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Report to Congressional Committees: 

Untied States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

June 2006: 

Elections: 

The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 
General Election: 

GAO-06-450: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-450, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that 
tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since 
the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America 
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the 
nation’s elections processes, not all of which had to be implemented by 
the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, 
and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure 
effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the 
authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election 
issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the 
election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems 
since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and 
(2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO 
sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all 
responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 
local election jurisdictions about election administration activities 
(80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about 
experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local 
jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election 
system characteristics. 

What GAO Found: 

In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local 
jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, 
but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For 
example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 
1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration 
lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA 
requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time 
mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different 
identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who 
registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed 
regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office 
must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, 
provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA 
also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best 
practice guides and voluntary voting system standards and distributed 
federal funds to states for improving election administration, 
including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of 
local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be 
replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a 
greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper 
ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the 
elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance 
management, security, and testing will continue to be important to 
ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process. GAO found that 
states made changes—either as a result of HAVA or on their own—to 
address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 
election. GAO also found that some challenges continued—such as 
problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle 
agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, 
recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and 
continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new 
challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, 
incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter 
registration drives; 
larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; 
and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the 
eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote 
certification deadlines. 

Figure: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, 
Process, and Technology: 

[See PDF for Image] 

[End of Figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-450]. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-451SP]. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-452SP]. 

To view the full product or the related surveys, click on the links 
above. 

For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-
8777 or JenkinsWO@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Transmittal Letter: 

Executive Summary: 

Purpose: 

Background: 

Results in Brief: 

Principal Findings: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 1: 

Election Authority: 

Election System Elements: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Chapter 2: 

Overview: 

Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: 

Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and Other NVRA 
Entities Remained a Challenge: 

Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large Volume of 
Voter Registration Applications for the November 2004 General Election: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 3: 

Overview: 

Absentee Voting: 

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting: 

Early Voting: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 4: 

Overview: 

HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election Administration: 

Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for All 
Prospective Voters: 

Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll Workers 
Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on 
Challenges Training Poll Workers: 

Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium 
Jurisdictions: 

Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued to Be a 
Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That 
Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge: 

Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by Most 
Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for Some 
Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported 
Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in Other 
Jurisdictions Did Not: 

Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some Large and 
Medium Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Third-
Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election Day 2004: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 5: 

Overview: 

Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA Requirement for 
Provisional Ballots: 

State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for 
Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election 218: 

State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas 
Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted: 

A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and 
Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 6: 

Overview: 

In the 2004 General Election the Vote-Counting Process Remained Complex 
and Marked by Local Diversity: 

For the 2004 General Election, More States Had Requirements or Guidance 
for Determining Voter Intent: 

Recounts and Contested Elections Remained Uncommon for the November 
2004 General Election: 

Several States Had Further Developed Their Specifications for an 
Election Recount since the 2000 General Election: 

Vote Count Audits Were Not Prevalent in the 2004 General Election, but 
Some States Reported Taking Action to Require Them: 

Local Jurisdictions Reported Some Mistakes and Technical Challenges in 
Counting Votes for the 2004 General Election: 

In the 2004 General Election, Some Election Jurisdictions Reported 
Difficulty Meeting Deadlines for Certifying the Final Vote Count: 

The Recount in Washington State Revealed the Intricacies of the 
Election Process, but Also Yielded Many State Reforms: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 7: 

Overview: 

Voting Methods Vary among Jurisdictions and Are Being Influenced by 
States' Choices and HAVA: 

Voting Equipment Performance Was Not Consistently Measured during the 
2004 General Election, but Estimated Levels of Performance Satisfaction 
Were High: 

Attention to Voting System Security Management Continues to Vary amid 
Published Concerns and Federal Improvement Efforts: 

Certain Types of Tests and Evaluations Were Widely Performed on Voting 
Systems, while Others Were Less Common: 

Information on Jurisdictions' Election Technology Integration Is 
Limited, but Current and Emerging Technologies Offer Greater 
Opportunities: 

Concluding Observations: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products: 

Appendix II: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials: 

Appendix III: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions: 

Appendix IV: Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions GAO Visited: 

Appendix V: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix VI: Voter Registration Deadlines for States and the District 
of Columbia: 

Appendix VII: Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions Visited: 

Appendix VIII: Selected State Statutory Requirements for Absentee 
Voting: 

Appendix IX: State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling Places and 
Alternative Voting Methods: 

Appendix X: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements 
for Local Jurisdictions to Use Federal Standards for Voting Systems: 

Appendix XI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

Glossary: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed Names from 
Voter Registration List for 2004 General Election for Various Reasons: 

Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged in 
Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering Completed Voter- 
Registration Applications: 

Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning 
Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems in Processing 
Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When Absentee Ballot 
Applications Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in Processing Submitted 
Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when Absentee Ballots 
Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote More than Once, 
November 2004 General Election: 

Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were Actually 
Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by Jurisdiction 
Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error Problems on Absentee 
Applications That Used the Federal Post Card Application, November 2004 
General Election: 

Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines 
from Inside and Outside the United States, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the 
District of Columbia, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Various Staff Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Various Methods to Train Early Voting Staff, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting Methods and 
Accommodations for the November 2004 General Election: 

Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter Education Prior to 
the November 2004 General Election: 

Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll Workers for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide That 
Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for the November 2004 
Election under Various Scenarios: 

Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Various 
Methods to Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their Provisional Ballot, 
November 2004: 

Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected 
Jurisdictions: 

Table 21: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Having Written Ballot 
Security Policies and Procedures, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 22: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Particular 
Voting Methods by Ballot Type for the November 2004 Election: 

Table 23: States Reported Changes to Recount Provisions since 2000 for 
the 2004 General Election: 

Table 24: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 
2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions 
Visited by GAO: 

Table 25: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General 
Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by 
GAO: 

Table 26: Voting System Security Topics Addressed in Security Plans 
Submitted by Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: 

Table 27: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with 
Common Time Frames and Responsibilities: 

Table 28: Population in Each State Group: 

Table 29: Local Election Survey Sample Allocation: 

Table 30: Local Election Jurisdiction Survey Response Rates, Overall 
and by Sample Strata: 

Table 31: Local Election Jurisdictions Visited: 

Table 32: States Reporting on November 2004 General Election 
Registration Deadlines: 

Table 33: Selected Information on Jurisdictions We Visited That Had 
Early Voting: 

Table 34: Selected State Requirements for Domestic Absentee Voting, 
November 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Table 35: States' Mail-in Absentee Ballot Application and Mail-in 
Absentee Ballot Deadlines for Inside the United States, November 2004 
General Election: 

Table 36: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places: 

Table 37: State Provisions for Alternative Voting Methods and 
Accommodations: 

Table 38: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places 
and Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities for the November 
2004 General Election: 

Table 39: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for 
Use of Voluntary Federal Standards for New Voting Systems for the 
November 2006 General Election: 

Figures Figures: 

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 
Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 
2004 General Election: 

Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be 
Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in 
Place for the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant 
Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, 
Process, and Technology: 

Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter Registration 
Information with State Records: 

Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of January 
2006, Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter Registration List to 
Enter, Update, and Query Information: 

Figure 10: States' Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match Voter 
Registration Information with State Death Records and Felony Conviction 
Records: 

Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the 
Voter Had Registered Elsewhere: 

Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for 
First- Time Mail Registrants: 

Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process: 

Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 
Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for 
2004 General Election: 

Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications Documented by a 
Large Jurisdiction in 2004: 

Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with 
Insufficient Election Workers to Process Voter Registration 
Applications: 

Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had Names 
on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to Be Fraudulent and 
Volume of Fraudulent Applications Identified for the 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process: 

Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form for 
the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the Inclusion 
of Affidavit Information--One with Certification on Inner Envelope and 
One with Certification on Outer Envelope--for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Problems Processing Absentee Applications because the Applicant Did Not 
Meet the Excuse Required by State Law, November 2004 General Election:  

Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking for 
Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported 
Providing Early Voting as an Option in the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered 
Early Voting for Various Time Periods, November 2004 General Election:  

Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform Prospective 
Voters of New Identification Requirements: 

Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling Places 
for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 30: States' Reported Identification Requirements for Prospective 
Voters for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Enough Poll 
Workers with Specific Political Party Affiliation for the November 2004 
General Election: 

Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Poll Workers 
with Information Technology Skills or Computer Literacy for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions We 
Visited: 

Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll 
Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire: 

Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining Enough 
Polling Places That Were Accessible to Voters with Disabilities for 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot: 

Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large 
Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election Day: 

Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope: 

Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter Affidavit: 

Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for 
Poll Workers in Champaign, Illinois: 

Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be 
Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to 
Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted: 

Figure 47: Sealed Voting Equipment Bag: 

Figure 48: Punch Card Tabulator Connected to Computer: 

Figure 49: Punch Card Voting Booth: 

Figure 50: New Hampshire Guidance for Determining Voter Intent on Paper 
Ballots: 

Figure 51: Number of States Reporting Federal and Statewide Recounts 
for the 2004 Primary or General Elections: 

Figure 52: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in 
Place for the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 53: Examples of Voting Equipment: 

Figure 54: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant 
Voting Methods in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Figure 55: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant 
Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 56: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire 
Particular Voting Systems before the November 2006 General Election: 

Figure 57: State-Reported Status of Lever and Punch Card Voting 
Equipment in 2000, 2004, and 2006: 

Figure 58: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Single and Multiple Voting Methods in the November 2004 General 
Election:  

Figure 59: Precinct Count Optical Scan Voting Equipment: 

