This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-450 entitled 'Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 General Election' which was released on June 8, 2006. This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Report to Congressional Committees: Untied States Government Accountability Office: GAO: June 2006: Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 General Election: GAO-06-450: GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-06-450, a report to congressional committees. Why GAO Did This Study: The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the nation’s elections processes, not all of which had to be implemented by the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 local election jurisdictions about election administration activities (80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election system characteristics. What GAO Found: In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best practice guides and voluntary voting system standards and distributed federal funds to states for improving election administration, including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process. GAO found that states made changes—either as a result of HAVA or on their own—to address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 election. GAO also found that some challenges continued—such as problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter registration drives; larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote certification deadlines. Figure: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology: [See PDF for Image] [End of Figure] What GAO Recommends: GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-450]. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-451SP]. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-452SP]. To view the full product or the related surveys, click on the links above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512- 8777 or JenkinsWO@gao.gov. [End of Section] Contents: Transmittal Letter: Executive Summary: Purpose: Background: Results in Brief: Principal Findings: Concluding Observations: Chapter 1: Election Authority: Election System Elements: Scope and Methodology: Chapter 2: Overview: Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and Other NVRA Entities Remained a Challenge: Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large Volume of Voter Registration Applications for the November 2004 General Election: Concluding Observations: Chapter 3: Overview: Absentee Voting: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting: Early Voting: Concluding Observations: Chapter 4: Overview: HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election Administration: Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for All Prospective Voters: Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll Workers Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on Challenges Training Poll Workers: Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued to Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge: Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by Most Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in Other Jurisdictions Did Not: Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Third- Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election Day 2004: Concluding Observations: Chapter 5: Overview: Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA Requirement for Provisional Ballots: State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election 218: State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted: A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted: Concluding Observations: Chapter 6: Overview: In the 2004 General Election the Vote-Counting Process Remained Complex and Marked by Local Diversity: For the 2004 General Election, More States Had Requirements or Guidance for Determining Voter Intent: Recounts and Contested Elections Remained Uncommon for the November 2004 General Election: Several States Had Further Developed Their Specifications for an Election Recount since the 2000 General Election: Vote Count Audits Were Not Prevalent in the 2004 General Election, but Some States Reported Taking Action to Require Them: Local Jurisdictions Reported Some Mistakes and Technical Challenges in Counting Votes for the 2004 General Election: In the 2004 General Election, Some Election Jurisdictions Reported Difficulty Meeting Deadlines for Certifying the Final Vote Count: The Recount in Washington State Revealed the Intricacies of the Election Process, but Also Yielded Many State Reforms: Concluding Observations: Chapter 7: Overview: Voting Methods Vary among Jurisdictions and Are Being Influenced by States' Choices and HAVA: Voting Equipment Performance Was Not Consistently Measured during the 2004 General Election, but Estimated Levels of Performance Satisfaction Were High: Attention to Voting System Security Management Continues to Vary amid Published Concerns and Federal Improvement Efforts: Certain Types of Tests and Evaluations Were Widely Performed on Voting Systems, while Others Were Less Common: Information on Jurisdictions' Election Technology Integration Is Limited, but Current and Emerging Technologies Offer Greater Opportunities: Concluding Observations: Appendixes: Appendix I: Related GAO Products: Appendix II: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials: Appendix III: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions: Appendix IV: Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions GAO Visited: Appendix V: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: Appendix VI: Voter Registration Deadlines for States and the District of Columbia: Appendix VII: Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions Visited: Appendix VIII: Selected State Statutory Requirements for Absentee Voting: Appendix IX: State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods: Appendix X: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for Local Jurisdictions to Use Federal Standards for Voting Systems: Appendix XI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: Glossary: Tables: Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed Names from Voter Registration List for 2004 General Election for Various Reasons: Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged in Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering Completed Voter- Registration Applications: Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems in Processing Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When Absentee Ballot Applications Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in Processing Submitted Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when Absentee Ballots Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote More than Once, November 2004 General Election: Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were Actually Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, November 2004 General Election: Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by Jurisdiction Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error Problems on Absentee Applications That Used the Federal Post Card Application, November 2004 General Election: Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines from Inside and Outside the United States, November 2004 General Election: Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the District of Columbia, November 2004 General Election: Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Staff Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 2004 General Election: Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Methods to Train Early Voting Staff, November 2004 General Election: Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting Methods and Accommodations for the November 2004 General Election: Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter Education Prior to the November 2004 General