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United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2007: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs: 

GAO-07-406SP: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-406SP, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

This report is GAOís fifth annual assessment of selected weapon 
programs. From 2001 to the present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
doubled its planned investment in new systems from approximately $750 
billion to almost $1.5 trillion. While DOD expects these systems to 
transform military operations, their acquisition remains a high-risk 
area. GAOís reviews of weapons over three decades have found consistent 
cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. The 
nationís growing long-range fiscal challenges may ultimately spur 
Congress to pressure DOD to cut spending on new weapons and to redirect 
funding to other priorities. In response, DOD might be compelled to 
deliver new weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the 
most from its investments. 

This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an 
independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs, 
identifying potential risks and needed actions when a programís 
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practices. 
Programs assessed were selected using several factors: high dollar 
value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report also 
highlights issues raised by the cumulative experiences of individual 
programs. GAO updates this report annually under the Comptroller 
Generalís authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO assessed 62 weapon systems with a total investment of over $950 
billion, some two-thirds of the $1.5 trillion DOD plans for weapons 
acquisition (see below). Several of these programs will be developed 
without needed technology, design, and production knowledge, and will 
cost more and take longer to deliver. Progress in acquisitions is 
measured by passage through critical junctures, or knowledge points: 
Are the productís technologies mature at the start of development? Is 
the product design stable at the design review? Are production 
processes in control by production start? By these best practice 
measures, limited progress has been made by the programs GAO assessed. 
Fully mature technologies were present in 16 percent of the systems at 
development startóthe point at which best practices indicate mature 
levels should be present. The programs that began development with 
immature technologies experienced a 32.3 percent cost increase, whereas 
those that began with mature technologies increased 2.6 percent. 
Furthermore, 27 percent of the assessed programs demonstrated a stable 
design at the time of design review and in terms of production, very 
few programs reported using statistical process control data to measure 
the maturity of production processes. 

Effective program management and control are essential to executing a 
knowledge-based approach. However, DOD does not have an environment 
that facilitates effective program management. For example, key 
personnel are rotated too frequently. Further, DOD is increasingly 
relying on contractors to perform key management functions raising 
questions about the capacity of DOD to manage new weapon system 
programs. 

Figure: Total Cumulative Planned Expenditures on Current portfolio of 
Major Defense Acquisition: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-406SP]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul Francis (202) 512-
4841 or FrancisP@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

Better Acquisition Outcomes Needed to Accomplish DOD Transformation 
Objectives in Current Fiscal Environment: 

DOD Weapon Programs Consistently Experience a Reduced Return on 
Investment: 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Most Programs Proceed with Low Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

Effective Management Capacity and Control Are Essential to Successfully 
Executing a Knowledge-Based Approach: 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

Aerial Common Sensor (ACS): 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM): 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II: 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH): 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System 
(ATIRCM/CMWS): 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS): 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

C-130J Hercules: 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

USMC CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X): 

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

E-10A Wide Area Surveillance Technology Development Program (TDP): 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

EA-18G: 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV: 

Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS): 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

Extended Range Munition (ERM): 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

F-22A Modernization and Improvement Program: 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS: 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS 
AMF): 

Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR): 

JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS): 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

Land Warrior: 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6): 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): 

Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV): 

MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

21'' Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System (MRUUVS): 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA): 

PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

Space Radar (SR): 

SSN 774 Technology Insertion Program: 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program: 

Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): 

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS): 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): 

Agency Comments: 

Scope of Our Review: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Macro Analysis: 

System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Best Practice Reports: 

Recent Weapon Systems Reports: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Key Megasystems Currently in Development: 

Table 2: Average Annual Real Growth in Defense Spending Accounts: 

Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 27 Weapon Systems: 

Table 4: Examples of Reduced Buying Power: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Total Cumulative Planned Expenditures on Current Portfolio of 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 

Figure 2: DOD's Projected Annual Investment in Procurement and 
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation of Weapon Systems: 

Figure 3: Percentage of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at 
Key Junctures: 

Figure 4: Average Program RDT&E Cost Growth from First Full Estimate: 

Figure 5: Percentage of Programs That Achieved Design Stability at Key 
Junctures: 

Figure 6: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

AMRAAM: AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile: 

ASDS: Advanced SEAL Delivery System: 

ATIRCM/CMWS: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile 
Warning System: 

BFVS: Bradley Fighting Vehicle System: 

CAVES WAA: conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array: 

CEC: Cooperative Engagement Capability: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FBCB2: Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below: 

FMTV: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles: 

FY: fiscal year: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

GBS: Global Broadcast Service: 

GPS: Global Positioning System: 

HIMARS: High Mobility Artillery Rocket System: 

JASSM: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile: 

JLENS: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 
System: 

JPATS: Joint Primary Aircraft Training System: 

JPEO: Joint Program Executive Office: 

JSOW: Joint Standoff Weapon: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

MDAP: Major Defense Acquisition Program: 

MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System: 

MIDS-LVT: Multifunctional Information Distribution System - Low Volume 
Terminal: 

MLRS: Multiple Launch Rocket System: 

MM III GRP: Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program: 

MM III PRP: Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program: 

MP-RTIP: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program: 

MUE: Modernized User Equipment: 

NA: not applicable: 

NAS: National Airspace System: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

R&D: research and development: 

RDT&E: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation: 

SAR: Selected Acquisition Report: 

SBX: Sea-Based X-Band: 

SDD: System Development and Demonstration: 

TBD: to be determined: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System: 

USMC: U.S. Marine Corps: 

U.S.C.: United States Code: 

March 30, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

This is our fifth annual assessment of selected Department of Defense 
(DOD) weapon programs. The breadth of this assessment gives us insights 
into a broad range of programs as well as the overall direction of 
weapon system acquisitions. Our analysis of individual weapon systems 
is grounded in best practices for attaining high levels of product 
knowledge in the areas of technology, design, and production. We find 
that new programs continue to move through development without 
sufficient knowledge, thereby resulting in cost increases and schedule 
delays. The link between knowledge and cost is real and predictable. It 
provides three choices for decision makers: (1) accept the status quo, 
(2) demonstrate high knowledge levels before approving individual 
programs, or (3) increase cost estimates to accurately reflect the 
consequences of insufficient knowledge. 

This report also provides decision makers with an analysis of 
cumulative DOD weapon system investment and buying power. Although DOD 
has doubled its planned investment in major weapon systems from $750 
billion to $1.5 trillion since 2001, unanticipated cost growth has 
reduced the return on this investment. The investment level itself 
represents a significant policy choice, since during that same period, 
the government's total liabilities and unfunded commitments have 
increased from about $20 trillion to about $50 trillion. The nation's 
fiscal exposures increase every day due to known demographic trends, 
continuing operating deficits, and compounding interest costs. Given 
the federal fiscal outlook, what was once a desire to deliver high- 
quality products on time and within budget has become an imperative. 
DOD simply must maximize its return on investment to provide the 
warfighter with needed capabilities and the best value for the 
taxpayer. With over $880 billion remaining to invest in the current 
portfolio of major systems, the status quo is both unacceptable and 
unsustainable. 

Recognizing this dilemma, DOD has embraced best practices in its 
policies, instilled more discipline in requirements setting, 
strengthened training for program managers, and reorganized offices 
that support and oversee programs. Yet this intention has not been 
fully implemented and it has not had a material effect on weapon system 
programs. To translate policy into better programs, several additional 
elements are essential, including having a sound business case for each 
program that focuses on real needs and embodies best practices, sound 
business arrangements, and clear lines of responsibility and 
accountability. DOD must think strategically, separate wants from 
needs, and make tough choices. Specifically, enforcing stated DOD 
policy on individual acquisitions will require DOD to have the will and 
the congressional support to say "no" to programs that do not measure 
up, to recognize and reward savings, and to hold appropriate parties 
accountable for poor outcomes. This does not mean that no risks should 
be taken or that all problems can be foreseen and prevented. Nor is it 
necessary for DOD to sacrifice its record of delivering the best 
weaponry in the world to U.S. forces. However, it is possible for DOD 
to continue to deliver the best weaponry at a reasonable cost and in a 
more timely manner. The taxpayers and our military forces deserve no 
less. 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

March 30, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

This report is GAO's fifth annual assessment of selected weapon 
programs. The Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its planned 
investment in new weapon systems from approximately $750 billion in 
2001 to almost $1.5 trillion in 2007. In the last 5 years, the number 
of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) in development has risen 
from 72 to 85, and systems are becoming increasingly complex in their 
interdependency and technological sophistication. Unfortunately, we 
have seen little change in acquisition outcomes over this same period. 
Although U.S. weapons are among the best in the world, the cost of 
developing a weapon system continues to often exceed estimates by tens 
or hundreds of millions of dollars. This, in turn, results in fewer 
quantities than initially planned for, delays in product delivery, and 
performance shortfalls. Not only is the buying power of the government 
reduced and opportunities to make other investments lost, but the 
warfighter receives less than promised. DOD is depending on the weapons 
currently under development to transform military operations for the 
21st century. The size and scale of current planned investment 
necessitate better results than we have seen in the past. 

The current fiscal environment presents challenges for DOD's plans to 
transform military operations. As the nation begins to address long- 
term fiscal imbalances, DOD is likely to encounter considerable 
pressure to reduce its investment in new weapons. DOD also faces 
pressures within its own budget as investment in new weapon systems 
competes with funds needed to replace equipment and sustain military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To make more efficient use of 
scarce investment dollars, DOD needs to adhere to a knowledge-based 
approach to product development that centers on attaining high levels 
of knowledge in three elements: technology, design, and production. 
Higher levels of knowledge at program start enable better estimates of 
how much weapon systems will cost to finish and improve the likelihood 
that a program will stay within cost and on schedule. Building upon 
this knowledge--as the product proceeds through design and into 
production--further increases the likelihood that a program will stay 
within cost and schedule targets and deliver promised capabilities, 
thus enabling DOD to buy what was originally budgeted. Lack of 
knowledge in individual programs is amplified when the program is part 
of an interdependent network, as cost overruns and schedule delays 
reverberate across systems of related programs. Additionally, 
successful acquisition outcomes require that program managers have the 
capacity to make knowledge-driven development decisions. In the larger 
context, DOD needs to make changes in its requirements and budgeting 
processes that are consistent with getting the desired outcomes from 
the acquisition process. 

In this report, we assess 62 programs that represent an investment of 
over $950 billion.[Footnote 1] Our objective is twofold: to provide 
decision makers with a cross-cutting analysis of DOD weapon system 
investment and also to provide independent, knowledge-based assessments 
of how well DOD has attained knowledge for individual systems. 

Programs were selected for individual assessment based on several 
factors, including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and 
(3) congressional interest. The majority of the 62 programs covered in 
the report are considered major defense acquisition programs by 
DOD.[Footnote 2] 

Better Acquisition Outcomes Needed to Accomplish DOD Transformation 
Objectives in Current Fiscal Environment: 

Without improved acquisition outcomes, achieving DOD's transformation 
objectives will be difficult given the current fiscal environment. DOD 
is currently investing in weapon systems that it is depending on to 
transform military operations. While these weapon systems are expected 
to provide unprecedented capabilities, the cost and complexity to 
develop these new systems will be exceptional. However, the nation's 
long-term fiscal imbalances will likely place pressure on the 
affordability of DOD's planned investments. Without better acquisition 
outcomes, there is greater risk that DOD will not be able to achieve 
its transformation objectives. 

DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Operations Expected to Be the Most 
Expensive and Complex Attempted: 

DOD is undertaking new efforts to fundamentally transform military 
operations that are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever. 
In the next 5 to 7 years, DOD plans to increase its investment in 
weapon systems that are key to this transformation. As figure 1 shows, 
DOD's total planned investment in major defense acquisition programs is 
almost $1.5 trillion (2007 dollars) for its current portfolio, with 
over $880 billion of that investment yet to be made. 

Figure 1: Total Cumulative Planned Expenditures on Current Portfolio of 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The MDA portion of investment data only goes through fiscal year 
2011 and does not include full cost of developing MDA systems. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

DOD's annual investment in the research, development, test and 
evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement of major weapon systems is expected 
to rise from $157 billion in 2007 to $173 billion in 2011(see fig. 2), 
peaking at approximately $195 billion in 2013.[Footnote 3] 

Figure 2: DOD's Projected Annual Investment in Procurement and 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation of Weapon Systems: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

The complexity of DOD's transformational efforts is especially evident 
in the development of several large megasystems, major weapon systems 
that depend on the integration of multiple systems--some of which are 
developed as separate programs--to achieve desired capabilities. This 
strategy often requires interdependent programs in concurrent 
development to be closely synchronized and managed, as they may, for 
example, depend on integrated architectures and common standards as a 
foundation for interoperability. If dependent systems are not available 
when needed, then a program could face cost increases, schedule delays, 
or reduced capabilities. Furthermore, the larger scope of development 
associated with these megasystems produces a much greater fiscal impact 
when cost and schedule estimates increase. Table 1 describes three of 
the department's largest and most complex megasystems that are 
currently under way. 

Table 1: Key Megasystems Currently in Development: 

Future Combat Systems (FCS)*; 
FCS* is a suite of manned and unmanned ground and air vehicles, 
sensors, and munitions linked by an information network that will 
enable warfighters to respond to threats with speed, precision, and 
lethality. FCS consists of 18 components and depends on numerous 
complimentary systems outside of FCS. For example, FCS is dependent on 
JTRS* and WIN-T* to provide key communication and networking 
capabilities that it requires to operate effectively. If these systems--
which have both been fraught with cost, schedule, and performance 
problems of their own--are not available as planned, FCS may need to 
seek costly backup technologies, adjust its schedule, or accept reduced 
capabilities. 

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); 
BMDS consists of 10 elements that will work in concert to defeat enemy 
missiles launched from any range during any phase of their flight, 
including STSS*, GMD*, Aegis BMD*, ABL*, MKV*, KEI*, and THAAD*. While 
almost all of the elements will work separately, some sensor data must 
be shared among the elements for them to work in concert and for BMDS 
to provide full coverage against enemy missiles. For example, the Aegis 
BMD program provides long-range surveillance and tracking for the GMD 
system. While Aegis BMD's functionality has been successfully tested in 
several events, it has never been validated in an end-to-end flight 
test with the GMD system. 

Global Information Grid (GIG); 
The GIG is the cornerstone of DOD's net- centricity strategy. It is a 
system of interdependent systems that make up a secure, reliable 
network that enables users to access and share information at virtually 
any location and at any time. Five major programs are related to GIG's 
core network: TSAT*, JTRS*, GIG-Bandwidth Expansion, Network Centric 
Enterprise Services, and the Cryptography Transformation Initiative. 
Both JTRS* and TSAT* have recently been restructured due to--among 
other things--technical difficulties, complicating DOD's efforts to 
realize the GIG as planned. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Programs with an asterisk are assessed in this report. 

[End of table] 

The Current Fiscal Environment Presents Challenges to Accomplishing 
DOD's Transformation Objectives: 

The nation's long-term fiscal imbalances will likely place pressure on 
the affordability of DOD's planned investment in major weapon systems, 
reducing the ability of budgets to accommodate typical margins of error 
in terms of cost increases and schedule delays. As entitlement programs 
like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid consume a growing 
percentage of available resources, discretionary programs--including 
defense--face competition for the increasingly scarce remaining funds. 
Sustaining real top line budget increases in any discretionary program 
will be difficult in this constrained resource environment. 

DOD budget projections conform to this tightening framework by 
offsetting growth in procurement spending with reductions in RDT&E, 
personnel, and other accounts. The minimal real increases projected in 
defense spending through fiscal year 2011 depend on these offsets. 
However, as table 2 shows, these projections do not reflect recent 
experience, nor do they take into account higher than anticipated cost 
growth and schedule delays, which can compound the fiscal impact and 
affordability of DOD's planned investment. 

Table 2: Average Annual Real Growth in Defense Spending Accounts: 

Account: Procurement; 
2000-2006 (actual): 5.61%; 
2007-2011 (projected): 6.46%. 

Account: RDT&E; 
2000-2006 (actual): 8.42%; 
2007-2011 (projected): - 2.95%. 

Account: Military personnel; 
2000-2006 (actual): 3.67%; 
2007-2011 (projected): -0.68%. 

Account: Operation and Maintenance; 
2000-2006 (actual): 5.55%; 
2007- 2011 (projected): 1.00%. 

Account: Other; 
2000-2006 (actual): 5.18%; 
2007-2011 (projected): - 3.85%. 

Account: Total; 
2000-2006 (actual): 5.45%; 
2007-2011 (projected): 0.90%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Since 2004, total costs for a common set[Footnote 4] of 64 major weapon 
systems under development have grown in real terms by 4.9 percent per 
year--costing $165 billion (constant 2007 dollars) more in 2007 than 
planned for in 2004. Over this same period, the funding needed to 
complete these programs has increased despite the significant 
investment that has already been made. Furthermore, as congressional 
leaders advise DOD to incorporate the costs of the war into the annual 
budget rather than into supplemental appropriations, trade-offs will 
likely be required among the resource demands of repairing or replacing 
those weapon systems damaged in Iraq and Afghanistan and future 
investments to modernize and transform the armed forces. If DOD cannot 
deliver its new weapon programs within estimated costs, difficult 
choices may have to be made regarding which investments to pursue and 
which to discontinue. 

DOD Weapon Programs Consistently Experience a Reduced Return on 
Investment: 

While DOD is pursuing plans to transform military operations and 
committing more investment dollars to realize these new weapon systems, 
it regularly realizes a reduced return on their investment. DOD 
programs typically take longer to develop and cost more to buy than 
planned, placing additional demands on available funding. As shown in 
table 3, total RDT&E costs for a common set[Footnote 5] of 27 weapon 
programs that we were able to assess since development began increased 
by almost $35 billion, or 33.5 percent, over the original business case 
(first full estimate). The same programs have also experienced an 
increase in the time needed to develop capabilities with a weighted 
average schedule increase of over 23 percent.[Footnote 6] 

Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 27 Weapon Systems (billions of 
constant 2007 dollars): 

Total cost; 
First full estimate: $506.4; 
Latest estimate: $603.1; 
Percent change: 19.1%. 

RDT&E cost; 
First full estimate: $104.7; 
Latest estimate: $139.7; 
Percent change: 33.5%. 

Weighted average acquisition cycle time[A] (months); 
First full estimate: 137.9; 
Latest estimate: 170.2; 
Percent change: 23.5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for 
the 27 programs based on total program costs at the first full and 
latest estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was 98.9 
months for the first full estimate and 124.6 months for the latest 
estimate resulting in a 26.1 percent change. 

[End of table] 

The consequence of cost and cycle time growth is often manifested in a 
reduction of the buying power of the defense dollar. As costs rise and 
key schedule milestones are delayed, programs are sometimes forced to 
make trade-offs in quantities, resulting in a reduction in buying 
power. Quantities for 12 of the common set programs have been reduced 
since their first estimate.[Footnote 7] Additionally, the weighted 
average program acquisition unit cost for 26 of the 27 programs 
increased by roughly 39 percent, meaning that each unit cost 
significantly more to buy than originally planned.[Footnote 8] Table 4 
illustrates 6 programs with a significant reduction of buying power. 
Some of these programs experienced higher costs for the same initial 
quantity. 

Table 4: Examples of Reduced Buying Power (constant 2007 dollars): 

Program: Joint strike fighter; 
Initial estimate: $196.5 billion; 
Initial quantity: 2,866 aircraft; 
Latest estimate: $223.3 billion; 
Latest quantity: 2,458 aircraft; 
Percentage of unit cost increase: 32.8. 

Program: Future combat systems; 
Initial estimate: $85.5 billion; 
Initial quantity: 15 systems; 
Latest estimate: $131.7 billion; 
Latest quantity: 15 systems; 
Percentage of unit cost increase: 54.1. 

Program: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft; 
Initial estimate: $36.9 billion; 
Initial quantity: 913 aircraft; 
Latest estimate: $50.0 billion; 
Latest quantity: 458 aircraft; 
Percentage of unit cost increase: 170.2. 

Program: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle; 
Initial estimate: $16.0 billion; 
Initial quantity: 181 vehicles; 
Latest estimate: $28.6 billion; 
Latest quantity: 138 vehicles; 
Percentage of unit cost increase: 134.7. 

Program: Space Based Infrared System High; 
Initial estimate: $4.2 billion; 
Initial quantity: 5 satellites; 
Latest estimate: $10.4 billion; 
Latest quantity: 3 satellites; 
Percentage of unit cost increase: 311.6. 

Program: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle; 
Initial estimate: $8.4 billion; 
Initial quantity: 1,025 vehicles; 
Latest estimate: $11.3 billion; 
Latest quantity: 1,025 vehicles; 
Percentage of unit cost increase: 33.7. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. Images sourced in their respective 
order: JSF Program Office; Program Manager, Future Combat
Systems (BGT); V-22 Joint Program Office; (Left) © 2005 ILS/Lockheed 
Martin, (right) © 2003 The Boeing Company; Lockheed Martin
Space Systems Company; General Dynamics Land Systems. 

[End of table] 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work that 
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective centered on best 
practices in system development. We have found that leading commercial 
firms pursue an approach that is based in knowledge, where high levels 
of product knowledge are demonstrated at critical points in 
development. Programs take steps to gather knowledge that demonstrates 
that their technologies are mature, their designs are stable, and their 
production processes are in control. This knowledge helps programs 
identify risks early and address them before they become problems. The 
result of a knowledge-based approach is a product delivered on time, 
within budget, and with the promised capabilities. Based on our best 
practice work, we have identified three key knowledge points--junctures 
where programs need to display critical levels of knowledge to proceed. 
These knowledge points and associated indicators are defined as 
follows: 

* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This point occurs when 
a sound business case is made for the product--that is, a match is made 
between the customer's requirements and the product developer's 
available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and capacity. 
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 
development is an important indicator of whether this match has been 
made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product 
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended 
environment. 

* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a 
program determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will 
meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability 
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system- 
level critical design review, usually held midway through development. 
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system 
design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable. 

* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature and the design is 
reliable. This point is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the 
company can manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality 
targets. A best practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing 
processes are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, 
sustainable, and capable of consistently producing parts within the 
product's quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production. 
Demonstration of a prototype that meets reliability and performance 
requirements prior to the production decision, can minimize production 
and post-production costs. 

The attainment of each successive knowledge point builds upon the 
preceding one. If a program is falling short in one element, like 
technological maturity, it is harder to achieve design stability and 
almost impossible to achieve production maturity. In particular, 
separating technology development from product development can help 
reduce costs and deliver a product on time and within budget. 

Most Programs Proceed with Low Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

To get the most out of its weapon system investments, DOD revised its 
acquisition policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based, 
evolutionary framework. However, DOD's policy does not incorporate 
adequate controls to ensure the effective implementation of a knowledge-
based acquisition process. As we have reported in the past, most of the 
programs we reviewed this year proceeded with lower levels of knowledge 
at critical junctures and attained key elements of product knowledge 
later in development than specified in DOD policy. The cost and 
schedule consequences of delayed knowledge attainment are significant. 

Programs That Enter System Development with Immature Technologies Cost 
More and Take Longer: 

Our 2007 assessment continues to show that very few programs start with 
mature technologies (see fig. 3). This initial knowledge deficit 
cascades through design and production, so that at each key juncture, 
decision makers have to rely on assumptions in lieu of knowledge. Only 
16 percent of programs in our assessment demonstrated all of their 
critical technologies as mature at the start of development, meaning 
that the vast majority of programs failed to achieve knowledge point 1 
when they should have. By design review, when programs should have 
attained knowledge point 2 by demonstrating a stable design, only 44 
percent had attained knowledge point 1. In the past 2 years alone, 
several programs have passed through their development start or design 
review with immature technologies.[Footnote 9] Without mature 
technologies, it is difficult to know whether the product being 
designed and produced will deliver the desired capabilities or, 
alternatively, if the design allows enough space for technology 
integration. Yet, 33 percent of the programs we assessed had still not 
attained knowledge point 1 by the time of their decision to start 
production. 

Figure 3: Percentage of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at 
Key Junctures: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Over the next 5 years, many of the programs in our assessment plan to 
hold a design review or make a production decision without 
demonstrating the level of technology maturity that should have been 
seen before the start of development. Twenty-three of the programs we 
assessed plan to hold a design review in the next 5 years. Six of those 
23 did not provide a projection of their expected technology maturity 
by that point. Of the remaining 17 programs, only 6 reported that they 
expect to have achieved technology maturity by the time of their design 
review. Similarly, 31 of the programs in our assessment plan to make a 
production decision in the next 5 years, but 12 programs did not 
provide a projection of the technology maturity at that point and 5 of 
the remaining 19 programs still expect to have immature technologies at 
that time--not having achieved any of the knowledge points (technology 
maturity, design stability, or production maturity) at production 
start. 

Consequences accrue to programs that are still working to mature 
technologies well into system development, when they should be focusing 
on maturing system design and preparing for production. Programs that 
start with mature technologies experience less cost growth than those 
that start with immature technologies. Figure 4 shows that programs 
that start with mature technologies saw their research, development, 
test and evaluation cost estimates increase by 2.6 percent over the 
first full estimate. 

Figure 4: Average Program RDT&E Cost Growth from First Full Estimate: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

In comparison, RDT&E costs for programs that began development with 
immature technologies increased by 32.3 percent over the first full 
estimate. Programs that started development with mature technologies 
also manage to stay on schedule, averaging less than a 1-month delay 
over their initial timetable. Alternatively, programs that began 
development with immature technologies have experienced average delays 
of more than 20 months over their original schedules. Furthermore, 
programs that enter development with all of their technologies mature 
tend to maintain their buying power, achieving their promised return on 
investment. Program acquisition unit costs increased by less than 1 
percent for programs that reached knowledge point 1 by development 
start, whereas the programs that started development with immature 
technologies experienced an average program acquisition unit cost 
increase of 30 percent over the first full estimate.[Footnote 10] 

DOD's policy states that technologies should be demonstrated in at 
least a relevant environment before a program enters system 
development; whereas GAO utilizes the best practice standard that calls 
for technology to be assessed one step higher--demonstration in a 
realistic environment. If we applied DOD's lower standard, 32 percent 
of programs entered development with all of their technologies mature 
compared with 16 percent using the best practice standard. Using either 
standard, most programs still do not begin development with mature 
technology. There is a cost consequence of entering development with 
technologies at DOD's lower standard. Programs that meet DOD's 
technology maturity standard experience an average RDT&E cost growth of 
approximately 8.4 percent, whereas programs that enter development with 
all technologies at the higher standard specified by best practices saw 
their RDT&E cost estimates grow by 2.6 percent. 

Programs Continue Past Design Reviews without Demonstrating a Stable 
Design: 

The majority of programs in our assessment that have held a design 
review did so without first achieving a stable design. As illustrated 
in figure 5, only 27 percent of programs in our assessment demonstrated 
that they had attained a stable design at the time of design review. 
Thirty-three percent of programs had still not achieved design 
stability by the time they decided to start production. Twenty-three 
programs in our assessment are currently scheduled to hold their 
critical design reviews by the year 2012. Only 5 of these programs 
expect to have achieved design stability by the time of their critical 
design reviews. 

Figure 5: Percentage of Programs That Achieved Design Stability at Key 
Junctures: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Most Programs Do Not Collect Data to Measure Production Maturity: 

Only 2 of the 20 programs we assessed that are now in production 
reported using statistical process control data to measure the maturity 
of the production process, which is the data needed to demonstrate 
knowledge point 3.[Footnote 11] Neither of these programs had reached 
production maturity--having all of the production processes under 
statistical control--by knowledge point 3. 

In addition to ensuring that the program meets all knowledge points 
prior to starting production, prototypes should be constructed and 
tested to make sure that the weapons being produced meet performance 
and reliability requirements. For example, despite having achieved 
technology maturity and design stability, the Expeditionary Fighting 
Vehicle discovered reliability failures during preproduction testing. 
As a result, the program has delayed production and is being 
restructured to incorporate improvements in the vehicle design. Thirty- 
two of the programs we assessed provided us information on when they 
had or planned to have first tested a fully configured, integrated 
production representative article (i.e., prototype) in its intended 
environment. Of those programs, 47 percent reported they have already 
conducted or planned to conduct a developmental test of a production 
representative article (i.e., prototype) before they make their initial 
production decision. GAO's work has shown that production and 
postproduction costs are minimized when a prototype is demonstrated to 
meet reliability and performance requirements prior to the production 
decision. 

Effective Management Capacity and Control Are Essential to Successfully 
Executing a Knowledge-Based Approach: 

Effective program management and control are essential to facilitating 
a knowledge-based acquisition approach. The capacity to manage 
requirements, control funding, and oversee the contracted development 
of critical technologies, product designs, and production processes 
better ensures that programs stay within budget, keep on schedule, and 
deliver the capabilities originally promised. However, our past work 
has shown that DOD does not have an environment that facilitates 
effective program management. At the same time, DOD is increasingly 
relying on contractors to perform key management functions. In 
addition, inadequate knowledge development has resulted in the extended 
use of cost reimbursement contracts in some cases. Under these 
contracts, the government bears most of the cost risk. 

DOD Does Not Provide Program Managers an Environment That Facilitates a 
Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach: 

Our past work has shown that DOD does not have an environment that 
facilitates effective program management and programs have little 
incentive to pursue knowledge-based acquisition paths.[Footnote 12] In 
particular, our work has shown that program managers are not empowered 
to execute weapons acquisition programs nor are they set up to be 
accountable for results. Program managers cannot veto new requirements, 
control funding, or control staff. In addition, DOD has not established 
effective controls that require decision makers to measure progress 
against specific criteria and ensure that managers capture key 
knowledge before moving to the next acquisition phase. Without 
effective controls that require program officials to satisfy specific 
criteria, it is difficult to hold decision makers or program managers 
accountable to cost and schedule targets. Moreover, the incentive 
structure of program managers--based primarily on maintaining program 
funding--contributes to the consistent underestimation of costs, 
optimistic schedules, and the suppression of bad news that could 
jeopardize funding. Furthermore, rather than lengthy assignment periods 
between key milestones as suggested by best practices, many of the 
programs we reviewed had multiple program managers within the same 
milestone. This promotes shortsightedness and reduces accountability 
for poor outcomes. Consequently, programs have little incentive to 
pursue knowledge-based acquisition paths as program funding is not tied 
to successfully reaching knowledge points before a program can proceed. 

Contractors Increasingly Perform Key Program Management Functions: 

DOD is relying on contractors in new ways to manage and deliver weapon 
systems. While DOD has downsized its acquisition workforce by almost 
half in the last decade, DOD has increased its contract obligations for 
professional, administrative, and management support from $10.8 billion 
in 1996 to $28.3 billion in 2005 (both in constant 2005 dollars). Based 
on our work looking at various major weapon systems, we have observed 
that DOD has given contractors increased program management 
responsibilities to develop requirements, design products, and select 
major system and subsystem contractors. In part, this increased 
reliance has occurred because DOD is experiencing a critical shortage 
of certain acquisition professionals with technical skills related to 
systems engineering, program management, and cost estimation. The 
increased dependence on contractors raises questions about the capacity 
of DOD to manage new weapon system programs, an undertaking made more 
difficult when technology, design, and production knowledge are 
lacking. 

Inadequate Knowledge Development Has Resulted in the Extended Use of 
Cost Reimbursement Contracts in Some Cases: 

The extended use of cost reimbursement contracts may be a further 
consequence of inadequate knowledge attainment. Under a cost 
reimbursement contract, the government bears most of the cost risk--the 
risk of paying more than it expected. DOD typically uses cost 
reimbursement contracts for development and can use fixed price 
contracts for production and deployment. If technologies are mature, 
designs are stable, and production processes are in place, then 
production costs are more likely to be known. In these cases the 
program can more easily award a fixed price contract. However, we found 
several examples of programs extending the use of cost reimbursement 
contracts into production and deployment instead of using fixed price 
contracts, reflecting uncertainties in program development. While the 
extended use of cost reimbursement contracts may be appropriate under 
these circumstances, it is indicative of programs proceeding through 
the acquisition process with inadequate knowledge. 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

We assess each program in two pages and depict the extent of knowledge 
in a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of 
the first page. As illustrated in figure 6, the knowledge graph is 
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the 
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange), 
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted 
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment 
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. The 
closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the 
more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and 
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by 
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice 
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces 
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks 
are discovered and resolved. 

Figure 6: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system 
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing 
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design 
review, as some technologies were still not mature and only a small 
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for 
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve 
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that 
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases. 

We conducted our review from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II 
contains detailed information on our methodology. 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Our assessments of the 62 weapon systems follow. 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

MDA's ABL element is being developed in capability-based blocks to 
destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of flight. Carried aboard 
a modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL employs a beam control/fire control 
subsystem to focus the beam on a target, a high-energy chemical laser 
to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy missiles, and a battle management 
subsystem to plan and execute engagements. We assessed the Block 2004 
design, which is being further developed in Block 2006, and is expected 
to lead to a lethality demonstration in 2009. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Airborne Laser program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing: 

Program office: Kirtland AFB, N.M. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $2,515.4 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $2,515.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2003: $5,749.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $5,449.2; 
Percent change: -5.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost;
As of 09/2003: $5,749.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $5,449.2; 
Percent change: -5.2. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through 
fiscal year 2011 is $6,435.6 million. 

[End of table] 

Program officials expected ABL to provide an initial capability during 
Block 2006, but this event was delayed and none of ABL's seven critical 
technologies are fully mature. During Block 2006, the program continues 
work on a prototype expected to provide the basic design for a future 
operational capability. Program officials expected to demonstrate the 
prototype's critical technologies during a flight test in late 2008, 
but recent testing problems delayed the test until fiscal year 2009. 
MDA released 100 percent of the engineering drawings for the 
prototype's design, but additional drawings may be needed if problems 
encountered during future testing force design changes. The program's 
prime contractor replanned future contract work in August 2004. 
However, the program continues to overrun its fiscal year cost and 
schedule budgets. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

ABL Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office assessed all seven of its critical technologies--the 
six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric compensation, 
transmissive optics, optical coatings, jitter control, and managing the 
high-power beam--as nearly mature. According to program officials, all 
of these technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment 
and are needed to provide the system with an initial operational 
capability. 

Although the program office assessed jitter control as nearly mature, 
the technology will pose a high risk until it is demonstrated in flight 
tests. Jitter--a phenomenon pertaining to the technology of controlling 
and stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that vibration unique to 
the aircraft does not degrade the laser's aimpoint--is critical to the 
operation of the laser. The ABL's laser beam must be stable enough to 
impart sufficient energy on a fixed spot of the target to rupture its 
fuel tank. Program officials told us that they will continue to refine 
jitter mitigation efforts and will learn more about jitter control in 
future tests. 

Since our last assessment, the program office has reevaluated the 
maturity level for one of its critical technologies--managing the high- 
power beam. The technology was reported as fully mature, but has since 
been assessed as nearly mature as it has not yet been demonstrated in a 
realistic environment. The program plans to demonstrate all 
technologies in a realistic environment during a flight test of the 
system prototype, referred to as a lethal demonstration, in which ABL 
will attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges 
with integrating the laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents 
have delayed this test into 2008, and recent technical challenges 
associated with developing and testing the beam control/fire control 
software have caused further delays in the lethal demonstration. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess ABL's design stability because the element's 
initial capability will not be fully developed until the second 
aircraft is well under way. While the program has released 100 percent 
of its engineering drawings for the prototype, it is unclear whether 
the design of the prototype aircraft can be relied upon as a good 
indicator of design stability for the second aircraft. More drawings 
may be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered 
during flight testing force design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

The program is producing a limited quantity of hardware for the 
system's prototype. However, we did not assess the production maturity 
of ABL because MDA has not made a production decision. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2004, the ABL program restructured its prime contract to focus on 
near-term milestones and to provide a more realistic budget and 
schedule for the remaining work. The program further refined its work 
plan in 2005. However, recent technical challenges associated with the 
program's beam control/fire control ground test series are causing the 
contractor to experience further cost growth and schedule slip. As of 
June 2006, the program was overrunning its fiscal year 2006 budget by 
approximately $49 million and was unable to complete approximately $23 
million of planned work. 

Additionally, the program has experienced a number of quality-related 
issues that may have impacted laser performance. During fiscal year 
2006, several laser subcomponents failed or were found to be deficient. 
Program officials believe that a number of the deficiencies and 
failures were attributable to poor quality control and may have 
contributed to the laser achieving 83 percent of its design power, 
rather than the 100 percent originally planned. According to officials, 
the program will test the laser power again once all deficiencies are 
resolved. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Aerial Common Sensor (ACS): 

The Army's ACS is an airborne reconnaissance, intelligence, 
surveillance, and target acquisition system and is being designed to 
provide timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component 
commander. The ACS will replace the Guardrail Common Sensor and the 
Airborne Reconnaissance Low airborne systems. ACS will co-exist with 
current systems until it is phased in and current systems retire. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Graphic artist rendering of generic Airborne ISR platform. No 
photo image available. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD: 

Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $792.8 million: 

Procurement: $11.9 million: 

Total funding: $804.8 million: 

Procurement quantity: 33: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2004: $1,237.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,158.9; 
Percent change: -6.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2004: $2,994.3; 
Latest 12/2005: $12.0; 
Percent change: -99.6. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2004: $4,236.6; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,170.9; 
Percent change: -72.4. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2004: $111.489; 
Latest 12/2005: $30.814; 
Percent change: -72.4. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2004: 38; 
Latest 12/2005: 38; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2004: 127; 
Latest 12/2005: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

These costs and quantities are expected to change due to the ACS 
program restructuring, as is the acquisition timeline. 

[End of table] 

Due to a significant increase in ACS weight, the Army terminated the 
development contract. By the time the contract was terminated, three 
technologies had reached maturity and one more was nearing maturity. 
The Army expected to demonstrate the maturity of all but one critical 
technology by the original design review in December 2006. The program 
office estimated that 50 percent of drawings would have been releasable 
at that time. The Army is currently reassessing requirements for the 
program and plans to restart development in the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2009. The new date for design review has not been determined. Some 
requirements may be eliminated, moved to a future spiral, or assigned 
to another system. ACS system technologies maturity, design, cost, and 
schedule will likely be affected. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

ACS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only one of ACS's six critical technologies was mature when the program 
initially started development in July 2004 and two more were nearing 
maturity. When the Army terminated the development contract, one 
additional technology was nearing maturity. The maturity of one of the 
remaining technologies was tied to the development of the airborne 
version of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which would not have been 
available until after ACS was fielded. The Army expected that all of 
the critical technologies except the one tied to the radios would be 
fully mature by December 2006. It is not currently clear which 
requirements might be eliminated or the resulting impact to the 
technology maturity. However, the Army plans to seek approval for 
development start only after all its critical technologies have reached 
maturity. 

Design Stability: 

The program office estimated that 50 percent of the drawings expected 
for ACS would have been releasable by the original design review, which 
was scheduled for December 2006. However, in December 2004, 5 months 
after the program began development, the contractor informed the Army 
that the weight of the prime mission equipment had exceeded the 
structural limits of the aircraft. In September 2005, the Army ordered 
the contractor to stop all work under the existing contract and in 
January 2006 terminated the contract for system development. As a 
result, the new date for design review has not been determined, but it 
is unlikely that any of the original drawings will be relevant at the 
time of program restart due to technology obsolescence and program 
redefinition. 

