support 
Oversight and Accountability, GAO-07-309. 

DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by 
DHS between March and May 2007, the Secure Border Initiative program is 
in place, with a Program Management Office and governance structure, 
system integrator, and funding. In September 2006, the SBInet contract 
was awarded. CBP has been designated as the DHS executive agent for the 
SBInet program and has established a Program Management Office to 
oversee SBInet. With regard to other border security initiatives, DHS 
noted that Operation Streamline, launched in December 2005, is a 
coordinated effort among CBP, ICE, and the Department of Justice to 
create a zero-tolerance zone for illegal entries in the Del Rio Border 
Patrol sector. 
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has made progress in developing a strategy 
to detect and identify illegal border crossings between ports of entry-
-namely the Secure Border Initiative--and has developed other 
initiatives to detect and deter illegal border crossings. 

Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Implement a program to detect and identify 
illegal border crossings between ports of entry; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not yet fully 
implemented a program to effectively detect and identify illegal border 
crossings between ports of entry. In past work, we and the DHS IG 
identified challenges in implementing earlier border security programs 
designed to detect and deter illegal border crossings. For example, in 
February 2006 the DHS IG reported that initiatives using technology, 
such as unmanned aerial vehicles and remote video surveillance, had 
failed to consistently demonstrate the predicted force multiplier 
effect for border security. More recently, we reported that although 
DHS has published some information on various aspects of the Secure 
Border Initiative and SBInet, it remains unclear how SBInet will be 
linked, if at all, to US-VISIT so that the two systems can share 
technology, infrastructure, and data across programs. In addition, we 
reported that according to DHS, work on the northern border for the 
Secure Border Initiative is not projected to begin before fiscal year 
2009. We have ongoing work to further assess the Secure Border 
Initiative. For more information, see GAO-07-309; GAO-07-248; Border 
Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border 
Surveillance Technology Program, GAO-06-295; and Border Security: 
Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on 
Federal Lands, GAO-04-590. Also, see Department of Homeland Security 
Office of the Inspector General, A Review of Remote Surveillance 
Technology Along U.S. Land Borders, OIG-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: 
December 2005). 

DHS updated information: DHS provided evidence of SBInet progress, 
including the award of four task orders as of May 2007. At the end of 
fiscal year 2006, DHS reported that 75 miles of fence were constructed 
and a total of 370 miles are planned to be constructed by the end of 
calendar year 2008. CBP also plans to establish 200 miles of vehicle 
barriers by the end of calendar year 2008, with 67 miles completed. 
Further, DHS has established a Miles of Effective Control goal. The 
goal is to gain effective control of the entire southwest border by 
2013. According to DHS, effective control indicates that defense-in-
depth capabilities in the area are robust enough to (1) detect illegal 
entries; (2) identify and classify the entries; (3) efficiently and 
effectively respond; and (4) bring events to a satisfactory law 
enforcement resolution. As of March 2007, DHS reported that it had 392 
miles under effective control, and the goal for the end of calendar 
year 2008 is 642 miles. DHS stated that SBInet Technology Coverage goal 
is to cover 387 miles of the border completed by the end of calendar 
year 2008 in the Tucson and Yuma sectors. With regard to Operation 
Streamline, CBP reported that beginning with a 5-mile stretch of the 
border, the initiative now spans the entire 210 mile Del Rio Sector 
Border. DHS also noted that National Guard resources have been deployed 
to the border to enhance capabilities under Operation Jumpstart. As of 
February 28, 2007, DHS reported that nearly 46,000 aliens were 
apprehended and more than 520 vehicles were seized through Operation 
Jumpstart. Additionally, CBP plans to add 6,000 Border Patrol agents by 
the end of calendar year 2008. In fiscal year 2007, DHS plans to 
increase its Border Patrol presence between ports of entry by hiring, 
training, and deploying 1,500 additional agents. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. The Secure Border Initiative and SBInet are in 
the early phases of implementation, and DHS has taken actions to 
implement the initiative, particularly in awarding four task orders 
under SBInet. However, these contracts have only recently been awarded, 
and it is unclear what progress contractors have made in implementing 
the activities specified in the task orders. Moreover, DHS reported 
that it has effective control of 380 miles of the border as of March 
2007, but the U.S. land border encompasses more than 6,000 miles, and 
DHS does not expect to begin work on the northern border until fiscal 
year 2009. Although DHS has only recently begun to implement SBInet, 
which is a multi-year program, DHS and its legacy components 
implemented programs to secure the border between ports of entry prior 
to the Secure Border Initiative and SBInet. We and the DHS IG reported 
on challenges faced by DHS in implementing programs that pre-dated the 
Secure Border Initiative and SBInet.  

Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Develop a strategy to detect and interdict 
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to develop a 
strategic approach for interdicting illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and 
other items into the United States.[A] For example, according to DHS, 
in August 2006 DHS and the Department of Justice submitted a National 
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and Implementation Plan to 
the International Drug Control Policy Coordinating Committee. This 
document identified the major goals, objectives, and resource 
requirements for closing gaps in U.S. and Mexico counternarcotics 
capabilities along the southwest border. DHS has also taken steps to 
plan for the deployment of radiation portal monitors at ports of entry. 
For more information, see Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made 
Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-
Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389; Prescription Drugs: Strategic 
Framework Would Promote Accountability and Enhance Efforts to Enforce 
the Prohibitions on Personal Importation, GAO-05-372; and Cigarette 
Smuggling: Federal Law Enforcement Efforts and Seizures Increasing, 
GAO-04-641. 

DHS updated information: According to updated information 
provided by DHS, the CBP Office of Field Operations developed a 
comprehensive strategic plan entitled Securing America's Borders at the 
Ports of Entry that defines CBP's national strategy specifically at all 
air, land, and sea ports of entry. This plan was finalized and 
published in September 2006 concurrent with the development of the 
Secure Border Initiative. According to DHS, it complements the national 
strategy for gaining operational control of the borders between ports 
of entry and addresses the specific security concerns and required 
actions that are the direct responsibility of the Office of Field 
Operations. Programs under the auspices of the Office of Field 
Operations that support enhanced detection and interdiction of illegal 
flows of contraband and harmful substances into the United States 
include the National Targeting Center for Cargo; the Automated 
Targeting System; the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism; the 
Container Security Initiative; the Secure Freight Initiative; and 
deployment of radiation portal monitors, large-scale, non-intrusive 
inspection technology, and canine enforcement teams. Additionally, 
according to the Office of Counternarcotics, in March 2006, the 
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy was approved by the 
International Drug Control Policy Coordinating Committee. This document 
identified the major goals, objectives, and recommendations for closing 
gaps in U.S. and Mexico counternarcotics capabilities along the 
southwest border. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has made progress in 
developing a strategy to implement its various programs for detecting 
and interdicting illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into 
the United States. With regard to flows of illegal drugs in particular, 
the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy has been 
approved by the International Drug Control Policy Coordinating 
Committee. 

Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 6. Implement a strategy to detect and 
interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the 
United States.  

Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have identified challenges in 
DHS's efforts to interdict flows of illegal goods into the United 
States.[B] DHS has implemented the Container Security Initiative to 
allow CBP officials to target containers at foreign seaports so that 
any high-risk containers maybe inspected prior to their departure for 
the United States. We have identified challenges in implementation of 
the program, including staffing imbalances that, in the past, impeded 
CBP's targeting of containers. DHS has also implemented the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a voluntary program design to 
improve the security of international supply chain through which CBP 
officials work in partnership with private companies to review supply 
chain security plans. Our work has identified a number of challenges in 
implementation of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, 
including that CBP's standard for validation is hard to achieve and, 
given that the program is voluntary, there are limits on how intrusive 
CBP can be in its validations. With regard to radiation portal 
monitors, we reported as of December 2005, DHS had completed deployment 
of portal monitors at two categories of entry--a total of 61 ports of 
entry--and had begun work on two other categories; overall, however, 
progress had been slower than planned. According to DHS officials, the 
slow progress resulted from a late disbursal of funds and delays in 
negotiating deployment agreements with seaport operators. Further, we 
noted the expected cost of the program was uncertain because DHS's 
plans to purchase newer, more advanced equipment were not yet 
finalized, and we projected that the program's final cost would be much 
higher than CBP anticipated at the time of our review. In 2006, we 
reported on the results of our investigation of potential security 
weaknesses associated with the installation of radiation detection 
equipment at ports of entry. As part of this investigation, we deployed 
two teams of investigators to the field to make simultaneous border 
crossings at the northern and southern borders in an attempt to 
transport radioactive sources into the United States. The radiation 
portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material 
when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border 
crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance 
with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. 
However, our investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to 
enter the United States with the radioactive sources in the trunks of 
their vehicles. In 2005 we also reported that inspection and 
interdiction efforts at international mail branches and express carrier 
facilities had not prevented a reported substantial volume of 
prescription drugs from being illegally imported from foreign Internet 
pharmacies into the United States. We acknowledged that CBP and other 
agencies, including ICE, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, had taken a step in the right direction by 
collaborating to establish a task force designed to address challenges 
that we identified, but nonetheless, an unknown number of illegal drugs 
entered the country each day. In addition, in 2004 we noted that CBP 
reported that the number of cigarette seizures by CBP and ICE increased 
dramatically, from 12 total seizures in 1998 to 191 seizures in 2003. 
CBP attributed this increase to better intelligence and better 
inspections--based on electronic methods such as its Automated 
Targeting System. For more information, see GAO-06-389; GAO-05-372; GAO-
04-641; Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources 
Across Our Nation's Borders at Two Locations, GAO-06-940T; and Maritime 
Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act, GAO-07-
754T. 

DHS updated information: DHS provided updated information related to 
its implementation of a strategy to detect and interdict illegal flows 
of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States. In general, 
the Strategic Plan on Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry, 
which defines CBP's national strategy at all air, land, and sea ports 
of entry, outlines programs designed to achieve border security 
objectives. CBP's Office of Field Operations has developed a formal 
implementation process to execute the Securing America's Borders at the 
Ports of Entry strategic plan that includes regular senior executive 
participations, steering committee oversight, and the creation of 
Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry Implementation 
Division to provide ongoing oversight and coordination of a 
comprehensive development schedule for the Office of Field Operations' 
high priority programs. More specifically, DHS has several programs in 
place to help detect and interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and 
other items into the United States. These programs include the National 
Targeting Center for Cargo, the Automated Targeting System, the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the Container Security Initiative, 
deployment of radiation portal monitors, large-scale non-intrusive 
inspection technology, canine enforcement programs, and the Secure 
Freight Initiative.[C] With regard to the National Targeting Center for 
Cargo, CBP reported that this center expands CBP's 
capability to do cargo shipment targeting to provide ports of entry 
with immediate analysis capabilities. With regard to radiation portal 
monitors, as of March 9, 2007, CBP has deployed 966 radiation portal 
monitors to ports of entry. According to CBP, these radiation portal 
monitor deployments provide CBP with the capability to screen 
approximately 91 percent of containerized cargo and 88 percent of 
personally owned vehicles entering the United States. With regard to 
non-intrusive technology, CBP reported deploying about 189 systems and 
is scheduled to have 224 large-scale systems deployed by the end of 
fiscal year 2009. CBP's canine enforcement teams are assigned to 73 
ports of entry and more than 300 detector dog teams were trained in 
fiscal year 2006. DHS provided us with other sensitive data on the 
outputs of its efforts, which we considered in making our assessment. 
Furthermore, according to the Office of Counternarcotics, the 
Implementation Plan for the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics 
Strategy includes recommendations on funding and resource requirements 
and estimated timelines for implementing the National Southwest Border 
Counternarcotics Strategy in fiscal years 2008 through 2011. In 
addition, in fiscal year 2007, DHS plans to increase its Border Patrol 
presence between ports of entry by hiring, training, and deploying 
1,500 additional agents. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to implement various 
programs to detect and interdict illegal flows of goods into the United 
States. For example, DHS has deployed radiation portal monitors and 
large scale non-intrusive detection systems at ports of entry and has 
developed the Container Security Initiative and Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism Program. However, we have reported on 
challenges in implementation efforts associated with these programs. 
Moreover, CBP's Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry plan 
is still in the early stages of implementation, but once implemented, 
will help CBP detect and interdict illegal flows of goods into the 
United States. Further, the Implementation Plan for the National 
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy has only recently been 
developed. In addition, we considered the sensitive data provided by 
DHS on the outputs of its efforts as well as our prior work in making 
our assessment. 

Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 7. Implement effective security measures in 
the visa issuance process.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress but still 
faces challenges in its efforts to implement effective security 
measures as part of the visa issuance process.[D] In 2005 we reported 
that DHS had not yet expanded the Visa Security Program as it planned. 
The Visa Security Program is DHS's program to oversee the assigning of 
visa security officers to locations overseas to review visa 
applications. In prior work we reported that DHS had begun supplying 
Visa Security Officers to the U.S. embassy and consulate in Saudi 
Arabia. According to DHS, the Department of State's consular officials, 
and the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the Visa Security 
Officers strengthened visa security at these posts. Visa Security 
Officers offer law enforcement and immigration experience and have 
access to and experience using information from law enforcement 
databases, which are not readily available to consular officers. DHS 
planned to expand the Visa Security Program to additional posts 
throughout fiscal years 2005 and 2006, but faced various difficulties 
in its efforts to expand. For example, chiefs of mission at the posts 
chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 delayed approval of DHS's 
requests. Embassy and Department of State officials attributed the 
delays to questions about the program's goals, objectives, and staffing 
requirements, as well as DHS's plans to coordinate with existing law 
enforcement and border security staff and programs at post at that 
time. For more information, see Border Security: Actions Needed to 
Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security's Visa 
Security Program, GAO-05-801. 

DHS updated information: Since the time of our review, DHS has made 
progress in expanding the Visa Security Program to additional posts; 
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Although the department has made some progress 
in expanding the Visa Security Program, the department has reported 
facing similar challenges to those that we previously identified in its 
expansion and implementation efforts and did not provide us with 
evidence that it has fully addressed those challenges.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Implement initiatives related to the 
security of certain documents used to enter the United States; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has various initiatives related 
to the security of documents used to enter the United States but has 
faced difficulties in implementing these initiatives.[E] With regard to 
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, we reported in May 2006 on 
challenges faced by DHS in implementation. This initiative is DHS's 
program to implement requirements for U.S. citizens and citizens of 
Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to show a passport or other documents that 
the Secretary of Homeland Security deems sufficient to show identity 
and citizenship to CBP officers when those individuals enter the United 
States from certain countries in North, Central, or South America. We 
reported that alternative programs or documents, such as frequent 
traveler programs and driver's licenses with enhanced security 
features, had various challenges and using them in lieu of a passport 
would not easily resolve the management issues faced by DHS. We 
reported that once decisions are made on what documents will be needed, 
DHS and the Department of State will face challenges in program 
implementation and management. Major challenges would remain in 
developing (1) an implementation plan, (2) budget estimates, (3) 
awareness programs for the public, (4) training programs for DHS staff, 
(5) bilateral coordination with Canada, and (6) a common understanding 
of how the Travel Initiative links to the overall strategy for securing 
the nation's borders. Falling short in any of these areas may hinder 
the ability of the agencies to achieve their goal of improving security 
while facilitating commerce and tourism. According to DHS officials, 
they have formed working groups to take action in each of these areas, 
but much more work remains in developing plans and approaches that 
improve the likelihood of program success; With regard to the Visa 
Waiver Program, the program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel 
to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less 
without obtaining a visa. In July 2004, we reported that DHS 
established a Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit, which completed 
security assessments of the 27 countries that participate in the Visa 
Waiver Program. DHS also submitted a report to Congress summarizing the 
assessment findings. However, we identified several problems with the 
2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during 
portions of the process, the review process lacked clear criteria and 
guidance to make key judgments, and the final reports were untimely. 
Furthermore, the monitoring unit could not effectively achieve its 
mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security 
concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. In 
September 2006 we testified that while DHS had taken some actions to 
mitigate the program's risks, the department faced difficulties in 
further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department had not 
established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely 
stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002. 
Furthermore, DHS sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen 
passport data to the United States and the International Criminal 
Police Organization, but it had not issued clear reporting guidelines 
to participating countries; With regard to the Immigration Advisory 
Program, this pilot program is designed to increase the level of 
scrutiny given to the travel documents of certain high-risk passengers 
before they board international flights traveling to the United States. 
Under this program, CBP assigns officers to selected foreign airports 
where they utilize an automated risk-targeting system that identifies 
passengers as potentially high-risk--including passengers who do not 
need a visa to travel to the United States. CBP officers then 
personally interview some of these passengers and evaluate the 
authenticity and completeness of these passengers' travel documents. 
CBP has reported several successes through the Immigration Advisory 
Program pilot. According to CBP documents, from the start of the 
program in June 2004 through February 2006, Immigration Advisory 
Program teams made more than 700 no-board recommendations for 
inadmissible passengers and intercepted approximately 70 fraudulent 
travel documents. However, in May 2007 we reported that CBP had not 
taken all of the steps necessary to fully learn from its pilot sites in 
order to determine whether the program should be made permanent and the 
number of sites that should exist. These steps are part of a risk 
management approach to developing and evaluating homeland security 
programs; In addition, in prior work our agents have attempted to 
enter the United States using fictitious documents. Our periodic tests 
since 2002 clearly showed that CBP officers were unable to effectively 
identify counterfeit driver's licenses, birth certificates, and other 
documents. Specifically, in 2003 our agents were able to easily enter 
the United States from Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and 
counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Later in 2003 and 
2004, we continued to be able to successfully enter the United States 
using counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but were 
denied entry on one occasion. In 2006, the results of our work 
indicated that CBP officers at the nine land border crossings we tested 
at that time did not detect the counterfeit identification we used. At 
the time of our review, CBP agreed that its officers were not able to 
identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land 
border crossings and fully supported the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative that will require all travelers to present a passport before 
entering the United States. We did not assess whether this initiative 
would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United 
States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilities shown by 
our work. We have ongoing work assessing the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative and the use of fraudulent travel documents. For more 
information, see GAO-07-248; Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed 
to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854; 
Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada, GAO-06-741R; Border 
Security: Consular Identification Cards Accepted within United States, 
but Consistent Federal Guidance Needed, GAO-04-881; Aviation Security: 
Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under 
Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-346; and 
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the 
United States, GAO-06-976T. 

DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by 
DHS, CBP has undertaken a variety of efforts associated with the 
security of documents used to enter the United States. These efforts 
include implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in 
the air environment; enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program; increased 
access to lost and stolen passport information from multiple sources; 
introduction of the Fraudulent Documents Analysis Unit, which issues 
notices to the field regarding detection of fraudulent documents; and 
training of carrier agents overseas in documentary requirements and 
fraudulent document detection. With regard to the Western Hemisphere 
Travel Initiative, since January 23, 2007, all U.S. citizens and 
nonimmigrant aliens from Canada, Bermuda and Mexico entering the United 
States from within the Western Hemisphere at air ports of entry are 
required to present a valid passport. CBP has reported more than 99 
percent compliance with these requirements at air ports of entry. DHS 
stated that the department is working toward implementation of the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for travelers entering the United 
States through land and sea ports of entry, and in June 2007 announced 
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the land and sea portions. U.S. 
and Canadian citizens entering the United States from within the 
Western Hemisphere at land and sea ports currently may make a verbal 
declaration of citizenship or present a myriad of forms and documents 
to enter the country such as birth certificates and drivers' licenses. 
On June 8, 2007, because of delays in processing applications for U.S. 
passports, U.S. citizens traveling to Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, 
and Bermuda who have applied for but not yet received passports can 
temporarily enter and depart from the United States by air with a 
government issued photo identification and Department of State official 
proof of application for a passport through September 30, 2007. With 
regard to fraudulent documents, CBP reported that it has electronic 
copies of all U.S.-issued travel and citizenship documents, with the 
exception of U.S.-issued passports, which CBP is working to gain access 
to with the Department of State. When travelers apply for admission at 
a port of entry, CBP officers are to scan the document presented by the 
travelers to help minimize the risk of photograph substitution on the 
documents and the use of canceled travel documents. Over 4,400 CBP 
officers have access to the Department of State Consolidated Consular 
Database, which allows officers to view unique visa information. During 
2006, CBP stated that it provided ports of entry with the highest rate 
of fraudulent document interceptions with comprehensive document 
examination workstations to better equip them with the ability to 
examine questioned documents presented for entry to the United States. 
According to CBP, workstations have been deployed at 11 ports of entry, 
where the equipment improves the ability of officers to thoroughly 
inspect documents to detect forgeries. CBP reported that its Fraudulent 
Document Analysis Unit received 40,362 fraudulent documents from the 
ports of entry during fiscal year 2006. Of this number, there were 
7,252 passports from 84 countries, the majority of which were issued by 
Mexico and the United States. CBP also reported that it has deployed 
ePassport readers to 200 primary inspection lanes at the 33 largest 
airports to enhance document verification. With regard to lost and 
stolen passports, DHS reported that it has a real-time interface with 
the State Department that provides data on all lost or stolen passports 
reported to the State Department, both United States and foreign. CBP 
noted that the programs mentioned above are used in conjunction with 
US-VISIT fingerprinting of non-U.S. citizens and resident aliens to 
provide a biometric authentication of the document-bearers' identity 
and verification of documents' validity. With regard to the Immigration 
Advisory Program, DHS has issued a strategic plan for fiscal years 2007 
through 2012. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions related to the security 
of certain documents used to enter the country by, for example, 
implementing the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at air ports of 
entry. However, we have reported on management challenges faced by DHS 
with regard to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and, although 
the requirement for implementing the initiative is not until 2009, we 
reported that the Departments of Homeland Security and State have a 
long way to go to implement their proposed plans, and the time to get 
the job done has been slipping by. We have also reported on risks and 
challenges faced by DHS with regard to the Visa Waiver Program, such as 
the timely reporting of stolen passports, and DHS did not provide us 
with evidence that it has taken actions to fully address these risks 
and challenges. Furthermore, while DHS has made progress in deploying 
document examination workstations and ePassport readers to lanes at 
ports of entry, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has yet 
determined proposed locations for deploying additional workstations. In 
addition, DHS has not yet fully used a risk management approach in 
implementing its Immigration Advisory Program. 

Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Provide adequate training for all border 
related employees; Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken 
steps to provide training to border security personnel. In September 
2005, we reported that the creation of CBP within DHS merged border 
inspection functions at U.S. ports of entry, which had previously been 
performed by three separate agencies. We reported that the "One Face at 
the Border," initiative created the positions of CBP officer and CBP 
agriculture specialist and combined aspects of three former inspector 
functions. CBP created a series of training courses to provide former 
U.S. Customs and former Immigration and Naturalization Service officers 
with the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out the 
responsibilities of this new position. In addition, CBP officers 
received training to meet CBP's new mission priority of terrorism 
prevention. Because agricultural inspections were more specialized, CBP 
officers received training sufficient to enable them to identify 
potential agricultural threats, make initial regulatory decisions, and 
determine when to make referrals to CBP agriculture specialists. We 
reported that CBP emphasized on-the-job training in an effort not to 
place officers on the job without direct supervisory and tutorial 
backup. CBP's main strategy to prepare for field delivery of training 
was to provide extensive train-the-trainer courses so that trainers 
could return to their field sites and instruct officers there. We 
reported that change had not come about without challenges, as many 
officers were reported to have resisted changes to their 
responsibilities, mainly related to the difficulties in learning a new 
set of procedures and laws. Officials noted that there has been an 
enormous amount of required training for CBP officers, and it could 
sometimes be overwhelming. For former officers, in addition to 
completing an extensive cross-training schedule and new training 
related to terrorism prevention, there were many other required courses 
related to their mission. We reported that although staffing challenges 
may ultimately have been relieved with trained officers able to perform 
dual inspections, officials noted that it had been extremely difficult 
to take staff off-line to complete the "One Face at the Border" 
training. In March 2007, we reported that Border Patrol's basic 
training program exhibited attributes of an effective training program. 
However, we also reported while Border Patrol officials were confident 
that the academy could accommodate the large influx of new trainees 
anticipated over the next 2 years, they have expressed concerns over 
the sectors' ability to provide sufficient field training. For example, 
officials were concerned with having a sufficient number of experienced 
agents available in the sectors to serve as field training officers and 
first-line supervisors. We reported that the Border Patrol is 
considering several alternatives to improve the efficiency of basic 
training delivery and to return agents to the sectors more quickly. For 
example, the Border Patrol is pilot-testing a proficiency test for 
Spanish that will allow those who pass the test to shorten their time 
at the academy by about 30 days. However, we concluded that the Border 
Patrol's plan to hire an unprecedented number of new agents over the 
next 2 years could strain the sectors' ability to provide adequate 
supervision and training. Moreover, the field training new agents 
receive has not been consistent from sector to sector, a fact that has 
implications for how well agents perform their duties. To ensure that 
these new agents become proficient in the safe, effective, and ethical 
performance of their duties, it will be extremely important that new 
agents have the appropriate level of supervision and that the Border 
Patrol has a standardized field training program. For more information, 
see Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training 
Important for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 and Homeland 
Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents, GAO-07-
540R. 

DHS updated information: In May 2007, DHS provided us with updated 
information on its efforts to provide training for border security 
personnel. Specifically, CBP reported that it has implemented a plan to 
hire and train 3,900 Border Patrol agents in fiscal year 2007; 4,800 
agents in fiscal year 2008; and 850 agents in the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2009. CBP, working with the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center, reported making various modifications to the Border 
Patrol basic training program to accommodate the volume of new 
trainees. CBP also reported that it is designing its post-Academy 
training to align with the new Academy program and to use the 2-year 
Federal Career Intern Program. In addition, CBP has an annual call for 
training and uses a National Training Plan and a Training Advisory 
Board to determine ongoing basic and advanced training requirements. 
Post-Academy training for Border Patrol Agents includes a structured 
academic program with two pass or fail probationary exams, and Border 
Patrol local offices provide agents with area-specific training through 
the Border Patrol Field Training Program. Post-Academy training for CBP 
officers working at ports of entry feature classroom, online, and on-
the-job experiences linked to the job that the individual CBP officer 
will perform in his or her home duty post. According to CBP, CBP 
provides in-depth, task-based training to CBP officers that address 
tasks that the CBP officer will be called on to perform. In addition, 
CBP provides "cross-training" to officers from the former U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service or Customs Services based on 
operational requirements. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. CBP has established and implemented programs 
for training its border security personnel. With regard to basic 
training, we previously reported that Border Patrol's basic training 
program exhibited attributes of an effective training program. CBP also 
uses a National Training Plan and a Training Advisory Board to 
determine training requirements. However, in prior work we reported on 
various challenges in CBP's provision and adequacy of field-based 
training. For example, with regard to Border Patrol agents, we reported 
that the field training new agents receive has not been consistent from 
sector to sector, which has implications for how well agents perform 
their duties. In addition, we identified concerns regarding CBP's 
capacity to provide training to the projected large influx of new 
Border Patrol agents over the next 2 years. 

Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 10. Develop staffing plans for hiring and 
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's border 
security mission.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: CBP has taken actions to develop 
staffing plans for hiring and allocating human capital resources to 
fulfill the agency's border security mission. In July 2005 we reported 
that CBP had taken steps to increase management flexibility in 
assigning staff to inspection functions and improve staff allocation in 
an effort to minimize passenger wait times and ensure the most 
efficient use of existing staff at airports. We reported that CBP had 
introduced its "One Face at the Border" program to increase staffing 
flexibility so that staff could conduct different types of inspections 
within airports. We also reported that CBP was developing a national 
staffing model to more systematically allocate existing staff levels at 
airports nationwide, however, the model did not address weaknesses 
identified in Customs' and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service's staffing models in our and the Department of Justice 
Inspector General's previous audit work. In February 2006, we reported 
that for program acquisitions like the America's Shield Initiative to 
be successful, DHS needed to, among other things, have adequate staff 
to fill positions that have clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
and that it had not fully staffed the America's Shield Initiative 
program office. One criticism we had of the former U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service was that because of staffing shortages, mission 
staff often had to assume administrative or other functions as a 
collateral duty. One effect of assigning mission staff to 
administrative work was that they were not spending all of their time 
on duties needed to accomplish the program's mission and thus were not 
reaching the full potential of the program position. In 2005 we found 
that this was a problem in some offices. Some officials we contacted in 
CBP said they had to use mission staff in this way because they did not 
have enough administrative support to compensate for the realignment of 
administrative staff to shared services, the addition of mission 
personnel that came as a result of mergers of some programs in the 
transition, and hiring freezes. As a result, officers, adjudicators, 
and investigators in some field offices were taking on administrative 
work full-time or as a collateral duty. For more information, see GAO-
06-295 and Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in 
Transforming Immigration Programs, GAO-05-81. 

DHS updated information: In May 2007, DHS provided us with data on 
CBP's fiscal year 2007 hiring projections and documentation of its 
staffing models for various positions within CBP, such as CBP officers 
and Border Patrol agents. Information on these staffing models is 
sensitive; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved 
this performance expectation. DHS has developed staffing models and 
plans for border security personnel.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 11. Ensure adequate infrastructure and 
facilities. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet satisfactorily 
ensured that CBP inspectors and Border Patrol have adequate 
infrastructure and facilities to support their activities. CBP Field 
Operations maintains programs at 20 field operations offices and 327 
ports of entry, of which 15 are pre-clearance stations in Canada and 
the Caribbean. Border Patrol agents are assigned to patrol more than 
6,000 miles of the nation's land borders and are coordinated through 20 
sectors. CBP's facilities and tactical infrastructure portfolio 
consisted of CBP-owned and leased facilities and real estate; temporary 
structures, such as modular buildings for rapid deployment and 
temporary base camps; and other tactical infrastructure, such as 
fences, lights, and barriers. Additionally, CBP owned and maintained a 
motor vehicle fleet; a variety of aircraft including fixed wing 
aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles; and different 
types of marine vessels such as hovercrafts, airboats, and high-speed 
interceptors. Further, the agency acquired different types of scanning 
and detection equipment, such as large-scale x-ray and gamma-imaging 
systems, nuclear and radiological detection equipment, as well as a 
variety of portable and hand-held devices. In February 2007, we 
reported that CBP's capital planning process was evolving and not yet 
mature. Although the agency has established a review and approval 
framework that required documentation to (1) describe how a proposed 
capital project supports the agency's strategic goals and (2) identify 
the mission need and gap between current and required capabilities, we 
were unable to verify implementation of these practices due to a lack 
of non-information technology examples. Additionally, we reported that 
CBP has not developed a comprehensive, agencywide, long-term capital 
plan, although it produced several documents that included some 
elements of such a plan. For land ports of entry, CBP implemented a 
capital investment planning process to ensure that facility and real 
property funding is allocated in a manner that supports critical 
facility projects. CBP piloted the capital investment planning process 
and the strategic resource assessments on the land port of entry. In 
December 2006, we reported that with regard to US-VISIT going forward, 
DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to US-VISIT at land 
ports of entry, including a transition from digitally scanning 2 
fingerprints to 10. While such changes are intended to further enhance 
border security, deploying them may have an impact on aging and space-
constrained land ports of entry facilities because they could increase 
inspection times and adversely affect port of entry operations. 
Moreover, our previous work showed that the US-VISIT program office had 
not taken necessary steps to help ensure that US-VISIT entry capability 
operates as intended. For example, in February 2006 we reported that 
the approach taken by the US-VISIT program office to evaluate the 
impact of US-VISIT on land port of entry facilities focused on changes 
in I-94 processing time at 5 ports of entry and did not examine other 
operational factors, such as US-VISIT's impact on physical facilities 
or work force requirements. As a result, program officials did not 
always have the information they needed to anticipate problems that 
occurred, such as problems processing high volumes of visitors in space 
constrained facilities. For more information please see GAO-07-248 and 
Federal Capital: Three Entities' Implementation of Capital Planning 
Principles is Mixed. GAO-07-274. 