Election: Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide That Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for the November 2004 Election under Various Scenarios: Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Various Methods to Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their Provisional Ballot, November 2004: Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected Jurisdictions: Table 21: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Having Written Ballot Security Policies and Procedures, November 2004 General Election: Table 22: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Particular Voting Methods by Ballot Type for the November 2004 Election: Table 23: States Reported Changes to Recount Provisions since 2000 for the 2004 General Election: Table 24: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: Table 25: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: Table 26: Voting System Security Topics Addressed in Security Plans Submitted by Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: Table 27: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with Common Time Frames and Responsibilities: Table 28: Population in Each State Group: Table 29: Local Election Survey Sample Allocation: Table 30: Local Election Jurisdiction Survey Response Rates, Overall and by Sample Strata: Table 31: Local Election Jurisdictions Visited: Table 32: States Reporting on November 2004 General Election Registration Deadlines: Table 33: Selected Information on Jurisdictions We Visited That Had Early Voting: Table 34: Selected State Requirements for Domestic Absentee Voting, November 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Table 35: States' Mail-in Absentee Ballot Application and Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines for Inside the United States, November 2004 General Election: Table 36: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places: Table 37: State Provisions for Alternative Voting Methods and Accommodations: Table 38: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places and Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities for the November 2004 General Election: Table 39: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for Use of Voluntary Federal Standards for New Voting Systems for the November 2006 General Election: Figures Figures: Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 2004 General Election: Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election: Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology: Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter Registration Information with State Records: Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of January 2006, Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter Registration List to Enter, Update, and Query Information: Figure 10: States' Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match Voter Registration Information with State Death Records and Felony Conviction Records: Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the Voter Had Registered Elsewhere: Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for First- Time Mail Registrants: Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process: Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for 2004 General Election: Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications Documented by a Large Jurisdiction in 2004: Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with Insufficient Election Workers to Process Voter Registration Applications: Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had Names on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to Be Fraudulent and Volume of Fraudulent Applications Identified for the 2004 General Election: Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process: Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the Inclusion of Affidavit Information--One with Certification on Inner Envelope and One with Certification on Outer Envelope--for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Problems Processing Absentee Applications because the Applicant Did Not Meet the Excuse Required by State Law, November 2004 General Election: Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking for Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General Election: Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after the November 2004 General Election: Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported Providing Early Voting as an Option in the November 2004 General Election: Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered Early Voting for Various Time Periods, November 2004 General Election: Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform Prospective Voters of New Identification Requirements: Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 General Election: Figure 30: States' Reported Identification Requirements for Prospective Voters for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Enough Poll Workers with Specific Political Party Affiliation for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Poll Workers with Information Technology Skills or Computer Literacy for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions We Visited: Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire: Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Were Accessible to Voters with Disabilities for November 2004 General Election: Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot: Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election Day: Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope: Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter Affidavit: Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for Poll Workers in Champaign, Illinois: Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted: Figure 47: Sealed Voting Equipment Bag: Figure 48: Punch Card Tabulator Connected to Computer: Figure 49: Punch Card Voting Booth: Figure 50: New Hampshire Guidance for Determining Voter Intent on Paper Ballots: Figure 51: Number of States Reporting Federal and Statewide Recounts for the 2004 Primary or General Elections: Figure 52: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election: Figure 53: Examples of Voting Equipment: Figure 54: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant Voting Methods in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Figure 55: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 56: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire Particular Voting Systems before the November 2006 General Election: Figure 57: State-Reported Status of Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment in 2000, 2004, and 2006: Figure 58: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Single and Multiple Voting Methods in the November 2004 General Election: Figure 59: Precinct Count Optical Scan Voting Equipment: Figure 60: State-Reported Involvement in the Use of Specific Voting Methods in the 2004 and 2006 General Elections: Figure 61: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Identifying Factors That Influenced Buying or Leasing Voting Equipment since the 2000 General Election: Figure 62: Federal Payments to States in Fiscal Year 2003 under HAVA to Replace Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment: Figure 63: Example of DRE Instructions and Equipment: Figure 64: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Voting System Performance Information for the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Figure 65: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 66: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 67: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: Figure 68: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting System Efficiency for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 69: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Satisfied with Voting System Performance for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 