Other Program Issues: 

In December 2005, just prior to contract termination, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense directed the Army and Navy, in coordination with 
the Air Force, Joint Staff, and others to conduct a study of joint 
multi-intelligence airborne ISR needs. The report findings, which were 
due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by the end of July 2006, are 
still pending. Four options are being considered. One option would be 
to restart system development with most or all of the previous 
requirements intact. The second option would be to field a system that 
is more capable than those currently operating while deferring some 
requirements for future spirals. This option would probably still 
require a business jet or larger platform to permit growth. The third 
option would be to field two systems with some requirements on a manned 
platform and some on an unmanned platform. The fourth option would be 
to field an unmanned system. The Army expects to make a decision in 
time for it to be reflected in the fiscal year 2008 president's budget. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being 
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed 
U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short-to-medium-range ballistic 
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit- 
to-kill missiles, and command and control systems. It will also be used 
as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed the missile to be 
delivered in Block 2006, the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1A. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source; Aegis BMD Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin (WS), Raytheon (SM-3): 

Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $4,553.3 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $4,553.3 million: 

Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2003: $7,371.5; 
Latest 07/2006: $9,038.8; 
Percent change: 22.6. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 07/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2003: $7,371.5; 
Latest 07/2006: $9,038.8; 
Percent change: 22.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Costs and quantities are for all known blocks from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through 
fiscal year 2011 is $10,688.5. 

[End of table] 

According to program officials, the Block 1A missile being fielded 
during 2006-2007 has mature technologies and a stable design. However, 
we believe that two critical technologies are less mature because full 
functionality of these two capabilities of the new missile has not been 
demonstrated in a realistic environment. If events occur that require 
the new capability, program officials believe the upgrades will perform 
as expected. Even without them, officials noted that the missile 
provides a credible defense against the Block 2004 threat set and some 
of the Block 2006 threat set. All drawings have been released to 
manufacturing. The program is not collecting statistical data on its 
production process of the Block 1A missile but is using other means to 
gauge production readiness. 

Figure: Attainment of product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Aegis BMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials believe that all three technologies critical to the 
SM-3 Block 1A missile are mature. However, we believe that two of these 
critical technologies are less mature. The warhead's seeker has been 
fully demonstrated in flight tests and is mature. We believe two other 
technologies, which were upgraded to create the SM-3 Block 1A, are less 
mature: the Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS) and the 
Third Stage Rocket Motor. While some modes of these technologies have 
been demonstrated in flight tests, the "pulse mode" of the SDACS, which 
provides endgame divert for the kinetic warhead, and the "zero pulse 
mode" of the Third Stage Rocket Motor, which increases the missile's 
capability against shorter-range threats, have not been successfully 
flight-tested. The SDACS operation in pulse mode failed during a June 
2003 flight test. According to program officials, the test failure was 
a result of multiple issues with the original design. The program has 
implemented changes to address these problems. While recent ground 
tests have demonstrated performance of the new configuration, the 
changes have not yet been flight tested. A flight test in December 2006 
that would have partially demonstrated the pulse SDACS was not 
completed because the missile failed to launch. A flight test that will 
fully test the new SDACS design is not planned until 2008. 

The Third Stage Rocket Motor is capable of three modes of operation, 
two of which have been added in Block 2006. While both new modes failed 
initial ground testing, one was later successfully flight tested in 
June 2006 after design changes. The second, zero pulse mode, has also 
undergone design changes. While program officials believe they have a 
working design and that the missile can use this mode if needed, it has 
not yet been flight-tested. The first flight-test that could 
demonstrate this capability is not scheduled until fiscal year 2009. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported that the design for the SM-3 Block 1A 
missiles being produced during Block 2006 is stable with 100 percent of 
its drawings released to manufacturing. Although two upgrades to the SM-
3 Block 1A missile have not been fully flight-tested, the program does 
not anticipate any additional design changes related to these upgrades. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of the 22 SM-3 missiles being 
procured for Block 2006. Program officials stated that the contractor's 
processes are not yet mature enough to statistically track production 
processes. The Aegis BMD program is using other means to assess 
progress in production and manufacturing, such as tracking rework 
hours, cost of defects per unit, and other defect and test data. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegis- 
equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software 
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic 
missile defense mission. In particular, the program is upgrading Aegis 
destroyers for long-range surveillance and tracking of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. The program plans to complete the upgrade of 14 
destroyers by the end of the Block 2006 period. In several events, this 
functionality has been successfully tested, but it has never been 
validated in an end-to-end flight test with the GMD system, for which 
it is providing long-range surveillance and tracking. Since our last 
assessment, Aegis BMD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 
increased by $362.4 million (4.2 percent), primarily in fiscal years 
2008 and 2009. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical 
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control 
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are 
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
partnership program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Advanced EHF Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin: 

Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,302.8 million: 

Procurement: $76.3 million: 

Total funding: $1,379.1 million: 

Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,519.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $5,588.0; 
Percent change: 23.6. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,336.8; 
Latest 12/2005: $678.7; 
Percent change: -49.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,856.7; 
Latest 12/2005: $6,266.7; 
Percent change: 7.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,171.333; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,088.899; 
Percent change: 78.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest 12/2005: 3; 
Percent change: -40.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 111; 
Latest 12/2005: 134; 
Percent change: 20.7. 

[End of table] 

The AEHF program's technologies are mature and the design is stable. In 
late 2004, the program was delayed and restructured because key 
cryptographic equipment would not be delivered in time and to allow the 
program time to replace some critical electronic components and add 
testing. Schedule risk remained due to the continued concurrent 
development of two critical path items managed and developed outside 
the program. According to the program office, these issues have been 
resolved and the first satellite is entering into final integration and 
testing and is on schedule for first launch. Current plans are to meet 
full operational capability with three AEHF satellites and the first 
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) satellite. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

AEHF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all of the 14 critical technologies 
are mature, having been demonstrated in a relevant environment. The 
technologies are being integrated into the first satellite and for 
final environmental testing. 

Design Stability: 

AEHF's design is stable. All expected design drawings have been 
released. The program completed its system-level critical design review 
in April 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

Production maturity could not be assessed, as the program office does 
not collect statistical process control data. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program was restructured in October 2004, when the National 
Security Agency did not deliver key cryptographic equipment to the 
payload contractor in time to meet the launch schedule. The 
restructuring delayed the program 1 year to allow time to resolve the 
cryptographic delivery problems and other program issues including 
replacement of critical electronic components and additional payload 
testing. Resolving these issues added about $800 million to the 
program. Last year, we reported that the program still faced schedule 
risk due to concurrent development of two critical path items developed 
and managed outside the program: the cryptographic components developed 
and produced by the National Security Agency and the Command Post 
Terminal managed by another Air Force program office. 

The program office reported all cryptographic hardware and components 
for the satellites were delivered, meeting all revised delivery 
milestones. In addition, the replacement of critical electronic 
components and additional payload testing was completed. 

Since our assessment of the AEHF last year, the Command Post Terminal, 
a critical path item, was delayed. However, the program office will now 
use the test terminal that was originally built to provide end-to-end 
testing of the system to control the satellites. Program officials 
stated that utilizing the test terminal, developed by Lincoln 
Laboratories, will have no adverse schedule or operational impact on 
the satellites. 

Program officials told us the mission control segment continues to meet 
or exceed its schedule and performance milestones. Three AEHF satellite 
launches are scheduled for 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively. In the 
last year, the program completed most systems-level testing and started 
final integration and environmental testing on the first satellite. The 
program office stated that the program remains on schedule to meet the 
first launch date. The flight structure for the second satellite has 
been delivered for payload integration. The third satellite is on 
contract and includes procurement of long lead components. Full 
operational capability is planned with three AEHF satellites and the 
first TSAT. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
AEHF remains on track for a first launch date of April 2008 with events 
proceeding as expected in accordance with the December 2004 program 
replan. The Air Force further stated that the program is currently in 
fabrication and production of the first two satellites, and the third 
satellite will begin assembly, integration, and test in fiscal year 
2009. It noted that the cryptographic chip development has remained on 
schedule since the January 2005 summit between the Air Force and the 
National Security Agency. In addition, the Air Force stated that all 
spacecraft flight cryptographic units were received on schedule and 
that chips for the ground terminals are due over the next couple of 
years to support terminal production schedules. Moreover, according to 
Air Force officials, DOD explored the option of adding a fourth AEHF 
satellite to mitigate the potential gap caused by schedule slips in the 
TSAT program, but decided to restructure the TSAT program baseline and 
not purchase a fourth AEHF satellite at this time. 

[End of section] 

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F 
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon 
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current 
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the 
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness 
of the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be 
inserted in new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and 
above aircraft. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $9.1 million: 

Procurement: $1,310.6 million: 

Total funding: $1,319.7 million: 

Procurement quantity: 331: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2001: $563.8; 
Latest 09/2006: $627.7; 
Percent change: 11.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2001: $1,809.0; 
Latest 09/2006: $1,842.8; 
Percent change: 1.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2001: $2,372.8; 
Latest 09/2006: $2,470.5; 
Percent change: 4.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2001: $5.718; 
Latest 09/2006: $5.953; 
Percent change: 4.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2001: 415; 
Latest 09/2006: 415; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2001: 69; 
Latest 09/2006: 72; 
Percent change: 4.4. 

Procurement funding for the radar is included in the funding for the F/ 
A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft programs. 

[End of table] 

The AESA radar's critical technologies appear to be mature and the 
design appears stable, but radar development continues during 
production. According to the program office, there has been significant 
progress in radar maturation, performance, and stability. However, 
risks and problems remain. Software development continues to be a top 
challenge, and spurious radar emissions could require software and/or 
hardware changes. Development of design improvements is ongoing. The 
program also carries a challenging risk associated with the production 
rate. Although program costs appear somewhat stable, two key 
milestones--initial operational capability and full-rate production-- 
have slipped by several months, and first deployment of the radar in a 
full squadron has been delayed by the carrier airwing schedule. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

AESA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

A fiscal year 2004 technology readiness assessment for the radar 
determined that the four critical technologies were mature. To further 
ensure technology maturity, a final technology assessment was held in 
November 2005. Program officials now consider critical technologies to 
work in their final form and under expected conditions. 

Design Stability: 

Although the AESA design appears to be stable, development has 
continued during production. That development has been slowed by 
software immaturity, and the software has caused inconsistent radar 
performance. Several advanced radar capabilities were deferred to 
future software configurations, but program officials said it did not 
affect key performance parameters. Software hangups have forced radar 
restarts in each of the six AESA operational test aircraft. The problem 
is improving, but is still above the required rate. 

Other deficiencies are being pursued, such as improving target 
breakout, track scheduling, and fault detection. Integrating AESA 
software capabilities and correcting deficiencies continue under a 
technical delivery order contract. Spurious radiated emissions may 
degrade performance of other subsystems, which could result in 
unacceptable weapon system performance. Redesign of radar modules and/ 
or software changes may be required to reduce emissions. Officials said 
development of design improvements has been completed or is almost 
complete, but ongoing verification tests may require additional design 
changes. 

Operational evaluation started later than planned due to delays in 
maturing air-to-air software, so it was not completed until November 
2006, and the report is not expected until January 2007, resulting in a 
5-month delay for initial operational capability. Follow-on tests are 
scheduled through fiscal year 2008 to test, for example, advanced air- 
to-air modes and integration with aircraft electronic warfare systems. 
Unsatisfactory results could result in system software changes. 

Development of the radar's anti-tamper capability is on schedule 
according to officials. Operational testing of this capability is to be 
completed in fiscal year 2008. While the anti-tamper capability is 
required to have no effect on radar performance, operational tests of 
anti-tamper models may identify problems requiring design changes. By 
then, about 116 radars are to have been produced. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because statistical process 
control data are not being collected. Manufacturing processes continue 
to be monitored and controlled at each manufacturing center and 
laboratory. Twenty percent of the 415 radars have been approved for 
production now that the fourth and final low-rate production has been 
approved. Most of the 415 radars will be installed in F/A-18E/Fs on the 
aircraft production line, but 135 radars are to be retrofitted into 
existing aircraft. As of November 2006, 24 radars had been delivered 
and installed in aircraft. Long-lead funding for full production has 
been approved, but due to the testing delay, full-rate production has 
slipped by 3 months. The program has a challenging production risk. On- 
time delivery of radars is risky for the fourth low-rate production lot 
because production must increase from 2 to 4 radars per month, retrofit 
radars begin in fiscal year 2008, and foreign military sales follow. 
Thus, on-time delivery of aircraft could be affected by missing or late 
radars. 

Other Program Issues: 

The first deployment of AESA radars in a full squadron has been delayed 
by 6 months due to a Navy decision on the carrier airwing schedule, not 
AESA problems, according to officials. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated AESA 
software development continues in a spiral fashion during production as 
planned. Operational evaluation was completed in December 2006 and is 
expected to support initial operational capability in March 2007 and 
full-rate production in April 2007, both within thresholds. Due to 
schedule delays, some advanced radar capabilities were deferred, as 
approved. Many of the deferred items for most of the deficiencies 
identified during operational evaluation have been incorporated in the 
next aircraft software build, and will undergo operational tests prior 
to first system deployment in 2008. Final advanced capabilities will be 
incorporated in the following year. 

[End of section] 

Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM): 

The Navy is developing new Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) systems 
that will be fielded with aircraft mission kits on MH-60S Block 2 
helicopters. Together, these systems will provide carrier strike groups 
and expeditionary strike groups with organic airborne mine 
countermeasures capability. To successfully field this capability, the 
Navy must develop, test, and integrate 5 new mine countermeasures 
systems with a modified MH-60S airframe. We assessed the Navy's 
progress in developing the mine countermeasures systems. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City (PMA-299). 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Arete Associates, Boeing, EDO Defense Systems, 
Northrop Grumman, Raytheon: 

Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $156.7 million: 

Procurement: $353.0 million: 

Total funding: $526.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 77: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of (various): $444.9; 
Latest 01/2007: $589.9; 
Percent change: 32.6. 

Procurement cost; 
As of (various): $1,067.9; 
Latest 01/2007: $699.5; 
Percent change: -34.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of (various): $1,522.9; 
Latest 01/2007: $1,298.2; 
Percent change: -14.8. 

Program unit cost; 
As of (various): NA; 
Latest 01/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of (various): 231; 
Latest 01/2007: 144; 
Percent change: -37.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of (various): NA; 
Latest 01/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Costs and quantities are for the AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar, 
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, Organic Airborne and Surface 
Influence Sweep System, Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System, and 
Airborne Mine Neutralization System. 

[End of table] 

The MH-60S Block 2 AMCM helicopter will rely upon 5 new mine 
countermeasures systems, the AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar, Airborne 
Laser Mine Detection System, Organic Airborne and Surface Influence 
Sweep System, Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System, and Airborne Mine 
Neutralization System. The Navy has not yet fully matured technologies 
for 3 of these systems, although it asserts a high degree of design 
stability in these programs. However, if technologies do not mature as 
planned, design changes for the affected systems may be required. In 
addition, the Navy is not collecting statistical process control data 
for the 2 systems in production, preventing us from assessing 
production maturity. The achievement of key product knowledge shown is 
for the Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep System, Rapid 
Airborne Mine Clearance System, and Airborne Mine Neutralization 
System. 

Figure: Attainment of Product knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

AMCM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Thirty-three of the 38 critical technologies comprising the 5 MH-60S 
mine countermeasures systems are fully mature, and the remaining five 
technologies are approaching maturity. Technologies supporting the AN/ 
AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar and the Organic Airborne and Surface 
Influence Sweep System are all fully mature. However, the Airborne 
Laser Mine Detection System and the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance 
System each have one immature technology, while the Airborne Mine 
Neutralization System has three technologies that have not been fully 
matured. 

The Airborne Laser Mine Detection System is currently in production. 
This system detects, classifies, and localizes floating and near 
surface moored mines by firing a laser into the water and using cameras 
to capture water reflections to create images. One technology that 
enables this process is the system's active pixel sensor, which the 
Navy has not fully matured. Although the Navy has identified a mature 
backup technology for the active pixel sensor that will be used in the 
event problems are discovered during testing, this alternative will 
impose schedule delays upon the program as it will require integration 
into the existing system design. 

The Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System is currently in development, 
with initial production planned for August 2008. This system will use a 
30 millimeter gun and targeting sensor to neutralize near-surface and 
surface (floating) moored mines. One technology critical to achieving 
full functionality of this system is its fire control system, which the 
Navy is still developing. The Navy plans to test the fire control 
system in a relevant environment in the second quarter of fiscal year 
2007. 

The Airborne Mine Neutralization System is currently in development and 
is scheduled to enter production in June 2007. This system will provide 
the capability to neutralize bottom and moored mines using an airborne 
delivered expendable mine neutralization device. The Navy has fully 
matured this system's neutralizer technology, and is approaching full 
maturity with its launch and handling subsystem, deployment 
subassembly, and warhead assembly technologies. 

Design Stability: 

All 5 of the MH-60S mine countermeasures systems have completed design 
readiness reviews. To date, 98 percent of design drawings have been 
released for these systems, and the Navy anticipates that only the 
Airborne Mine Neutralization System and the Airborne Laser Mine 
Detection System will require completion of additional drawings. While 
the Navy considers the design for the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance 
System to be complete, if this system's fire control system technology 
does not mature as planned, design changes could be required. 

Production Maturity: 

Both the AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar and Airborne Laser Mine 
Detection System are currently in production. Currently, the Navy is 
not collecting statistical process control data for these systems--an 
approach it attributes to the limited number of initial production 
units being procured. Consequently, we could not assess production 
maturity for either the AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar or the Airborne 
Laser Mine Detection System. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II: 

The Army's APKWS II is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile 
designed to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system is 
intended to add a new laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 
Rocket System and is expected to provide a lower cost, accurate 
alternative to the Hellfire missile. Future block upgrades are planned 
to improve system effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance 
technology used in the new seeker. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: APKWS II Program Office, BAE Systems. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems: 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $182.5 million: 

Procurement: $1,296.6 million: 

Total funding: $1,479.1 million: 

Procurement quantity: 71,565: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/2006: $208.4; 
Latest 08/2006: $208.4; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/2006: $1,296.6; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,296.6; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/2006: $1,505.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,505.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/2006: $.021; 
Latest 08/2006: $.021; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/2006: 71,637; 
Latest 08/2006: 71,637; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/2006: 62; 
Latest 08/2006: 62; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The APKWS II program entered system development with its one critical 
technology mature and its design stable. Since our previous assessment, 
the Army restructured the program and, in April 2006, awarded a 2-year, 
$41.9 million system development and demonstration contract for the new 
APKWS II program. Last year, we reported that the combination of a 
number of problems, including the placement of the laser seeker on the 
fins rather than in the head of the missile, led to the Army's 
curtailment of the original APKWS contract in January 2005. Although 
the APKWS II laser guidance technology appears mature, its integration 
on the missile's fins still presents a risk since this design is 
essentially the same as the original APKWS. Due to funding uncertainty, 
the schedule for the design review slipped from June 2006 to May 2007 
and flight tests were delayed from August 2006 to January 2007. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

APKWS II Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials consider the one APKWS critical technology, laser 
guidance, to be mature. However, on the original APKWS program, 
integration of the laser seeker and guidance proved to be more 
problematic than originally estimated, and this difficulty contributed 
to contract curtailment and program restructuring. The Army 
restructured the program under the same set of key performance 
parameters and, in April 2006, awarded the APKWS II contract to one of 
the original program participants using the same laser seeker and 
guidance technology as in the original program. According to program 
officials, the contractor funded its own work on the revised APKWS II 
during the 15-month period between the original program curtailment and 
contract award for the follow-on program. The contractor's effort 
focused on the problems that plagued the original program. Program 
officials stated that during the interim 15-month period, the 
contractor successfully addressed the original APKWS problems and also 
conducted three successful missile flights. 

Design Stability: 

The number of engineering drawings increased from 115 to 160 from the 
original APKWS to the APKWS II program. According to program officials, 
the drawings now include guidance and telemetry section drawings. 
Program officials expect to have all the engineering drawings released 
by the design review in May 2007. Due to funding uncertainty, the 
system critical design review slipped from June 2006 to May 2007. 

Production Maturity: 

According to program officials, key manufacturing processes have not 
yet been determined. However, officials stated that statistical process 
control will be employed and all key manufacturing processes will be 
placed under control during low-rate initial production. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program officials expected to hold the APKWS II system critical design 
review in June 2006 and flight tests in August 2006. However, funding 
uncertainty has caused those schedules to slip. The Army requested that 
some of the procurement money originally slated for the first APKWS be 
reprogrammed to support the development of APKWS II. This request was 
followed by two additional requests from the Army to reprogram money 
from another source. However, Congress has not yet approved any 
reprogramming requests for APKWS II. Subsequently, in June 2006, the 
Army directed the prime contractor to take actions to manage the 
contract within current funding constraints and to execute the contract 
through November 2006 with existing funding. That has caused the 
schedule for the design review to slip to May 2007 and the flight test 
to January 2007. Due to the uncertainty of future funds, APKWS II 
program officials predict further schedule slippages and subsequent 
increased program costs related to replanning activities. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials stated 
that having a design with the laser seeker on the wings was not an 
issue that led to the Army's curtailment of the original APKWS 
contract. Program officials further noted that this design presents no 
major difficulties to the ongoing integration of the APKWS laser seeker 
and guidance section into the Hydra-70 Rocket components. They believe 
the placement of the laser seeker provides significant advantages 
during extreme environmental operations and adjacent rocket firings. 
Also, program officials noted that the lack of required funding in 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007 resulted in moving the first flight to 
January 2007 and the design review to May 2007. Finally, they stated 
that efforts are ongoing to establish a revised, realistic baseline 
within current funding constraints and that they are confident the 
revised cost and schedule will not breach the current Acquisition 
Program Baseline. 

The Army also provided technical changes, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

GAO Comments: 

Our prior work has shown that the placement of the laser seeker on the 
fins rather than in the head of the missile was problematic for the 
original APKWS program. The integration difficulty contributed to the 
cost overrun and protracted schedule, which subsequently led to program 
curtailment and restructuring. 

[End of section] 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH): 

The Army's ARH is expected to provide reconnaissance and security 
capability for air and ground maneuver teams. The ARH combines a 
modified off-the-shelf airframe with a nondevelopmental item mission 
equipment package and is replacing the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior fleet. A 
streamlined acquisition strategy was proposed for the ARH program, as 
it will be fielded to support current military operations. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: ARH Prototype #1 Flight Testing at Bell Helicopter, 2006 Bell 
Helicopter, A Textron Company. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $224.2 million: 

Procurement: $2,911.4 million: 

Total funding: $3,135.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 368: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2005: $375.9; 
Latest 08/2006: $398.4; 
Percent change: 6.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2005: $2,923.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $2,911.4; 
Percent change: -0.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2005: $3,298.9; 
Latest 08/2006: $3,309.8; 
Percent change: 0.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2005: $8.964; 
Latest 08/2006: $8.994; 
Percent change: 0.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2005: 368; 
Latest 08/2006: 368; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2005: 47; 
Latest 08/2006: 47; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The ARH program began system development without designating any 
technologies as critical. Since then, the program has identified two 
critical technologies--the sensor package and the engine--both of which 
are approaching full maturity. The ARH program is scheduled to hold its 
critical design review in January 2007, and it is not certain that the 
critical technologies will be mature by that time. The program has 
mandated that 85 percent of the drawings be released by the design 
review. About 88 percent have been released to date. The Army does not 
plan to collect statistical process control data in preparation for the 
production decision scheduled for May 2007. Rather, the Army will 
evaluate ARH's engineering and manufacturing readiness levels. Further, 
the Army's oversight of ARH may be compromised due to the 
decertification of the prime contractor's earned value management 
system. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

ARH Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The ARH program had not designated any technologies as critical at the 
time of development start. However, in October 2005 (90 days after 
contract award), two technologies were determined to be critical. Both 
technologies, the sensor package and the engine, are approaching full 
maturity. Although the sensor is a derivative of a currently fielded 
and flying system, it contains some updated components. The sensor was 
tested earlier this year in a prototype configuration and improvements 
are currently being incorporated into the design. The system will be 
retested in late calendar year 2006. The engine has recently completed 
the compressor rig test, the results of which will be critical in 
reducing the risk of the engine and increasing the maturity level. 
However, the program office is unsure if these technologies will be 
fully mature by critical design review, scheduled for January 2007. 

Design Stability: 

According to the program office, the ARH is a limited design effort and 
will take an off-the-shelf aircraft and convert it to military use by 
incorporating existing military and commercial equipment. The ARH 
program office has imposed a critical design review entrance criterion 
of 85 percent drawing release. The review, currently scheduled for 
January 2007, will not be held until this entrance criterion is 
satisfied. Currently, the program has released 88 percent of the 
drawings. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because, according to the 
program office, it does not plan to collect statistical process control 
data. However, the program office stated that production is managed 
through the use of engineering and manufacturing readiness levels 
(EMRLs).To determine production capability, the ARH program stated it 
will conduct a production readiness review (including an assessment of 
the EMRL), review facility plans and limited tooling development, 
conduct an operations capacity analysis, and assess lean manufacturing 
initiatives such as design for six sigma. In addition, the program 
office stated that the production status of the ARH program will be 
evaluated by tracking the cost of repairs and rework. 

Other Program Issues: 

In March 2006, the lead contractor lost its earned value management 
certification due to a recent compliance review that found lack of 
progress in addressing long-standing systemic deficiencies. Without 
certified earned value management data, the Army will not have timely 
information on the contractor's ability to perform work within 
estimated cost and schedule. According to the program office, the 
contractor did not make its first milestone detailed in the Defense 
Contract Management Agency's corrective action plans in efforts to 
obtain earned value compliance. Still, the contractor plans to be 
compliant by the end of August 2007, 3 months after ARH low-rate 
initial production is scheduled to begin. 

According to program officials, the Army plans to start low-rate 
production in May 2007 and procure two lots of 18 and 20 to conclude in 
May 2008. However, the Army does not plan to start full-rate production 
until February 2009. This schedule creates a 10-month production break 
between low-rate initial production and full-rate production. During 
the production break, the program plans to purchase development and 
production needs such as support equipment, pilot and maintenance 
trainers, and spares. Further, according to program officials, the 
budget reduction of $39 million in fiscal year 2007 exacerbates the 
break issue which could be very disruptive. The program office's 
proposed solution to the production break is to increase low-rate 
production, but this would have to be approved by the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Another possible 
solution could be to extend low-rate production to three lots, as 
opposed to two, which would help the program ramp up production and 
fill the 10-month production break. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System: 

The Army's and Special Operations' ATIRCM/CMWS is a component of the 
Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures planned to defend U.S. 
aircraft from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will be 
employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. ATIRCM/CMWS includes 
an active infrared jammer, missile warning system, and countermeasure 
dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, such as flares, 
chaff, and smoke. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: BAE Systems. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America: 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $62.9 million: 

Procurement: $3,525.3 million: 

Total funding: $3,588.2 million: 

Procurement quantity: 2,351: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/1996: $616.6; 
Latest 08/2006: $673.2; 
Percent change: 9.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/1996: $2,521.8; 
Latest 08/2006: $4,373.6; 
Percent change: 73.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/1996: $3,138.4; 
Latest 08/2006: $5,046.8; 
Percent change: 60.8. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/1996: $1.014; 
Latest 08/2006: $1.406; 
Percent change: 38.6. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/1996: 3,094; 
Latest 08/2006: 3,589; 
Percent change: 16.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/1996: Classified; 
Latest 08/2006: Classified; 
Percent change: Classified. 

[End of table] 

The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with 
technologies mature and designs stable. However, one of the five 
critical technologies was recently downgraded due to continued 
technical difficulties. Currently, the program's production processes 
are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion of the program 
entered limited production in February 2002 to meet urgent deployment 
requirements. However, full-rate production for both components was 
delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past several years, 
the program has had to overcome cost and schedule problems brought on 
by shortfalls in knowledge. Key technologies were demonstrated late in 
development, and only a small number of design drawings were completed 
by design review. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

ATIRCM/CMWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program's five critical technologies were considered mature until a 
government/industry team recently downgraded the maturity level of the 
infrared jamming head due to technical issues. Additionally, the other 
four technologies did not mature until after the design review. Most of 
the early technology development effort focused on the application to 
rotary wing aircraft. When system development began in 1995, 
requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force fixed-wing 
aircraft. This change caused problems that contributed to cost 
increases of over 150 percent. The Navy and the Air Force subsequently 
dropped out of the program, but the Navy and the Army are currently 
pursuing future joint production planning. 

Design Stability: 

The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the 
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the 
time of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings 
complete due to the expanded requirements. Two years after the design 
review, 90 percent of the drawings were released and the design was 
stable. This resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional 
testing, and a 3-year schedule delay. However, the number of drawings 
may be changing because the infrared jam laser and the infrared lamp 
will be replaced with a multi-band laser. 

Production Maturity: 

According to program officials, the program has 26 key manufacturing 
processes in various phases of control. The CMWS production portion of 
the system has stabilized and benefited from increased production 
rates. Also, processes supporting both ATIRCM and CMWS will continue to 
be enhanced as data is gathered and lessons learned will be included in 
the processes. 

The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to meet an 
urgent need. Subsequently, full rate production was delayed for both 
components due to reliability testing failures. The program implemented 
reliability fixes to six production representative subsystems for use 
in initial operational test and evaluation. These systems were 
delivered in March 2004. The full-rate production decision for the 
complete system was delayed until June 2011 due to ATIRCM performance 
issues. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army uses the airframe as the acquisition quantity unit of measure 
even though it is not buying an ATIRCM/CMWS system for each aircraft. 
When the program began, plans called for putting an ATIRCM/CMWS on each 
aircraft. Due to funding constraints, the Army reduced the number of 
systems to be procured and will rotate the systems to aircraft as 
needed. The Army is buying kits for each aircraft, which include the 
modification hardware, wiring harness, and cables necessary to install 
and interface the ATIRCM/CMWS to each platform. In May 2006, the 
quantity of ATIRCM/CMWS systems was increased from 1,710 to 2,752, and 
kits to use for aircraft integration was increased from 3,571 to 4,393. 
However, a new cost estimate for the additional systems has not been 
completed. Based on the number of systems before the May 2006 increase, 
the true unit procurement cost for each ATIRCM/CMWS system is more on 
the order of $2.95 million. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that the 
ATIRCM/CMWS program continues to focus efforts on the Global War on 
Terrorism force protection requirements. In response to an Acting 
Secretary of the Army November 2003 memo to equip all Army helicopters 
to be deployed to the war zone with the most cost-effective defensive 
systems, the program office proposed accelerating the CMWS portion of 
ATIRCM. In July 2006, the CMWS was provided to each deployed aircraft 
with CMWS installation kits. These accelerated efforts provided the 
CMWS ahead of the planned schedule (February 2007). CMWS initial 
operational test and evaluation and full-rate production decision 
events were successfully completed during this reporting period. 

The Army also stated that the ATIRCM funding was utilized to maintain 
the CMWS acceleration due to delays in receipt of reprogramming 
funding. The rebaselined ATIRCM program efforts are now continuing, 
with initial operational test and evaluation planned for November 2009. 
This rebaselined plan was presented and approved by the Army 
Acquisition Executive in December 2005. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system 
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with 
federal requirements the frequency must be changed to a band where the 
DOD has been designated as the primary user. The modified radar system 
is being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination 
of stealth, range, payload, and near-precision weapons delivery 
capabilities. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: U.S. Air Force, U.S. Edwards Air Force Base, California. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $202.1 million: 

Procurement: $545.4 million: 

Total funding: $747.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 14: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2004: $694.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $607.9; 
Percent change: -12.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2004: $542.8; 
Latest 08/2006: $545.4; 
Percent change: 0.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2004: $1,236.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,153.4; 
Percent change: -6.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2004: $58.890; 
Latest 08/2006: $54.921; 
Percent change: -6.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2004: 21; 
Latest 08/2006: 21; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2004: 63; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

The total quantity of 21 units includes 14 to be bought with 
procurement funds and 7 to be bought with R&D funds. All 21 units will 
eventually be placed on operational B-2 aircraft. 

[End of table] 

All four of the B-2 RMPs critical technologies are considered mature 
and 100 percent of the design drawings have been released. Production 
maturity metrics will be formulated as part of a production readiness 
review prior to the April 2007 start of production. However, the first 
of two radar antenna software sets will not complete operational 
testing until 2008. Further, the program will not begin tracking the 
radar's operational reliability until early 2007. Recent program flight-
testing delays may lead to a delay in the planned start of production. 
Also, six operational B-2s will receive development radar units prior 
to the completion of flight testing. These units are necessary to 
obtain reliability and maintainability data and for crew training, but 
building them early in development may add to the risk of future design 
changes. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

B-2 RMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All four B-2 RMP critical technologies were considered mature at the 
design review in May 2005. While the program entered development in 
August 2004 with two of these four critical technologies mature and two 
approaching maturity, the receiver/exciter for the electronic driver 
cards and aspects of the antenna designed to help keep the B-2's radar 
signature low, all four are now considered mature. 

Design Stability: 

The program currently has released 100 percent of its drawings and 
plans to maintain this 100 percent level by the planned start of 
production in April 2007. The program, however, does not use the 
release of design drawings as the sole measure of design stability but 
instead uses the successful completion of design events, such as 
subsystem design reviews, as its primary measure of design stability. 
The program has completed its design readiness review and at that time 
had released 85 percent of its design drawings. 

Production Maturity: 

The program does not use manufacturing process control data as the sole 
measure of production maturity because of the small number of 
production units. However, the program has identified one key process 
related to the assembly of the radar antenna array. Instead of using 
manufacturing process control data, the program plans to formulate 
other metrics to measure progress toward production. The program plans 
to use these other metrics as part of a production readiness review 
prior to the start of production in April 2007. 

The program plans to enter production in April 2007 and procure four 
radars at a cost of $160.7 million. However, recent flight-testing 
delays may lead to a reconsideration of April 2007 as the start of 
production and it will not be until the beginning of fiscal year 2008 
when radar flight-testing has progressed to the point that the first of 
two planned radar antenna software sets are fully tested and certified. 
Furthermore, the program does not plan to track the operational 
reliability of the radar until January 2007. Also, an operational 
assessment of the radar was delayed from March 2006 to early 2007. This 
is an important schedule event leading up to production and its delay 
will impact when information will be available leading up to the start 
of production. Producing units before testing is able to demonstrate 
the design is mature and works in its intended environment increases 
the likelihood of future costly design changes. 

The program plans to build six radar units during development to be 
used on B-2 aircraft to gather developmental reliability and 
maintainability data and provide for crew training and proficiency 
operations when the legacy radar frequency is no longer available. Last 
year, the Air Force plan was for six of these radar units to be placed 
on B-2 aircraft for this purpose, but because some B-2s are needed for 
other operations and will not be available, only two operational 
aircraft will initially be fitted with the new radars, with the 
remaining four to be fitted later in 2007. The Air Force and prime 
contractor have determined this will not affect training but will mean 
less radar reliability and maintainability data will initially be 
collected for analysis. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force agrees that producing radar units before testing has been 
completed does increase the risk of future potentially costly design 
changes. However, they have decided the risk is low compared to the 
benefits gained by having operational production units in place to meet 
requirements. 

The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS): 

The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 
(BAMS UAS) is to provide a persistent maritime intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Along with the Multi-
mission Maritime Aircraft and Aerial Common Sensor, BAMS UAS will be 
part of a broad area maritime surveillance family of systems integral 
to the Navy's recapitalization of its Maritime Patrol and 
Reconnaissance Force. DOD is negotiating international participation in 
the program. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: D.P. Associates, Inc./Andrew Kirschbaum. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD: 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $779.3 million: 

Procurement: $310.9 million: 

Total funding: $1,190.7 million: 

Procurement quantity: 4: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $819.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $310.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,230.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: 70; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The BAMS UAS program plans to begin system development in October 2007. 
The program previously planned to reach system development during the 
first quarter of fiscal year 2005. However, the Navy did not allocate 
funds to the program for fiscal year 2006, which delayed development 
start to 2007 and postponed the initial operational capability from 
fiscal year 2010 to 2013. Program officials have not currently 
identified any critical technologies, but contractor proposals will be 
required to identify critical technologies during the source selection 
period from April to September 2007. The program plans to conduct a 
technology readiness assessment in parallel with source selection and 
anticipates results by August 2007. According to program officials, 
each critical technology must be approaching maturity and demonstrated 
in a relevant environment prior to development contract award. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

BAMS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

BAMS UAS is taking steps to evaluate technologies prior to the start of 
program development. The Navy awarded four contracts using a broad 
agency announcement in conjunction with its Persistent Unmanned 
Maritime Airborne Surveillance (PUMAS) effort to engage industry in 
support of developing unmanned ISR mission performance metrics and 
capabilities within a family of systems as well as to gain insight into 
the state of industry research and technology. BAMS UAS has received 
the study results and is in the process of using the information to 
develop technical baselines and assess program risks. In addition, the 
Navy has acquired 2 Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) UAS to 
provide a rapid technology demonstration capability. GHMD data and test 
results are being used to refine BAMS UAS doctrine, concept of 
operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Program officials have not currently identified any critical 
technologies, but contractor proposals will be required to identify 
critical technologies during the source selection, period from April to 
September 2007. According to program officials, critical technologies 
must be approaching maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment 
prior to the start of development in October 2007. 

Other Program Issues: 

As one component of a family of systems, BAMS UAS is intended to serve 
as an adjunct to the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The program 
intends to colocate BAMS UAS mission crews with Maritime Patrol and 
Reconnaissance (MPR) Forces to allow operators to closely coordinate 
missions and utilize common support infrastructure. BAMS UAS will share 
its persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role with 
MMA. If the BAMS UAS does not develop as planned or continues to 
experience schedule delays, the MMA is its fallback, and according to 
the Navy, the overall cost of the MMA program would increase due to a 
need to procure additional aircraft. 

The Navy's Aerial Common Sensor (ACS), a cooperative Army-led program, 
was the replacement for the Navy's current airborne intelligence 
platform, the EP-3. It, in conjunction with MMA and BAMS UAS is 
intended to constitute the MPR family of systems. Due to a significant 
increase in the weight of ACS, the Army terminated the development 
contract. According to BAMS UAS officials, problems with the ACS have 
not affected the BAMS UAS program and future spirals may include 
planned ACS capabilities such as signals intelligence. 

The program is seeking government-to-government dialogue and exchange 
of information among allied and friendly nations that have common 
maritime surveillance needs. Program officials indicated that several 
nations have expressed interest in possible participation in the 
program. 