DHS updated information: In May 2007, DHS provided updated information 
outlining steps it has and is taking to improve land ports of entry 
inspection and Border Patrol facilities so they effectively meet 
mission requirements. CBP plans to extend the methodology piloted on 
land ports of entry to air and sea ports of entry by the end of 2007. 
According to DHS, its fiscal year 2007 to 2011 Construction Spending 
Plan includes a rapid response component to address urgent facility 
requirements for the 6,000 new Border Patrol agents who will be 
deployed between fiscal year 2007 and December 2008 as well as the 
existing facility gap for 3,400 currently deployed agents. According to 
DHS, the focus of the rapid response effort is the Border Patrol 
Stations, which will accommodate the vast majority of new agents. 
Border Patrol sector headquarters, checkpoints, horse stables, and 
remote processing facilities are included in CBP's investment strategy, 
but not in the rapid response solutions since they are minimally 
affected by the increase in deployment. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. According to DHS, there is an existing 
facility gap for 3,400 currently deployed Border Patrol agents, and 
although DHS is planning a rapid response to a legislative mandate 
requiring a large staffing increase by the end of 2008, DHS has not yet 
sufficiently increased infrastructure and facilities. Furthermore, as 
we previously reported, DHS's capital investment planning process is 
not yet mature and has only been piloted at the land ports of entry. In 
addition, with regard to US-VISIT, we reported on various 
infrastructure-related difficulties which could affect effective 
implementation of the program.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 12. Leverage technology, personnel, and 
information to secure the border.
 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has worked to 
leverage its resources to secure the border, but has faced challenges 
in doing so. For example, CBP's Interagency Border Inspection System 
has sought to improve screening of travelers entering the United States 
at ports of entry by utilizing terrorist information that the National 
Terrorist Screening Center gathers and consolidates. The DHS IG 
reported, though, that the name-based watch lists that this system 
utilizes had been prone to repeated false hits for the same individual 
on different trips, a situation that results in CBP officers conducting 
secondary inspections of the travelers every time they enter the United 
States, an inefficient use of the officers' time. In addition, in 
December 2006 we reported that DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT 
is to strategically fit with other land-border security initiatives and 
mandates, and thus cannot ensure that these programs work in harmony to 
meet mission goals and operate cost effectively. We noted that agency 
programs need to properly fit within a common strategic context 
governing key aspects of program operations, such as what functions are 
to be performed, what facility or infrastructure changes will be needed 
to ensure that they operate in harmony and as intended, and what 
standards govern the use of technology. We reported that until 
decisions on DHS's border security initiatives are made, it remains 
unclear how programs will be integrated with US-VISIT, if at all--
raising the possibility that CBP would be faced with managing differing 
technology platforms and border inspection processes at each land port 
of entry. We reported that knowing how US-VISIT is to work in concert 
with other border security and homeland security initiatives and what 
facility or facility modifications might be needed could help Congress, 
DHS, and others better understand what resources and tools are needed 
to ensure success. For more information, see GAO-07-248 and Terrorist 
Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the 
Public, GAO-06-1031. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office 
of Inspector General, Review of CBP Actions Taken to Intercept 
Suspected Terrorists at U.S. Ports of Entry, OIG-06-43 (Washington, 
D.C.: June 2006). 

DHS updated information: In April 2007, DHS reported that its 
interagency Border Inspection System and US-VISIT are well integrated 
at air, sea and land border ports. According to CBP, CBP officers at 
these ports of entry are able to screen travelers against both 
biographic and biometric watch lists in addition to verifying 
identities and travel documents. CBP reported that false hits on watch 
lists have been addressed with an enhancement that allows port 
personnel to identify the subjects if false hits in the system to 
prevent hits on subsequent trips. US-VISIT and other border and port 
systems utilize the same architecture and infrastructure to minimize 
costs and promote information sharing. Additionally, DHS stated that 
the Secure Border Initiative Strategic Plan is bringing clarity of 
mission, effective coordination of DHS assets, and greater 
accountability to the work of DHS in securing the nation's borders. 
Moreover, according to DHS, Operation Streamline, launched in December 
2005, is a coordinated effort among CBP, ICE, and the Department of 
Justice to create a zero tolerance zone for illegal entries in the Del 
Rio Office of Border Patrol sector. Beginning with a 5 mile stretch of 
the border, Operation Streamline now spans the entire 210 mile Del Rio 
Sector Border. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Although DHS has taken some actions to 
leverage technology, personnel, and information to secure the border, 
such as using watch lists, more work remains. For example, it is still 
unclear how US-VISIT will work with other border security initiatives, 
including the Secure Border Initiative. While the Secure Border 
Strategic Plan provides some information on how the various border 
security initiatives relate, the plan does not fully describe how these 
initiatives will interact once implemented. In addition, the further 
development and implementation of SBInet will be key to DHS efforts in 
achieving this performance expectation, but SBInet is still in the 
early phases of implementation.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[A] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice, have a role to play in developing a strategy to detect and 
interdict illegal flows of goods in the country. This performance 
expectation is focused on DHS's roles and responsibilities in 
developing a strategy for detecting and interdicting illegal flows of 
goods into the United States.

[B] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice, have a role to play in detecting and interdicting illegal 
flows of goods in the country. This performance expectation is focused 
on DHS's roles and responsibilities in implementing a strategy for 
detecting and interdicting illegal flows of goods into the United 
States. We address cargo security in the context of maritime security 
in a later section of this report.

[C] We address those programs related to maritime cargo security, for 
example the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the 
Container Security Initiative, in a later section of this report.

[D] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
State, have a role to play in implementing effective security measures 
in the visa issuance process. This performance expectation is focused 
on DHS's roles and responsibilities in implementing effective security 
measures in the visa issuance process--namely the Visa Security 
Program.

[E] Other agencies, such as the Department of State, have 
responsibilities for enhancing the security of documents used to enter 
the United States.

[End of table]

DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Immigration Enforcement:

DHS is responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration laws. Immigration 
enforcement includes apprehending, detaining, and removing criminal and 
illegal aliens; disrupting and dismantling organized smuggling of 
humans and contraband as well as human trafficking; investigating and 
prosecuting those who engage in benefit and document fraud; blocking 
and removing employers' access to undocumented workers; and enforcing 
compliance with programs to monitor visitors. Within DHS, ICE is 
primarily responsible for immigration enforcement efforts. In 
particular, ICE's Office of Investigations is responsible for enforcing 
immigration and customs laws and its Office of Detention and Removal 
Operations is responsible for processing, detaining, and removing 
aliens subject to removal from the United States.

As shown in table 18, we identified 16 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of immigration enforcement, and we found that overall DHS 
has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations.[Footnote 23] 
Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 8 of the 
performance expectations and has generally not achieved 4 other 
performance expectations.[Footnote 24] For 4 performance expectations, 
we could not make an assessment. In meeting its performance 
expectations, ICE faced budget constraints that significantly affected 
its overall operations during fiscal year 2004. For example, ICE was 
faced with a hiring freeze in fiscal year 2004 that affected its 
ability to recruit, hire, and train personnel. Over the past 2 years, 
ICE has reported taking actions to strengthen its immigration 
enforcement functions and has, for example, hired and trained 
additional personnel to help fulfill the agency's mission.

Table 18: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration 
Enforcement:

Performance expectation: 1. Develop a program to ensure the timely 
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal 
from the United States. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 2. Implement a program to ensure the timely 
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal 
from the United States.
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 3. Ensure the removal of criminal aliens.
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 4. Assess and prioritize the use of alien 
detention resources to prevent the release of aliens subject to 
removal. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 5. Develop a program to allow for the secure 
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 6. Implement a program to allow for the secure 
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens. 
Assessment: No assessment made. 

Performance expectation: 7. Develop a prioritized worksite enforcement 
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed.
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 8. Implement a prioritized worksite 
enforcement strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are 
employed. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 9. Develop a comprehensive strategy to 
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the 
United States. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 10. Implement a comprehensive strategy to 
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the 
United States. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 11. Develop a law enforcement strategy to 
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border 
criminal activity. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 12. Implement a law enforcement strategy to 
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border 
criminal activity. 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 13. Disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money 
laundering and financial crimes. 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 14. Develop a program to screen and respond to 
local law enforcement and community complaints about aliens who many be 
subject to removal. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 15. Develop staffing plans for hiring and 
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's immigration 
enforcement mission. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 16. Provide training, including foreign 
language training, and equipment for all immigration enforcement 
personnel to fulfill the agency's mission. 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: Total; 
Assessment: Generally achieved: 8; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 4; 
Assessment: No assessment made: 4.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

Table 19 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS 
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in 
the area of immigration enforcement and our assessment of whether DHS 
has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance 
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most 
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).

Table 19: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Immigration Enforcement:

Performance expectation: 1. Develop a program to ensure the timely 
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal 
from the United States.
 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken actions to 
develop programs to help ensure the timely identification and removal 
of noncriminal aliens subject to removal from the United States. In 
June 2003, ICE established the Compliance Enforcement Unit to reduce 
the number of aliens who had violated the terms of certain types of 
visas and were residing in the United States. According to the DHS IG, 
the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, the Student and 
Exchange Visitor System, and the United States Visitor and Immigrant 
Status Indicator Technology identify visa violators. These three 
systems are designed to track a specific segment of the nonimmigrant 
population and provide ICE with information concerning visa overstays. 
The DHS IG reported that when compliance violations were identified, 
enforcement actions must identify, locate, and apprehend violators. 
Once apprehended, violators must be detained, adjudicated, and removed. 
We have ongoing work assessing DHS guidelines for removing aliens from 
the United States who are subject to removal. For more information, see 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Review of 
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Compliance Enforcement Unit, 
OIG-05-50 (Washington, D.C: September 2005); Detention and Removal of 
Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33 (Washington, D.C.: April 2006); An Assessment 
of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fugitive 
Operations Teams, OIG-07-34 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007); and Review 
of U.S. ICE's Detainee Tracking Process, OIG-07-08 (Washington, D.C.: 
November 2006). 

DHS updated information: In March, April, and May 2007, ICE provided 
updated information on its efforts to ensure the timely identification 
and removal of aliens subject to removal from the United States. ICE 
established the National Fugitive Operations Program in fiscal year 
2003 to reduce the number of fugitive aliens in the United States and 
established the Fugitive Operations Support Center in June 2006 to aid 
in accounting for and reporting on the U.S. fugitive alien population, 
reviewing cases in ICE's Deportable Alien Control System, developing 
targeted field operational initiatives, assessing national absconder 
data, and providing comprehensive leads and other support to field 
offices. ICE reported establishing fiscal year goals for the Fugitive 
Operations Teams located throughout its field offices. Each field 
office, based on the number of teams located within its area of 
operational responsibility, is expected to arrest 1,000 fugitive 
targets and targets' associates. Furthermore, the Fugitive Operations 
Support Center has a goal of eliminating another 26,000 fugitive cases 
annually as a result of data integrity updates to ICE's Deportable 
Alien Control System. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation as DHS has taken actions to develop a program 
to ensure the timely identification and removal of aliens subject to 
removal from the United States. 

Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Implement a program to ensure the timely 
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal 
from the United States. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Various factors have 
affected DHS's efforts to identify and remove noncriminal aliens 
subject to removal from the United States in a timely manner. According 
to the DHS IG, in recent years the number of "other than Mexican" 
aliens that DHS has apprehended has been rising, and such aliens have 
consumed more ICE resources because they cannot simply be returned over 
the border. In April 2006, the DHS IG found that Detention and Removal 
Operations was unable to ensure the departure from the United States of 
all removable aliens. In April 2006, the DHS IG reported that of the 
774,112 illegal aliens apprehended during the prior 3 years, 280,987 
(36 percent) were released largely due to a lack of personnel, bed 
space, and funding needed to detain illegal aliens while their 
immigration status was being adjudicated. The DHS IG noted that their 
release presented a significant risk due to the inability of CBP and 
ICE to verify the identity, country of origin, and terrorist or 
criminal affiliation of many of the aliens being released. Further, the 
DHS IG reported that the declining personnel and bed space level was 
occurring when the number of illegal aliens apprehended was increasing. 
The DHS IG stated that even though the Detention and Removal Operations 
had received additional funding and enhanced its Fugitive Operations 
Program, it was unlikely that many of the released aliens would ever be 
removed. ICE has encountered trouble deporting other than Mexican 
aliens because it has to first obtain travel documents from the aliens' 
countries of origin in order to repatriate them, and some countries 
have been unwilling to issue these documents. The DHS IG found that 
this unwillingness on the part of the countries of origin to issue 
travel documents created a "mini-amnesty" program for some aliens and 
also encouraged aliens to enter the United States illegally if they 
knew that their countries did not cooperate. DHS reported that it was 
working with the Department of State to address travel documents and 
related issues preventing or impeding the repatriation of aliens, 
particularly to Central and South American countries. However, the DHS 
IG reported that these efforts had yet to fully address the potential 
national security and public safety risks associated with DHS's 
inability to remove tens of thousands of illegal aliens. In addition, 
in March 2007, the DHS IG reported on DHS's National Fugitive 
Operations Program. The purpose of the program is to identify, locate, 
apprehend, and remove aliens--both criminal and noncriminal--who have 
unexecuted final orders of removal. This program analyzes data 
contained in various systems, such as the Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System that contains information on international students 
and exchange visitors, to identify those who may have violated their 
terms of entry or who might otherwise pose a threat to national 
security. The DHS IG found that the backlog of fugitive aliens 
increased despite Fugitive Operation Teams' efforts and that the teams' 
efforts were hampered by insufficient detention capacity; database 
limitations; and inadequate working space. Additionally, the DHS IG 
reported that the removal rate of fugitive aliens apprehended by the 
teams could not be determined. The DHS IG noted that progress had been 
made in staffing the teams and that the teams had effective 
partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies. We have ongoing 
work assessing DHS guidelines for removing aliens from the United 
States who are subject to removal. For more information, see Department 
of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Detention and Removal 
of Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33 (Washington, D.C.: April 2006); An 
Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's 
Fugitive Operations Teams, OIG-07-34 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007); 
and Review of U.S. ICE's Detainee Tracking Process, OIG-07-08 
(Washington, D.C.: November 2006). 

DHS updated information: In March, April, and May 2007, ICE provided 
data on the results of its efforts to implement a program to ensure the 
timely identification and removal of aliens subject to removal from the 
United States. According to DHS, under the Secure Border Initiative, 
DHS has ended "catch and release" of non-Mexican nationals apprehended 
at or near U.S. borders. DHS stated that it remains committed to a 
"catch and return" regime, ensuring that no alien is released due to 
lack of detention capacity in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. DHS also 
reported that the average length of time spent in detention by an alien 
during removal proceedings has generally decreased from about 41.5 days 
in fiscal year 2002 to about 33.7 days as of August 31, 2006. However, 
ICE reported that during the first 5 months of fiscal year 2007, the 
average length of stay increased to 38.5 days. ICE officials noted that 
various factors can affect the average length of stay, such as the 
unwillingness of foreign countries to issue travel documents and the 
type of proceeding in which an alien is placed (e.g., expedited removal 
or a full hearing).[A] ICE also stated that increased use of electronic 
travel documents and video teleconferencing have helped reduce delays 
that have contributed to longer periods of detention. ICE officials 
noted that decisions by foreign countries to refuse or delay issuance 
of travel documents are outside the control of DHS, and ICE has 
stationed a full-time liaison officer at the Department of State to 
help improve relations with the Department of State and foreign 
countries. ICE reported that it has improved relations with Central 
American countries in particular regarding the issuance of travel 
documents and noted, for example, that El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras--which are among the countries with the highest number of 
removals from the United States--have agreed to use ICE's Electronic 
Travel Document System. With regard to its National Fugitive Operations 
Program, ICE reported that at the end of fiscal year 2006, it had 
deployed 50 Fugitive Operations Teams nationwide and noted that 75 such 
teams have been fully funded for fiscal year 2007. Additional 
information reported by ICE on its effort to identify and remove 
criminal aliens from the United States is provided under the next 
performance expectation; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has 
generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has undertaken 
efforts to ensure the timely identification of aliens subject to 
removal from the United States and provided us with data on its 
efforts, including data on the number of removable aliens arrested. DHS 
also provided us with data on the average length of time spent in 
detention by aliens during removal proceedings. While the average 
length of stay has generally decreased over time, DHS still faces 
difficulties in ensuring the removal of all aliens subject to removal 
from the United States in a timely manner. First, the average length of 
stay for an alien in detention between October 2006 and the end of 
February 2007 has increased from the fiscal year 2006 level; it remains 
to be seen whether the average of length of stay in fiscal year 2007 
will increase, decrease, or stay the same as the fiscal year 2006 
level. Second, the DHS IG reported that DHS has faced difficulties in 
removing aliens from the United States because of the unwillingness of 
some countries to provide the necessary travel documents, a 
circumstance that may be outside of DHS's control but that DHS has 
implemented efforts to help address, such as negotiating memoranda of 
understanding with foreign countries. DHS has finalized memorandum of 
understanding with three countries, and is working with other countries 
to expand use of the Electronic Travel Document System. Nevertheless, 
as previously suggested by the DHS IG, these efforts may not yet fully 
address the potential national security and public safety risks 
associated with DHS's inability to remove tens of thousands of illegal 
aliens. Third, DHS has faced challenges in identifying aliens for 
removal from the United States and, according to the DHS IG, the 
fugitive alien population appears to be growing at a rate that exceeds 
Fugitive Operations Teams' ability to apprehend.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Ensure the removal of criminal aliens.
 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Our work and the DHS IG's 
work have shown that DHS has faced difficulties in its efforts to 
ensure the removal of criminal aliens from the United States. In 
October 2004 we reported that although the legacy U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service was to identify and remove criminal aliens as 
they came out of federal and state prison systems, it had failed to 
identify all removable imprisoned criminal aliens. Some who were 
released from prison committed and were convicted of new felonies. At 
that time, ICE Detention and Removal Operations officials, who took 
over the program from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
stated that they were taking steps to ensure the departure of all 
removable aliens. For example, they established fugitive operations 
teams. In April 2006, the DHS IG also reported that the expansion of 
the Criminal Alien Program, which identifies and processes criminal 
aliens incarcerated in federal, state, and local correctional 
institutions and jails who have no legal right to remain in the United 
States after serving out their sentence, would create more demands for 
the Detention and Removal Operations to detain, process, and remove 
illegal aliens. The DHS IG concluded that DHS and ICE needed to ensure 
that any planned increase in the Detention and Removal Operations' 
ability to identify and remove criminal aliens be accompanied by a 
comparable increase in support personnel, detention bed space, 
equipment, infrastructure, and funding to ensure the timely removal of 
criminal aliens from the United States. Besides the lack of bed space, 
the DHS IG reported that the Detention and Removal Operations' ability 
to detain and remove illegal aliens with final orders of removal was 
affected by (1) the propensity of illegal aliens to disobey orders to 
appear in immigration court; (2) the penchant of released illegal 
aliens with final orders to abscond; (3) the practice of some countries 
to block or inhibit the repatriation of its citizens; and (4) two U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions that mandate the release of criminal and other 
high-risk aliens 180 days after the issuance of the final removal order 
except in "Special Circumstances." The DHS IG reported that, 
collectively, the bed space, personnel, and funding shortages, coupled 
with the other factors, had created an unofficial "mini-amnesty" 
program for criminal and other high-risk aliens. For more information, 
see Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration 
Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements, 
GAO-05-66. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Inspector General, Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006); An Assessment of United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fugitive Operations Teams, OIG-
07-34 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007); and Review of U.S. ICE's Detainee 
Tracking Process, OIG-07-08 (Washington, D.C.: November 2006); DHS 
updated information: During March, April, and May 2007, ICE provided 
updated information on its efforts to ensure the removal of criminal 
aliens from the United States. According to ICE, there are no data on 
the universe of aliens incarcerated in state and local jails who are 
amenable to removal proceedings. This is because prisons and jails 
utilize independent booking software that tracks place of birth in 
different ways. Additionally, information on place of birth is not 
sufficient to determine whether an individual is an alien subject to 
removal from the United States. According to ICE, while it does not 
know the exact number of incarcerated criminal aliens subject to 
removal at this time, there are approximately 158,000 incarcerated 
criminal aliens with immigration detainers within the Enforcement 
Operational Immigration Records system, ICE's administrative case 
management system. In June 2006 and in support of its Criminal Alien 
Program, ICE established the National Detection Enforcement and 
Processing Offenders by Remote Technology Center in Chicago, Illinois 
to help in the screening, interviewing, and removal processing of 
criminal aliens in federal detention facilities throughout the United 
States to help ensure that these criminal aliens are deported rather 
than released into the community upon completion of their federal 
sentences. ICE reported that this center has screened more than 9,200 
incarcerated criminal aliens, issued nearly 7,000 charging documents, 
and located nearly 1,000 alien absconders. Moreover, ICE reported that 
it has finalized agreements with nine local law enforcement agencies to 
work with these agencies to take into custody and remove aliens 
convicted of crimes at the state and local level. Using these 
partnerships and other measures, ICE reported that as of March 2007, 
its Criminal Alien Program has provided coverage for 1,674 of the 4,828 
federal, state, and local jails and prisons nationwide, including for 
all 114 Bureau of Prisons federal detention facilities. ICE reported 
that for fiscal year 2007 it has set a target of removing 90,000 aliens 
from U.S. prisons and jails and, for fiscal year 2007, is on pace to 
double the approximately 60,000 charging documents it issued through 
the Criminal Alien Program in fiscal year 2006. ICE plans to expand 
coverage of the Criminal Alien Program to 3,400 covered facilities by 
fiscal year 2009. According to ICE, each Criminal Alien Program team is 
expected to process 1,800 new administrative cases per year. ICE also 
reported that from October 1, 2006, through March 31, 2007, it has 
removed more than 17,000 Bureau of Prison non-U.S. citizen inmates. If 
the bureau releases a similar number in fiscal year 2007 as it released 
in fiscal year 2006 (about 26,600, according to ICE), ICE reported that 
it is on track to remove all removable aliens released from the Bureau 
of Prisons in fiscal year 2007. Overall, ICE projects that in fiscal 
year 2007, it will process for removal more than 120,000 removable 
aliens located in prisons and jails nationwide; Our assessment: We 
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance 
expectation. Although DHS has made progress in removing criminal aliens 
from the United States, much more work remains. For example, DHS has 
taken actions to expand its Criminal Alien Program to remove criminal 
aliens subject to removal from the United States after they complete 
their sentences in federal, state, and local correctional institutions 
and jails. However, ICE has not yet expanded the Criminal Alien Program 
or taken actions to ensure coverage of all federal, state, and local 
correctional institutions and jails. ICE has reached agreements with 
only nine local law enforcement agencies to remove aliens convicted of 
crimes at the state or local level. As a result, ICE may not be able to 
fully ensure the removal of criminal aliens from facilities that are 
not covered through the Criminal Alien Program or agreements with local 
law enforcement agencies. Moreover, the DHS IG reported that ICE faces 
a variety of challenges in its efforts to expand the Criminal Alien 
Program, and DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has yet 
addressed these challenges; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Assess and prioritize the use of alien 
detention resources to prevent the release of aliens subject to 
removal; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken actions to 
assess and prioritize use of alien detention and removal resources. In 
November 2005, the DHS IG reported that the separation of CBP's 
apprehension components from Detention and Removal Operations created 
challenges in national coordination because the two are part of 
different agencies that pursued different sets of priorities and each 
has its own planning process. The DHS IG noted that Detention and 
Removal Operations prepared detention bed space and staff needs 
projections without the benefit of CBP apprehension and arrest 
projections, while CBP developed its future apprehension initiatives 
without the benefit of insight into Detention and Removal Operations' 
future processing capability. In an effort to achieve better efficiency 
and effectiveness, ICE and CBP negotiated a memorandum of understanding 
between Border Patrol agents and ICE investigators, although employees 
of both agencies noted persisting coordination problems in the 
apprehension and detention process. Other factors that increased the 
number of aliens that the Detention and Removal Operations have 
detained include the rising number of aliens that require mandatory 
detention and Detention and Removal Operations' improved ability to 
identify criminal aliens who are incarcerated in correctional 
institutions and jails and who will be subject to removal upon release 
from jail. The DHS IG also found that ICE has worked to improve 
strategic planning for detention resources, and the ICE Detention and 
Removal Operations issued a strategic plan in 2003 called "Endgame." 
This plan includes specific objectives for optimizing the means for 
detaining illegal aliens, including (1) ensuring sufficient and 
appropriate bed space is available based on detention category, 
characteristic, and condition of release; (2) enhancing partnerships 
with other federal detention agencies for better use of their 
resources, to include facilities and training; and (3) developing a 
National Custody Management Plan promoting the effective utilization of 
available bed space and alternative detention settings. The plan 
identified several significant challenges, many beyond DHS's control, 
including the number of aliens to remove, limited resources, political 
will, foreign governments, and nonremovable aliens. The DHS IG reported 
that, for these reasons, DHS needed to intensify its efforts to provide 
ICE with the resources and interagency support needed to overcome these 
challenges. For more information, see Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Inspector General, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge 
Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
OIG-06-04 (Washington, D.C.: November 2005); ICE's Compliance with 
Detention Limits for Aliens with a Final Order of Removal from the 
United States, OIG-07-28 (Washington, D.C.: February 2007); Treatment 
of Immigration Detainees Housed at Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Facilities, OIG-07-01 (Washington, D.C.: December 2006); Review of U.S. 
ICE's Detainee Tracking Process, OIG-07-08 (Washington, D.C.: November 
2006); and Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006). 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on efforts to assess and prioritize use of alien detention 
and removal resources. According to ICE, successful enforcement 
strategies and the requirement to manage within ICE's operational 
budget have resulted in a situation where Detention and Removal 
Operations has exceeded its funded bed space level and therefore must 
apply rigorous criteria to determine which apprehended aliens are 
detained. According to DHS, ICE detains all aliens who pose a threat to 
community safety or national security, and those required to be 
detained under the nation's immigration laws. In fiscal year 2006, ICE 
added 7,000 beds in facilities along the southern border, and in the 
first quarter of fiscal year 2007 added 2,000 beds. In order to ensure 
the availability of bed space in the future, ICE introduced a formal 
capacity planning program designed to provide advance notice of future 
bed space requirements and collaborated with apprehending entities to 
obtain apprehension forecasts to project short and long term needs. The 
Detention Operations Coordination Center, established in July 2006, 
coordinates the transfer of detainees from field offices with a 
shortage of detention space to those with available beds. ICE also 
reported that the detainee transportation system has been restructured 
to increase in-flight service routes for longer, more cost effective 
flights. ICE reported that as it creates models to determine detention 
capacity needs, Detention and Removal Operations is taking account of 
the capacity needs of CBP and ICE and is working with the U.S. Bureau 
of Prisons, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the 
Departments of Justice and State to develop a more efficient detention 
and removal system. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. While the availability of detention space 
depends on resources, DHS has taken actions to assess and prioritize 
the use of alien detention resources to prevent the release of aliens 
subject to removal by increasing bed space, relocating detainees, and 
better coordinating with relevant agencies. DHS has also taken actions 
to develop and implement a capacity planning program to identify future 
bed space requirements and has established priorities for bed space 
needs.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Develop a program to allow for the secure 
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in developing 
programs to allow secure alternatives to detention. In October 2004, we 
reported that Detention and Removal Operations planned to use the 
results of its pilot programs (e.g., electronic monitoring and home 
visits of nondetained aliens) to determine which efforts intended to 
prevent nondetained aliens from fleeing while in immigration 
proceedings would merit additional funding. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its Intensive Supervision Appearance Program and its 
Electronic Monitoring Program. According to ICE, under the Intensive 
Supervision Appearance Program, established in June 2004 and only 
available to aliens not subject to mandatory detention, all 
participants must agree to comply with the conditions of their release. 
Case specialists are then assigned a limited caseload of participants 
and are responsible for monitoring those participants in the community 
by using tools such as electronic monitoring (bracelets), home visits, 
work visits, and reporting by telephone. The Electronic Monitoring 
Program is a reporting and case management tool for aliens released 
from custody that utilizes telephone reporting and electronic devices, 
such as radio frequency and Global Positioning System technology, to 
identify a nondetained alien's location and help ensure the alien's 
appearance at scheduled hearings and, as appropriate, the alien's 
scheduled removal. Last, DHS is conducting research on piloting a 
program that would utilize a kiosk-type hardware like the US-VISIT 
program to which an alien could report monthly. Instead of reporting to 
a deportation officer, the alien would scan his fingerprint and have 
his photo taken at the kiosk, which would be linked to appropriate 
databases. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has developed two programs that allow for 
the secure alternative detention of noncriminal aliens--the Intensive 
Supervision Appearance program and the Electronic Monitoring Program--
and is exploring other alternatives to detention for noncriminal 
aliens. 
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 6. Implement a program to allow for the secure 
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not conducted work on DHS's 
efforts to provide for the secure alternative detention of noncriminal 
aliens. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its efforts to provide alternatives to detention. ICE 
reported that under its Intensive Supervision Appearance Program there 
has been an 82 percent court appearance rate, as compared to 61 percent 
for the general nondetained population and that 47 percent of program-
enrolled aliens who received final removal orders were confirmed to 
have left the United States compared to 13 percent of aliens in the 
nondetained general population believed to have compiled with removal 
orders. According to ICE, since the inception of the Electronic 
Monitoring Program in 2003, the program has been used by almost 9,100 
aliens and is currently used by 6,500 aliens. ICE noted that the number 
of aliens who have participated in these programs has been relatively 
small and that only certain aliens are eligible to be detained through 
these programs. ICE noted that no limit exists on the total number of 
aliens who can be monitored under the program. Furthermore, ICE noted 
that it is working to improve its alternative to detention programs by, 
for example, exploring additional supervision technologies and 
developing a memorandum of understanding with the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review to fast-track alternative-to-detention participants 
through the immigration hearing process. In addition, ICE reported that 
it is planning to expand its programs for secure alternative detention 
to increase programs' capacity to allow for a total detained population 
of 10,500 aliens. 

Our assessment: We cannot assess of the extent to which DHS has 
generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not completed 
work related to DHS's effort to implement a program for 
secure alternatives to detention, and while DHS provided us with some 
information on its implementation efforts, we are unable to assess 
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation based on this 
information. 
 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 7. Develop a prioritized worksite enforcement 
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Our work has shown that DHS has 
taken actions to develop a prioritized worksite enforcement program. As 
part of the Secure Border Initiative, in April 2006 ICE announced a new 
interior enforcement strategy to target employers of unauthorized 
aliens, immigration violators, and criminal networks. As we testified 
in June 2006, under this strategy, ICE has planned to target employers 
who knowingly employ unauthorized workers by bringing criminal charges 
against them. For more information, see Immigration Enforcement: 
Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement 
Efforts, GAO-06-895T and Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder 
Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-05-813. 
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its worksite enforcement program. Specifically, ICE 
reported that its worksite enforcement strategy includes (1) critical 
infrastructure protection, (2) criminal investigations of egregious 
employer violators, and (3) enhanced employer compliance and outreach 
through implementation of the ICE Mutual Agreement between Government 
and Employers. As part of its critical infrastructure protection 
efforts, ICE has undertaken enforcement actions to remove unauthorized 
workers from critical infrastructure sites, as those unauthorized 
workers may pose a threat to sensitive facilities. ICE has also engaged 
in criminal investigations targeting unscrupulous employers for 
significant criminal violations and has sought to prosecute employers' 
managers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also 
announced the first nine charter members of the ICE Mutual Agreement 
between Government and Employers, a program designed to build 
cooperative relationships between the federal government and businesses 
to strengthen hiring practices and reduce the employment of 
unauthorized workers. Through the program, ICE seeks to encourage 
industry compliance through enhanced employer training and education. 
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has developed a prioritized worksite 
enforcement strategy focused on critical infrastructure protection and 
egregious employers and has provided employers with a tool for enhanced 
training and education on compliance with laws prohibiting the 
employment of unauthorized workers. 
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Implement a prioritized worksite 
enforcement strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are 
employed. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Our work has shown that DHS has 
faced challenges in implementing a prioritized worksite enforcement 
strategy. In August 2005 and June 2006 we reported that worksite 
enforcement was one of various immigration enforcement programs that 
competed for resources among ICE responsibilities and that worksite 
enforcement had been a relatively low priority. We reported that 
competing needs for resources and difficulties in proving that 
employers knowingly hired unauthorized workers hindered ICE's worksite 
enforcement efforts. In addition, ICE officials stated that the lack of 
sufficient detention space limited the effectiveness of worksite 
enforcement efforts. We also noted that the availability and use of 
fraudulent documents made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that 
employers knowingly hired unauthorized workers. We reported that the 
number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for improperly 
completing paperwork or knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally 
declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. We also reported that the 
percentage of ICE agent work-years spent on worksite enforcement 
generally decreased between fiscal years 1999 and 2003. In addition, we 
reported that ICE lacked outcome goals and measures that hindered its 
ability to effectively assess the results of its worksite enforcement 
efforts. For example, we noted that until ICE fully develops outcome 
goals and measures, it may not be able to determine the extent to which 
its critical infrastructure protection efforts have resulted in the 
elimination of unauthorized workers' access to secure areas of critical 
infrastructure sites, one possible goal that ICE may use for its 
worksite enforcement program. For more information, see GAO-06-895T and 
GAO-05-813. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its worksite enforcement implementation efforts. ICE 
reported that during fiscal year 2006 it initiated about 1,200 worksite 
enforcement investigations, seized property and assets valued at 
approximately $1.7 million at the time of the initial enforcement 
action, and made 716 criminal arrests, a substantial increase over 
criminal arrests made in previous fiscal years. ICE reported that 
during fiscal year 2006 criminal fines, forfeitures, and payments in 
lieu of forfeiture yielded more than $2.5 million. ICE reported that it 
obtained criminal and civil judgments totaling $26.7 million as a 
result of its worksite enforcement efforts for the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2007. With regard to the third prong of ICE's worksite 
enforcement strategy--the ICE Mutual Agreement between Government and 
Employers--as of January 2007, ICE had nine employers as members.[B] 
One requirement for participation in this program is that member 
employers enroll in the Employment Eligibility Verification system, 
which allows participating employers to electronically verify the work 
authorization status of newly hired employees. ICE reported that it 
does not yet have systems in place to measure the effectiveness and 
success of its program. ICE reported that it does not collect data on 
program effectiveness because it would require the law enforcement 
agency to collect data from a wide range of agencies that are 
responsible for carrying out the specific law enforcement mission. ICE 
reported that it uses its law enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of 
arrests, indictments, convictions, seizures, and forfeitures); 
consequences resulting from closed cases (e.g., indictments and 
convictions); and risk assessments to assess efficiency and 
effectiveness of its efforts. With regard to the consequences resulting 
from closed cases, ICE noted that a measure of success is if an 
investigation results in an indictment and a conviction. ICE reported 
that it measures the quality of cases and focuses its efforts on those 
cases that are the highest priority for protecting the United States. 
With regard to risk assessments, ICE reported that it conducts threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences assessments of customs and immigration 
systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation by terrorists 
and other criminals and to determine the optimal application of 
resources to ensure the maximum contribution to national security and 
public safety. ICE reported that additional time is needed to afford 
its programs the opportunity to mature into an outcome-based system.