70: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Identified Security Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 71: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Security Controls in the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 72: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Documented Security Policies or Procedures for Their Voting Systems in the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 73: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Established Policies or Procedures for Electronic Transmission of Voted Ballots in the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: Figure 74: State-Reported Standards Required for Voting Systems: Figure 75: State-Reported Voting System Certification Requirements for the 2004 General Election: Figure 76: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Conducting Postelection Voting System Audits for the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: Figure 77: Examples of Portable Memory Cards and Cartridges Used with Voting Equipment: Figure 78: Examples of Ballot Tabulation Equipment and Environments: Figure 79: Example of an Assembly for Producing a Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail for DRE Voting Equipment: Figure 80: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Networking or Remote Access for Voting Equipment in the 2004 General Election: Figure 81: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Automated Election Support for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 82: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire Voting Equipment: Abbreviations: ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act: DRE: direct recording electronic: EAC: Election Assistance Commission: FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: FEC: Federal Election Commission: FPCA: Federal Post Card Application: FVAP: Federal Voting Assistance Program: HAVA: Help America Vote Act: MCD: minor civil division: MVA: motor vehicle agency: NASED: National Association of State Election Directors: NIST: National Institute for Standards and Technology: NVRA: National Voter Registration Act: PKI: public key infrastructure: SSA: Social Security Administration: UOCAVA: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: VVPT: Transmittal Letter: June 6, 2006: Congressional Committees: The November 2004 presidential election was not as close as the 2000 presidential election, but it still raised concerns about our election processes. Following the 2004 general election, a number of members of Congress asked GAO to review aspects of that election. In response to these requests, GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, for each major stage of the election process--voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting elections, provisional voting, and counting the votes--plus voting methods, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement the Help America Vote Act, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election. Copies of this report are being sent to the congressional leadership and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Science. Copies will also be sent to state election officials and the election official for the District of Columbia and local elections jurisdictions that participated in our research and will be made available to other interested parties upon request. As a courtesy, we are providing other members of Congress a copy of the report's highlights page and executive summary. If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777; or William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, at (202) 512-8757. They can also be reached by e-mail at rabkinn@gao.gov and jenkinswo@gao.gov, respectively. Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix XI. Signed by: David M. Walker: Comptroller General of the United States: List of Congressional Committees: The Honorable Trent Lott: Chairman: The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Rules and Administration: United States Senate: The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers, III: Chairman: The Honorable Juanita Millender-McDonald: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on House Administration: House of Representatives: The Honorable Arlen Specter: Chairman: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on the Judiciary: United States Senate: The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman: The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member: Committee on the Judiciary: House of Representatives: The Honorable Susan M. Collins: Chairman: The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: United States Senate: The Honorable Tom Davis: Chairman: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Government Reform: House of Representatives: [End of section] Executive Summary: Purpose: Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the foundation of our democracy. All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, should be able to cast their votes and have their validly cast votes counted accurately. Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting systems raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. Subsequently, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted,[Footnote 1] and major election reforms are now being implemented. The November 2004 general election highlighted some of the same challenges as in 2000 as well as some new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both elections highlighted the importance of the interaction of people, processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and maintaining public confidence that our election system works. The November 2004 general election was the first federal election that tested changes states have made to their systems of election administration since the 2000 general election and the first presidential election since the enactment of HAVA. HAVA includes a number of provisions related to the administration of federal elections affecting voter registration, absentee voting, voting systems, and other election administration activities. The November 2004 general election was not as close or contentious as the 2000 general election, but media reports, interest groups, and members of Congress raised concerns about various aspects of the elections process. Following the November 2004 election, a number of members of Congress asked us to review aspects of that election. In response to these requests, we initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress using an approach similar to that we used to examine election issues following the November 2000 election. During the design of the review, GAO kept key committees of jurisdiction and interested parties informed of its work. This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States and the November 2004 election. It discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election for each major stage of the election process--voter registration, absentee and early voting, Election Day preparation and activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--and for voting technology. Background: In the United States, election authority is shared by federal, state, and local entities. In addition to HAVA, federal laws have been enacted in several major areas of the voting process such as the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which was designed to expand the opportunities for citizens to register to vote in federal elections by allowing registration by mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) and other public agencies, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), which facilitated absentee voting by these populations. The U.S. election system is highly decentralized, with primary responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections residing at the local jurisdiction level--generally, the county level in most states, but some states have delegated election responsibility to subcounty governmental units. Subcounty election jurisdictions in 9 states account for about 75 percent of about 10,500 local election jurisdictions in the United States, but about 12 percent of the 2000 U.S. Census population. Local election jurisdictions vary widely in size and complexity, ranging from small New England townships to Los Angeles County, whose number of registered voters exceeds that of many states. Our election system is based upon a complex interaction of people (voters, election officials, and poll workers), processes (controls), and technology that must work effectively together to achieve a successful election. Every stage of the election process-- registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting Election Day activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--is affected by the interface of people, processes, and technology. Following the November 2000 general election, GAO issued a series of reports addressing a range of issues that emerged during that election.