Agency Comments: 

The BAMS UAS program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and 
avionics for 13 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It 
provides Navigation/ Safety modifications and Communication Navigation 
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management upgrades; installs a Terrain 
Avoidance Warning System; replaces weather avoidance radars, compass 
systems, and dual autopilots; installs dual flight management systems; 
and provides high frequency, ultra high frequency, and very high 
frequency datalinks. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, System Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $578.2 million: 

Procurement: $2,889.5 million: 

Total funding: $3,467.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 424: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2001: $712.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,627.9; 
Percent change: 128.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2001: $3,086.0; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,909.9; 
Percent change: -5.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2001: $3,798.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $4,537.7; 
Percent change: 19.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2001: $7.320; 
Latest 12/2005: $10.456; 
Percent change: 42.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2001: 519; 
Latest 12/2005: 434; 
Percent change: -16.4. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2001: TBD; 
Latest 12/2005: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the C-130 AMP technologies are mature 
and the design is stable for the basic combat delivery aircraft. 
However, production maturity is unknown because the program has not 
collected key manufacturing information and flight testing just began. 
The production decision has been delayed 17 months since last year's 
review. This allows time for more flight testing before making a 
production decision in November 2007. However, the program will have 
limited flight testing completed of a fully integrated, capable version 
of the basic configuration. Estimated costs for the program are 
expected to increase. In October 2006, the Air Force Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group estimated the total program cost at over twice the 
current cost estimate. An updated acquisition strategy reflecting the 
results of the program restructuring has yet to be approved. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

C-130 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature. 

Design Stability: 

The C-130 AMP basic configuration is stable with nearly all of the 
expected drawings released. The basic configuration is critical because 
it provides the foundation for all 13 mission system designs. The 
program completed its critical design review in August 2005 for the 
basic configuration. However, during installation trials to demonstrate 
system integration, program officials realized that they did not have a 
sound understanding of the installation complexity. As a result, 
drawings have been revised based on the lessons learned, and the 
program acknowledges that additional drawings or changes may be needed 
to incorporate the unique features of each variant. 

Production Maturity: 

The program did not collect statistical process control data during 
development. Program officials stated that details on what data they 
will collect regarding manufacturing processes and quality control have 
yet to be defined for low-rate initial production. The Milestone B 
approved exit criteria established the production readiness review as 
one of the three criteria the C-130 AMP must meet to begin low-rate 
production in 2008. According to the program office, a low-rate 
production readiness review will be held in May 2007, and a full-rate 
production readiness review is scheduled for May 2009. 

Since last year's review, the production decision has been delayed 17 
months. The program office stated that the program will now have more 
than two-thirds of total development test points completed for the 
basic configuration before entering the production phase. However, the 
program will have only limited flight testing completed with a fully 
integrated, capable version. Future design variants are scheduled for 
demonstrations even later and will be done concurrently, leaving little 
time for corrections if problems arise. An official from the Office of 
the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, expressed similar 
concerns about the level of concurrent flight testing and production. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program has been undergoing a program restructure for some time, 
putting the program in a state of flux. Since GAO's last review of the 
C-130 AMP, the program has encountered several delays in its schedule, 
the quantities expected to be purchased have been reduced by 31 
aircraft, and the Special Operations Command removed funding from the C-
130 AMP for the Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration program 
from fiscal year 2008 forward. In October 2006, the Air Force Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group estimated the total program cost at over 
twice the current cost estimate. According to the program office, an 
updated acquisition strategy, program baseline, and test plan are 
expected to be approved prior to the production decision in fiscal year 
2008. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments on a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-130J Hercules: 

The C-130J is the latest addition to DOD's fleet of C-130 aircraft and 
constitutes a major upgrade for the aircraft series. The aircraft is 
designed primarily for the transport of cargo and personnel within a 
theater of operation. Variants of the C-130J are being acquired by the 
Air Force (e.g., Air Mobility Command and Special Operations Command), 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to perform their respective missions. We 
reviewed the Air Force's C-130J program. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: C-130J Program Office (657th AESS), U.S. Air Force. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company - Marietta: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $207.4 million: 

Procurement: $2,020.9 million: 

Total funding: $2,252.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: 18: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1996: $10.6; 
Latest 08/2006: $262.9; 
Percent change: 2,380.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1996: $861.9; 
Latest 08/2006: $7,502.8; 
Percent change: 770.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1996: $872.5; 
Latest 08/2006: $7,886.0; 
Percent change: 803.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1996: $79.316; 
Latest 08/2006: $99.822; 
Percent change: 25.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1996: 11; 
Latest 08/2006: 79; 
Percent change: 618.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1996: 16; 
Latest 08/2006: 33; 
Percent change: 106.3. 

These figures only reflect the Air Force's procurement of the C-130J. 

[End of table] 

The C-130J program was initiated at production in June 1996. We did not 
access technology, design, or production maturity because the Air Force 
does not have the information necessary to do so. Officials stated this 
is because the C-130J was originally procured as a commercial item that 
precluded DOD from obtaining the information. The program uses other 
means, such as Defense Contract Management Agency oversight of 
production, to assess maturity. In September 2006, DOD declared initial 
operational capability for the C-130J aircraft despite being rated as 
only partially mission capable in some areas. Program officials stated 
that options to address these shortfalls have been developed. In 
October 2006, the program completed the transition to a noncommercial 
negotiated contract to provide full insight into cost and pricing data 
for the remaining procurement of 39 C-130J aircraft. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for Image] 

[End of figure] 

C-130J Hercules Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-130J's critical technologies because, according 
to program officials, the technologies that make possible the major 
upgrades from earlier C-130 aircraft were assumed to be mature. Since 
the contractor initiated development of the C-130J at its own expense 
in the early 1990s, DOD took no responsibility for the system's 
technology maturity. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the C-130J's design because, according to program 
officials, the Air Force does not have design drawings used to measure 
maturity. It believed the design was stable when the program was 
initiated, based on the fact that the C-130J was offered as a 
commercial item and evolved from an earlier C-130 design. However, when 
compared to earlier C-130 models the C-130J's development was 
approximately 70 percent new effort. Design changes provided major 
improvements such as a new propulsion system, an advanced integrated 
diagnostics system, a glass cockpit, digital avionics, and cargo 
compartment enhancements. Despite being considered a commercial 
development, the C-130J encountered numerous deficiencies early on that 
had to be corrected in order to meet minimum warfighter requirements. 
Other design shortfalls have recently been discovered which impact the 
aircraft's ability to meet its airdrop operations requirements. Program 
officials stated that options to address these shortfalls have been 
developed. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of the C-130J because, 
according to program officials, the Air Force does not have data to 
show the total number of key product characteristics, the maturity of 
critical manufacturing processes, or capability indices. Program 
officials stated this is because the C-130J was originally procured as 
a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 commercial item, which 
limits DOD's access to the full range of contractor manufacturing 
process information. Further, officials stated that the program's 
recent conversion to a noncommercial FAR Part 15 (negotiated) contract 
did not increase their visibility into these types of production 
metrics. The program relies on oversight by the Defense Contract 
Management Agency at the contractor's facility to ensure that the C- 
130J aircraft is manufactured in accordance with applicable standards 
and contactor critical manufacturing process documents. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, Air Mobility Command declared the 
aircraft's initial operational capability in September 2006. Yet, in 
April 2006, DOD testing officials reported several shortfalls with 
substantial operational impact resulting in the aircraft being rated as 
only partially mission capable. Program officials plan to address 
future Air Force needs and correct deficiencies identified during 
operational testing with ongoing modernization efforts funded by DOD 
and foreign military customers. 

The program office was directed to change the acquisition of C-130J 
aircraft from a FAR Part 12 commercial item acquisition to a non- 
commercial Part 15 negotiated acquisition to provide full insight into 
cost and pricing of the aircraft. In response, a definitized contract 
was negotiated in October 2006 for the remaining procurement of 39 
aircraft. Program officials estimate the Air Force will save 
approximately $168 million by converting to a noncommercial negotiated 
acquisition. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and 
reduce ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic 
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, 
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the 
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the 
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We 
assessed the C-5 AMP. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Lockheed-Martin Aeronautics Company. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $0.0 million: 

Procurement: $79.9 million: 

Total funding: $79.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 5: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/1998: $368.9; 
Latest 06/2006: $432.1; 
Percent change: 17.1. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/1998: $645.2; 
Latest 06/2006: $478.9; 
Percent change: -25.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/1998: $1,014.0; 
Latest 06/2006: $911.0; 
Percent change: -10.2. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/1998: $8.048; 
Latest 06/2006: $14.934; 
Percent change: 85.6. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/1998: 126; 
Latest 06/2006: 61; 
Percent change: -51.6. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/1998: 83; 
Latest 06/2006: 94; 
Percent change: 13.3. 

[End of table] 

The program's technologies and design are considered mature. We could 
not assess production maturity as the components are commercial-off- 
the-shelf items that are installed in other commercial and military 
aircraft. However, according to a DOD test official the program has 
many maintenance issues including 240 deficiencies, the most severe 
include the autopilot disconnecting during flight, flight management 
system problems, and engine display issues that were identified during 
testing. The program has a contract in place to fix many deficiencies, 
while a block upgrade is being considered to address more significant 
deficiencies. An Air Force mobility study recommended modification of 
all 111 C-5 aircraft. However, according to program officials, they 
currently do not have the funds to modify 52 aircraft. Future budgets 
will address funding for the remainder of the fleet. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

C-5 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the 
program used commercial technologies that are considered mature. 

Design Stability: 

The program reports that the contractor has released all of the 
drawings for the AMP. Last year we reported that the C-5 AMP had 
released 100 percent of its drawings; however, due to modifications in 
the design, 270 drawings were added. As a result, the program had 
completed only 54 percent of the total number of drawings for the 
system by the time of the production decision. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity because most components are 
readily available as commercial off-the-shelf items. This equipment is 
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. To ensure 
production maturity, the program office is collecting data regarding 
modification kit availability and the installation schedules. 

The program still has not demonstrated that the system will work as 
intended and is reliable. In fiscal year 2006, officials halted the 
flight test program for over 6 months due to problems resulting mainly 
from maintenance technical orders and maturity issues. Testing 
activities were eventually resumed in April 2006 and operational 
testing was completed in June 2006. According to a test official, there 
are still many outstanding maintenance issues for the program, 
including 240 deficiencies. Among those deficiencies, the three most 
severe problems affect safety of flight and require corrective action, 
including the autopilot disconnecting during flight, flight management 
system problems, and engine display issues. The program office has a 
contract in place to fix many deficiencies as part of sustainment, and 
a block upgrade is being considered to address the more significant 
deficiencies. In addition, there are 14 requirements for the program 
that have been delayed for 2 years but should have been met by August 
2005, two of which are major program requirements that concern takeoff 
and landing data. Some of the 14 requirements will be addressed by the 
RERP program and others may be addressed by the block upgrade program. 
According to the test official, the C-5 AMP officials consider 
development complete. 

Other Program Issues: 

In February 2006, the C-5 AMP program was reclassified as a Major 
Defense Acquisition Program. Over the past 2 years, the program has run 
into significant problems while trying to complete software development 
that have impacted the cost and schedule of the program. Most notably, 
a software build was added to fix problems with AMP integration, flight 
management system stability, and system diagnostics. The added build 
caused a $23 million cost overrun, which was paid for by shifting funds 
from the RERP program and extended developmental testing to 10 months. 

Last year we reported that the Air Force was conducting mobility 
studies to determine the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft it would 
need in the future. The study was issued in 2006 and recommended 
modification of all 111 C-5 aircraft. However, according to C-5 program 
officials they currently do not have the funds to modify the remaining 
52 aircraft. To fund the modifications could cost nearly $800 million 
based on current unit cost. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. RERP 
is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and 
availability of the C-5 through engine replacement and modifications to 
subsystems, i.e., electrical and fuel, while the C-5 Avionics 
Modernization Program (AMP) is designed to enhance the avionics. The 
upgrades are part of a two-phased modernization effort to improve the 
mission capability rate, performance, and transport throughput 
capabilities and reduce total ownership costs. We assessed the C-5 
RERP. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Edwards AFB, CA. Photo taken by LM Aero. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $198.9 million: 

Procurement: $8,298.9 million: 

Total funding: $8,497.7 million: 

Procurement quantity: 109: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2001: $1,611.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,342.9; 
Percent change: -16.6. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2001: $8,410.4; 
Latest 08/2006: $8,330.9; 
Percent change: -0.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2001: $10,025.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $9,673.7; 
Percent change: -3.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2001: $79.564; 
Latest 08/2006: $87.150; 
Percent change: 9.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2001: 126; 
Latest 08/2006: 111; 
Percent change: -11.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2001: 100; 
Latest 08/2006: 125; 
Percent change: 25.0. 

[End of table] 

The program's technologies are mature and the design is stable. We did 
not assess production maturity because the Air Force is buying 
commercially available items. The program recently delayed the low-rate 
initial production decision by 1 year because of cost pressures with 
the first production unit and Berry Amendment issues (requirement to 
use U.S. sources) with the engine. These issues contributed to a delay 
in awarding the long-lead contract for the first production unit. A 
major supplier has stated its unwillingness to bring their commercial 
manufacturing processes into Berry Amendment compliance. DOD is 
pursuing a waiver for this supplier. The Air Force expects to award the 
long-lead contract in April 2007, 14 months later than planned. This 
delay in production should allow the program more time for flight 
testing and to gain a better understanding of the kits' costs. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

C-5 RERP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent 
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. 

Design Stability: 

According to program officials, the basic design of the C-5 RERP is 
stable. At the design review, the program had more than 90 percent of 
its drawing released. However, since then, a redesign of the pylon/ 
thrust reverser was needed to address overweight conditions and safety 
concerns for the engine mount area. According to program officials, the 
redesign, now complete, contributed to a 4-month delay to the program. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air 
Force is buying commercially available items. 

The program had planned to enter low-rate initial production in late 
2006 without demonstrating through flight testing that the RERP would 
work as intended. However, program officials stated that this decision 
has been delayed until December 2007 due to upward production cost 
pressures and Berry Amendment specialty metal issues (requirements to 
use U.S. sources) with the engine. The program has not yet awarded the 
initial contract to purchase the long-lead items for the first 
production unit, which was expected to be awarded in February 2006, 
because of supplier noncompliance with the Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. 
2533a). A major supplier has specifically stated its unwillingness to 
bring their commercial manufacturing process into compliance, citing 
increased costs in domestic specialty metals and the risk compliance 
poses to its competitiveness in the global marketplace. According to 
program officials, the Air Force considered several options and is now 
pursuing a waiver to resolve issues concerning Berry Amendment 
compliance. Program officials currently estimate the long-lead contract 
will be awarded in April 2007, 14 months later than originally planned. 
In addition, Air Force officials have indicated that cost pressures 
with the engine also contributed to this delay. This delay in 
production should allow the program more time for flight testing and to 
gain a better understanding of the production costs. 

Other Program Issues: 

The C-5 RERP is dependent on the C-5 AMP because the aircraft must 
undergo AMP modifications prior to RERP modifications. A recent DOD 
study on mobility recommended modification of all 111 C-5 aircraft. 
However, according to Air Force officials they currently do not have 
the funds to modify 52 C-5 AMP aircraft. In addition, the C-5 AMP has 
performance shortfalls that need to be fixed. According to the program 
office, it has a sustainment contract in place to fix some of the 
deficiencies, but a block upgrade program will be needed to fix the 
more significant deficiencies. The Air Force expects to request funds 
for the block upgrade program beginning in fiscal year 2010. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the risk associated with entering production before flight testing has 
been completed is being partially mitigated by two operational 
assessments. The favorable results of the first operational assessment 
supports the long-lead production decision review by the Air Force. 
Other technical comments were provided and incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

USMC CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

The Marine Corps' CH-53K system will perform the marine expeditionary 
heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and 
personnel to support distributed operations deep inland from a sea- 
based center of operations. The CH-53K program is expected to replace 
the current CH-53E helicopter with a new design to improve range and 
payload, survivability and force protection, reliability and 
maintainability, coordination with other assets, and overall cost of 
ownership. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Sikorksy Aircraft Company, Copyright 2003 Sikorksy Aircraft 
Company. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation: 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $3,649.9 million: 

Procurement: $11,274.8 million: 

Total funding: $14,924.7 million: 

Procurement quantity: 152: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $4,031.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $11,274.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $15,306.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $95.072; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: 161; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: 117; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The CH-53K program entered system development in December 2005 without 
demonstrating that its 3 critical technologies had reached full 
maturity. The program expects one of these technologies to reach full 
maturity in 2009 and the remaining two technologies to be mature by 
2012, three years after the program's design review. While an initial 
readiness assessment for the program identified 10 critical 
technologies, a subsequent assessment reduced that number to 3. 
Elements of the 7 eliminated technology areas, including the engines, 
are not considered critical, although they may still present challenges 
to the program as many of them are currently being developed or used by 
other programs and will be integrated later into the CH-53K. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

CH-53K Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The three critical technologies for the CH-53K program--the main rotor 
blade, the main gearbox, and the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper-- 
are not fully mature. The viscoelastic lag damper, which serves to 
prevent excessive blade lagging, is expected to be fully mature by 
2009, while the other two technologies are expected to be fully mature 
by 2012. 

The main rotor blade will be 6 percent longer than that of the CH-53E 
and will require improved performance to meet the vertical lift 
requirement. Current testing of smaller-scale models of the rotor 
blades is expected to demonstrate increased maturity for the main rotor 
blade, with the actual sized main rotor blade achieving full maturity 
by 2012. 

The main gearbox is not mature. While other helicopters have utilized 
similar technology for greater loads, they differed from the CH-53K in 
operational requirements. Tests of the gearbox later this year are 
expected to demonstrate increased maturity, while full maturity is 
expected by 2012. 

A viscoelastic lag damper similar to that planned for use is currently 
in operation on other helicopters. However, while currently approaching 
full maturity, it must be resized for use on the larger CH-53K rotor 
head and will not reach full maturity until 2009. The viscoelastic lag 
damper is expected to result in improvements in maintainability and 
supportability over the hydraulic damper used on the CH-53E. Prototype 
dampers are currently being procured and testing of their damping 
characteristics is scheduled for later this year. 

An assessment conducted in September 2004 reduced 10 original critical 
technologies to the 3 above. Of the 7 eliminated technologies, 2 are 
being developed by the CH-53K program and 5 are being developed by or 
used on other programs and will be integrated onto the CH-53K platform. 
While the program does not anticipate problems with the 5 technologies, 
they are dependent on the development and maturity schedules of the 
other programs. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the design stability of the CH-53K because the total 
number of drawings expected is not known at this time. 

Other Program Issues: 

Due to unexpected attrition of CH-53E aircraft, the need for an 
operational replacement has increased, resulting in the return of 
decommissioned CH-53Es to operational status. Supplemental funding has 
been provided to reclaim five aircraft, and funding has been requested 
to reclaim two more while the program continues to review the condition 
of remaining aircraft. 

Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft have flown at three times the 
planned utilization rate. This operational pace is expected to result 
in higher airframe and component repair costs, including short-term 
fatigue repairs necessary to minimize CH-53E inventory reductions until 
CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful levels. 

To address these challenges, the program intends to manufacture 29 of 
the 156 total helicopters (19 percent) during low-rate initial 
production and concurrent with initial operational testing. While 
concurrent production may help to field the systems sooner, it could 
also result in greater retrofit costs if unexpected design changes are 
required. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
CH-53K Program conducted a Technology Readiness Assessment in September 
2004, which assessed 10 candidate technologies. Three of those 
technologies met the criteria for designation as critical technology 
elements (CTE): main rotor blade, main gearbox, and the visoelastic lag 
damper. According to the Navy's comments, the technology readiness 
level (TRL) of the visoelastic lag damper was assessed as a model or 
prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment and the main rotor 
blade and main gearbox were assessed as components in a lab 
environment. Further, the Navy stated that the CH-53K Program has a 
technical maturation plan to achieve maturity of these three CTEs by 
Milestone C in 2012, which is progressing as planned, and risk due to 
these CTEs is considered low. This plan was staffed through the 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and is reviewed 
semiannually by DDR&E. 

[End of section] 

Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X): 

The Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) is planned to 
provide the United States Air Force with a vertical take-off and 
landing aircraft that is quickly deployable and capable of main base 
and austere location operations for worldwide CSAR and personnel 
recovery missions. The CSAR-X will be developed in two blocks and will 
replace the aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. We assessed CSAR- 
X Block 0, the first block to be developed. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: 669 AESS/Th CSAR-X Program Office. 

Note: Photo is of the HH-60 Pavehawk, the aircraft CSAR-X will replace. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,296.8 million: 

Procurement: $7,046.5 million: 

Total funding: $8,447.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 141: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: $1,310.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: $7,046.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: $8,461.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: $58.761; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: 144; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: 70; 
Percent change: NA. 

Estimates are for CSAR-X Block 0 only and do not reflect the totals for 
the entire CSAR-X program. 

[End of table] 

CSAR-X program officials report that all of the critical technologies 
for Block 0 were mature before the program committed to product 
development in October 2006. The development contract was awarded to 
Boeing in November 2006, but a bid protest by competitors was filed 
with GAO and has required the program to suspend development 
activities. The protest was sustained in February 2007 and the Air 
Force is currently considering its response to the GAO recommendation. 
Information regarding design stability and production maturity was not 
available at the time of this review. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

CSAR-X Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

CSAR-X program officials identified eight critical technologies for 
Block 0 and report that all eight were mature before development start. 
They also identified a number of other critical technologies expected 
to support Block 10, but did not provide data on their levels of 
maturity. These additional technologies will be assessed prior to the 
start of Block 10 development. 

Other Program Issues: 

CSAR-X is being managed as an incremental development program. Block 0, 
the block assessed in this review, and Block 10 will be managed as 
separate programs, each with its own requirements, program baseline, 
and milestone reviews. 

The initiation of CSAR-X Block 0 development has been delayed several 
times. According to program officials, the largest part of the schedule 
slip resulted from the Air Force adding $849 million to the program's 
future budget to move the beginning of Block 10 development ahead 2 
years, from 2011 to 2009, to more closely align with the scheduled 
conclusion of Block 0 development. As a result of those changes, the 
program office went back to the competitors and asked them to 
incorporate the new Block 10 development plan and funding profile into 
their proposals. 

The Air Force awarded the CSAR-X Block 0 development contract to Boeing 
in November 2006. However, a bid protest by competitors challenging the 
award was filed with GAO, requiring the Air Force to suspend the 
beginning of product development activities. In February 2007, GAO 
sustained the protest, recommending that the Air Force amend the 
solicitation and request revised proposals. If the new evaluation 
results in a determination that Boeing's proposal no longer represents 
the best value to the government GAO recommended that the Air Force 
terminate its contract. The Air Force is currently considering its 
response to the GAO recommendation. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft 
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion, 
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability. 
These technologies are to allow for increased sortie rates and 
decreased manning rates as compared to existing systems. Construction 
of the first ship of the class--CVN 78--is scheduled to begin in 
January 2008. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: CVN-21 Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News: 

Program office: Washington, DC: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $2,000.5 million: 

Procurement: $22,970.9 million: 

Total funding: $24,971.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: 3: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/2004: $4,415.8; 
Latest 12/2005: $4,253.2; 
Percent change: -3.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/2004: $28,288.4; 
Latest 12/2005: $25,805.9; 
Percent change: -8.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/2004: $32,704.2; 
Latest 12/2005: $30,059.1; 
Percent change: -8.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/2004: $10,901.398; 
Latest 12/2005: $10,019.713; 
Percent change: -8.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/2004: 3; 
Latest 12/2005: 3; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/2004: 137; 
Latest 12/2005: 149; 
Percent change: 8.8. 

Costs decreased due to a correction in the estimated costs for the 
second ship. 

[End of table] 

CVN 21 expects to have 6 of 17 current critical technologies fully 
mature and another 7 approaching maturity by critical design review now 
scheduled for May 2007. Program officials stated that the extended 
construction and design period allows further time for development. 
Fallback technologies still exist for 6 of 17 total critical 
technologies, but their use entails drawbacks, such as decreased 
performance and/or an increase in manpower requirements. While the 
design process appears on track, weight and stability issues have 
presented a challenge. In 2006 the Navy decided to delay awarding the 
contract for construction of the first two ships of the class by 1 year 
to meet other Navy priorities. The Navy expects to award the CVN 78 
construction contract in January 2008. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

CVN-21 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only 4 of CVN 21's 17 current critical technologies are fully mature-- 
the nuclear propulsion and electrical plant, a new desalination system, 
the Multi-Function Radar, and a high strength alloy steel. A plasma-arc 
waste destruction system and the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching 
System (EMALS) are expected to be fully mature and 7 are expected to be 
approaching maturity prior to critical design review. A total of 9 are 
expected to be fully mature in time for construction contract award in 
2008. The program reported 16 critical technologies at development 
start, with as many as 22 technologies in 2006. Since last year's 
assessment, the Navy eliminated a technology; and redefined another. 

Programs other than CVN-21 are developing 6 of the critical 
technologies--the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), a missile; Multi- 
Function Radar, Volume Search Radar, an automated weapon information 
system; and a GPS-based landing system--known as JPALS. Progress in 
those programs could affect the CVN-21 schedule. Four of these 
technologies have mature alternate systems as backups. No backup is 
feasible for the radars without major ship redesign. While the Multi- 
function Radar demonstrated maturity through at-sea testing, the Volume 
Search Radar will not achieve maturity until 2014 after operational 
testing on the future destroyer. Program officials stated that they 
will most likely install AAG--even if it is not fully mature when a 
decision to use a backup must be made. CVN 78's optimal build sequence 
could be impacted, if AAG is not delivered on time. 

EMALS will replace steam catapults and is expected to demonstrate 
maturity through land based testing. EMALS will not be tested at sea, 
but officials believe that this testing is the only alternative 
designed to approximate an aircraft carrier environment. 

The Navy eliminated an integrated inventory system and intended to 
pursue materials aimed at reducing carrier weight. The materials were 
ultimately eliminated because the Navy believes that it can already 
achieve its goals for ship weight and stability. Only high-strength and 
toughness steel is expected to be used on CVN 78. 

Four critical technologies will not be mature until after construction 
start in 2008. While a self-propelled weapons loading device is not 
required until ship delivery in 2015, an armor protection system is 
needed for installation starting in 2009--the same year it is expected 
to demonstrate maturity. Risks associated with the 1,100-ton air 
conditioning plants are considered low since the components are 
available and used today, but this size has never been installed on a 
ship. Finally, the advanced weapons elevators are not expected to reach 
maturity until after shipboard system testing just prior to delivery. 

Design Stability: 

A design review is currently planned for May 2007, but program 
officials stated that the design is regularly reviewed. Since the 
program does not measure design stability by percentage of drawings 
completed, it was not assessed according to this metric. Rather, the 
program measures progress in developing the product model. According to 
program officials, the ship is meeting its design targets--in part 
because of a 1 year delay in the construction contract, which resulted 
in additional time to develop the design. However, since a number of 
systems are still in development, the final design could be impacted. 

Meeting the ship's requirements for weight and stability has been a 
challenge. EMALS and AAG have exceeded their allocated weight margins 
and weight must be compensated elsewhere on the ship. Additional 
degradation of its weight allowance could occur as the final designs 
for critical technologies become known. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy concurred with our assessment, but emphasized that a lengthy 
construction period provides additional time to mature technologies. 
The Navy noted that technology readiness is closely managed through 
proven design processes, risk assessments, site visits, and contracting 
methods to ensure adequate maturity. Specific attention is given to 
requirements, legacy system availability, technology readiness, 
affordability, schedule, and return on investment. In addition, initial 
construction efforts aimed at validating new designs, tooling, and 
construction processes are already under way. 

Finally, the Navy stressed that the decision to delay the program in 
2006 was not related to technology maturity, weight, or stability 
issues. 

[End of section] 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

The Navy's DDG 1000--formerly known as DD(X)--destroyer is a 
multimission surface ship designed to provide advanced land attack 
capability in support of forces ashore and contribute to U.S. military 
dominance in littoral operations. The program awarded contracts for 
detail design and construction of two lead ships in August 2006. The 
program will continue to mature its technologies and design as it 
approaches construction start, currently planned for July 2008. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: PEO Ships (PMS 500), Copyright DDG 1000.com Northrup Grumman 
Ship Systems. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman Ship 
Systems, Raytheon: 

Program office: Washington, DC: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $2,641.2 million: 

Procurement: $23,419.4 million: 

Total funding: $26,060.7 million: 

Procurement quantity: 10: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 01/1998: $2,094.3; 
Latest 08/2006: $8,690.0; 
Percent change: 314.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 01/1998: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $24,409.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 01/1998: $2,094.3; 
Latest 08/2006: $33,099.7; 
Percent change: 1,480.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 01/1998: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $3,309.973; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 01/1998: 0; 
Latest 08/2006: 10; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 01/1998: 128; 
Latest 08/2006: 192; 
Percent change: 50.0. 

Costs increased due to changes in cost estimating, additional 
technology development, program restructuring, and quantity change. 

[End of table] 

Three of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are fully mature. While 7 
other technologies are approaching full maturity, 5 of them will not be 
fully mature until after ship installation as testing in a realistic 
environment is not considered feasible. The 2 remaining technologies-- 
the volume search radar and total ship computing environment--have only 
completed component level demonstrations and subsequently remain at 
lower levels of maturity. Concurrent with its efforts to mature ship 
technologies, the Navy has initiated detail design activities in the 
program. While the Navy is planning to complete at least 75 percent of 
DDG 1000's total detail design products ahead of lead ship 
construction, any challenges encountered in remaining technology 
development activities could place this target at risk. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

DDG 1000 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Three of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are fully mature. Seven 
other technologies, including the advanced gun system and its 
projectile, hull form, infrared signature mockups, integrated 
deckhouse, integrated power system, and peripheral vertical launching 
system, are approaching full maturity. The Navy currently plans to 
complete development of the integrated deckhouse and peripheral 
vertical launching system prior to beginning construction on DDG 1000's 
two lead ships. However, practical limitations prevent the advanced gun 
system and its projectile, hull form, integrated power system, and 
infrared signature mockups from being fully demonstrated in an at-sea 
environment until after lead ship installation. Two other technologies-
-the volume search radar and total ship computing environment--remain 
at lower levels of maturity. 

The volume search radar, along with the multi-function radar, together 
comprise DDG 1000's dual band radar system. While the multi-function 
radar has reached maturity, considerable testing remains for the volume 
search radar. The Navy is currently planning to install volume search 
radar equipment at a land-based test facility in March 2007. Following 
installation, the volume search radar will undergo land-based testing, 
which the Navy plans to complete by March 2008 in an effort to increase 
the radar's maturity prior to lead ship construction start in July 
2008. However, full maturity of this technology will not occur until 
after ship installation. In addition, because the efforts are 
concurrent, there is risk that any delays or problems discovered in 
testing for the volume search radar could ultimately impact dual band 
radar production plans. According to Navy officials, in the event the 
volume search radar experiences delays in testing, it will not be 
integrated as part of the dual band radar into the deckhouse units that 
will be delivered to the shipbuilders. Instead, the Navy will have to 
task the shipbuilder with installing the volume search radar into the 
deckhouse, which program officials report will require more labor hours 
than currently allocated. 

The Navy's total ship computing environment for DDG 1000 requires 
developing hardware infrastructure and writing and releasing six blocks 
of software code. Although development of the first three software 
blocks progressed in line with cost and schedule estimates, program 
officials report that changes in the availability of key subsystems 
developed external to the DDG 1000 program, introduction of 
nondevelopment items, and changes in program integration and test needs 
prompted the Navy to defer some of the functionalities planned in 
software release four to software blocks five and six, and full 
maturity of the integrated system will not be attained until after ship 
construction start. 

Design Stability: 

The DDG 1000 program recently entered detail design phase. The Navy is 
now assessing design stability by reviewing detail design products, 
including system drawings, detail drawings, manufacturing drawings, and 
calculations and analyses. According to program officials, 175 of 3,723 
(projected) detail design products for DDG 1000 have been completed. 
The Navy estimates that at least 75 percent of DDG 1000's total detail 
design products will be completed prior to start of lead ship 
construction in July 2008. Successfully meeting this target depends on 
maturing DDG 1000 technologies as planned. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy stated that our assessment was factually correct, but 
misleading in areas of technology maturity and program funding. 
According to the Navy, DDG 1000 critical technologies achieved 
technology readiness levels appropriate to gain authorization in 
November 2005 to enter detail design phase. Since that event, 
technologies have been further tested, and all are on track to meet 
cost and schedule targets. Also, given the unique nature of 
shipbuilding, with detail design and construction efforts spread over 
approximately 5 years, the Navy claimed that comparing DDG 1000 
technology readiness levels to GAO-developed best practices criteria is 
not valid. Further, the Navy noted that GAO's cost comparison computing 
percent change from January 1998 to the current program baseline does 
not account for program progression through the acquisition cycle and 
may be misinterpreted as cost growth. 

GAO Comments: 

Our approach is valid because our work has shown that technological 
unknowns discovered late in development lead to cost increases and 
schedule delays. 

[End of section] 

E-10A Wide Area Surveillance Technology Development Program (TDP): 

The Air Force's E-10A, equipped with the wide-area surveillance variant 
of the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) 
radar, is intended to provide next-generation air and ground moving 
target detection capabilities and an imaging capability for surface 
surveillance. The system is also intended to provide a battle 
management capability that will integrate other intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and weapons assets. The Boeing 767-400ER 
aircraft is being used as the TDP testbed. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Northrup Grumman. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman: 

Program office: Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,294.5 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $1,294.5 million: 

Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2005: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,057.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2005: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $0.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2005: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,057.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2005: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,057.645; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2005: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: 1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2005: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The E-10A TDP has not yet started development. In May 2006, DOD 
approved the TDP acquisition, technology development, and test and 
evaluation strategies. The program has identified 18 critical 
technologies, five of which are currently assessed as being fully 
mature. The program projects that nearly all critical technologies will 
be fully mature by 2011--when the TDP demonstrations are scheduled for 
completion. The TDP demonstrations will include the live fire 
engagement of cruise missiles, the live fire engagement of ground 
targets, and the use of information services via internet protocol- 
enabled communication channels. The demonstrations constitute the TDP 
exit criteria. If an E-10A development program is initiated, 
capabilities will be acquired through an evolutionary acquisition 
process. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

E-10A WAS TDP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Of the TDP's 18 critical technologies, 5 are fully mature, with the 
remaining 13 projected to be mature or approaching maturity by 2011. 
TDP technologies will be matured in two ways. In some cases, the 
technologies will be demonstrated on the E-10A testbed or in the system 
integration laboratory during the TDP test program. In other cases, the 
program office will monitor and leverage the advances made by other 
programs and agencies to mature relevant technologies. 

Eight technologies will be matured directly by the TDP. The program 
projects that 7 of the 8 will be fully mature at the end of the TDP. 
The one critical technology that is projected to not reach full 
maturity is information assurance, which is projected to be approaching 
full maturity by the end of the TDP. 

The other 10 critical technologies will be matured as part of program 
activities. For example, the narrowband communications critical 
technology is expected to be provided by the Joint Tactical Radio 
System, and the Wideband Beyond Line-of-Sight critical technology is 
expected to be provided by the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight 
Terminals. The program projects that 9 of the 10 critical technologies 
will be fully mature at the end of the TDP; the remaining critical 
technology is projected to be either approaching full maturity or fully 
mature. 

Other Program Issues: 

The E-10A's MP-RTIP radar is a modular, scalable, two-dimensional 
active electronically scanned radar. The MP-RTIP also supports the 
Global Hawk program. MP-RTIP will deliver a "large sensor" variant for 
the E-10A aircraft and a "small sensor" variant for the Global Hawk. 
The MP-RTIP development effort currently plans to provide two E-10A 
sensors and three Global Hawk sensors. The E-10A and Global Hawk 
programs will fund production of the MP-RTIP sensors for their 
respective operational platforms. The two E-10A MP-RTIP development 
sensors will be integrated into the E-10A system integration laboratory 
and testbed, and are scheduled for delivery in 2009 and 2010. The 
Global Hawk variants of the radar are scheduled for delivery in 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 

The MP-RTIP radar began development in 2003. The Global Hawk variant of 
the radar has 8 critical technologies and the E-10A has 1 additional 
critical technology (pulse compression unit) for a total of 9. The 
majority of the critical technologies have reached full maturity and 
the remaining critical technologies are approaching full maturity. 
Regarding design stability, all of the drawings expected are releasable 
for both variants of the MP-RTIP radar. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred 
with the information provided in this report. 

[End of section] 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based, 
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It 
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C 
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2D AHE is 
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational 
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and 
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Program Executive Office, Tactical Aircraft Programs (PMA-231). 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop-Grumman Corp. 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,820.8 million: 

Procurement: $10,066.2 million: 

Total funding: $11,887.1 million: 

Procurement quantity: 69: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2003: $3,531.2; 
Latest 12/2005: $3,538.7; 
Percent change: 0.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2003: $10,031.1; 
Latest 12/2005: $10,066.2; 
Percent change: 0.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2003: $13,562.2; 
Latest 12/2005: $13,605.0; 
Percent change: 0.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2003: $180.830; 
Latest 12/2005: $181.399; 
Percent change: 0.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2003: 75; 
Latest 12/2005: 75; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2003: 95; 
Latest 12/2005: 94; 
Percent change: -1.1. 

[End of table] 

The E-2D AHE program entered system development in June 2003 with four 
immature critical technologies. Since that time, one of the program's 
four critical technologies has reached full maturity. Although the 
design met best practice standards at the time of the October 2005 
design review, the total number of engineering drawings has 
subsequently increased. The program office reports that the design is 
almost 100 percent complete, but technology maturation and system 
integration may lead to more design changes or increased costs. We 
could not assess production maturity because the program does not plan 
to use statistical process controls. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

E-2D AHE Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of the E-2D AHE's four critical technologies (the space time 
adaptive processing algorithms) is mature. More mature backup 
technologies exist for the three remaining technologies: the rotodome 
antenna, a silicon carbide-based transistor for the power amplifier to 
support UHF radio operations, and the multichannel rotary coupler for 
the antenna. These technologies were flown on a larger test platform in 
2002 and 2003. However, use of the backup technologies would result in 
degraded system performance and would not support aircraft weight and 
volume constraints as well as accommodate future system growth. Flight 
testing, which will include the four critical technologies, is planned 
to begin in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The next AHE 
technology readiness assessment is to be performed prior to the low 
rate initial production decision in fiscal year 2009, and the program 
office anticipates that the remaining technologies will be mature at 
that time. 

Design Stability: 

The program had completed 90 percent of planned drawings prior to the 
October 17, 2005 design review. However, the number of drawings 
required has since increased, driven primarily by underestimating total 
structural and wiring drawings, part discrepancies discovered during 
aircraft assembly, and rework associated with the prime contractor's 
new design software, which resulted in the need for unique drawings for 
suppliers. This increase in drawings means that the program had 
completed less than 75 percent of total drawings at design review. The 
program office reports that 99 percent of total drawings are complete 
and projects that 100 percent of the drawings will be complete by the 
planned start of production in March 2009. However, the technology 
maturation process may lead to more design changes. 

The program office reported that the systems integration laboratory is 
being created this year and a fully integrated prototype will be 
delivered in 2007. Without the benefit of an integration laboratory or 
a prototype prior to entering the system demonstration phase, the 
program increases the likelihood that problems will be discovered late 
in development when they are more costly to address. 

Production Maturity: 

The program expects a low-rate initial production decision in March 
2009, but does not require the contractor to use statistical process 
controls to ensure its critical processes are producing high-quality 
and reliable products. According to the program, the contractor 
assembles the components using manual, not automated, processes that 
are not conducive to statistical process control. The program relies on 
postproduction data, such as defects per unit, to track variances and 
nonconformance. The program also conducts production assessment reviews 
every 6 months to assess the contractor's readiness for production. The 
program has updated the manufacturing processes that were established 
and used for the E-2C over the past 30 years. The program considers the 
single station joining tool; the installation of electrical, hydraulic, 
and pneumatic lines; and the installation of the prime mission 
equipment all critical manufacturing processes. 