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to implement its 
worksite enforcement strategy and, among other things, has conducted 
more worksite enforcement investigations and made more criminal arrests 
in fiscal year 2006 in comparison to prior fiscal years. However, 
millions of unauthorized workers face little likelihood of confronting 
ICE worksite enforcements actions. Moreover, DHS did not provide us 
with evidence on the extent to which its efforts have contributed to 
the achievement of ICE's desired outcomes for its worksite enforcement 
program and on the extent to which ICE has developed outcome goals and 
measures for its worksite enforcement program. We previously reported, 
without these goals and measures, it may be difficult for ICE to fully 
determine whether its worksite enforcement program is achieving its 
desired outcomes. With regard to the ICE Mutual Agreement between 
Government and Employers, the third prong of ICE's worksite enforcement 
strategy, we have previously identified weaknesses in one of the 
program's key requirements--participation in the Employment Eligibility 
Verification program. These weaknesses include the program's inability 
to identify document fraud, DHS delays in entering information into its 
databases, and some employer noncompliance with program. DHS has 
undertaken some efforts to address these weakness, but they would have 
to be fully addressed to help ensure the efficient and effective 
operation of an expanded program. 
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Develop a comprehensive strategy to 
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the 
United States. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In prior work we reported that as of 
April 2005, ICE had not yet finalized a national strategy for combating 
alien smuggling.[C] For more information, see Combating Alien 
Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal Response, GAO-05-
305. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its efforts to develop a strategy to combat human 
smuggling and trafficking. For example, the Secure Border Initiative is 
a comprehensive, multiyear program established by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal 
immigration. The Secure Border Initiative includes DHS's efforts to 
identify and dismantle smuggling organizations. According to DHS, the 
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center is an important component of 
DHS's strategy to combat alien smuggling. Additionally, ICE reported 
that, in 2006, it initiated its Trafficking in Persons Strategy to 
target criminal organizations and individuals engaged in human 
trafficking worldwide. The Trafficking in Persons Strategy focuses on 
building partnerships and collaboration with other DHS agencies, 
foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, the Department of 
Justice Civil Rights Division, and federal, state, and local law 
enforcement. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has made progress toward developing a 
comprehensive strategy to interdict and prevent trafficking and 
smuggling of aliens into the United States by, for 
example, establishing the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center and 
the Trafficking in Persons Strategy.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 10. Implement a comprehensive strategy to 
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the 
United States.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Our work has shown that DHS has 
faced challenges in implementing its antismuggling and trafficking 
mission.[D] In May 2005 we reported that ICE and CBP--two DHS 
components with antismuggling missions--signed a memorandum of 
understanding in November 2004 to address their respective roles and 
responsibilities, including provisions to ensure proper and timely 
sharing of information and intelligence. However, we reported that 
there was no mechanism in place for tracking the number and the results 
of referrals or leads made by CBP to ICE for investigation. Without 
such a mechanism, there may have been missed opportunities for 
identifying and developing cases on large or significant alien-
smuggling organizations. CBP and ICE officials acknowledged that 
establishing a tracking mechanism would have benefits for both 
agencies. Such a mechanism would help ICE ensure that appropriate 
action is taken on the referrals. Also, CBP could continue to pursue 
certain leads if ICE--for lack of available resources or other reasons-
-could not take action on the referrals. For more information, see GAO-
05-305. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided updated 
information on its antismuggling and trafficking efforts. With regard 
to smuggling, CBP established its Office of Alien Smuggling 
Interdiction to set guidelines for the development and maintenance of a 
program to address human smuggling incidents. This office is also 
intended to institutionalize information sharing within CBP on migrant 
smuggling, trafficking in persons, and clandestine terrorist travel. 
CBP noted that the office is still a work in progress, and CBP has 
established various goals and associated time frames for completing 
these goals. With regard to human trafficking, ICE reported that in 
fiscal year 2006 it opened nearly 300 human trafficking investigations 
and made about 180 arrests as a result of human trafficking 
investigations. ICE reported that since 2005 it has hosted or 
participated in training sessions on human trafficking and has 
collaborated with nongovernmental organizations that provide services 
to human trafficking victims. In addition, ICE reported on various 
initiatives to share information with CBP regarding human smuggling and 
trafficking. As previously discussed, ICE reported that it does not yet 
have systems in place to measure the effectiveness and success of its 
program. ICE reported that it does not collect data on program 
effectiveness because doing so would require the law enforcement agency 
to collect data from a wide range of agencies that are responsible for 
carrying out the specific law enforcement mission. ICE reported that it 
uses its law enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of arrests, 
indictments, convictions, seizures, and forfeitures); consequences 
resulting from closed cases (e.g., indictments and convictions); and 
risk assessments to assess efficiency and effectiveness of its efforts. 
ICE reported that in May 2007, the ICE Offices of Investigations and 
International Affairs issued a joint memorandum to field offices 
providing guidance in accomplishing the component of the human 
trafficking strategy and requiring quarterly outreach reports and 
annual assessments. According to ICE, these quarterly reports and 
annual assessments will be used to monitor future progress in 
antitrafficking efforts. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. In prior work, we noted that effectiveness of 
a strategy for smuggling depends partly on having clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities for those agencies with antismuggling missions. 
CBP and ICE largely addressed this point in signing a memorandum of 
understanding and undertaking other information sharing initiatives. 
However, coordination between these two agencies and implementation of 
antismuggling efforts could be enhanced by development and use of a 
mechanism for sharing information. In addition, as part of its efforts 
to implement its antismuggling and trafficking strategy, DHS has 
identified the importance of performance evaluation but has not yet 
developed outcome goals and measures to assess the extent to which its 
efforts are achieving desired outcomes and has only recently initiated 
efforts to obtain quarterly reports and annual assessments from field 
offices. Until DHS has developed a mechanism to better share 
information among the responsible agencies and the ability to evaluate 
the outcomes of its efforts, DHS will not have a comprehensive strategy 
in place. In addition, although CBP has established goals for its 
Office of Alien Smuggling Interdiction, the majority of these goals 
have target time frames later than May 2007, or CBP noted that time 
frames are ongoing.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 11. Develop a law enforcement strategy to 
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border 
criminal activity. 

Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work on DHS 
efforts to combat criminal alien gangs.[E]. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its efforts to combat alien gangs. According to ICE, one 
of the goals of the Secure Border Initiative is to identify and remove 
immigration violators who are criminal aliens at large in the United 
States. ICE stated that it will use the additional resources in the 
proposed fiscal year 2008 budget to enhance ICE's anti-gang initiative--
Operation Community Shield--and increase the number of transnational 
gang members that are identified, arrested, and removed from the United 
States. Operation Community Shield, a national law enforcement 
initiative, partners ICE with other federal, state, and local law 
enforcement. Additionally, ICE participates in the National Gang 
Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center, a multi-agency 
national anti-gang enforcement targeting center, and in regular policy 
coordination meetings at the National Security Council concerning 
international organized crime. As a participant in the National 
Security Council Policy Coordination Committee meetings, ICE is 
assisting in the development of a strategy to combat transnational 
gangs in the United States, Mexico, and Central America. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has initiated various efforts, such as 
Operation Community Shield, in developing a strategy for combating 
criminal alien gangs. ICE has also worked with other agencies and 
groups to develop a strategy to combat alien gangs.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 12. Implement a law enforcement strategy to 
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border 
criminal activity.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work on DHS 
efforts to combat criminal alien gangs.[F]. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its efforts to combat criminal alien gangs. Operation 
Community Shield was initiated by ICE in February 2005 to combat 
violent transnational street gangs and expanded to include all criminal 
and prison gangs. Under Operation Community Shield, ICE identifies 
violent gangs and develops intelligence on their membership; deters, 
disrupts, and dismantles gang operations by tracing and seizing their 
cash, weapons, and other assets; criminally prosecutes or removes gang 
members from the United States; partners with other law enforcement 
agencies at the federal, state and local levels to develop a force 
multiplier effect for gang investigations; and conducts outreach to 
boost public awareness about gangs. In March 2007, ICE reported that 
since its inception in February 2005, Operation Community Shield has 
resulted in the arrests of more than 4,000 gang members and associates. 
Additionally, ICE stated that it will provide staffing positions to 
identified high-threat gang areas based on the current transnational 
threat at the time the positions and funding are received. Given the 
mobility of transnational gangs, ICE will make a determination on the 
placement of resources in specific areas needing staffing based on 
tactical intelligence and other operational considerations. As 
previously discussed, ICE reported that it does not yet have systems in 
place to measure the effectiveness and success of its program, but uses 
its law enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of arrests, indictments, 
convictions, seizures, and forfeitures); consequences resulting from 
closed cases (e.g., indictments and convictions); and risk assessments 
to assess efficiency and effectiveness of its efforts. 

Our assessment: We cannot make an assessment of the extent to which DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not 
completed work related to DHS's effort to combat criminal alien gangs, 
and while DHS provided us with some information on its implementation 
efforts, we are unable to assess DHS's progress in achieving this 
performance expectation based on the information DHS provided. 
Specifically, DHS did not provide us with information that would 
clearly enable us to assess the extent to which DHS's efforts to 
implement a strategy to combat alien gangs have resulted in desired 
outcomes.
 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 13. Disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money 
laundering and financial crimes.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work related 
to ICE's ability to disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money 
laundering and financial crimes.[G]. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its efforts to combat money laundering and financial 
crimes. With regard to a strategy for money laundering, ICE reported 
that it was a major contributor to the 2005 U.S. Money Laundering 
Threat Assessment produced by an interagency group to assess the 
progress that the United States had made in combating money laundering, 
evaluating the changing environment, and identifying areas that require 
further attention. ICE was also active in preparing the 2006 and 2007 
National Money Laundering Strategies that addressed the findings and 
recommendations in the earlier report and set out goals, strategies, 
and specific actions for agencies to follow. The 2007 National Money 
Laundering Strategy noted that to measure the effectiveness of U.S. 
enforcement measures, ICE will compile investigative data. To support 
investigations with a potential nexus to terrorism and other financial 
crimes investigations, in July 2003, ICE launched Operation 
Cornerstone, an outreach program designed to identify and eliminate 
systemic vulnerabilities in financial systems that could be exploited 
by individuals, criminal organizations, and terrorists. ICE reported 
conducting more than 4,000 outreach presentations that have resulted in 
over 275 criminal investigations and $3 million seized since its 
establishment. With regard to bulk cash smuggling, ICE reported that 
the launch of Operation Firewall in August 2005, and its subsequent 
expansion in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, helped combat bulk cash 
smuggling. ICE reported that since its inception, Operation Firewall 
has resulted in the seizure of more than $76 million and the arrest of 
more than 200 suspects. ICE noted that the November 2004 establishment 
of Trade Transparency Units created cooperative international 
investigative efforts to identify and eliminate trade-based money 
laundering system, which supports the trafficking of drugs, people, and 
other contraband as well as terrorism. ICE also reported that it 
launched the Unlicensed Money Service Business/Informal Value Transfer 
System to prevent terrorists and other criminals from moving illicit 
funds through unlicensed money service businesses. Overall, in fiscal 
year 2006, ICE reported conducting nearly 4,000 financial 
investigations that resulted in more than 1,200 arrests and the seizure 
of more than $137 million in suspected illicit proceeds. As previously 
discussed, ICE reported that it does not yet have systems in place to 
prove that it has disrupted and dismantled mechanisms for money 
laundering and financial crimes. ICE reported that it uses its law 
enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of arrests, indictments, 
convictions, seizures, and forfeitures); consequences resulting from 
closed cases (e.g., indictments and convictions); and risk assessments 
to assess efficiency and effectiveness of its efforts. 

Our assessment: We cannot make an assessment of the extent to which DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not 
completed work related to DHS efforts to disrupt and dismantle 
mechanisms for money laundering and financial crimes. Although DHS 
provided us with some information on its implementation efforts, we are 
unable to assess DHS's progress in achieving this performance 
expectation based on the information DHS provided. Specifically, DHS 
did not provide us with information that would clearly enable us to 
assess the extent to which DHS's efforts to disrupt and dismantle 
mechanisms for money laundering and financial crimes have resulted in 
desired outcomes.
 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 14. Develop a program to screen and respond to 
local law enforcement and community complaints about aliens who may be 
subject to removal. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work related 
to ICE programs for screening and responding to local law enforcement 
and community complaints about aliens who may be subject to removal.

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its efforts to work with state and local law enforcement 
agencies. ICE reported that it in 2006 it initiated a pilot program, 
called the Law Enforcement Agency Response, in Phoenix, Arizona, to 
provide full-time response to local law enforcement agencies' requests 
for immigration-related assistance. As of March 2007, ICE reported that 
this program unit has received nearly 400 requests for assistance. ICE 
is studying the feasibility of continuing the pilot program and 
expanding it to other locations. In addition, ICE has established 
memoranda of agreement with 21 law enforcement agencies to provide 
training and assistance to state and local police and correctional 
personnel in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. ICE reported 
that as a result of these efforts, in fiscal year 2006 more than 6,000 
individuals were arrested and, as of March 2007, more than 4,000 
individuals have been arrested during fiscal year 2007 for violating 
misdemeanor and felony state and local laws. According to ICE, its Law 
Enforcement Support Center also provides information to law enforcement 
agencies relating to foreign nationals suspected of criminal activity 
and immigration status information of foreign nationals under arrest or 
investigation. Further, the Forensic Document Laboratory provides 
assistance to federal, state, tribal, local, and foreign authorities in 
making authenticity determinations of travel and identity documents.

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has developed a number of programs to 
screen and respond to local law enforcement and community complaints 
about aliens who may be subject to removal. Additionally DHS has 
provided field guidance directing an enhanced response to state and 
local requests for information.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 15. Develop staffing plans for hiring and 
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's immigration 
enforcement mission. 

Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Since the transfer of 
responsibilities to DHS in March 2003, ICE has faced resource and 
financial management challenges that affected its ability to fully 
address all of its competing priorities. For example, ICE was faced 
with a hiring freeze in fiscal year 2004, which affected its ability to 
recruit, hire, and train personnel. Moreover, in June 2006 we reported 
that ICE did not yet have a formal risk management process for 
prioritizing and allocating its limited resources. Rather ICE primarily 
relied on the judgment of staff in major field offices in addition to 
national programs developed in headquarters. For more information, see 
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in 
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its human capital functions. ICE reported that it has 
developed comprehensive staffing plans for all of the agency's critical 
positions in support of ICE's immigration enforcement mission and 
provided us with the operational assumptions underlying the staffing 
models. ICE also reported streamlining its hiring process and noted 
meeting all of its 2006 hiring goals. ICE reported (1) establishing 
preliminary guidance to provide ICE leadership and program managers 
with a framework for hiring and funding decisions and (2) implementing 
a workforce planning initiative to examine interdependencies and 
relationships among component programs. ICE stated that it has a hiring 
plan for supplemental, enhancement, and attrition hiring and that it is 
currently filling these positions. As of April 10, 2007, ICE reported 
that it has hired 1,213 employees in key occupations with 892 remaining 
for this fiscal year. ICE noted that Detention and Removal Operations 
is currently working toward hiring to its authorized and funded level 
for positions of 6,762 and that approximately 5,222 positions are 
filled with 1,540 vacancies. Due to the number of vacancies, Detention 
and Removal Operations stated that it is striving to achieve a hiring 
goal that would ensure that at least 90 percent of its field and 85 
percent of its headquarters vacancies are filled by the end of fiscal 
year 2007. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has provided information outlining its 
current staffing allocations and the operational basis of staffing 
models and has created initiatives to facilitate hiring and staffing. 
ICE staffing models are taken into consideration when requesting funds 
in the budget.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 16. Provide training, including foreign 
language training, and equipment for all immigration enforcement 
personnel to fulfill the agency's mission.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work on DHS's 
provision of training for immigration enforcement personnel. 

DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, ICE provided updated 
information on its training efforts. ICE reported that its ICE-D Basic 
Law Enforcement Training Program is an 18.5-week basic law enforcement 
training program that provides newly hired Detention and Removal 
Operations employees with entry-level training in law, tactical 
physical techniques, firearms, and operational training. ICE also 
reported that the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has added a 5-
week Spanish language immersion course that became part of the ICE-D 
program in April 2007. According to ICE, in November 2006 ICE offered a 
4-hour instructor-led course on Alien Smuggling/Victims of Trafficking, 
but is in the process of developing a more balanced course that is not 
just focused on the southern border. ICE also offers other training 
courses. See Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector 
General, A Review of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Discipline 
Procedures, OIG-06-57 (Washington, D.C.: August 2006). 

Our assessment: We cannot make an assessment of the extent to which DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not 
completed work related to DHS's effort to provide training and 
equipment to immigration enforcement personnel. While DHS provided us 
with some information on its training efforts, we are unable to assess 
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation based on the 
information DHS provided. Specifically, DHS did not provide us with 
information that would clearly enable us to assess the extent to which 
DHS has provided training, beyond basic training, for all immigration 
enforcement personnel.
 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken a sufficient number of actions to satisfy most elements of the 
expectation. However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not 
signify that no further action is required of DHS or that functions 
covered by the expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. 
Conversely, "generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet 
taken a sufficient number of actions to satisfy most elements of the 
performance expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may 
be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy 
some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the 
DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS 
actions to satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information 
DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which 
DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no 
assessment made."

[A] Under expedited removal, aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the 
border and within 14 days of entry who do not have documents, or who 
have false documents, can be removed from the United States without a 
hearing before an immigration judge.

[B] The other two prongs of ICE's worksite enforcement strategy are 
critical infrastructure protection and criminal investigations of 
egregious employer violators.

[C] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice, have a role to play in developing a strategy for antismuggling 
and trafficking. This performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles 
and responsibilities.

[D] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice, have a role to play antismuggling and trafficking efforts. 
This performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles and 
responsibilities.

[E] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice, have a role to play in developing a strategy for combating 
alien gangs. This performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles and 
responsibilities.

[F] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice, have a role to play in combating criminal alien gangs. This 
performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles and responsibilities.

[G] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice, have a role to play in disrupting and dismantling mechanisms 
for money laundering and financial crimes. This performance expectation 
is focused on DHS's roles and responsibilities.

[End of table]

DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Providing Immigration Services:

USCIS is the agency within DHS that is responsible for processing 
millions of immigration benefit applications received each year for 
various types of immigration benefits, determining whether applicants 
are eligible to receive immigration benefits, and detecting suspicious 
information and evidence to refer for fraud investigation and possible 
sanctioning by other DHS components or external agencies. USCIS 
processes applications for about 50 types of immigration benefits with 
a goal of ensuring that processing of benefits applications takes place 
within a 6 month time frame. USCIS has introduced new initiatives to 
modernize business practices and upgrade information technology 
infrastructure to transform its current, paper-based data systems into 
a digital processing resource to enhance customer service, prevent 
future backlogs of immigration benefit applications, and improve 
efficiency with expanded electronic filing.

As shown in table 20, we identified 14 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of immigration services and found that overall DHS has made 
modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found 
that DHS has generally achieved 5 performance expectations and has 
generally not achieved 9 others.

Table 20: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration 
Services:

Performance expectation: 1. Eliminate the benefit application backlog 
and reduce application completion times to 6 months. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Institute process and staffing reforms to 
improve application processes. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 3. Establish a timetable for reviewing the 
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration 
benefit applications. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 4. Institute a case management system to 
manage applications and provide management information. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 5. Develop new programs to prevent future 
backlogs from developing. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 6. Establish online access to status 
information about benefit applications. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 7. Establish online filing for benefit 
applications. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 8. Establish revised immigration application 
fees based on a comprehensive fee study. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 9. Capture biometric information on all 
benefits applicants. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 10. Implement an automated background check 
system to track and store all requests for applications. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 11. Communicate immigration-related 
information to other relevant agencies; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 12. Establish training programs to reduce 
fraud in the benefits process. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 13. Create an office to reduce immigration 
benefit fraud. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 14. Implement a fraud assessment program to 
reduce benefit fraud. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: Total; 
Assessment: Generally achieved: 5; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 9; 
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

Table 21 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS 
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in 
the area of immigration services and our assessment of whether DHS has 
taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance 
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most 
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).

Table 21: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Immigration Services:

Performance expectation: 1. Eliminate the benefit application backlog 
and reduce application completion times to 6 months.
 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has made significant 
progress in reducing the number of immigration benefit applications 
pending adjudication and has prioritized pending applications in a 
reasonable manner. However, USCIS cannot yet ensure that it has 
eliminated the backlog and reduced application completion time to 6 
months primarily because (1) a large number of applications are still 
pending before the agency, many of which USCIS stated are of lower 
priority in its backlog elimination efforts, and (2) USCIS does not yet 
have a case management system for tracking applications it receives to 
determine whether applications are processed within 6 months of 
receipt. In addition, USCIS has yet to demonstrate that it has overcome 
long-standing technology problems. With respect to an immigration 
benefit application, the term backlog, as defined by statute, means the 
period of time in excess of 180 days (6 months) that such application 
has been pending before USCIS. USCIS, using its operational definition 
of backlog, measures the volume of its backlog as the number of 
applications pending before the agency in excess of the number of 
applications received in the most recent 6 months. USCIS then subtracts 
from this number all applications pending where either benefits would 
not be immediately available even if the applications were granted or 
further adjudication of the application depends on action by another 
agency or the applicant; USCIS stated that by consistently completing 
more applications than are filed each month, the agency should 
gradually reduce its pending workload of applications to a level at 
which it can complete all incoming applications within the workload 
targets established for each application type. Eventually, according to 
the agency's backlog elimination plan, as long as USCIS is processing 
more applications than it is receiving, there should be no backlog. 
However, we reported that under USCIS's definition of backlog, the 
agency cannot guarantee that every applicant requesting a benefit will 
receive a decision within 6 months of filing. Moreover, although 
USCIS's data showed a significant decrease in the backlog from January 
2004 through June 2005, we reported that the sharp drop in the backlog 
was due to USCIS's decision in July 2004 to remove from its backlog 
count those 1.15 million cases for which an immigration visa was not 
immediately available and a benefit therefore could not be provided. In 
September 2005, the DHS IG noted that removal of some applications from 
the backlog, as well as other backlog reduction efforts such as the 
hiring of temporary staff, may have benefited the agency in the short-
term. However, the DHS IG reported that these actions would not resolve 
the long-standing processing and information technology problems that 
contributed to the backlog in the first place and that, until these 
problems were addressed, USCIS would not be able to apply its resources 
to meet mission and customer needs effectively; In our previous work, 
we noted that USCIS's automated systems were not complete and reliable 
enough to determine how long it actually takes to process specific 
benefit applications or to determine the exact size of its backlog. 
USCIS has identified requirements for transforming its information 
technology systems to address deficiencies in its capabilities, but 
these transformation efforts have not yet been fully developed or 
implemented. We reported that until USCIS develops this capability, it 
cannot assure Congress that it has successfully eliminated the backlog, 
and it will not be able to provide accurate information about the 
actual number of applications that have been pending in excess of 180 
days or the actual amount of time they have been pending. For more 
information, see Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address 
Backlogs and Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20. Also, see 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in Modernizing 
Information Technology, OIG-07-11 (Washington, D.C.: November 2006) and 
USCIS Faces Challenges in Modernizing Information Technology, OIG-05-41 
(Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 

DHS updated information: In March through June 2007, DHS provided 
updated information on its backlog. In January 2004, USCIS had 
approximately 3.8 million applications backlogged pending adjudication, 
including applications that, according to USCIS, if granted would not 
provide the applicant or petitioner with an immediate immigration 
benefit or were pending as a result of delays outside of USCIS's 
control. Based on an analysis of data provided in USCIS's Backlog 
Elimination Plan Update for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006, as 
of September 2006, USCIS had a total of about 1.0 million backlogged 
applications, including applications that, according to USCIS, if 
granted would not provide the applicant or petitioner with an immediate 
immigration benefit or were pending as a result of delays outside of 
USCIS's control. As a subset of this 1.0 million, USCIS reported that 
the backlog under its control was less then 10,000. Specifically, for 
each application type, USCIS removed from the calculated backlog the 
total number of pending applications that, even if the application were 
granted, the ultimate benefit sought would not be immediately available 
due to annual numerical caps set by statute. As reported in the USCIS 
Backlog Elimination Plan updates, certain applications and petitions 
were removed from the backlog count because (1) the benefit was not 
immediately available to the applicant or beneficiary; (2) USCIS was 
waiting for applicants or petitioners to respond to requests for 
information; (3) applicants were afforded the opportunity to retake 
naturalization tests; or (4) USCIS was waiting for actions from outside 
federal agencies, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation name checks. 
USCIS has previously acknowledged that there may be some applications 
that have been pending more than 6 months and reported to us that the 
agency cannot determine the precise composition of the total 
applications pending adjudication as of September 2006 because such 
data are not available for all applications within USCIS; Our 
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. USCIS has made significant progress in 
reducing the number of applications pending adjudication and processing 
times for adjudicating applications. However, USCIS's method of 
calculating its backlog leaves the possibility of individual 
applications pending for longer than 6 months, so long as in the 
aggregate the number of pending applications on any given date does not 
exceed the number received in the previous 6 months. USCIS has 
acknowledged that some applications received in fiscal years 2005 and 
2004, or even earlier, may still be pending. Moreover, USCIS removed 
from its backlog calculation any pending applications for which a 
benefit would not be immediately available, even if the application 
were granted, or that were awaiting action outside of USCIS. While 
giving such applications lower priority is a reasonable approach to 
backlog reduction and is useful for workload analysis, those 
applications--1 million as of September 2006--are still awaiting 
adjudication. For example, about 750,000 of these applications are 
those for which a benefit would not be immediately available even if 
granted, according to USCIS. Adjudicating these applications would let 
applicants or their beneficiaries know their eligibility for benefits, 
however, and could prevent future delays if large numbers of these 
benefits suddenly became immediately available due to a statutory 
increase in the caps, as happened when a 2005 law eliminated the annual 
cap on asylum beneficiaries. Additionally, DHS's current data systems 
cannot produce backlog information based on the date of the filing of a 
benefit application, which contributes to USCIS's difficulty in 
measuring its backlog consistent with the statutory definition, upon 
which the performance expectation is in part based, and in providing 
information on whether it is processing applications within 6 months of 
receipt. USCIS has not yet demonstrated that it has overcome long-
standing technology problems which, according to the DHS IG, 
contributed to the backlog in the first place. Without information on 
whether individual applications have been pending for more than 6 
months, we cannot verify that USCIS has eliminated its backlog and 
reduced application completion time to 6 months.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Institute process and staffing reforms to 
improve application processes.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We reported that 
in fiscal year 2002 USCIS committed about 70 percent of its backlog 
reduction funds to employing about 1,100 temporary adjudicator staff 
and authorizing overtime. In May 2005, USCIS finalized a staffing 
allocation model to address how many and where staff were needed to 
better match projected workloads. On the basis of this model, USCIS 
determined it had to retain the temporary adjudicators currently on 
hand (about 1,100) through the end of fiscal year 2006 and fill 
vacancies to increase its level of permanent adjudicator staff by 27 
percent (about 460) to maintain productivity and prevent future 
backlogs through fiscal year 2007. Additionally, USCIS's staffing model 
addressed how many and where staff were needed to better match 
projected workloads. USCIS officials said that the need for future 
staffing adjustments could be offset by future efficiencies gained 
during its transition to more robust information technology 
capabilities. We reported that reflection in its planning processes and 
documents of expected gains as a result of new technologies should 
improve USCIS's ability to make strategic staffing decisions. In 
addition, we reported that USCIS issued guidance and regulations to 
streamline processes, including clarifying guidance to adjudicators 
about requests for additional evidence and notices of intent to deny, 
and establishing greater flexibility in setting the length of validity 
of the employment authorization document. For more information, see GAO-
06-20; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Establish a timetable for reviewing the 
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration 
benefit applications; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not yet 
established a timetable for reviewing program rules, processes, and 
procedures for immigration benefits applications. In November 2006, the 
DHS IG reported that USCIS had undertaken a structured approach to 
address process challenges through its business transformation program 
and established cross-functional teams with dedicated management 
participation and generated several strategic level plans to provide a 
business-centric vision and guidance for implementing technical 
solutions. The DHS IG reported that the accomplishments to date were 
steps in the right direction for both business and information 
technology modernization, but that USCIS remained entrenched in a cycle 
of continual planning, with limited progress toward achieving its long-
term transformation goals. Obtaining the funding needed to support 
implementation of the business transformation program was a continual 
concern. The DHS IG reported that establishing a clearly defined 
transformation strategy, including the funding plans, goals, and 
performance measures needed to manage its execution, is fundamental. 
Linking information technology objectives to this transformation 
strategy and ensuring sufficient internal and external stakeholder 
involvement in information technology and process improvement 
initiatives also would be key. The DHS IG reported that until USCIS 
addresses these issues, it would not be in a position to either 
effectively manage existing workloads or handle the potentially 
dramatic increase in immigration benefits processing workloads that 
could result from proposed immigration reform legislation. For more 
information, see Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 
General, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in 
Modernizing Information Technology, OIG-07-11 (Washington, D.C.: 
November 2006). 

DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by 
USCIS in March and April 2007, the USCIS Transformation Program Office 
will prepare its detailed timetable for reviewing program rules, 
business processes, and procedures for each benefit category once it 
receives and awards the contract for information technology services. 
USCIS reported analyzing over 50 existing transactions and grouped them 
into lines of business--the adjudication of citizenship benefit 
applications, immigrant benefit applications, humanitarian benefit 
applications, and non-immigrant benefit applications. USCIS has 
incorporated a timetable for incrementally implementing each of the 
lines of business in its transformation expenditure plan. USCIS plans 
to transform benefit adjudication for citizenship benefits by October 
2008; immigrant benefits by October 2010; humanitarian benefits by 
October 2011; and non-immigrant benefits by October 2012. USCIS 
reported that the Transformation Spend Plan has been approved by the 
Office of Management and the Budget and that the plan's transmittal to 
Congress should occur shortly. According to the tentative schedule, 
USCIS plans to transform its paper-based process into an electronic end-
to-end adjudicative process. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. USCIS has made progress in meeting this 
performance expectation, but has not yet established a detailed 
timetable for reviewing program rules, processes, and procedures for 
immigration benefits applications. USCIS officials noted that the 
agency will prepare its detailed timetable for reviewing program rules, 
business processes, and procedures for each benefit category once it 
receives and awards the contract for information technology services. 
Until USCIS establishes such a timetable, it has not yet achieved this 
performance expectation.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Institute a case management system to 
manage applications and provide management information. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet instituted a case 
management system for managing applications and providing management 
information. In November 2005, we reported that USCIS cannot readily 
determine the number of applications that have been pending for more 
than 6 months from the data management systems it is currently using to 
manage its backlog elimination efforts. However, USCIS has identified 
the technology improvements necessary to develop this capability. Since 
fiscal year 2002, the agency has invested about 2 percent ($10.5 
million) of its funds allocated for backlog elimination for technology 
improvements. We reported that among the critical elements of USCIS's 
planned technology modernization efforts was a new case management 
system that should provide the agency with the capability to produce 
management reports on the age of all pending benefit applications. We 
reported that an integrated case management system is a tool that will 
be used by USCIS staff in processing benefits and adjudicating cases. 
USCIS reported that system development began during fiscal year 2006 as 
part of the agency's transformation efforts. In November 2005, we 
reported that USCIS was assembling the system requirements and 
conducting surveys of industry best practices. In addition, USCIS 
reviewed a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate alternative implementation 
strategies for the new integrated case management system. USCIS 
anticipated that its current case management systems would be 
decommissioned by fiscal year 2011. We reported that USCIS did not 
expect these systems to be fully deployed before fiscal year 2010. For 
more information, see GAO-06-20. 