Figure 60: State-Reported Involvement in the Use of Specific Voting 
Methods in the 2004 and 2006 General Elections: 

Figure 61: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Identifying 
Factors That Influenced Buying or Leasing Voting Equipment since the 
2000 General Election: 

Figure 62: Federal Payments to States in Fiscal Year 2003 under HAVA to 
Replace Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment: 

Figure 63: Example of DRE Instructions and Equipment: 

Figure 64: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Voting 
System Performance Information for the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Figure 65: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General Election, by 
Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 66: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 General 
Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 67: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 General Election, 
by Predominant Voting Method: 

Figure 68: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting System Efficiency for the 2004 General Election, 
by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 69: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Satisfied with Voting 
System Performance for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 70: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Identified 
Security Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election, by 
Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 71: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Security 
Controls in the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 72: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Documented 
Security Policies or Procedures for Their Voting Systems in the 2004 
General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 73: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Established 
Policies or Procedures for Electronic Transmission of Voted Ballots in 
the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: 

Figure 74: State-Reported Standards Required for Voting Systems: 

Figure 75: State-Reported Voting System Certification Requirements for 
the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 76: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Conducting 
Postelection Voting System Audits for the 2004 General Election, by 
Predominant Voting Method: 

Figure 77: Examples of Portable Memory Cards and Cartridges Used with 
Voting Equipment:  

Figure 78: Examples of Ballot Tabulation Equipment and Environments: 

Figure 79: Example of an Assembly for Producing a Voter-Verifiable 
Paper Audit Trail for DRE Voting Equipment: 

Figure 80: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Networking 
or Remote Access for Voting Equipment in the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 81: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Automated 
Election Support for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 82: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions with Plans to 
Acquire Voting Equipment: 

Abbreviations: 

ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act: 

DRE: direct recording electronic: 

EAC: Election Assistance Commission: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FEC: Federal Election Commission: 

FPCA: Federal Post Card Application: 

FVAP: Federal Voting Assistance Program: 

HAVA: Help America Vote Act: 

MCD: minor civil division: 

MVA: motor vehicle agency: 

NASED: National Association of State Election Directors: 

NIST: National Institute for Standards and Technology: 

NVRA: National Voter Registration Act: 

PKI: public key infrastructure: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

UOCAVA: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: 

VVPT: 

Transmittal Letter: 
June 6, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

The November 2004 presidential election was not as close as the 2000 
presidential election, but it still raised concerns about our election 
processes. Following the 2004 general election, a number of members of 
Congress asked GAO to review aspects of that election. In response to 
these requests, GAO initiated a review under the authority of the 
Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad 
interest to Congress. 

This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United 
States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, for each 
major stage of the election process--voter registration, absentee and 
early voting, preparing for and conducting elections, provisional 
voting, and counting the votes--plus voting methods, this report 
discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, 
including steps taken to implement the Help America Vote Act, and (2) 
challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 
election. 

Copies of this report are being sent to the congressional leadership 
and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on 
Science. Copies will also be sent to state election officials and the 
election official for the District of Columbia and local elections 
jurisdictions that participated in our research and will be made 
available to other interested parties upon request. As a courtesy, we 
are providing other members of Congress a copy of the report's 
highlights page and executive summary. 

If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin, 
Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777; or 
William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, at (202) 512-8757. They can also be 
reached by e-mail at rabkinn@gao.gov and jenkinswo@gao.gov, 
respectively. Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix XI. 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Trent Lott: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Rules and Administration: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers, III: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Juanita Millender-McDonald: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on House Administration: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Arlen Specter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Executive Summary: 

Purpose: 

Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at 
the foundation of our democracy. All eligible persons, but only 
eligible persons, should be able to cast their votes and have their 
validly cast votes counted accurately. Reports of problems encountered 
in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter 
registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated 
voting systems raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of 
certain aspects of the U.S. election system. Subsequently, the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted,[Footnote 1] and major 
election reforms are now being implemented. The November 2004 general 
election highlighted some of the same challenges as in 2000 as well as 
some new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and 
implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both 
elections highlighted the importance of the interaction of people, 
processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and 
maintaining public confidence that our election system works. 

The November 2004 general election was the first federal election that 
tested changes states have made to their systems of election 
administration since the 2000 general election and the first 
presidential election since the enactment of HAVA. HAVA includes a 
number of provisions related to the administration of federal elections 
affecting voter registration, absentee voting, voting systems, and 
other election administration activities. 

The November 2004 general election was not as close or contentious as 
the 2000 general election, but media reports, interest groups, and 
members of Congress raised concerns about various aspects of the 
elections process. Following the November 2004 election, a number of 
members of Congress asked us to review aspects of that election. In 
response to these requests, we initiated a review under the authority 
of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of 
broad interest to Congress using an approach similar to that we used to 
examine election issues following the November 2000 election. During 
the design of the review, GAO kept key committees of jurisdiction and 
interested parties informed of its work. 

This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United 
States and the November 2004 election. It discusses (1) changes to 
election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to 
implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in 
the November 2004 election for each major stage of the election 
process--voter registration, absentee and early voting, Election Day 
preparation and activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--and 
for voting technology. 

Background: 

In the United States, election authority is shared by federal, state, 
and local entities. In addition to HAVA, federal laws have been enacted 
in several major areas of the voting process such as the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which was designed to expand the 
opportunities for citizens to register to vote in federal elections by 
allowing registration by mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) 
and other public agencies, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), which facilitated absentee voting 
by these populations. 

The U.S. election system is highly decentralized, with primary 
responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections 
residing at the local jurisdiction level--generally, the county level 
in most states, but some states have delegated election responsibility 
to subcounty governmental units. Subcounty election jurisdictions in 9 
states account for about 75 percent of about 10,500 local election 
jurisdictions in the United States, but about 12 percent of the 2000 
U.S. Census population. Local election jurisdictions vary widely in 
size and complexity, ranging from small New England townships to Los 
Angeles County, whose number of registered voters exceeds that of many 
states. Our election system is based upon a complex interaction of 
people (voters, election officials, and poll workers), processes 
(controls), and technology that must work effectively together to 
achieve a successful election. Every stage of the election process-- 
registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting 
Election Day activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--is 
affected by the interface of people, processes, and technology. 

Following the November 2000 general election, GAO issued a series of 
reports addressing a range of issues that emerged during that 
election.[Footnote 2] These reports also identified challenges that 
election officials reported they faced in major stages of the election 
process. We have also issued reports since the November 2004 general 
election on voter registration issues and security and reliability of 
electronic voting. As appropriate, information from our October 2001 
comprehensive report on election processes nationwide was used as a 
basis for determining changes since 2000.[Footnote 3] Our more recent 
reports were used to supplement this report on challenges election 
officials faced in the November 2004 election. Our methodology for this 
report included a Web-based survey of all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia (all 51 responded) and a mail questionnaire sent to a 
representative probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions 
nationwide, stratified by population (632, or 80 percent, responded). 
We also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of 28 local 
election jurisdictions in 14 states, selected to reflect variation in 
such factors as geographic location, whether early voting was offered, 
whether recounts for federal or statewide offices occurred, and voting 
technology used.[Footnote 4] Some of the 28 jurisdictions visited were 
among those we had visited for our 2001 election report. In stratifying 
our nationwide mail survey of local election jurisdictions, we grouped 
election jurisdictions by their 2000 U.S. Census population--small 
(less than 10,000), medium (10,000 to 100,000), and large (more than 
100,000). These categories are also used in this report to describe 
jurisdictions we visited. The results of our state and local surveys 
are presented in two supplemental products that can be found on our Web 
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 5] 

Results in Brief: 

The most prevalent changes to state and local elections systems since 
the 2000 presidential election were changes required under HAVA, which, 
among other things, established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC) with wide-ranging duties that include providing information and 
assistance to states and local jurisdictions with regard to election 
administration. EAC is led by four Commissioners who are to be 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The 
Commissioners who, under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 
2003, were appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by 
the Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 
2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives; 
however, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up affected its 
ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames 
specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual 
report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states' procurement of new 
voting systems and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions 
to meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. 

In addition, HAVA included specific changes to certain aspects of state 
administration of federal elections. Some key changes included 
requirements for states to implement statewide voter registration 
lists, a requirement that certain first-time mail registrants provide 
identification with their registration application or when they vote 
for the first time at the polls, and a requirement that most states 
permit, under certain circumstances, the casting of provisional 
ballots--those cast by voters at the polls whose eligibility to vote is 
unclear and to be determined later--in elections for federal office. 
HAVA also provided for funding to encourage states to replace their 
punch card and lever voting equipment, and set out voting system 
standards that state voting systems used in federal elections must 
meet. While HAVA defined some parameters for these requirements, the 
act leaves the states discretion in choosing the methods of 
implementing them. It is too early to determine the full effect that 
HAVA's requirements may have on the elections process because those 
requirements are in different stages of implementation. States had to 
implement HAVA's requirements for provisional voting and identification 
for first-time voters who register by mail prior to the November 2004 
election. However, 41 states obtained waivers, allowed under HAVA, to 
delay the implementation of their statewide voter registration systems 
from January 1, 2004, to January 1, 2006. Moreover, states are in 
different stages of replacing their older voting equipment, such as 
punch card and lever machines, with newer technology. 