The program is currently building the first two development aircraft. 
According to the program office, there are no significant differences 
in the manufacturing processes for the development aircraft and the 
production aircraft. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the E-
2D AHE program is executing the development contract and critical 
technologies do not represent a high risk to the program at present. 
The increase in drawings is due to some suppliers not using modern 
technology, so rework was necessary by the prime contractor to convert 
the drawings to support legacy manufacturing processes. 

Flight testing, which will include the four critical technologies, is 
planned to begin in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The test 
program will demonstrate design maturity of all technologies and 
capabilities. A Technology Readiness Assessment will be conducted prior 
to the low-rate production decision. Integration of statistical process 
controls would require significant Navy investment to update the E-2D 
aircraft manufacturing process. The Navy has elected not to make this 
investment due to the maturity of the 30-plus-year E-2 production 
history. 

[End of section] 

EA-18G: 

The EA-18G Growler aircraft will replace the carrier-based EA-6B and 
provide electronic warfare capability to the Navy beginning in 2009. It 
is a combination of the Improved Capability (ICAP) III electronic suite 
and the F/A-18F platform. The EA-6B now provides support to the Navy as 
well as the Air Force and Marine Corps. Only 14 EA-6Bs have been funded 
to receive the ICAP III. Plans to develop a joint service airborne 
electronic attack system of systems have not developed as planned. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Copyright 2006 U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing: 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $858.9 million: 

Procurement: $6,354.5 million: 

Total funding: $7,213.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: 76: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2003: $1,757.6; 
Latest 01/2007: $1,840.3; 
Percent change: 4.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2003: $6,494.2; 
Latest 01/2007: $6,710.6; 
Percent change: 3.3. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2003: $8,251.8; 
Latest 01/2007: $8,550.9; 
Percent change: 3.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2003: $91.686; 
Latest 01/2007: $106.887; 
Percent change: 16.6. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2003: 90; 
Latest 01/2007: 80; 
Percent change: -11.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2003: 70; 
Latest 01/2007: 69; 
Percent change: -1.4. 

[End of table] 

The EA-18G entered system development without demonstrating that its 
five critical technologies had reached full maturity, but has since 
made progress in maturing these technologies. However, all technologies 
are still not fully mature. The design appears stable, with almost all 
drawings complete. However, until all technologies demonstrate 
maturity, the potential for design changes remains. The program is 
executing a compressed development schedule to address an expected 
decline in the EA-6B inventory. However, upgrades have slowed the EA-6B 
inventory decline. The program now plans to reduce total procurement to 
80 aircraft, but one third of the EA-18G aircraft will still be 
procured as low-rate initial production aircraft. Additional 
procurement and/or retrofit costs could occur if design deficiencies 
are discovered during the development and test phase. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

EA-18G Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the EA-18G's five critical technologies were mature when the 
program started development. Two of the critical technologies, the ALQ- 
99 pods and the F/A-18F platform, are mature. We assess the remaining 
three technologies--the ALQ-218 receiver system, the communications 
countermeasures set (CCS), and the tactical terminal system--as 
approaching full maturity. Software needed for full functionality of 
these technologies is not yet released. Tests to assess their 
performance will not occur until late fiscal year 2007. 

The program considers the EA-18G development effort as low to medium 
risk because they consider the fielded F/A-18F aircraft and the ICAP 
III electronic suite mature. The program assessed all but the CCS 
mature because they include both what has been demonstrated as well as 
the level of development risk. We believe the assessment of the CCS is 
correct given that it will function on the EA-18G in a new environment 
with space constraints that will be a challenge. However, there are 
other technology form and fit challenges. The ALQ-218 receiver is being 
transferred from the EA-6B where it is housed in a larger pod on the 
vertical tail. For the EA-18G, the ALQ-218 has been redesigned to fit 
on the wing tips. This wing tip environment is known to cause severe 
under wing and wing tip noise and vibration that could degrade the 
performance of the receiver. 

Design Stability: 

The design of the EA-18G appears to be stable. Program officials state 
that all drawings have been released and the design complete. However, 
flight tests are needed to verify the impact of loads on some of 
designs and whether redesign might be needed. In addition, the program 
continues to identify a number of risks that could impact eventual 
design and retrofit cost. One risk addresses the effect of vibration on 
reliability and performance of the wingtip pods for the ALQ-218 
receiver. The effect of the wing tip environment on the performance and 
reliability of the ALQ-218 will not be known until flight tests are 
conducted. Currently all suitability performance measures and almost 
all ALQ-218 technical performance measures are based on calculated 
values. Actual values not are gathered until EA-18G flight tests are 
conducted. The first test EA-18G was delivered to the Navy for flight 
tests in September 2006. Schedules call for ALQ-218 flight performance 
tests to begin in February 2007 and operational tests in 2008. Initial 
operational capability for the EA-18G is planned for September 2009. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity. The program does not collect 
statistical process control data. The program is executing a compressed 
development schedule to address an expected decline in EA-6B aircraft. 
Initial plans called for purchasing 90 EA-18Gs. The Navy/DOD is 
proposing to reduce the total quantity to 80 aircraft in the FY 2008 
budget. The proposed reduction in procurement quantities from 90 to 84 
is a result of re-evaluating inventory requirements in association with 
the Navy's proposed FY 2008 budget and the application of tiered 
readiness. A reduction totaling an additional 4 aircraft from the first 
low-rate initial production buy is also being considered, making the 
total procurement quantity 80 aircraft. Low-rate initial production 
aircraft will total one third of the total buy. This is significantly 
greater than the traditional DOD benchmark of 10 percent. Program 
officials state that the large initial production buy is driven in part 
by the scheduled replacement of the EA-6Bs due to the extensive flight 
hours on EA-6Bs, and the age of the existing inventory. However, in 
April 2006 we reported that EA-6B inventory levels were projected to 
meet the Navy's requirements at least until 2017. 

Program officials state that EA-18G development continues to meet or 
exceed all cost, schedule and technical performance requirements. They 
also state that flight tests performed to date have shown the Advanced 
Electronic Attack system is very mature, and that software is being 
delivered ahead of schedule. However, the program also reports that 
post operational test and evaluation efforts have been funded to 
correct any deficiencies discovered during these tests. Also, the 
production and/or retrofit cost to correct design deficiencies 
discovered during the development and test phase are excluded from the 
production contract price and would require separate contract 
authorization. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Navy provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV: 

The Air Force's EELV program acquires satellite launch services for 
military, intelligence, and civil missions from two families of launch 
vehicles--Atlas V and Delta IV. The program's goal is to preserve the 
space launch industrial base, sustain assured access to space, and 
reduce life cycle cost of space launches by at least 25 percent over 
previous systems. A number of vehicle configurations are available 
depending on the satellite vehicles weight and mission specifications. 
We assessed both the Atlas V and Delta IV. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: (Left) Copyright 2005 Lockheed Martin; (right) Copyright 2003 
The Boeing Company. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Launch Services, Lockheed Martin Space 
Systems: 

Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $18.3 million: 

Procurement: $22,429.4 million: 

Total funding: $22,447.7 million: 

Procurement quantity: 110: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1998: $1,636.8; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,906.1; 
Percent change: 16.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1998: $14,337.6; 
Latest 12/2005: $26,673.9; 
Percent change: 86.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1998: $15,974.4; 
Latest 12/2005: $28,580.0; 
Percent change: 78.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1998: $88.256; 
Latest 12/2005: $207.101; 
Percent change: 134.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1998: 181; 
Latest 12/2005: 138; 
Percent change: -23.8. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1998: TBD; 
Latest 12/2005: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

While the EELV program office now has access to technology, design, and 
production maturity information, such data is treated as proprietary 
due to the commercial nature of the existing launch services contracts. 
Three launches occurred since GAO's last assessment--one government, 
one NASA and one commercial bringing the total launches to 14. In May 
2005, Boeing Launch Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems 
announced an agreement to create a joint venture (United Launch 
Alliance, or ULA) that will combine production, engineering, test, and 
launch operations associated with U.S. government launches of Boeing 
Delta and Lockheed Martin Atlas rockets. In October 2006, the Federal 
Trade Commission announced its acceptance, subject to final approval, 
of an agreement containing a consent order with Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin, and ULA. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

EELV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We could not assess the technology maturity of EELV because the Air 
Force has not formally contracted for information on technology 
maturity from its contractors. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of EELV because the Air Force 
has not formally contracted for the information needed to conduct this 
assessment. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity of EELV because the Air 
Force has not formally contracted for information that would facilitate 
this assessment. 

Other Program Issues: 

To meet national security space needs, congressional mandates, and 
national space transportation policy requirements for assured access to 
space, the government is sharing a level of risk with the launch 
providers through a new program strategy for EELV launches. Implemented 
in 2006, the strategy is expected to cover missions scheduled to launch 
starting in 2008. In 2005, the Air Force released requests for 
proposals for EELV launch services and EELV launch capabilities 
contracts. The Air Force awarded a cost plus award fee contract for 
launch capabilities to Lockheed Martin in February 2006 and to Boeing 
Launch Services in November 2006. The Air Force is currently 
negotiating a firm fixed price contract with a mission success 
incentive with Lockheed Martin for EELV launch services. The launch 
services contract with Boeing will follow. 

As part of the proposed joint venture, the contractors expect to 
combine the Atlas V and Delta IV production at the Boeing plant in 
Decatur, Alabama, and engineering at the Lockheed Martin Facility in 
Denver, Colorado. The Federal Trade Commission has provisionally 
accepted a consent order regarding the joint venture. The proposed 
consent order was placed on public record for 30 days and addresses 
ancillary competitive harms that DOD has identified as not inextricably 
tied to the national security benefits of the proposed joint venture 
between Lockheed Martin and Boeing Launch Services. The Federal Trade 
Commission is currently reviewing public comments on the proposed 
consent order. 

A 2006 congressionally mandated study on future launch requirements 
concluded that the EELV program can satisfy the nation's military space 
launch needs through 2020. However, the study noted that it is 
important to revalidate the requirements for heavy lift capability, 
assured access to space, the RL-10 upper stage, and the use of the 
Russian-built RD-180 engines in parallel with cost and performance 
assessments. According to EELV program officials, the program office is 
continually engaged on these issues, which under the new contract 
structure and the ULA joint venture can be more easily addressed. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the program is transitioning from a commercial services program, with 
limited insight, to a more traditional government program with full 
cost and program oversight. According to the Air Force, the transition 
will be completed in 2007 when both providers are awarded the EELV 
launch services contracts. Program officials also provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS): 

The Marine Corps' EFSS includes a launcher, prime mover, ammo prime 
mover, and ammunition. It will be the primary fire support system for 
the vertical assault element of the Marine Corps' Ship to Objective 
Maneuver force and is designed to be internally transportable by the MV-
22 and CH-53E. The EFSS prime mover is a variant of the Internally 
Transportable Vehicle (ITV), which is being developed in a separate 
program, but under common management with EFSS. We assessed all 
components of the EFSS. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: EFSS/ITV Program Office, Marine Corps Systems Command. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems: 

Program office: Quantico, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $31.1 million: 

Procurement: $33.9 million: 

Total funding: $86.1 million: 

Procurement quantity: 60: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2004: $51.2; 
Latest 06/2006: $67.8; 
Percent change: 32.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2004: $580.9; 
Latest 06/2006: $580.9; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2004: $727.7; 
Latest 06/2006: $744.3; 
Percent change: 2.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2004: $10.546; 
Latest 06/2006: $10.634; 
Percent change: 0.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2004: 69; 
Latest 06/2006: 70; 
Percent change: 1.4. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2004: 52; 
Latest 06/2006: 52; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

According to the program office, between 2004 and 2006 the program 
experienced requirements growth. Significant funding was used for 
ammunition development (for precision guided munitions) and 
certification efforts (to develop insensitive munitions). 

[End of table] 

While the EFSS is in production, we could not assess production 
maturity as the program is not collecting statistical data on its 
production processes. However, according to the program office, an ITV 
operational assessment revealed manufacturing problems. In addition, 
the EFSS passed its design review and entered production without having 
achieved design stability. Deficiencies were identified during EFSS 
developmental testing of selected requirements. Although 18 
requirements were fully met, 3 were not. Also, while other variants of 
the ITV have received an interim flight certification for the V-22, CH- 
53, and C-130 aircraft during the ITV operational assessment, the EFSS 
vehicle has not yet been certified as it was not a part of that 
assessment. The EFSS program has, however, completed about 95 percent 
of the certification indicating it can safely transport munitions on 
Navy ships. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

EFSS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We have assessed the EFSS as having mature technologies. Program 
officials have stated that the EFSS is relying on existing 
technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The EFSS design was not stable at the time of the EFSS design review as 
only an estimated 60 percent of the system drawings were complete at 
that point. Furthermore, EFSS entered production still short of having 
obtained design stability, though it was nearing stability with 84 
percent of the drawings completed. During ongoing ITV operational 
testing, the vehicle's half shaft (an axle component) did not perform 
adequately and there were problems with some fuel flow gauges. While 
most of the EFSS components are modified commercial-off-the-shelf 
items, the half shaft used during the ITV operational test was a custom-
built item. The program office is now replacing it with a stronger 
commercial one to address the operational shortfalls noted. The 
operational assessment also revealed problems with the accuracy of the 
fuel gauges. Fixes for these deficiencies are undergoing reliability 
testing. As these issues are resolved, the EFSS design is expected to 
change. 

The EFSS is currently an unarmored vehicle. In fiscal year 2007, 
Congress added $8 million to the EFSS program for armor kits. Because 
the program is constrained by weight and size requirements (a key 
performance parameter is its ability to be transported internally by 
the MV-22 aircraft and CH-53E helicopter), the program office is 
designing two types of kits. The "A" kit will be permanently attached 
and add about 60 pounds to the vehicle. The "B" kit will be added after 
the vehicle exits the aircraft and is expected to add an additional 85 
pounds. Also, the program office is installing blast-attenuating seats 
on the EFSS vehicles. These changes will result in additional design 
modifications, as many lessons are learned in the course of further 
testing. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess EFSS production maturity as the program is not 
collecting statistical control data on its production processes. The 
program is currently in low-rate initial production and is on schedule 
to enter full-rate production by the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. 
According to the program office, during the ongoing operational 
assessment of the ITV, EFSS experienced 24 failures--18 of which were 
associated with 2 components. The remaining 6 failures were associated 
with assembly problems. For example, 3 vehicles did not have their fuel 
pumps set at the right setting for the type of fuel used. According to 
the program office, these manufacturing problems remain a challenge for 
the program. 

Other Program Issues: 

While an EFSS developmental test revealed that 3 of the 24 tested 
requirements were not met, officials said that to date all but 1 have 
been resolved. When placed in a firing position and with a projectile 
ready to load, the system should be able to fire the first round within 
30 seconds. The average first round response time was 57.3 seconds with 
live fire. In addition, the program office told us it has successfully 
reduced the vehicle weight by 180 pounds, completed 95 percent of the 
process designed to ensure that the system can safely carry munitions 
on-board Navy ships, and will meet insensitive munitions requirements. 
In addition, other ITV variants have received interim flight 
certification for the V-22, CH-53, and C-130 aircraft. However, the 
EFSS vehicles have not yet been flight certified. However, according to 
the program office, all EFSS vehicles are on track for final 
certification by April 2007. 

In addition to the internal EFSS program issues discussed above, the 
space available on the MV-22 constrains the EFSS vehicle design and 
weight. As a result, if the MV-22 interior design is altered, it could 
adversely impact the EFSS program. The V-22 program office is aware of 
these constraints and is committed to them. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships 
offshore to their inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer 
distances than the system it is designed to replace, the Assault 
Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). The EFV will have two variants--a 
troop carrier for 17 combat-equipped Marines and 3 crew members and a 
command vehicle to manage combat operations in the field. We assessed 
both variants. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: General Dynamics Land Systems. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics: 

Program office: Woodbridge, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $502.3 million: 

Procurement: $8,546.8 million: 

Total funding: $9,107.5 million: 

Procurement quantity: 1012: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of; 12/2000: $1,518.9; 
Latest 08/2006: $2,415.6; 
Percent change: 59.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of; 12/2000: $6,811.9; 
Latest 08/2006: $8,748.5; 
Percent change: 28.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of; 12/2000: $8,418.2; 
Latest 08/2006: $11,254.9; 
Percent change: 33.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of; 12/2000: $8.213; 
Latest 08/2006: $10.980; 
Percent change: 33.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of; 12/2000: 1,025; 
Latest 08/2006: 1,025; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of; 12/2000: 138; 
Latest 08/2006: 189; 
Percent change: 37.0. 

[End of table] 

The EFV's technologies are mature and the system design was thought to 
be stable. Given the recent discovery of problems associated with 
reliability, a decision on how to proceed is pending by the Marine 
Corps that could significantly impact the program cost, schedule, and 
quantity parameters. Congress recently zeroed out the EFV's fiscal year 
2007 procurement budget request and directed that the EFV program 
extend its development phase. Further, growth in the number of lines of 
software code needed for the EFV vehicle continues and could contribute 
to the already escalating program cost growth. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

EFV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five of the EFV system's critical technologies are mature and have 
been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype. 

Design Stability: 

The EFV has released 82 percent of its initial production design 
drawings to the manufacturer. The program had planned to release the 
remaining drawings before the production decision in December 2006. 
According to a program official, because of recent system reliability 
failures discovered during the early operational assessment (EOA) 
testing, the production decision has been delayed. During the recent 
EOA, the EFV failed to perform reliably and only achieved a fraction of 
the required operational goal of 43.5 hours of operations before 
maintenance was required. 

Production Maturity: 

Congress recently zeroed out the EFV's fiscal year 2007 procurement 
budget request and directed that it extend its system development and 
demonstration phase. The Marine Corps is currently considering 
production options that could impact cost, schedule, and quantity 
parameters. 

Other Program Issues: 

The EFV program relies on software to provide all electronic, 
firepower, and communication functions. The program is collecting 
metrics relating to cost, schedule, and quality and is using an 
evolutionary development approach. Nevertheless, software development 
continues to present a risk. The program continues to experience growth 
in the total lines of software code needed. Since development started 
in 2000, the total lines of software code required by the system has 
increased by about 238 percent, with approximately 36 percent of this 
amount being new code. Additionally, software planned for the EFV 
initial production version will be different from the software used in 
the SDD versions. Furthermore, software testing has identified 187 
software defects. The Marine Corps testing agency identified software 
failure as a factor impacting the system's reliability. We believe that 
software issues could put the program at risk for cost growth. In 
addition, to the recently discovered reliability issues that will 
require some, yet, undisclosed system changes, the program is already 
planning changes to the EFV baseline program, which are driven by the 
Quadrennial Defense Review and the Strategic Planning Guidance. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
EFV program is being restructured as a result of proposed quantity 
reductions and to incorporate reliability performance improvements in 
the vehicle design. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics was briefed on the program office's plans in 
October 2006, and has declined to make an acquisition decision. The 
Under Secretary has concurred with the Department of the Navy to 
convene an Independent Expert Program Review (IEPR) to examine the EFV 
program and recommend a path forward. The IEPR is scheduled for 
completion in December 2006, with a program review in the January- 
February 2007 time frame. After which, an acquisition path forward will 
be decided. 

[End of section] 

Extended Range Munition (ERM): 

The Navy's ERM is a 5-inch, rocket-assisted projectile that will 
provide fire support to expeditionary forces operating near the 
littorals. ERM is being designed to fire to an objective range of 63 
nautical miles using modified 5-inch guns onboard 32 Arleigh Burke 
class destroyers. ERM represents a continuation of the Navy's Extended 
Range Guided Munition program, which entered system development and 
demonstration in 1996. The Navy is currently restructuring the program 
to reflect an updated initial fielding date of 2011. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Naval Gunnery Project Office, PEO IWS3C/Raytheon, Copyright 
2006 Raytheon. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems: 

Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $130.9 million: 

Procurement: $862.5 million: 

Total funding: $993.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: 15,040: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/1997: $84.2; 
Latest 11/2006: $520.6; 
Percent change: 518.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/1997: $332.5; 
Latest 11/2006: $906.1; 
Percent change: 172.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/1997: $416.7; 
Latest 11/2006: $1,426.8; 
Percent change: 242.4. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/1997: $.049; 
Latest 11/2006: $.094; 
Percent change: 94.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/1997: 8,570; 
Latest 11/2006: 15,100; 
Percent change: 76.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/1997: 50; 
Latest 11/2006: 182; 
Percent change: 264.0. 

[End of table] 

The Navy identifies 17 critical technologies for ERM, 11 of which have 
reached maturity. A series of flight tests in 2005 revealed reliability 
problems with several ERM components. The Navy continues to evaluate 
data from these flight tests, but anticipates that design changes for 
some technologies may be required. In addition, the Navy has identified 
a number of obsolete components in the ERM design. As a result, ERM is 
undergoing significant redesign, and 63 percent of the munition's 
design drawings have been released to date. According to program 
officials, the Navy continues to evaluate plans and identify resources 
required for completing development of the munition. Until these plans 
are approved and performance of redesigned components is validated 
through testing, uncertainty remains on whether the Navy's goal to 
begin fielding ERM in 2011 is realistic. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

ERM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Eleven of ERM's 17 critical technologies are fully mature. Four 
technologies--the anti-jam electronics, control actuation system, data 
communication interface, and safe/arm device and fuze--are approaching 
full maturity. However, the Navy's maturity assessment for two 
technologies may need to be reduced pending reports from failure review 
boards the Navy initiated after ERM flight test failures in 2005. 
According to program officials, these review boards have preliminarily 
identified ERM's control actuation system and rocket motor igniter as 
potential contributors to the test failures, which could require 
redesign of these components. In addition, the Navy has encountered 
obsolescence issues with ERM's global positioning satellite receiver 
and inertial measurement unit technologies. As a result, program 
officials report they have had to identify alternative components for 
these technologies and redesign the munition to accommodate these new 
components. Until these replacement components are integrated and 
tested with the munition, the global positioning satellite receiver and 
inertial measurement unit technologies will remain at lower levels of 
maturity. Although program officials report that the Navy continues to 
evaluate schedule and cost options for completing ERM system 
development, a comprehensive test plan for the munition has not been 
established. 

Design Stability: 

The program has released approximately 63 percent of ERM's anticipated 
140 production representative engineering drawings. None of these 
drawings were released in time for the munition's May 2003 design 
review. Instead, the Navy conducted this review with less mature 
drawings and used them to validate the design of the developmental test 
rounds. According to program officials, recent changes to ERM 
components to address obsolescence and reliability issues have required 
significant redesign of the munition. Program officials state that this 
redesign process for ERM will be complete before further developmental 
tests are initated for the munition. The completed design will then be 
reviewed and certified by a mission control panel within the Navy. 

Production Maturity: 

The Navy plans to collect statistical process control data for ERM once 
hardware production begins. According to Navy officials, approximately 
60 ERM units will be built during system development using process 
control methods developed in the Excalibur program. The Navy 
anticipates that this strategy will result in mature production 
processes for ERM at the beginning of low-rate production. 

Other Program Issues: 

As a result of challenges in developing ERM, the Navy awarded a 
demonstration contract in May 2004 for the Ballistic Trajectory 
Extended Range Munition (BTERM). This munition's rocket motor caused 
test failures that led the Navy to abandon plans to recompete the 
development contract for ERM. According to a Navy official, the Navy 
concluded that ERM was a more viable option for fielding a tactical 
round by fiscal year 2011, and it is no longer requesting funding for 
BTERM. Navy officials state a competition could still occur in 2011 for 
ERM production. 

In August 2006, oversight of the ERM program was elevated by requiring 
that major programmatic decisions, such as approval of the Navy's 
estimate for resources needed for completion and the strategy for 
development and testing, be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics rather than by the Navy. 
While this restructuring has elevated oversight, program plans continue 
to evolve, and a comprehensive review of the program by the Under 
Secretary has not been performed. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy stated that a revised acquisition strategy and acquisition 
program baseline for ERM are under review by the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. In addition, the 
prime contractor for ERM, Raytheon, has conducted an extensive trade 
study and downselect process to minimize technical risk for replacing 
obsolete components. The Navy is also updating ERM's test and 
evaluation master plan to include three development test phases of 20 
rounds each in fiscal years 2008 through 2010 as well as a 40-round 
shipboard operational test series in fiscal year 2011. Each test series 
must be successfully completed as defined in annual continuation 
criteria certified by ERM's milestone decision authority. In addition, 
contractor production processes will be evaluated as part of an open 
competition for initial and full-rate production of ERM. 

[End of section] 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based, 
fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended 
to improve the range and accuracy of cannon artillery. The Excalibur's 
near vertical angle of fall should reduce collateral damage area around 
the intended target, making it more effective in urban environments 
than the current projectiles. The Future Combat System's non-line-of- 
sight cannon requires the Excalibur to meet its required range. Only 
the unitary variant block is currently being developed. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: PM Excalibur and Raytheon. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon, Tucson, Ariz. 

Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $275.7 million: 

Procurement: $1,127.2 million: 

Total funding: $1,402.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 29,665: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/1997: $64.6; 
Latest 12/2005: $883.0; 
Percent change: 1,267.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/1997: $724.3; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,180.7; 
Percent change: 63.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/1997: $788.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,063.7; 
Percent change: 161.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/1997: $.004; 
Latest 12/2005: $.068; 
Percent change: 1,627.0. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/1997: 200,000; 
Latest 12/2005: 30,294; 
Percent change: -84.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/1997: 160; 
Latest 12/2005: 36; 
Percent change: -15.0. 

[End of table] 

The Excalibur program has begun early production to support an urgent 
early fielding requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery that 
will reduce collateral damage. According to program officials, this 
early production run of the Excalibur's first incremental block will 
involve 500 rounds and fielding has been delayed due to test issues 
until sometime in the second quarter of fiscal year 2007. They also 
noted that Excalibur's critical technologies reached full maturity in 
May 2005, and all of its 790 drawings were completed in July 2005. The 
Excalibur unitary variant will be developed in three incremental 
blocks, which will incorporate increased capabilities and accuracy over 
time. Since development began in 1997, the program has encountered a 
number of significant changes including four major restructures, 
reduced initial production quantities and increased unit costs. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Excalibur Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Excalibur program is developing its unitary variant in three 
incremental blocks. All three of the unitary variant's critical 
technologies reached full technology maturity in May 2005 at the time 
of the Excalibur's design review. These technologies were the airframe, 
guidance system, and warhead. 

Design Stability and Production Maturity: 

In May 2005, Excalibur held its design review and entered production. 
Excalibur's design appears to be stable. At the time of the design 
review, 750 of 790 design drawings were releasable. All 790 were 
complete for the first Excalibur block in July 2005. By August 2006, 
the number of releasable drawings had grown to 943. 

We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity. The first block 
has entered limited production, to support an urgent fielding 
requirement in Iraq, with limited statistical control data. The program 
expects to begin collecting statistical control data for all key 
manufacturing processes starting in fiscal year 2007. Production of the 
second block is scheduled for fiscal year 2007 and the third block in 
fiscal year 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

Excalibur started as a combination of three smaller artillery programs 
with the intent to extend the range of artillery projectiles with an 
integrated rocket motor. It is expected to enable three different Army 
howitzers and the Swedish Archer howitzer to fire further away and 
defeat threats more quickly while lowering collateral damage and 
reducing the logistic support burden. The program has encountered a 
number of changes and issues since development began in 1997, including 
a decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of the contractor's 
plant, early limited funding, technical problems, and changes in 
program requirements. Since 1997, it has been restructured four times 
including when the program was merged, in 2002, with a joint Swedish/ 
U.S. program known as the Trajectory Correctable Munition. This merger 
helped the Excalibur deal with design challenges, including issues 
related to its original folding fin design. Also in 2002, the program 
was directed to include the development of the Excalibur for the Army's 
Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. 

The net effect of these changes has been to lengthen the program's 
schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities. 
As a result, program overall cost and unit cost have dramatically 
increased. 

The Excalibur plan currently focuses on developing its unitary version 
in three incremental blocks. In the first block, the projectile would 
meet its requirements for accuracy in a non-jammed environment and 
lethality and would be available for early fielding. In the second 
block, the projectile would be improved to meet its requirements for 
accuracy in a jammed environment, extended range, and increased 
reliability. It would be available for fielding to the Future Combat 
System's Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon in September 2008 or when the cannon 
is available. Finally, in the third block, the projectile would be 
improved to further increase reliability, lower unit costs, and would 
be available for fielding to all systems in late fiscal year 2011. The 
other two Excalibur variant blocks--smart and discriminating--would 
enter system development in fiscal year 2010. 

In 2002, an early fielding plan for the unitary version was approved. 
According to the program office, test issues have now delayed its 
fielding to Iraq from the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2006 until the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2007. Also, first article testing was 
completed with an initial reliability of over 80 percent. The program 
office also noted that the initial block will exceed the objective 
requirements for accuracy and effectiveness. A limited user test is 
scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2007 prior to fielding 
in Iraq. Development of the second incremental block is ongoing. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

F-22A Modernization and Improvement Program: 

The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority 
fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It was 
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to 
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for 
long ranges. The F-22A's modernization and improvement program is 
intended to provide enhanced ground attack, information warfare, 
counterair, and other capabilities and improve the realiability and 
maintainability of the aircraft. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: F-22A System Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,938.0 million: 

Procurement: $1,083.0 million: 

Total funding: $3,021.0 million: 

Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/2003: $2,984.0; 
Latest 09/2006: $2,998.0; 
Percent change: 0.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/2003: $517.0; 
Latest 09/2006: $1,287.0; 
Percent change: 148.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/2003: $3,501.0; 
Latest 09/2006: $4,285.0; 
Percent change: 22.4. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/2003: $12.824; 
Latest 09/2006: $24.769; 
Percent change: 93.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/2003: 273; 
Latest 09/2006: 173; 
Percent change: -36.6. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/2003: 133; 
Latest 09/2006: 133; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

In 2003, the F-22A established a modernization program to add enhanced 
air-to-ground capabilities to aircraft. At that time, all three of the 
critical technologies needed were mature according to the program 
office. Since then, however, the program has added three additional 
critical technologies, all of which are not mature. The F-22A continues 
to fall short of its required reliability rates. The F-22A program 
implemented a reliability and maintainability maturation program to 
increase aircraft reliability rates to required levels. Although the F- 
22A program has made improvements to systems used to diagnose 
maintenance problems, these systems are still reporting inaccurate 
information 20 percent of the time. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

F-22A Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to program officials, the F-22A modernization effort started 
development in 2003 with all three of its critical technologies mature. 
The three identified technologies involved 32-bit stores management 
system, processing memory, and cryptography. However, since the 
modernization started the program has added three additional critical 
technologies. These technologies involve smaller and more powerful 
radio frequency components, larger bandwidth, and radio frequency low 
observable features. At the time of our review, none of these 
technologies had been demonstrated in a realistic environment. Program 
officials characterized their current stages of development as 
laboratory settings demonstrating basic performance, technical 
feasibility, and functionality but not form and fit (size, weight, 
materials, etc.) Overall technology maturity is consequently lower now 
than when the modernization effort began. Program officials cited 
funding instability and new program requirements as contributors to 
slower progress than planned. However, according to program office 
officials, the F-22A has a disciplined systems engineering process in 
place that ensures the technology is developed and matured before 
integrating the technologies onto the system. 

Other Program Issues: 

In an effort to improve the reliability and maintainability of the F- 
22A, the Air Force budgeted $102 million in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. 
The F-22A continues to be below its expected reliability rates. A key 
reliability requirement for the F-22A is a 3-hour mean time between 
maintenance, defined as the number of operating hours divided by the 
number of maintenance actions. This is required by the time it reaches 
100,000 operational flying hours, projected to be reached in 2010. 
Currently the mean time between maintenance is less than 1 hour, or 
half of what was expected at the end of system development. 

In November 2005, the F-22A completed follow-on operational test and 
evaluation. The purpose of this test was to evaluate the capability of 
the F-22A to execute the air-to-ground mission, evaluate deferred 
initial operational test and evaluation items, and support initial 
operational capability declaration. The F-22A was evaluated as mission 
capable to complete some limited air-to-ground missions such as 
accurate delivery of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). 

The Air Force has identified deficiencies that may impact the F-22A's 
ability to complete planned operations. For example, problems with the 
thermal management system have impacted the F-22A's ability to operate 
in hot weather conditions. The Air Force implemented a modification to 
correct the thermal management problems in early 2006. The F-22A's 
diagnostics and health management system continues to report some 
inaccurate data. Although the technical order data fault isolation 
accuracy has improved, the maintenance jobs created for corrective 
maintenance actions to return an aircraft to flyable status are still 
reporting inaccuracies around 20 percent of the time. 

The Air Force identified structural cracks in two sections of the 
aircraft during fatigue testing that resulted in unplanned 
modifications to the F-22A. Fatigue testing identified cracks in the 
aircraft's aft boom where the horizontal tail attaches to the fuselage. 
The Air Force is planning modifications to strengthen the structure to 
get the 8,000-hour service life. These modifications are being 
implemented under the Structural Retrofit Program (SRP). The Air Force 
estimates the cost to modify 78 F-22As will be approximately $115 
million. The modifications to correct this problem will not be fully 
implemented until 2010. The second structural problem involved cracking 
in "titanium casting" materials near the engine. Program officials 
stated that the problem with this titanium was a defect in the material 
from the subcontractor. The cost to correct this problem is not 
included in the SRP. The Air Force did not provide information on the 
cost to correct this problem. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

The FCS program will equip the Army's new transformational modular 
combat brigades and consists of an integrated family of advanced, 
networked combat and sustainment systems; unmanned ground and air 
vehicles; and unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of- 
systems architecture, FCS features 18 major systems and other enabling 
systems along with an overarching network for information superiority 
and survivability. This assessment focuses on the full FCS program. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Program Manager, Future Combat Systems (BCT). 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing: 

Program office: Hazelwood, Mo. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $20,891.0 million: 

Procurement: $101,920.0 million: 

Total funding: $123,510.2 million: 

Procurement quantity: 15: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2003: $19,881.4; 
Latest 08/2006: $29,043.9; 
Percent change: 46.1. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2003: $64,916.5; 
Latest 08/2006: $101,920.0; 
Percent change: 57.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2003: $85,456.9; 
Latest 08/2006: $131,663.1; 
Percent change: 54.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2003: $5,697.129; 
Latest 08/2006: $8,777.541; 
Percent change: 54.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2003: 15; 
Latest 08/2006: 15; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2003: 91; 
Latest 08/2006: 139; 
Percent change: 52.8. 

This assessment reflects the program of record. Since the conclusion of 
our review, the Army has announced program adjustments that will affect 
the architecture, program milestones, production quantities, and 
possibly other program areas. 

[End of table] 

The FCS program has made progress maturing critical technologies, but 
only 1 of the FCS' 46 critical technologies is fully mature. Technology 
maturation will continue throughout development, with an associated 
risk of cost growth and schedule delays. The Army does not expect to 
complete the definition of FCS' requirements until at least 2008. As 
FCS requirements continue to evolve, the Army anticipates making 
additional trade-offs. For example, a recent trade-off resulted in 
increased ballistic protection levels for manned ground vehicles but at 
an increased design weight. The Army anticipates that a high percentage 
of design drawings will be completed by the design review but that will 
not take place until 2010. FCS cost estimates have increased 
significantly as the Army has gained more product knowledge. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

FCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The FCS program has made progress maturing critical technologies in the 
last year, yet it still has not demonstrated the level of knowledge 
expected of a program entering development. Only 1 of the FCS' 46 
critical technologies is fully mature. The program office provided its 
own updated critical technology assessment, which showed that 36 of 46 
technologies are nearing full maturity. An independent assessment of 
FCS' critical technologies is expected before the preliminary design 
review in 2008. 

The FCS program is not following the best practice standard of having 
mature technologies prior to starting system development. The program 
employs integration phases to facilitate incremental introduction of 
technologies into the FCS system of systems, and to allow for 
capability augmentation over time. The Army's approach, however, will 
allow technologies to be included in the integration phases before they 
approach full maturity. FCS officials insist fully matured technologies 
are not necessary until after the design readiness review in 2011, 
which is contrary to best practices and the intent of DOD acquisition 
policy. 

The program has made progress defining FCS requirements, but the 
process may not be complete until the preliminary design review in 
2008. In August 2006, the program documented the desired functional 
characteristics of FCS systems and the criteria for achieving those 
characteristics. Although a notable accomplishment, this event should 
have occurred before the start of development 4 years ago. Furthermore, 
if technologies do not mature as planned, Army officials say that they 
may trade off FCS capabilities. As the requirements process has 
proceeded, the Army has made key trade-offs, including one that 
increased the ballistic protection levels of the manned ground vehicles 
(to meet expected threats) and resulted in an increased design weight. 
The requirements definition process will continue at least until the 
preliminary design review in 2008 when the Army is expected to confirm 
the technical feasibility and affordability of the FCS system-level 
requirements. 

Design Stability: 

The Army expects to conduct the preliminary design review in 2008--much 
later than recommended by best practices. However, it may be the point 
at which the FCS program finally approaches a match between 
requirements and resources. Beyond that, the FCS acquisition strategy 
includes a very aggressive schedule, with critical design review in 
2010 and a Milestone C decision in 2012. Although it is early in the 
design process, the Army expects to release 95 percent of FCS's design 
drawings by 2010. Further, testing of the entire FCS concept will not 
occur until 2012, or just prior to an initial production decision, 
illustrating the late accumulation of key knowledge. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program office estimates show that the FCS program's costs have 
increased substantially since the program began. The increases were 
primarily attributed to increased program scope and an extension of the 
development and procurement phases. Also, current cost estimates are 
built with greater program knowledge and are therefore more realistic 
and accurate. However, the most recent Army cost estimate does not yet 
reflect some recent requirements changes that increased the number and 
type of systems to be developed and procured. Further, recent 
independent cost estimates point out several major risk areas in the 
Army cost estimates. Although the program is working to reduce unit 
costs, those desired savings may not be realized until much later in 
the program, if at all. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the FCS program manager 
stated that this assessment does not give the Army credit for the 
technical progress shown during recent demonstrations and experiments. 

GAO Comments: 

While this assessment does not specifically focus on such 
demonstrations, they would be reflected to some extent in the Army's 
own technology assessments. Also, while some progress is being made on 
individual FCS systems, that progress is not consistent across the 
family of FCS systems and the information network. 

[End of section] 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high altitude, long-endurance 
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. After a 
successful technology demonstration, the system entered development and 
limited production in March 2001. The acquisition program has been 
restructured several times. The current plan acquires 7 aircraft 
similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-4A) and 47 of a larger 
and more capable model (the RQ-4B). 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Northrup Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,614.1 million: 

Procurement: $4,098.5 million: 

Total funding: $5,791.8 million: 

Procurement quantity: 35: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/2001: $957.6; 
Latest 09/2006: $3,458.6; 
Percent change: 261.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/2001: $3,970.4; 
Latest 09/2006: $5,485.6; 
Percent change: 38.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/2001: $4,957.0; 
Latest 09/2006: $9,083.2; 
Percent change: 83.2. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/2001: $78.683; 
Latest 09/2006: $168.207; 
Percent change: 113.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/2001: 63; 
Latest 09/2006: 54; 
Percent change: -14.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/2001: 55; 
Latest 09/2006: 78; 
Percent change: 41.8. 