DHS updated information: According to USCIS, a case management system 
to manage applications and provide management information will be 
incorporated in the Secure Information Management Service, for which 
the first increment pilot was deployed in July 2007. This increment 
will include forms related to USCIS's citizenship function. Three 
additional increments will address the functions of immigrant, 
asylum/refugee, and nonimmigrant. USCIS noted that development of its 
case management system is tied to transformation that began in fiscal 
year 2006. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Although USCIS is planning to pilot the first 
phase of its Secure Information Management Service, USCIS does not yet 
have a case management system that provides reliable information on its 
application processing and backlog. 
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Develop new programs to prevent future 
backlogs from developing.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to examine and 
test new programs to prevent future backlogs, but these programs are 
still in the pilot stages. In 2005 we reported that in response to 
recommendations made in the USCIS Ombudsman's 2004 annual report, USCIS 
conducted a number of pilot projects designed to reduce benefit 
application processing times and was considering adopting several 
practices it determined to be successful. We reported that the agency 
studied the processing of two types of applications during the pilots: 
(1) applications to replace permanent resident cards (form I-90) and 
(2) applications to register permanent residence or adjust status (form 
I-485). First, during the period March 2004 through November 2004, 
USCIS conducted a pilot program designed to reduce processing time for 
applications for permanent resident cards. The pilot, conducted in the 
Los Angeles area, allowed for electronically filed permanent resident 
cards to be processed at application support centers, where applicants 
have their initial contact with the agency and have their photographs 
and fingerprints taken. During the pilot, average processing times were 
reduced from over 8 months to about 2 weeks. USCIS's Performance 
Management Division recommended that USCIS implement the pilot 
nationwide. Second, beginning in March 2004 and May 2004 respectively, 
USCIS conducted pilot programs in the New York and Dallas district 
offices that focused on testing new processes for adjudicating family-
based applications for adjustments of status within 90 days. Each 
sought to streamline and accelerate application processing by shifting 
aspects of processing responsibility from the National Benefits Center, 
a central processing hub for certain benefit applications, to the 
district offices. Using elements of processes tested in the Dallas and 
New York pilot projects, USCIS has implemented up-front processing at 
three district officesæSan Diego, San Antonio, and Buffalo--that did 
not have a backlog of adjustment of status applications when 
implemented. USCIS anticipates expanding the number of offices on a 
quarterly basis as they become current in their processing so that 
applicants with pending applications are not disadvantaged. The pilot 
in Dallas will also continue as long as USCIS determines that 
additional information may be gleaned and until the district office 
becomes current in processing applications. In March 2004, a third 
adjustment of status pilot for employment-based applications was 
implemented at the California service center. The focus was to 
adjudicate within 75 days petitions for immigrant workers with advanced 
degrees concurrently with the associated applications for adjustment of 
status. Ultimately, USCIS deemed the pilot inefficient and adverse to 
the service center backlog elimination goals because resources were 
diverted from addressing backlogged cases. For more information, see 
GAO-06-20. 

DHS updated information: According to information provided by DHS in 
March, April, and May 2007, in September of 2006, USCIS expanded its 
District Office Rapid Adjudication Pilot program by extending that 
program in Dallas, the office of origin, and by including field offices 
located in El Paso and Oklahoma City. USCIS noted that for applicants 
within the jurisdiction of these offices, the pilot program makes it 
mandatory that adjustment of status applications be filed in person 
rather than by mail, after the applicant has scheduled an appointment 
using InfoPass. According to USCIS, the pilot is slated to run through 
September 21, 2007. Additionally, USCIS stated that it is monitoring 
the adjustment of status workflow in three identified offices, Buffalo, 
San Antonio, and San Diego, which are currently within a 90-day 
processing time frame. Under the "90-Day Office" process, processing is 
initiated on the application at the National Benefits Center. To date, 
USCIS noted that it has not captured sufficient statistical data to 
assess the effects of expanding the Dallas pilot to El Paso and 
Oklahoma City. Moreover, it has yet been able to assess whether the 
process in the Dallas pilot or the "90-Day Office" process is more 
likely to result in better customer service, administrative efficiency, 
and national security. USCIS issued a final rule in May 2007 to adjust 
the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition 
Schedule. According to USCIS, this rule will help ensure that the 
agency has the resources necessary to prevent backlogs from developing 
by providing a stable source of revenue to support staff and technology 
to meet USCIS's goal of at least a 20 percent reduction in processing 
times by the end of fiscal year 2009. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Although USCIS has explored reducing 
processing times through a number of programs, these programs are still 
in the pilot stages. In some cases, USCIS ended the pilot programs 
because they were inefficient or did not meet program goals. In other 
cases, USCIS has not yet fully assessed the results of its pilot 
programs to determine the extent to which the programs could be 
implemented on a national basis. Moreover, USCIS has not yet 
demonstrated that it has addressed its long-standing technology 
challenges, which have contributed to backlog development. In addition, 
USCIS reported that its revisions to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Benefit Application and Petition Schedule will help it ensure that 
future backlogs do not develop. However, at the time of this review, 
the extent to which these revisions will help to prevent the 
development of future backlogs is unknown.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 6. Establish online access to status 
information about benefit applications. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has established 
online access to status information about benefits applications. In 
June 2005, we reported that private attorneys, paralegals, and other 
representatives can use the USCIS Internet Web site to check the status 
of their clients' immigration cases using a USCIS receipt number. Under 
the system, USCIS also notifies the representatives via e-mail when a 
case status changes; for example, when actions are taken, such as the 
approval or denial of an application. As of April 2005, over 300,000 
customers, attorneys, and other representatives had used this system. 
For more information, see Immigration Services: Better Contracting 
Practices Needed at Call Centers, GAO-05-526.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 7. Establish online filing for benefit 
applications.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: On November 1, 2006, USCIS announced 
a new Web portal to serve as a "one-stop shop" for all information 
about U.S. immigration and citizenship. According to DHS, the new site 
should facilitate downloading of petitions and applications, filing 
applications electronically, and signing up online for appointments.

DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided updated 
information on its efforts to establish online filing for benefit 
applications. In fiscal year 2006, USCIS reported that of the 5,953,490 
forms filed, a total of 350,838 were filed online. According to updated 
information provided by DHS in April 2007, eight forms are available 
online for e-filing, and other forms are available on the USCIS Web 
site for downloading, completing, and mailing to the appropriate 
Service Center. According to USCIS, the Secure Information Management 
Service, with the citizenship increment released in July 2007, will 
serve as the foundation for the paperless, account-based case 
processing environment, and subsequent releases of the immigration, 
asylum/refugee, and nonimmigration increments will result in additional 
online e-filing capabilities. In addition, USCIS stated that while it 
may be feasible to automate additional forms and make them available 
electronically, USCIS transformation will fundamentally reengineer e-
filing, increase data integrity, and increase operational efficiency.

Our assessment: Until USCIS expands its online filing capabilities and 
further defines requirements and capabilities and implements those 
capabilities through its Secure Information Management Service, we 
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance 
expectation. Although DHS has established online filing for eight types 
of applications, there are other types of applications for which online 
filing is not yet available. Moreover, USCIS plans to expand its online 
filing capabilities through its Secure Information Management Service, 
but this service is still in the development stages and has not yet 
been implemented.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Establish revised immigration application 
fees based on a comprehensive study.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: USCIS issued a proposed rule to 
adjust immigration benefit fees and issued the final rule in May 2007. 
As required under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, we reviewed the 
USCIS's funding to determine whether in the absence of appropriated 
funds USCIS was likely to derive sufficient funds from fees to carry 
out its functions. In January 2004, we concluded that USCIS fees were 
not sufficient to fully fund USCIS's operations, in part because (1) 
the fee schedule was based on an outdated fee study that did not 
include all costs of USCIS's operations and (2) costs had increased 
since that study was completed due to an additional processing 
requirement and other actions. We reported that although fees were not 
sufficient, there were insufficient data to determine the full extent 
of the shortfall. A fundamental problem was that USCIS has not had a 
system to track the status of each application as it moves through the 
process. Accordingly, USCIS did not have information on the extent to 
which work on applications in process remained to be finished. In 
addition, USCIS did not know the current cost of each step to process 
each application. The effect was that USCIS knew neither the cost to 
process new applications nor the cost to complete pending applications. 
Further because DHS was still determining how administrative and 
overhead functions would be carried out and the related costs 
allocated, USCIS did not know what future administrative and overhead 
costs would be. For the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through 
2003, USCIS reported operating costs exceeded available fees by almost 
$460 million, thus creating the need for appropriated funds. USCIS 
projected that this situation would remain in fiscal year 2004. We 
reported that absent actions to increase fees, reduce processing costs 
and times, or both, as well as to improve the timeliness and 
completeness of fee schedule updates, USCIS would continue to need 
appropriated funds to avoid even greater increases in the backlog of 
pending applications. We recommended that in order to determine the 
cost to process new and pending applications, USCIS should perform a 
comprehensive fee study to determine the cost to process new 
immigration applications and determine the cost to eliminate the 
backlog of pending applications. For more information, see Immigration 
Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to Fund U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services' Operations, GAO-04-309R.

DHS updated information: On February 1, 2007, USCIS issued a Proposed 
Rule for the Adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit 
Applications and Petition Fee Schedule and issued the final rule in May 
2007. Based on a 2004 GAO recommendation, USCIS conducted a 
comprehensive review of its resources and activities for the first time 
in 10 years, employing the Activity Based Costing methodology to 
determine the full costs of immigration benefit applications and in 
which USCIS fees are based on the complexity of the work. In updated 
information provided by DHS in March and April 2007, USCIS stated that 
the new fee structure ensures appropriate funding to meet customer 
service needs and national security requirements and modernizes an 
outdated business infrastructure. According to DHS, the fiscal year 
2008 President's budget reflects that 99 percent of USCIS funding would 
be derived from fee collections. The remaining 1 percent, $30 million, 
is requested as an appropriation to support the Employment Eligibility 
Verification program. According to USCIS, a number of problems caused 
the present day funding gap, including (1) the failure of fees to 
reflect the actual cost of doing business, (2) the loss of significant 
appropriated funding for backlog reduction, (3) the need for payment of 
additional fees because of processing delays, (4) reliance on money 
from temporary programs to fund operating costs, (5) reallocation of 
funds from their intended purpose to cover base operations, and (6) 
insufficient funds to provide for additional, costly security 
requirements. USCIS indicated that additional funding was necessary to 
enhance the security and integrity of the immigration system, improve 
service delivery, and modernize business infrastructure. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. In following up on our prior recommendations, 
we found that USCIS has conducted a comprehensive review of its 
resources and activities and determined that the current fees did not 
reflect current processes or recover the full cost of services being 
provided. USCIS employed an activity-based costing methodology to 
determine the full costs of immigration benefit applications. As a 
result of its comprehensive fee review, USCIS published a proposed rule 
in February 2007 in the Federal Register and a final rule in May 2007 
to increase the immigration and naturalization benefit application 
fees.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Capture biometric information on all 
benefits applicants.
 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS does not yet have the 
capabilities in place to capture and store biometric information on all 
benefits applicants. In 2006 we reported that USCIS was developing 
various systems for capturing and storing biometric information 
including the Biometric Storage System, which would allow USCIS to 
store biometrics information for verification of identity and for 
future form submissions. USCIS planned to expand biometric storage 
capacity to allow storage of biometric information for all USCIS 
customers, allowing information to be resubmitted for subsequent 
security checks. The system would capture 10 prints for Federal Bureau 
of Investigation fingerprint checks and image sets (photograph, press-
prints, and signatures). Senior officials told the DHS IG that USCIS's 
use of biometrics had been constrained by the capacity of application 
support centers to collect the data. In addition, the DHS IG reported 
in November 2005 that USCIS collected photographs with many 
applications but did not have a system for automated, facial 
recognition screening. For more information, see GAO-06-20. Also, see 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A Review 
of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Alien Security Checks, 
OIG-06-06 (Washington, D.C.: November 2005). 

DHS updated information: According to DHS officials, the Biometric 
Storage System is in the design phase. According to the Biometric 
Storage System Project Management Plan, the system is intended to 
facilitate the deterrence, detection, and pursuit of immigration 
benefit fraud and promote identification and communication of 
immigration-related information to partners in support of the DHS 
Strategic Plan. In developing the system, USCIS plans to leverage 
existing capabilities already being developed by other components in 
the immigration and border management enterprise. USCIS plans to share 
Biometric Storage System data with the US-VISIT biometric repository 
called IDENT. This should enable data sharing and provide USCIS 
information about applicants with a record in IDENT. USCIS estimated 
that the first phase of Biometric Storage System, which will replace 
existing outdated biometrics infrastructure with a foundation for the 
new system, would begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. At 
that time, USCIS plans to have access to limited biometrics data 
available to the intra-agency community--ICE, CBP, and USCIS--on a view-
only basis. USCIS reported that although the Biometric Storage System 
is not yet in place, the agency shares biometric information with US-
VISIT and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example. 

Our assessment: Until the Biometric Storage System is more fully 
developed and implemented, we conclude that DHS has generally not 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has not yet deployed its 
Biometric Storage System, but plans to implement the first phase of the 
system in 2008. 
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 10. Implement an automated background check 
system to track and store all requests for applications. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet implemented an 
automated background check system to track and store all requests for 
applications. In 2006 we reported that USCIS's Background Check Service 
system automated and managed the submission of all security checks 
including name and fingerprints from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Interagency Border Inspection System. We noted 
that the Background Check Service system was intended to track and 
store security check responses in a centralized system and that USCIS 
was preparing to initiate the testing and implementation phase, but 
USCIS had to first select a hosting and production facility for the 
system. For more information, see GAO-06-20. 

DHS updated information: In March, April, and June 2007, USCIS provided 
us with updated information on its efforts to develop and implement its 
Background Check Service. According to USCIS, the schedule for 
deploying the Background Check Service has changed from May 2007 to 
December 2007 because USCIS moved the Background Check Service to a new 
location and encountered problems at the new center. According to 
USCIS, there were several firewall issues and other communication 
problems, but the problems are being worked on by the contractor. 

Our assessment: Until DHS more fully develops and implements its 
Background Check Service, we conclude that DHS has generally not 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has worked toward deployment 
of the first phase of its Background Check Service, but has pushed back 
its target time frame for deploying the first phase until December 2007.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 11. Communicate immigration related 
information to other relevant agencies.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken some actions to share 
immigration information for enforcement and fraud prevention purposes. 
In 2006 we reported that USCIS had three major projects under way to 
improve its ability to receive and share data within the agency as well 
as with other agencies as part of its information technology 
transformation. First, the data layer/repository project was intended 
to present users with a consolidated system to access information from 
63 USCIS systems rather than the situation where users had to log onto 
separate systems to obtain data. This capability would be available to 
adjudicators and, eventually, to external users. Second, the software 
updates project was intended to upgrade, among other things, USCIS's 
desktop and software capabilities, USCIS's servers and network, and 
USCIS's capability to support the new electronic processes. Third, the 
e-adjudication pilot project was intended to allow paperless 
(electronic) adjudication for certain immigration forms. USCIS could 
not provide a completion date for the data layer and e-adjudication 
pilots due, in part, to uncertainty regarding future funding. USCIS 
expected to complete full implementation for its information technology 
transformation by fiscal year 2010. With regard to US-VISIT, we 
reported that the program intended to collect, maintain, and share 
information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United 
States and facilitate information sharing and coordination within the 
immigration and border management community. For more information, see 
Taxpayer Information: Options Exist to Enable Data Sharing between IRS 
and USCIS but Each Presents Challenges, GAO-06-100 and GAO-06-20. 

DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by 
DHS in March, April, and May 2007, in fiscal year 2006 USCIS launched 
the Integrated Digitization Document Management Program to convert 
existing paper-based A-files and related documents into a digitized 
format; ensure that data are accurately captured electronically from 
paper A files; and provide storage, discovery, and electronic delivery 
of digitized files. USCIS stated that the last function was released in 
June 2007. USCIS has entered into a number of memoranda of 
understanding that outline agreements on immigration-related 
information sharing with other federal agencies and foreign 
governments. In addition, immigration information is shared though 
others programs, such as US-VISIT. US-VISIT, for example, provides for 
the sharing of biometric and biographic-related information between DHS 
components, and the Departments of Justice and State. USCIS, CBP, and 
ICE have also entered into memoranda of understanding with other 
federal agencies and foreign governments to enhance information 
sharing. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken some actions to develop and 
launch systems to facilitate information sharing with other agencies, 
such as by allowing for the electronic delivery of files and 
information. Moreover, USCIS has completed memoranda of understanding 
with other agencies.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 12. Establish training programs to reduce 
fraud in the benefits process.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in 
establishing training programs to reduce fraud in the benefits process, 
but more work remains. In 2006 we reported that adjudicators at USCIS 
service centers and district offices that we visited received some 
fraud-related information or training subsequent to their initial hire. 
We reported that USCIS initial adjudicator training provided 
approximately 4 hours of fraud-related training that focused primarily 
on detecting fraudulent documents. However, USCIS headquarters 
officials responsible for field operations told us that there was no 
standard training regarding fraud trends and that fraud-related 
training varied across field offices. Our interviews indicated that the 
frequency and method for distributing ongoing information about fraud 
detection was not uniform across the service centers and district 
offices we visited. For more information, see Immigration Benefits: 
Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's 
Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-259. 

DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided updated 
information outlining its training programs to reduce fraud in the 
benefits process. With regard to adjudication officers, the Office of 
Fraud Detection and National Security has created an hour anti-fraud 
module that is provided to adjudicators attending immigration officer 
basic training, journeyman Immigration Officer training, and 
supervisory adjudications training. USCIS has also developed training 
for specific areas with a past history of fraud. For example, USCIS has 
provided Religious Worker anti-fraud training to 145 officers at the 
California Service Center where adjudication of religious worker 
petitions is centralized. With regard to Office of Fraud Detection and 
National Security Officers, during a basic 3-week national security and 
anti-fraud course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, 
instruction is provided to these officers on such areas as Fraud 
Detection and National Security anti-fraud standard operating 
procedures, practical training on USCIS and other government systems, 
interviewing techniques, national security reporting, Headquarters 
Fraud Detection and National Security intelligence processes, legal 
issues, and report writing. Additionally, all Immigration Officers and 
Intelligence Research Specialists must attend the Fraud Detection and 
National Security Data System training, which serves as the case 
management system for all fraud and national security related work 
conducted by the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, as 
part of the basic 3-week course and will continue to be provided 
ongoing training as systems evolve through the use of formal 
correspondence, informal conference calls, e-newsletters. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. USCIS has initiated a number training programs 
focused on detecting fraud in the benefits process. However, the intent 
of this performance expectation is not only that DHS has anti-fraud 
training programs, but also that these programs are delivered to 
individuals according to their roles and responsibilities for 
adjudicating applications. DHS did not provide us with evidence on the 
extent to which it has taken actions to ensure that its anti-fraud 
training courses have been distributed and implemented appropriately 
across all field offices, a key concern we identified in our prior 
work. In addition, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has 
taken actions to ensure that all staff receive the anti-fraud training 
appropriate to their roles and responsibilities in adjudicating certain 
types of applications.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 13. Create an office to reduce immigration 
benefit fraud.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. USCIS established 
the Fraud Detection and National Security office to enhance its fraud 
control efforts by serving as its focal point for addressing 
immigration benefit fraud. Established in 2003, Fraud Detection and 
National Security is intended to combat fraud and foster a positive 
control environment by pursuing objectives to develop, coordinate, and 
lead the national antifraud operations for USCIS; oversee and enhance 
policies and procedures pertaining to the enforcement of law 
enforcement background checks on those applying for immigration 
benefits; identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in the various 
policies, practices, and procedures that threaten the legal immigration 
process; recommend solutions and internal controls to address these 
vulnerabilities; and act as the primary USCIS conduit and liaison with 
ICE, CBP, and other members of the law enforcement and intelligence 
community. For more information, see GAO-06-259; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 14. Implement a fraud assessment program to 
reduce benefit fraud; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to implement a 
fraud assessment program, but much more work remains. In 2006 we 
reported that the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, 
established in 2003, outlined a strategy for detecting immigration 
benefit fraud, and undertook two assessments in a series of fraud 
assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain 
immigration benefits. A complimentary effort is USCIS's plan to develop 
automated fraud analysis tools. USCIS has hired a contractor to develop 
the Fraud Detection and National Security, an automated capability to 
screen incoming applications against known fraud indicators, such as 
multiple applications received from the same person. According to the 
Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, it planned to deploy 
an initial data analysis capability by the third quarter of fiscal year 
2006 and release additional data analyses capabilities at later dates 
but could not predict when these latter capabilities would be achieved. 
However, according to a Fraud Detection and National Security 
operations manager, the near and midterm plans were not aimed at 
providing a full data-mining capability. In the long term, USCIS 
planned to integrate these data analyses tools for fraud detection into 
a new application management system being developed as part of USCIS's 
efforts to transform its business processes for adjudicating 
immigration benefits, which includes developing the information 
technology needed to support these business processes. Also, in the 
long term, according to the Fraud Detection and National Security 
Office Director, a new USCIS application management system would 
ideally include fraud filters to screen applications and remove 
suspicious applications from the processing stream before they are seen 
by adjudicators. For more information, see GAO-06-259. 

DHS updated information: According to USCIS, the purpose of the benefit 
fraud assessment is to use statistically valid methods to determine the 
amount, percentage, and type of fraud in benefit applications to aid 
USCIS in its efforts to develop anti-fraud strategies, establish 
priorities for planning purposes, and identify fraud patterns and 
linkages for referral to ICE. In updated information provided by USCIS 
in April 2007, USCIS reported that it has completed benefit fraud 
assessments for the I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers, I-90 
Application to Replace a Permanent Resident Card, and Religious Worker 
applications. USCIS reported that it is analyzing data from other 
assessments of the I-129 H1B Employment-based, I-130 Marriage-based, I-
130 Yemeni-specific Family-based, and 1-589 Asylum applications and 
expect final reports on these assessments to be issued by the end of 
fiscal year 2007. USCIS also reported that it is conducting an 
assessment for I-129 L-1A Employment-based application. USCIS reported 
that as a result of these assessments, it now has baseline data and can 
focus on developing a more comprehensive benefit fraud assessment 
strategy. In fiscal year 2008, USCIS intends to issue a roadmap 
outlining the visa categories for which it will conduct benefit fraud 
assessments in the future. In addition, USCIS officials stated that 
development work for the Fraud Detection and National Security Program 
Data Systems' initial analytical capabilities was completed in the 
first quarter of fiscal year 2007. USCIS indicated that development 
delays for the initial analytical capabilities were encountered due to 
budgetary, contractual, and performance issues. Full implementation of 
the initial capability was delayed until the second quarter of fiscal 
year 2007 due to hardware acquisition issues. According to USCIS, 
procurement activities are underway to award the next development 
contract with a plan that includes a contract award in early third 
quarter of fiscal year 2007 with the implementation of follow-on 
analytical capabilities early in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. 
USCIS stated that this procurement was briefly delayed due to an 
evaluation of another case management software application. A final 
decision was made in February 2007 to move forward with the development 
of Fraud Detection and National Security Data System. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has completed fraud assessments for three 
types of immigration benefits--having completed two at the time of our 
March 2006 report--and expects to issue final reports on four 
additional assessments later in fiscal year 2007. However, USCIS has 
not yet fully developed a comprehensive strategy for conducting benefit 
fraud assessments. Until DHS does so and demonstrates successful 
application of a strategy and approach for conducting fraud assessment, 
we conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance 
expectation. In addition, DHS has taken actions to develop a data 
system to identify fraud through automated analysis tools. However, 
this data analysis capability has not yet been fully implemented.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Securing the Aviation Sector:

DHS has implemented a variety of programs to help secure the aviation 
sector. Within the department, TSA is the primary agency with 
responsibility for aviation security efforts. TSA was established in 
2001 with the mission to protect the transportation network while also 
ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Since its inception, 
TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security and has 
developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to 
secure commercial aviation. For example, TSA has undertaken efforts to 
strengthen airport security; provide and train a screening workforce; 
prescreen passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screen 
passengers, baggage, and cargo. TSA has implemented these efforts in 
part to meet numerous mandates for strengthening aviation security 
placed on the agency following the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks. These mandates set priorities for the agency and guided TSA's 
initial efforts to enhance aviation security. In addition to TSA, CBP, 
and DHS's Science and Technology Directorate play roles in securing 
commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has responsibility for 
conducting passenger prescreening--or the matching of passenger 
information against terrorist watch lists--for international flights 
operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound 
air cargo upon its arrival in the United States. The Science and 
Technology Directorate is responsible for the research and development 
of aviation security technologies.

As shown in table 22, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of aviation security, and we found that overall DHS has 
made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we 
found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and 
has generally not achieved 7 performance expectations.

Table 22: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation 
Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Implement a strategic approach for aviation 
security functions.
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 2. Establish standards and procedures for 
effective airport perimeter security. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 3. Establish standards and procedures to 
effectively control access to airport secured areas.
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 4. Establish procedures for implementing 
biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access control. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Ensure the screening of airport employees 
against terrorist watch lists. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 6. Hire and deploy a federal screening 
workforce. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 7. Develop standards for determining aviation 
security staffing at airports. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 8. Establish standards for training and 
testing the performance of airport screener staff. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Establish a program and requirements to 
allow eligible airports to use a private screening workforce. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 10. Train and deploy federal air marshals on 
high-risk flights.
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 11. Establish standards for training flight 
and cabin crews. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 12. Establish a program to allow authorized 
flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or 
criminal acts. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 13. Establish policies and procedures to 
ensure that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk 
or threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate 
action. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 14. Develop and implement an advanced 
prescreening system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger 
information to the Selectee List and No Fly List. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 15. Develop and implement an international 
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to 
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 16. Develop and implement processes and 
procedures for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints.
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 17. Develop and test checkpoint technologies 
to address vulnerabilities. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 18. Deploy checkpoint technologies to address 
vulnerabilities. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 19. Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS) 
and explosive trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage 
for explosives. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 20. Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage 
screening equipment at airports; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 21. Pursue the deployment and use of in-line 
baggage screening equipment at airports. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 22. Develop a plan for air cargo security. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 23. Develop and implement procedures to screen 
air cargo. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 24. Develop and implement technologies to 
screen air cargo. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: Total; 
Assessment: Generally achieved: 17; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 7; 
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

Table 23 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS 
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in 
the area of aviation security and our assessment of whether DHS has 
taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance 
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most 
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).

Table 23: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Aviation Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Implement a strategic approach for aviation 
security functions:
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has adhered to a strategic 
approach for implementing its aviation security functions, governed 
largely by legislative requirements. TSA, which has responsibility for 
securing all modes of transportation, has also taken steps to ensure 
that it implements its aviation security functions in a strategic 
manner. For example, in April 2006, we reported that TSA has spent 
billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of initiatives to 
strengthen the key components of its passenger and checked baggage 
screening systems--people, processes, and technology. These components 
are interconnected and are critical to the overall security of 
commercial aviation. For more information, see Aviation Security: 
Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but 
Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, the National Strategy on 
Aviation Security and its six supporting plans were released. The six 
supporting plans are Aviation Transportation System Security, Aviation 
Operational Threat Response, Aviation Transportation System Recovery, 
Aviation Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration, Domestic 
Outreach, and International Outreach. According to TSA, an Interagency 
Implementation Working Group was established under TSA leadership in 
January 2007 to initiate implementation efforts for the 112 actions 
specified in the supporting plans. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation, as DHS has taken a strategic approach to 
implementing its aviation security functions, and the National Strategy 
on Aviation Security has been issued.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Establish standards and procedures for 
effective airport perimeter security.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In June 2004, we reported on TSA's 
efforts to strengthen the security of airport perimeters (such as 
airfield fencing and access gates), the adequacy of controls 
restricting unauthorized access to secured areas (such as building 
entryways leading to aircraft), and security measures pertaining to 
individuals who work at airports. At the time of our review, we found 
TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport security but had not yet 
implemented a number of congressionally mandated requirements. We 
reported that TSA had begun evaluating the security of airport 
perimeters, but had not yet determined how the results of these 
evaluations could be used to make improvements to the nation's airport 
system as a whole. Specifically, we found that TSA had begun conducting 
regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of selected security 
procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected airports. These 
evaluations, though not yet complete at the time of our report, 
identified perimeter security concerns. In addition, we reported that 
TSA intended to compile baseline data on security vulnerabilities to 
enable it to conduct a systematic analysis of airport security 
vulnerabilities on a nationwide basis. TSA said such an analysis was 
essential since it would allow the agency to determine minimum 
standards and the adequacy of security policies and help the agency and 
airports better direct limited resources. Nonetheless, at the time of 
our review, TSA had not yet developed a plan that prioritized its 
assessment efforts, provided a schedule for completing these 
assessments, or described how assessment results would be used to help 
guide agency decisions on what, if any, security improvements were 
needed. We are conducting follow-on work in this area. For more 
information, see Aviation Security: Transportation Security 
Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security 
Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges 
Remain, GAO-06-597T and Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to 
Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access 
Controls, GAO-04-728. 

DHS updated information: In April and July 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated sensitive information on efforts to secure airport perimeters. 
This information described TSA's plans to assess technology being used 
to enhance perimeter security, as well as a summary of TSA's policies 
and procedures related to perimeter security. DHS also provided us with 
updated sensitive information on its efforts to enhance security 
procedures for gate screening, aircraft cabin searches, and security 
measures for personnel identification media. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. While DHS has taken actions to enhance 
perimeter security, DHS did not provide us with evidence that these 
actions provide for effective airport perimeter security and thus 
satisfy the intent of this performance expectation. DHS also did not 
provide information or documentation that it had addressed all of the 
relevant requirements established in the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act and our 2004 recommendations related to (1) identifying 
security weaknesses of the commercial airport system as a whole, (2) 
prioritizing funding to address the most critical needs, or (3) 
reducing the risks posed by airport workers. Until DHS demonstrates how 
the security efforts it has undertaken have strengthened commercial 
airport perimeters security, it will be difficult for it to justify its 
resources needs and clearly identify progress made in the area. 

Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Establish standards and procedures to 
effectively control access to airport secured areas.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and DHS IG findings: In June 2004 we 
reported that TSA had begun evaluating the controls that limit access 
into secured airport areas, but had not completed actions to ensure 
that all airport workers employed in these areas were vetted prior to 
being hired and trained. We also reported that TSA had begun evaluating 
the security of the controls that limited access into secured airport 
areas, but had not yet determined how the results of these evaluations 
could be used to make improvements to the nation's airport system as a 
whole. Specifically, we found that TSA had begun conducting regulatory 
compliance inspections, covert testing of selected security procedures, 
and vulnerability assessments at selected airports. These evaluations-
-though not completed at the time of our report--identified access 
control security concerns. For example, TSA identified instances where 
airport operators failed to comply with existing security requirements. 
In addition, we reported that TSA intended to compile baseline data on 
security vulnerabilities to enable it to conduct a systematic analysis 
of airport security vulnerabilities on a nationwide basis. TSA said 
such an analysis was essential since it would allow the agency to 
determine minimum standards and the adequacy of security policies and 
help the agency and airports better direct limited resources. 
Nonetheless, at the time of our review, TSA had not yet developed a 
plan that prioritized its assessment efforts, provided a schedule for 
completing these assessments, or described how assessment results would 
be used to help guide agency decisions on what, if any, security 
improvements were needed. More recently, in March 2007, the DHS IG 
reported the results of its access control testing at 14 domestic 
airports of various sizes nationwide. As a result of more than 600 
access control tests, the DHS IG identified various recommendations to 
enhance the overall effectiveness of controls that limit access to 
airport secured areas. We are conducting follow-on work in this area. 
For more information, see GAO-06-597T and GAO-04-728. See also 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Audit of 
Access to Airport Secured Areas (Unclassified Summary), OIG-07-35 
(Washington, D.C., March 15, 2007). 

DHS updated information: In March, April, and July 2007, DHS provided 
us with updated information on its efforts to establish standards and 
procedures for effective access control of airport secured areas. TSA 
reported that its Aviation Direct Access Screening Program was piloted 
in March 2006 and disseminated to Federal Security Directors in August 
2006 to provide for random screening of airport and airline employees 
and employees' property and vehicles as they enter secure areas of 
airports. Transportation security officers screen for the presence of 
explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other items of interest as well 
as improper airport identification. TSA reported that the Aviation 
Direct Access Screening Program was reissued in March 2007 to include 
boarding gate screening and aircraft cabin searches and to mandate 
participation for airports nationwide. TSA also reported that it 
verifies the identification of individuals present in airport secured 
areas and assists operators and air carriers in performance of security 
responsibilities. DHS also provided us with updated sensitive 
information on its efforts to enhance security procedures for gate 
screening, aircraft cabin searches, and security measures for personnel 
identification media, as well as a description of TSA's plans to assess 
technology being used to enhance access controls and a summary of TSA's 
access control policies and procedures. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to establish procedures 
for access control of airport secured areas. However, DHS did not 
provide us with evidence that these actions provide for effective 
access control for airport secured areas and thus satisfy the intent of 
this performance expectation. Additionally, DHS did not provide 
information or documentation that it had addressed all of the relevant 
requirements established in the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act and our 2004 recommendations related to (1) identifying security 
weaknesses of the commercial airport system as a whole, (2) 
prioritizing funding to address the most critical needs, or (3) 
reducing the risks posed by airport workers. The recent assessment by 
the DHS OIG identified continuing weaknesses in TSA's procedures to 
prevent unauthorized individuals from access to secured airport areas. 
Until DHS demonstrates how the security efforts it has undertaken have 
strengthened the security of airport access controls, it will be 
difficult for it to justify its resource needs and clearly identify 
progress in this area.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Establish procedures for implementing 
biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access control.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In June 2004, we reported that TSA 
had begun efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related 
technologies, such as biometric identification systems. However, we 
reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing new 
technologies or balancing the costs and effectiveness of these 
technologies with the security needs of individual airports and the 
commercial airport system as a whole. In September 2005, TSA issued a 
guidance package for biometrics for airport access control. This 
guidance was primarily directed at airport operators who own and 
operate access control systems at airports and manufacturers of 
biometric devices who would need to submit their devices for 
qualification, including performance testing, in order to be 
potentially placed on a TSA biometric Qualified Products List. The 
guidance package includes information on technical and operational 
requirements and standards, implementation guidance, and a plan for 
biometric qualified products list. 