On the basis of our surveys of states and local jurisdictions and 
visits to selected jurisdictions, we found that states varied in their 
progress in implementing their statewide voter registration lists and 
how they have implemented their voting systems. Except for the 9 states 
that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA's requirements for establishing 
a statewide voter registration lists, all other states subject to the 
statewide list requirement were not required to perform list 
maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended waiver 
deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election, states 
were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related to 
their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list 
verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and 
procedures at the state and local level for performing required list 
maintenance functions. Thus, states are still working to fully 
implement HAVA's voter registration requirements. As states gain more 
experience with their statewide voter registration and data-matching 
systems and processes, it is likely their systems and processes will 
evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining accurate voter 
registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is to be expected. 

We also found that implementation of the identification provision for 
certain first-time mail registrants varied. One noteworthy variation is 
in the definition of mail registration: Some local jurisdictions we 
visited said that applications received through voter registration 
drives would be treated as mail registrations and thus would be subject 
to the HAVA identification requirements. Other local jurisdictions we 
visited said applications from registration drives were not to be 
treated as mail registrations and therefore were not subject to the 
HAVA identification requirements. As to the other two provisions, the 
results of GAO's survey of state and local officials and jurisdictions 
we visited showed that states varied in their implementation of HAVA's 
requirement for provisional voting. One variation of particular note 
during the November 2004 election was the difference in state 
requirements regarding the location where voters must cast their 
provisional ballots in order for them to be counted. For example, in 
some jurisdictions, once the voter's eligibility to vote had been 
verified, the provisional ballot was counted if it was cast within the 
voter's county of residence, while in other jurisdictions the ballot 
was counted only if the voter had cast it in the assigned precinct. 
Notwithstanding these variations for implementing provisional voting, 
it is clear that provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter 
participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when 
attempting to vote. 

Many states have taken advantage of federal funding to replace their 
punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. The 
results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that 
large jurisdictions are replacing older voting equipment with more 
technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small 
jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and 
constitute the majority of jurisdictions across the United States. On 
the basis of states' reported plans and local jurisdictions' estimated 
plans for acquiring voting systems for future elections, the election 
technology environment can be characterized as varied and evolving. 
Accordingly, voting system performance management, security, and 
testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the 
overall election process. 

In addition to reporting the required HAVA changes, some states 
reported having taken other actions since the 2000 general election to 
reform election administration; for example, 6 states reported they had 
eliminated the need for an excuse to vote absentee, and 9 states 
reported establishing procedures to conduct an automatic recount 
(audit), in full or in part, of the vote tabulation to help ensure 
accuracy of the vote prior to certification. 

Election officials identified challenges faced in the November 2004 
general election. Some of these challenges were also identified as 
challenges in GAO's October 2001 comprehensive report on the election 
processes, while others were raised with us for the first time. 

Continuing Challenges in 2004: 

* Voter registration. According to our nationwide survey of local 
election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local 
jurisdictions reported that they continued to encounter challenges with 
the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 
general election, such as difficulties related to voter registration 
applications with inaccurate and incomplete voter registration 
information, multiple registrations by the same person, or ineligible 
voters appearing on the list. Election jurisdictions also continued to 
face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor 
vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities. 

* Absentee voting. The results of our nationwide survey indicate that 
election jurisdictions continued to experience absentee voting 
challenges that included receiving late absentee voter applications and 
ballots, managing large workloads with inadequate resources, addressing 
voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee 
applications, and preventing potential fraud. Although election 
officials in jurisdictions we visited provided examples of procedures 
used to help protect against fraud such as comparing signatures on 
absentee applications to signatures on registration applications, 
election officials still suspected instances of fraud. In 1 
jurisdiction we visited, election officials reported they referred to 
the district attorney for investigation matters pertaining to 44 
individuals who allegedly voted absentee ballots with invalid 
signatures. 

* Election Day activities. According to our nationwide survey of local 
election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local 
jurisdictions reported that they encountered many of the same 
challenges preparing for and conducting Election Day activities in the 
November 2004 general election as they did in November 2000, including 
recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled poll workers, 
locating a sufficient number of polling places that met requirements, 
designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were many 
candidates or issues to include, having long lines at polling places, 
and handling the large volume of telephone calls received from voters 
and poll workers on Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide 
survey, we estimate that large jurisdictions and, to some extent, 
medium jurisdictions encountered these challenges more than small 
jurisdictions. 

* Vote counting. On the basis of interviews with election officials, 
many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology for 
vote counting that had confronted election officials across the country 
in the November 2000 general election continued to be a challenge for 
them in the 2004 general election. Voting equipment problems, poll 
worker errors, and voter errors were reported as making it difficult to 
tabulate the votes quickly and accurately. 

* Voting technology. According to our local jurisdiction survey and 
visits, voting system performance measures have not been systematically 
embraced, reliable performance data have not been collected, and 
security and testing activities have not been consistently required and 
performed for all voting systems. As a result, effective management of 
voting technology remains a challenge for many states and local 
jurisdictions because election officials may continue to use a 
patchwork of operational indicators and anecdotal experiences, rather 
than requirements-based information on voting system performance, to 
support decisions regarding voting system investments and operations. 

New Challenges in 2004: 

* Registrations from registration drives. Election officials in some 
local election jurisdictions we visited reported that efforts of 
various groups to "get out the vote" by registering new voters through 
voter registration drives created new challenges not identified to us 
in the 2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions 
we visited, election officials told us they faced a challenge 
processing large volumes of voter registration applications just prior 
to the deadlines for registration. The conditions that election 
officials reported experiencing in processing the volume of voter 
registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully 
train temporary workers, can result in data entry errors that would 
have the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not 
identifying ineligible voters. Moreover, while not reported as a 
prevalent problem, applications received from voter registration drives 
was a challenge reported by election officials, who said that some of 
these applications had incomplete or invalid addresses, fictitious 
names, or questionable signatures. On the basis of our nationwide 
survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of 
local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared 
to have fraudulent names. 

* Early voting. Election officials reported encountering new challenges 
managing early voting. Some local jurisdictions we visited reported 
that they experienced long lines at early voting locations resulting 
from larger than expected early voter turnout. In some jurisdictions we 
visited, election officials said that factors such as inadequate 
planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that could 
be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring 
more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management 
of large early voter turnout. 

* New UOCAVA provision. A new challenge could develop for election 
officials as a result of a HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to 
help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service 
voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United 
States, this 2002 amendment extended the period of time that can be 
covered by a single application from the year during which the 
application was received to a time period covering up to the next two 
subsequent general elections for federal office, or 4 years. However, 
election officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a 
possible unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when 
uniformed services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, 
absentee ballots may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent 
general elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the Federal Post Card 
Application form where voters can indicate that they want ballots for 
one federal election only, election officials were concerned that many 
absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable. 

* Third-party polling place activities. Election officials in some of 
the jurisdictions we visited in states where the presidential race was 
considered close (often referred to as battleground states) reported 
encountering challenges with disruptive third-party (e.g., poll 
watchers, observers, and electioneers) activities at polling places on 
Election Day. In some instances, these third parties simply increased 
the number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling 
location; 
in others, election officials told us third-party observers' behavior 
negatively affected poll workers and voters. 

* Provisional voting. The implementation of provisional voting 
requirements as specified under HAVA highlighted another instance where 
states varied in their election systems, with somewhat distinct 
approaches for providing and counting provisional ballots. That is, 
states reported various differences in their counting processes such as 
the prescribed location (e.g., county or precinct) in which a voter 
must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be counted. Another 
way states varied included circumstances, apart from those specified in 
HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters 
claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot. States also varied in 
the design of provisional ballots and how they tracked them. 

* Vote counting deadlines. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to 
election officials with respect to counting the votes: Some 
jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps required 
to verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for 
tallying the final vote count. 

* Voting systems. States and local jurisdictions face a broad challenge 
in ensuring consistent accuracy, integrity, and security among their 
voting systems in light of their adoption of various versions of 
federal voluntary voting system standards containing somewhat 
different--and, in some cases, outdated--performance thresholds for 
voting equipment. Adoption of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System 
Guidelines by EAC on December 13, 2005, provided updated criteria that 
states and local jurisdictions can choose to apply when evaluating and 
certifying their voting equipment. Organizations involved with voting 
system certification--including federal, state, and local governments; 
testing authorities; 
and vendors--may need the capacity to assume the workloads associated 
with the adoption of current standards, including upgrading, testing, 
and certifying newly acquired voting systems to meet the standards, 
particularly if the standards are to be applied to the 2006 general 
election. Furthermore, as states and jurisdictions move to a more 
integrated suite of election systems, proactive and systematic efforts 
in areas such as standards will be essential to addressing emerging 
technical, security, and reliability interactions among systems and 
managing risks in this dynamic election environment. 

Principal Findings: 

Voter Registration: 

In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter 
registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two 
goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons of registering to 
vote, and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to 
those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not 
inadvertently removed from the registration lists. During 2004 and 
2005, many states were in the process of implementing their HAVA- 
required statewide voter registration lists and associated requirements 
for maintaining such a list. Thus, the potential benefits to be gained 
from HAVA's requirement for a statewide voter registration list were 
not evident in many states at the time of the November 2004 general 
election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA intended to help states and 
local election jurisdictions have access to more accurate voter 
registration list information, such as identifying duplicate 
registrations and matching the voter information against other state 
agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many 
states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of 
being able to verify voter registration application information with 
state motor vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to 
match voter registration lists with a state agency's records to 
identify felons who may be ineligible to vote. 