[End of table] 

RQ-4A production is complete and two deployed in 2006 to support 
military operations. RQ-4B is in production with key technologies 
mostly mature. Representative prototypes of the two sensors driving the 
requirement for the larger aircraft are in flight test. Airframe design 
is now stable, but differences between the two models were much more 
extensive and complex than anticipated; these differences and ongoing 
support of military operations resulted in extended development times, 
frequent engineering changes, and significant cost increases. 
Statistical process controls are being implemented for some 
manufacturing processes, but delayed testing constrain efforts to 
mature processes. Dates for integrating and testing new technologies 
and for achieving initial operational capability have been delayed 
about 2 years. DOD is rebaselining the program with a substantial 
increase in cost. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Global Hawk Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Critical technologies on the RQ-4B have made good progress during the 
last year with all 10 technologies mature or nearing maturity. This 
includes the advanced signals intelligence and improved radar sensors, 
the two key capabilities that drove the decision to develop and acquire 
the larger aircraft. Representative prototypes of both sensors are in 
flight tests. 

Design Stability: 

The RQ-4B basic airframe design is now stable with 100 percent of 
engineering drawings released. During the first year of production, 
however, frequent and substantive engineering changes increased 
development and airframe costs and delayed delivery and testing 
schedules. Differences between the two aircraft models were much more 
extensive and complex than anticipated. 

Production Maturity: 

The contractor has completed RQ-4A production. Four aircraft have been 
officially accepted into the operational inventory and three will be 
delivered in 2007. Completing the RQ-4A operational assessment has been 
delayed about 2 1/2 years and performance problems were identified in 
communications, imagery processing, and engines. Officials reported 
that the deficiencies have been addressed and the assessment will be 
completed by April 2007. 

The first RQ-4B aircraft completed production in August 2006 and will 
soon start developmental flight testing. Another 11 are on order 
through the fiscal year 2006 buy. Statistical process controls are 
being implemented for some manufacturing processes. Officials have 
identified critical processes and started to collect data for 
demonstrating capability to meet cost, schedule, and quality targets. 
Other performance indicators such as defects and rework rates are also 
used to monitor quality. 

Continuing delays in flight and operational tests may affect efforts to 
mature production processes. Performance and flight issues identified 
during tests could result in design changes, revised production 
processes, and rework. Completing operational tests to verify the basic 
RQ-4B design works as intended have been delayed more than 2 years to 
February 2009. By that time, the Air Force plans to have bought about 
one-half the entire fleet. Schedules for integrating, testing, and 
fielding the new advanced sensors have also been delayed, raising risks 
that these capabilities may not meet the warfighter's performance and 
time requirements. 

Other Program Issues: 

We have previously reported significant cost, schedule, and performance 
problems for the Global Hawk program. Soon after its March 2001 start, 
DOD restructured the program from a low-risk incremental approach to a 
high-risk, highly concurrent strategy to develop and acquire the larger 
RQ-4B aircraft with advanced, but immature, technologies on a much 
accelerated production schedule. Since then, the development time has 
been extended another 3 years with a substantial contract cost overrun, 
production costs have increased, and software and component parts 
deliveries have slipped as have the schedules for many critical 
milestones and testing dates. The Air Force reported breaches of Nunn- 
McCurdy unit cost thresholds (10 U.S.C. 2433) and DOD had to certify 
the need for the program to Congress and establish improved cost 
controls. Due to the unit cost and schedule breaches, the Global Hawk 
program is being rebaselined for the fourth time since the March 2001 
start. The revised average unit procurement cost estimate is 56.5 
percent higher than the 2002 approved baseline. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the Global Hawk program is stronger today than it was last year. As 
noted above, technology, design, and production have progressed at the 
same time management, technical and risk management processes have 
improved. RQ-4A systems entered Global War on Terror operations 
providing warfighters with over 83,500 intelligence images, while other 
aircraft are currently being deployed to the user. The basic RQ-4B 
aircraft has completed development, entered production, and started 
testing. The advanced payload developers moved into early component 
testing, which is an important risk reduction milestone for 
integration. The program continues to focus on military operations and 
conducting comprehensive testing as that capability moves into 
production and deployment. Program challenges include software 
production, advanced sensors payload integration, and sustainment 
normalization. 

[End of section] 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

MDA's GMD element is being developed incrementally to defend the United 
States against long-range ballistic missile attacks. Block 2006 
provides a limited defensive capability and consists of a collection of 
radars and interceptors, which are integrated by a central control 
system that formulates battle plans and directs the operation of GMD 
components. We assessed the maturity of all technologies critical to 
the Block 2006 GMD element, but we assessed design and production 
maturity for the interceptors only. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Department of Defense. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Company: 

Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $11,076.4 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $11,076.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2003: $23,776.5; 
Latest 08/2006: $30,667.9; 
Percent change: 29.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2003: $23,776.5; 
Latest 08/2006: $30,667.9; 
Percent change: 29.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through 
fiscal year 2011 is $34,135.1: 

[End of table] 

Even though only 9 of GMD's 13 critical technologies are fully mature, 
MDA released all hardware drawings to manufacturing and expected to 
have 14 interceptors available for operational use by December 2006. 
Ongoing efforts to mature remaining technologies, along with concurrent 
testing and fielding efforts may lead to additional design changes. 
Although MDA is producing hardware for operational use, it has not made 
a formal production decision. Additionally, we could not assess the 
stability of the production processes because the program is not 
collecting statistical data for them. As reported in our last 
assessment, we expect that the prime contract could overrun its target 
cost by $1.5 billion. According to program officials, the primary cost 
drivers are challenges with the EKV, testing, redesign of the BV+ 
booster, and maintenance and repair on the SBX platform. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

GMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials assessed 9 out of 13 critical technologies as mature. 
The 4 remaining technologies have not been demonstrated in a realistic 
environment; therefore they do not meet the criteria for a full level 
of maturity. Mature technologies include the fire control software, the 
Block 2004 exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) infrared seeker; EKV 
discrimination; the Orbital Sciences Corporation booster; the Cobra 
Dane radar; the Beale radar; the sea-based X-band radar, the guidance, 
navigation, and control subsystems, and the in-flight interceptor 
communications system. The remaining technologies, which are nearing 
maturity, are the Block 2006 version of the upgraded infrared seeker 
and onboard discrimination for the EKV units, and the BV+ booster, 
including its guidance, navigation, and control subsystem. These 
remaining technologies are due to be initially fielded in 2008. 

Design Stability: 

The design of the Block 2006 ground-based interceptor appears stable 
with 100 percent of its drawings released to manufacturing. However, 
program officials acknowledge that changes to the interceptor's design 
and drawings may be necessary because the program is developing the 
interceptor in parallel with testing, fielding, and operations. 

Production Maturity: 

Officials do not plan to make an official production decision as the 
program will evolve and mature interceptors through block capability 
enhancements as they are fielded for limited defensive operations. We 
could not assess the maturity of the production processes for these 
interceptors because the program is not collecting statistical control 
data. According to program officials, data are not tracked because 
current and projected quantities of GMD component hardware are low. 
Instead, the GMD program measures production capability and maturity 
with a monthly evaluation process called a manufacturing capability 
assessment that assesses critical manufacturing indicators for 
readiness and execution. 

MDA had 10 interceptors ready for alert by December 2005 and expected 
to emplace 6 more by the end of December 2006 for a total of 16. 
However, at the time of our assessment, program officials estimated 
that only 14 interceptors would be fielded by that time. By the end of 
Block 2006, in December 2007, MDA plans to have 24 interceptors 
fielded. Fielding delays have occurred as the contractor increased the 
robustness of its quality assurance program. All interceptors fielded 
to date use the Orbital Science Corporation's OBV booster. The BV+ 
booster is continuing to mature and is expected to be ready for flight 
testing in fiscal year 2008. 

Other Program Issues: 

The GMD test program was restructured in 2005 because of flight test 
failures and quality control problems. GMD successfully completed two 
flight tests utilizing operational interceptors in fiscal year 2006. 
Flight test 2 was an end-to-end test of one engagement scenario 
resulting in a target intercept. Flight test 3, scheduled for December 
2006, planned to have a target intercept as an objective, but the test 
has been delayed until at least the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. 
Accordingly, further tests are needed before models and simulations 
that estimate GMD's performance can be relied upon. 

As reported in our last assessment, we estimate that at the contract's 
completion the GMD prime contractor, Boeing, could experience a cost 
overrun of approximately $1.5 billion. Program officials, however, 
believe that this cost data is distorted because the work plan that the 
contractor is being measured against does not reflect ongoing work. The 
program is in the process of implementing a new plan that will reflect 
new quality control processes and the latest flight test plan. Since 
our last assessment, GMD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 has 
increased by $860 million (2.9 percent). 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS: 

GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department 
of Transportation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, United 
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system 
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation 
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000, 
Congress approved the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF 
satellites. In addition to satellites, GPS includes a control system 
and receiver units. We focused our review on the Block IIF. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Navstar GPS Joint Program Office, Space and Missile Systems 
Center. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing for IIF, Boeing for OCS, Lockheed Martin for 
IIR-M: 

Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $437.4 million: 

Procurement: $984.4 million: 

Total funding: $1,421.8 million: 

Procurement quantity: 7: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2002: $2,023.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,439.7; 
Percent change: 20.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2002: $3,691.2; 
Latest 12/2005: $4,482.9; 
Percent change: 21.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2002: $5,715.1; 
Latest 12/2005: $6,922.6; 
Percent change: 21.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2002: TBD; 
Latest 12/2005: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2002: 33; 
Latest 12/2005: 40; 
Percent change: 21.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2002: TBD; 
Latest 12/2005: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Unit cost has yet to be determined as the Air Force has not calculated 
costs based on the procurement of 7 fewer satellites. Cost and 
quantities include Block IIR, IIR-M and IIF satellites, and the 
Operational Control System (OCS). 

[End of table] 

Since our assessment of the GPS Block IIF effort last year, significant 
cost increases and schedule delays have occurred. The program has 
requested an additional $151 million to cover testing and production 
costs, did not award the contractor $21.4 million in award fees, and 
incurred an estimated 17-month delay in the launch of the first IIF 
satellite. According to the program office, the Block IIF technologies 
are mature. Since the start of the GPS program in 1973, GPS satellites 
have been modernized in blocks with the newer blocks providing 
additional capabilities. The contractor was not required to provide 
data on design drawings so design stability could not be assessed. 
Since these satellites are not mass-produced, statistical process 
control techniques are not used to monitor production. 

Figure: Attainment of product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

GPS Block II Modernization Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The only critical technology on the Block IIF satellites is the space- 
qualified atomic frequency standards and it is considered mature. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract 
does not require that design drawings be delivered to the program. Last 
year design of the software for the Application Specific Integrated 
Circuit microcircuit chips and delays in security clearances resulted 
in $46 million in cost overruns. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not 
collect statistical process control data. The program office had relied 
on earned value management reports to monitor the contractor's 
production efforts, but discovered this past year that the contractor's 
earned value management reporting system was not accurately reporting 
cost and schedule performance data. According to program officials, 
they have addressed these reporting deficiencies and have requested 
separate audits to identify the root causes of the problems. In 
addition, the program office has increased its personnel at the 
contractor's facility to observe operations and to verify that 
corrective measures are being taken to address deficiencies. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program office estimates that the planned launch of the first IIF 
satellite will be delayed 17 months from January 2007 to May 2008 due 
to schedule and testing delays. This past year, the contractor 
encountered a series of delays with the delivery of hardware components 
from subcontractors as well as the development of the software that 
runs equipment used to test payload and bus components. The concurrent 
development and production of the first three IIF satellites has led to 
significant cost increases and schedule delays. As a result, the 
program office has requested approximately $151 million in funds to be 
reprogrammed this year. This amount is based on the contractor's cost 
estimate to complete development and production of the first three 
satellites. 

In June 2006 the program reported that 40 modernized GPS satellites (a 
combination of IIR, IIR-M and IIF satellites) would be procured. 
However, the program office now plans to procure 7 fewer satellites-- 
meaning 12 IIF satellites are to be procured instead of 19. In order to 
sustain the GPS constellation, 12 IIF satellites are needed until the 
first GPS III satellite is launched in fiscal year 2013. If approved, 
the reduced number of IIF satellites and a possible increase in program 
funding will increase unit cost per satellite, potentially breaching 
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. 

The program office did not award the contractor $21.4 million in 2006 
available award fees due to cost overruns and schedule delays. 
According to program officials, the $21.4 million will be used to cover 
a portion of the cost overruns. The procurement of the IIF satellites 
and control system used a contracting approach that gave the contractor 
full responsibility for the life cycle of the program and allowed 
parallel development and production efforts which resulted in cost 
overruns and schedule delays. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force generally concurred with this assessment and provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System: 

The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and 
tracking of land attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is 
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is completed and served as a 
testbed to demonstrate initial capability. Spiral 2 will utilize two 
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well 
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing 
stations. JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other 
systems, such as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Cruise Missile Defense Systems Project Office, JLENS Product 
Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon: 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,781.4 million: 

Procurement: $4,309.3 million: 

Total funding: $6,156.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 14: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2005: $1,843.7; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,887.9; 
Percent change: 2.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2005: $4,218.5; 
Latest 12/2005: $4,309.3; 
Percent change: 2.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2005: $6,128.2; 
Latest 12/2005: $6,262.8; 
Percent change: 2.2. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2005: $383.014; 
Latest 12/2005: $391.427; 
Percent change: 2.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2005: 16; 
Latest 12/2005: 16; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2005: 97; 
Latest 12/2005: 97; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The program began development in August 2005 with only one of its five 
critical technologies mature. Currently, of the four remaining 
technologies, one is near full maturity and the others are not expected 
to be mature until the production decision in September 2010. The size 
of the aerostat was increased to accommodate the weight load for 
detection and tracking equipment requirements. Although the program 
plans to release 90 percent of the engineering drawings by the design 
review in September 2008, the program faces risk of redesign until 
technologies demonstrate full maturity and weight issues are resolved. 
Furthermore, the program recently definitized its development contract 
in December 2006 after the program ordered a change to the contract in 
October 2005. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

JLENS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its 
five critical technologies mature. The communications payload 
technology consisting of radios and fiber optic equipment is mature and 
the processing station technology--which serves as the JLENS operations 
center--is approaching full maturity. Both sensors--the fire control 
radar (formerly the precision track illumination radar) and the 
surveillance radar along with the platform--have not yet reached 
maturity. The program expects to integrate and demonstrate these 
technologies by the production decision in 2010. 

The JLENS platform consists of the aerostat, mobile mooring station, 
power and fiber optic data transfer tethers, and ground support 
equipment. The aerostat, a buoyant aircraft used for payload attachment 
and support, has been increased in size from 71 meters to 74 meters-- 
the length necessary to lift 7,000 pounds of total payload weight to an 
altitude that will allow the radar to meet detection and tracking 
requirements. The primary payload weight comes from the radar. However, 
additional fiber optic data cables to meet information assurance 
requirements increased the weight by 300 pounds. This is largely due, 
according to program officials, to the incorporation of the Navy's 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) into the system's design. CEC 
is a system that fuses high quality radar tracking data to create a 
single, common air picture. The addition of CEC adds a high-powered 
antenna to the aerostat and increases the number of aerostat fiber 
optic cables from 3 to 9 to accommodate the CEC and to provide spare 
cables for alternate JLENS payloads. 

JLENS sensors support the system's primary mission to acquire, track, 
classify, and discriminate targets. According to the project office, 
many of the JLENS sensor technologies have legacy components. A 
majority of the surveillance radar components have been tested in an 
environment similar to the expected JLENS deployment environment and 
many of the fire control radar components have prototypes. However, 
these technologies will require physical modification and demonstration 
of subcomponents for use in the JLENS operational environment. Tests to 
characterize and integrate fire control radar and surveillance radar 
components are currently being conducted in the program's system 
integration laboratory. 

Design Stability: 

The program estimates that 90 percent of its 6,230 drawings will be 
released by the design review in September 2008. However, until the 
maturity of the JLENS's critical technologies has been demonstrated the 
potential for design changes remains. 

Other Program Issues: 

The JLENS product office ordered a change to the contract in October 
2005. According to program officials, upon review of the proposal from 
the contractor, the government discovered that the contractor did not 
meet the JLENS funding profile provided with the change order. 
Furthermore, a review of the proposal found that several requirements 
had not been addressed in revisions that took place after August 2005-
-when the program entered product development. The contractor submitted 
a revised proposal in July 2006. According to program officials, 
negotiations and definitization of the contract that met the program's 
funding profile and requirements were completed in December 2006. 

The JLENS program intends to hand over the task of making JLENS 
interoperable with other systems to an integrated air and missile 
defense (IAMD) program office. The IAMD program office will develop a 
standard set of interfaces between sensors such as JLENS and other 
sensors, weapons and battle management, command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities. According to 
program officials, the impact of IAMD requirements on the JLENS 
schedule are not currently known. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy, 
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. 
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier- 
suitable version will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The 
conventional takeoff and landing version will primarily be an air-to- 
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and 
will complement the F-22A. The short takeoff and vertical landing 
version will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source; JSF Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin: 

Program Office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $18,627.9 million: 

Procurement: $178,658.9 million: 

Total funding: $197,442.3 million: 

Procurement quantity: 2,443: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $35,833.2; 
Latest 12/2005: $44,806.3; 
Percent change: 25.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $158,974.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $178,776.6; 
Percent change: 12.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $196,472.2; 
Latest 12/2005: $223,795.7; 
Percent change: 13.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $68.553; 
Latest 12/2005: $91.048; 
Percent change: 32.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 2,866; 
Latest 12/2005: 2,458; 
Percent change: -14.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 185; 
Latest 12/2005: 196; 
Percent change: 6.0. 

[End of table] 

JSF program data indicates that two of the system's eight critical 
technologies are now mature, four are approaching maturity but two are 
immature despite being past the design review. Design stability was not 
reached by the design review, the two variants had released fewer 
drawings than suggested by best practices and the program had not 
demonstrated the successful integration of the system. The program 
plans to enter production in 2007 with little demonstrated knowledge 
about performance and producibility. All three variants will not be in 
flight testing until 2 years after production begins with a fully 
integrated aircraft in flight testing 4 years after it begins. DOD 
organizations have raised concerns with the program highlighting cost, 
schedule, and performance risks. 

Figure: Attainment of product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

JSF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

In 2001, the JSF entered development without its eight critical 
technologies being mature. Two are now mature, four are approaching 
maturity but two (mission systems integration and prognostics and 
health maintenance) are immature despite being past the design review. 

Design Stability: 

As of October 2006, JSF officials report that 91 percent of the short 
takeoff and vertical landing variant and 46 percent of the conventional 
variant drawings have been released. At the February 2006 design 
review, the program reported that 46 and 3 percent of the drawings had 
been released respectively, less than the best practices standard. 
Also, the program had not prototyped the expected designs or 
demonstrated the successful integration of the system. The program 
projects it will have released 47 percent of the carrier variant 
drawings at its design review in 2007. Issues with stabilizing the 
design have impacted the delivery of the first production 
representative aircraft by about 2 Ĺ years. 

Production Maturity: 

The program is collecting information on the maturity of manufacturing 
processes. However, because the design has not been proven to work, the 
potential for design changes during flight testing weakens efforts to 
mature processes. A change in design can also require a change in the 
manufacturing processes--a costly proposition once production begins. 
The development uncertainties still facing the program are reflected in 
DOD's plans to use cost reimbursement contracts for initial production 
orders. The 7-year flight test program began in late 2006 and a fully 
integrated variant is scheduled to fly in 2011 leaving a significant 
time period where changes could occur. By 2011, DOD expects to have 
invested more than $20 billion in production aircraft. Further, 
manufacturing processes currently planned have not been proven. The 
first test aircraft (nonproduction representative) encountered 
inefficiencies requiring 32 percent more manufacturing hours to date 
than planned. Since entering manufacturing, the aircraft design and the 
manufacturing processes have changed substantially. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since the program rebaseline in 2004, costs have increased more than 
$30 billion (then year dollars), delivery of the key development 
aircraft has slipped as much as 10 months with other development 
activities slipping as well. The contractor's cost performance has also 
decreased. Internal DOD organizations have expressed concerns about the 
program. A February 2006 operational assessment noted risks with the 
flight test schedule, software development, maintainability and mission 
effectiveness. DOD cost analyst and contract management officials have 
expressed concerns that costs to complete the program will be higher 
than estimates. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JSF program office 
said that for the third year, GAO ignores F-35 successes, does not 
measure against the 2004 replan, and misapplies commercial best 
practices. F-35 is more mature than any comparable program at a similar 
development point. Advanced virtual prototyping tools ensure structure, 
avionics and propulsion fit together before production. The first test 
aircraft is complete with unprecedented assembly fit and quality, 
problem-free power-on, rapid execution of engine and secondary-power 
tests and actual weight within 1 percent of predictions. Ten 
development aircraft are now in manufacturing. Lab investment is 
substantially larger and earlier than in legacy programs promoting 
early risk burndown. The acquisition strategy provides the best balance 
of cost, schedule and risk via sequential development of variants and 
spiral blocks of mission capabilities. GAO's approach would result in 
multibillion-dollar cost increases and significant legacy fleet impact. 

GAO Comments: 

In our evaluation we did consider all pertinent information including 
JSF progress and program office technical comments on this assessment 
and found the JSF program consistently proceeding through critical 
junctures with knowledge gaps that expose the program to significant 
risks. Like past programs that have followed this approach, the 
consequences have been predictable as the JSF has continually missed 
its cost and schedule targets--even after the 2004 replan. If the 
program were to follow a knowledge-based approach it would lower risks 
allowing for more realistic cost and schedule estimates. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS 
AMF): 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services. Program/product offices are developing radio hardware and 
software for users with similar requirements. The AMF program will 
develop radios that will be integrated into nearly 100 different types 
of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations for all the services. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: JTRS AMF Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD: 

Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $819.9 million: 

Procurement: $328.0 million: 

Total funding: $1,147.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 1,097: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 01/2007: $1,148.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 01/2007: $328.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 01/2007: $1,476.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 01/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 01/2007: 1,344; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 01/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include costs and quantities budgeted through fiscal year 2011. 

[End of table] 

JTRS AMF has taken steps to develop knowledge prior to the start of 
system development. As part of the program's acquisition strategy, a 
presystem development phase started in September 2004 with the award of 
competitive system design contracts to two industry teams led by Boeing 
and Lockheed Martin. Through this acquisition strategy, program 
officials expect competitive designs that will help mitigate costs and 
other risks. While challenges remain, program officials noted that 
significant progress has been made by both industry teams in 
demonstrating technology and design maturity. The program is scheduled 
to enter system development in June 2007. The JTRS AMF system 
development program will be designed to introduce capabilities 
incrementally, consistent with the approved 2006 restructuring of the 
overall JTRS acquisition program. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge; 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

JTRS AMF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

To help mitigate technical risks and address key integration 
challenges, JTRS AMF awarded competitive predevelopment contracts to 
two industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. In June 2007, 
after a full and open competition, a contracting team will be selected 
for the JTRS AMF system development. The program office will use an 
Army organization to prepare an independent Technology Readiness 
Assessment before entry into the system development and demonstration 
acquisition phase. The identification of critical technologies was 
completed by Boeing and Lockheed Martin in early 2006, and validated by 
the independent assessment team through the design work leading up to 
the preliminary design reviews. Both companies submitted self- 
assessment reports of their design's critical technologies to the 
program office and the independent assessment team. The independent 
assessment of the maturity of the program's critical technologies was 
completed by the independent assessment team in October 2006, and has 
been submitted to the Joint Program Executive Officer for review and 
completion of the Technology Readiness Assessment prior to the program 
Milestone B decision, scheduled for June 2007. 

Both teams have demonstrated progress in developing key functions of 
the radio through in-lab and field demonstrations with representative 
hardware and software components of their designs. Preliminary design 
reviews were held in August 2005 for both teams, and program officials 
indicated that both preliminary designs met the National Security 
Agency's information assurance requirements for that stage of 
development. As the JTRS program was being restructured in late 2005 
and early 2006, the JTRS AMF contracts were extended to continue risk 
reduction and design maturity work. These extensions to the contracts 
were completed in October 2006, with each company presenting its 
detailed preliminary designs during 3-weeks of reviews. These reviews 
focused on the design details necessary to meet the JTRS AMF Increment 
1 requirements. Although the program is likely to face challenges as it 
proceeds through systems development and demonstration, program 
officials are confident that the program can enter the system 
development and demonstration phase in June 2007 with sufficiently 
mature technologies. This assurance is based on the independent 
technology maturity assessment results, the technical exchanges and 
design reviews held with the contractors, along with rigorous risk 
reduction and demonstration activities done by both the contractors and 
program office during the 2-year pre-system development and 
demonstration contracts. 

Other Program Issues: 

The restructuring of the JTRS program under the Joint Program Executive 
Office is in place and its emphasis on an incremental approach will 
defer costly nontransformational requirements to later increments. The 
first increment has been defined and prioritizes development of high- 
priority networking waveforms and achieving interoperability with key 
legacy waveforms. For JTRS AMF, Increment 1 will include the 
development of a small radio variant for airborne platforms that will 
support the Wideband Networking Waveform, the Soldier Radio Waveform, 
the NATO Link 16/Tactical Digital Information Link J (TADIL-J) 
waveform, and the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) waveform. 
Increment 1 will also include the development of a large radio variant 
for ships and fixed stations that will support MUOS and legacy UHF 
satellite communications (SATCOM). 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office provided technical comments which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR): 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with select radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and 
software for users with similar requirements. The JTRS Ground Mobile 
Radio (formerly Cluster 1) product office, within the JTRS Ground 
Domain program office, is developing radios for ground vehicles. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: PdM Ground Mobile Radio. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing: 

Program office: San Diego, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $787.1 million: 

Procurement: $13,458.5 million: 

Total funding: $14,245.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 104,285: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2002: $937.5; 
Latest 09/2006: $1,546.8; 
Percent change: 65.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2002: $15,078.9; 
Latest 09/2006: $13,460.1; 
Percent change: -10.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2002: $16,016.4; 
Latest 09/2006: $15,006.9; 
Percent change: -6.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2002: $.148; 
Latest 09/2006: $.144; 
Percent change: -2.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2002: 108,388; 
Latest 09/2006: 104,425; 
Percent change: -3.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2002: 55; 
Latest 09/2006: 117; 
Percent change: 112.7. 

[End of table] 

The JTRS GMR program has recently been restructured due to significant 
cost and schedule problems that came to light in late 2004. Since 
development began in 2002, the program has struggled to mature and 
integrate key technologies and has been forced to make design changes. 
The program restructuring appears to put the program in a better 
position to succeed by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk 
approach to developing capabilities. The program reported that all but 
one of JTRS GMR's critical technologies are mature or approaching 
maturity. Nonetheless, several risks remain. The radio has only 
demonstrated limited networking capabilities and the program continues 
to reconcile size, weight and power requirements. In addition, the new 
JTRS joint management structure is new and untested. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

JTRS GMR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The maturity of JTRS GMR critical technologies is questionable. The 
program reported that 13 of its 20 critical technologies were mature 
indicating that progress has been made since the program entered system 
development in 2002 when none of the program's critical technologies 
were mature. However, this progress is based on a series of contractor 
demonstrations conducted in spring 2005 that used only partially 
functioning prototypes. Among other things, the demonstrations did not 
show extensive Wideband Networking Waveform capabilities. For example, 
the demonstrated network only linked 4 users, far fewer than the 
required 250. The Wideband Networking Waveform represents the core of 
the JTRS networking capability and its integration is the most 
significant technical challenge to the radio's development, according 
to program officials. In addition, critical technologies such as the 
network bridging software are immature. The program expects to 
demonstrate the maturity of all critical technologies during a System 
Integration Test in early fiscal year 2010. This test will be conducted 
in an operational environment using fully functioning prototypes. 

Design Stability: 

The program reported that 83 percent of its design drawings have been 
released to manufacturing. Although security requirements continue to 
be a challenge, the current design incorporates the security 
requirements that include the ability of the GMR system to be used in 
an open networked environment. 

The program--in collaboration with the user community--also continues 
to reconcile size, weight, and power requirements. The delivery of new 
power amplifiers that were developed as part of a science and 
technology program could help address these concerns. Nonetheless, 
these challenges and the uncertainty of technology maturity raise 
concern about the program's design stability. The program will undergo 
a second design review in November 2007. 

Other Program Issues: 

The restructuring appears to put the program in a better position to 
succeed, by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach to 
developing and fielding capabilities. The incremental approach defers 
the development for some of the more challenging requirements to later 
increments, allowing more time to mature critical technologies, 
integrate the components and test the radio system before committing to 
production. DOD also expects that the establishment of the JTRS Joint 
Program Executive Office and other management changes will improve 
oversight and coordination of the JTRS program. 

While the restructuring appears to address many of the problems that 
affected JTRS in the past, the long-term technical challenges discussed 
previously must be overcome for the program to be successful. In 
addition, the JPEO is assessing different options to enable network 
interoperability between JTRS networks and anticipates that development 
of this effort will start in 2007. 

Although the new joint management structure is an improvement over the 
previous fragmented structure, it is new and untested. Joint 
development efforts in DOD have often been hampered by an inability to 
obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military services. 
Some agency officials also expressed concern whether the services will 
have the budget capacity to fund integration costs once the radio sets 
were available for installation. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office noted that the baseline information of June 2002--the 
start of development--should reflect the lower risk "Threshhold" values 
rather than the higher risk "Objective" values for both cost and 
schedule to more appropriately provide a medium-risk program comparison 
between the start of development in 2002 and GAO's assessment period in 
September 2006. The restructured program is medium risk. The JTRS Joint 
Program Executive Office also provided technical comments which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

GAO Comments: 

We did not change the baseline cost and schedule information as 
suggested by the Joint Program Executive Office. We assess all programs 
in this report by their original development baseline. 

[End of section] 

JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS): 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with select radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and 
software for users with similar requirements. The JTRS HMS (formerly 
Cluster 5) product office, within the JTRS Ground Domain program 
office, is developing handheld, manpack, and small form radios. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: PdM Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems: 

Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $398.1 million: 

Procurement: $8,727.1 million: 

Total funding: $9,125.2 million: 

Procurement quantity: 328,514: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2004: $500.8; 
Latest 08/2006: $673.3; 
Percent change: 34.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2004: $8,727.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $8,727.1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2004: $9,227.9; 
Latest 08/2006: $9,400.4; 
Percent change: 1.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2004: $.028; 
Latest 08/2006: $.029; 
Percent change: 1.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2004: 329,574; 
Latest 08/2006: 329,574; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2004: 85; 
Latest 08/2006: 82; 
Percent change: -3.5. 

[End of table] 

The JTRS HMS program has recently been restructured, along with the 
entire JTRS Joint Program Executive Office enterprise. The program 
restructuring appears to put the program in a better position to 
succeed by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach to 
developing capabilities. The program reports that all of JTRS HMS's 
critical technologies are mature or approaching maturity. Nonetheless, 
several risks remain. Meeting the radios' size, weight, and power 
requirements continues to be a challenge. In addition, while the key 
networking waveform has been integrated onto JTRS HMS radios, program 
officials expect that it will take additional effort to transition the 
waveform from a static laboratory environment to a realistic 
operational platform. Solutions enabling multinetwork interoperability 
are also still being developed. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

JTRS HMS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The maturity of JTRS HMS critical technologies is questionable. The 
program reported that 3 of its 6 critical technologies were mature 
indicating that progress has been made since system development began 
in 2004 when only one of its critical technologies was mature. The 
remaining critical technologies are approaching maturity. However, in 
most cases, the reported maturity is not justified because the 
technologies either were not demonstrated in a realistic environment or 
they were not demonstrated using an adequately functioning prototype. 
Nonetheless, the program office believes that the delivery of early 
prototypes in late October 2006 indicates that significant progress has 
been made. 

The restructuring of the program combined with requirements relief has 
allowed for the maturing of JTRS HMS critical technologies. The program 
expects that all 6 of its critical technologies will mature 
sufficiently to begin low-rate production deliveries of the small form 
radios by the end of fiscal year 2009 and for the manpack/handheld 
radios by the end of fiscal year 2010. However, meeting the 
requirements of the JTRS HMS radios will continue to be a challenge 
because of their small size, weight, and power constraints. Program 
officials expect that the requirements relief provided by the 
restructuring should help to address these issues. In particular, the 
restructuring reduces the number of JTRS HMS radio variants from 15 to 
9. Reducing the number of variants provides relief in the hardware 
design and platform integration work. In addition, the restructuring 
reduces the number of waveforms from 19 to 5 required to operate on the 
various HMS radios, which is expected to reduce power demands, thereby 
reducing the size and weight demands. 

Importantly, JTRS HMS radios will also not be required to operate the 
Wideband Networking Waveform. The Wideband Networking Waveform provides 
key networking capabilities to JTRS but carries with it a large power 
requirement. As an alternative, JTRS HMS radios will operate the 
Soldier Radio Waveform which is a low-power, short-range networking 
waveform optimized for radios with severe size, weight, and power 
constraints such as dismounted soldier radios and small-form radios. 
The initial version of the Soldier Radio Waveform has been successfully 
integrated onto early prototypes. While the waveform has demonstrated 
some functionality, program officials noted that it will take some 
effort to transition the waveform from a static laboratory environment 
to a realistic operational platform. In particular, program officials 
are concerned about the waveform's security architecture and how this 
may affect integrating it onto a JTRS radio. Given these concerns, the 
waveform's development schedule may be ambitious. The contract to 
further develop this waveform was awarded early in fiscal year 2007. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the design stability of JTRS HMS because the total 
number of drawings is not known and there are currently no releasable 
drawings complete. Design review is scheduled for February 2007. 

Other Program Issues: 

Although the production decision for HMS radios has been delayed for 2 
years, the recent restructuring of the JTRS program appears to put the 
program in a better position to succeed by emphasizing an incremental, 
more moderate risk approach to developing and fielding capabilities. 
The success of the first "spin-out" of Future Combat Systems is 
dependent on the delivery of select JTRS HMS radios that operate the 
Soldier Radio Waveform. 

While the restructuring reduces program risk, the long-term technical 
challenges discussed previously must be overcome for the program to be 
successfully executed. In addition, the JPEO is assessing different 
options to enable network interoperability between JTRS networks and 
anticipates that development of this effort will start in 2007. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office provided technical comments which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

MDA's KEI element is a missile defense system designed to destroy 
medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during 
the boost and midcourse phases of flight. Key components include hit- 
to-kill interceptors, mobile launchers, and fire control and 
communications units. We assessed the proposed land-based KEI 
capability, which according to program officials, could be available in 
2014. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Kinetic Energy Interceptors Program Office, Northrup Grumman. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman: 

Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $4,190.4 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $4,190.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2003: $8,984.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $2,334.8; 
Percent change: -74.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/2003: $8,984.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $2,334.8; 
Percent change: -74.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through 
fiscal year 2011 is $4,931.13 million. 

[End of table] 

KEI's seven critical technologies are at a relatively low level of 
maturity, with two rated as high risk--the interceptor's booster motors 
and the algorithm that enables the kill vehicle to identify the threat 
missile's body from the luminous exhaust plume. During fiscal year 
2006, program officials conducted a series of static fire tests and 
wind tunnel tests in preparation for a 2008 booster flight test. After 
the booster flight test, MDA will assess KEI's achievements and decide 
how the program should proceed. If a decision is made to move forward, 
MDA plans to finalize the design during the second quarter of fiscal 
year 2011. According to program officials, by that time 4 of the 7 
critical technologies will be demonstrated in flight tests, but the 
other 3 will have only completed ground testing. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

KEI Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All seven KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of 
maturity. During fiscal year 2006, program officials conducted several 
static fire tests and wind tunnel tests in an effort to mature the 
technologies. Each of the technologies is a part of the element's 
interceptor--the weapon component of the element consisting of a kill 
vehicle mounted atop a boost vehicle. Four of the seven technologies 
are critical to the performance of the boost vehicle, which propels the 
kill vehicle into space. Boost vehicle technologies include three 
stages of booster motors, an attitude control system, and a thrust 
vector control system. The remaining three technologies are related to 
the kill vehicle--its infrared seeker, divert system, and plume-to- 
hardbody algorithms. Backup technologies exist for all technologies, 
with the exception of the infrared seeker. However, these technologies 
are at the same low level of maturity as the critical technologies. 

MDA plans to demonstrate three critical technologies--the thrust vector 
control system, attitude control system, and the three-stage booster 
motor--in two booster flight tests by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 
2011. Other technologies will have been demonstrated in ground tests, 
such as hardware-in-the-loop tests. The integration of all critical 
technologies will be demonstrated in an element characterization test 
early in fiscal year 2013, a sea risk reduction flight test in mid- 
fiscal year 2013, followed by the first integrated flight test late in 
fiscal year 2013. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials noted that they expect the design of the 
demonstration hardware to be the same as the design of the operational 
hardware. Therefore, integration and manufacturability issues are being 
addressed in the design of the demonstration hardware. According to 
program officials, KEI's operational design will be finalized in 2011. 
KEI officials estimate that KEI's design will incorporate about 7,500 
drawings. The officials expect 5,000 of these drawings to be complete 
when it holds a critical design/production readiness review for the 
land-based capability in 2011. However, it is too early to make an 
accurate assessment of KEI's designs because not all of KEI's 
technologies are mature. 

Other Program Issues: 

The KEI program is undergoing a rebaseline plan to compensate for 
funding reductions from fiscal year 2004 through 2006, and the addition 
of new requirements such as a larger booster, 2-color seeker, and 
development verification tests. Currently the KEI contract is scheduled 
to end in January 2012, however funding reductions forced program 
officials to delay the completion of its land mobile based 
capabilities--originally planned for Block 2012--to Block 2014. 
According to program officials, once the re-baseline is complete and 
negotiations are finished, the KEI contract will extend through June 
2015. Additionally, program officials noted that the addition of new 
requirements, the reductions in funding, and the deferring of 
activities has increased the overall program cost by $1.5 billion. 

Agency Comments: 

The Program Office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Land Warrior: 

The Army's Land Warrior is a modular, integrated, soldier-worn system 
of systems intended to enhance the lethality, situational awareness, 
and survivability of dismounted combat and support soldiers. It 
consists of a wearable computer, a radio, a navigation module for 
friendly force tracking, a helmet-mounted display to provide a common 
operational picture, and power. We assessed Land Warrior in support of 
the Army's Stryker Brigades. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Program Executive Office Soldier. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems: 

Program office: Fort Belvoir, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $419.6 million: 

Procurement: $2,395.3 million: 

Total funding: $2,814.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 24,409: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2003: $806.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,059.1; 
Percent change: 31.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2003: $1,886.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $2,444.9; 
Percent change: 29.6. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2003: $2,692.8; 
Latest 08/2006: $3,504.0; 
Percent change: 30.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2003: $.168; 
Latest 08/2006: $.141; 
Percent change: -16.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2003: 15,985; 
Latest 08/2006: 24,849; 
Percent change: 55.5. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2003: 145; 
Latest 08/2006: 175; 
Percent change: 20.7. 