DHS updated information: DHS did not provide us with updated 
information on its efforts to establish procedures for implementing 
biometric identifier systems. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Although TSA issued a guidance package, we 
reported in April 2007 that DHS and industry stakeholders continue to 
face difficult challenges in ensuring that the biometric access control 
technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment where 
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program (DHS's 
effort to develop biometric access control systems to verify the 
identity of individuals accessing secure transportation areas) is being 
initially tested. Because of the challenges in implementing the system 
in the maritime environment, DHS has not yet determined how and when it 
will implement a biometric identification system for access controls at 
commercials airports. We have initiated ongoing work to further assess 
DHS's efforts to establish procedures for implementing biometric 
identifier systems for airport secured areas access control.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Ensure the screening of airport employees 
against terrorist watch lists.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as it has worked 
to ensure the screening of airport employees against terrorist watch 
lists. We reported that TSA requires most airport workers who perform 
duties in secured and sterile areas to undergo a fingerprint-based 
criminal history records check. TSA further requires airport operators 
to compare applicants' names against the No Fly List and Selectee List. 
Once workers undergo this review, they are granted access to airport 
areas in which they perform duties. For more information, see GAO-06-
597T and GAO-04-728.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 6. Hire and deploy a federal screening 
workforce. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has hired and deployed a federal 
screening workforce at airports. TSA initially deployed over 50,000 
screeners (now called transportation security officers) at over 440 
commercial airports nationwide. However, TSA has experienced staffing 
shortages, and we reported that to accomplish its security mission, TSA 
needs a sufficient number of passenger and checked baggage 
transportation security officers trained and certified in the latest 
screening procedures and technology. We reported in February 2004 that 
staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had hindered the ability of 
some Federal Security Directors to provide sufficient resources to 
staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their 
checkpoints without using additional measures such as overtime. TSA has 
taken action to address some of these staffing challenges by, for 
example, developing a model to determine the most appropriate 
allocation of transportation security officers among airports and 
implementing human capital initiatives to address hiring and retention 
challenges. For more information, see GAO-06-597T; Airport Passenger 
Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges 
Remaining, GAO-03-1173; and Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing 
Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its 
Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that TSA deployed 
a pay-for-performance system, called Performance Accountability and 
Standards System, for transportation security officers, lead and 
supervisory transportation security officers, and screening managers. 
TSA also reported that it has developed a local, decentralized hiring 
process to give Federal Security Directors more control over aspects of 
hiring. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. We have not yet fully evaluated TSA's pay-for-
performance system or its hiring process. However, DHS has hired and 
deployed a federal screening workforce at airports.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 7. Develop standards for determining aviation 
security staffing at airports.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation as DHS has 
developed standards for determining aviation security staffing levels. 
In June 2005, TSA submitted its report on aviation security staffing 
standards to Congress. Known as the Staffing Allocation Model, these 
standards are intended to provide an objective measure for determining 
staffing levels for transportation security officers, while staying 
within the congressionally mandated limit of 45,000 full-time 
equivalent screeners. In February 2007, we reported that TSA's Staffing 
Allocation Model is intended to provide a sufficient number of 
transportation security officers--or screeners--to perform passenger 
and checked baggage screening through built-in assumptions, which are 
designed to ensure the necessary levels of security and to minimize 
wait times, along with multiple monitoring mechanisms to assess the 
sufficiency of the model's outputs. However, we identified concerns 
with some of the fiscal year 2006-model assumptions. Further, although 
TSA officials stated that they plan to conduct an annual review of 
select assumptions, and based changes to the fiscal year 2007 model on 
such a review, TSA does not have a mechanism in place for prioritizing 
its review and for ensuring that all assumptions are periodically 
validated to help ensure that they reflect operating conditions. We 
reported that TSA risks basing its staffing allocations on assumptions 
that do not reflect operating conditions if periodic validations are 
not conducted. For more information, see GAO-06-597T; Aviation 
Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment 
Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T; and GAO-07-299; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Establish standards for training and 
testing the performance of airport screener staff; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has established standards for 
training and testing airport transportation security officers. For 
example, TSA introduced an Online Learning Center that made self-guided 
courses available over the Internet. In December 2005, TSA reported 
completing enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000 
transportation security officers. TSA also implemented and strengthened 
efforts to collect performance data on the effectiveness of screening 
operations. For example, TSA increased its use of covert testing to 
assess the performance of screening operations. However, we identified 
concerns with transportation security officers' access to online 
training. In May 2005, we also noted that TSA had not yet begun to use 
data from local covert testing to identify training and performance 
needs because of difficulties in ensuring that local covert testing was 
implemented consistently nationwide, although TSA is taking some 
actions to address this issue. In April 2007, we reported that TSA 
monitors transportation security officers' compliance with passenger 
checkpoint screening standard operating procedures through its 
performance accountability and standards system and through local and 
national covert testing. According to TSA officials, the agency 
developed the performance accountability and standards system in 
response to our 2003 report that recommended that TSA establish a 
performance management system that makes meaningful distinctions in 
employee performance and in response to input from TSA airport staff on 
how to improve passenger and checked baggage screening measures. This 
system is used by TSA to measure transportation security officers' 
compliance with passenger checkpoint screening procedures. We have 
ongoing work assessing TSA's covert testing program, which we will 
complete later this year. For more information, see GAO-597T; Aviation 
Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, 
but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457; and GAO-07-448T. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated 
information on its efforts to train and test the performance of airport 
screener staff. TSA reported that its Aviation Screening Assessment 
Program, which is to be implemented at all airports this year, is 
intended to use local screening workforce and Bomb Appraisal Officers 
to perform covert testing of passenger and baggage screening 
capabilities. TSA reported that the program is intended to measure 
screening performance using standardized test scenarios. In addition, 
TSA reported that it is implementing Improvised Explosive Devices 
Checkpoint Screening Drills in which transportation security officers 
will be routinely exposed to simulated items, without warning. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation, as DHS has established standards for training 
and testing for airport transportation security officers.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Establish a program and requirements to 
allow eligible airports to use a private screening workforce.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has taken 
actions to establish a program that allows eligible airports to use 
private screeners. In March 2006, we reported that TSA created the 
Screening Partnership Program to allow all commercial airports an 
opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to use qualified private 
screening contractors and private sector screeners. We noted that TSA 
developed performance goals and began drafting related measures and 
targets to assess the performance of private screening contractors 
under the Screening Partnership Program in the areas of security, 
customer service, costs, workforce management, and innovation. However, 
we noted that as TSA moved forward with this program, it had 
opportunities to strengthen the management and oversight of the 
program, including providing clear guidance to program applicants on 
their roles and responsibilities at airports where a privatized 
screener workforce operates and identifying the underlying reasons for 
the small number of program applicants. For more information, see 
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector 
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains, GAO-06-166 and Aviation 
Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow Airports 
to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services, GAO-05-126; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 10. Train and deploy federal air marshals on 
high-risk flights; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has trained 
and deployed federal air marshals on flights deemed high-risk. To carry 
out its mission, the Federal Air Marshal Service deploys federal air 
marshals on board flights either destined for or originating in the 
United States. Deployed to passenger flights, federal air marshals 
dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers and perform 
their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue attention 
to themselves. We have ongoing work assessing the Federal Air Marshal 
Service program. For more information, see Aviation Security: Federal 
Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls, 
GAO-06-203; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 11. Establish standards for training flight 
and cabin crews; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as it has 
established standards for training flight and cabin crews. In September 
2005, we reported that TSA enhanced guidance and standards for flight 
and cabin crew member security training with input from stakeholders. 
Specifically, TSA revised the guidance and standards to include 
additional training elements required by law and to improve the 
organization and clarity of the guidance and standards. TSA also took 
steps to strengthen its efforts to oversee air carriers' flight and 
cabin crew security training to ensure they were complying with the 
required guidance and standards. For example, in January 2005, TSA 
added staff with expertise in designing training programs to review air 
carriers' crew member security training curriculums and developed a 
standard form for staff to use to conduct their reviews. TSA also 
developed an advanced voluntary self-defense training program with 
input from stakeholders and implemented the program in December 2004. 
However, we noted that TSA had not established strategic goals and 
performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of the training 
because it considered its role in the training program as regulatory. 
We also noted that TSA lacked adequate controls for monitoring and 
reviewing air carriers' crew member security training, including 
written procedures for conducting and documenting these reviews. For 
more information, see Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member 
Security Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal 
Controls Needed, GAO-05-781; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 12. Establish a program to allow authorized 
flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or 
criminal acts; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: According to the DHS IG, 
TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer program is to select, train, 
deputize, arm with handguns, and supervise volunteer airline pilots and 
other flight deck crew members for the purpose of defending the flight 
decks of passenger and cargo aircraft. The IG reported in December 
2006, they surveyed a sample of federal flight deck officers to 
identify pilot concerns about the Federal Flight Deck Officer program. 
Pilot concerns included not being given time off to attend training, 
the remote location of the training and the amount of time needed to 
get to the training site, TSA's weapons carriage policy, and the type 
of credentials used to identify federal flight deck officers. These 
concerns may have dissuaded pilots from participating in the program, 
thus reducing the number of federal flight deck officers. In December 
2005, management of the Federal Flight Deck Officer program was 
assigned to TSA's Office of Law Enforcement-Federal Air Marshal 
Service. This office established focus groups to foster communications 
among the federal flight deck officer community, the airline industry, 
and professional associations, and to address federal flight deck 
officer operational concerns. Also, the office management established a 
federal flight deck officer working group to assess recommendations on 
proposals concerning federal flight deck officer credentials and 
badges, checkpoint requirements, weapons issues (including transport, 
storage, and qualifications), communications protocols, training, and 
industry liaison. While TSA has now trained and deputized federal 
flight deck officers and has addressed various procedural and process 
issues, the DHS IG concluded that more needed to be accomplished to 
maximize the use of federal flight deck officers on international and 
domestic flights. TSA continues to work with federal flight deck 
officers, Federal Security Directors, and industry to improve Federal 
Flight Deck Officer program effectiveness. For more information, see 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 
Improvements Needed in TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, OIG-
07-14 (Washington, D.C.: December 2006). 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it has 
implemented a Federal Flight Deck Officer program for all-cargo 
aircraft operators and noted that this program provides training to 
pilots, program management, resources, and equipment to protect the 
aircraft. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. The DHS IG reported that TSA has established 
and is working to improve the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. 
However, the DHS IG also reported that a variety of challenges have 
affected the program, including the amount of time and location of 
training, the weapons carriage policy, and type of credentials used to 
identify federal flight deck officers.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 13. Establish policies and procedures to 
ensure that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk 
or threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate 
action.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. TSA ensures that 
all passengers on domestic flights are checked against the Selectee 
List and No Fly List. Passenger prescreening is used to identify 
passengers who may pose a higher risk to aviation security than other 
passengers and therefore should receive additional and more thorough 
security scrutiny. Air carriers check passenger information against 
government supplied watch lists that contain the names of individuals 
who, for certain reasons, are either not allowed to fly (the No Fly 
List) or pose a higher than normal risk and therefore require 
additional security attention (the Selectee List). Passengers on the No 
Fly List are denied boarding passes and are not permitted to fly unless 
cleared by law enforcement officers. Passengers who are on the Selectee 
List are issued boarding passes, and they and their baggage undergo 
additional security measures. For more information, see Aviation 
Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks 
Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-356; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 14. Develop and implement an advanced 
prescreening system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger 
information to the Selectee List and No Fly List; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS is developing an advanced 
passenger prescreening system called Secure Flight. However, TSA has 
faced challenges in developing and implementing Secure Flight and has 
not yet completed its development efforts. In 2006 we reported that TSA 
had not conducted critical activities in accordance with best practices 
for large-scale information technology programs and had not followed a 
disciplined life cycle approach in developing Secure Flight, in which 
all phases of the project are defined by a series of orderly steps and 
the development of related documentation. We also found that while TSA 
had taken steps to implement an information security management program 
for protecting Secure Flight information and assets, its efforts were 
incomplete, based on federal standards and industry best practices. In 
addition, in 2006 we reported that prior to TSA's rebaselining effort 
of Secure Flight, several oversight reviews of the program had been 
conducted that raised questions about program management, including the 
lack of fully defined requirements. In January 2007, TSA reported that 
it has completed its rebaselining efforts, which included reassessing 
program goals and capabilities and developing a new schedule and cost 
estimates. However, we have not yet assessed TSA's progress in 
addressing past problems. In February 2007, we reported that as TSA 
moves forward with Secure Flight, it will need to employ a range of 
program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to 
control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. We have 
ongoing work reviewing DHS's efforts to develop and implement Secure 
Flight, including progress made during its rebaselining efforts. For 
more information, see Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain 
for the Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, 
GAO-06-864T; Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration 
Did Not Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure 
Flight Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken 
Steps to More Fully Inform the Public, GAO-05-864R; and Aviation 
Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks 
Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-356; DHS 
updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated 
information on its efforts to develop and implement Secure Flight. DHS 
reported that as a result of its rebaselining efforts, government 
controls were developed to implement Secure Flight, and DHS provided 
information on Secure Flight's technical and system engineering 
management plans and requirements, concept of operations, risk 
assessments, and privacy issues. DHS reported that it plans to begin 
parallel operations with the first groups of domestic aircraft 
operators in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 and to take over 
full responsibility for watch list matching in fiscal year 2010; Our 
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS is continuing efforts to develop the 
Secure Flight program, but has not yet completed its development 
efforts and has not yet implemented the program; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 15. Develop and implement an international 
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to 
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet implemented 
enhancements to its passenger prescreening process for passengers on 
international flights departing from or bound to the United States. We 
recently reported that the existing identity-matching component of 
DHS's process involves separate matching activities conducted by air 
carriers (prior to a flight's departure and pursuant to TSA 
requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight's departure). We 
reported that as with domestic passenger prescreening, air carriers 
conduct an initial match of self-reported passenger name record data 
against the No Fly List and Selectee List before international flight 
departures. CBP's process, in effect, supplements the air carrier 
identity-matching for international flights by comparing additional 
passenger information collected from passports (this information 
becomes part of Advanced Passenger Information System data), against 
the No Fly List and Selectee List and other government databases. Under 
current federal regulations for CBP's prescreening of passengers on 
international flights, air carriers are required to provide the U.S. 
government with passenger name record data as well as Advanced 
Passenger Information System data to allow the government to conduct, 
among other things, identity matching procedures against the No Fly 
List and Selectee List--which typically occur just after or at times 
just before the departure of international flights traveling to or from 
the United States, respectively. To address a concern that the federal 
government's identity matching may not be conducted in a timely manner, 
in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue a proposed rule requiring 
that the U.S. government's identity-matching process occur before the 
departure of international flights. CBP published this proposed rule in 
July 2006 and, if implemented, it would allow the U.S. government to 
conduct passenger prescreening in advance of flight departure, and 
would eliminate the need for air carriers to continue performing an 
identity-matching function for international flights. For more 
information, see GAO-07-448T and Aviation Security: Efforts to 
Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, but 
Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-346; DHS updated 
information: In March 2007, TSA reported that it was working with CBP 
to combine the predeparture Advance Passenger Information System and 
Secure Flight into one DHS solution; Our assessment: We conclude that 
DHS has generally not achieved this performance expectation. We 
identified various problems with DHS's implementation of the 
international prescreening process and made recommendations to help 
address some of those concerns. In addition, while efforts to define 
functional requirements and operations are underway for aligning 
international and domestic passenger prescreening, full implementation 
of an integrated system will not occur for several years, as Secure 
Flight is not yet operational for domestic passenger prescreening; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 16. Develop and implement processes and 
procedures for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed and implemented 
processes and procedures for screening passengers at checkpoints. 
Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel 
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of 
any unauthorized explosives, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous 
item onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. Authorized TSA 
personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated 
screening locations. The passenger-screening functions are X-ray 
screening of property, walk-through metal detector screening of 
individuals, hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, physical 
search of property and trace detection for explosives, and behavioral 
observation. We have also reported that TSA has developed processes and 
procedures for screening passengers at security checkpoints, balancing 
security needs with efficiency and customer service considerations. TSA 
has also revised these policies and procedures to generally improve the 
efficiency, effectiveness, and clarity of the procedures, but could 
improve the evaluation of procedures before they are implemented. In 
April 2007, we reported that standard operating procedures 
modifications were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA 
senior-level officials and program-level staff. In some cases, TSA 
tested proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine 
whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose. However, we 
reported that TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved to 
help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally 
tested would achieve their intended purpose. We also reported that 
TSA's documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures 
was not complete. We noted that without more complete documentation, 
TSA may not be able to justify key modifications to passenger screening 
procedures to Congress and the traveling public. For more information, 
see Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive 
Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and 
Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634; 
Aviation Security: TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not 
Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the 
Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive, GAO-07-623R; GAO-03-
1173; and GAO-06-371T. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it trained 
tens of thousands of transportation security officers and took various 
regulatory actions to address concerns regarding liquids and gels 
carried aboard aircraft. DHS reported that TSA worked with technical 
experts and counterparts in other countries to harmonize security 
procedures. TSA also reported making changes to the Prohibited Items 
List to allow transportation security officers to focus on detecting 
high-risk threats which have the ability to cause catastrophic damage, 
such as improvised explosive devices. Moreover, TSA provided 
information on two recent initiatives intended to strengthen the 
passenger checkpoint screening process. TSA's Screening Passenger by 
Observation Technique program is a behavior observation and analysis 
program designed to provide TSA Behavior Detection Officers with a 
nonintrusive means of identifying potentially high-risk individuals who 
exhibit behaviors indicative of inordinate levels of stress, fear, 
and/or deception that could indicate possible terrorist or criminal 
activity. TSA reported that this program is implemented using a threat-
based strategy and is based on other behavioral analysis programs used 
by law enforcement and security personnel. In addition, TSA's Travel 
Document Checker program replaces current travel document checkers with 
transportation security officers who have access to sensitive security 
information on the threat posture of the aviation industry and check 
for fraudulent documents.

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation, as DHS has developed and implemented processes 
and procedures for screening passengers at airport checkpoints.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 17. Develop and test checkpoint technologies 
to address vulnerabilities.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has undertaken efforts to 
develop and test checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities 
that may be exploited by identified threats such as improvised 
explosive devices. For example, TSA recently placed increased focus on 
the threats posed by liquid explosives and has been developing 
technology to automatically detect liquid explosives in bottles. TSA 
has also been modifying commercial-off-the-shelf technologies to 
mitigate threats posed by passengers bearing improvised explosive 
devices. However, these machines do not automatically detect 
explosives. For example, TSA is modifying a whole body image to screen 
passengers for explosives, plastics, and metals otherwise obfuscated by 
clothing. The machine uses x-ray backscatter technology to produce an 
image that transportation security officers interpret. We are currently 
reviewing DHS and TSA's efforts to develop and test technologies and 
will be reporting on these efforts later this year. For more 
information, see GAO-06-371T. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated 
information on its efforts to develop and test checkpoint technologies. 
TSA reported that it is exploring portable explosive detection system 
units and explosive trace portals at various airport locations and is 
operationally testing a whole body imaging system. TSA also reported 
that it is planning to pilot test a cast and prosthetics screening 
technology and an automated explosives detection system for carry-on 
baggage. TSA also reported that, in partnership with the Science and 
Technology Directorate, it is assessing the capabilities of advanced x-
ray technologies to provide enhanced capabilities in the detection of 
improvised explosives devices in carry-on items. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has reported taking actions to develop and 
test checkpoint technologies. The full extent of DHS's efforts is the 
focus of an ongoing GAO review scheduled for completion later this year.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 18. Deploy checkpoint technologies to address 
vulnerabilities.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet deployed checkpoint 
technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities. For example, in 
July 2006, TSA provided us with information that 97 explosives trace 
portal machines had been installed at over 37 airports. This new 
technology uses puffs of air to help detect the presence of explosives 
on individuals. However, DHS identified problems with these machines 
and has halted their deployment. DHS's fiscal year 2007 budget request 
stated that TSA expected that 434 explosives trace portal machines 
would be in operation throughout the country by September 2007. TSA is 
also developing backscatter technology, but limited progress has been 
made in fielding this technology at airport passenger screening 
checkpoints. We are currently reviewing TSA's technology development 
and deployment efforts and will be reporting on these efforts later 
this year. For more information, see GAO-06-371T. 

DHS updated information: DHS reported in March 2007 that extensive 
deployment of new technologies will not be realized for another 2 
years. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has faced challenges and delays in 
deploying checkpoint technologies to effectively address 
vulnerabilities, and TSA has reported that deployment of new 
technologies is likely 2 years away.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 19. Deploy EDS and ETD systems to screen 
checked baggage for explosives. 
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as TSA has 
deployed EDS and ETD systems at the nation's airports. From November 
2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 1,600 EDS 
machines and about 7,200 ETD machines to screen checked baggage for 
explosives at over 400 commercial airports. TSA made progress in 
fielding EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's airports, placing this 
equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--to conduct 
the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives, due to 
congressional mandates to field the equipment quickly and limitations 
in airport design. For more information, see Aviation Security: TSA 
Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be 
Strengthened, GAO-06-869 and GAO-06-371T.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 20. Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage 
screening equipment at airports.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed 
a plan to deploy in-line baggage screening equipment at airports, based 
in part on a recommendation we made. The plan is aimed at increasing 
security through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-
cycle costs, minimizing impacts on TSA and airport and airline 
operations, and providing a flexible security infrastructure. In March 
2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed to help 
fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that 
screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government 
about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that 
many of the initial in-line EDS systems did not achieve the anticipated 
savings. However, recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS 
systems and EDS screening technology offer the opportunity for higher-
performance and lower-cost screening systems. Screening with in-line 
EDS systems may also result in security benefits by reducing the need 
for TSA to use alternative screening procedures, such as screening with 
explosives detection canines and physical bag searches, which involve 
trade-offs in security effectiveness. For more information, see GAO-06-
869; GAO-06-371T; and GAO-07-448T.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 21. Pursue the deployment and use of in-line 
baggage screening equipment at airports.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Despite delays in the widespread 
deployment of in-line systems due to the high upfront capital 
investment required, DHS is pursuing the deployment and use of in-line 
explosives detection equipment and is seeking creative financing 
solutions to fund the deployment of these systems. TSA determined that 
recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS 
screening technology offer the opportunity for higher performance and 
lower cost screening systems. Screening with in-line EDS systems could 
also result in security benefits by reducing congestion in airport 
lobbies and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening 
procedures, such as screening with explosives detection canines and 
physical bag searches. TSA's use of these procedures, which are to be 
used only when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security 
vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there is a 
security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in an 
area, has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. TSA has begun 
to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage 
screening systems, but resources have not been made available by 
Congress to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-
scale basis. TSA reported that as of June 2006, 25 airports had 
operational in-line EDS systems and an additional 24 airports had in-
line systems under development. In May 2006, TSA reported that under 
current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage 
screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. For 
more information, see GAO-06-869 and GAO-06-371T. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it is working 
with its airport and air carrier stakeholders to improve checked 
baggage screening solutions and to look creatively at in-line baggage 
screening system solutions to enhance security and free up lobby space 
at airports. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has undertaken efforts to deploy and use 
in-line baggage screening equipment, but challenges exist to deploying 
in-line systems due to the high costs of the systems and questions 
regarding how the systems will be funded.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 22. Develop a plan for air cargo security.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed 
a strategic plan for domestic air cargo security and has taken actions 
to use risk management principles to guide investment decisions related 
to air cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country, 
referred to as inbound air cargo, but these actions are not yet 
complete. With regard to domestic air cargo, we reported that TSA 
completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a 
threat-based risk management approach to securing the nation's air 
cargo transportation system. TSA's plan identified strategic objectives 
and priority actions for enhancing air cargo security based on risk, 
cost, and deadlines. With regard to inbound air cargo, in April 2007, 
we reported that TSA and CBP have taken some preliminary steps to use 
risk management principles to guide their investment decisions related 
to inbound air cargo, as advocated by DHS, but most of these efforts 
are in the planning stages. We reported that although TSA completed a 
risk-based strategic plan to address domestic air cargo security, it 
has not developed a similar strategy for addressing inbound air cargo 
security, including how best to partner with CBP and international air 
cargo stakeholders. Further, TSA has identified the primary threats 
associated with inbound air cargo, but has not yet assessed which areas 
of inbound air cargo are most vulnerable to attack and which inbound 
air cargo assets are deemed most critical to protect. TSA plans to 
assess inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets--two 
crucial elements of a risk-based management approach--but has not yet 
established a methodology or time frame for how and when these 
assessments will be completed. Without such assessments, we reported 
that TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its resources on the 
most critical security needs. We recommended that TSA more fully 
develop a risk-based strategy to address inbound air cargo security, 
including establishing goals and objectives for securing inbound air 
cargo and establishing a methodology and time frames for completing 
assessments of inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets 
that can be used to help prioritize the actions necessary to enhance 
security. For more information, see Aviation Security: Federal Action 
Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76, and 
Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are 
in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 23. Develop and implement procedures to screen 
air cargo.

Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to develop and 
implement procedures for screening domestic air cargo.[A] With regard 
to domestic air cargo, air carriers are responsible for implementing 
TSA security requirements that include measures related to the 
acceptance, handling, and inspection of cargo; training of employees in 
security and cargo inspection procedures; testing employee proficiency 
in cargo inspection; and access to cargo areas and aircraft, and TSA 
inspects carriers' compliance. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had 
significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections 
conducted of air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with 
security requirements. We also reported that TSA exempted certain cargo 
from random inspection because it did not view the exempted cargo as 
posing a significant security risk. However, airline industry 
stakeholders told us that while the rationale for exempting certain 
types of cargo from random inspection was understandable, the 
exemptions may have created potential security risks and 
vulnerabilities. Partly on the basis of a recommendation we made, TSA 
is evaluating existing exemptions to determine whether they pose a 
security risk and has reduced some exemptions that were previously 
allowed. We also noted that TSA had not developed performance measures 
to determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers were 
complying with security requirements and had not analyzed the results 
of inspections to systematically target future inspections on those 
entities that pose a higher security risk to the domestic air cargo 
system. We have reported that without these performance measures and 
systematic analyses, TSA would be limited in its ability to effectively 
target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its oversight 
responsibilities for this essential area of aviation security. With 
regard to inbound air cargo, in April 2007, we reported that TSA issued 
its air cargo security rule in May 2006, which included a number of 
provisions aimed at enhancing the security of inbound air cargo. For 
example, the final rule acknowledged that TSA amended its security 
directives and programs to triple the percentage of cargo inspected on 
domestic and foreign passenger aircraft. To implement the requirements 
contained in the air cargo security rule, TSA drafted revisions to its 
existing security programs for domestic and foreign passenger air 
carriers and created new security programs for domestic and foreign all-
cargo carriers. However, we reported that TSA requirements continue to 
allow inspection exemptions for certain types of inbound air cargo 
transported on passenger air carriers. We reported that this risk was 
further heightened because TSA has limited information on the 
background of and security risk posed by foreign shippers whose cargo 
may fall within these exemptions. TSA officials stated that the agency 
is holding discussions with industry stakeholders to determine whether 
additional revisions to current air cargo inspection exemptions are 
needed. We also reported that TSA inspects domestic and foreign 
passenger air carriers with service to the United States to assess 
whether the air carriers are complying with air cargo security 
requirements, such as inspecting a certain percentage of air cargo. We 
reported, however, that TSA did not currently inspect all air carriers 
transporting cargo into the United States. While TSA's compliance 
inspections provide useful information, the agency has not developed an 
inspection plan that includes performance goals and measures to 
determine to what extent air carriers are complying with security 
requirements. For more information, see GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated 
information on its efforts to develop and implement procedures for 
screening air cargo. DHS noted that because the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act set specific milestones for screening cargo 
and baggage carried on passenger aircraft, TSA focused initially on 
passenger aircraft. DHS issued the Air Cargo Security Requirements 
Final Rule in May 2006 that requires airports that currently maintain a 
Security Identification Display Area to expand the area to air cargo 
operating areas. At airports where a Security Identification Display 
Area is nonexistent but all-cargo operations occur, TSA requires 
aircraft operators to incorporate other security measures, such as 
security threat assessments for all persons with unescorted access to 
cargo, into their programs. TSA also reported that as of March 2007, it 
had 300 inspectors dedicated solely to oversight of the air cargo 
supply chain. During 2006, TSA reported that inspectors conducted more 
than 31,000 compliance reviews of air carriers and freight 
consolidators and have conducted covert testing of the domestic air 
cargo supply chain. TSA also reported that it is developing an air 
cargo risk-based targeting system to assess the risk of cargo to be 
moved on all aircraft operating within the United States. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has developed and implemented procedures 
to screen domestic and inbound air cargo. Furthermore, TSA has 
significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections 
conducted of air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with 
security requirements. However, as we previously reported, TSA 
requirements continue to allow inspection exemptions for certain types 
of inbound air cargo transported on passenger air carriers, which could 
create security vulnerabilities, and TSA has limited information on the 
background of and security risk posed by foreign shippers whose cargo 
may fall within these exemptions.
 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 24. Develop and implement technologies to 
screen air cargo.
 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet developed and 
implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. TSA's plans for 
enhancing air cargo security include developing and testing air cargo 
inspection technology. However, these planned enhancements may pose 
operational, financial, and technological challenges to the agency and 
air cargo industry stakeholders. In October 2005 we reported that TSA 
had completed a pilot program focused on testing the applicability of 
EDS technology to inspect individual pieces of air cargo, referred to 
as break bulk cargo. Although EDS is an approved method for inspecting 
passenger baggage, it had not been tested by TSA to determine its 
effectiveness in inspecting air cargo. According to TSA officials, TSA 
must review the results of its EDS pilot test before the agency would 
determine whether to certify EDS for inspecting air cargo. According to 
TSA officials, the agency has also been pursuing multiple technologies 
to automate the detection of explosives in the types and quantities 
that would cause catastrophic damage to an aircraft in flight. TSA 
planned to develop working prototypes of these technologies by 
September 2006 and complete operational testing by 2008. TSA 
acknowledged that full development of these technologies may take 5 to 
7 years. In April 2007, we reported that DHS has taken some steps to 
incorporate new technologies into strengthening the security of air 
cargo, which will affect both domestic and inbound air cargo. However, 
we reported that TSA and DHS's Science and Technology Directorate were 
in the early stages of evaluating available aviation security 
technologies to determine their applicability to the domestic air cargo 
environment. TSA and the Science and Technology Directorate are seeking 
to identify and develop technologies that can effectively inspect and 
secure air cargo with minimal impact on the flow of commerce. According 
to TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently 
and effectively inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of 
potential terrorist threats, including explosives and weapons of mass 
destruction. Accordingly, TSA, together with the Science and Technology 
Directorate, is conducting a number of pilot programs that are testing 
a variety of different technologies that may be used separately or in 
combination to inspect and secure air cargo. These pilot programs seek 
to enhance the security of air cargo by improving the effectiveness of 
air cargo inspections through increased detection rates and reduced 
false alarm rates, while addressing the two primary threats to air 
cargo identified by TSA--hijackers on an all-cargo aircraft and 
explosives on passenger aircraft. TSA anticipates completing its pilot 
tests by 2008, but has not yet established time frames for when it 
might implement these methods or technologies for the inbound air cargo 
system. According to DHS and TSA officials, further testing and 
analysis will be necessary to make determinations about the 
capabilities and costs of these technologies when employed for 
inspecting inbound air cargo at foreign locations. For more 
information, see GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660. 

DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated 
information on its efforts to develop and implement air cargo screening 
technologies. TSA reported that new technologies to physically screen 
air cargo will not be available in the near term. TSA reported that it 
is using and improving existing technologies to screen air cargo. For 
example, TSA reported increasing the use of canine teams and stated 
that these teams dedicate about 25 percent of their time of air cargo 
security activities. 

Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS focused initial aviation security efforts 
on fulfilling congressional mandates related to passenger and baggage 
screening and has faced challenges in its efforts to develop and 
implement air cargo screening technologies. In prior work, we reported 
that TSA has taken actions to develop technologies for screening air 
cargo, but had not yet tested the effectiveness of various technologies 
in inspecting air cargo. We also reported that full development of 
technologies for screening air cargo may be years away.
 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken a 
sufficient number of actions to satisfy most elements of the 
performance expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may 
be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy 
some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the 
DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS 
actions to satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information 
DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which 
DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no 
assessment made."

[A] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used 
interchangeably by TSA to denote some level of examination of a person 
or good, which can entail a number of different actions, including 
manual physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain 
weapons, explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using nonintrusive 
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be 
inspected. For this and the subsequent performance expectation, we use 
the term "screen" to refer to this broad range of activities. However, 
in our April 2007 report that is referenced in this performance 
expectation's associated findings section, the term "screening" was 
used when referring to TSA or CBP efforts to apply a filter to analyze 
cargo related information to identify cargo shipment characteristics or 
anomalies for security risks. The term "inspection" was used to refer 
only to air carrier, TSA, or CBP efforts to examine air cargo through 
physical searches and the use of nonintrusive technologies.