Local jurisdictions also encountered instances where voters claimed to 
be registered to vote and their names were not on the voter 
registration list. When this occurs, under HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements, states must permit voters to cast provisional ballots if 
the voters assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction where 
they desire to vote and are eligible to vote in a federal election. The 
results of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions 
indicate that many local jurisdictions encountered problems determining 
whether a provisional ballot was eligible to be counted where voters 
claimed to have registered at a motor vehicle agency or at another NVRA 
entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter had submitted 
a registration application at one of those offices. 

While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election 
system generally, applying to register and being registered are not 
synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the 
voter registration applications they receive. Local election 
jurisdictions continued to encounter challenges with the voter 
registration lists for the November 2004 election such as difficulties 
related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration 
information, multiple registrations, and ineligible voters appearing on 
the lists. The surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions 
prior to the November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of 
balancing ease of registration with assurances that only eligible 
voters are on the registration rolls. In some cases, election officials 
reported that hundreds or thousands of applications were submitted just 
before the registration deadline and close to Election Day. According 
to our nationwide survey and visits to selected jurisdictions, entering 
voter registrations in a timely manner presented a challenge for some 
election officials in marshaling the needed resources, including in 
some cases hiring and training temporary employees, to review the 
applications, obtain missing or incomplete information from applicants, 
determine that the registrants were eligible to vote in the 
jurisdiction, and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were added 
to the voter registration rolls prior to Election Day. As shown in 
figure 1, we estimate that 19 percent of jurisdictions nationwide 
received applications just prior to the registration deadline that 
posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day, with large 
jurisdictions experiencing problems more than medium and small 
jurisdictions.[Footnote 6] 

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 
Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 
2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium 
and small jurisdictions. 

[End of figure] 

During our site visits, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that 
on a daily basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data 
entry. As a result, election officials reported that they hired 80 full-
time temporary workers who worked two full-time shifts to enter all 
eligible applications into the voter registration list used at the 
polls on Election Day. Election officials in another large jurisdiction 
told us that they unexpectedly received about 10,000 last-minute 
registration applications. 

According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and 
election officials in jurisdictions we visited, many local election 
jurisdictions had processes to help manage receipt of voter 
registration applications such as training for MVA and other NVRA 
entities' staff and local election office's staff for data entry and 
tracking of registration application forms. However, some local 
jurisdictions did not report having such management processes. We 
estimate that 76 percent of all jurisdictions provided training to data 
entry staff about the processing and inputting of registration 
applications, and we estimate that over half of all jurisdictions 
tracked incoming registration applications to ascertain the total 
number received, the number entered into registration lists, and the 
number not processed because of omission or application error, and to 
identify ineligible voters based on age or residence. In addition, some 
local jurisdictions we visited reported that they implemented processes 
such as tracking the number of applications distributed and the source 
from which applications are received, and providing receipts to voter 
registrants to help alleviate problems encountered with properly 
registering voters. 

In addition to challenges encountered processing the large volume of 
registration applications received through voter registration drives, 
on the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, 
we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter 
registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names. 
Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported receiving 
voter registration applications that had irregularities. For example, 
election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported receiving applications 
that were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were incomplete, or 
had invalid addresses. Election officials in another jurisdiction also 
reported receiving applications with fictitious names and fake 
signatures. Generally, election officials reported that the number of 
applications that were irregular were few in number, especially in 
relation to the total number of applications received. 

Absentee and Early Voting: 

Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote 
absentee or early. For the November 2004 general election, 3 additional 
states reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses 
such as being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct 
on Election Day to vote absentee. Three states reported expanding their 
provisions for permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the 
elderly or individuals with disabilities), allowing voters to receive 
absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, such as 4 years. 
One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in absentee 
voters provide an affidavit from a notary or witness for their 
signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Furthermore, HAVA 
amended UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of time that 
can be covered by a single absentee ballot application by absent 
uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing 
outside of the United States from the year during which the application 
was received to a time period covering up to the two next regularly 
scheduled general elections for federal office. 

Absentee voting. Voting prior to Election Day can make voting easier 
for voters but can also create challenges for election officials. On 
the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, 
more than half of all jurisdictions encountered problems receiving 
absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots from voters too late 
to process--an estimated 55 percent of jurisdictions received 
applications too late and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too 
late, as shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, 
November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and 
large jurisdictions. 

[End of figure] 

Although the extent of the problem in terms of the number of 
applications and ballots that could not be processed is unknown, the 
estimated number of jurisdictions encountering the problem would seem 
to be of some concern to state and local election officials. Absentee 
application deadlines close to Election Day provide citizens increased 
time to apply to vote absentee. But such deadlines can create 
difficulties for election officials, providing a short period of time 
to ensure that eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to 
vote, including having time to notify voters and have the voters 
correct errors on their ballot applications, such as failing to sign 
them. The impact of absentee ballot application deadlines on voters' 
ability to complete and return the absentee application and ballot in 
time for their votes to be counted is another example of the 
difficulties of balancing voter access and ease of voting with 
appropriate election administration processes and controls. 

Election officials identified problems related to voter errors on 
absentee ballot applications and ballots. On the basis of our 
nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, we estimate that almost 
half of the jurisdictions encountered problems with missing or 
illegible signatures on absentee ballot applications, and our survey 
results also indicate that local jurisdictions encountered problems 
with, among other things, missing or inadequate voting residence 
addresses on absentee applications and missing or incomplete witness 
information for a voter's signature or information. In jurisdictions 
that we visited, some election officials told us of steps they took, 
when time permitted, to address voter errors. States reported having 
information on their Web sites that included information on the basic 
requirements for requesting and casting an absentee ballot. In 
addition, some absentee voting applications and ballots provided to us 
by elections jurisdictions we visited included instructions for voting 
absentee. 

Mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to be particularly 
susceptible to fraud. Election fraud could include such activities as 
completion of a ballot by someone other than the registered voter or an 
attempt by a voter to cast more than one ballot in an election. On the 
basis of our nationwide survey, we estimated that a majority of 
jurisdictions used procedures in the November 2004 election designed to 
help ensure that absentee voters did not vote more than once and that 
absentee ballots were actually completed by the person requesting the 
ballot. However, some mail-in absentee voter fraud concerns remained. 
In particular, election officials expressed concern regarding absentee 
voters being unduly influenced or intimidated while voting by third 
parties who went to voters' homes and offered to assist them in voting 
ballots. Election officials also expressed concerns about the influence 
of third parties on voters for early voting when voters waiting in line 
were approached by candidates and poll watchers. 

Uniformed military and overseas absentee voters. Election officials in 
a few jurisdictions we visited told us of a possible unintended 
consequence that may create a challenge with respect to provisions in 
UOCAVA as amended by HAVA, whereby the Federal Post Card Application 
can possibly cover as many as two subsequent general elections for 
federal office. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited 
said that when uniformed service personnel are reassigned to other duty 
posts, ballots might not be sent to the correct address for subsequent 
general elections. Election officials in some of these jurisdictions 
said they were taking steps to help ensure that absentee ballots would 
be sent to the correct address for the 2006 general election, such as 
requesting e-mail addresses as a means to obtain information to update 
mailing addresses or conducting mass mailings to these voters to 
confirm mailing addresses. However, election officials were concerned 
that if these efforts are not successful, a number of the ballots 
mailed to addresses provided on the Federal Post Card Application for 
the November 2006 election would be returned as undeliverable. This was 
a concern for these election officials because the jurisdictions would 
have to absorb the expense of mailing ballots that would be 
undeliverable. Furthermore, a potential effect may be that some 
uniformed services voters, who applied to vote absentee using the 
Federal Post Card Application, may not receive their ballots for 
subsequent general elections. As noted in our April 2006 report on 
election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, one of the 
top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for these voters was 
that they were undeliverable.[Footnote 7] 

Early voting. With respect to early voting, election officials in some 
jurisdictions we visited identified obtaining adequate staffing for 
conducting early voting as a challenge, especially when given the 
unanticipated large early voter turnout. In 11 of the 14 early voting 
jurisdictions visited, election officials emphasized the importance of 
staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election 
office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. According to our 
nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 30 percent 
of jurisdictions used permanent staff to work early voting polling 
locations. Our nationwide survey also showed that jurisdictions used 
other types of staff and combinations of staff such as permanent and 
part-time staff. Depending on the number of early voting locations to 
be staffed, using experienced staff may not always be feasible, and 
using other staff may affect the speed with which voters can be 
processed and may contribute to long lines. As states fully implement 
their statewide voter registration lists, processing voters at early 
voting locations may become easier as the voter registration systems 
evolve and systems become user-friendly so that all types of staff can 
be more effective in processing voters. 

Conducting Elections: 

States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the 
November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA requirements and 
other state actions to improve the administration of elections in the 
United States. HAVA established requirements with respect to elections 
for federal office for, among other things, certain voters who register 
by mail to provide identification prior to voting; 
mandated that voting equipment accessible to individuals with 
disabilities be located at each polling place; 
and required that voter information be posted at polling places on 
Election Day. Since the November 2000 general election, some states 
have also reported making changes to their identification requirements 
for all voters. 

Many of the challenges that election officials reported encountering in 
preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election were 
not new challenges. Recruiting and training an adequate supply of poll 
workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing communications 
on Election Day were challenges that we identified in our October 2001 
report on the November 2000 general election.[Footnote 8] As shown in 
figure 3, on the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that more 
large jurisdictions encountered difficulties than medium and small 
jurisdictions when it came to obtaining a sufficient number of poll 
workers. 

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[B] The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. 