[End of table] 

In 2005, the Army terminated a spiral of Land Warrior--the Dismounted 
Battle Command System--intended to provide a limited, near-term 
capability to the current force, and it renewed its focus on the full 
Land Warrior system. The program office reports that the full system's 
three critical technologies (power, radio, and navigation module) are 
mature. In 2006, the program conducted a user representative assessment 
and a Limited User Test that were to inform the decision-maker 
regarding Land Warrior's entry into low-rate initial production in 
March 2007. According to the Army, test results indicate that Land 
Warrior is generally effective, suitable, and survivable. However, due 
to significant Army-wide resource challenges, the Army has decided to 
not pursue further development and production of Land Warrior. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Land Warrior Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office reports that Land Warrior's three critical 
technologies--a navigation module, radio, and power (rechargeable 
batteries)--are mature, and prototypes of these technologies have been 
tested in a realistic environment. Two backup technologies--disposable 
batteries and a navigation module with GPS only--are also mature. Since 
our last review, the program has focused on reducing the weight of 
subsystems and enhancing reliability by better integrating the 
subsystems and improving connections to the processor. 

The Land Warrior system was to have used the JTRS radio (assessed 
elsewhere in this report), scheduled to be available in fiscal year 
2011. In the meantime, the program is using a radio compatible with 
Stryker communications to provide voice, position, and command and 
control information at the team/squad level and higher. 

The Stryker vehicle component of Land Warrior allows for battery 
recharging in the vehicle, communication between the dismounted soldier 
and vehicle using the radio, and access to the lower tactical internet 
through a gateway installed in the vehicle. 

Design Stability: 

The program reported that 23 design drawings out of a total expected 
number of 70 were releasable at the January 2006 critical design review 
for Land Warrior, and that all 70 drawings are currently releasable. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the maturity of production processes for Land 
Warrior because the program does not collect statistical process 
control data during the system development phase. In the last quarter 
of fiscal year 2006, the Army Training and Doctrine Command conducted a 
user representative assessment of the system and the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command led a Limited User Test, both of which will inform a 
production decision in March 2007. According to the program office, 
General Dynamics plans to take lessons learned from the assessment to 
mature manufacturing processes. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Land Warrior program has experienced significant challenges and 
delays in its 12-year history. The program restructured after 
contractor prototypes failed basic certification tests in 1998. 
Government testing revealed technical and reliability problems with 
Block I (Land Warrior-Initial Capability), which was subsequently 
terminated in 2003. Block II (Land Warrior-Stryker Interoperable) was 
restructured in 2004 in response to congressional direction to 
immediately field some Land Warrior capabilities to the current force. 
The restructured program--the Dismounted Battle Command System (DBCS)-
-was refocused in 2005 following a test event that concluded it had not 
demonstrated the necessary capabilities and was not mature. Elements of 
DBCS--such as a friendly force tracking capability--were modified and 
integrated into the next phase of the system, Land Warrior in support 
of Stryker. 

The current program has been focused on developing an integrated Land 
Warrior capability in support of the Army's Stryker Brigades. Slightly 
less capable than Block II, this system was used to equip one Stryker 
battalion in fiscal year 2006 for assessment purposes. A program 
official reports that, following the assessment, the battalion decided 
to take the Land Warrior system with it to Iraq when it deploys in the 
third quarter of fiscal year 2007. 

The Ground Soldier System--a future iteration of Land Warrior 
capability--will provide advanced capabilities. This future iteration 
is intended to provide a dismounted soldier capability to the Army's 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) and to units not associated with FCS. 

Due to significant Army-wide resource challenges, the Army has decided 
to not pursue further development and production of Land Warrior. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

The Navy's LCS is a surface combatant optimized for littoral warfare 
with innovative hull designs and reconfigurable mission packages to 
counter threats in three mission areas: mine, antisubmarine, and 
surface warfare. The ship and mission packages are being developed in 
spirals with the first 15 ships, Flight 0, produced in two designs. The 
first ships of each design are currently under construction with 
deliveries expected in June and November 2007. We assessed only Flight 
0 ships and their associated mission packages. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: (top) Lockheed Martin, (bottom) General Dynamics. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin: 

Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $463.0 million: 

Procurement: $5,504.1 million: 

Total funding: $5,967.0 million: 

Procurement quantity: 11: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2004: $1,262.9; 
Latest 06/2006: $1,718.5; 
Percent change: 36.1. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2004: $0.0; 
Latest 06/2006: $5,968.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2004: $1,262.9; 
Latest 06/2006: $7,686.5; 
Percent change: 508.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2004: $631.434; 
Latest 06/2006: $512.433; 
Percent change: -18.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2004: 2; 
Latest 06/2006: 15; 
Percent change: 650.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2004: 41; 
Latest 06/2006: 46; 
Percent change: 12.2. 

In 2005 the Navy expanded the planned purchase of Flight 0 to 15 ships. 
Two of the ships were procured through research and development funds. 
Quantity shown is for number of ships procured, mission packages will 
also be procured with funding shown. 

[End of table] 

The LCS program began production in December 2004 and recently began 
acquiring some elements of the mission packages. The program office 
identified 36 critical technologies for the mission packages and 21 
technologies for the two ship designs. The Navy continues to test and 
mature technologies for the three mission packages, currently 22 of the 
36 mission package technologies are fully mature; 9 are near full 
maturity; and 5 remain in development. The technologies that remain 
immature affect all three mission packages. All but one of the ship- 
specific technologies are fully mature or near maturity. Some cost and 
schedule growth has been experienced in ship construction due to issues 
in design and production. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

LCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Seven of the technologies under development for LCS are used in 
multiple applications or mission packages. Since these technologies are 
used on different platforms or environments, the program office chose 
to assess them in each setting separately, resulting in a total of 36 
critical technologies, 22 of which are currently mature. 

Delivery of the first mine warfare mission package will align with 
delivery of the first ship in June 2007. Of the 16 technologies 
currently used for mine warfare, only the organic airborne and surface 
influence sweep system, remains immature. Tests to demonstrate this 
technology in a relevant environment are scheduled for the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2007. Five other technologies are close to full 
maturity, while 10 others are fully mature. 

The first antisubmarine and surface warfare packages will align with 
delivery of the second LCS in fiscal year 2008. Of the 13 technologies 
dedicated to antisubmarine warfare, 3 remain in development, including 
the advanced deployable system and two subsystems for the antisubmarine 
variant of the remote mine-hunting vehicle. While the program expects 
to demonstrate the two subsystems in a relevant environment in late 
fiscal 2007, plans to mature advanced deployable system are unclear. An 
additional 4 technologies are near full maturity, while the remaining 6 
are fully mature. Of the 7 technologies dedicated to surface warfare, 
the non-line-of-sight missile system is the only one not fully mature. 
It is expected to be demonstrated in a relevant environment in mid- 
fiscal year 2007. Since our last review, the unmanned surface vehicle 
was removed from the surface warfare mission, although it is still used 
in other missions. 

The majority of ship-specific technologies are mature or close to full 
maturity. The Lockheed Martin design, the first to enter production, 
currently has 9 of 10 technologies mature or close to full maturity, 
only a system used to launch and retrieve small boats is not mature. 
The General Dynamics design currently has all of its technologies 
mature or close to full maturity. Since our last review the program has 
reduced the number of critical technologies monitored to conform with 
DOD's definition of a critical technology--a new or novel technology 
used to meet key requirements. Although not designated as critical, 
these technologies remain in the ships' design. 

Design Stability: 

Design of mission packages and ships are tracked in a unique manner. To 
ensure technologies used in mission packages will be compatible with 
LCS, the program has established interface specifications that each 
system must meet. Design stability is tracked by monitoring changes to 
the requirements documents, execution of engineering change proposals, 
and the completion of contract deliverables related to drawings, ship 
specifications, and independent certification of the design. Developing 
commercial design standards for military use has created some 
challenges, contributing to a 6 month delay in the delivery of the 
first ship. 

Production Maturity: 

Rather than using statistical process controls to monitor production 
readiness, the LCS program uses a number of metrics to track 
production. The primary means of monitoring production is an earned 
value management system, additionally the program tracks hours spent on 
rework, deficiencies detected and corrected, and the number of test 
procedures performed. Delays in delivery of ship propulsion components 
have also contributed to schedule growth for the first ship. 

Other Program Issues: 

Costs for constructing Flight 0 ships have grown due to development of 
a formal cost estimate, incorporation of lessons learned in 
construction of the first ships, and the congressionally mandated 
addition of requirements for force protection and survivability. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy stated that the LCS modular open system architecture strategy 
decouples core seaframe design and construction from the phased 
delivery of focused mission package payloads. A robust risk management 
process tracks technologies under development to ensure they are 
matured and fulfill program requirements according to planned 
deployment timelines. The Navy continues to apply all available 
management tools to optimize unit cost and schedule through the 
challenges of first of class construction. 

[End of section] 

Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6): 

The Navy's LHA 6 will replace aging Tarawa-class amphibious assault 
ships and is designed to embark, land, and support expeditionary 
forces. The LHA 6 design will feature enhanced aviation capabilities 
and is optimized to support new aircraft such as the V-22 Osprey and 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). LHA 6 is planned to be a modified variant 
of the LHD 8 amphibious assault ship currently under construction with 
delivery of the first ship expected in late 2011. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: LHA 6 Program Office, U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems: 

Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $39.8 million: 

Procurement: $2,443.2 million: 

Total funding: $2,483.0 million: 

Procurement quantity: 1: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $204.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,736.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,940.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,940.623; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: 1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 12/2005: 146; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

In 2005, DOD and the Navy determined that the LHA 6 program had no 
critical development technologies because all of the ship's critical 
systems and equipment utilize technologies from existing Navy programs. 
However, the program office has identified six key subsystems needed to 
achieve the system's full capability, one of which is not mature. 
Almost 45 percent of LHA 6 is based on the design of the LHD 8 ship 
currently under construction. A design review of LHA 6 was conducted in 
October 2005, and the Navy determined that LHA 6's preliminary design 
was stable. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

LHA 6 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

In August 2005, the Navy concluded that all LHA 6 components and 
technologies are fully mature and that the program met technology 
requirements to enter system development. The Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense for Science and Technology concurred and the program proceeded 
without a formal technology readiness assessment. However, the program 
office has identified six key subsystems needed to achieve LHA 6's full 
capability--five of which are mature. The Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence suite (C4I); Ship Self 
Defense System (SSDS); Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC); Rolling 
Airframe Missile (RAM); and Evolved NATO Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) are 
all mature technologies used on numerous Navy ships. According to 
program officials, these technologies will not be modified for LHA 6 
and further development will not be required for ship integration. The 
500 ton air conditioning (AC) plants modified for LHA 6 are undergoing 
testing to ensure functionality. Finally, the Joint Precision Approach 
and Landing System (JPALS)--a new GPS-based aircraft landing system--is 
not yet mature. 

The AC plant is the only machinery/auxiliary technology that will 
differ from the LHD 8 ship, but according to program officials it will 
be a minor adaptation of plants used aboard Virginia-class submarines. 
Program officials state that first article testing of the plant is in 
progress and scheduled to continue through June 2007. According to 
program officials, the plant met all ship specifications during its 
initial testing. 

JPALS will be used to support the all-weather landings of next- 
generation Navy aircraft, including the Joint Strike Fighter. The 
system, however, is not yet mature because its major components have 
not been tested together. JPALS has not yet started system development, 
but is expected to be fielded on other ships prior to its integration 
on LHA 6. Program officials state that the LHA 6 design has 
incorporated space for the system based on initial estimates of its 
specifications. Furthermore, the legacy aviation control system, SPN- 
41A, will serve as the backup technology in the event that JPALS 
development is delayed beyond LHA 6 deployment and the introduction of 
the JSF. According to the program office, JPALS is not needed to 
achieve the operational requirements of LHA 6 and SPN-41A is sufficient 
to land the JSF if the aircraft is fielded before JPALS. 

Design Stability: 

The program does not measure design stability by percentage of 
engineering drawings completed, and therefore was not assessed 
according to this metric. However, the Navy certified that LHA 6 has a 
stable preliminary design based on the determination of an independent 
technical evaluation board during the critical design review in October 
2005. The program office plans to award a detail design and 
construction contract to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in December 
2006. Program officials state that they will use the engineering 
drawing schedule to track design stability. 

According to program officials, almost 45 percent of the design effort 
will be based on drawings from LHD 8. Over half of the ship will 
require newly created designs or drawings modified from LHD 8. Major 
adjustments made from the LHD 8 design include expansion of the ship's 
aviation hanger deck to create additional space for future aircraft, 
removal of the well deck to accommodate the increased hanger space and 
additional aviation fuel capacity, and updated warfare systems. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, one area of risk for the ship is the 
development of new software code for a portion of the machinery control 
system. LHA 6 is dependent on LHD 8 to provide 75 percent of its 
machinery control system software, as well as the automated bridge and 
diesel generator control systems software. Program officials said that 
this software has not yet been tested or demonstrated. All other 
software will be used on other Navy systems prior to LHA 6's delivery. 
Program officials expect LHA 6's schedule will accommodate this 
software development. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy concurred with 
the information provided in this report. 

[End of section] 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

The Army's AH-64D Longbow Apache can be employed day or night, in 
adverse weather and obscurants, and is capable of engaging and 
destroying advanced threat weapon systems. The primary targets of the 
aircraft are mobile armor and air defense units, with secondary targets 
being threat helicopters. Block III enhancements are to ensure the 
Longbow Apache is compatible with the Future Combat System 
architecture, is a viable member of the future force, and is 
supportable through 2030. We assessed the Block III portion of the 
Apache. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source; Boeing; Army Systems Program Office; Huntsville, AL. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing: 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $901.5 million: 

Procurement: $5,628.4 million: 

Total funding: $6,529.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 597: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,068.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $5,628.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $6,697.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $11.125; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: 602; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: 78; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The Apache Block III program entered the system development and 
demonstration phase in July 2006 with one critical technology, an 
improved drive system, approaching full maturity. The Apache Block III 
program plans to complete three phases of development and meet 
requirements through a series of technology insertions, each requiring 
integration, test, and qualification activities. The Army is reporting 
that at the start of development, these technology insertions were 
fully mature. Only the first phase of insertions will need to be 
installed at the factory; the others can be installed in the field. A 
production decision for the first phase is scheduled in 2010. Also, 
when it was approved for development, the Army was directed to extend 
the development schedule due to an aggressive test schedule, thereby 
increasing development cost. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Longbow Apache BLIII Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Army is reporting that the Apache Block III program entered system 
development in July 2006 with one critical technology, an improved 
drive system. That technology is approaching full maturity. The 
improved drive system technology will be used in a helicopter 
transmission for the first time. The technology improves the available 
power and increases reliability over the existing transmission. The 
drive system has been demonstrated in a relevant environment, and plans 
exist for flight testing in 2009 and 2010 to evaluate its full 
maturity. 

The Army was reporting on 15 critical technologies prior to development 
start. However, as it reached development start, the Army opted to 
report on only 1 technology as critical. The remainder of the 15 
technologies are not considered critical. The program plans to meet 
requirements through a series of technology insertions that will 
require integration, test, and qualification activities. The Army is 
reporting that at the start of development, these technology insertions 
were fully mature and will be incorporated into the system development 
and demonstration program in three phases. Each Apache aircraft will go 
to the factory for Block III modification only one time--for the first 
phase of insertions--and other modifications will be retrofitable in 
the field. A production decision for that initial phase of development 
is scheduled in 2010. 

The technology insertions are divided into two primary categories: 
those related directly to processor upgrades and those independent of 
processor upgrades. The first phase of planned insertions addresses 
some of the processor upgrades and all of the nonprocessor upgrades. 
The processor-dependent insertions involve both hardware and software 
upgrades and are not field retrofitable. They include level IV unmanned 
aerial vehicle control, improved electronics/modular open system 
approach, aircraft survivability equipment, interim communications 
suite, modernized signal processor unit, instrument meteorological 
conditions/instrument flight rules hardware and software, and radar 
electronic unit. Those insertions that are independent of the processor 
include the improved drive system, engine enhancements, composite main 
rotor blades, airframe life extension, and training device concurrency. 
This phase is planned to be complete in 2014. The second and third 
development efforts are processor upgrades that are software 
modifications and are field retrofitable. Phase two is scheduled for 
completion in 2016 and includes the insertion of embedded diagnostics 
and a common data link. The final phase includes cognitive decision 
aids, image fusion, aided target, detection and classification, 
supportability improvements, multimode laser, fire control radar, and 
radio frequency interferometer improvements. The final phase will be 
completed after 2016. 

According to program officials, the technical risk involved with these 
technologies is low even though no backup technology exists. If, for 
some reason, the technology is unavailable for insertion at its given 
time, the program would proceed with existing technology until the new 
technology can be incorporated. Further, cost impact for incorporating 
the technologies is expected to be minimal given the ability to add 
software changes in the field and because the helicopter would have to 
be returned to the production plant only once to accomplish upgrades. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials estimate that 100 percent of its 1,546 drawings will 
be released by the design review scheduled for January 2008. However, 
until the maturity of critical technologies and technology insertions 
have been demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Apache Block III program was approved for system demonstration and 
development in July 2006. On approval, the Defense Acquisition Board 
directed the Army to extend the development schedule due to an 
aggressive test plan that resulted in a higher development cost for the 
program. Also, the Apache Block III's production decision slipped from 
March 2009 to April 2010. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army was provided an opportunity to comment on a draft of this 
assessment, but did not have any comments. 

[End of section] 

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): 

The Army's Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) is a new aircraft acquisition 
that will conduct exclusively noncombat missions in support of specific 
Army tasks to include homeland security support operations, disaster 
relief, search and rescue, general support, medical evacuation, and 
support for Army training and test centers. The Army is purchasing a 
commercially available helicopter for this mission rather than enter 
into a new development program. The commercial system has been in use 
as a medical evacuation helicopter. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: EADS North America Contract Photographer. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: EADS North America Defense Co. 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $0.0 million: 

Procurement: $1,615.6 million: 

Total funding: $1,615.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 314: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2006: $0.0; 
Latest 09/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2006: $1,574.4; 
Latest 09/2006: $1,671.0; 
Percent change: 6.1. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2006: $1,574.4; 
Latest 09/2006: $1,671.0; 
Percent change: 6.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2006: $4.889; 
Latest 09/2006: $5.190; 
Percent change: 6.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2006: 322; 
Latest 09/2006: 322; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2006: 10; 
Latest 09/2006: 11; 
Percent change: 10.0. 

[End of table] 

The LUH is a commercial off-the-shelf procurement. No developmental 
efforts are planned, and the system's technology and design are mature. 
Production maturity is high since the selected system is a Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) certified aircraft, the Eurocopter-145, 
that is currently in use commercially. The contract for the system was 
awarded on June 30, 2006. The system is scheduled to undergo limited 
operational test and evaluation in March 2007 and its initial 
operational capability is planned for May 2007. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

LUH Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the LUH's critical technologies because the LUH is an 
off-the-shelf procurement of a fully developed, FAA-certified 
commercial aircraft. As a result, the LUH program office states that 
the system's five critical technologies are mature. These critical 
technologies are (1) network-ready communications, (2) cabin size 
sufficient for 2 crew and 6 passenger seats, (3) force protection 
defined as the capability of the crew to operate all flight controls 
while wearing standard protection suits, (4) survivability defined as 
meeting FAA standards for crashworthy seats and fuel tanks, and (5) 
performance defined as the ability to carry 2 patients on litters with 
a medical attendant and equipment. Program officials state that no 
development efforts are to take place and that the aircraft will not be 
modified. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the LUH's design stability because program officials 
said that the design of the LUH is stable, since the aircraft is 
already a fully developed commercial aircraft. Also, since the LUH is a 
currently flying, fully developed aircraft, the program office is not 
requiring the contractor to provide technical drawings for the system. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials state that production maturity is at a high level 
because the aircraft is a commercially available helicopter and 
production lines are already established. For this reason, they will 
not require statistical process control data on the system as it is 
produced. The system will undergo limited operational tests in March 
2007 and be fielded shortly thereafter, in May 2007. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army awarded a low-rate initial production contract for up to 42 
aircraft in June 2006, with full-rate production decision scheduled for 
May 2007. The Army plans to acquire a total of 322 aircraft. The 
program is an FAA-certified aircraft already being commercially 
produced and the contractor will provide total logistics support. The 
helicopter will not fly combat missions or be deployed into combat 
areas. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV): 

MDA's MKV is being designed as an optional payload for midcourse 
defense systems. It will engage midcourse threat clusters with multiple 
small kill vehicles launched from a carrier vehicle. Key components to 
the system include the carrier and kill vehicles, payload 
communications, adapter, telemetry, and shroud. We assessed the carrier 
vehicle and kill vehicle capabilities currently under development and 
expected to be available in the Block 2012-2014 time frame. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Lockheed Martin. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin: 

Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $1,627.6 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $1,627.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2006: $1,721.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,721.1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2006: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2006: $1,721.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,721.1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2006: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2006: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2006: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2011. 

[End of table] 

The MKV program transitioned from a technology development to system 
development in 2006 with, we believe, none of its 18 critical 
technologies mature. While the program assessed 14 of its 18 critical 
technologies as approaching maturity, these technologies have yet to 
demonstrate the form and fit required for the MKV. The program is 
trying to lower program risk by creating a decision point in 2009 to 
assess the maturity of its highest risk technology, engagement 
management algorithms. If the algorithms are not mature at that time, 
the program will consider continuing development of the carrier vehicle 
as a unitary kill vehicle without multiple kill vehicles. Additionally, 
we were unable to assess design stability because, according to program 
officials, the program has not yet selected a final concept that 
includes the number of kill vehicles on the carrier vehicle. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

MKV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to our analysis, none of the program's 18 critical 
technologies are mature. The technologies on the carrier vehicle are 
the divert and attitude control system (DACS), cooler, inertial 
measurement units (IMU), kill enhancement device (KED), focal plane 
array (FPA), optics, power, processor, and carrier vehicle-ground 
datalink. The technologies on the kill vehicle are the DACS, seeker 
FPA, KED, cooler, optics, IMUs, power, processors, and carrier vehicle- 
to-kill vehicle datalink. According to the program, 14 of these 
technologies are approaching maturity and 4 are not mature--the FPA and 
optics on the carrier vehicle, and the KED on both the carrier vehicle 
and the kill vehicle. We disagree with the program's evaluation of the 
readiness of the 14 technologies assessed as approaching maturity. 
Although all of the critical technologies have been used in previous 
programs, the hardware has not been tested in a smaller form and with 
the correct fit for the MKV program. Program officials agreed that 
these technologies may need to be repackaged to properly fit on the MKV 
and further testing may be needed at that time to ensure the technology 
is mature. The KEDs are optional hardware, which the program will 
decide either to pursue or defer in the Block 2008 time frame. 

The program assessed its top risk for the program to be payload system 
algorithm maturity. Without the maturity of these algorithms, the 
system will not be able to engage targets with the multiple kill 
vehicles. While the program has developed risk mitigation plans, 
program officials are also designing for low risk by developing the 
carrier vehicle prior to developing the kill vehicles. At a key 
decision point in 2009, the program will assess the maturity of the 
algorithms and, if they are still immature, consider whether to 
continue development of the carrier vehicle without multiple kill 
vehicles. Program officials say that if the program continues with a 
single carrier vehicle, multiple kill vehicles could be added at a 
later date. However, pursuing this option would make MKV very similar 
to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System's Exoatmospheric Kill 
Vehicle, although program officials claim the unitary carrier vehicle 
would be more producible. 

Design Stability: 

We were unable to assess the design stability of the MKV program 
because the program has not yet selected the final configuration of the 
MKV system. According to program officials, the configuration has been 
narrowed down to two main concepts with varying numbers of kill 
vehicles on the carrier vehicle. Program officials hoped to finalize 
the MKV concept by late October 2006. The program intends to use 
engineering and manufacturing readiness levels, technology readiness 
levels, and software readiness levels to assess the maturity of the MKV 
design leading up to the system critical design review scheduled for 
2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program officials are anticipating schedule delays for the program due 
to the $20 million cut in the fiscal year 2007 budget they received in 
September 2006. The officials stated that they expect that the system 
requirement reviews for the payload, carrier vehicle, and kill vehicle 
planned for summer 2007 will be postponed. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole, 
medium-to-high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system 
capable of flying at higher speeds and higher altitudes than its 
predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. The Reaper is designed to provide a 
ground attack capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and 
assess small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each system will consist 
of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite 
communications suite. We assessed the first increment of the air 
vehicle. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated: 

Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $130.3 million: 

Procurement: $471.7 million: 

Total funding: $601.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 30: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2004: $186.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $209.4; 
Percent change: 12.6. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2004: $484.2; 
Latest 08/2006: $572.8; 
Percent change: 18.3. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2004: $670.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $782.2; 
Percent change: 16.7. 

Program unit cost;
As of 08/2004: TBD; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2004: 63; 
Latest 08/2006: 63; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2004: 70; 
Latest 08/2006: 70; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Cost data are from all known costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Total estimated program cost is $1,317.2 million. 

[End of table] 

The Reaper entered system development in February 2004 with three of 
its four critical technologies mature. The fourth technology has 
experienced several delays, but it began weapons release testing in 
December 2006. Once mature, the technology will enable the program to 
perform its primary mission--to destroy enemy targets. The Air Force 
has completed over 80 percent of the design drawings for the first 
increment and projects that it will have achieved design stability by 
the 2007 critical design review. However, the program has already begun 
producing aircraft for an interim combat capability and plans to 
produce additional preproduction aircraft with improved interim 
capabilities without demonstrating production maturity. Initial 
operational testing is not scheduled to begin until 2008. At that 
point, nearly one-third of the quantity will be on contract or 
delivered. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

MQ-9 (Reaper) Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Three of the Reaper's four critical technologies--the synthetic 
aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air 
vehicle--are fully mature. The fourth technology, the stores management 
subsystem, is designed to integrate and store data necessary to launch 
munitions. This subsystem has experienced several delays; it was 
initially expected to be mature in 2004. The latest delay was a result 
of incorporating the Hellfire missile into the subsystem. It began 
weapons release testing in December 2006. Once mature, the technology 
will enable the Reaper to perform its primary mission, to destroy enemy 
targets. Subsequent increments may require other new technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The program office currently reports that over 80 percent of the 
drawings for the first increment are complete. Since our last report, 
the program's critical design review has slipped about 4 months, 
primarily due to the requirement to incorporate the Hellfire missile. 
The program office expects 94 percent of the drawings for the first 
increment will be completed by the critical design review, now 
scheduled for March 2007. Program officials acknowledge that additional 
drawings will be needed for subsequent increments. 

Production Maturity: 

The program does not plan to use statistical process controls to ensure 
product quality. Instead, it plans to use other quality control 
measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to track product quality. 
Production work on the Predator and Reaper and the Army's Warrior have 
greatly increased the contractor's business base and workforce 
requirements. OSD and Air Force officials have raised concerns about 
the contractor's production capacity to meet this expanded business 
base. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Reaper program has undergone two significant changes over the past 
year. First, the requirement to add the Hellfire missile delayed the 
delivery of the interim combat capability aircraft by about 7 months. 
Second, the Air Force decided to provide an early fielding capability 
to the user. While these aircraft will be more capable than the interim 
combat aircraft, they will not have the full capability. According to 
program officials, the hardware in the early fielding aircraft will 
meet most of the required capabilities; subsequent aircraft will have 
upgrades to the radar and weapons as well as further software 
developments and technical orders. 

The Reaper's acquisition approach increases the risks of concurrent 
design and production. The Air Force will have already contracted for 
one-third of the total production aircraft quantity before it completes 
initial operational testing. Changes stemming from the test program 
would further cause a perturbation to the aircraft's cost, schedule, 
and manufacturing plan. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

21'' Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System (MRUUVS): 

Launched and recovered from submarine torpedo tubes, the Navy's 21" 
MRUUVS will independently perform a range of information-gathering 
activities. It supplants two related programs now limited to prototype 
development, the long-term mine reconnaissance system and the advanced 
development unmanned undersea vehicle. Each MRUUVS will include the 
vehicle, combat and control interfaces, and equipment for either mine 
countermeasure or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
missions (ISR). 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Unmanned Undersea Vehicles program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD: 

Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $375.3 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $375.3 million: 

Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: $430.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: $430.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 10/2006: 59; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include costs budgeted through fiscal year 2011. 

[End of table] 

One of the MRUUVS program's six critical technologies is currently 
mature and the remaining five are approaching maturity. While the 
program expects to have four of the remaining five critical 
technologies mature by development start--now scheduled for August 
2009--the sonar is not expected to reach maturity until 2010. Although 
many technologies have undergone at-sea testing, the program plans to 
rely on development efforts in other programs to demonstrate full 
maturity of some of MRUUVS's critical technologies. As a result of 
program restructuring and budget reductions, the milestone review to 
authorize development start has slipped by over 2 years since last 
year's assessment. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

21'' MRUUVS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of six critical technologies is currently mature and the remaining 
five are approaching maturity. The program expects to have all but one 
critical technology fully mature by system development start--now 
planned for August 2009. In some cases the program plans to rely on 
development efforts in other programs to demonstrate maturity for 
MRUUVS technologies. 

The maturity of software that provides MRUUVS's autonomous capability 
has been demonstrated. Commercial unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV) have 
demonstrated autonomy, and at-sea testing on a prototype vehicle in 
January 2006 demonstrated autonomous control and decision-making 
capabilities. Nevertheless, software development will continue, with 
incremental improvements added as they are developed. 

Technology to manage the vehicle launch and recovery process involves 
acoustic signaling and mechanical activities. A predecessor vehicle on 
which MRUUVS is based has demonstrated homing, docking, and replacement 
into a model submarine hull. MRUUVS's launch capability was 
demonstrated in January 2006 during at-sea tests with a submarine. Due 
to a mechanical failure, however, the vehicle could not be recovered 
back into the submarine. A test is planned for 2007 to demonstrate end- 
to-end vehicle recovery with a submarine. 

The Littoral Precision Undersea Mapping Array enables object 
identification and obstacle avoidance. An advanced development model 
has been developed, tested, and deployed on a 21" vehicle, thereby 
demonstrating its mine identification capability. The Navy had planned 
to test a more advanced, lighter-weight prototype, but has now 
eliminated this development based on budget cuts. Instead, the program 
believes it can achieve full maturity through modeling and simulation 
and demonstrations of the array--without a test vehicle. 

ISR technology already exists and is operational on Navy unmanned 
aerial vehicles. However, packaging the required technology within the 
size, space, and weight constraints of MRUUVS will require 
miniaturized, highly compact, and lightweight components that can be 
adapted for an ocean environment. In 2006 the ISR suite was packaged 
into a 21" prototype for at-sea testing. While this demonstrated 
partial maturity, the program does not expect additional testing and 
development to occur until after a development contract is awarded. The 
program believes that maturity will be demonstrated by October 2008 
through sensor development on other programs. 

While conventional batteries that could support MRUUVS endurance 
requirements have successfully been demonstrated on other UUVs, the 
program office intends to leverage development of rechargeable 
batteries from the Advanced SEAL Delivery System program for use on 
MRUUVS. While these batteries have attained functional capability, 
further development is necessary to ensure fit into a small unmanned 
undersea vehicle. 

In January 2006 the synthetic aperture sonar was tested at-sea using a 
larger UUV. The Navy eliminated further development of a final 
prototype due to cost growth and design failures. Full maturity of the 
sonar is not expected until fiscal year 2010--after a contract for 
MRUUVS development is awarded. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since last year's assessment the program has undergone significant 
restructuring. In February 2006 the Navy implemented a new program 
strategy, which delayed development start from July 2006 to late 2008. 
According to program officials, program restructuring was necessary not 
only because of Navy-wide fiscal issues, but also because of technology 
immaturity and problems with system integration. 

Additional changes resulted from the most recent appropriations, which 
reduced the program by $16.9 million in fiscal year 2007. As a 
consequence of this reduction, the acquisition and contracting 
strategies are again being revised. Program officials expect additional 
delays in the MRUUVS program, with development start slipping to 2009. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide low data rate voice and data communications capable of 
penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is 
designed to replace the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite 
system currently in operation and provide support to worldwide, 
multiservice, mobile, and fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a 
network of advanced UHF satellites and multiple ground segments. We 
assessed both the space and ground segments. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Lockheed Martin Corporation Copyright 2006 Lockheed Martin 
Corporation. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems: 

Program office: San Diego, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $2,097.5 million: 

Procurement: $2,210.6 million: 

Total funding: $4,355.7 million: 

Procurement quantity: 4: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2004: $3,353.4; 
Latest 08/2006: $3,186.6; 
Percent change: -5.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2004: $2,790.2; 
Latest 08/2006: $2,210.6; 
Percent change: -20.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/2004: $6,179.2; 
Latest 08/2006: $5,459.2; 
Percent change: -11.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2004: $1,029.866; 
Latest 08/2006: $909.864; 
Percent change: -11.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2004: 6; 
Latest 08/2006: 6; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2004: 91; 
Latest 08/2006: 91; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

In September 2004, the MUOS program was authorized to begin 
development. All seven of the program's critical technologies are 
mature. The program is ordering long lead items for the first two 
satellites before achieving a final design. This early procurement 
could lead to rework, causing cost increases and schedule delays if 
relevant designs change prior to critical design review. While the MUOS 
development has become time-critical due to the operational failure of 
two UHF Follow-On satellites, the program's ground software development 
represents significant cost and schedule growth risk. In addition, 
problems encountered under the Joint Tactical Radio System program may 
result in underutilization of MUOS capabilities. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

MUOS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Eight of nine critical technologies were mature at the development 
start decision in September 2004. The number of critical technologies 
has since varied due to continuing program analyses of required 
technologies. According to the program office, all seven of the 
program's critical technologies are mature. 

Design Stability: 

The MUOS program is procuring long lead items for the first two 
satellites before achieving a final design. According to the program 
office, $71.9 million (constant 2007 dollars) in long lead items is to 
be ordered before critical design review in March 2007. Such 
procurement could lead to rework if relevant designs change prior to 
the system-level critical design review, causing program cost increases 
and schedule delays. According to the program office, delaying long 
lead procurement until after critical design review would cause the 
program schedule to slip. In addition, the program office noted that 
the majority of the long lead procurements are planned after respective 
segment-level critical design reviews (which precede the system-level 
critical design review) and that most are for standard commercial 
satellite bus components. 

The program office estimates 3,020 drawings to be required for the MUOS 
design. The development contract requires 90 percent of the design 
drawings as a condition of conducting critical design review. As of 
September 2006, 1,692 drawings had been completed. 

Other Program Issues: 

The importance of the first MUOS launch has increased due to the 
unexpected failures of two UHF Follow-On satellites, one in June 2005 
and another in September 2006. As a result, communication capabilities 
are expected to degrade below those required in November 2007, almost 3 
years earlier than estimated at MUOS development start. DOD is 
examining options for addressing a communications capability gap, 
including developing an integrated waveform to increase communications 
capacity provided by existing satellites and continuing to lease 
satellite communications capacity. According to the MUOS program 
manager, accelerating the MUOS schedule likely would increase program 
cost and schedule risks and options to develop new gap-filler 
satellites would not be viable due to the short development timeframes 
required. 

According to the program office, development of MUOS ground software 
represents one of the highest risks to the program due to the size and 
complexity of the contractor's design. A 2006 independent program 
assessment also concluded that MUOS software development represents 
significant risk. The program office stated that the ground software is 
to be developed in three builds consisting of multiple increments to 
mitigate schedule risk. Additionally, the program intends to track and 
assess software development using numerous metrics we have found to be 
useful for program success, such as those for cost, schedule, defects, 
and quality. As of August 2006, early software development efforts are 
meeting cost and schedule goals. However, cost and schedule growth 
risks remain due to the concurrent development of the three builds. 
Specifically, during the approximate 4-year software development 
effort, about one-half of this period is to consist of concurrent 
development among the software builds. Such concurrency can increase 
the severity of software problems due to their cascading cost and 
schedule impacts on other builds. 

Full utilization of MUOS capabilities is dependent on the fielding of 
terminals developed under the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 
program. However, development problems encountered under the JTRS 
program have resulted in deferrals of requirements and have increased 
risk that MUOS capabilities will be underutilized until MUOS-compliant 
terminals are fielded. 

According to the program office, MUOS satellites can be launched, and 
their legacy payload capability can be used to support warfighter 
requirements if problems are encountered with MUOS ground software or 
JTRS synchronization. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

NPOESS is a tri-agency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the 
year 2026. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single 
national system. The program consists of five segments: space; command, 
control, and communications; interface data processing; launch; and 
field terminal software. We assessed all segments. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: NPOESS Integrated Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology: 

Program office: Silver Spring, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: TBD: 

Procurement: TBD: 

Total funding: TBD: 

Procurement quantity: 2: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2002: $4,883.2; 
Latest 10/2006: $7,681.1; 
Percent change: 57.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2002: $1,260.6; 
Latest 10/2006: $2,755.9; 
Percent change: 118.6. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2002: $6,143.8; 
Latest 10/2006: $10,437.0; 
Percent change: 69.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2002: $1,023.963; 
Latest 10/2006: $2,609.247; 
Percent change: 154.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2002: 6; 
Latest 10/2006: 4; 
Percent change: -33.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2002: 172; 
Latest 10/2006: 235; 
Percent change: 36.6. 

Funding needed to complete has yet to be determined and costs are 
expected to change as a part of a program restructuring. 

[End of table] 

Following our review last year, 7 of the original 14 critical 
technologies were removed from the NPOESS program. One was removed in 
2005 and 6 more in June 2006 as part of the program's restructure due 
to a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost breach at the 25 percent 
threshold. The 7 remaining technologies are expected to be mature by 
design review in January 2009. The program office is not collecting 
statistical process control data to assess production maturity because 
of the small number of satellites to be produced. As part of a 
mandatory certification process, the program was restructured and will 
only include the procurement of two satellites and the deletion of a 
critical sensor. The launch of the first satellite was delayed an 
additional 28 months to early 2013. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

NPOESS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only 1 of the program's 14 original critical technologies was mature at 
the production decision in August 2002. In 2005, 1 critical technology 
was deleted and 6 more were deleted in 2006. Four of the deleted 
technologies were associated with a major sensor, which was removed 
from NPOESS. Four of the 7 remaining technologies are mature, and the 
program projects that all 7 will be mature by the design review in 
January 2009. Only 3 of the remaining technologies have a backup 
technology. 

The program undertook the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a demonstration 
satellite, to reduce risk and provide a bridging mission for NASA's 
Earth Observing System. This project is to provide data processing 
centers with an early opportunity to work with sensors, ground 
controls, and data-processing systems and allow for incorporating 
lessons learned into the four NPOESS satellites. Under the restructured 
NPOESS program, the satellite is to demonstrate the remaining three 
major sensors and one noncritical sensor in an operational environment 
and was scheduled for launch in May 2006. Since our assessment last 
year, the launch has been delayed from May 2006 until January 2010--a 
total of about 44 months. 