[Footnote 2] These reports also identified challenges that election officials reported they faced in major stages of the election process. We have also issued reports since the November 2004 general election on voter registration issues and security and reliability of electronic voting. As appropriate, information from our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide was used as a basis for determining changes since 2000.[Footnote 3] Our more recent reports were used to supplement this report on challenges election officials faced in the November 2004 election. Our methodology for this report included a Web-based survey of all 50 states and the District of Columbia (all 51 responded) and a mail questionnaire sent to a representative probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions nationwide, stratified by population (632, or 80 percent, responded). We also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of 28 local election jurisdictions in 14 states, selected to reflect variation in such factors as geographic location, whether early voting was offered, whether recounts for federal or statewide offices occurred, and voting technology used.[Footnote 4] Some of the 28 jurisdictions visited were among those we had visited for our 2001 election report. In stratifying our nationwide mail survey of local election jurisdictions, we grouped election jurisdictions by their 2000 U.S. Census population--small (less than 10,000), medium (10,000 to 100,000), and large (more than 100,000). These categories are also used in this report to describe jurisdictions we visited. The results of our state and local surveys are presented in two supplemental products that can be found on our Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 5] Results in Brief: The most prevalent changes to state and local elections systems since the 2000 presidential election were changes required under HAVA, which, among other things, established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) with wide-ranging duties that include providing information and assistance to states and local jurisdictions with regard to election administration. EAC is led by four Commissioners who are to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners who, under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives; however, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states' procurement of new voting systems and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. In addition, HAVA included specific changes to certain aspects of state administration of federal elections. Some key changes included requirements for states to implement statewide voter registration lists, a requirement that certain first-time mail registrants provide identification with their registration application or when they vote for the first time at the polls, and a requirement that most states permit, under certain circumstances, the casting of provisional ballots--those cast by voters at the polls whose eligibility to vote is unclear and to be determined later--in elections for federal office. HAVA also provided for funding to encourage states to replace their punch card and lever voting equipment, and set out voting system standards that state voting systems used in federal elections must meet. While HAVA defined some parameters for these requirements, the act leaves the states discretion in choosing the methods of implementing them. It is too early to determine the full effect that HAVA's requirements may have on the elections process because those requirements are in different stages of implementation. States had to implement HAVA's requirements for provisional voting and identification for first-time voters who register by mail prior to the November 2004 election. However, 41 states obtained waivers, allowed under HAVA, to delay the implementation of their statewide voter registration systems from January 1, 2004, to January 1, 2006. Moreover, states are in different stages of replacing their older voting equipment, such as punch card and lever machines, with newer technology. On the basis of our surveys of states and local jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, we found that states varied in their progress in implementing their statewide voter registration lists and how they have implemented their voting systems. Except for the 9 states that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA's requirements for establishing a statewide voter registration lists, all other states subject to the statewide list requirement were not required to perform list maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended waiver deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election, states were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related to their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and procedures at the state and local level for performing required list maintenance functions. Thus, states are still working to fully implement HAVA's voter registration requirements. As states gain more experience with their statewide voter registration and data-matching systems and processes, it is likely their systems and processes will evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is to be expected. We also found that implementation of the identification provision for certain first-time mail registrants varied. One noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration: Some local jurisdictions we visited said that applications received through voter registration drives would be treated as mail registrations and thus would be subject to the HAVA identification requirements. Other local jurisdictions we visited said applications from registration drives were not to be treated as mail registrations and therefore were not subject to the HAVA identification requirements. As to the other two provisions, the results of GAO's survey of state and local officials and jurisdictions we visited showed that states varied in their implementation of HAVA's requirement for provisional voting. One variation of particular note during the November 2004 election was the difference in state requirements regarding the location where voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for them to be counted. For example, in some jurisdictions, once the voter's eligibility to vote had been verified, the provisional ballot was counted if it was cast within the voter's county of residence, while in other jurisdictions the ballot was counted only if the voter had cast it in the assigned precinct. Notwithstanding these variations for implementing provisional voting, it is clear that provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote. Many states have taken advantage of federal funding to replace their punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that large jurisdictions are replacing older voting equipment with more technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and constitute the majority of jurisdictions across the United States. On the basis of states' reported plans and local jurisdictions' estimated plans for acquiring voting systems for future elections, the election technology environment can be characterized as varied and evolving. Accordingly, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall election process. In addition to reporting the required HAVA changes, some states reported having taken other actions since the 2000 general election to reform election administration; for example, 6 states reported they had eliminated the need for an excuse to vote absentee, and 9 states reported establishing procedures to conduct an automatic recount (audit), in full or in part, of the vote tabulation to help ensure accuracy of the vote prior to certification. Election officials identified challenges faced in the November 2004 general election. Some of these challenges were also identified as challenges in GAO's October 2001 comprehensive report on the election processes, while others were raised with us for the first time. Continuing Challenges in 2004: * Voter registration. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local jurisdictions reported that they continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as difficulties related to voter registration applications with inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations by the same person, or ineligible voters appearing on the list. Election jurisdictions also continued to face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities. * Absentee voting. The results of our nationwide survey indicate that election jurisdictions continued to experience absentee voting challenges that included receiving late absentee voter applications and ballots, managing large workloads with inadequate resources, addressing voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee applications, and preventing potential fraud. Although election officials in jurisdictions we visited provided examples of procedures used to help protect against fraud such as comparing signatures on absentee applications to signatures on registration applications, election officials still suspected instances of fraud. In 1 jurisdiction we visited, election officials reported they referred to the district attorney for investigation matters pertaining to 44 individuals who allegedly voted absentee ballots with invalid signatures. * Election Day activities. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local jurisdictions reported that they encountered many of the same challenges preparing for and conducting Election Day activities in the November 2004 general election as they did in November 2000, including recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled poll workers, locating a sufficient number of polling places that met requirements, designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were many candidates or issues to include, having long lines at polling places, and handling the large volume of telephone calls received from voters and poll workers on Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that large jurisdictions and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions encountered these challenges more than small jurisdictions. * Vote counting. On the basis of interviews with election officials, many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology for vote counting that had confronted election officials across the country in the November 2000 general election continued to be a challenge for them in the 2004 general election. Voting equipment problems, poll worker errors, and voter errors were reported as making it difficult to tabulate the votes quickly and accurately. * Voting technology. According to our local jurisdiction survey and visits, voting system performance measures have not been systematically embraced, reliable performance data have not been collected, and security and testing activities have not been consistently required and performed for all voting systems. As a result, effective management of voting technology remains a challenge for many states and local jurisdictions because election officials may continue to use a patchwork of operational indicators and anecdotal experiences, rather than requirements-based information on voting system performance, to support decisions regarding voting system investments and operations. New Challenges in 2004: * Registrations from registration drives. Election officials in some local election jurisdictions we visited reported that efforts of various groups to "get out the vote" by registering new voters through voter registration drives created new challenges not identified to us in the 2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines for registration. The conditions that election officials reported experiencing in processing the volume of voter registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully train temporary workers, can result in data entry errors that would have the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not identifying ineligible voters. Moreover, while not reported as a prevalent problem, applications received from voter registration drives was a challenge reported by election officials, who said that some of these applications had incomplete or invalid addresses, fictitious names, or questionable signatures. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names. * Early voting. Election officials reported encountering new challenges managing early voting. Some local jurisdictions we visited reported that they experienced long lines at early voting locations resulting from larger than expected early voter turnout. In some jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that factors such as inadequate planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that could be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management of large early voter turnout. * New UOCAVA provision. A new challenge could develop for election officials as a result of a HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States, this 2002 amendment extended the period of time that can be covered by a single application from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the next two subsequent general elections for federal office, or 4 years. However, election officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when uniformed services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, absentee ballots may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the Federal Post Card Application form where voters can indicate that they want ballots for one federal election only, election officials were concerned that many absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable. * Third-party polling place activities. Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited in states where the presidential race was considered close (often referred to as battleground states) reported encountering challenges with disruptive third-party (e.g., poll watchers, observers, and electioneers) activities at polling places on Election Day. In some instances, these third parties simply increased the number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling location; in others, election officials told us third-party observers' behavior negatively affected poll workers and voters. * Provisional voting. The implementation of provisional voting requirements as specified under HAVA highlighted another instance where states varied in their election systems, with somewhat distinct approaches for providing and counting provisional ballots. That is, states reported various differences in their counting processes such as the prescribed location (e.g., county or precinct) in which a voter must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be counted. Another way states varied included circumstances, apart from those specified in HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot. States also varied in the design of provisional ballots and how they tracked them. * Vote counting deadlines. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to election officials with respect to counting the votes: Some jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps required to verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for tallying the final vote count. * Voting systems. States and local jurisdictions face a broad challenge in ensuring consistent accuracy, integrity, and security among their voting systems in light of their adoption of various versions of federal voluntary voting system standards containing somewhat different--and, in some cases, outdated--performance thresholds for voting equipment. Adoption of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines by EAC on December 13, 2005, provided updated criteria that states and local jurisdictions can choose to apply when evaluating and certifying their voting equipment. Organizations involved with voting system certification--including federal, state, and local governments; testing authorities; and vendors--may need the capacity to assume the workloads associated with the adoption of current standards, including upgrading, testing, and certifying newly acquired voting systems to meet the standards, particularly if the standards are to be applied to the 2006 general election. Furthermore, as states and jurisdictions move to a more integrated suite of election systems, proactive and systematic efforts in areas such as standards will be essential to addressing emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions among systems and managing risks in this dynamic election environment. Principal Findings: Voter Registration: In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons of registering to vote, and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the registration lists. During 2004 and 2005, many states were in the process of implementing their HAVA- required statewide voter registration lists and associated requirements for maintaining such a list. Thus, the potential benefits to be gained from HAVA's requirement for a statewide voter registration list were not evident in many states at the time of the November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA intended to help states and local election jurisdictions have access to more accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying duplicate registrations and matching the voter information against other state agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being able to verify voter registration application information with state motor vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists with a state agency's records to identify felons who may be ineligible to vote. Local jurisdictions also encountered instances where voters claimed to be registered to vote and their names were not on the voter registration list. When this occurs, under HAVA's provisional voting requirements, states must permit voters to cast provisional ballots if the voters assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction where they desire to vote and are eligible to vote in a federal election. The results of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that many local jurisdictions encountered problems determining whether a provisional ballot was eligible to be counted where voters claimed to have registered at a motor vehicle agency or at another NVRA entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter had submitted a registration application at one of those offices. While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system generally, applying to register and being registered are not synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the voter registration applications they receive. Local election jurisdictions continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists for the November 2004 election such as difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations, and ineligible voters appearing on the lists. The surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of registration with assurances that only eligible voters are on the registration rolls. In some cases, election officials reported that hundreds or thousands of applications were submitted just before the registration deadline and close to Election Day. According to our nationwide survey and visits to selected jurisdictions, entering voter registrations in a timely manner presented a challenge for some election officials in marshaling the needed resources, including in some cases hiring and training temporary employees, to review the applications, obtain missing or incomplete information from applicants, determine that the registrants were eligible to vote in the jurisdiction, and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were added to the voter registration rolls prior to Election Day. As shown in figure 1, we estimate that 19 percent of jurisdictions nationwide received applications just prior to the registration deadline that posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day, with large jurisdictions experiencing problems more than medium and small jurisdictions.[Footnote 6] Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. [End of figure] During our site visits, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that on a daily basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data entry. As a result, election officials reported that they hired 80 full- time temporary workers who worked two full-time shifts to enter all eligible applications into the voter registration list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in another large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about 10,000 last-minute registration applications. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and election officials in jurisdictions we visited, many local election jurisdictions had processes to help manage receipt of voter registration applications such as training for MVA and other NVRA entities' staff and local election office's staff for data entry and tracking of registration application forms. However, some local jurisdictions did not report having such management processes. We estimate that 76 percent of all jurisdictions provided training to data entry staff about the processing and inputting of registration applications, and we estimate that over half of all jurisdictions tracked incoming registration applications to ascertain the total number received, the number entered into registration lists, and the number not processed because of omission or application error, and to identify ineligible voters based on age or residence. In addition, some local jurisdictions we visited reported that they implemented processes such as tracking the number of applications distributed and the source from which applications are received, and providing receipts to voter registrants to help alleviate problems encountered with properly registering voters. In addition to challenges encountered processing the large volume of registration applications received through voter registration drives, on the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported receiving voter registration applications that had irregularities. For example, election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported receiving applications that were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were incomplete, or had invalid addresses. Election officials in another jurisdiction also reported receiving applications with fictitious names and fake signatures. Generally, election officials reported that the number of applications that were irregular were few in number, especially in relation to the total number of applications received. Absentee and Early Voting: Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote absentee or early. For the November 2004 general election, 3 additional states reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct on Election Day to vote absentee. Three states reported expanding their provisions for permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the elderly or individuals with disabilities), allowing voters to receive absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, such as 4 years. One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in absentee voters provide an affidavit from a notary or witness for their signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Furthermore, HAVA amended UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application by absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the two next regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. Absentee voting. Voting prior to Election Day can make voting easier for voters but can also create challenges for election officials. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, more than half of all jurisdictions encountered problems receiving absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots from voters too late to process--an estimated 55 percent of jurisdictions received applications too late and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too late, as shown in figure 2. Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions. [End of figure] Although the extent of the problem in terms of the number of applications and ballots that could not be processed is unknown, the estimated number of jurisdictions encountering the problem would seem to be of some concern to state and local election officials. Absentee application deadlines close to Election Day provide citizens increased time to apply to vote absentee. But such deadlines can create difficulties for election officials, providing a short period of time to ensure that eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to vote, including having time to notify voters and have the voters correct errors on their ballot applications, such as failing to sign them. The impact of absentee ballot application deadlines on voters' ability to complete and return the absentee application and ballot in time for their votes to be counted is another example of the difficulties of balancing voter access and ease of voting with appropriate election administration processes and controls. Election officials identified problems related to voter errors on absentee ballot applications and ballots. On the basis of our nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, we estimate that almost half of the jurisdictions encountered problems with missing or illegible signatures on absentee ballot applications, and our survey results also indicate that local jurisdictions encountered problems with, among other things, missing or inadequate voting residence addresses on absentee applications and missing or incomplete witness information for a voter's signature or information. In jurisdictions that we visited, some election officials told us of steps they took, when time permitted, to address voter errors. States reported having information on their Web sites that included information on the basic requirements for requesting and casting an absentee ballot. In addition, some absentee voting applications and ballots provided to us by elections jurisdictions we visited included instructions for voting absentee. Mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to be particularly susceptible to fraud. Election fraud could include such activities as completion of a ballot by someone other than the registered voter or an attempt by a voter to cast more than one ballot in an election. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimated that a majority of jurisdictions used procedures in the November 2004 election designed to help ensure that absentee voters did not vote more than once and that absentee ballots were actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. However, some mail-in absentee voter fraud concerns remained. In particular, election officials expressed concern regarding absentee voters being unduly influenced or intimidated while voting by third parties who went to voters' homes and offered to assist them in voting ballots. Election officials also expressed concerns about the influence of third parties on voters for early voting when voters waiting in line were approached by candidates and poll watchers. Uniformed military and overseas absentee voters. Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited told us of a possible unintended consequence that may create a challenge with respect to provisions in UOCAVA as amended by HAVA, whereby the Federal Post Card Application can possibly cover as many as two subsequent general elections for federal office. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited said that when uniformed service personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, ballots might not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Election officials in some of these jurisdictions said they were taking steps to help ensure that absentee ballots would be sent to the correct address for the 2006 general election, such as requesting e-mail addresses as a means to obtain information to update mailing addresses or conducting mass mailings to these voters to confirm mailing addresses. However, election officials were concerned that if these efforts are not successful, a number of the ballots mailed to addresses provided on the Federal Post Card Application for the November 2006 election would be returned as undeliverable. This was a concern for these election officials because the jurisdictions would have to absorb the expense of mailing ballots that would be undeliverable. Furthermore, a potential effect may be that some uniformed services voters, who applied to vote absentee using the Federal Post Card Application, may not receive their ballots for subsequent general elections. As noted in our April 2006 report on election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, one of the top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for these voters was that they were undeliverable.[Footnote 7] Early voting. With respect to early voting, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited identified obtaining adequate staffing for conducting early voting as a challenge, especially when given the unanticipated large early voter turnout. In 11 of the 14 early voting jurisdictions visited, election officials emphasized the importance of staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. According to our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 30 percent of jurisdictions used permanent staff to work early voting polling locations. Our nationwide survey also showed that jurisdictions used other types of staff and combinations of staff such as permanent and part-time staff. Depending on the number of early voting locations to be staffed, using experienced staff may not always be feasible, and using other staff may affect the speed with which voters can be processed and may contribute to long lines. As states fully implement their statewide voter registration lists, processing voters at early voting locations may become easier as the voter registration systems evolve and systems become user-friendly so that all types of staff can be more effective in processing voters. Conducting Elections: States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA requirements and other state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United States. HAVA established requirements with respect to elections for federal office for, among other things, certain voters who register by mail to provide identification prior to voting; mandated that voting equipment accessible to individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; and required that voter information be posted at polling places on Election Day. Since the November 2000 general election, some states have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for all voters. Many of the challenges that election officials reported encountering in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election were not new challenges. Recruiting and training an adequate supply of poll workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing communications on Election Day were challenges that we identified in our October 2001 report on the November 2000 general election.