[C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[D] Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of 
reasons, including that poll workers are not recruited, but elected or 
appointed; 
that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is 
not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; 
or that the election officials themselves serve as poll workers. 

[E] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor 
that involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and 
technologies associated with numerous activities. However, we found in 
our survey of local jurisdictions and site visits to 28 localities that 
more large and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions reported that they 
encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the November 
2004 general election than small jurisdictions did. This may be because 
the complexity of administering an election and the potential for 
challenges increase with the number of people and places involved and 
the scope of activities and processes that must be conducted, such as 
the need to provide ballots and voter assistance in languages other 
than English. The results of our local election jurisdiction survey 
indicate that more large and medium jurisdictions than small 
jurisdictions took steps--such as through voter education or providing 
instructions at polling places for poll workers--designed to minimize 
potential problems. Many of the election officials in large 
jurisdictions we visited told us that being well prepared, having 
established policies and procedures in place, and having high-quality 
election staff were factors that contributed to a smooth Election Day. 
One problem that election officials in some jurisdictions reported 
encountering on Election Day was actions by poll watchers and other 
third parties that election officials considered disruptive. This 
presents another issue that election officials may need to include in 
their Election Day preparations and training. 

Provisional Voting: 

Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that 
some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions 
regarding the voters' eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 
2004, states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for 
federal office by voters who assert that they are eligible to vote and 
registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter 
registration list.[Footnote 9] Such states are also required under HAVA 
to provide provisional ballots in federal elections under other 
circumstances, such as for certain voters who registered by mail and do 
not have required identification. While HAVA requires that states 
permit an individual under certain circumstances to cast a provisional 
ballot in a federal election, the act left the specific choices on the 
methods of implementation to the discretion of the states. Under HAVA, 
election officials receiving provisional voter information are to 
determine whether such individuals are eligible to vote under state 
law. If an individual is determined to be eligible, HAVA specifies that 
such individual's provisional ballot be counted as a vote in that 
election in accordance with state law. 

On the basis of our survey of state election officials, our nationwide 
survey of election jurisdictions, and our visits to jurisdictions, 
states and local jurisdictions varied in a number of ways in how they 
implemented HAVA's provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 
election. For example, in addition to those specified in HAVA, the 
circumstances reported by states and local jurisdictions when a 
provisional ballot would be offered varied, with some jurisdictions 
allowing voters claiming they did not receive an absentee ballot to 
vote provisionally. The results of our survey of state elections 
officials showed that states also varied as to the location where 
voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for such ballots to 
be eligible to be counted, as shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be 
Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin and Wyoming) authorize some 
measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with 
the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast 
their votes in the specific precincts in which they are registered in 
order for their votes to be eligible to be counted. 

[End of figure] 

On the basis of our interviews with local election officials, local 
election procedures and unique circumstances add to the differences 
among jurisdictions. For example, in some jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials described various factors that affected the counting 
of provisional ballots, such as the time allowed for provisional voters 
to provide missing identification. Specifically, in 1 jurisdiction, 
voters had to provide the required identification before the polls 
closed for the ballot to be counted, while in other jurisdictions the 
ballot would be counted if the voter provided the required 
identification within a specified number of days after Election Day. 

These variations in provisional voting implementation highlight how 
individual state rules, procedures, and practices may have affected the 
number of provisional ballots cast and counted in the November 2004 
election. These differences and limited data availability make it 
difficult to determine with certainty how many provisional ballots were 
cast and counted nationally in the November 2004 election. However, the 
data that are available indicate that the HAVA requirement for 
provisional voting has helped to better facilitate voter participation 
of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to 
vote. 

Counting the Votes: 

Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 
50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is 
the same across the nation: to accurately process those ballots 
requiring verification and accurately count every valid ballot. As with 
the elections process overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not 
a simple process. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to 
detail, and the seamless integration of people, processes, and 
technology. 

In 2004, vote counting remained an intricate multistep process 
characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a 
local jurisdiction's technology, size, and preferences. The multistep 
process can involve such activities as the initial vote count, a vote 
count audit to verify the accuracy of the count, certification of the 
vote count, and recounts of the votes when an election is 
close.[Footnote 10] There were some notable developments related to 
conducting recounts that may be mandatory (because of a close margin of 
victory) or requested. Some states reported that they added rules for 
mandatory recounts. Others reported that they changed their guidance 
for who may request a recount. Regarding vote count audits, while 29 
states and the District of Columbia reported they did not require 
audits of vote counts, 21 states reported having provisions that 
required or allowed audits of vote counts, as shown in figure 5. 
Furthermore, 9 states reported having taken some legislative or 
executive steps toward doing so since November 2004. 

Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in 
Place for the 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Includes District of Columbia. 

[End of figure] 

Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a 
jurisdiction for casting their ballots--early, absentee, provisional, 
and Election Day voting--enhances eligible voters' opportunity to vote. 
At the same time, multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make 
the vote-counting process more complicated. In addition, short 
deadlines for certifying the final vote--as little as 2 days in 1 
state--provide little time for election officials to review, verify, 
and count provisional and absentee ballots. Larger jurisdictions 
generally face more challenges than smaller jurisdictions because of 
the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types--absentee, 
provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for many 
jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in tracking, 
verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in November 
2004, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited said that 
they are implementing new procedures for provisional voting, such as 
printing provisional ballots in a color different from other types of 
ballots or using paper ballots rather than direct recording electronic 
(DRE) machines for provisional voters. These procedures are intended to 
help election officials track provisional ballots to ensure that they 
are all accounted for and included in the vote count. 

Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington told us that they are moving 
to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a countywide basis by a 
new state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting 
eliminates some challenges that can affect accurate vote counting-- 
e.g., poll worker training on voting equipment operations and 
provisional voting or the chance of malfunctioning voting equipment at 
the polls--it magnifies the importance of other aspects of the process, 
such as accurately matching voter signatures and having clear guidance 
for determining voter intent from improperly or unclearly marked 
ballots. 

The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed 
the interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring 
an accurate vote count. In the initial statewide count, a mere 261 
votes separated the two top candidates, and an initial recount reduced 
that margin of victory to just 42 votes out of more than 2.7 million 
cast, and the final recount resulted in a 129-vote margin of victory 
for the candidate who came in second in the first two vote counts. The 
experiences of election jurisdictions that had to conduct the recounts 
illustrated how small errors in the election administration process can 
affect the vote count. For example, in at least 11 counties provisional 
ballots were found by a Washington state superior court to have been 
counted without verifying voter signatures or before verification of 
voter registration status had been completed. Furthermore, 573 absentee 
ballots were erroneously disqualified in one county, and 22 absentee 
and provisional ballots were discovered in the base units of optical 
scan machines in another county after the election had been certified. 
Were any state's election processes subjected to the very close 
scrutiny that characterized the recount in Washington state, it is 
likely that imperfections would be revealed. Votes are cast and 
elections are conducted by people who are not and cannot be 100 percent 
error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the consistently 
error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large 
jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, 
absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve a 
consistently error-free count can help to ensure that any errors are 
reduced to the minimum humanly possible. 

Voting Methods and Technologies: 

The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied 
and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local 
jurisdiction survey estimates. Figure 6 shows the estimated percentages 
of all jurisdictions' use of a predominant voting method in the 2000 
and 2004 general elections. Two key patterns emerged in the use of 
voting methods between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. First, we 
estimate that the percentage of large jurisdictions using DREs doubled 
from 15 percent in the 2000 general election to 30 percent in 2004. The 
predominant voting method most often used for large jurisdictions 
changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE and 
precinct count optical scan in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the 
predominant voting methods most often used remained the same for small 
and medium jurisdictions (paper ballots and precinct count optical 
scan, respectively) from 2000 to 2004. Furthermore, on the basis of our 
local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of 
jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan equipment before the 
2006 general election. Second, in response to our state survey, 9 
states reported that they eliminated the lever machine and punch card 
voting methods for the 2004 general election. In addition, 18 other 
states plan to eliminate lever or punch card voting methods for the 
2006 general election. This greater state involvement in jurisdictions' 
choice of voting methods, the availability of federal funding to 
replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and certain HAVA 
requirements--among other factors--are likely influences on the 
adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods. 

Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant 
Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by 
specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing 
for updates to the federal voting system standards, including the 
performance components of those standards. According to our local 
jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance 
standards for accuracy, reliability, or efficiency for the 2004 general 
election--usually standards selected by their respective states. It is 
important that system performance be measured during an election, when 
the system is being used and operated according to defined procedures 
by voters and election workers, to provide a basis for determining 
where performance needs, requirements, and expectations are not being 
met so that timely corrective action can be taken. As was the case for 
the 2000 general election, jurisdictions collected various types of 
voting system performance measures for the 2004 general election, 
although some types of measures were collected by fewer jurisdictions 
than others--in part because they were not well suited to particular 
voting methods. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 
the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied 
with their systems' performance during the 2004 general election, even 
though performance data may not have been collected to an extent that 
would provide firm support for these views. The moderate collection 
levels of data on operational voting systems' performance may present a 
challenge to state and local election officials in their efforts to 
make informed decisions on both near-term and long-term voting system 
changes and investments. 

Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public 
confidence in the election process, and according to our local 
jurisdiction survey estimated results, accomplishing this was a shared 
responsibility among states, local jurisdictions, vendors, law 
enforcement officials, and others for most jurisdictions. According to 
our state survey, estimates from our local jurisdiction survey, and 
visits to jurisdictions, there were differences across states and 
jurisdictions in areas such as the adoption of system security 
standards and reported implementation of system security controls, 
which was generally consistent with what we reported in our October 
2001 report on election processes. In addition, 27 states reported in 
our state survey that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply 
voluntary federal standards to voting systems used for the first time 
in the November 2006 general election that are outdated, unspecified, 
or entail multiple versions. In the area of testing, most states 
reported that they required national or state certification of their 
voting systems, but the systems covered by those requirements and the 
criteria used for certification also varied by state and by voting 
method. Readiness (logic and accuracy) testing continued to be commonly 
performed by an estimated 92 percent of local jurisdictions that used 
automated voting systems for the 2004 general election, but the local 
election officials we talked with described a variety of testing 
approaches.[Footnote 11] We estimate that two other forms of testing-- 
parallel testing and postelection auditing of voting equipment--were 
much less prevalent than readiness testing and were conducted by 2 
percent and 43 percent of jurisdictions that used automated voting, 
respectively.[Footnote 12] Appropriately defined and implemented 
standards for system functions and testing processes are essential to 
ensuring the accuracy, integrity, and reliability of voting systems 
across all phases of the elections process. States and local 
jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and consistently 
applying appropriate standards and other directives for security 
management and testing to address vulnerabilities and risks in their 
specific election environments. 

The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of 
voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 
general election according to estimates from our local jurisdiction 
survey and visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of 
integration we examined, such as electronic programming or setup and 
electronic management. Furthermore, relatively few local jurisdictions 
we visited reported having plans for integrating or further integrating 
their election-related systems and components for the 2006 general 
election, and in the instances where jurisdictions reported plans, the 
scope and nature of the plans varied. Nevertheless, there is real 
potential for greater integration among voting systems, election 
systems, and components as states and jurisdictions act on plans to 
acquire optical scan and DRE equipment that lends itself to 
integration. It is unclear if and when this migration to more 
technology-based voting methods will produce more integrated election 
system environments. However, suitable standards and guidance for these 
interconnected components and systems--some of which remain to be 
developed--could facilitate the development, testing, operational 
management, and maintenance of components and systems, thereby 
maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election technologies 
and achieving states' and local jurisdictions' goals for performance 
and security. The challenge inherent in such a dynamic environment is 
to update system standards so that emerging technical, security, and 
reliability interactions are systematically addressed. 

Concluding Observations: 

The administration of election systems will never be error free or 
perfect. Each stage of the election process poses a major challenge for 
election officials. Effective management of the election system 
requires a variety of resources that must be prepared, mobilized, and 
deployed at regular intervals. These resources include the people who 
conduct the election and participate in it, the processes that govern 
what the people do and how the election is conducted, and the 
technology that facilitates the efforts of the people as they work 
through the election processes. Although responsibility for election 
administration falls largely on local governmental units, state and 
federal governments have a role to play in helping to minimize the 
types of errors that can occur. Thus, as technology evolves and 
circumstances warrant, state and federal governments might consider 
what, if any, actions on their part could help to improve election 
processes. 

GAO found that states have made changes--either as a result of HAVA or 
on their own--that addressed some of the challenges identified in the 
2000 general election. GAO also found that some challenges continue and 
new challenges occurred in the 2004 general election. In passing HAVA, 
Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve 
upon several aspects of the voting administration system. It is too 
soon to determine the full effect of those changes, especially the 
requirement for statewide voter registration lists for federal 
elections and new voting systems, both of which are at different stages 
of implementation across the states. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 1: 
Introduction: 

The basic goal of the elections system in the United States is 
straightforward: All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, 
should be able to cast their votes and, if such votes have been 
properly cast by the voters, have those votes counted accurately. Faith 
in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the 
foundation of our democracy. Reports of problems encountered in the 
close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration 
lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting 
equipment raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of certain 
aspects of the U.S. election system. After the events surrounding the 
November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being 
implemented.[Footnote 13] The November 2004 general election 
highlighted some of the same challenges as 2000 as well as some new 
challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and 
implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both 
elections highlighted the importance of the effective interaction of 
people, processes, and technology in ensuring effective election 
operations and maintaining public confidence that our election system 
works. 

Since 2001, GAO has issued a series of reports covering aspects of the 
election process primarily with respect to federal elections.[Footnote 
14] This report focuses on the changing of such election processes in 
the United States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, 
primarily with respect to federal elections, our objectives were to 
examine each major stage of the election process to (1) identify 
changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps 
taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the issues and challenges 
encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election. 

Election Authority: 

Election authority is shared by federal, state, and local officials in 
the United States. Congressional authority to affect the administration 
of elections derives from various constitutional sources, depending 
upon the type of election.[Footnote 15] Congress has passed legislation 
in several major areas of the voting process. For example, the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA),[Footnote 16] expanded the 
opportunities for citizens to register to vote for federal elections 
by, among other things, requiring most states to accept registration 
applications for federal elections by mail and at state motor vehicle 
agencies (MVA) and at certain other state agencies. The act also 
requires that in the administration of elections for federal office, 
states are to take certain steps to accurately maintain voter 
registration lists, and it limits the circumstances for removing names 
from voter lists. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 
Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) requires states to, among other things, permit 
uniformed services voters absent from the place of residence where they 
are otherwise qualified to vote, their dependents, and U.S. citizens 
residing outside the country to register and vote absentee in elections 
for federal office.[Footnote 17] 

The Help America Vote Act was enacted into law on October 29, 2002. As 
discussed below, the act includes a number of provisions related to 
voter registration, provisional voting, absentee voting, voting 
equipment, and other election administration provisions, and authorizes 
the appropriation of funds to be used toward implementing the law's 
requirements. HAVA also provides that the choices on the methods of 
implementation of such requirements, for example, a computerized 
statewide voter registration list, provisional voting, voter 
information requirements at the polling place, identification 
requirements, and voting system standards (for ballot verification, 
manual audit capacity, accessibility, and error rates), are left to the 
discretion of the states. HAVA further specifies that such requirements 
are minimum requirements and should not be construed to prevent states 
from establishing election technology and administration requirements 
that are stricter than HAVA requirements as long as they are not 
inconsistent with certain other specified provisions. 

HAVA, in general, applies to all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. Areas covered by the law include: 

* Computerized statewide voter registration list: HAVA requires most 
states to implement a single, uniform, centralized, computerized 
statewide voter registration list to serve as the official voter 
registration list for the conduct of all elections for federal office 
in each such state.[Footnote 18] Under HAVA, the computerized statewide 
voter registration list was to have been implemented by 2004. However, 
40 states and the District of Columbia received waivers to extend the 
deadline until January 1, 2006. States are required to perform regular 
maintenance of the voter list by comparing it to state records on 
felons and deaths, and to match voter registration applicant 
information on the voter list with information in the state motor 
vehicle agency's records and Social Security Administration records, as 
appropriate. 

* Absentee ballots: HAVA contains various amendments to UOCAVA 
regarding absentee voting for absent uniformed service voters and 
certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States. 
The amendments, among other things, (1) required that the secretaries 
of each military department, to the maximum extent practicable, provide 
notice to military personnel of absentee ballot deadlines, (2) extended 
the time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application 
from UOCAVA voters, and (3) prohibited states from refusing to accept 
or process, with respect to federal elections, a voter registration 
application or an absentee ballot application by an absent uniformed 
services voter on the ground that the application was submitted before 
the first date that the state otherwise accepts or processes 
applications for that year from nonuniformed service absentee voters. 

* Provisional ballots: HAVA requires most states to implement 
provisional voting for elections for federal office.[Footnote 19] Under 
HAVA, in an election for federal office, states are to provide a 
provisional ballot to an individual asserting (1) to be registered in 
the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible 
to vote in a federal election but (3) whose name does not appear on the 
official list of eligible voters for the polling place. Provisional 
ballots are also to be provided in elections for federal office to 
individuals who an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, 
and for court-ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have 
closed. These various types of individuals, under HAVA, are to be 
permitted to cast the provisional ballot upon the execution of written 
affirmation at the polling place that they are registered voters in the 
jurisdiction and that they are eligible to vote in that election. If 
election officials determine that the individual is eligible under 
state law to vote, the individual's provisional ballot is to be counted 
as a vote in accordance with state law. HAVA also requires that a free 
access system be established to inform voters if their votes were 
counted, and if not, the reason why. 

* Polling places: HAVA provisions targeted, among other things, 
improving information at polling places and Election Day procedures. To 
improve the knowledge of voters regarding voting rights and procedures, 
HAVA requires election officials[Footnote 20] to post voting 
information at each polling place on the days of elections for federal 
office, including, for example, a sample ballot, polling place hours, 
how to vote, instructions for first-time voters who registered by mail, 
and general information on federal and state voting rights laws and 
laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. The act also authorized 
the appropriation of funds for payments to states for educating voters 
concerning voting procedures, voting rights, and voting technology. 
Under HAVA, voting systems used in elections for federal office are 
required to meet specified accessibility requirements for individuals 
with disabilities. With respect to improving accessibility, HAVA also 
authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states to be used 
for improved accessibility of polling places for, among others, 
individuals with disabilities and those with limited English 
proficiency. HAVA also requires that such voting systems provide 
individuals with disabilities with the same opportunity for access and 
participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters. 
In connection with this requirement, HAVA provides for the use of at 
least one direct recording electronic (DRE) device or other voting 
system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling 
place.[Footnote 21] 

* Identification requirements: Under HAVA, states are to require that 
certain voters who register by mail to provide specified types of 
identification when voting at the polls or send a copy of the 
identification with their mailed applications.[Footnote 22] Acceptable 
identification includes a current and valid photo identification or 
current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or 
other government document that shows the name and address of the voter. 
Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met the identification 
requirement may cast a vote under HAVA's provisional voting section. 
Similarly, mail-in ballots from persons who have not provided the 
required identification also are to be counted as HAVA provisional 
ballots. 