Design Stability: 

In August 2002, the program committed to the fabrication and production 
of two satellites with operational capability before achieving design 
stability or production maturity. There are no drawing numbers 
available at this time due to the program restructure. Program 
officials indicated they are in the process of revising the design 
drawings to accommodate the deletion of a major sensor. These revisions 
could result in significant spacecraft design modifications. The design 
review date has been delayed 33 months to January 2009. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because, according to the 
program office, it does not collect statistical process control data 
due to the small number of satellites to be built. However, program 
officials stated that the contractors track and use various metrics to 
track subcomponent production, such as rework percentages and defect 
containment. 

Other Program Issues: 

The launch of the first satellite has been delayed an additional 28 
months to early 2013. The restructured NPOESS program includes two 
satellites funded using RDT&E appropriations, with the option in fiscal 
year 2010 for two additional satellites using the existing contract, 
funded with procurement appropriations. In addition, a deleted major 
sensor was to collect data to produce microwave imagery and other 
meteorological and oceanographic data. However, the program will now 
include developing a competition for a new replacement sensor 
coinciding with the second R&D satellite. The program restructure will 
also result in reduced satellite data collection coverage, requiring 
dependence on a European satellite for coverage during midmorning 
hours. Although the program has reduced the number of satellites it 
will produce, the program acquisition unit cost per satellite is about 
23 percent above the 2005 approved program baseline. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on our draft, the Air Force generally concurred with our 
findings and offered technical comments for our consideration. We 
incorporated the technical comments where appropriate. In addition, the 
Air Force stated that the NPOESS program completed the Nunn-McCurdy (10 
U.S.C. 2433) certification process on June 5, 2006. The Air Force noted 
that the Integrated Program Office is now tracking NPOESS development 
to an interim program plan and that the program office has increased 
contractor oversight through additional staff and processes. Moreover, 
according to Air Force officials, the program executive's office is 
establishing various independent review teams. 

[End of section] 

P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA): 

The Navy's P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA) is the 
replacement for the P-3C Orion. Its primary roles are persistent 
antisubmarine warfare; antisurface warfare; and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The P-8A shares an 
integrated maritime patrol mission with the Broad Area Maritime 
Surveillance Unmanned Aerial System (BAMS UAS). These two systems are 
intended to sustain and improve the Navy's maritime warfighting 
capability. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: The Boeing Company, Copyright 2005 The Boeing Company. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: The Boeing Company: 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $5,162.8 million: 

Procurement: $20,970.1 million: 

Total funding: $26,253.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: 108: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2004: $6,924.0; 
Latest 12/2005: $6,784.5; 
Percent change: -2.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2004: $21,480.6; 
Latest 12/2005: $20,970.1; 
Percent change: -2.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2004: $28,531.1; 
Latest 12/2005: $27,880.7; 
Percent change: -2.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2004: $248.097; 
Latest 12/2005: $244.567; 
Percent change: -1.4. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2004: 115; 
Latest 12/2005: 114; 
Percent change: -0.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2004: 160; 
Latest 12/2005: 160; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The P-8A program entered development with none of its four critical 
technologies mature. The program developed maturation plans and 
identified mature backup technologies for each of the critical 
technologies. According to program officials, the P-8A would lose some 
capabilities but still meet its minimum requirements if it used these 
backups. Since our assessment of the P-8A effort last year, the program 
has decided to use one of its backups. Two of the remaining three 
critical technologies are not anticipated to reach maturity until 2008 
and 2009, at least 4 years later than recommended by best practices. 
The program office was unable to provide the number of drawings 
completed, but expects that 80 percent of the design drawings will be 
released by critical design review in 2007. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

P-8A MMA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the P-8A's four critical technologies were mature when it 
entered development in May 2004. The program had previously expected 
all four technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant environment by 
design review in July 2007. Since our last assessment, the program has 
decided not to use the acoustic bellringer algorithms. They will 
instead use the backup technology, which is baseline signal processing 
without the bellringers. Bellringers are advanced signal-processing 
aids that provide sorting and identification of specific sounds. The 
backup is being used because an analysis of bellringer performance 
showed that it would not meet expectations. The bellringer algorithms 
were not required to meet baseline performance requirements, but had 
the potential to provide increased performance above the required 
capability. 

None of the three remaining critical technologies--electronic support 
measures (ESM) digital receiver, data fusion, and integrated rotary 
sonobuoy launcher--are mature. These technologies have not moved beyond 
the laboratory environment, and have not matured since the beginning of 
development in May 2004. The program office stated that decisions on 
using backup technologies for the ESM digital receiver and the sonobuoy 
launcher may not be made until after design review. 

The final production hardware is complete for the ESM digital receiver, 
a technology being leveraged from the EA-18G program. Technology 
maturity will be demonstrated by design review, 3 years later than 
recommended by best practices standards. The data fusion and the 
integrated rotary sonobuoy launcher have not been integrated into a 
prototype system, but are expected to reach maturity in 2008 and 2009 
respectively, at least 4 years later than recommended by best practice 
standards. 

Design Stability: 

The P-8A program office was unable to provide the number of drawings 
expected or currently completed. As a result, we could not assess 
current design stability. The program office expects that 80 percent of 
the design drawings will be released to manufacturing at critical 
design review in 2007. 

Other Program Issues: 

As of June 2006, the P-8A program is on budget and on schedule. 
However, if the P-8A fails to develop as expected or experiences 
schedule slippage, the Navy would have to continue relying on its aging 
P-3C Orion fleet. 

The P-8A shares the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance role with the BAMS UAS. The BAMS UAS development start 
was delayed 2 years until October 2007. If the BAMS UAS does not 
develop as planned or continues to experience schedule delays, the P-8A 
is its fallback and according to the Navy, the overall cost of the 
program would increase due to a need to procure additional P-8A 
aircraft. 

Another program that may impact the P-8A program is the Aerial Common 
Sensor (ACS). The ACS is intended to replace three current systems, 
including the Navy's EP-3. However, the Army terminated the ACS 
contract in January 2006 because the airframe selected could not 
accommodate the intended mission equipment. Decisions concerning the 
ACS program will determine whether the Navy participates in a future 
Army-led ACS program. One of the alternatives assessed by the Navy to 
replace the EP-3 included incorporating the ACS equipment onto the P-8A 
airframe. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy concurred with GAO's assessment of the P-8A MMA program. The 
Navy stated that the program continues to manage the three remaining 
critical technologies. Furthermore, the maturation of these 
technologies is on schedule and will be assessed at the critical design 
review planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. The airplane 
design remains approximately 70 percent in common with that of the 
commercial 737-800 baseline. Over 25 percent of the detailed design 
drawings are now complete. The metrics for measuring drawing release 
are now defined and are being used as one critical measurement to 
assess design maturity for the critical design review. According to the 
Navy, the program continues to meet or exceed the cost, schedule, and 
performance parameters defined in the program baseline. 

[End of section] 

PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

The Army's Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program is the process by 
which the Patriot missile system transitions to the MEADS. The MEADS 
mission is to provide low-to-medium altitude air and missile defense 
with the capability to counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles, and other air-breathing threats. MEADS is a 
codevelopment program among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We 
assessed the MEADS fire unit portion of the program. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Lower Tier Project Office, Combined Aggregate Program (LTPO-
CAP). 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: MEADS International: 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $4,271.3 million: 

Procurement: $12,557.0 million: 

Total funding: $16,828.2 million: 

Procurement quantity: 48: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2004: $4,879.8; 
Latest 09/2006: $4,747.9; 
Percent change: -2.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2004: $12,921.7; 
Latest 09/2006: $12,557.0; 
Percent change: -2.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2004: $17,801.5; 
Latest 09/2006: $17,304.9; 
Percent change: -2.8. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2004: $370.865; 
Latest 09/2006: $360.518; 
Percent change: -2.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2004: 48; 
Latest 09/2006: 48; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2004: 158; 
Latest 09/2006: 157; 
Percent change: -0.6. 

[End of table] 

The MEADS fire unit began development in 2004 with two mature critical 
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one 
immature critical technology. The technologies remain at these levels. 
Program plans call for a system design review in 2009, but officials 
estimate that only one of the six fire unit technologies will be more 
mature at that time than at development start. The program office 
anticipates that all critical technologies will be fully mature by the 
start of production in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

Current plans call for the insertion of MEADS components into Patriot 
Fire Units beginning in 2008 and continuing in 2010 and 2013. However, 
this could change because plans for these insertions are under review. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only two of the six critical technologies--launcher electronics and 
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile integration--are mature. 
Three other critical technologies--the low noise exciter that manages 
the radars' frequencies, the cooling system for the radars, and a slip 
ring that carries power and coolants to the radars--are nearing 
maturity. The remaining critical technology--the transmit/receive 
module that transmits/receives signals for the fire control radar--is 
immature. 

The project office estimates that the maturity level of the low noise 
exciter, the radar cooling system, and the slip ring will remain 
unchanged when product development begins and that the transmit receive 
module will be near full maturity. The office expects all critical 
technologies to be fully mature by the start of production in late 
2012. There are no backup technologies for any of the MEADS critical 
technologies. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of 
releasable drawings and total drawings expected were not available. The 
program office expects to know the total number of releasable drawings 
at the design review in 2009. 

Other Program Issues: 

MEADS is being developed to employ the current PAC-3 missile and the 
future PAC-3 missile segment enhancement variant. The missile segment 
enhancement is a U.S.-funded effort to improve on the current PAC-3 
missile capability. Program estimates indicate that the Army plans to 
develop and procure missiles at a cost of approximately $6.1 billion. 
We did not assess the missile and the missile segment enhancement, and 
the associated costs are not included in our funding information. 

The MEADS program has adopted an incremental acquisition approach 
wherein MEADS major items are incrementally inserted into the current 
Patriot force. The first of the three insertions is to begin in 2008, 
with another in 2010, and the final in 2013. The program office plans 
for each increment to introduce new or upgraded capability into the 
program. The 2008 and 2010 increments are under review as the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Army consider the means to 
consolidate and align multiple Air and Missile Defense command and 
control development efforts. The Army's objective is to provide a joint 
integrated network-centric architecture for common Battle Management 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. The 2013 
increment is not effected by the potential realignment and the Army 
expects MEADS to achieve initial operating capability in 2017 with four 
units. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with this assessment. 

[End of section] 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to 
meet requirements in the missile warning, missile defense, technical 
intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. A replacement 
for the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High was to consist of four 
satellites (plus a spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two 
sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and fixed 
and mobile ground stations. In 2005, the number of GEO satellites was 
reduced to three. We assessed the sensors and satellites. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company: 

Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $2,573.3 million: 

Procurement: $1,532.1 million: 

Total funding: $4,184.8 million: 

Procurement quantity: 1: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1996: $4,023.5; 
Latest 12/2005: $8,547.2; 
Percent change: 112.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1996: $0.0; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,635.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1996: $4,225.9; 
Latest 12/2005: $10,436.4; 
Percent change: 147.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1996: $845.183; 
Latest 12/2005: $3,478.789; 
Percent change: 311.6. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1996: 5; 
Latest 12/2005: 3; 
Percent change: -40.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1996: TBD; 
Latest 12/2005: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

The SBIRS High program's critical technologies and design are now 
mature. Production maturity could not be determined because the 
contractor does not collect production statistical process control 
data. After delays of 18 and 21 months, both HEO sensors have now been 
delivered. According to program officials, early HEO 1 sensor 
performance on-orbit confirms the sufficiency of the payload design and 
workmanship. In 2005, the program incurred two Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 
2433) unit cost breaches and made a decision not to buy two satellites. 
Although program officials acknowledge that the GEO satellites are 
orders of magnitude more complex than the HEO sensors, they believe a 
more realistic program schedule has been developed. The first GEO 
satellite delivery is scheduled for late 2008. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

SBIRS High Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies--the infrared 
sensor, thermal management, and onboard processor--are mature. However, 
program officials stated that flawed initial systems engineering 
created first-time integration and test risk associated with the 
complex GEO satellite. According to program officials, early test 
results of the scanning and staring sensors are positive. The staring 
sensor is to have the ability to stare at one earth location and then 
rapidly change its focus area, representing a significant leap in 
capability over the current system. 

Design Stability and Production Maturity: 

The program's design is considered stable since almost all drawings 
have been released, but design-related problems may arise. Design 
problems led to delayed delivery of both HEO sensors, which were 
accepted for operations without meeting all program specifications. 
Given the greater complexity of the GEO satellites over the HEO 
sensors, the probability is high that major design flaws will be 
discovered on the GEO satellites as well. 

Program officials are using 10 milestones to indicate progress. Four 
have been completed so far. Key events remaining include delivery of 
flight software to support the payload testing, payload delivery, 
ground software deliveries, and system ground connectivity tests. 

Although the contractor does not collect statistical process control 
data, the program office tracks and assesses production maturity 
through detailed monthly test data and updates. According to program 
officials, about 95 percent of flight hardware for the first GEO 
satellite and 85 percent for the second have been delivered. Some 
testing is complete for the first GEO satellite, including the payload 
engineering thermal-vacuum test and testing to verify that the 
spacecraft will operate as intended in conditions comparable to those 
it will encounter on-orbit. 

Other Program Issues: 

Given the high probability of design flaws, costly redesigns that 
further delay GEO delivery are possible. According to program 
officials, tests have been added to identify design issues and reduce 
the likelihood of significant schedule impacts. The program office has 
identified four focus areas that are most likely to impact the program, 
including flight software development and test, database development, 
resource contention between ground operations and software test and 
development, and human error in manufacturing. 

In July 2005, the program reported its third and fourth Nunn-McCurdy 
unit cost breaches (10 U.S.C. 2433). As part of the mandatory program 
certification process, the program was restructured in late 2005. The 
resulting Acquisition Decision Memorandum certified the program to 
complete the GEO 1 and 2 development activity and allowed for the 
option to procure one additional GEO satellite. In December 2005, the 
Air Force was directed to begin efforts to develop a viable competing 
capability in parallel with the SBIRS program, known as the Alternative 
Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS). The Air Force recently awarded 
contracts to Raytheon and SAIC for sensor assembly development for 
AIRSS. AIRSS is being designed in part to provide an alternative to the 
SBIRS GEO 3 satellite. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the GEO payload and spacecraft have successfully completed several risk 
reduction activities and appear mature and stable. It noted however, 
that if unforeseen difficulties arise during the GEO integration and 
test sequence, current direction from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense is to maintain schedule, even at the sacrifice of performance. 
The Air Force stated that in the interest of preserving schedule, it 
may delay full capability. The Air Force expects GEO 1 payload delivery 
in the summer of 2007 for integration with the spacecraft bus. It 
further noted that integrated system test activities will be the focus 
of GEO 1 efforts in 2008, with the first GEO satellite launch 
anticipated late that year. The Air Force expects that the GEO 2 
payload and bus will undergo integration and test activities in 2008 in 
anticipation of a launch in late 2009. Technical comments were provided 
and incorporated as necessary. 

[End of section] 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb Increment II will provide the 
capability to attack mobile targets from stand-off range in adverse 
weather. The program builds on a previous increment that provided 
capability against fixed targets. SDB II will also provide capability 
for multiple kills per pass, multiple ordnance carriage, near-precision 
munitions, and reduced munitions footprint. The weapon will be 
installed on the Air Force's F-15E and the Navy's Joint Strike Fighter 
and is designed to work with other aircraft, such as the F-22A and B-1. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: SDB II Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing, Raytheon: 

Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $815.5 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $815.5 million: 

Procurement quantity: 12,000: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $858.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $858.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: 12,000; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: 100; 
Percent change: NA. 

The unit price will remain unknown until a contractor is selected at 
the end of the risk reduction phase. 

[End of table] 

Two of SDB II's five critical technologies are mature and are currently 
in use on the SDB I program. The remaining technologies are expected to 
be nearly mature by development start in December 2009. SDB II awarded 
two risk reduction phase contracts to Boeing and Raytheon in May 2006. 
The risk reduction phase will last 42 months, at the end of which 
Boeing and Raytheon will compete for the system development and 
demonstration contract to be awarded in December 2009. The risk 
reduction approach is said to allow higher risk and less mature 
technologies to be fielded in an evolutionary fashion. First SDB II 
delivery is expected in 2014. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

SDB II Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Two of the five critical technologies--the airframe and the guidance 
and control system--are considered mature. These two technologies were 
leveraged from legacy Air Force and Navy weapons. Three others, the 
multi-mode seeker, net-ready data link, and payload (warhead and fuze) 
need further development. The seeker is currently the least mature, and 
according to program officials, will be the most challenging technology 
to demonstrate due to the complexity of the algorithms it will require 
and the need to package the multimode seeker into a small volume. The 
program expects that each critical technology will be mature or 
approaching full maturity when the program begins system development 
and demonstration in December 2009. 

According to program officials, the strategy for maturing these 
technologies is to "test early, test often," using modeling and 
simulation techniques, and relying on other programs that have used the 
same or similar technologies. Each contractor will conduct these 
activities separately. At the down select point, the program plans to 
evaluate the contractors on the level of technology maturity they 
achieved during the risk reduction phase. 

Other Program Issues: 

The government plans to procure the SDB II based on contractor- 
developed and government-approved system performance specifications, 
which will become contractually binding at down select in 2009. The 
contractor will be accountable for system performance. Accordingly, the 
contractor is responsible not only for the design of the weapon system, 
but also for planning the developmental test and evaluation program to 
verify the system performance. The government will assess the 
contractor's verification efforts for adequacy before three major 
decision points: award of low-rate production contract, declaration 
that the system is ready for dedicated operational test, and award of 
full-rate production after the beyond low rate production assessment. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred 
with the information presented and provided technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Radar (SR): 

SR is an Air Force-led, joint DOD and intelligence community program to 
develop a satellite system to provide persistent, all-weather, day and 
night surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in denied areas. As 
envisioned, SR would generate volumes of radar imagery data for 
transmission to ground-, air-, ship-, and space-based systems. We 
assessed the space segment. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Space Radar Integrated Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co., Northrop Grumman 
Space and Mission Systems Corp. 

Program office: Chantilly, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $10,841.4 million: 

Procurement: $4,878.7 million: 

Total funding: $17,528.5 million: 

Procurement quantity: 8: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 01/2006: $9,605.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $11,305.4; 
Percent change: 17.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 01/2006: $10,110.1; 
Latest 08/2006: $4,878.7; 
Percent change: -51.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 01/2006: $23,326.3; 
Latest 08/2006: $17,992.6; 
Percent change: -22.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 01/2006: $1,060.285; 
Latest 08/2006: $1,799.257; 
Percent change: 69.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 01/2006: 22; 
Latest 08/2006: 10; 
Percent change: -54.6. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 01/2006: TBD; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

Five critical technologies will support the SR program, and they are 
still being matured. The program office is focusing its efforts on 
technology risk reduction and concept definition activities. The Air 
Force has made several changes to the acquisition approach, including 
schedule and cost changes, to address concerns about the affordability 
of SR. The program also recently revised its development start date 
from the last quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2009, an 8-month 
extension. Launch of the first fully operational SR satellite is 
scheduled for fiscal year 2016. Design and production maturity could 
not be assessed because SR has not begun product development. 

Figure: Attainment of product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

SR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office recently revised its critical technologies. It 
assessed the integrated radio frequency assembly, advanced analog/ 
digital converters, surface moving target indication processing 
algorithms, open ocean surveillance processing algorithms, and low 
earth orbit laser communication terminals as the critical technologies 
needing further development. The program office also stated that 
critical technology identification is an ongoing process and that 
technologies could be removed or additional technologies could be added 
as studies, requirements, and performance analyses are further refined. 
The program office expects almost all of the technologies to be mature 
when it begins the product development phase. 

Other Program Issues: 

For fiscal year 2007, the Appropriations Conferees reduced the 
program's requested budget by $80 million. DOD and other SR users have 
created a new path for developing a single space radar system to meet 
user needs. As a result, the Air Force has restructured the program and 
is evaluating the SR schedule and associated costs. The new path 
includes several changes to the SR acquisition approach. First, in 
early 2005, a new Space Radar Integrated Program Office was established 
in Chantilly, Virginia, to work more closely with the intelligence 
community, DOD and other users, senior Air Force leadership, and the 
Congress. Second, the new SR senior leadership established a framework 
with overarching guidance for maturing the critical technologies, 
emphasizing use of more mature and less risky technology in a block 
development approach. For example, the program office recently employed 
this approach by deferring high-risk technologies, such as onboard 
processing and more advanced solar cells and batteries, from the first 
block of satellites to be developed. The program office plans to 
incorporate these technologies as they mature. Third, a team of program 
office personnel and mission partners established a new plan to drive 
fiscal year 2006 risk reduction activities and revised cost estimates. 
Finally, the SR development approach reduced the total number of 
satellites to be acquired from 22 to 10. While this reduction decreases 
recurring costs, it does not decrease research and development costs. 
In fact, with the decrease in total quantity, research and development 
costs are amortized over fewer satellites, resulting in an increase in 
the average unit cost. While DOD and the intelligence community in 
January 2005 committed to pursue a single space radar capability, a 
cost-share agreement between DOD and the intelligence community for 
this effort has yet to be established. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force stated that it 
is still coordinating plans for demonstrating the maturity of one 
technology (advanced analog/digital converters). It has established an 
initial test program but needs to resolve whether or not testing is 
required at a higher level of assembly to meet the standard for 
demonstrating technology maturity. In any case, the program office 
intends to demonstrate adequate maturity for all critical technologies 
before it begins the product development phase. 

[End of section] 

SSN 774 Technology Insertion Program: 

The Navy is seeking to enhance the performance and lower the cost of 
the Virginia class submarine by inserting new technologies, like those 
for electromagnetic signature reduction and sensors for CAVES WAA, and 
improving its production processes and design. The Navy seeks to lower 
the cost of two submarines per year to $2 billion each (2005 dollars) 
by 2012, a reduction of about $400 million. We assessed the maturity of 
the technologies planned for insertion, and discuss some of the design 
and production improvements. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Northrup Grumman Newport News. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics Electric Boat: 

Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $83.4 million: 

Procurement: $556.0 million: 

Total funding: $639.4 million: 

Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $85.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $556.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: $641.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

There is no procurement cost associated with software for 
electromagnetic signature reduction. Procurement costs presented are 
for sensor technologies and, according to program officials, represent 
a $12 million savings over existing sensors. 

[End of table] 

The program office identified three critical technologies for insertion 
into the Virginia-class submarine beginning in 2010, including one 
software package for electromagnetic signature reduction and two 
technologies for sensor arrays. Development start for the array 
technologies occurred in October 2006, while development start for 
software will occur in October 2008. Currently all three technologies 
are immature. The achievement of key product knowledge shown is for the 
sensor technologies. Prior to 2010 the program office is making 
additional changes to the submarine's design and production processes 
to reduce cost or enhance capabilities. According to program officials, 
one of these changes, the introduction of the advanced sail, was 
recently deferred from 2009 to 2014. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

SSN 774 Tech Insertion Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Virginia class submarine program is developing three new 
technologies for insertion into submarines beginning in 2010. The first 
of these is a software package containing improved algorithms to 
monitor and, if necessary, reduce the submarine's electromagnetic 
signature. This software will be installed in submarines under 
construction in 2010 and 2011, SSN-781 through SSN-786, as well as all 
future submarines. Program officials state that after the software is 
installed, at-sea testing and calibration are required to ensure full 
functionality. Similar software has been demonstrated in British 
submarines, but due to alterations and additional testing needed for 
use with Virginia-class submarines, the software is considered 
immature. The other two technologies selected for insertion will be 
integrated to form the conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture 
array (CAVES WAA), a sensor designed to replace existing systems and 
lower the cost of construction while maintaining or improving 
performance. The two technologies, fiber optic sensors and the 
integrated panels that contain the sensors and manage their signature, 
are both immature. Currently rough models of both technologies are 
being tested in a laboratory environment. If the fiber optic sensors do 
not develop as expected, a more mature ceramic sensor may be used to 
preserve cost savings and performance. If both technologies encounter 
difficulties in development, the program will continue to use the 
existing systems. 

Design Stability: 

While the program office will track the stability of design for these 
new technologies, it will use metrics other than the engineering 
drawings. In addition to these new technologies, the program office 
will introduce a series of design changes beginning with the submarine 
authorized for construction in 2008. Redesign could include anything 
from new lighting systems to replacing the front section of the 
submarine. The program office is also investigating replacing some 
hydraulic systems with lower-cost electric systems and simplifying 
other components like the propulsion lubrication system. Eventually the 
program office hopes to achieve savings of $100 million per submarine 
by 2012 through changes to technology and design. 

According to program officials, one of these design changes, the 
introduction of the advanced sail, was recently deferred from 2009 
until 2014 to allow further design development and risk reduction. Near 
term funding for this effort has been reallocated to take advantage of 
other cost reduction opportunities. When implemented, this design 
change will replace the existing sail, the structure that sits atop the 
main body of the submarine, with one that provides expanded space for 
sensor systems or equipment for special forces teams. The advanced sail 
will be constructed of composite materials whose feasibility has 
already been demonstrated under a separate development program. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy is also attempting to reduce cost in the Virginia-class 
submarine program by improving production processes. The program office 
seeks to reduce construction time by up to 24 months through 
improvements to construction efficiency. Some of the methods proposed 
include increasing the size and weight of the sections of the submarine 
while decreasing the number of sections produced, installing more 
equipment in the sections prior to assembling them, and performing hull 
treatments prior to delivery. These changes will be assisted by the 
construction of new, more efficient equipment and facilities at the 
shipyards, an initiative funded by the Navy and enabled by contract 
incentives. The Navy anticipates per-submarine savings of $65 million 
to $110 million through these initiatives, but acknowledges the 
significant increase in maturity of construction processes required to 
achieve these savings. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The 
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built 
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch 
these satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the 
context of the missile defense system. MDA is also studying 
improvements to the STSS program, and it will be building next- 
generation satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: STSS Program Brief. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology: 

Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $3,186.3 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $3,186.3 million: 

Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2004: $3,461.2; 
Latest 02/2006: $4,682.9; 
Percent change: 35.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2004: $0.0; 
Latest 02/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2004: $3,461.2; 
Latest 02/2006: $4,682.9; 
Percent change: 35.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2004: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2004: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2004: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009 for all parts of STSS--Blocks 2006, 
2008, 2010, and 2012. Total known program cost through fiscal year 2011 
is $6,366.4 million. 

[End of table] 

All of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature. The 
STSS design appears otherwise stable, with all drawings released to 
manufacturing. Both satellites' acquisition and tracking sensors, which 
are the satellites' payloads, were delivered in 2006. However, 
continuing quality and workmanship problems with the first satellite's 
payload as well as space vehicle integration and test issues, according 
to MDA, caused the contractor to overrun its fiscal year 2006 budget 
and experience schedule delays. This and a funding reduction have 
caused a 5-month slip in the launch date for the demonstration 
satellites. The launch is now scheduled for December 2007. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

STSS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five critical technologies--satellite communication cross-links, 
onboard processor, acquisition sensor, track sensor, and the single- 
stage cryocooler--are mature. The last two technologies--track sensor 
and the single-stage cryocooler--reached maturity when the thermal 
vacuum testing on the first satellite's payload was completed in 
February 2006. 

Design Stability: 

The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to 
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings 
and the satellite components for the partially built satellites from 
the Space Based Infrared System Low effort were released to 
manufacturing. By the time STSS went through its design review in 
November 2003, the program office had released all subsequent design 
drawings. 

Other Program Issues: 

The payload for the first satellite was delivered on February 28, 2006, 
and has been integrated onto the satellite. The second satellite's 
payload completed thermal vacuum testing and was delivered on December 
19, 2006. The payload was supposed to be delivered in August 2006, but 
an issue surfaced with higher than expected friction on the elevation 
gimbal that restricted movement of the track sensor to above-the- 
horizon viewing. This was resolved and a full range of motion was 
demonstrated in a thermal vacuum test. The STSS ground segment 
activities have progressed well. The first part of the ground 
acceptance test was successfully completed, and the last part is 
expected to be conducted in January 2007. In addition, the ground 
segment operations and training-related materials have been turned over 
to system test personnel. 

The program experienced quality and workmanship problems with its 
payload subcontractor over the past several years, particularly with 
the first satellite's payload. More recently, the prime contractor 
tightened its inspection and supervision of the subcontractor's 
processes, and an education effort was undertaken to ensure that all 
personnel on the program knew and understood the program instructions. 
The subcontractor's performance with respect to the payload for the 
second satellite improved significantly as a result of these more 
recent actions. 

The program office is in the process of negotiating a contract change 
that will move the contract launch date from July 2007 to December 
2007. There are two reasons for the change in contract and forecast 
launch date. First, the program office directed additional testing of 
the first satellite's track sensor and a second thermal vacuum test of 
its payload because the test data from the original tests were 
ambiguous. The tests added a couple of months to the program schedule. 
Second, MDA received a $200 million funding cut that placed the STSS 
program under tight financial restrictions in fiscal year 2006, 
allowing no funds for contingencies and forcing the program office to 
push some work into fiscal year 2007. The program was unable to shift 
the deferred work into fiscal year 2007 and still make the July 2007 
launch date. Thus, the program office expects that the two 
demonstration satellites will be launched in December 2007. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend 
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will 
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and 
communications system. We assessed the design for the Block 2008 
initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to hand off to the 
Army in fiscal year 2009 for limited operational use. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: THAAD Project Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin: 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding FY07-FY11: 

R&D: $3,279.8 million: 

Procurement: $0.0 million: 

Total funding: $3,279.8 million: 

Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 01/2006: $12,309.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $12,455.0; 
Percent change: 1.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 01/2006: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2006: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 01/2006: $12,309.7; 
Latest 08/2006: $12,455.0; 
Percent change: 1.2. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 01/2006: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 01/2006: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 01/2006: NA; 
Latest 08/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through 
fiscal year 2011 is $13,432.3. 

[End of table] 

Program officials assessed THAAD's technologies as mature and its 
design as generally stable, with 93 percent of its design drawings 
released. During Block 2006, the program is continuing to mature 
THAAD's design and expects to deliver a limited operational capability 
during Block 2008. In fiscal year 2006, the program successfully 
conducted three of five scheduled tests. One of the tests that was not 
successfully completed was Flight Test 4. During this test, the target 
malfunctioned, causing program officials to call this a "no test." The 
program does not plan to conduct this test at a later date. Rather, the 
objectives of this test will be rolled into a later flight test, 
allowing the program to gain the knowledge, but at a later date. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

THAAD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials assessed all of THAAD's critical technologies as 
mature. All of these technologies are included in four major 
components: the fire control and communications component; the 
interceptor; the launcher; and the radar. 

Program officials made changes in the execution of the THAAD program 
that allowed it to make progress in maturing critical technologies. 
Officials placed more emphasis on risk reduction efforts, including 
adopting technology readiness levels to assess technological maturity. 

Design Stability: 

THAAD's basic design is nearing completion with approximately 93 
percent of the 13,010 drawings expected to be available at the start of 
production. The number of drawings increased from the approximately 
9,850 reported last year primarily due to design changes that testing 
identified as being needed. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because the program is 
only delivering test units until fiscal year 2009. MDA plans to 
purchase two fire units while simultaneously conducting developmental 
activities. The first will be delivered in fiscal year 2009, with a 
second expected to become available during fiscal year 2010. Prior to a 
production decision, the program office plans to assess production 
maturity using risk assessments and verification reviews for assurance 
of the contractor's readiness to proceed with repeatable processes and 
quality. 

Other Program Issues: 

THAAD officials expected to complete five flight tests prior to the end 
of fiscal year 2006 but were only able to conduct four tests. During 
flight tests 1 and 2 program officials demonstrated missile 
performance, divert attitude control system operations, and kill 
vehicle control. While conducting integrated system flight test 3, the 
seeker demonstrated the ability to locate a target in the high endo- 
atmosphere--the primary objective of the test--and successfully 
intercepted a target. During flight test 4--which was scheduled to be 
the program's first objective intercept attempt--the target 
malfunctioned shortly after launch and forced program officials to 
destroy the target. As a result of the malfunction, program officials 
were forced to declare flight test 4 a "no-test." Program officials are 
planning to add the objectives from flight test 4 into a later flight 
test, which will allow them to gain the knowledge they initially 
planned on receiving from this test at a later date. 

Additionally, hardware issues and technical problems are causing the 
program's prime contractor to experience negative cost and schedule 
variances. The variances can primarily be attributed to the missile, 
launcher, and THAAD fire control and communications components. As of 
September 30, 2006 the THAAD program was behind schedule in completing 
$38.2 million of fiscal year 2006 work and overrunning its fiscal year 
2006 cost budget by $89.2 million. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

The Air Force's TSAT system is the spaceborne element of the Global 
Information Grid that will provide high data rate military satellite 
communications services to DOD users. The system is designed to provide 
survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose radio 
frequency and laser cross-links with other air and space systems. The 
TSAT system will consist of a constellation of five satellites, plus a 
sixth satellite to ensure mission availability. We assessed the six 
satellites. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source; TSAT Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: SE&I: Booz Allen Hamilton, TMOS: Lockheed Martin 
Integrated Systems Solutions: 

Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $11,931.2 million: 

Procurement: $3,948.4 million: 

Total funding: $15,906.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 4: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/2007: $13,740.0; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/2007: $3,948.4; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/2007: $17,715.7; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/2007: $2,952.6; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/2007: 6; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/2007: 147; 
Latest 08/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

The above data reflects costs and quantities as of the 2006 assessment; 
latest figures on cost and quantities are unavailable. 

[End of table] 

Since our last assessment, DOD rescinded the approval to begin 
preliminary design activities and restructured the TSAT program 
strategy to align program activity with the December 2004 National 
Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 into an incremental development 
approach. Each increment will incorporate available mature technology 
to lower program risk and improve confidence in launching TSAT 
satellites according to schedule. DOD also directed the Air Force to 
ensure that all critical technologies are mature and Systems Design 
Review is complete prior to seeking preliminary design development 
approval for the space segment. According to program officials, a new 
acquisition strategy is being developed, which will result in a new 
program baseline. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

TSAT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

In June 2006, DOD rescinded the prior approval for TSAT to enter the 
preliminary design phase to align the program with current national 
security space acquisition policy. The program is now in the concept 
development phase. Currently, four of the program's seven technologies 
are mature. 

Of the seven technologies, four technologies--packet processing 
payload, communication-on-the-move antenna, information assurance space 
for internet protocol encryption and information-assurance for 
transmission security--are mature. The other three--dynamic bandwidth 
and resource allocation, protected bandwidth efficient modulation 
waveforms, and single access laser communication--are scheduled to 
reach maturity before development start, currently scheduled for April 
2007. All of the technologies are needed to be mature prior to entering 
the preliminary design phase again. 

The wide-field of view multi-access laser communication technology was 
part of the original TSAT baseline program. However, it is no longer 
part of the baseline due to the lower risk incremental approach. The 
program is currently budgeting $16.7 million for maturation of this 
technology which could be inserted into future increments, according to 
the program office. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, the TSAT program has spent about $1 
billion to date. However, given that the program is in the concept 
development phase, information on cost, design stability, production 
maturity, or software development for satellite production is not yet 
available. According to DOD officials, a request for proposals for the 
space segment is expected to be released in May 2007, and the contract 
is expected to be awarded in December 2007. 

The program awarded a contract in January 2006 to develop the TSAT 
Mission Operations System (TMOS) that will provide network management, 
and to develop the overall network architecture. The program awarded 
this contract first to allow the competing space contractors to focus 
their satellite designs on a single architecture and mission operations 
system, thereby reducing program complexity. According to the TSAT 
program office, TMOS will include software development that will take 
place in four increments, with a projected 5.2 million total lines of 
code in the final system. 

The June 2004 program baseline showed a first satellite launch 
scheduled for October 2011. The date was later moved to October 2013, 
and then to September 2014, due to TSAT appropriations reductions in 
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, according to the program office. Congress 
made these reductions due to concerns about the maturity of critical 
technologies and an aggressive acquisition schedule. Congress continues 
to express concerns about the program. For fiscal year 2007, the 
Appropriations conferees reduced the program's requested budget by $130 
million. According to the program office, the initial launch date is 
now October 2014 due to the latest reduction. While encouraged by 
changes to the program's acquisition strategy, the Senate 
Appropriations Committee noted that even with reduced funding, the 
program budget was still significantly higher than the prior year. The 
committee stated that excessive cost growth across a short time span 
facilitates inefficiencies that can create future program management 
and cost overrun problems. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor aircraft developed by the Navy for 
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy use. As of fiscal year 2006, 85 
Marine Corps MV-22s and 7 Air Force CV-22s were procured. The MV-22 
will replace the Marine Corps CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters. There 
currently are two versions of the MV-22, the Block A, which 
incorporates safety-related changes, and Block B, which is built upon 
the Block A to provide enhanced maintainability. We assessed Block A 
but have comments concerning Block B, the version that will be 
deployed. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: V-22 Joint Program office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO: 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $821.7 million: 

Procurement: $25,848.8 million: 

Total funding: $26,860.5 million: 

Procurement quantity: 364: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/1986: $3,904.3; 
Latest 12/2005: $12,082.0; 
Percent change: 209.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/1986: $32,741.8; 
Latest 12/2005: $37,640.9; 
Percent change: 15.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/1986: $36,863.7; 
Latest 12/2005: $49,974.1; 
Percent change: 35.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/1986: $40.376; 
Latest 12/2005: $109.114; 
Percent change: 170.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/1986: 913; 
Latest 12/2005: 458; 
Percent change: -49.8. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/1986: 117; 
Latest 12/2005: 293; 
Percent change: 150.4. 

[End of table] 

While the design of Block A is considered stable, Block A will not be 
deployed in combat. Design stability of Block B--the deployed 
configuration--will be better known after its limited operational 
assessment in late 2007. Design changes are possible in order to 
address any deficiencies identified during this test and those 
identified during prior Block A tests as well as to lower production 
costs, and to field future upgrades. Fuselage structural design changes 
are possible if improved troop seat crash retention capability is 
directed. The current budget reinstated a funding shortfall from last 
year's budget submittal, and as a result, adequate funding to fully 
procure 185 aircraft exists. However, a bearing defect has been found 
in some critical assemblies of production aircraft and is being 
addressed. 

Figure: Attainment of product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

V-22 Program: 

Design Stability: 

The design of the MV-22 Block A is considered stable and mature. The 
Block B version, which will be the deployed version, is built upon the 
Block A to provide enhanced maintainability. Its maturity will be 
better known after operational tests planned prior to its initial 
operational capability in September 2007. Further design changes to 
Block B may be needed to address deficiencies identified during this 
assessment and the 2005 operational tests of Block A, to lower the 
production cost, and to field future upgrades. 

The Navy desires to increase the crashworthiness capability of the 
troop seat and fuselage structure above the current specification 
requirements. A new improved troop seat has been purchased for the V-22 
aircraft, a medium risk has been accepted for the new troop seat 
installation with the current fuselage structure, and the program is 
evaluating engineering change alternatives to add crashworthiness 
capability to the fuselage structure to further enhance crashworthiness 
capability. Improved troop seats may, in some crash conditions, impart 
higher loads into the airframe than originally intended due to new 
higher qualification standards. 