[End of table]

DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Securing Surface Transportation 
Modes:

DHS has undertaken various initiatives to secure surface transportation 
modes, and within the department, TSA is primarily responsible for 
surface transportation security efforts. Since its creation following 
the events of September 11, 2001, TSA has focused much of its efforts 
and resources on meeting legislative mandates to strengthen commercial 
aviation security. However, TSA has more recently placed additional 
focus on securing surface modes of transportation, which includes 
establishing security standards and conducting assessments and 
inspections of surface transportation modes such as passenger and 
freight rail; mass transit; highways, including commercial vehicles; 
and pipelines. Although TSA has primary responsibility within the 
department for surface transportation security, the responsibility for 
securing rail and other transportation modes is shared among federal, 
state, and local governments and the private sector. For example, with 
regard to passenger rail security, in addition to TSA, DHS's Office of 
Grant Programs provides grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk 
assessments for passenger rail agencies. Within the Department of 
Transportation, the Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad 
Administration have responsibilities for passenger rail safety and 
security. In addition, public and private passenger rail operators are 
also responsible for securing their rail systems.

As shown in table 24, we identified five performance expectations for 
DHS in the area of surface transportation security, and we found that 
overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those performance 
expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 
three of these performance expectations and has generally not achieved 
two others.

Table 24: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Surface 
Transportation Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Develop and adopt a strategic approach for 
implementing surface transportation security functions. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 2. Conduct threat, criticality, and 
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets. 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 3. Issue standards for securing surface 
transportation modes. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 4. Conduct compliance inspections for surface 
transportation systems. 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 5. Administer grant programs for surface 
transportation security. 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: Total; 
Assessment: Generally achieved: 3; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 2; 
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

Table 25 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS 
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in 
the area of surface transportation security and our assessment of 
whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the 
performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to 
satisfy most of the performance expectation's key elements (generally 
not achieved).

Table 25: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Surface Transportation Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Develop and adopt a strategic approach for 
implementing surface transportation security functions; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a strategic 
approach for securing surface transportation modes, which include mass 
transit, passenger rail, freight rail, commercial vehicles, pipelines, 
and related infrastructure such as roads and highways. In the past we 
have reported that TSA had not issued the Transportation Sector 
Specific Plan or supporting plans for securing all modes of 
transportation, in accordance with DHS's National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan and a December 2006 executive order. We reported that 
until TSA issued the sector-specific plan and supporting plans, it 
lacked a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for 
securing the transportation sector. In addition, in March 2007, we 
testified that as of September 2005, DHS had begun developing, but had 
not yet completed a framework to help federal agencies and the private 
sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks 
to transportation and other critical sectors. For more information, see 
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Leadership Needed to Prioritize and 
Guide Security Efforts, GAO-07-225T and Passenger Rail Security: 
Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and 
Guide Security Efforts, GAO-07-583T; DHS updated information: In May 
2007, DHS issued the sector-specific plan for transportation systems 
and supporting annexes for surface transportation assets, and reported 
taking actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the plan. 
The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan and its supporting 
modal implementation plans and appendixes establish a strategic 
approach based on the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and 
Executive Order 13416, Strengthening Surface Transportation Security. 
The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security 
framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make 
effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation 
decisions. The key efforts to be undertaken according to the plan 
include the (1) identification of assets, systems, networks and 
functions to be protected; (2) assessment of risks; (3) prioritization 
of risk management options; (4) development and implementation of 
security programs; (5) measurement of progress; (6) assessment and 
prioritization of research and development investments; and (7) 
management and coordination of sector responsibilities, including the 
sharing of information. In addition, during the course of our ongoing 
work assessing mass transit, freight rail, commercial vehicles, and 
highway infrastructure, we identified that DHS has begun to implement 
some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-specific plan 
for transportation systems and supporting annexes; Our assessment: We 
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation 
because TSA has issued the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan and 
supporting plans, a significant step in its efforts to develop and 
adopt a strategic approach for surface transportation security 
functions. While DHS has issued a strategy for securing all 
transportation modes, and has demonstrated that it has begun to take 
actions to implement the goals and objectives outlined in the strategy, 
we have not yet analyzed the overall quality of the plan or supporting 
modal annexes, the extent to which efforts outlined in the plans and 
annexes were implemented, or the effectiveness of identified security 
initiatives. The four performance expectations in the surface 
transportation security mission area discussed below are generally 
related to DHS's implementation of the strategy. In addition, we 
recognize that the acceptance of DHS's approach by federal, state, 
local, and private sector stakeholders is crucial to its successful 
implementation. However, we have not assessed the extent to which the 
plan and supporting modal annexes were coordinated with or adopted by 
these stakeholders. We will continue to assess DHS' efforts to 
implement its strategy for securing surface transportation modes as 
part of our ongoing reviews of mass transit, freight rail, commercial 
vehicles, and highway infrastructure security; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Conduct threat, criticality, and 
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to conduct 
threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of some surface 
transportation assets, particularly passenger and freight rail, but has 
not provided us with evidence that it has completed assessments in 
other surface transportation modes. In 2005, we reported that DHS and 
TSA conducted threat and vulnerability assessments of passenger rail 
systems. More recently, we testified that TSA had reported completing 
an overall threat assessment for mass transit, passenger, and freight 
rail modes and had conducted criticality assessments of nearly 700 
passenger rail stations. In addition, in March 2007 we testified that 
DHS's Office of Grants and Training, now called the Office of Grant 
Programs, developed and implemented a risk assessment tool to help 
passenger rail operators better respond to terrorist attacks and 
prioritize security measures. Passenger rail operators must have 
completed a risk assessment to be eligible for financial assistance 
through the fiscal year 2007 Transit Security Grant Program, which 
includes funding for passenger rail. To receive grant funding, rail 
operators are also required to have a security and emergency 
preparedness plan that identifies how the operator intends to respond 
to security gaps identified by risk assessments. As of February 2007, 
DHS had completed or planned to conduct risk assessments of most 
passenger rail operators. According to rail operators, DHS's risk 
assessment process enabled them to prioritize investments on the basis 
of risk and allowed them to target and allocate resources toward 
security measures that will have the greatest impact on reducing risk 
across their rail systems. However, TSA has not provided us with 
evidence that it has yet conducted threat and vulnerability assessments 
of all surface transportation assets, which may adversely affect its 
ability to adopt a risk-based approach for prioritizing security 
initiatives within and across all transportation modes. Until threat, 
criticality, and vulnerability assessments have been coordinated and 
completed, and until TSA determines how to use the results of these 
assessments to analyze and characterize risk, it may not be possible to 
effectively prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment 
decisions about protecting them. TSA has reported conducting additional 
risk assessments in rail and other transportation modes since the 
issuance of our September 2005 report. We will review these assessments 
and other TSA efforts to secure surface transportation modes in our 
ongoing and planned work related to passenger and freight rail, highway 
infrastructure, and commercial vehicle security. For more information, 
see GAO-07-225T; Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-06-181T; and 
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851; DHS updated 
information: In March and April 2007, and as part of ongoing work 
assessing freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highway 
infrastructure, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts 
to conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments for 
surface transportation assets. With regard to threat assessments, DHS 
receives and uses threat information as part of its surface 
transportation security efforts. TSA's Office of Intelligence provides 
annual intelligence summaries, periodic updates, and other current 
intelligence briefings to the rest of TSA. The annual assessments are 
shared with TSA stakeholders, and TSA provided us copies for all 
transportation modes. With regard to criticality assessments, DHS has 
conducted such assessments for some surface transportation modes. For 
example, TSA has conducted Corporate Security Reviews with 38 state 
Department of Transportation highway programs. For commercial vehicles, 
TSA has conducted 32 Corporate Security Reviews with large motor 
carriers, in an industry with over one million firms. It has also 
completed a pilot program with the state of Missouri to supplement the 
state's regular safety inspections of trucking firms with Corporate 
Security Reviews. TSA reports that over 1,800 Corporate Security 
Reviews have been completed in Missouri as part of this program. In 
addition, the National Protection and Programs Directorate 
Infrastructure Protection conducts highway infrastructure assessments 
that look at tier one and tier two critical highway infrastructure. The 
National Protection and Programs Directorate completed 54 highway 
infrastructure assessments performed from 2004 through May 2007. With 
regard to vulnerability assessments, DHS has conducted such assessments 
for surface transportation modes. For example, TSA reported that its 
Security Analysis and Action Program utilizes several different tools 
to identify vulnerabilities based on specific scenarios, such as an 
improvised explosive device on a passenger train. The purpose of the 
program is to gather information, identify generally accepted best 
practices, and benchmark existing security operations in comparison to 
established industry security practices. According to TSA, among other 
things, the Security Analysis and Action Program creates a baseline for 
future multimodal security assessments, develops a road map for future 
passenger rail security evaluations, and helps prioritize security 
countermeasures and emergency response enhancement needs based on 
threats and risks. For freight rail, we found that TSA has conducted 
vulnerability assessments of High Threat Urban Area rail corridors 
where toxic inhalation hazard shipments are transported. TSA reported 
that these corridor assessments provide site-specific mitigation 
strategies and lessons learned as well as tactics that can be modified 
for use at the corporate or national level. Furthermore, TSA reported 
that its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Protection Teams are 
deployed randomly to prepare for emergency situations in which TSA 
assets would be invited to assist a local transit agency. According to 
TSA, these teams allow TSA and local entities to develop templates that 
can be implemented in emergency situations and to supplement existing 
security resources. As of March 20, 2007, TSA reported that 50 Visible 
Intermodal Prevention and Protection team exercises have been conducted 
at various mass transit and passenger rail systems since December 2005. 
In addition, TSA reported that through its Pipeline Security Division, 
it has conducted 63 Corporate Security Reviews, on-site reviews of 
pipeline companies' security planning. The goals of these reviews are 
to develop knowledge of security planning and execution at pipeline 
sites; establish and maintain working relationships with pipeline 
security personnel; and identify and share security practices; Our 
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to conduct threat, 
criticality, and vulnerability assessments in surface transportation 
sectors, but we have not yet reviewed the quality of many of these 
assessments. DHS uses threat assessments and information as part of its 
surface transportation security efforts and has used criticality 
assessments to help prioritize its efforts. DHS has also conducted 
vulnerability assessment of assets within surface transportation modes, 
particularly for mass transit, freight rail, and highway 
infrastructure. However, with regard to High Threat Urban Area rail 
corridor assessments, DHS has not yet fully designated those corridors 
for which it plans to conduct future assessments. Moreover, for 
commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure, DHS has not yet 
completed all planned vulnerability assessments; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Issue standards for securing surface 
transportation modes; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has initiated efforts to develop 
security standards for surface transportation modes, but DHS did not 
provide us with information on its efforts beyond passenger and freight 
rail. In 2006, TSA was planning to issue security standards for all 
modes of transportation. TSA planned to issue only a limited number of 
standards--that is, standards will be issued only when assessments of 
the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the level 
of risk is too high or unacceptable. TSA has developed security 
directives and security action items--recommended measures for 
passenger rail operators to implement in their security programs to 
improve both security and emergency preparedness--for passenger rail 
and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 on passenger and freight 
rail security requirements. For more information, see GAO-07-225T; GAO-
06-181T; and GAO-05-851; DHS updated information: In April 2007, and as 
part of ongoing work, DHS provided us with updated information on TSA's 
efforts to issue standards for securing surface transportation modes. 
According to DHS, TSA uses field activities to assess compliance with 
security directives and implementation of noncompulsory security 
standards and protective measures with the objective of a broad-based 
enhancement of passenger rail and rail transit security. Through the 
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement inspectors review 
implementation by mass transit and passenger rail systems of the 17 
Security and Emergency Management Action Items (security action items) 
that TSA and the Federal Transit Administration jointly developed, in 
coordination with the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council. This 
initiative aims to elevate security posture throughout the mass transit 
and passenger rail mode by implementation of baseline security measures 
adaptable to the operating circumstances of any system. TSA also 
reported that in December 2006, it issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking on new security measures for freight rail carriers designed 
to ensure 100 percent positive handoff of toxic inhalation hazard 
shipments that enter high threat urban areas and establish security 
protocols for custody transfers of toxic inhalation hazard rail cars in 
high-threat urban areas. TSA also reported that its High Threat Urban 
Area rail corridor assessments supported the development of the 
Recommended Security Action Items for the Rail Transportation of Toxic 
Inhalation Materials issued by DHS and the Department of Transportation 
in June 2006; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to develop 
and issue surface transportation security standards for passenger and 
freight rail modes. However, DHS did not provide us with evidence of 
its efforts to develop and issue security standards for all surface 
transportation modes or a rationale or explanation why standards may 
not be needed for other modes; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Conduct compliance inspections for surface 
transportation systems; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in conducting 
compliance inspections, particularly in hiring and deploying 
inspectors, but inspectors' roles and missions have not yet been fully 
defined. TSA officials stated the agency has hired 100 surface 
transportation inspectors whose stated mission is to, among other 
duties, monitor and enforce compliance with TSA's rail security 
directives. However, some passenger rail operators have expressed 
confusion and concern about the role of TSA's inspectors and the 
potential that TSA inspections could be duplicative of other federal 
and state rail inspections. TSA rail inspector staff stated that they 
were committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating 
their respective roles to rail agency officials. According to TSA, 
since the initial deployment of surface inspectors, these inspectors 
have developed relationships with security officials in passenger rail 
and transit systems, coordinated access to operations centers, 
participated in emergency exercises, and provided assistance in 
enhancing security. However, the role of inspectors in enforcing 
security directives has not been fully defined. We will continue to 
assess TSA's compliance efforts during follow-on reviews of surface 
transportation modes For more information, see GAO-07-225T; GAO-06-
181T; and GAO-05-851; DHS updated information: In March and April 
2007, and as part of ongoing reviews, DHS provided us with updated 
information on its efforts to conduct compliance inspections for 
surface transportation systems. For example, with regard to freight 
rail, TSA reported visiting terminal and railroad yards to measure 
implementation of 7 of 24 recommended security action items for the 
rail transportation of toxic inhalation hazard materials. TSA reported 
that during the end of 2006, its inspectors visited about 150 
individual railroad facilities. Through its Surface Transportation 
Security Inspection program, TSA reported that its inspectors conduct 
inspections of key facilities for rail and transit systems to assess 
transit systems' implementation of core transit security fundamentals 
and comprehensive security action items; conduct examinations of 
stakeholder operations, including compliance with security directives; 
identify security gaps; and develop effective practices. TSA noted that 
its field activities also assess compliance with security directives 
and implementation of noncompulsory security standards and protective 
measures. For example, TSA reported that through the Baseline 
Assessment for Security Enhancements program, inspectors review mass 
transit and passenger rail systems' implementation of the 17 Security 
and Emergency Management Action Items jointly developed by TSA and the 
Federal Transit Administration. The program is a means to establish 
baseline security program data applicable to all surface mass transit 
systems. TSA also noted that it deploys inspectors to serve as federal 
liaisons to mass transit and passenger rail system operations centers 
and provide other security support and assistance in periods of 
heightened alert or in response to security incidents; Our assessment: 
We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance 
expectation. DHS has taken steps to conduct compliance inspections for 
surface transportation systems and has made progress in hiring and 
deploying inspectors. Although DHS has deployed inspectors to conduct 
compliance inspections and carry out other security activities in the 
mass transit (mass transit includes passenger rail) and freight rail 
modes, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has conducted 
compliance inspections for other surface transportation modes or 
information on whether the department believes compliance inspections 
are needed for other modes. Moreover, we reported that the role of 
inspectors in enforcing security requirements has not been fully 
defined, and DHS did not provide us with documentation on its efforts 
to better define these roles; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Administer grant programs for surface 
transportation security; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In March 2007, we reported that the 
DHS Office of Grants and Training, now called the Office of Grant 
Programs, has used various programs to fund passenger rail security 
since 2003. Through the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program, 
the Office of Grants and Training has provided grants to urban areas to 
help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent, 
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. In 2003 and 2004, $65 
million and $50 million, respectively, were provided to rail transit 
agencies through the Urban Area Security Initiative program. In 
addition, the 2005 DHS appropriations action provided $150 million for 
intercity passenger rail transportation, freight rail, and transit 
security grants. In fiscal year 2006, $150 million was appropriated, 
and in fiscal year 2007 $175 million was appropriated for the same 
purposes. The Office of Grants and Training used this funding to build 
on the work under way through the Urban Area Security Initiative 
program and create and administer new programs focused specifically on 
transportation security, including the Transit Security Grant Program 
and the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. During fiscal 
year 2006, the Office of Grants and Training provided $110 million to 
passenger rail transit agencies through the Transit Security Grant 
Program and about $7 million to Amtrak through the Intercity Passenger 
Rail Security Grant Program. During fiscal year 2007, the Office of 
Grants and Training plans to distribute $156 million for rail and bus 
security grants and $8 million to Amtrak. In January 2007, the Office 
of Grants and Training reported that the Intercity Passenger Rail 
Security Program had been incorporated into the Transit Security Grant 
Program. We reported that although the Office of Grants and Training 
has distributed hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to improve 
passenger rail security, issues have surfaced about the grant process. 
For example, we reported that as DHS works to refine its risk 
assessment methodologies, develop better means of assessing proposed 
investments using grant funds, and align grant guidance with the 
implementation of broader emergency preparedness goals, such as 
implementation of the National Preparedness Goal, it has annually made 
changes to the guidance for the various grants it administers. These 
changes include changes in the eligibility for grants. As a result of 
these annual changes, awardees and potential grant recipients must 
annually review and understand new information on the requirements for 
grant applications including justification of their proposed use of 
grant funds. We also reported that funds awarded through the Transit 
Security Grant Program can be used to supplement funds received from 
other grant programs. However, allowable uses are not clearly defined. 
For example, Transit Security Grant Program funds can be used to create 
canine teams but cannot be used to maintain these teams--that is, the 
grant funds cannot be used for food, medical care, and other such 
maintenance costs for the dogs on the team. Grant recipients have 
expressed a need for clear guidance on the allowable use of grants and 
how they can combine funds from more than one grant to fund and 
implement specific projects. In addition, some industry stakeholders 
have raised concerns regarding DHS's current grant process, noting that 
there are time delays and other barriers in grant funding reaching 
owners and operators of surface transportation assets. We will be 
assessing grants for mass transit as part of our ongoing work. For more 
information, see GAO-06-181T and Passenger Rail Security: Federal 
Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide 
Security Efforts, GAO-07-583T; DHS updated information: In March 2007, 
DHS provided us with updated information on its grant programs for 
surface transportation security. For example, TSA considers various 
factors in Transit Security Grant Program proposals, including the 
enhancement of capabilities to (1) deter, detect, and respond to 
terrorist attacks employing improvised explosive devices; (2) mitigate 
high-consequence risks identified in individual transit system risk 
assessments; (3) implement technology for detection of explosives and 
monitoring for suspicious activities; (4) improve coordination with law 
enforcement and emergency responders; and (5) expand security training 
and awareness among employees and passengers. TSA reported using the 
Transit Security Grant Program to drive improvements in areas such as 
training for key personnel, drills, exercises, and public awareness and 
preparedness; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed and 
administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes. 
However, some industry stakeholders have raised concerns regarding 
DHS's current grant process, such as time delays and other barriers in 
the provision of grant funding. We have not yet assessed DHS's 
provision of grant funding or the extent to which DHS monitors use of 
the funds. A recent legislative proposal would have the Department of 
Transportation, rather than DHS, distribute grant funds for specified 
surface transportation security purposes; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

DHS Has Made Substantial Progress in Maritime Security:

DHS has undertaken various programs to secure the maritime sector. In 
general, these maritime security programs fall under one of three 
areasæport and vessel security, maritime intelligence, and maritime 
supply chain security. Within DHS, various component agencies are 
responsible for maritime security efforts, including the Coast Guard, 
CBP, TSA, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The Coast Guard is 
responsible for port facility inspections and has lead responsibility 
in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. CBP is 
responsible for addressing the threat posed by terrorist smuggling of 
weapons in oceangoing containers. TSA is responsible for the 
implementation of the transportation worker identification credential 
program. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for 
acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation detection 
equipment, including portal monitors, within the United States.

As shown in table 26, we identified 23 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of maritime security, and we found that overall DHS has 
made substantial progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, 
we found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations 
and has generally not achieved 4 others. For 2 performance 
expectations, we did not make an assessment.

Table 26: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Maritime 
Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Develop national plans for maritime 
security; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 2. Develop national plans for maritime 
response; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Develop national plans for maritime 
recovery; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 4. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
security; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
response; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 6. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
recovery; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 7. Ensure port facilities have completed 
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Ensure that vessels have completed 
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 9. Exercise security, response, and recovery 
plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance security, response, and 
recovery efforts; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 10. Implement a national facility access 
control system for port secured areas; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 11. Implement a port security grant program to 
help facilities improve their security capabilities; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 12. Develop a national plan to establish and 
improve maritime intelligence; 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 13. Establish operational centers to monitor 
threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port 
level; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 14. Collect information on incoming ships to 
assess risks and threats; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 15. Develop a vessel-tracking system to 
improve intelligence and maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S. 
waters; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 16. Develop a long-range vessel-tracking 
system to improve maritime domain awareness; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 17. Collect information on arriving cargo for 
screening purposes; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 18. Develop a system for screening and 
inspecting cargo for illegal contraband; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 19. Develop a program to screen incoming cargo 
for radiation; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 20. Develop a program to work with foreign 
governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S. 
ports; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 21. Develop a program to work with the private 
sector to improve and validate supply chain security; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 22. Develop standards for cargo containers to 
ensure their physical security; 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 23. Develop an international port security 
program to assess security at foreign ports; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: Total; 
Assessment: Generally achieved: 17; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 4; 
Assessment: No assessment made: 2.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

Table 27 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS 
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in 
the area of maritime security and our assessment of whether DHS has 
taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance 
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most 
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).

Table 27: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Maritime Security:

Performance expectation: 1. Develop national plans for maritime 
security; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: The President and the Secretaries of 
Homeland Security, Defense, and State approved the supporting plans for 
National Strategy for Maritime Security in October 2005. The National 
Strategy for Maritime Security has eight supporting plans that are 
intended to address the specific threats and challenges of the maritime 
environment. The supporting plans are the National Plan to Achieve 
Domain Awareness; the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan; 
the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan; the International 
Outreach and Coordination Strategy; the Maritime Infrastructure 
Recovery Plan; the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan; the 
Maritime Commerce Security Plan; and the Domestic Outreach Plan. In 
addition, in September 2005, the Coast Guard issued Maritime Sentinel. 
Maritime Sentinel provides a framework for the Coast Guard's Ports, 
Waterways and Coastal Security program, setting out the Coast Guard's 
mission and goals in that area. Our review of Maritime Sentinel showed 
that the plan is results-oriented with outcome-based goals but that it 
needs to better describe the human capital resources necessary to 
achieve them; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS 
provided us with updated information on its efforts to develop national 
plans for maritime security. DHS reported that the Coast Guard has 
issued a number of plans supporting or relating to maritime security; 
Our assessment: Based on our review of Maritime Sentinel and updated 
information DHS provided, we conclude that that DHS has generally 
achieved this expectation; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Develop national plans for maritime 
response; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a national plan 
for response in conjunction with the Department of Defense. We have 
reported that the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan establishes 
roles and responsibilities for responding to marine terrorism to help 
resolve jurisdictional issues among responding agencies. For more 
information, see Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons 
Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170; DHS 
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated information on its efforts to develop national plans for 
maritime response. For example, DHS reported that the Maritime 
Operational Threat Response Plan is a strategic plan that addresses the 
full range of maritime threats including terrorism, piracy, drug 
smuggling, migrant smuggling, weapons of mass destruction 
proliferation, maritime hijacking, and fisheries incursions. DHS stated 
that this interagency national plan supersedes Presidential Directive-
27 (in the maritime domain only) for addressing nonmilitary incidents 
of national security significance and has been successfully exercised 
numerous times among agencies, including actual effective threat 
resolution. DHS further stated that the Maritime Operational Threat 
Response Plan is a national-level process to achieve consistently 
coordinated action and desired outcomes that directly support National 
Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-13; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally 
achieved this performance expectation as DHS has developed the Maritime 
Operational Threat Response Plan, which details agency responsibilities 
during incidents of marine terrorism; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Develop national plans for maritime 
recovery; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has 
developed the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, and the plan 
establishes a framework for maritime recovery. In April 2006, DHS 
released the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan. The Maritime 
Infrastructure Recovery Plan is intended to facilitate the restoration 
of maritime commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and 
reflects the disaster management framework outlined in the National 
Response Plan. The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan addresses 
issues that should be considered by ports when planning for natural 
disasters. However, it does not set forth particular actions that 
should be taken at the port level, leaving those determinations to be 
made by the port operators themselves. For more information, see Port 
Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in 
Disaster Planning and Recovery, GAO-07-412; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
security; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed 
regional (port-specific) plans for security. The Coast Guard led 
efforts to conduct a security assessment of each of the nation's 
seaports and develop a security plan for each seaport zone. Under 
regulations implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act, a 
Coast Guard Captain of the Port must develop an area plan in 
consultation with an Area Maritime Security Committee. These committees 
are typically composed of members from federal, local, and state 
governments; law enforcement agencies; maritime industry and labor 
organizations; and other port stakeholders that may be affected by 
security policies. In April 2007 we reported that implementing 
regulations for the Maritime Transportation Security Act specified that 
area plans include, among other things, operational and physical 
security measures in place at the port under different security levels, 
details of the security incident command and response structure, 
procedures for responding to security threats including provisions for 
maintaining operations in the port, and procedures to facilitate the 
recovery of the marine transportation system after a security incident. 
A Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular provided a 
common template for area plans and specified the responsibilities of 
port stakeholders under the plans. Currently, 46 area plans are in 
place at ports around the country. For more information, see Maritime 
Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act, GAO-
07-754T; Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations 
and Future Challenges, GAO-06-448T; Maritime Security: Enhancements 
Made, but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-
05-448T; and Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure 
an Effective Port Security Assessment Program, GAO-04-1062; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
response; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed 
regional (port-specific) plans for response. We have reported that the 
Captain of the Port is responsible for establishing both spill and 
terrorism response plans. In doing so, the Captain of the Port must 
identify local public and private port stakeholders who will develop 
and revise separate plans for marine spills of oil and hazardous 
materials and for terrorism response. Both plans call for coordinated 
implementation with other plans, such as the response and security 
plans developed by specific facilities or vessels. At the port level, 
effectively integrating spill and terrorism emergency responses 
requires all plans to operate in unison--the port spill response plan 
and the port terrorism response plan, as well as facility and vessel 
response plans; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 6. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for 
recovery; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has generally not developed 
regional (port-specific) plans for recovery. We have reported that 
guidance in the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan suggests that 
ports develop priorities for bringing vessels into port after a 
closure. Additionally, port terrorism response plans must include a 
section on crisis management and recovery to ensure the continuity of 
port operations; DHS updated information: In April 2007, DHS provided 
us with updated information on its efforts to develop regional (port-
specific) plans for recovery. DHS reported that the Coast Guard and CBP 
have developed protocols for recovery and resumption of trade. DHS 
stated that these protocols are currently being discussed with other 
federal agencies for coordination purposes and with the private sector 
to ensure that federal activities facilitate private sector recovery 
efforts. DHS also reported that Coast Guard headquarters is preparing 
guidance for field units for including recovery in their plans for 
creating Maritime Transportation System Recovery Units at the local 
(sector) level. Further, DHS reported that several ports have included 
recovery as part of their area plans, such as all ports in the Coast 
Guard's Atlantic Area, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and San 
Francisco. DHS stated that the level of detail in these plans varies 
but noted that many are working to enhance the section on recovery and 
resumption of trade. DHS added that these plans are developing as all-
hazard plans to include both natural and man-made incidents; Our 
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Our prior work has shown that work remains in 
DHS's efforts to develop regional (port-specific) plans for recovery; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 7. Ensure port facilities have completed 
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to ensure that 
port facilities have completed vulnerability assessments and developed 
security plans. Maritime Transportation Security Act implementing 
regulations require designated owners or operators of maritime 
facilities to identify vulnerabilities and develop security plans for 
their facilities. In May 2005 we reported that the Coast Guard had 
reviewed and approved the security plans of the over 3,000 facilities 
that were required to identify their vulnerabilities and take action to 
reduce them. Six months after July 1, 2004, the date by which the 
security plans were to be implemented, the Coast Guard reported that it 
had completed on-site inspections of all facilities to ensure the plans 
were being implemented as approved. In April 2007 we reported that 
Coast Guard guidance calls for the Coast Guard to conduct on-site 
facility inspections to verify continued compliance with security plans 
on an annual basis. A Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port 
Act amendment to the Maritime Transportation Security Act requires the 
Coast Guard to conduct at least two inspections of each facility 
annually, and it required that one of these inspections be unannounced. 
We are currently conducting a review of the Coast Guard's efforts for 
ensuring facilities' compliance with various Maritime Transportation 
Security Act requirements. For more information, see GAO-07-754T; GAO-
05-448T; and Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate 
New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838; 
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated information on its efforts to ensure that port facilities have 
completed vulnerability assessments and developed security plans. DHS 
reported that its Alternative Security Program allows for participants 
to use templates pre-approved by the Coast Guard for developing their 
security plans. Facilities that use these plans then undergo security 
plan verifications, as required by the Maritime Transportation Security 
Act; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has made progress in ensuring that port 
facilities have completed vulnerability assessments and developed 
security plans; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Ensure that vessels have completed 
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in ensuring 
that vessels have done vulnerability assessments and developed security 
plans. In May 2005 we reported that the Coast Guard had reviewed and 
approved the security plans of the more than 9,000 vessels that were 
required to identify their vulnerabilities and take action to reduce 
them. Six months after July 1, 2004, the date by which the security 
plans were to be implemented, the Coast Guard reported that it had 
completed on-site inspections of thousands of vessels to ensure the 
plans were being implemented as approved. For more information, see 
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning 
Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838 and GAO-05-448T; 
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated information on its efforts to ensure that vessels have 
completed vulnerability assessments and developed security plans. DHS 
reported that the Coast Guard completed security plan verifications for 
all inspected U.S.-flagged vessels by July 2005. DHS further reported 
that to date, the Coast Guard has completed security plan verifications 
on 98 percent of uninspected U.S.-flagged vessels regulated in 
accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. DHS noted 
that uninspected vessels are not required to undergo security plan 
verifications exams by regulation but stated the Coast Guard was 
committed to the goal of encouraging all vessel owners of uninspected 
vessels to undergo such examinations on a voluntary basis by the end of 
2006; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken steps to ensure that vessels 
have completed vulnerability assessments and developed security plans; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Exercise security, response, and recovery 
plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance security, response, and 
recovery efforts; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has generally exercised 
security, response, and recovery plans (at least at the regional level) 
with key stakeholders. The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for 
such testing and evaluation in the nation's ports and waterways, and as 
part of its response, it has added multi-agency and multicontingency 
terrorism exercises to its training program. These exercises vary in 
size and scope and are designed to test specific aspects of the Coast 
Guard's terrorism response plans, such as communicating with state and 
local responders, raising maritime security levels, or responding to 
incidents within the port. For each exercise the Coast Guard conducts, 
an after-action report detailing the objectives, participants, and 
lessons learned must be produced. We reported in January 2005 on the 
issues identified in port security exercises. For example, we found 
that 59 percent of the exercises raised communications issues, and 28 
percent raised concerns with participants' knowledge about who has 
jurisdiction or decision-making authority. In April 2007, we reported 
that the Coast Guard had conducted a number of exercises of its area 
plans over the past several years. For example, in fiscal year 2004, 
the Coast Guard conducted 85 port-based terrorism exercises that 
addressed a variety of possible scenarios. In August 2005, the Coast 
Guard and TSA initiated the Port Security Training Exercise Program--an 
exercise program designed to involve the entire port community, 
including public governmental agencies and private industry, and 
intended to improve connectivity of various surface transportation 
modes and enhance area plans. Between August 2005 and October 2007, the 
Coast Guard expects to conduct Port Security Training Exercise Program 
exercises for 40 area committees and other port stakeholders. For more 
information, see GAO-07-754T and Homeland Security: Process for 
Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further 
Attention, GAO-05-170; DHS updated information: In March and April 
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to 
exercise security, response, and recovery plans with key maritime 
stakeholders to enhance security, response, and recovery efforts. DHS 
reported that for each exercise the Coast Guard conducts, an after-
action report detailing the objectives, participants, and lessons 
learned must be produced within 21 days for non-contract-supported 
exercises and within 81 days for contract-supported exercises; Our 
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has made progress in exercising security, 
response, and recovery plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance 
security, response, and recovery efforts; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 10. Implement a national facility access 
control system for port secured areas; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: While DHS has taken steps 
to provide for an effective national facility access control system at 
ports, significant challenges remain. In September 2006 we identified 
several major challenges DHS and industry stakeholders face in 
addressing problems identified during Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential program testing and ensuring that key 
components of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
program can work effectively in the maritime sector, such as ensuring 
that the access control technology required to operate the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program, such as 
biometric card readers, works effectively in the maritime sector. 
Further, stakeholders at all 15 Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential testing locations we visited told us that TSA did not 
effectively communicate and coordinate with them regarding any problems 
that arose during testing at their facility. In July 2006 the DHS IG 
found that significant security vulnerabilities existed relative to the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential prototype systems, 
documentation, and program management. Further, the DHS IG reported 
that the Transportation Worker Identification Credential prototype 
systems were vulnerable to various internal and external security 
threats and that security-related issues identified could threaten the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential data. In April 2007 we 
testified that DHS had made progress toward implementing the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential. We reported, for 
example, that DHS had issued a rule that sets forth the requirements 
for enrolling and issuing cards to workers in the maritime sector and 
developed a schedule for enrolling worker and issuing Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential cards at ports; In April 2007 we 
reported that the SAFE Port Act contained a requirement for 
implementing the first major phase of the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential program by mid-2007. More specifically, it 
required DHS to implement Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential at the 10 highest risk ports by July 1, 2007; conduct a 
pilot program to test various aspects relating to Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential security card readers including access 
control technologies in the maritime environment; issue regulations 
requiring Transportation Worker Identification Credential card readers 
based on the findings of the pilot; and periodically report to Congress 
on the status of the program. DHS is taking steps to address these 
requirements, such as establishing a rollout schedule for enrolling 
workers and issuing Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
cards at ports and conducting a pilot program to test Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential access control technologies. However, 
we identified a number of challenges. For example, while DHS reports 
taking steps to address contract planning and oversight problems, the 
effectiveness of these steps will not be clear until implementation of 
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program begins. 
Additionally, significant challenges remain in enrolling about 770,000 
persons at about 3,500 facilities in the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential program. Sufficient communication and 
coordination to ensure that all individuals and organizations affected 
by the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program are 
aware of their responsibilities will require concerted effort on the 
part of DHS and the enrollment contractor. Further DHS and industry 
stakeholders need to address challenges regarding Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential access control technologies to ensure that 
the program is implemented effectively. Without fully testing all 
aspects of the technology, DHS may not be able ensure that the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential access control 
technology can meet the requirements of the system. For more 
information, see GAO-07-754T; Transportation Security: TSA Has Made 
Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential Program, but Challenges Remain, GAO-07-681T; Transportation 
Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982; 
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and 
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T; and Port Security: 
Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker 
Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106. Also, see Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, DHS Must Address 
Significant Security Vulnerabilities Prior to TWIC Implementation 
(Redacted), OIG-06-47 (Washington, D.C.: July 2006); DHS updated 
information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on 
its efforts to implement a national facility access control system for 
port secured areas. DHS reported that the Coast Guard is moving forward 
with TSA and its contractor to begin enrollments in the Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential program. DHS stated that Version 1 of 
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential will contain all of 
the required biometric information and that a second Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking will be published in February 2008 to address the technical 
requirements for readers that will be used at facilities and aboard 
vessels. DHS stated that in the meantime, a field test of card reader 
technology is scheduled for the Long Beach/Los Angeles port complex 
beginning in July 2007 and that this activity is in compliance with the 
timeline established in the SAFE Port Act. Further, DHS stated that the 
Coast Guard will request legislation requiring all persons who are 
deemed to need unescorted access to the secure areas of regulated 
vessels and facilities possess a valid Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential. DHS also reported that the Coast Guard is 
consolidating a number of merchant mariner licenses and documents into 
a single Merchant Mariner Credential. This consolidation is described 
in a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking that was published in 
the Federal Register simultaneously with the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential final rule on January 25, 2007, which will 
result in an effective date of March 26, 2007; Our assessment: We 
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance 
expectation. Although DHS has taken some actions to implement a 
national facility access control system for port secured areas, more 
work is needed for the department to achieve this performance 
expectation. As our previous work demonstrated, DHS faces a number of 
problems in implementing the Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential, such as ensuring that access control technology meets 
system requirements and ensuring sufficient communication and 
coordination so that all individuals and organizations affected by the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program are aware of 
their responsibilities. Further, while DHS reported a number of actions 
it has taken to meet this expectation, it did not provide us with 
documentation for some aspects of its efforts. For example, DHS did not 
provide us with documentation showing that it is making progress in 
starting enrollments; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 11. Implement a port security grant program to 
help facilities improve their security capabilities; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings and our assessment: We 
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation. 
The port security grant program provides assistance to nonfederal 
stakeholders for making security improvements at the nation's ports. 
During fiscal years 2002 through 2004, grants from the program totaled 
about $560 million and covered such concerns as more fencing, cameras, 
and communications equipment. For fiscal year 2005, the appropriations 
act for DHS provided $150 million for port security grants. For fiscal 
year 2006 the DHS appropriations act provided $175 million for the port 
security grant program, and in fiscal year 2007 the appropriations act 
provided $210 million for the program. While DHS has made progress in 
applying risk management to the port security grant program, it faces 
challenges in strengthening its approach, as demonstrated in part by 
its experience in awarding past grants. For example, DHS has 
established overall goals for the grant program but faces challenges in 
setting specific and measurable program objectives, in part because 
this effort hinges on similar action by other federal agencies. In 
February 2006 the DHS IG reported that DHS had improved the 
administration and effectiveness of the most recent round of port 
security grants, which totaled $142 million for 132 projects. For 
example, the DHS IG reported that DHS had directed funds to the 
nation's 66 highest risk ports using a risk-based formula and tiering 
process and had instituted a new funding allocation model. However, the 
DHS IG also found several challenges, identifying, for example, 20 
projects that reviewers determined did not meet national security 
priorities but were funded nonetheless. In its fiscal year 2006 
Performance and Accountability Report, DHS reported that a risk-based 
grant allocation process was completed in the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2006 and was a critical component of the process by which 
allocations were determined for the Port Security Grant Program. For 
more information, see Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to 
Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other 
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91. Also, see Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Inspector General, Follow Up Review of the Port 
Security Grant Program, OIG-06-24 (Washington, D.C.: February 2006, 
Revised) and Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 
General, Review of the Port Security Grant Program, OIG-05-10 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2005); 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 12. Develop a national plan to establish and 
improve maritime intelligence; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We generally have not conducted work 
on DHS's efforts to develop a national plan to establish and improve 
maritime intelligence, and as a result we cannot make an assessment of 
the extent to which DHS has taken actions to address this performance 
expectation; DHS updated information: In March and May 2007, DHS 
provided us with updated information on its efforts to develop a 
national plan to establish and improve maritime intelligence. DHS 
reported that the President approved the Global Maritime Intelligence 
Integration Plan in October 2005 in support of the National Strategy 
for Maritime Security; Our assessment: We did not make an assessment of 
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation. While DHS 
reported that the President approved the Global Maritime Intelligence 
Integration Plan, we were not able to determine the extent to which the 
plan has established and improved maritime intelligence; 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 13. Establish operational centers to monitor 
threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port 
level; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has established operational 
centers to monitor threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the 
regional/port level. In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard 
had two Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, located on each coast, 
that receive intelligence from, and provide intelligence to, the Coast 
Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. Maritime Intelligence Fusion 
Centers also provide actionable intelligence to Coast Guard commanders 
at the district and port levels and share that analysis with 
interagency partners. Another approach at improving information sharing 
and port security operations involves interagency operational centers--
command centers that bring together the intelligence and operational 
efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants. In April 2007, 
we reported that three ports currently have such centers, which are 
designed to have a unified command structure that can act on a variety 
of incidents ranging from possible terrorist attacks to search and 
rescue and environmental response operations. Several new interagency 
operational centers are about to come on line, but in continuing the 
expansion, DHS may face such challenges as creating effective working 
relationships and dealing with potential coordination problems. We also 
reported that the Coast Guard has the authority to create area 
committees--composed of federal, state, local, and industry members--
that help to develop the area plan for the port. Area committees serve 
as forums for port stakeholders, facilitating the dissemination of 
information through regularly scheduled meetings, issuance of 
electronic bulletins, and sharing key documents. As of June 2006, the 
Coast Guard had organized 46 area committees. Each has flexibility to 
assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of its port area, 
resulting in variations in the number of participants, the types of 
state and local organizations involved, and the way in which 
information is shared. The Coast Guard also reported that it had 
implemented a maritime monitoring system--known as the Common Operating 
Picture system--that fuses data from different sources. According to 
the Coast Guard, this system is the primary tool for Coast Guard 
commanders in the field to attain maritime domain awareness. For more 
information, see GAO-07-754T; Maritime Security: Information sharing 
Efforts Are Improving, GAO-06-933T; Maritime Security: New Structures 
Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing 
Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394; and GAO-05-448T; DHS updated 
information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on 
its efforts to establish operational centers to monitor threats and 
fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port level. DHS 
reported that at the port level, it is using pre-existing, primarily 
Coast Guard, command centers to foster information sharing and 
coordination of the operations of various federal and nonfederal 
participants. However, DHS noted that in most locations, these efforts 
are hampered by the limitations of pre-9/11 technology and physical 
space constraints; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally 
achieved this performance expectation. The Coast Guard established two 
regional Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, one on each coast. 
Further, the Coast Guard, with local federal port security 
stakeholders, has established three interagency operational centers 
with several new centers scheduled to come on line, and as of June 
2006, the Coast Guard had organized 46 area committees; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 14. Collect information on incoming ships to 
assess risks and threats; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken 
steps to collect information on incoming ships to assess risks and 
threats. This includes information relating to, for example, crew, 
passengers, and cargo. In March 2004, we reported that the Coast Guard 
had extended the former 24-hour notice of arrival prior to entering a 
United States port to 96 hours. The information provided with the 
notice of arrival includes details on the crew, passengers, cargo, and 
the vessel itself. This increase in notice has enabled the Coast Guard 
to screen more vessels in advance of arrival and allows additional time 
to prepare for boardings. For more information, see Coast Guard 
Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved 
Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 15. Develop a vessel-tracking system to 
improve intelligence and maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S. 
waters; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has made 
progress in developing a vessel-tracking system to improve 
intelligence/maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S. waters. The 
Nationwide Automatic Identification System uses a device aboard a 
vessel to transmit an identifying signal to a receiver located at the 
seaport and other ships in the area. This signal gives seaport 
officials and other vessels nearly instantaneous information and 
awareness about a vessel's identity, position, speed, and course. The 
Coast Guard intends to provide Nationwide Automatic Identification 
System coverage to meet maritime domain awareness requirements in all 
navigable waters of the United States and farther offshore. As of May 
2005, the Coast Guard had Nationwide Automatic Identification System 
coverage in several seaports and coastal areas. For more information, 
see GAO-05-448T and Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal 
Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification 
System, GAO-04-868; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 16. Develop a long-range vessel-tracking 
system to improve maritime domain awareness; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: While DHS has taken steps to develop 
a long-range vessel-tracking system, more work remains. In May 2005 we 
testified that the Coast Guard was working with the International 
Maritime Organization to develop functional and technical requirements 
for long-range tracking out to 2,000 nautical miles and had proposed an 
amendment to the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea for 
this initiative. The International Maritime Organization adopted 
amendments for the long-range identification and tracking of ships in 
May 2006. We have also reported that a recently passed International 
Maritime Organization requirement calls for most commercial vessels, 
including tankers, to begin transmitting identification and location 
information on or before December 31, 2008, to Safety of Life at Sea 
contracting governments under certain specified circumstances. This 
will allow the vessels to be tracked over the course of their voyages. 
Under this requirement, information on the ship's identity, location, 
date, and time of the position will be made available to the ship's 
flag state, the ship's destination port state, and any coastal state 
within 1,000 miles of the ship's route. For more information, see GAO-
05-448T; DHS updated information: In March, April, and June 2007, DHS 
provided us with updated information on its efforts to develop a long-
range vessel-tracking system to improve maritime domain awareness. DHS 
reported that it has classified and unclassified means available to 
perform long-range tracking. DHS stated that unclassified systems, 
including the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, are currently 
in the process of being fielded. DHS reported that the Nationwide 
Automatic Identification System, when implemented, will provide 
automatic identification system coverage from commercial satellites in 
all U.S. waters and up to 2,000 miles offshore. DHS stated that it 
expects initial capability in 2007. DHS also stated that it purchases 
tracking data from commercial sources in places where those 
capabilities are not currently fielded by the United States Coast 
Guard. DHS reported that work is in progress to establish a system 
through the International Maritime Organization that will provide an 
unclassified global tracking capability by 2008 as a part of an 
existing International Maritime Organization convention and give the 
United States a system that is compatible and interoperable with the 
Global maritime community. DHS reported that the Coast Guard will need 
to establish the capability to receive signals and interact with the 
International Maritime Organization's international data center and 
that the Coast Guard has funded various studies and demonstrations to 
address the implementation of long-range-tracking. Further, DHS 
reported that the Coast Guard has developed rule-making language that 
supports the International Maritime Organization rules regarding 
implementation of long-range tracking under the recently approved 
Safety of Life at Sea Chapter V. DHS stated that the proposed rule-
making is in final development and is expected to be published for 
comment later this year; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has 
generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has some 
vessel-tracking capabilities and is working with the International 
Maritime Organization to develop a long-range vessel-tracking system. 
However, DHS did not provide evidence that it has developed a long-
range vessel-tracking system out to 2,000 nautical miles; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 17. Collect information on arriving cargo for 
screening purposes; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS collects 
information on arriving cargo for screening purposes.[A] Pursuant to 
federal law, CBP required ocean carriers to electronically transmit 
cargo manifests to CBP's Automated Manifest System 24 hours before the 
cargo is loaded on a ship at a foreign port. In March 2004 we reported 
that according to CBP officials we contacted, although no formal 
evaluations had been done, the 24-hour rule was beginning to improve 
both the quality and timeliness of manifest information. CBP officials 
acknowledged, however, that although improved, manifest information had 
not always provided accurate or reliable data for targeting purposes. 
For more information see Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model 
and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and 
Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557 and 04-577T; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 18. Develop a system for screening and 
inspecting cargo for illegal contraband; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings and our assessment: We 
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation. 
DHS has developed a system for screening incoming cargo for illegal 
contraband--called the Automated Targeting System.[B] However, our 
previous work has identified a number of challenges to the 
implementation of this program. CBP employs its Automated Targeting 
System computer model to review documentation on all arriving 
containers and help select or target containers for additional 
scrutiny. The Automated Targeting System was originally designed to 
help identify illegal narcotics in cargo containers, but was modified 
to help detect all types of illegal contraband used by smugglers or 
terrorists. In addition, CBP has a program, called the Supply Chain 
Stratified Examination, which supplements the Automated Targeting 
System by randomly selecting additional containers to be physically 
examined. We identified a number of challenges to the implementation of 
the Automated Targeting System. For example, in March 2006 we testified 
that CBP did not yet have key controls in place to provide reasonable 
assurance that the Automated Targeting System was effective at 
targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of 
containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction. Further, we reported 
that while CBP strove to refine the Automated Targeting System to 
include intelligence information it acquires and feedback it receives 
from its targeting officers at the seaports, it was not able to 
systematically adjust the system for inspection results. In November 
2006, the DHS IG reported that national Automatic Targeting System 
performance measures were still being developed to determine the 
effectiveness of the Automatic Targeting System oceangoing container 
targeting system. The DHS IG also found that that CBP did not use all 
intelligence/information sources available for targeting purposes. In 
April 2007 we reported CBP faced the challenge of implementing the 
program while internal controls are being developed. CBP's vital 
mission does not allow it to halt its screening efforts while it puts 
these controls in place, and CBP thus faces the challenge of ensuring 
that it inspects the highest-risk containers even though it lacks 
information to optimally allocate inspection resources. For more 
information, see GAO-07-754T; Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary 
Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated 
Targeting System, GAO-06-591T; and Homeland Security: Summary of 
Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for 
Inspection, GAO-04-557T. Also, see Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Inspector General, Audit of Targeting Oceangoing Cargo 
Containers (Unclassified Summary), OIG-07-09 (Washington, D.C.: 
November 2006) and Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 
General, Audit of Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers (Unclassified 
Summary), OIG-05-26 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005); 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 19. Develop a program to screen incoming cargo 
for radiation; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: While DHS has taken steps to develop 
a program to screen incoming cargo for radiation, challenges remain.[C] 
As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 of 3,034 radiation portal 
monitors--about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans to deploy. 
As of February 2006, CBP estimated that with these deployments CBP had 
the ability to screen about 62 percent of all containerized shipments 
entering the United States, and roughly 77 percent of all private 
vehicles. Within these total percentages, CBP could screen 32 percent 
of all containerized seaborne shipments; 90 percent of commercial 
trucks and 80 percent of private vehicles entering from Canada; and 
approximately 88 percent of all commercial trucks and 74 percent of all 
private vehicles entering from Mexico. However, in March 2006 we 
reported that the deployment of portal monitors had fallen behind 
schedule, making DHS's goal of deploying 3,034 by 2009 unlikely. 
Further, in October 2006 we reviewed DHS's cost-benefit analysis for 
the deployment and purchase of $1.2 billion worth of new portal 
monitors. We found that DHS's cost-benefit analysis did not provide a 
sound analytical basis for the decision to purchase and deploy new 
portal monitor technology. For example, DHS did not use the results of 
its own performance tests in its cost-benefit analysis and instead 
relied on assumptions of the new technology's anticipated performance 
level. Further, the department's analysis did not include all of the 
major costs and benefits required by DHS guidelines. Finally, DHS used 
questionable assumptions in estimating the costs of current portal 
monitors. In March 2007 we reported that DHS has not yet collected a 
comprehensive inventory of testing information on commercially 
available polyvinyl toluene portal monitors. Such information--if 
collected and used--could improve the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office's understanding of how well portal monitors detect different 
radiological and nuclear materials under varying conditions. In turn, 
this understanding would assist the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's 
future testing, development, deployment, and purchases of portal 
monitors. Further, while DHS is improving its efforts to provide 
technical and operational information about radiation portal monitors 
to state and local authorities, some state representatives with whom we 
spoke, particularly those from states with less experience conducting 
radiation detection programs, would like to see the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office provide more prescriptive advice on what types of 
radiation detection equipment to deploy and how to use it. For more 
information, see Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Decision to Procure 
and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not 
Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis, GAO-07-581T;Combating Nuclear 
Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the National 
Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in Support of 
DNDO's Testing and Development Program, GAO-07-347R; Combating Nuclear 
Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New 
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available 
Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors' Costs and 
Benefits, GAO-07-133R; and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made 
Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-
Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389; DHS updated information: In 
March and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its 
efforts to develop a program to screen incoming cargo for radiation. 
DHS reported that the Coast Guard continues to develop the procedures 
and capabilities for detecting chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and high-yield explosive threats in the maritime environment. 
DHS reported that through these efforts, the Coast Guard has partnered 
with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and reported that it 
partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of 
Energy, and Department of Defense. DHS stated that the Coast Guard 
maintains three dedicated response teams, on call 365 days a year, to 
respond to and mitigate various environmental incidents. DHS reported 
that the Coast Guard has distributed personal radiation detectors, 
hand-held isotope identifiers, and radiation sensor backpacks to the 
field, and continues to pursue procurement of additional equipment 
through a joint acquisition strategy with Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office. Further, DHS as of March 9, 2007, CBP had deployed 966 
radiation portal monitors. DHS stated that these deployments provide 
CBP with the capability to screen approximately 91 percent of 
containerized cargo and 88 percent of personally owned vehicles 
entering the United States. DHS further stated that within these 
totals, CBP could screen about 89 percent of seaborne containerized 
cargo; 91 percent of commercial trucks and about 81 percent of 
personally owned vehicles arriving from Canada; and 96 percent of 
commercial trucks and 91 percent of personally owned vehicles arriving 
from Mexico; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not 
achieved this performance expectation. In our prior work, we reported 
that DHS was unlikely to reach its 2009 goal for radiation portal 
deployment. We also reported that in conducting its cost-benefit 
analysis of the decision to purchase and deploy new portal monitor 
technology, DHS did not include all of the major costs and benefits 
required by DHS guidelines and did not use the results of its own 
performance tests. The department instead relied on assumptions of the 
new technology's anticipated performance level. The lack of adequate 
means for acquiring technology is a major impediment to the development 
and implementation of the program; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 20. Develop a program to work with foreign 
governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S. 
ports; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a program to work 
with foreign governments to inspect suspicious cargo before leaving for 
U.S. ports. Announced in January 2002, the Container Security 
Initiative program was implemented to allow CBP officials to target 
containers at foreign seaports so that any high-risk containers may be 
inspected prior to their departure for U.S. destinations. The Security 
and Accountability for Every Port Act, which took effect in October 
2006, codified the Container Security Initiative. CBP first solicited 
the participation of the 20 foreign ports that shipped the highest 
volume of ocean containers to the United States. These top 20 ports are 
located in 14 countries and regions and shipped a total of 66 percent 
of all containers that arrived in U.S. seaports in 2001. CBP has since 
expanded the Container Security Initiative to strategic ports, which 
may ship lesser amounts of cargo to the United States but may also have 
terrorism or geographical concerns. We identified a number of 
challenges to the Container Security Initiative. For example, in April 
2005 we reported that staffing imbalances were impeding CBP from 
targeting all containers shipped from Container Security Initiative 
ports before they leave for the United States. However, we reported 
that CBP had been unable to staff the Container Security Initiative 
teams at the levels called for in the Container Security Initiative 
staffing model because of diplomatic and practical considerations. In 
terms of diplomatic considerations, the host government may limit the 
overall number of U.S. government employees to be stationed in the 
country and may restrict the size of the Container Security Initiative 
team. In terms of practical considerations, the host governments may 
not have enough workspace available for Container Security Initiative 
staff and may thus restrict the size of the Container Security 
Initiative team. The U.S. Department of State would also have to agree 
to the size of the Container Security Initiative teams, a decision that 
has to be balanced with the mission priorities of the embassy, the 
programmatic and administrative costs associated with increases in 
staffing, and security issues related to the number of Americans posted 
overseas. We reported that as a result of these staff imbalances, 35 
percent of U.S.-bound shipments from Container Security Initiative 
ports were not targeted and were therefore not subject to inspection 
overseas. We also reported the existence of limitations in one data 
source Container Security Initiative teams use for targeting high-risk 
containers. In April 2007 we reported that the number of seaports that 
participate in the program had grown to 50, with plans to expand to a 
total of 58 ports by the end of this fiscal year. We also identified 
several challenges to the Container Security Initiative. For example, 
we reported that there are no internationally recognized minimum 
technical requirements for the detection capability of nonintrusive 
inspection equipment used to scan containers. Consequently, host 
nations at Container Security Initiative seaports use various types of 
nonintrusive inspection equipment, and the detection capabilities of 
such equipment can vary. Further, we reported that some containers 
designated as high-risk did not receive an inspection at the Container 
Security Initiative seaport. Containers designated as high-risk by 
Container Security Initiative teams that are not inspected overseas 
(for a variety of reasons) are supposed to be referred for inspection 
upon arrival at the U.S. destination port. However, CBP officials noted 
that between July and September 2004, only about 93 percent of 
shipments referred for domestic inspection were inspected at a U.S. 
seaport. According to CBP, it is working on improvements in its ability 
to track such containers to ensure that they are inspected. We have 
ongoing work to further assess the Container Security Initiative. For 
more information, see GAO-07-754T; Homeland Security: Key Cargo 
Security Programs Can Be Improved, GAO-05-466T; Container Security: A 
Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would 
Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557; Homeland 
Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo 
Containers for Inspection, GAO-04-557T; and Container Security: 
Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to 
Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770. DHS updated information: In March 
and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts 
to develop a program to work with foreign governments to inspect 
suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S. ports. DHS reported that in 
April 2005 the Container Security Initiative began implementing 
revisions to the Container Security Initiative staffing model to have 
optimal levels of staff at Container Security Initiative ports to 
maximize the benefits of targeting and inspection activities, in 
conjunction with host nation customs officials, and to increase its 
staff at the National Targeting Center in the United States to 
complement the work of targeters overseas. DHS stated that this enabled 
Container Security Initiative ports to review and screen 100 percent of 
manifest information for containers destined to the United States; Our 
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this 
performance expectation. The department has developed a program to work 
with foreign governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves 
for U.S. ports. DHS has developed the Container Security Initiative, 
and the program allows CBP officials to target containers at foreign 
seaports for inspection. However, our previous work has identified a 
number of challenges to the implementation of this program, such as the 
detection capabilities of host nations' inspection equipment.
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 21. Develop a program to work with the private 
sector to improve and validate supply chain security; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a program to work 
with the private sector to improve and validate supply chain security, 
but some challenges remain. Initiated in November 2001, the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary program designed to 
improve the security of the international supply chain while 
maintaining an efficient flow of goods. Under the Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism, CBP officials work in partnership with 
private companies to review their supply chain security plans to 
improve members' overall security. In return for committing to making 
improvements to the security of their shipments by joining the program, 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism members may receive 
benefits that result in reduced scrutiny of their shipments. The 
Security and Accountability For Every Port Act, which took effect in 
October 2006, codified the program. In April 2007, we reported that 
since the inception of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, 
CBP has certified 6,375 companies, and as of March 2007, it had 
validated the security of 3,950 of them (61.9 percent). We also 
reported that while CBP initially set a goal of validating all 
companies within their first 3 years as Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism members, the program's rapid growth in membership 
made the goal unachievable. CBP then moved to a risk-based approach to 
selecting members for validation, considering factors such as the 
company having foreign supply chain operations in a known terrorist 
area or involving multiple foreign suppliers. CBP further modified its 
approach to selecting companies for validation to achieve greater 
efficiency by conducting "blitz" operations to validate foreign 
elements of multiple members' supply chains in a single trip. Blitz 
operations focus on factors such as Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism members within a certain industry, supply chains within a 
certain geographic area, or foreign suppliers to multiple Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism members. Risks remain a consideration, 
according to CBP, but the blitz strategy drives the decision of when a 
member company will be validated. However, we identified a number of 
challenges to Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. For example, 
CBP's standard for validations--to ensure that members' security 
measures are reliable, accurate and effective--is hard to achieve. 
Since the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary 
rather than a mandatory program, there are limits on how intrusive CBP 
can be in its validations. Further, challenges developing Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism outcome-based performance measures 
persist because of difficulty measuring deterrent effect. CBP has 
contracted with the University of Virginia for help in developing 
useful measures. We have ongoing work to further assess the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program. For more information, see 
GAO-07-754T; Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be 
Improved, GAO-05-466T; Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants 
Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, 
GAO-05-404; and Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs 
Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-
770; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us 
with updated information on its efforts to develop a program to work 
with the private sector to improve and validate supply chain security. 
For example, DHS reported that the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism program now has a Web based portal system that allows data 
storage and statistical tracking of all participants and also allows 
for reports to be run ensuring that performance goals are being met. 
DHS also stated that the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
reached its full staffing level of 156 Supply Chain Security 
Specialists in December of 2006; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. The department has 
developed a program to work with the private sector to improve and 
validate supply chain security. Through the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism, DHS officials work in partnership with private 
companies to improve members' overall security. However, our previous 
work has identified a number of challenges to the implementation of 
this program. For example, because the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism is a voluntary program, CBP is limited in how 
intrusive its validations can be, and CBP also faces challenges in 
developing outcome-based performance measures for the program; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 22. Develop standards for cargo containers to 
ensure their physical security; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We generally have not 
conducted work on DHS's efforts to develop standards to better secure 
containers, and as a result we cannot make an assessment of the extent 
to which DHS has taken actions to address this performance expectation; 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 23. Develop an international port security 
program to assess security at foreign ports; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed 
a program to assess security at foreign ports. However, our previous 
work has identified a number of challenges to the implementation of 
this program. To help secure the overseas supply chain, the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act required the Coast Guard to develop a 
program to assess security measures in foreign ports and, among other 
things, recommend steps necessary to improve security measures in their 
ports. In April 2007, we reported that the Coast Guard established this 
program, called the International Port Security Program, in April 2004. 
Under this program, the Coast Guard and host nations review the 
implementation of security measures in the host nations' ports against 
established security standards, such as the International Maritime 
Organization's International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. 
Coast Guard teams have been established to conduct country visits, 
discuss security measures implemented, and collect and share best 
practices to help ensure a comprehensive and consistent approach to 
maritime security in ports worldwide. The conditions of these visits, 
such as timing and locations, are negotiated between the Coast Guard 
and the host nation. Coast Guard officials also make annual visits to 
the countries to obtain additional observations on the implementation 
of security measures and ensure deficiencies found during the country 
visits are addressed. As of April 2007, the Coast Guard reported that 
it has visited 86 countries under this program and plans to complete 29 
more visits by the end of fiscal year 2007. We are currently conducting 
a review of the Coast Guard's international enforcement programs, such 
as the International Port Security Program. Although this work is still 
in process and not yet ready to be included in this assessment, we have 
completed a more narrowly scoped review required under the Security and 
Accountability For Every Port Act regarding security at ports in the 
Caribbean Basin. As part of this work, we looked at the efforts made by 
the Coast Guard in the region under the program and the Coast Guard's 
findings from the country visits it made in the region. In this review 
we found a number of challenges concerning program implementation. For 
example, for the countries in this region for which the Coast Guard had 
issued a final report, the Coast Guard reported that most had 
"substantially implemented the security code," while one country that 
was just recently visited was found to have not yet implemented the 
code and will be subject to a reassessment. At the facility level, the 
Coast Guard found several facilities needing improvements in areas such 
as access controls, communication devices, fencing, and lighting. 
Because our review of the Coast Guard's International Port Security 
Program is still ongoing, we have not yet reviewed the results of the 
Coast Guard's findings in other regions of the world. While our larger 
review is still not complete, Coast Guard officials have told us they 
face challenges in carrying out this program in the Caribbean Basin. 
These challenges include ensuring sufficient numbers of adequately 
trained personnel and addressing host nation sovereignty issues. For 
more information, see GAO-07-754T and GAO-05-448T; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[A] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used 
interchangeably to denote some level of examination of a person or 
good, which can entail a number of different actions, including manual 
physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain weapons, 
explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using noninstrusive 
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be 
inspected. However, for this performance expectation, we use the term 
"inspect" to refer to this broad range of activities and "screening" to 
refer to an assessment of the security risk posed by a container based 
on available information.

[B] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used 
interchangeably to denote some level of examination of a person or 
good, which can entail a number of different actions, including manual 
physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain weapons, 
explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using noninstrusive 
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be 
inspected. However, for this performance expectation, we use the term 
"inspect" to refer to this broad range of activities and "screening" to 
refer to an assessment of the security risk posed by a container based 
on available information.

[C] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used 
interchangeably to denote some level of examination of a person or 
good, which can entail a number of different actions, including manual 
physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain weapons, 
explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using noninstrusive 
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be 
inspected. For this performance expectation, we use the terms "screen" 
and "inspect" to refer to this broad range of activities.

[End of table]

DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Its Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Efforts:

Several federal legislative and executive provisions support 
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford 
Act)[Footnote 25] primarily establishes the programs and processes for 
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency 
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments; individuals; and 
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has 
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. 
FEMA's emergency preparedness and response efforts include programs 
that prepare to minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks 
and disasters; help to plan, equip, train, and practice needed skills 
of first responders; and consolidate federal response plans and 
activities to build a national, coordinated system for incident 
management. DHS's emergency preparedness and response efforts have been 
affected by DHS reorganizations and, in the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast 
hurricanes, reassessments of some initiatives, such as the National 
Response Plan and its Catastrophic Incident Supplement. DHS is 
undergoing its second reorganization of its emergency preparedness and 
response programs in about 18 months. The first reorganization was 
initiated by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the summer of 2005 
and created separate organizations within DHS responsible for 
preparedness and for response and recovery. The second reorganization 
was required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act and largely 
took effect on April 1, 2007.

As shown in table 28, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS 
in the area of emergency preparedness and response and found that 
overall DHS has made limited progress in meeting those performance 
expectations. In particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved 5 
performance expectations and has generally not achieved 18 others. For 
1 performance expectation, we did not make an assessment.

Table 28: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Emergency 
Preparedness and Response:

Performance expectation: 1. Establish a comprehensive training program 
for national preparedness; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 2. Establish a program for conducting 
emergency preparedness exercises; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 3. Conduct and support risk assessments and 
risk management capabilities for emergency preparedness; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Ensure the capacity and readiness of 
disaster response teams; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 5. Develop a national incident management 
system; Assessment: 
Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 6. Coordinate implementation of a national 
incident management system; Assessment: 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 7. Establish a single, all-hazards national 
response plan; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Coordinate implementation of a single, all-
hazards response plan; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 9. Develop a complete inventory of federal 
response capabilities; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 10. Develop a national, all-hazards 
preparedness goal; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 11. Support citizen participation in national 
preparedness efforts; 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 12. Develop plans and capabilities to 
strengthen nationwide recovery efforts; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 13. Develop the capacity to provide needed 
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 14. Provide timely assistance and services to 
individuals and communities in response to emergency events; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 15. Implement a program to improve 
interoperable communications among federal, state, and local agencies; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 16. Implement procedures and capabilities for 
effective interoperable communications; Assessment: 
Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 17. Increase the development and adoption of 
interoperability communications standards; 
Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 18. Develop performance goals and measures to 
assess progress in developing interoperability; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 19. Provide grant funding to first responders 
in developing and implementing interoperable communications 
capabilities; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 20. Provide guidance and technical assistance 
to first responders in developing and implementing interoperable 
communications capabilities; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 21. Provide assistance to state and local 
governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved. 

Performance expectation: 22. Administer a program for providing grants 
and assistance to state and local governments and first responders; 
Assessment: Generally achieved. 