* Election administration: HAVA also established an agency with wide- 
ranging duties to help improve state and local administration of 
federal elections. The Election Assistance Commission is to be involved 
with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to states 
implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national 
clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the 
administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering 
programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements to 
some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop testing 
for voting systems, and standards for election equipment. EAC is led by 
four Commissioners, who are to be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners, who, under HAVA, were to be 
appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by the President in 
October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 2003. Since 
beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many of its 
objectives. Among other things, EAC has held hearings on the security 
of voting technologies and the national poll worker shortage; 
established a clearinghouse for information on election administration 
by issuing two best practices reports; 
distributed payments to states for election improvements, including 
payments for voter education and voting equipment replacement; 
drafted changes to existing federal voluntary standards for voting 
systems; and established a program to accredit the national independent 
certified laboratories that test electronic voting systems against the 
federal voluntary standards. However, EAC has reported that its delayed 
start-up affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities 
within the time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its 
fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected 
states' procurement of new voting equipment and the ability of some 
states and local jurisdictions to meet related HAVA requirements by 
statutory deadlines. 

* Voting systems: One of the primary HAVA provisions relates to 
encouraging states to replace punch card voting systems and lever 
voting systems and authorizing appropriations for payments to support 
states in making federally mandated improvements to their voting 
systems. A voting system includes the people, processes, and technology 
associated with any voting method. It encompasses the hardware and 
software used to define the ballot, conduct the vote, and transmit and 
tally results, and system maintenance and testing functions. With 
respect to standards for voting systems used in elections for federal 
office, HAVA requirements for such systems include providing voters 
with the ability to verify their votes before casting their ballots, 
producing permanent paper records for manual auditing of voting 
systems, and compliance of voting system ballot counting error rates 
with those set out in specified federal voting system standards. HAVA 
also directs that updates to the federal voluntary voting system 
standards for these requirements be in place by January 1, 
2004,[Footnote 23] and provides for additional updates to the voluntary 
standards as approved by the Election Assistance Commission. Mechanisms 
are also specified that can be used by states and localities in 
acquiring and operating voting systems, including accreditation of 
laboratories to independently test and evaluate voting systems and 
federal certification for voting systems that undergo independent 
testing. 

The time frames for implementing various HAVA requirements ranged from 
as early as 45 days after enactment (a deadline for establishing a 
grant program for payment to the states for improved election 
administration) to as late as January 1, 2006, for various voting 
system standards.[Footnote 24] Several key deadlines were set for 
January 1, 2004, including implementation of HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements and the establishment of a statewide voter registration 
list (or to request a waiver from the deadline until January 1, 2006). 
States receiving funds to replace punch card voting systems or lever 
voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1, 2006; 
otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November 
2004 general elections. The deadline for states and jurisdictions to 
comply with specific requirements for voting systems, such as producing 
a paper record for audit purposes, was January 1, 2006. 

HAVA vests enforcement authority with the Attorney General to bring a 
civil action against any state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to 
carry out specified uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology 
and administration requirements under HAVA. These requirements pertain 
to HAVA voting system standards, provisional voting and voting 
information requirements, the computerized statewide voter registration 
list requirements, and requirements for persons who register to vote by 
mail. The enforcement of federal statutes pertaining to elections and 
voting has, with certain exceptions, been delegated by the Attorney 
General to the Civil Rights Division. 

Election System Elements: 

The U.S. election system is highly decentralized and based upon a 
complex interaction of people (election officials and voters), 
processes, and technology. Each of the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia has its own election system with a somewhat distinct approach. 
Within each of these 51 systems, the guidelines and procedures 
established for local election jurisdictions can be very general or 
specific. Each election system generally incorporates elements that are 
designed to allow eligible citizens to vote and ensures that votes are 
accurately counted. While election systems vary from one local 
jurisdiction to another, most election systems have the elements 
identified in figure 7. 

Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, 
Process, and Technology: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Delegation of Election Responsibility: 

Typically, states have decentralized elections so that the details of 
administering elections are determined at the local jurisdiction. 
States can be divided into two groups according to how they delegate 
election responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first group 
include 41 states where election responsibilities are delegated to 
counties, with a few of these states delegating election 
responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state that delegates these 
responsibilities to election regions. We included the District of 
Columbia along with this group. The second group is composed of 9 
states that delegate election responsibilities to subcounty 
governmental units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor civil 
divisions (MCD). However, in 1 of these states, Minnesota, election 
functions are split between county-level governments and MCDs. For 
example, registration is handled exclusively by county officials, and 
functions, such as polling place matters, are handled by MCDs. Overall, 
about 10,500 local government jurisdictions are responsible for 
conducting elections nationwide, with the first group of states 
containing about one-fourth of the local election jurisdictions and 
about three-fourths of the local election jurisdictions located in the 
states delegating responsibilities to MCDs. Although more election 
jurisdictions are in the 9 states, most of the population (88 percent 
of the U.S. population based on the Census of 2000) lives in the states 
delegating responsibilities primarily to counties. 

Voter Registration: 

While voter registration is not a federal requirement, the District of 
Columbia and all states, except North Dakota, generally require 
citizens to register before voting.[Footnote 25] The deadline for 
registering, and what is required to register, varies; 
at a minimum, state eligibility provisions typically require a person 
to be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident of the 
state, with some states requiring a minimum residency period. Citizens 
apply to register to vote in various ways, such as at motor vehicle 
agencies, during voter registration drives, by mail, or at local voter 
registrar offices. Election officials process registration applications 
and compile and maintain the list of registered voters to be used 
throughout the administration of an election. Prior to HAVA, voter 
registration lists were not necessarily centralized at the state level, 
and separate lists were often managed by local election officials. HAVA 
requires voter registration information for federal elections to be 
maintained as a statewide computerized list and matched with certain 
state data, and that voter registration application information be 
matched with certain state data and, in some cases, with federal data, 
to help ensure that the voter list is accurate. 

Absentee and Early Voting: 

All states and the District of Columbia have provisions allowing voters 
to cast their ballot before Election Day by voting absentee with 
variations on who may vote absentee, whether the voter needs an excuse, 
and the time frames for applying and submitting absentee ballots. In 
addition, some states also allow early voting, in which the voter goes 
to a specific location to vote in person prior to Election Day. As with 
absentee voting, the specific circumstances for early voting--such as 
the dates, times, and locations--are based on the state and local 
requirements. In general, early voting allows voters from any precinct 
in the jurisdiction to cast their vote before Election Day either at 
one specific location or at one of several locations. The early voting 
locations are staffed by poll workers who have a registration list for 
the jurisdiction and ballots specific to each precinct. The voter is 
provided with and casts a ballot for his or her assigned precinct. 

Conducting Elections: 

Election officials perform a broad range of activities in preparation 
for and on Election Day itself. Prior to an election, officials recruit 
and train poll workers to have the skills needed to perform their 
Election Day duties, such as opening and closing the polls, operating 
polling place equipment, and explaining and implementing provisional 
voting procedures for certain voters such as those who are not on the 
registration list. Where needed and required, election officials must 
also recruit poll workers who speak languages other than English. 
Polling places have to be identified as meeting basic standards for 
accessibility and having an infrastructure to support voting machines 
as well as voter and poll worker needs. Ballots are designed and 
produced to meet state requirements, voter language needs, and identify 
all races, candidates, and issues on which voters in each precinct in 
their jurisdiction will vote. Election officials seek to educate voters 
on topics such as what the ballot looks like, how to use a voting 
machine, and where their particular polling place is located. Finally, 
election officials seek to ensure that voting equipment, ballots, and 
supplies are delivered to polling places. 

On Election Day, poll workers set up and open the polling places. This 
can include tasks such as setting up the voting machines or voting 
booths, readying supplies, testing equipment, posting required signs 
and voter education information, and completing paperwork such as 
confirming that the ballot is correct for the precinct. Before a voter 
receives a ballot or is directed to a voting machine, poll workers 
typically are to verify his or her eligibility. The assistance provided 
to voters who are in the wrong precinct depends on the practices for 
that particular location. 

Provisional Voting: 

One of the most significant post-2000 election reforms found in HAVA, 
according to the Election Assistance Commission, is that states are 
required to permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast a 
provisional ballot in federal elections.[Footnote 26] More 
specifically, states are to provide a provisional ballot to an 
individual asserting to be (1) registered in the jurisdiction for which 
he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal 
election, but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of 
eligible voters for the polling place. In addition, provisional ballots 
are to be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who 
an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court- 
ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have closed. 
Although many states had some form of provisional balloting prior to 
the passage of HAVA, 44 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
were required to provide provisional ballots for the 2004 general 
election. Under HAVA, 6 states were exempt from HAVA's provisional 
voting requirements because they either permitted voters to register on 
Election Day or did not require voter registration.[Footnote 27] If 
individuals are determined to be eligible voters, their provisional 
ballots are to be counted as votes in accordance with state law, along 
with other types of ballots, and included in the total election 
results. 