According to program officials, engineering change proposals may be 
used to lower unit recurring flyaway cost to a level contractors 
believe is needed to generate foreign military sales of the aircraft. 
The government has invested and intends additional investments in cost 
reduction. At an initial meeting program officials stated that on cost 
type contracts most engineering change proposals are usually done at 
the government's expense even if the change is within the scope of the 
contract. However, when providing written technical comments the 
program office stated that the contractor has made and continues to 
make corporate investments as well to drive recurring flyaway costs 
down. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because statistical process 
control data were not available. In September 2005, DOD approved the V- 
22 for full-rate production after conducting a production readiness 
review. The review identified program management, production 
engineering and planning, and material and procured parts as high-risk 
areas requiring intense management attention. A number of initiatives 
were proposed to reduce these risks including the approval of a multi- 
year procurement contract in order to achieve a low product cost--one 
of the components of the high program management risk areas. Congress 
recently authorized the program to enter into a multiyear procurement 
contract. Initially program officials did not believe they could buy 
the number of aircraft proposed in the multi-year justification because 
of a reduction in program funding levels. This reduction was the result 
of the milestone decision authority adopting a lower independent cost 
estimate than the program estimate. However, according to the Navy, the 
current budget reinstated the funding shortfall from last year's budget 
submittal and adequate funding exists to fully procure the 185 aircraft 
in the multiyear buy. 

Production aircraft continue to be accepted with numerous deviations 
and waivers. Program officials stated that this practice will continue 
due to the time needed to address these items. Analysis of the 
acceptance documentation for the latest three aircraft delivered before 
November 2006, revealed several potentially serious defects such as the 
aircraft being conditionally accepted with bearing assemblies that 
contain a thin dense chrome plating/coating that did not meet contract 
requirements for two assemblies inside the proprotor gearbox. One of 
these assemblies is in a critical area. Program officials state that 
this deficiency has been addressed by (1) stripping chrome plating from 
bearings and replating in accordance with improved manufacturing 
processes, and (2) qualifying newly manufactured bearings for use 
without the chrome plating. Program officials state that these bearing 
assemblies may not meet the contract requirements in two critical 
assemblies. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Navy provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program: 

The Navy's VH-71 will be a dual-piloted, multi-engine, helicopter 
employed by Marine Helicopter Squadron One to provide safe, reliable, 
and timely transportation for the President and Vice President of the 
United States, heads of state, and others in varied and at times 
adverse climatic and weather conditions. When the President is aboard, 
the VH-71 will serve as the Commander in Chief's primary command and 
control platform. The system will replace the VH-3D and VH-60N. It will 
be developed in two increments. We assessed increment one. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: Presidential Helicopters Program office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration: 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $1,994.0 million: 

Procurement: $2,332.3 million: 

Total funding: $4,337.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 15: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: $3,703.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: $2,332.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: $6,210.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: $270.001; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: 23; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest 02/2006: 57; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program costs include costs for increments one and two. Increment one 
and two development and increment one production are funded with 
research and development funding. 

[End of table] 

In January 2005, the VH-71 program began system development and 
committed to production without fully maturing technologies, achieving 
design stability, or demonstrating production maturity due to an 
aggressive high-risk schedule driven by White House needs. The program 
is approaching technology maturity and design stability for increment 
one. However, this design may not be useable to meet increment two 
performance requirements. The range requirement in the prime contract 
was reduced because the estimated weight of the aircraft is over 1,200 
pounds more than the original limit. The program is also reassessing 
the requirements for increment two and considering cost, schedule, and 
performance trade-offs because the current program may not be 
executable. Concurrency in development, design, and production 
continues to put the program at risk for cost growth and schedule 
delays. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

VH-71 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The VH-71 program's two critical technologies were nearing maturity 
when the program began development and committed to production in 
January 2005. Since then, one of those technologies, the 10-inch 
cockpit control displays, matured. A prototype of the other critical 
technology, the Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded 
Resource Communications Controller, is not projected to be demonstrated 
in a realistic environment until 2007. The program's design review and 
ongoing technology readiness assessment efforts identified no 
significant technology risk for increment one. The critical 
technologies for increment two have not been identified. The program is 
reassessing the requirements for increment two and considering cost, 
schedule, and performance trade-offs because it may not be affordable 
and executable within the current program schedule. 

Design Stability and Production Maturity: 

In January 2005, the VH-71 program committed to the production of five 
aircraft without a final design or fully defined production processes. 
The program's August 2006 design review was held ten months later than 
planned and did not meet the Navy's criteria for a successful system- 
level review. An additional design review is planned for February 2007. 
In August 2006, 87 percent of the program's drawings were releasable to 
manufacturing with the remaining drawings primarily related to 
installation. The program obtained customer agreement to reduce the 
range requirement in the prime contract and is working to stabilize the 
weight of the aircraft. The program also obtained customer agreement to 
defer several other requirements to increment two, including those 
related to the auxiliary power unit and rotor track and balance 
technology. 

Concurrency in development, design, and production continues to drive 
the risk of cost growth and schedule delays on the program. Design 
development will continue through low-rate initial production as the 
program concurrently develops its manufacturing processes, increasing 
the likelihood that components being procured may have to be reworked 
to meet the final design. The program will not collect statistical 
process control data to demonstrate production maturity, but it will 
monitor indicators, such as number of non-conforming products, quality 
notifications, hours per process, and scrap and rework rates. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program officials told us that the five increment one aircraft will 
have a limited service life and its design may not be usable for 
increment two. Changes to the main gear box, drive train, engines, tail 
unit, and main rotor blades are required to meet increment two 
performance requirements. Program officials anticipate that five 
additional increment two aircraft will be produced to support full 
operational capability in 2015 rather than modifying increment one 
aircraft to the increment two configuration. This scenario is included 
in the program's overall cost. 

Earned value data show a potential increase of $341 million or 18 
percent, in the estimated cost to complete the current prime contract. 
While the program indicates that this increase is supported by its 
current budget, there is the potential for future program cost 
increases as the program reexamines requirements, schedules, and costs 
for increment two. The magnitude of any cost increase will likely not 
be known until after DOD's 2008 budget is submitted. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy concurred with 
the information provided in this report. 

[End of section] 

Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): 

The Army expects its Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft 
System, Warrior, to fill what it terms a capability gap for an unmanned 
aircraft system at the division level. A Warrior system will include 12 
aircraft, ground control stations, ground and air data terminals, 
automatic take-off and landing systems, and ground support equipment. 
The Army plans for Warrior to operate alone or with other platforms 
such as the Apache helicopter and perform missions including 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition and attack. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: UAVS Project Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Atomics: 

Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $229.4 million: 

Procurement: $1,440.2 million: 

Total funding: $1,669.6 million: 

Procurement quantity: 11: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/2005: $317.0; 
Latest 11/2006: $384.8; 
Percent change: 21.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/2005: $616.3; 
Latest 11/2006: $1,440.2; 
Percent change: 133.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/2005: $933.3; 
Latest 11/2006: $1,825.0; 
Percent change: 95.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/2005: $186.668; 
Latest 11/2006: $152.085; 
Percent change: -18.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/2005: 5; 
Latest 11/2006: 12; 
Percent change: 140.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/2005: 50; 
Latest 11/2006: 59; 
Percent change: 18.0. 

Costs and quantities shown are from program inception through fiscal 
year 2015. The Army has not yet decided on quantities beyond 2015. 

[End of table] 

Currently, two of Warrior's four critical technologies are mature. 
Although the remaining two technologies were immature in early 2006, 
the Army reports that they were nearing maturity as of the design 
review in late 2006. The Army anticipates that they will be mature by 
the time of the Warrior production start, currently scheduled for 
August 2008. While there are backup technologies available for both if 
they do not mature as the Army expects, these backups would result in a 
less capable Warrior system than the Army originally planned. The 
program office indicated that about 92 percent of the Warrior design 
drawings were released to manufacturing as of the design review. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Warrior UAS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Two of Warrior's four critical technologies--the heavy fuel engine and 
the automatic takeoff and landing system--are considered to be mature. 
According to the program office, representative configurations of these 
two technologies have been integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. 
However, there is still some risk because neither the engine nor the 
complete takeoff and landing system have been integrated onto an 
unmanned aircraft using exactly the same configuration as planned for 
Warrior. Further, the Army reported that the engine requires some 
additional modification in order to perform at the flight altitudes 
planned for Warrior. 

The two remaining critical technologies--the airborne ethernet and the 
multi-role tactical common data link--were not mature at the time the 
Army awarded the Warrior system development and demonstration contract 
in August 2005 and remained immature in early 2006. As of the design 
review in late 2006, the Army reported that they are nearing maturity 
and expects they will be fully mature by the time of the production 
start planned for August 2008. The airborne ethernet is expected to 
provide real-time communications capabilities among Warrior's internal 
aircraft components, including the avionics, payloads, and weapons. 
Similarly, the multirole tactical common data link is being developed 
to provide communications between Warrior aircraft and ground control 
stations as well as interoperability with other Army aviation 
platforms. While the contractor has integrated an airborne ethernet 
into an unmanned aircraft, neither it nor the data link has been 
integrated onto an unmanned aircraft exactly as they are to be used on 
Warrior. 

The Army has technologies in place as backups for the ethernet and data 
link, but these technologies would result in a less capable system than 
the Army originally planned. In particular, the backups for the data 
link suffer from slower data transmission rates or are not yet mature. 

Design Stability: 

The Warrior program office stated that about 92 percent of the design 
drawings were released to manufacturing as of the design readiness 
review. In last year's assessment, the Army anticipated that the review 
would occur in June 2006. However, the review slipped until late 2006 
as a result of the Army's decision to field an early model of the 
Warrior, known as Block 0. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess Warrior's production maturity because the Warrior 
contractor does not use statistical process control as its metric. 
Instead, the contractor employs global technology standards per the 
International Standards Organization as its method for monitoring, 
controlling, and improving processes. The Warrior program office stated 
that this approach is acceptable to the Army because Warrior production 
is relatively low-volume and the contractor generally employs nearly 
100 percent testing of all critical items. Since May 2006, Warrior's 
low-rate and full-rate production decision dates both have slipped by 
about 3 months due to the Army's decision to field the Block 0 version 
of Warrior. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army expects to buy 1 developmental system with 17 aircraft and 11 
complete production systems with a total of 132 production aircraft 
through 2015. However, the Army has not yet decided on the number of 
systems it might buy beyond that date. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided updated 
program information as well as technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. The program office also provided a more 
detailed description of the Warrior's planned capabilities and roles, 
including information on such characteristics as the aircraft system's 
control by division commander, payload flexibility, communications 
relay capability, ability to change missions in flight, and operation 
and maintenance by soldiers. 

[End of section] 

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS): 

WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential 
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition 
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the 
next generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite 
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal 
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and 
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: WGA Program Office. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Development Center: 

Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $30.6 million: 

Procurement: $890.3 million: 

Total funding: $920.9 million: 

Procurement quantity: 2: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2000: $196.6; 
Latest 12/2005: $332.7; 
Percent change: 69.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2000: $899.8; 
Latest 12/2005: $1,680.5; 
Percent change: 86.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2000: $1,096.4; 
Latest 12/2005: $2,013.2; 
Percent change: 83.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2000: $365.466; 
Latest 12/2005: $402.639; 
Percent change: 10.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2000: 3; 
Latest 12/2005: 5; 
Percent change: 66.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2000: 50; 
Latest 12/2005: 93; 
Percent change: 86.0. 

[End of table] 

The WGS program's technology and design are mature. We did not review 
production maturity data because of the commercial nature of the WGS 
acquisition contract, but unit-level manufacturing for WGS is complete. 
The program made progress in integrating and testing the first 
satellite, which is to be launched in June 2007. For example, rework on 
improperly installed fasteners is complete, contractors have redesigned 
computers to rectify data transmission errors, and environmental tests 
were successful. The Air Force is considering a three-block approach 
for WGS. Block 1 includes the first three satellites. Block 2 includes 
two satellites, with an unfunded option for a third satellite, which 
will transfer data at higher rates than those in the initial block. The 
Air Force has awarded a $1.07 billion contract for the Block 2 
satellites and has begun studying the possibility of a WGS Block 3. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

WGS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

WGS has two technologies that are vital to program success: the digital 
channelizer and the phased array antenna. According to program 
officials, both technologies were mature when the program made a 
production decision in November 2000. 

Design Stability: 

The design for WGS is mature, as the program office has released all 
the expected drawings to manufacturing. Each of the initial three 
satellites is at some level of assembly, integration, or testing. 

Production Maturity: 

The commercial nature of the WGS acquisition contract precludes the 
program office from having access to production process control data. 
Manufacturing processes for WGS are complete, as all units for the 
first satellite have been delivered. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program made progress in integrating and testing the first 
satellite. For example, rework due to incorrect installation of 
fasteners is complete and the contractors have redesigned computers to 
correct data transmission errors. In addition, no significant problems 
were identified during space-like environmental testing or tests in 
which the contractors shook the satellite to simulate launch conditions 
and demonstrate the quality of workmanship on the satellite. During 
these tests, the program office also conducted low-level signal testing 
associated with satellite launch. Interoperability testing on the first 
satellite was completed in December 2006, in preparation for satellite 
launch, which is still scheduled for June 2007. Satellites 2 and 3 are 
to launch in December 2007 and May 2008, respectively. 

To address DOD's growing communication needs, the Air Force is 
considering a three-block approach for WGS. Block 1 includes the first 
three satellites. Block 2 includes satellites 4 and 5, with an unfunded 
option for satellite 6. These satellites will transfer data at higher 
rates than those in the initial block, and the Air Force has awarded a 
$1.07 billion contract for the three satellites. The Air Force also has 
begun studying the possibility of including enhanced capability in a 
WGS Block 3 for added airborne intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance support. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
in October 2006 it awarded a fixed price incentive fee with firm target 
contract to Boeing Satellite Systems for WGS satellites 4 and 5, with 
an unfunded option for WGS 6. The fourth and fifth satellites will 
complete the currently planned WGS constellation and will be modified 
to provide more capacity for airborne intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance users. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. It is to provide reliable, secure, and seamless 
video, data, imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate 
simultaneously at various levels of security. WIN-T is to connect Army 
units with higher levels of command and provide Army's tactical portion 
of the Global Information Grid. In addition, it will provide key 
communications elements for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS), the 
linchpin of the transformation to a lighter, more capable force. 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: PM WIN-T. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics Government Systems Corp. 

Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 

R&D: $906.1 million: 

Procurement: $10,241.0 million: 

Total funding: $11,147.1 million: 

Procurement quantity: 1: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2003: $781.7; 
Latest 10/2006: $1,260.5; 
Percent change: 61.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2003: $10,054.0; 
Latest 10/2006: $10,341.1; 
Percent change: 2.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2003: $10,835.8; 
Latest 10/2006: $11,601.6; 
Percent change: 7.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2003: $10,835.786; 
Latest 10/2006: $11,601.604; 
Percent change: 7.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2003: 1; 
Latest 10/2006: 1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2003: 78; 
Latest 10/2006: 133; 
Percent change: 70.5. 

This assessment reflects the program of record. Since the conclusion of 
our review, the Army has informed the defense committees that since 
July 2003, WIN-T's program unit cost has grown by approximately 33%, 
triggering a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

[End of table] 

WIN-T is currently being restructured to meet emerging FCS requirements 
and a shift in the Army's funding priorities. The proposed 
restructuring will provide the program with more time to complete 
system development. WIN-T entered system development in August 2003 
with 3 of its 12 critical technologies nearing maturity. According to 
the Army, a November 2005 developmental test/operational test 
demonstrated all of WIN-T's critical technologies in a relevant 
environment. In August, the Army completed a revised technology 
readiness assessment that supports the WIN-T program office's position. 
However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not fully concur 
with this assessment. While design stability is evaluated during WIN- 
T's design reviews, it cannot be assessed using our methodology because 
the program office does not track the number of releasable drawings. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

WIN-T Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies 
close to reaching full maturity. The program office maintains that the 
maturity of these technologies was demonstrated in a relevant 
environment during a November 2005 developmental test/operational test 
event. A March 2006 system assessment, prepared by the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command, concluded that a WIN-T prototype demonstrated the 
potential to provide communications both "on the move" and "at the 
halt" in a limited network. According to WIN-T program office and other 
Army representatives, this test event demonstrates the viability of the 
WIN-T system architecture and progress in maturing WIN-T's critical 
technologies. However, this test was limited in scope, and the system 
assessment report did not explicitly address the extent to which WIN- 
T's critical technologies had matured. In late August, to support WIN- 
T's restructuring, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics and Technology submitted a revised Technology Readiness 
Assessment to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, concurring that 
WIN-T's critical technologies had been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering did not concur with the Army's 
assessment for two of these technologies. In order to gain the 
Director's concurrence, the WIN-T program office is updating data to 
reaffirm its ratings for WIN-T's critical technologies and is 
submitting plans to achieve full technology maturity by the start of 
production. 

Design Stability: 

Design stability could not be assessed because the program office does 
not plan to track the number of releasable drawings as a design metric. 
According to the program, WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but 
primarily an information technology system integration effort. 
Consequently, the government does not obtain releasable design drawings 
for many of WIN-T's components, particularly commercial components. 
Instead, design stability is evaluated at the preliminary and critical 
design reviews using the exit criteria developed by the government. 
According to DOD, the WIN-T design will evolve using performance-based 
specifications and open systems design and is to conform to an 
architecture that specifies the minimum set of standards and guidance 
for the acquisition of all DOD information systems. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army has also taken action to synchronize its FCS networking needs 
and WIN-T's planned capabilities, largely by restructuring the WIN-T 
program. The FCS program office led the Army's development of a study 
that examined ways to better synchronize the Army's communications 
programs, including WIN-T and FCS. The study concluded that the WIN-T 
program needed to make significant changes to both the hardware and 
software items it planned to deliver to FCS. For example, the size, 
weight, and power of the WIN-T elements that are needed to support FCS 
platforms had to be reduced significantly. These requirements were not 
part of the original WIN-T program, and, according to WIN-T program 
office representatives, additional time and funding will be required to 
address these new requirements. During this time, the Army was also 
looking for ways to address shortfalls in funding for high-priority 
items needed to support the Global War on Terrorism. To fund these 
shortfalls, the Army proposed cutting $655 million from WIN-T for 
fiscal years 2007 through 2011, which DOD approved. Recognizing that 
WIN-T could no longer be executed within its established costs and 
schedule, the Army determined that the program needed to be 
restructured. 

The Army's proposed restructuring of WIN-T would extend the program's 
development for about 5 years, and thereby delay the production 
decision from 2006 until 2011. DOD intends to complete a program review 
in the third quarter of fiscal year 2007 for which the Army must 
prepare a revised acquisition strategy, cost estimate, and technology 
assessment. On November 6, 2006, the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council approved the WIN-T Capability Development Document. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Agency Comments: 

DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of this report, but did 
provide technical comments. These comments, along with agency comments 
received on the individual assessments, were included as appropriate. 
(See app. I for a copy of DOD's response). 

Scope of Our Review: 

For the 62 programs, each assessment provides the historical and 
current program status and offers the opportunity to take early 
corrective action when a program's projected attainment of knowledge 
diverges significantly from the best practices. The assessments also 
identify programs that are employing practices worthy of emulation by 
other programs. If a program is attaining the desired levels of 
knowledge, it has less risk--but not zero risk--of future problems. 
Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated knowledge and 
best practices, it indicates an increased risk--not a guarantee--of 
future problems. The real value of the assessments is in recognizing 
gaps early, which provides opportunities for constructive intervention-
-such as adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and 
additional funding--before cost and schedule consequences mount. 

We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors, 
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3) 
congressional interest. The majority of the 62 programs covered in this 
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A 
program is defined as major if its estimated research and development 
costs exceed $365 million or its procurement costs exceed $2.19 billion 
in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Paul L. Francis: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-3000: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 

Mar 07 2007: 

Mr. Paul Francis: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Francis: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report, GAO-
07-406SP, "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs," dated February 9, 2007 (GAO Code 120565). 

We have enclosed technical comments that should be considered as you 
prepare the final report. 

My point of contact is Mr. Skip Hawthorne, 703.692.9556, or e-mail: 
skip.hawthorne@osd.mil. 

Signed by: 

Shay D. Assad: 
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from 
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our 
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system 
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate the 
data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took 
several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the 
data and performed various quality checks, which revealed some 
discrepancies in the data. We discussed the underlying data and these 
discrepancies with program officials and adjusted the data accordingly. 
We determined that the data provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable 
for our engagement purposes after reviewing DOD's management controls 
for assessing data reliability. 

Macro Analysis: 

Data for the total planned investment of major defense acquisition 
programs were obtained from funding stream data included in DOD's 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) or from data obtained directly from 
the program offices and then aggregated across all programs in base 
year 2007 dollars. 

The number of weapon systems in development for the 2003 and 2007 
assessment periods encompasses all programs with SARs on December 31, 
2001, (2003 assessment period) and December 31, 2005, (2007 assessment 
period) with the exception of the Ballistic Missile Defense System and 
the Chemical Demilitarization programs. 

The data presented in figure 2 on page 6 were obtained from table 6-1 
"Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority by Title, Constant 
fiscal year 2007 Dollars" in the National Defense Budget Estimates for 
fiscal year 2007. Likewise, the data presented in table 2 were drawn 
from table 6-1, "Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority by 
Title, Constant fiscal year 2007 Dollars" in the National Defense 
Budget Estimates for fiscal year 2007. The average annual real growth 
rate was calculated using the compound annual growth rate formula. 

To assess the total cost growth of major weapon systems between 2004 
and 2007 presented on page 8, we identified the common set of 64 major 
defense acquisition programs since 2004, with the exception of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System and the Chemical Demilitarization 
programs. Figures for the total cost of these programs were obtained 
from funding stream data included in SARs or from data acquired 
directly from the program offices, and then aggregated across all 
programs in base year 2007 dollars for the 2004 and 2007 assessment 
periods. To calculate the average annual rate of cost growth for this 
common set of programs, we applied the compound annual growth rate 
formula using the total funding data points for assessment periods 2004 
and 2007. 

To assess the total cost, schedule, and quantity changes of the 
programs included in our assessment presented in table 3 and on page 9, 
it was necessary to identify those programs with all of the requisite 
data available. Of the 62 programs in our assessment, 27 constituted 
the common set of programs where data were available for cost, 
schedule, and quantity at the first full estimate, generally milestone 
B, and the latest estimate. We excluded programs that had planning 
estimates as their first full estimate and if the first full estimate 
and latest estimate fell within a 1-year period of each other. Data 
utilized in this analysis were drawn from information contained in SARs 
or data provided by program offices as of January 15, 2007. We summed 
the costs associated with research, development, test and evaluation 
(RDT&E) and total costs consisting of RDT&E, procurement, military 
construction, and acquisition operation and maintenance. The schedule 
assessment is based on the change in the average acquisition cycle 
time, defined as the number of months between program start and the 
achievement of initial operation capability or an equivalent fielding 
date. 

The weighted calculations of acquisition cycle time and program 
acquisition unit cost for the common set of programs were derived by 
taking the total cost estimate for each of the 27 programs and dividing 
it by the aggregate total cost of all 27 programs in the common set. 
The resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the 
simple percentage change in program acquisition unit costs to obtain 
the weighted unit cost change of each program. Next, the sum of this 
weighted cost change for all programs was calculated to get the 
weighted unit cost change for the common set as a whole. To assess the 
weighted average acquisition cycle time change, we multiplied the 
weight calculation by the acquisition cycle time estimate for each 
corresponding program. A simple average was then taken to calculate the 
change between the first full estimate and the latest estimate. We 
believe these calculations best represent the overall progress of 
programs by placing them within the context of the common set's 
aggregate cost. 

To assess the percentage of programs with technology maturity, design 
stability, and production maturity at each key juncture presented in 
figure 3 and figure 5 and on pages 14 and 17, we identified programs 
that had actually proceeded through each key juncture--development 
start, system design review, and production start--and obtained their 
assessed maturity. The percentages in figures 3, 4, and 5 on pages 14, 
15, and 17 include programs in the 2007 assessment only. The population 
size for the technology maturity at development start is 37 programs, 
design review is 25 programs, and production start is 18 programs. The 
population size for the design stability at design review is 22 
programs, and 12 programs at production start. The population size for 
production maturity at production start is 20 programs. This 
information was drawn from data provided by the program office as of 
January 15, 2007. For more information, see the product knowledge 
assessment section in this appendix. 

Data on the date each program plans to conduct development tests of a 
production representative article (i.e., prototype) was obtained from 
program offices, and was then compared to the scheduled production 
decision. The population size for this analysis is 32 programs. 

System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

In the past 6 years, DOD has revised its policies governing weapon 
system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major 
acquisition events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more 
consistent across the 62 program assessments, we standardized the 
terminology for key program events. In the individual program 
assessments, "program start" refers to the initiation of a program; DOD 
usually refers to program start as milestone I or milestone A, which 
begins the concept and technology development phase. Similarly, 
"development start" refers to the commitment to system development that 
coincides with either milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's 
system development and demonstration phase. The "production decision" 
generally refers to the decision to enter the production and deployment 
phase, typically with low-rate initial production. Initial capability 
refers to the initial operational capability, sometimes also called 
first unit equipped or required asset availability. For shipbuilding 
programs, the schedule of key program events in relation to milestones 
varies for each individual program. Our assessments of shipbuilding 
programs report key program events as determined by each program's 
individual strategy. For the Missile Defense Agency programs that do 
not follow the standard Department of Defense acquisition model, but 
instead develop systems in incremental capability-based blocks, we 
identified the key technology development efforts that lead to an 
initial capability for the block assessed. 

The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal 
year 2007 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on 
information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some 
instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the 
term "to be determined" (TBD), or "not applicable," annotated (NA). The 
quantities listed refer only to procurement quantities. Satellite 
programs, in particular, produce a large percentage of their total 
operational units as development quantities, which are not included in 
the quantity figure. 

To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we 
reviewed DOD's SARs or obtained data directly from the program offices. 
In general, we compared the latest available SAR information with a 
baseline for each program. For programs that have started product 
development--those that are beyond milestone II or B--we compared the 
latest available SAR to the development estimate from the first 
selected acquisition report issued after the program was approved to 
enter development. For systems that have not yet started system 
development, we compared the latest available data to the planning 
estimate issued after milestone I or A. For systems not included in 
SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and current data from 
the individual program offices. For MDA systems for which a baseline 
was not available, we compared the latest available cost information to 
the amount reported last year. 

All cost information is presented in base year 2007 dollars using 
Office of the Secretary of Defense-approved deflators to eliminate the 
effects of inflation. We have depicted only the programs' main elements 
of acquisition cost--research and development and procurement. However, 
the total program costs also include military construction and 
acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of rounding and 
these additional costs, in some situations the total cost may not match 
the exact sum of the research and development and procurement costs. 
The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program 
cost by the total quantities planned. These costs are often referred to 
as program acquisition unit costs. In some instances, the data were not 
applicable, and we annotate this by using the term "NA." In other 
instances, the current absence of data on procurement funding and 
quantities precludes calculation of a meaningful program acquisition 
unit cost, and we annotate this by using the term "TBD." The quantities 
listed refer to total quantities, including both procurement and 
development quantities. 

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as 
the number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or 
A, and the achievement of initial operational capability or an 
equivalent fielding date. In some instances, the data were not yet 
available, and we annotate this by using the term "TBD," or were 
classified. 

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall 
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum 
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those 
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of 
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with 
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such 
detailed distinctions. 

Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key 
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to 
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each two- 
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such 
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program 
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a 
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed 
technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force science and 
technology research organizations use them to determine when 
technologies are ready to be handed off from science and technology 
managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels are 
measured on a scale of 1 to 9, beginning with paper studies of a 
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully 
integrated into a completed product. (See app. III for the definitions 
of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work has shown that 
a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in a 
realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity that 
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. In 
our assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness 
level 7, a prototype demonstrated in a realistic environment, are 
referred to as mature or fully mature and those that have reached 
technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant 
environment, are referred to as approaching or nearing maturity and are 
assessed as attaining 50 percent of the desired level of knowledge. 
Satellite technologies that have achieved technology readiness level 6 
are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating 
maturity in an operational environment--space. 

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of 
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of 
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those 
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to 
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies 
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always 
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system 
at key decision points after the passage of many years. 

To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our 
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the 
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We 
sought to clarify the percentage of drawings completed in those cases 
where information existed that raised concerns. Completed engineering 
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed 
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build-to" 
drawings. 

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify 
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to 
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those 
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate this 
information provided by the program office. We sought to clarify the 
number of critical manufacturing processes and percentage of 
statistical process control where information existed that raised 
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which 
is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a 
process is running to its specification limits. The index can be 
translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it 
to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework 
trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were 
unavailable. 

Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential 
risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a 
program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our 
detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller 
treatment of risk elements. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III:  Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology Readiness Level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties; 
Hardware Software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology Readiness Level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware Software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology Readiness Level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware Software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale 
individual components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology Readiness Level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" 
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware Software: Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale 
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or 
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach 
suitable for flight articles; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology Readiness Level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a 
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory 
integration of components; 
Hardware Software: High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent 
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size, weight, materials, etc.) 
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of 
several components with reasonably realistic support 
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form 
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology Readiness Level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment; 
Hardware Software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit, and 
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and 
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/ 
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. Integration 
of technology is well defined. 

Technology Readiness Level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a 
realistic environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in 
a test bed aircraft; 
Hardware Software: Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate 
full functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft. 
Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology Readiness Level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if 
it meets design specifications; 
Hardware Software: Flight-qualified hardware; 
Demonstration Environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in 
the actual system application. 

Technology Readiness Level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test 
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug 
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware Software: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration Environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841: 

Acknowledgments: 

Ridge C. Bowman, Alan R. Frazier, Jordan Hamory, and Bruce H. Thomas 
made key contributions to this report. Other key contributors included 
David B. Best, Beverly A. Breen, Maricela Cherveny, Thomas J. Denomme, 
Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David J. Hand, Barbara H. 
Haynes, Michael J. Hazard, Ivy G. Hubler, Judy T. Lasley, Matthew B. 
Lea, Diana L. Moldafsky, Brian T. Mullins, John E. Oppenheim, Kenneth 
E. Patton, Charles W. Perdue, Michael J. Sullivan, Robert S. Swierczek, 
Adam Vodraska, Viraphonh Vongvanith, and Karen S. Zuckerstein. 

The following staff were responsible for individual programs: 

System: Airborne Laser (ABL); 
Primary Staff: LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: Aerial Common Sensor (ACS); 
Primary Staff: Dayna L. Foster/Rae Ann H. Sapp. 

System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); 
Primary Staff: Ivy G. Hubler/Steven B. Stern. 

System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF); 
Primary Staff: Bradley L. Terry. 

System: Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA); 
Primary Staff: Joseph E. Dewechter/Jerry W. Clark. 

System: Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM); 
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Durbin/ Moshe Schwartz. 

System: Advance Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS); 
Primary Staff: Michele R. Williamson/ Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH); 
Primary Staff: Michael J. Hesse/Tana M. Davis. 

System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning 
System (ATIRCM/CMWS); 
Primary Staff: Danny G. Owens. 

System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP); 
Primary Staff: Don M. Springman/Andrew H. Redd. 

System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS); 
Primary Staff: W. William Russell IV/Michael T. Dice. 

System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Sean D. Merrill /Marvin E. Bonner. 

System: C-130J Hercules; 
Primary Staff: Matthew T. Drerup/Cheryl K. Andrew. 

System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Sameena N. Ismailjee/ Cheryl K. Andrew. 

System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP); 
Primary Staff: Sameena N. Ismailjee/ Cheryl K. Andrew. 

System: USMC CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement; 
Primary Staff: Kevin J. Heinz/Stephen V. Marchesani. 

System: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X); 
Primary Staff: Travis J. Masters/Julie C. Hadley. 

System: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVN-21); 
Primary Staff: Diana L. Moldafsky/Lisa L. Berardi. 

System: DDG 1000 Destroyer; 
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE); 
Primary Staff: Gary L. Middleton/ Daniel J. Novillo/Joseph H. Zamoyta. 

System: E-10A Wide Area Surveillance Technology Development Program (E- 
10A WAS TDP); 
Primary Staff: Paul G. Williams/James S. Kim. 

System: EA-18G; 
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/ Christopher A. DePerro/ Judy T. Lasley. 

System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle--Atlas V, Delta IV (EELV); 
Primary Staff: Maria A. Durant/Richard Y. Horiuchi. 

System: Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS); 
Primary Staff: Bonita P. Oden/Jerry W. Clark. 

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV); 
Primary Staff: Leon S. Gill/Danny G. Owens/Steven B. Stern. 

System: Extended Range Munition (ERM); 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile; 
Primary Staff: John P. Swain. 

System: F-22A Modernization and Improvement Program; 
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Robert K. Miller. 

System: Future Combat Systems (FCS); 
Primary Staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/ William C. Allbritton. 

System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System; 
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie Shivers. 

System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD); 
Primary Staff: Steven B. Stern/Ivy G. Hubler. 

System: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/ 
OCS; 
Primary Staff: Jean N. Harker/Josie H. Sigl. 

System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 
System (JLENS); 
Primary Staff: Alan R. Frazier/Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF); 
Primary Staff: Matthew B. Lea/Gary L. Middleton. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station 
(JTRS AMF); 
Primary Staff: Paul G. Williams/Nicholas C. Alexander. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR); 
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams. 

System: JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS); 
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Michael D. O'Neill/Paul G. Williams. 

System: Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI); 
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins/LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: Land Warrior; 
Primary Staff: Susan K. Woodward. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener. 

System: Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6); 
Primary Staff: Ryan D. Consaul/Jordan Hamory. 

System: Longbow Apache Block III; 
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Light Utility Helicopter (LUH); 
Primary Staff: Beverly A. Breen/Michael J. Hesse. 

System: Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV); 
Primary Staff: Meredith M. Allen/ Richard A. Cederholm. 

System: Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System (MQ-9); 
Primary Staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp/Sara R. Margraf. 

System: 21 Inch Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System 
(MRUUVS); 
Primary Staff: Diana L. Moldafsky. 

System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS); 
Primary Staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi/Peter E. Zwanzig. 

System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS); 
Primary Staff: Suzanne S. Olivieri/ Carol R. Cha/ Sharron R. Candon. 

System: P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA); 
Primary Staff: Heather L. Barker Miller/ W. William Russell IV. 

System: PATRIOT/ MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit; 
Primary Staff: Richard A. Cederholm/ Ronald N. Dains. 

System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High); 
Primary Staff: Maricela Cherveny/ Claire A. Cyrnak. 

System: Small Diameter Bomb, Increment II (SDB II); 
Primary Staff: Carrie R. Wilson/ Letisha T. Jenkins-Marks. 

System: Space Radar (SR); 
Primary Staff: Lisa P. Gardner/Richard Y. Horiuchi. 

System: SSN 774 Technology Insertion Program; 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/; 
Thomas P. Twambly. 

System: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); 
Primary Staff: Sigrid L. McGinty/Josie H. Sigl. 

System: Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); 
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins/ LaTonya D. Miller/Steven B. Stern. 

System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT); 
Primary Staff: Arturo Holguin Jr./Tony A. Beckham. 

System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft; 
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden. 

System: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program; 
Primary Staff: Ronald E. Schwenn/Joseph H. Zamoyta. 

System: Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (Warrior UAS); 
Primary Staff: Tana M. Davis. 

System: Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS); 
Primary Staff: Tony A. Beckham. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T); 
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

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DOD Acquisitions: Contracting for Better Outcomes. GAO-06-800T. 
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System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000. 

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Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, D.C.: August 
16, 1999. 

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Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 
1999. 

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FOOTNOTES 

[1] This estimate includes total research, development, test and 
evaluation (RDT&E); procurement; military construction; and acquisition 
operation and maintenance appropriations to develop the weapon systems. 
The macro analyses contained in this report are based on data as of 
January 15, 2007, and may not reflect subsequent events. 

[2] MDAPs are programs identified by DOD as programs that require 
eventual RDT&E expenditures of more than $365 million or $2.19 billion 
in procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 

[3] Estimates for 2013 in constant 2007 dollars as reported by the 
Congressional Budget Office in "Long-Term Implications of Current 
Defense Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2007," pg. 13. 

[4] This common set refers to all programs that were reported as major 
defense acquisition programs in both the 2004 and 2007 assessment 
periods. This includes several programs whose knowledge attainment is 
not assessed in this report. The 64 programs that make up this common 
set are AEHF, AESA, AIM-9X, AMRAAM, ASDS, ATIRCM/CMWS, BFVS A3 Upgrade, 
C-130 AMP, C-130J, C-17, C-5 RERP, CEC, CH-47F, CVN-21, CVN-77, DDG 
1000, DDG 51, E-2 AHE, E-2C REP, EELV, EFV, Excalibur, F-22A Raptor, F/ 
A-18E/F, FBCB2, FCS, FMTV, GBS, Global Hawk, GOSHAWK, GPS II MSO 
Navstar, GPS II MUE Navstar, HIMARS, JASSM, Javelin, JDAM, JPATS, JSF, 
JSOW Baseline, JSOW, JTRS, Land Warrior, Longbow Apache Airframe Mods, 
LPD 17, MH-60R, MIDS-LVT, MLRS, MM III GRP, MM III PRP, NAS, NPOESS, 
Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment, SBIRS High, SSGN, SSN 774, Stryker, T- 
AKE, Tomahawk, Trident II, UH-60M, USMC H-1 Upgrade, V-22, WGS, and WIN-
T. 

[5] This common set refers to 27 programs included in this report that 
we were able to assess since development began. The 27 program are 
AEHF, MUOS, NPOESS, WGS, Patriot/MEADS, ARH, Excalibur, FCS, Warrior 
UAS, EA-18G, EFSS, V-22, AESA, E-2D AHE, JTRS HMS, JTRS GMR, Land 
Warrior, WIN-T, ERM, CVN-21, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, F-22A Modernization, 
Global Hawk, JSF, Reaper, and P-8A MMA. We limited analysis to these 27 
programs because all data including cost, schedule, and quantities were 
available for comparison between program estimates. 

[6] A weighted average gives more expensive programs a greater value. 

[7] The programs are AEHF, NPOESS, Excalibur, EA-18G, V-22, JTRS GMR, C-
5 AMP, C-5 RERP, F-22A Modernization, Global Hawk, JSF, and P-8A MMA. 

[8] This estimate is a weighted average based on total program cost and 
does not include the Excalibur program because of its extreme unit cost 
growth. The simple average program unit cost increase for the same 26 
programs is 34 percent. The weighted average, including the Excalibur, 
is 90 percent. 

[9] Since April 2005, CH-53K, ARH, JLENS, Warrior UAS, MKV, SSN 774 
Technology Insertion, and Longbow Apache Block III programs have all 
entered development with immature technologies. Likewise, EA-18G, JSF, 
DDG 1000, E2D-AHE, Land Warrior, and Warrior UAS have all held design 
reviews since April 2005. All six programs passed through their design 
reviews with immature technologies. 

[10] These percentages are program cost weighted averages. The simple 
average increase for RDT&E costs is 7 percent for the programs that 
started development with mature technologies and 56 percent for the 
programs that started development with immature technologies. The 
simple average increase for program acquisition unit costs is 21 
percent for programs that started development with mature technologies 
and 31 percent for the programs that started development with immature 
technologies. 

[11] The two programs are ATIRCM/CMWS and Global Hawk. 

[12] GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program 
Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
30, 2005). 

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