Performance expectation: 23. Allocate grants based on assessment 
factors that account for population, critical infrastructure, and other 
risk factors; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 24. Develop a system for collecting and 
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to emergency 
responders; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: Total; 
Assessment: Generally achieved: 5; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 18; 
Assessment: No assessment made: 1.

Source: GAO analysis.

Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has 
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation. 
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no 
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the 
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, 
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken 
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance 
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted 
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not 
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have 
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to 
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided 
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has 
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment 
made."

[End of table]

Table 29 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS 
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in 
the area of emergency preparedness and response and our assessment of 
whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the 
performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to 
satisfy most of the performance expectation's key elements (generally 
not achieved).

Table 29: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in 
Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Performance expectation: 1. Establish a comprehensive training program 
for national preparedness; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has developed and 
implemented various training programs, but it is unclear how these 
programs contribute or link to a comprehensive training program for 
national preparedness. In July 2005, we reported that according to 
DHS's National Training and Exercises and Lessons Learned 
Implementation Plan, DHS intended to implement a system to develop and 
maintain state and local responders' all-hazards capabilities. The goal 
of this system was to provide integrated national programs for 
training, exercise, and lessons learned that would reorient existing 
initiatives at all government levels in order to develop, achieve, and 
sustain the capabilities required to achieve the National Preparedness 
Goal. As part of this system, DHS intended to implement a national 
training program including providing criteria for accreditation of 
training courses, a national directory of accredited training 
providers, and a National Minimum Qualification Standards Guide. In 
March 2006, the DHS IG reported that FEMA provided regular training for 
emergency responders at the federal, state, and local levels; managed 
the training and development of FEMA employees internally; and provided 
disaster-specific training through the Disaster Field Training 
Operations cadre. FEMA's Training Division increased the size and 
number of classes it delivered, even as budgets decreased. The DHS IG 
found that courses provided by the Emergency Management Institute were 
one of FEMA's primary interactions with state and local emergency 
managers and responders. However, the DHS IG reported that the ability 
of Emergency Management Institute classes to improve emergency 
management during a hurricane was not quantifiable with available 
measurements. The DHS IG reported that employee development lacked the 
resources and organizational alignment to improve performance. 
Specifically, the DHS IG reported that FEMA had no centralized and 
comprehensive information on employee training. FEMA used several 
incompatible systems, including databases operated by the Employee 
Development branch, Emergency Management Institute, Disaster Field 
Training Operations cadre, and information technology security. 
Additional classes, including classes provided at conferences, classes 
provided by state or local entities, and leadership training courses, 
were not consistently tracked. The DHS IG reported that FEMA regional 
training managers maintained records on their own, drawing from each of 
these systems. The DHS IG concluded that not only was this process 
inefficient and susceptible to error, it also complicated efforts to 
monitor employee development of mission-critical skills and 
competencies. For more information, see Statement by Comptroller 
General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R 
and Homeland Security: DHS's Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652. Also, see 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A 
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS 
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated information on its efforts to establish a comprehensive 
training program for national preparedness. DHS has developed a series 
of training programs on the National Response Plan and the National 
Incident Management System to improve national preparedness. In 
particular, DHS reported that more than 100 Office of Grants and 
Training-supported courses are available to emergency responders and 
that in fiscal year 2006, there were more than 336,000 participants in 
Office of Grants and Training courses. DHS has also developed and 
implemented a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan designed to guide 
states in linking training and exercise activities. According to DHS, 
states identify priorities in their state strategies, translate them 
into target capabilities that they need to build, and then attend a 
workshop in which they build a schedule for training and exercises to 
address the capabilities. DHS reported that course content in the 
National Training Program is being aligned to target capabilities so 
that there is a direct link between the capabilities a state needs to 
build and the courses that its responders need to take to build those 
skills. In addition, DHS reported that the U.S. Fire Administration's 
National Fire Academy and FEMA's Emergency Management Institute have 
coordinated to develop a curriculum for first responder training across 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments and that in fiscal year 
2006, more than 26,000 and 13,000 students attended training at the 
National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute, 
respectively. DHS noted that with the re-creation of the National 
Integration Center in FEMA's new National Preparedness Directorate, 
FEMA will be coordinating development of a comprehensive national 
training strategy to ensure course curriculum is consistent among 
training facilities and to avoid duplication or overlap; Our 
assessment: Until DHS issues a comprehensive national training 
strategy, we conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Although DHS has developed and implemented a 
variety of training programs related to national preparedness, 
specifically on the National Response Plan and National Incident 
Management System, DHS did not provide us with evidence on how these 
various programs have contributed to the establishment of a 
comprehensive, national training program. Moreover, DHS reported that 
it is working to develop a comprehensive national training strategy, 
but did not provide us with a target time frame for completing and 
issuing the national strategy; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 2. Establish a program for conducting 
emergency preparedness exercises; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken actions to 
establish a program for conducting emergency preparedness exercises, 
but much more work remains. In July 2005 we reported that as part of 
its plan for national training, exercises, and lessons learned, DHS 
intended to establish a national exercise program. This program was 
intended to reorient the existing National Exercise Program to 
incorporate the capabilities-based planning process and provide 
standardized guidance and methodologies to schedule, design, develop, 
execute, and evaluate exercises at all levels of government. This 
program was also intended to provide requirements for the number and 
type of exercises that communities of varying sizes should conduct to 
meet the National Preparedness Goal. In March 2006, the DHS IG reported 
on the long-term deterioration in FEMA's exercise program. The DHS IG 
reported that emergency management exercises were developed to test and 
validate existing programs, policies, plans, and procedures to address 
a wide range of disasters to which FEMA must respond. There were 
numerous types of exercises, ranging from tabletop exercises, where 
participants discussed actions and responses, to command post 
exercises, where specific aspects of a situation were exercised, to 
large-scale exercises, which involved multiple entities and a 
significant planned event with activation of personnel and resources. 
Further, the DHS IG reported that FEMA no longer had a significant role 
in the development, scope, and conduct of state exercises, though FEMA 
personnel maintained a presence at state events. FEMA participated in 
exercises administered by other agencies, but those exercises limited 
FEMA's ability to choose which plans, objectives, and relationships to 
test. For more information, see GAO-06-365R and GAO-05-652. Also, see 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A 
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS 
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated information on its efforts to establish a program for 
conducting emergency preparedness exercises. DHS has developed a 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program that, according to DHS, 
has been adopted by every major federal agency involved in emergency 
preparedness. This program provides a standardized methodology for 
exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement 
planning and provides guidance and doctrine for exercises that are 
conducted with homeland security grant funding. According to DHS, all 
exercise grant recipients are mandated to comply with Homeland Security 
Exercise Evaluation Program guidelines. DHS reported that for exercises 
for which the department collected and analyzed information in fiscal 
year 2006, 33 out of 48 Direct Support Exercises were compliant with 
the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program and 40 out of 110 
state or locally funded grant exercises were compliant. DHS noted that 
it has not evaluated regional and national exercises' compliance with 
the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program. DHS has also 
developed a Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program Toolkit, 
which is an online system that walks users through scheduling, 
planning, evaluating, and tracking corrective actions from an exercise. 
DHS has also developed the Corrective Action Program to track and 
monitor corrective actions following exercises and the National 
Exercise Schedule to facilitate the scheduling and synchronization of 
national, federal, state, and local exercises. In addition, DHS 
reported that the National Exercise Program charter was approved by the 
Homeland Security Council, and DHS reported that the National Exercise 
Program Implementation Plan has been approved by the President and is 
scheduled to be released shortly; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS 
has generally achieved this performance expectation. The National 
Exercise Program charter has been established and approved. Moreover, 
DHS has developed and begun to implement the Homeland Security Exercise 
Evaluation Program. This program provides standardized guidance and 
methodologies for scheduling, developing, executing, and evaluating 
emergency preparedness exercises; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 3. Conduct and support risk assessments and 
risk management capabilities for emergency preparedness; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to support 
efforts to conduct risk assessments and develop risk management 
capabilities for emergency preparedness, but much more work remains. In 
July 2005 we reported that, according to DHS's Assessment and Reporting 
Implementation Plan, DHS intended to implement an assessment and 
reporting system to collect preparedness data to inform decision makers 
at all levels on the capabilities of the federal government, states, 
local jurisdictions, and the private sector. According to the plan, DHS 
intended to collect data from all governmental recipients of direct 
funding, using states to collect data from local jurisdictions and 
using federal regulatory agencies and other appropriate sources to 
collect private sector data. According to DHS, aggregating these data 
at all levels would provide information needed to allocate resources, 
execute training and exercises, and develop an annual status report on 
the nation's preparedness. The purpose of the assessment and reporting 
system was to provide information about the baseline status of national 
preparedness and to serve as the third stage of DHS's capability-based 
planning approach to ensure that state and local first responder 
capabilities fully support the National Preparedness Goal. For more 
information, see Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles 
to Guide Federal Investments, GAO-07-386T and GAO-05-652; DHS updated 
information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on 
its efforts to conduct and support risk assessments and risk management 
capabilities for emergency preparedness. In particular, in April 2007, 
DHS established the new Office of Risk Management and Analysis to serve 
as the DHS Executive Agent for national-level risk management analysis 
standards and metrics; develop a standardized approach to risk; develop 
an approach to risk management to help DHS leverage and integrate risk 
expertise across components and external stakeholders; assess DHS risk 
performance to ensure programs are measurably reducing risk; and 
communicate DHS risk management in a manner that reinforces the risk-
based approach; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS did not provide us with 
documentation on its efforts to actually conduct risk assessments and 
support risk management capabilities specifically for emergency 
preparedness. Moreover, DHS has only recently established the new 
Office of Risk Management and Analysis, and this office's effect on 
DHS's efforts to support risk management capabilities for emergency 
preparedness is not yet known; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 4. Ensure the capacity and readiness of 
disaster response teams; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced challenges 
in ensuring the capacity and readiness of emergency response teams. In 
our work reviewing the response to Hurricane Katrina, we reported that 
while there were aspects that worked well, it appeared that logistics 
systems for critical resources were often totally overwhelmed by the 
hurricane, with critical resources apparently not available, properly 
distributed, or provided in a timely manner. We also reported that the 
magnitude of the affected population in a major catastrophe calls for 
greater capabilities for disaster response. In March 2006, the DHS IG 
reported that, historically, FEMA has established a 72-hour time period 
as the maximum amount of time for emergency response teams to arrive on 
scene. However, the DHS IG concluded that it was unclear whether this 
was responsive to the needs of a state and the needs of disaster 
victims. The DHS IG reported that a 72-hour response time did not meet 
public expectations, as was vividly demonstrated by media accounts 
within 24 hours after landfall of Hurricane Katrina. The DHS IG noted 
that shorter time periods, such as 60 hours, 48 hours, or even 12 
hours, had been mentioned. However, to meet this level of expectation, 
several factors had to be addressed. According to the DHS IG, once 
strategic performance measures and realistic expectations were 
established, other actions could be taken to support those response 
goals. For more information, see GAO-06-365R. Also, see Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A Performance Review of 
FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS updated information: In 
March and May 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its 
efforts to ensure the capacity and readiness of disaster response 
teams. DHS reported that FEMA has completed efforts to identify and 
categorize more than 100 resources, including teams and pieces of 
equipment, which are then grouped into eight disciplines, such as law 
enforcement resources, emergency medical services, and search and 
rescue resources. DHS also provided information on its various disaster 
response teams currently in use. DHS's Emergency Response Teams-
National are to be deployed in response to incidents of national 
significance and major disasters to coordinate disaster response 
activities, coordinate and deploy key national response assets and 
resources, provide situational awareness, and maintain connectivity 
with DHS operations centers and components. DHS's Emergency Response 
Teams-Advanced are designed to be deployed in the early phases of an 
incident to work directly with states to assess disaster impact, gain 
situational awareness, help coordinate disaster response, and respond 
to specific state requests for assistance. DHS's Rapid Needs Assessment 
Teams are small regional teams that are designed to collect disaster 
information to determine more specific disaster response requirements. 
In addition, Federal Incident Response Support Teams are designed to 
serve as the forward component of Emergency Response Teams-Advanced to 
provide preliminary on-scene federal management in support of the local 
Incident or Area Commander. DHS has established readiness indicators 
for the Federal Incident Response Support Teams and Urban Search and 
Rescue teams have their own indicators, but FEMA officials stated that 
they have not yet developed readiness indicators for other types of 
response teams. DHS reported that its Federal Incident Response Teams 
were tested during Tropical Storm Ernesto and other events, such as 
tornadoes. In addition, FEMA reported that it is developing a concept 
for new rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams 
designed to provide a forward federal presence to facilitate managing 
the national response for catastrophic incidents, called National 
Incident Management and Regional Incident Management Teams; Our 
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. Although DHS provided us with documentation on 
its various response teams and efforts taken to strengthen teams' 
readiness and capacity, DHS did not provide us with concrete evidence 
to demonstrate that response teams' readiness and capacity have 
improved since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although DHS has tested its 
response team capabilities in several small-scale disasters, they have 
not been tested in a large-scale disaster. In addition, DHS did not 
provide us with documentation of the results of exercises, tests, or 
after-action reports on the small-scale disasters in which the response 
teams have been used that would indicate enhancements in teams' 
readiness and capacity. Moreover, DHS has not yet developed readiness 
indicators for its disaster responses teams other than Urban Search and 
Rescue and Federal Incident Response Support Teams; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 5. Develop a national incident management 
system; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a national 
incident management system. The National Incident Management System is 
a policy document that defines roles and responsibilities of federal, 
state, and local first responders during emergency events. The intent 
of the system described in the document is to establish a core set of 
concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to 
enable effective, efficient, and collaborative emergency event 
management at all levels. These concepts, principles, and processes are 
designed to improve the ability of different jurisdictions and first 
responder disciplines to work together in various areas--command, 
resource management, training, and communications. For more 
information, see Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, 
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the 
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 
System, GAO-06-618 and GAO-05-652; DHS updated information: In March 
and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on efforts to 
further develop the National Incident Management System. DHS reported 
that the National Incident Management System has been undergoing review 
and revision by federal, state, and local government officials; tribal 
authorities; and nongovernmental and private sector authorities. 
According to DHS, the National Incident Management System document is 
under review pending release of the revised National Response Plan, now 
the National Response Framework. The current version of the National 
Incident Management System document remains in effect during the 2007 
hurricane season; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed the National 
Incident Management System, and the system defines the roles and 
responsibilities of various entities during emergency events; 
Assessment: Generally achieved.

Performance expectation: 6. Coordinate implementation of a national 
incident management system; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Much more work remains for DHS to 
effectively coordinate implementation of the National Incident 
Management System. Drawing on our prior work identifying key practices 
for helping to enhance and sustain collaboration among federal 
agencies, key practices for collaboration and coordination include, 
among other things, defining and articulating a common outcome; 
establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the 
outcome; identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources; 
agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; establishing 
compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across 
agency boundaries; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and 
report the results of collaborative efforts; and reinforcing agency 
accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and 
reports. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 requires all 
federal departments and agencies to adopt and use the system in their 
individual preparedness efforts, as well as in support of all actions 
taken to assist state and local governments. However, in our work on 
Hurricane Katrina, we reported on examples of how an incomplete 
understanding of the National Incident Management System roles and 
responsibilities led to misunderstandings, problems, and delays. In 
Louisiana, for example, some city officials were unclear about federal 
roles. In Mississippi, we were told that county and city officials were 
not implementing the National Incident Management System because they 
did not understand its provisions. For more information, see GAO-06-618 
and GAO-05-652; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS 
provided us with updated information on efforts to coordinate 
implementation of the National Incident Management System. DHS reported 
that in March 2004, it established the National Incident Management 
System Integration Center to coordinate implementation of the system. 
This center issues compliance guidelines to state and local responders 
annually and collects data on efforts to coordinate implementation of 
the National Incident Management System. DHS reported that more than 1 
million state and local responders have taken training following 
guidelines established by the center for National Incident Management 
System compliance and that about 5.4 million students have received 
National Incident Management System-required training through the 
Emergency Management Institute as of February 2007. DHS also reported 
that the center, in conjunction with the Emergency Management 
Institute, released seven new National Incident Management System 
training programs in fiscal year 2006, including courses on multiagency 
coordination, public information systems, and resource management, 
among others. DHS has also developed sample National Incident 
Management System-compliant tabletop, functional, and command post 
exercises for use by federal, state, and local government agencies in 
testing system policies, plans, procedures, and resources in emergency 
operations plans. In addition, the National Incident Management System 
specifies 34 requirements that state and local governments must meet to 
be compliant with the system, and as of October 1, 2006, all federal 
preparedness assistance administered by DHS became contingent on 
states' compliance with the system, including federal funding through 
the DHS Emergency Management Performance Grants, Homeland Security 
Grant Program, and Urban Area Security Initiative. DHS reported that 
during fiscal years 2005 and 2006, National Incident Management System 
requirements, including the completion of training, were based on a 
self-certification process. For fiscal year 2007, DHS reported that the 
self-certification process will not be used; rather DHS provided states 
a specific set of metrics for implementation of the National Incident 
Management System, and states are required to report on the 
establishment of these measurements; Our assessment: We conclude that 
DHS has generally not achieved this performance expectation. In fiscal 
years 2005 and 2006, states self-certified that they had met National 
Incident Management System requirements, and DHS has not fully verified 
the extent to which states were compliant with system requirements 
during those years. DHS has provided states with a specific set of 
metrics for fiscal year 2007, but the extent to which these metrics 
will enhance DHS's ability to monitor states' compliance with the 
National Incident Management System is not yet known. In addition, 
although DHS has taken actions, such as issuing compliance guidelines, 
providing training, developing sample exercises, and collecting data on 
implementation of the National Incident Management System, DHS did not 
provide us with documentation demonstrating how these actions have 
contributed to DHS's effective coordination of implementation of the 
system. For example, DHS did not provide us with documentation on how 
these training and exercise programs have contributed to ensuring 
effective coordination of National Incident Management System 
implementation; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 7. Establish a single, all-hazards national 
response plan; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has established a single all-
hazards national response plan, but the plan is undergoing revision. In 
December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan, which was 
intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a 
single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic 
incidents where federal involvement is necessary. The National Response 
Plan is applicable to incidents that go beyond the state and local 
levels and require a coordinated federal response, and the plan, 
operating within the framework of the National Incident Management 
System, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy 
and operational direction for domestic incident management. The plan 
also includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which describes an 
accelerated, proactive national response to catastrophic incidents. DHS 
revised the National Response Plan following Hurricane Katrina, but we 
reported that these revisions did not fully address, or they raised 
new, challenges faced in implementing the plan. For more information, 
see GAO-06-618; DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided 
us with updated information on efforts to establish an all-hazards 
national response plan. DHS reported that the National Response Plan is 
currently undergoing review and revision by federal, state, and local 
government officials; tribal authorities; and nongovernmental and 
private sector officials. According to DHS, this review includes all 
major components of the National Response Plan, including the base 
plan, Emergency Support Functions, annexes, and the role of the 
Principal Federal Official, Federal Coordinating Officer, and Joint 
Field Office Structure. A Catastrophic Planning Work Group is examining 
the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement. DHS noted that this 
review is being conducted in four phases, with the first phase focused 
on prioritization of key issues, the second phase focused on the 
rewriting process, the third phase focused on releasing the revised 
documents, and the fourth phase focused on providing a continuous cycle 
of training, exercises, and periodic reviews. DHS reported that, as of 
March 2007, it was in the rewriting phase and has gathered input on key 
issues from internal and external stakeholders, after-action reports, 
Hurricane Katrina reports, and other resources. According to DHS, the 
revised document is renamed the National Response Framework and was 
released to internal stakeholders for review at the end of July 2007. 
Based on the review, edits and updates will be made to the document 
prior to its anticipated release on August 20, 2007 for a 30 day public 
comment period. DHS reported that the current version of the National 
Response Plan document remains in effect during the 2007 hurricane 
season; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS issued the National Response 
Plan and a limited post-Katrina revision in May 2006, but we and others 
have identified concerns with those revisions. DHS also recognized the 
need for a more in-depth, substantive review and revision of the plan 
and expects to issue the latest revision in August 2007. DHS has 
acknowledged that some complex issues have taken more time than 
expected to assess and resolve. The changes made to the plan may affect 
roles and responsibilities under the plan and federal, state, and local 
agencies' training, exercises, and implementation plans. Until the 
National Response Plan and its annexes and Catastrophic Supplement are 
completed and distributed to all those with roles and responsibilities 
under the plan, federal agencies and others that have new or amended 
responsibilities under the revised plan cannot complete their 
implementation plans and the agreements needed to make the National 
Response Plan, its annexes, and supplements fully operational; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 8. Coordinate implementation of a single, all-
hazards response plan; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Much more work remains 
for DHS to effectively coordinate implementation of the National 
Response Plan. Drawing on our prior work identifying key practices for 
helping to enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies, 
key practices for collaboration and coordination include, among other 
things, defining and articulating a common outcome; establishing 
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the outcome; 
identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources; agreeing upon 
agency roles and responsibilities; establishing compatible policies, 
procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; 
developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of 
collaborative efforts; and reinforcing agency accountability for 
collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports. In March 2006, 
the DHS IG reported on FEMA's disaster management activities in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina. The DHS IG reported that during the 
response, several significant departures from National Response Plan 
protocols occurred: (1) DHS's actions to apply National Response Plan 
protocols for Incidents of National Significance and catastrophic 
incidents were ambiguous; (2) DHS defined a new, operational role for 
the Principal Federal Officer by assigning the officer both Federal 
Coordinating Officer and Disaster Recovery Manager authorities; and (3) 
the Interagency Incident Management Group took an operational role not 
prescribed in the National Response Plan. As a backdrop to these 
changes, the DHS IG reported that FEMA had not yet developed or 
implemented policies and training for roles and responsibilities 
necessary to supplement the National Response Plan. In reviewing DHS's 
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we also identified numerous 
weaknesses in efforts to implement the plan. For example, in the 
response to Hurricane Katrina, we reported in September 2006 that there 
was confusion regarding roles and responsibilities under the plan. DHS 
revised the National Response Plan following Hurricane Katrina, but we 
reported that these revisions did not fully address, or they raised 
new, challenges faced in implementing the plan. For more information, 
see GAO-06-618. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management 
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2006); DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided 
us with updated information on efforts to coordinate implementation of 
the National Response Plan. DHS reported that it developed and released 
training programs to support the National Response Plan and that this 
training has been required as a condition of certification of National 
Incident Management System compliance by state and local governments. 
DHS also reported that it is revising the National Response Framework 
and intends to release the revised plan in August 2007; Our assessment: 
We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance 
expectation. DHS did not provide us with documentation on how its 
training programs have contributed overall to the department's efforts 
to coordinate implementation of the National Response Plan and could 
not demonstrate to us that the department has made progress in 
improving its ability to coordinate plan implementation since Hurricane 
Katrina. As we previously stated, the revised National Response Plan 
may require changes in federal, state, and local agencies' training, 
exercises, and implementation plans. It is also unclear how the revised 
plan will be implemented by states and first responders during the 
coming hurricane season, given that these entities will not have had an 
opportunity to train and practice under the revised version of the 
plan. We are concerned that if the revisions are not completed prior to 
the beginning of the 2007 hurricane season, it is unlikely that the 
changes resulting from these revisions could be effectively implemented 
for the 2007 hurricane season; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 9. Develop a complete inventory of federal 
response capabilities; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has undertaken efforts related 
to development of an inventory of federal response capabilities, but 
did not provide us with evidence on the extent to which its efforts 
have resulted in the development of a complete inventory. In July 2005 
we reported that DHS began the first stage of the capabilities-based 
planning process identifying concerns using 15 National Planning 
Scenarios that were developed by the Homeland Security Council. As it 
moved to the step in the process of developing a sense of preparedness 
needs and potential capabilities, DHS created a list of tasks that 
would be required to manage each of the 15 National Planning Scenarios. 
Then, in consultation with federal, state, and local emergency response 
stakeholders, it consolidated the list to eliminate redundancies and 
create a Universal Task List of over 1,600 discrete tasks. Next, DHS 
identified target capabilities that encompassed these critical tasks. 
From this universe of potential tasks, DHS worked with stakeholders to 
identify a subset of about 300 critical tasks that must be performed 
during a large-scale event to reduce loss of life or serious injuries, 
mitigate significant property damage, or are essential to the success 
of a homeland security mission. The final step of the first stage of 
DHS's planning process was to decide on goals, requirements, and 
metrics. To complete this step, DHS, working with its stakeholders, 
developed a Target Capabilities List that identified 36 capabilities 
needed to perform the critical tasks for the events illustrated by the 
15 scenarios. In December 2005, DHS issued an updated version of the 
Target Capabilities List. For more information, see GAO-05-652; DHS 
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated information on its efforts to develop a complete inventory of 
federal response capabilities. For example, the Catastrophic Incident 
Supplement of the National Response Plan has been approved and includes 
identified specific capabilities from federal agencies that will be 
deployed according to a specified time frame in the event of a 
catastrophic incident (the Supplement may be revised based on the 
ongoing review of the National Response Plan and its annexes and 
supplements). DHS also reported that the National Incident Management 
System Incident Response Information System is currently undergoing 
development and testing. When testing is complete, the system will be 
provided to all federal agencies involved in the National Response Plan 
for collection of their inventory of National Incident Management 
System-typed resources. DHS reported that it is preparing to issue 
information to federal agencies that are signatories to the National 
Response Plan for agencies' use in creating an inventory of their 
resources. According to DHS, the database of these resources and 
capabilities is expected to be operational by the end of 2007. At this 
point, however, FEMA officials told us that the department does not 
have one comprehensive inventory of response capabilities. In addition, 
DHS reported that the Common Operating Picture Function in the Homeland 
Security Information Network serves as a communication tool that allows 
the DHS National Operations Center to gain real-time situational 
awareness of disaster response. During disaster response operations, 
automated reporting templates are populated by appropriate federal 
departments and agencies as specified under the National Response Plan; 
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this 
performance expectation. DHS has taken a variety of steps to develop a 
complete inventory of federal response capabilities, including 
finalizing the National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement. 
DHS is also taking steps to develop the National Incident Management 
System Incident Response Information System, but has not yet released 
the system. While DHS provided us with information on its various tools 
for identifying and specifying federal capabilities that will be 
deployed in the event of an incident, DHS reported that it does not yet 
have a complete inventory of all federal capabilities; Assessment: 
Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 10. Develop a national, all-hazards 
preparedness goal; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed an interim, 
national, all-hazards preparedness goal, but has not yet issued a final 
version of the goal. The December 2005 version of the National 
Preparedness Goal defines both the 37 major capabilities that first 
responders should possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and 
recover from a wide range of incidents and the most critical tasks 
associated with these capabilities. We reported that an inability to 
effectively perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a 
detrimental impact on effective protection, prevention, response, and 
recovery capabilities. For more information, see GAO-06-618 and GAO-05-
652; DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported to us that 
public release of the final National Preparedness Goal was imminent, 
but did not provide us with a target time frame for issuing the final 
version of the goal. DHS officials noted that the department has worked 
with various federal, state, and local entities to develop, review, and 
get approval of the final National Preparedness Goal; Our assessment: 
Until the final version of the National Preparedness Goal is issued, we 
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance 
expectation. Although DHS has developed and issued an interim National 
Preparedness Goal, it has not yet issued a final version of the goal 
and did not provide a target time frame for doing so. Issuing a final 
version of the goal is important for finalizing the major capabilities 
required of first responders in preparing for and responding to various 
incidents; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 11. Support citizen participation in national 
preparedness efforts; 
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We have not completed 
work on DHS's efforts to support citizen participation in national 
preparedness efforts, and DHS did not provide us with information on 
its actions to meet this performance expectation. As a result, we 
cannot make an assessment of DHS's progress for this performance 
expectation; 
Assessment: No assessment made.

Performance expectation: 12. Develop plans and capabilities to 
strengthen nationwide recovery efforts; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced challenges 
in developing plans and capabilities needed to strengthen nationwide 
recovery efforts.[A] In February 2006 we reported that beginning and 
sustaining community and economic recovery, including restoring a 
viable tax base for essential services, calls for immediate steps so 
residents can restore their homes and businesses. Removing debris and 
restoring essential gas, electric, oil, communications, water, sewer, 
transportation and transportation infrastructure, other utilities, and 
services such as public health and medical support are vital to 
recovery and rebuilding. However, these recovery efforts in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina were hindered by various factors, 
including the magnitude and scope of the hurricane. For more 
information, see GAO-06-365R; DHS updated information: In March and May 
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to 
develop plans and capabilities to strengthen nationwide recovery 
efforts. DHS and the American Red Cross developed the National 
Sheltering System to provide a Web-based data system to support shelter 
management and reporting and identification activities. DHS also issued 
a recovery strategy for mass sheltering and housing assistance in June 
2006 to address contingencies for providing sheltering and housing 
assistance for declared emergencies and major disasters. FEMA also 
developed a Web-based Housing Portal to consolidate available rental 
resources for evacuees from federal agencies, private organization, and 
individuals. In addition, DHS reported making enhancements to its 
debris removal processes by, for example, adjusting its debris removal 
policy to ensure cost sharing for federal contracting, establishing a 
list of debris removal contractors, and developing guidance for local 
government debris removal contractors. DHS reported that an interagency 
work group, initiated in 2005, is working to develop federal 
contaminated debris policy and operational procedure guidance. In 
addition, FEMA officials noted that the agency is using a cost 
estimating format to capture all costs for construction projects by 
taking into account allowances for uncertainties in the construction 
process; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not 
achieved this performance expectation. DHS did not provide us with 
documentation on how its various initiatives have contributed overall 
to develop the department's capabilities to strengthen nationwide 
recovery efforts. DHS has taken steps to develop plans, policies, and 
guidance for recovery efforts. However, DHS did not provide us with 
evidence of its capabilities for recovery efforts; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved.

Performance expectation: 13. Develop the capacity to provide needed 
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner; 
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced 
difficulties in developing the capacity to provide emergency services 
and assistance in a timely manner and has not provided us with 
documentation to demonstrate that it has effectively met this 
performance expectation. The various reports and our own work on FEMA's 
performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggested that 
FEMA's human, financial, and technological resources and capabilities 
were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented 
degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane victims. Our 
work pointed out that the National Response Plan did not specify the 
proactive means or capabilities the federal government should use to 
conduct damage assessments and gain situational awareness when the 
responsible state and local officials were overwhelmed. As a result, 
response efforts were hampered by the federal government's failure to 
fully use its available assets to conduct timely, comprehensive damage 
assessments in Louisiana and Mississippi. With regard to logistics, our 
work and that of others indicated that logistics systems--the 
capability to identify, dispatch, mobilize, and demobilize and to 
accurately track and record available critical resources throughout all 
incident management phases--were often totally overwhelmed by Hurricane 
Katrina. Critical resources were not available, properly distributed, 
or provided in a timely manner. The result was duplication of 
deliveries, lost supplies, or supplies never being ordered. Reviews of 
acquisition efforts indicated that while these efforts were noteworthy 
given the scope of Hurricane Katrina, agencies needed additional 
capabilities to (1) adequately anticipate requirements for needed goods 
and services (2) clearly communicate responsibilities across agencies 
and jurisdictions and (3) deploy sufficient numbers of personnel to 
provide contractor oversight. For more information, see Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the Individuals and 
Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to Reduce Such 
Problems in the Future, GAO-06-1013, and GAO-06-618. Also, see 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A 
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS 
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with 
updated information on its efforts to develop the capacity to provide 
needed emergency assistance and services in a timely manner. For 
example, DHS reported that FEMA and the American Red Cross have 
developed and improved methods to better identify and more quickly 
assist individuals evacuated to a shelter, including developing and 
implementing methods to identify and reunify missing and separated 
family members during a disaster. DHS reported that it has developed 
interim guidance regarding sending FEMA registration intake staff to 
Red Cross management shelters following a disaster and plan to refine a 
formal standard operating procedure for this activity. DHS also 
reported that it is pursuing contract and contingency surge 
capabilities that will allow for the rapid expansion of FEMA's 
registration intake capacity of up to 200,000 people per day. (FEMA 
surpassed 100,000 registrations per day following Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita.) FEMA has also reported tripling its daily home inspection 
capacity through contracted firms from 7,000 to 20,000 per day. 
Furthermore, FEMA reported that it is working with federal, state, and 
local partners to provide mass evacuee support planning to assist state 
and local governments in planning and preparing for hosting of large 
displaced populations. As part of these efforts, FEMA reported that it 
is working to develop an evacuee registration and tracking capability, 
implementation plans for federal evacuation support to states, and 
emergency sheltering guidance and planning assistance for potential 
host states and communities. FEMA reported that it plans to have a Mass 
Evacuation Management Unit operational by January 2008 and the National 
Mass Evacuation Registration and Tracking System operational once 
requirements are fully developed. In addition, DHS reported making 
enhancements to its logistics capabilities. For example, DHS has 
developed an Internet-based system that provides FEMA with the ability 
to manage its inventory and track the location of trailers carrying 
commodities. DHS officials also reported that the department is 
undertaking an optimization planning initiative to, among other things, 
identify best locations for logistics centers, but this planning eff