Vote Counting and Recounting: 

Following the close of the polls, election officials and poll workers 
complete a number of basic steps to get the votes counted and determine 
the outcome of the election. Equipment and ballots are to be secured, 
and votes are to be tallied or transferred to a central location for 
counting. The processes used to count or to recount election votes vary 
with the type of voting equipment used in a jurisdiction, state 
statutes, and local jurisdiction policies. Votes from Election Day, 
absentee ballots, early votes (where applicable), and provisional 
ballots are to be counted and consolidated for each race to determine 
the outcome. While preliminary results are available usually by the 
evening of Election Day, the certified results are generally not 
available until days later. Some states establish a deadline for 
certification of results, while other states do not. 

Voting Methods and Technologies: 

Voting methods are tools for accommodating the millions of voters in 
our nation's approximately 10,000 local election jurisdictions. Since 
the 1980s, ballots in the United States have been cast and counted 
using five methods: paper ballots, lever machines, punch cards, optical 
scan, and DREs. Four of the five methods by which votes are cast and 
counted involve technology; only the paper ballot system does not use 
technology. The three newer methods--punch card, optical scan, and DRE-
-depend on computers to tally votes. Punch card and optical scan 
methods rely on paper ballots that are marked by the voter, while many 
DREs use computers to present the ballot to the voter. Voting systems 
utilize technology in different ways to implement these basic voting 
methods. For instance, some punch card systems include the names of 
candidates and issues on the printed punch card, while others use a 
booklet of candidates and issues that must be physically aligned with 
the punch card. The way systems are designed, developed, tested, 
installed, and operated can lead to a variety of situations where 
misunderstanding, confusion, error, or deliberate actions by voters or 
election workers can, in turn, affect the equipment's performance in 
terms of accuracy, ease of use, security, reliability, and efficiency. 
In fact, some recent election controversies have been specifically 
associated with particular voting methods and systems. Nevertheless, 
all voting methods and systems can benefit from established information 
technology management practices that effectively integrate the people, 
processes, technologies. 

Scope and Methodology: 

For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials 
in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a 
nationally representative stratified random probability sample of 788 
local election jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with 
election officials in 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Copies of 
the survey instruments are in appendixes II and III. In addition, the 
results of our state and local surveys are presented in two 
supplemental GAO products that can be found on our Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 28] Appendix IV provides a 
summary of jurisdictions we visited. In reporting the state survey 
data, actual numbers of states are provided. When reporting local 
jurisdiction survey data, we provide estimates for jurisdictions 
nationwide. Unless otherwise noted, the maximum sampling error, with 95 
percent confidence, for estimates of all jurisdictions from our local 
jurisdiction survey is plus or minus 5 percentage points 
(rounded).[Footnote 29] We also provide some national estimates by 
jurisdiction population size, and the sampling errors for these 
estimates are slightly higher. For these estimates, large jurisdictions 
are defined as those with a population over 100,000, medium 
jurisdictions have a population of over 10,000 to 100,000, and small 
jurisdictions have a population of 10,000 or less. Unless otherwise 
noted, all estimates from our local jurisdiction survey are within our 
planned confidence intervals. 

Jurisdictions in which we conducted on-site interviews were chosen 
based on a wide variety of characteristics, including voting methods 
used, geographic characteristics, and aspects of election 
administration, such as whether early voting was offered. We did not 
select jurisdictions we visited on the basis of size, but as 
appropriate, we identify the size of a jurisdiction we visited using 
the same groupings we used for our nationwide mail survey. 

We also reviewed extensive prior GAO work and other national studies 
and reports, and attended an annual election official conference. A 
comprehensive description of our methodology for this report is 
contained in appendix V. 

We conducted our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in 
Washington, D.C; Dallas; Los Angeles; and 28 local election 
jurisdictions in 14 states, in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 2: 
Voter Registration: 

In general, the goal of a voter registration system is to ensure that 
eligible citizens who complete all the steps required of them to 
register to vote in their jurisdictions are able to have their 
registrations processed accurately and in a timely fashion, so they may 
be included on the rolls in time for Election Day. The November 2000 
general election resulted in widespread concerns about voter 
registration in the United States. Headlines and reports questioned the 
mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration by highlighting 
accounts of individuals who thought they were registered being turned 
away from polling places on Election Day, the fraudulent use of the 
names of dead people to cast additional votes, and jurisdictions 
incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter 
registration lists. With the passage of HAVA,[Footnote 30] with respect 
to federal elections, most states were required to establish statewide 
computerized voter registration lists and perform certain list 
maintenance activities as a means to improve upon the accuracy of voter 
registration lists.[Footnote 31] List maintenance is performed by 
election officials and consists of updating registrants' information 
and deleting duplicate registrations and the names of registrants who 
are no longer eligible to vote. 

The voter registration process includes the integration of people, 
processes, and technology involved in registering eligible voters and 
in compiling and maintaining accurate and complete voter registration 
lists. In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter 
registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two 
goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons registering to vote, 
and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those 
eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not 
inadvertently removed from the voter registration lists. This has been 
a challenging task, and remains so, as we and others have noted. While 
registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system 
generally, applying to register and being registered are not 
synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the 
voter registration applications they receive. This chapter describes 
various HAVA and state changes related to the voter registration 
processes that have occurred since the 2000 general election. It also 
examines continuing and new registration challenges encountered by 
local jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. 

Overview: 

With respect to voter registration, a significant change since the 2000 
general election is the HAVA requirement for states to each establish a 
single, uniform, statewide, computerized voter registration list for 
conducting elections for federal office. The HAVA requirements for 
states to develop statewide lists and verify voter information against 
state and federal agency records presented a significant shift in voter 
list management in many states. While the initial deadline to implement 
HAVA's statewide list requirement was January 1, 2004, more than 40 
states took advantage of a waiver allowing an extra 2 years to complete 
the task, or until January 1, 2006. The statewide registration lists 
for federal elections are intended to implement a system capable of 
maintaining voter registration lists that are more accurate by 
requiring states to (1) match voter registration application 
information against other state and federal agency databases or records 
to help ensure that only eligible voters are added to such lists, (2) 
identify certain types of ineligible voters whose names should be 
removed from the lists, and (3) identify individual voter names that 
appear more than once on the list to be removed from the lists. While 
HAVA defined some parameters for the required statewide voter 
registration lists and required matching voter information with certain 
state and federal records, the act leaves the choices on the methods of 
implementing such statewide list requirement to the discretion of the 
states. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, states 
varied in the progress made in implementing their statewide voter 
registrations lists, how they have implemented these systems, and the 
capabilities of their systems to match information with other state and 
federal agency records as well as many other features of the state 
systems. 

In addition to requiring states to develop statewide voter registration 
lists, HAVA provides that states must require that mail registrants who 
have not previously voted in a federal election in the state are to 
provide certain specified types of identification with their mail 
application, and if they do not provide such identification with their 
application, these first-time mail registrants are to provide the 
identification at the polls. Furthermore, if such a voter does not have 
the requisite identification at the polls, HAVA requires that the voter 
be provided a provisional ballot with the status of his or her ballot 
to be determined by the appropriate state or local official. As with 
the statewide voter registration list requirement, HAVA leaves the 
choices on the methods of implementing the provisional voting 
requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of interviews 
of officials in 28 local election jurisdictions, implementation of the 
requirement for first-time voters who registered by mail varied. One 
noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration, where 
some local jurisdictions we visited told us that applications received 
through voter registration drives would be treated as mail 
registrations subject to HAVA identification requirements and other 
local jurisdictions we visited told us applications from registration 
drives were not treated as mail registrations and therefore were not 
treated as subject to HAVA identification requirements. 

As noted above, during 2004 and 2005 many states were in the process of 
implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and 
associated requirements for maintaining the lists. Thus, the potential 
benefits to be gained from HAVA's requirement for the statewide voter 
registration lists were not evident in many states at the time of the 
November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA 
intended to help states and local election jurisdictions to have access 
to more accurate voter registration list information, such as 
identifying duplicate registrations and matching the voter information 
against other state agency databases or records, were not yet fully 
implemented by many states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet 
seeing the benefits of being able to verify voter registration 
application information with state motor vehicle agency databases to 
identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists with 
state vital statistics agency records to identify deceased persons, and 
to appropriate state agency's records to identify felons who may be 
ineligible to vote. Thus, on the basis of our nationwide survey and 
local election jurisdictions we visited, many local jurisdictions 
continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists 
that they had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as 
difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter 
registration information, multiple registrations, or ineligible voters 
appearing on the list. In addition, election officials in some 
jurisdictions we visited told us they continued to face challenges 
obtaining voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies 
and other NVRA entities.[Footnote 32] 

In addition, for some local election jurisdictions we visited, election 
officials told us that efforts on the part of various groups to get out 
the vote by registering new voters through voter registration drives 
created new challenges not identified to us as a problem in the 2000 
general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large 
volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines 
for registration, which included challenges in some large jurisdictions 
to resolve issues of incomplete or inaccurate (and potentially 
fraudulent) applications submitted by entities conducting voter 
registration drives. 

Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: 

HAVA requires states to, among other things, (a) implement a single, 
uniform, computerized statewide voter registration list for conducting 
elections for federal office;[Footnote 33] (b) perform regular 
maintenance by comparing the voter list against state records on felons 
and deaths; (c) verify information on voter registration applications 
with information in state motor vehicle agency databases or with a 
Social Security Administration database, as appropriate. In addition, 
HAVA imposes new identification requirements for certain mail 
registrants--such as, individuals