[Footnote 8] As shown in figure 3, on the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that more large jurisdictions encountered difficulties than medium and small jurisdictions when it came to obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers. Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [B] The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant. [C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [D] Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of reasons, including that poll workers are not recruited, but elected or appointed; that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; or that the election officials themselves serve as poll workers. [E] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [End of figure] Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor that involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and technologies associated with numerous activities. However, we found in our survey of local jurisdictions and site visits to 28 localities that more large and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions reported that they encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election than small jurisdictions did. This may be because the complexity of administering an election and the potential for challenges increase with the number of people and places involved and the scope of activities and processes that must be conducted, such as the need to provide ballots and voter assistance in languages other than English. The results of our local election jurisdiction survey indicate that more large and medium jurisdictions than small jurisdictions took steps--such as through voter education or providing instructions at polling places for poll workers--designed to minimize potential problems. Many of the election officials in large jurisdictions we visited told us that being well prepared, having established policies and procedures in place, and having high-quality election staff were factors that contributed to a smooth Election Day. One problem that election officials in some jurisdictions reported encountering on Election Day was actions by poll watchers and other third parties that election officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that election officials may need to include in their Election Day preparations and training. Provisional Voting: Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions regarding the voters' eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 2004, states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for federal office by voters who assert that they are eligible to vote and registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter registration list.[Footnote 9] Such states are also required under HAVA to provide provisional ballots in federal elections under other circumstances, such as for certain voters who registered by mail and do not have required identification. While HAVA requires that states permit an individual under certain circumstances to cast a provisional ballot in a federal election, the act left the specific choices on the methods of implementation to the discretion of the states. Under HAVA, election officials receiving provisional voter information are to determine whether such individuals are eligible to vote under state law. If an individual is determined to be eligible, HAVA specifies that such individual's provisional ballot be counted as a vote in that election in accordance with state law. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, our nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, and our visits to jurisdictions, states and local jurisdictions varied in a number of ways in how they implemented HAVA's provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 election. For example, in addition to those specified in HAVA, the circumstances reported by states and local jurisdictions when a provisional ballot would be offered varied, with some jurisdictions allowing voters claiming they did not receive an absentee ballot to vote provisionally. The results of our survey of state elections officials showed that states also varied as to the location where voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for such ballots to be eligible to be counted, as shown in figure 4. Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin and Wyoming) authorize some measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast their votes in the specific precincts in which they are registered in order for their votes to be eligible to be counted. [End of figure] On the basis of our interviews with local election officials, local election procedures and unique circumstances add to the differences among jurisdictions. For example, in some jurisdictions we visited, election officials described various factors that affected the counting of provisional ballots, such as the time allowed for provisional voters to provide missing identification. Specifically, in 1 jurisdiction, voters had to provide the required identification before the polls closed for the ballot to be counted, while in other jurisdictions the ballot would be counted if the voter provided the required identification within a specified number of days after Election Day. These variations in provisional voting implementation highlight how individual state rules, procedures, and practices may have affected the number of provisional ballots cast and counted in the November 2004 election. These differences and limited data availability make it difficult to determine with certainty how many provisional ballots were cast and counted nationally in the November 2004 election. However, the data that are available indicate that the HAVA requirement for provisional voting has helped to better facilitate voter participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote. Counting the Votes: Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is the same across the nation: to accurately process those ballots requiring verification and accurately count every valid ballot. As with the elections process overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not a simple process. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail, and the seamless integration of people, processes, and technology. In 2004, vote counting remained an intricate multistep process characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a local jurisdiction's technology, size, and preferences. The multistep process can involve such activities as the initial vote count, a vote count audit to verify the accuracy of the count, certification of the vote count, and recounts of the votes when an election is close.[Footnote 10] There were some notable developments related to conducting recounts that may be mandatory (because of a close margin of victory) or requested. Some states reported that they added rules for mandatory recounts. Others reported that they changed their guidance for who may request a recount. Regarding vote count audits, while 29 states and the District of Columbia reported they did not require audits of vote counts, 21 states reported having provisions that required or allowed audits of vote counts, as shown in figure 5. Furthermore, 9 states reported having taken some legislative or executive steps toward doing so since November 2004. Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] Includes District of Columbia. [End of figure] Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a jurisdiction for casting their ballots--early, absentee, provisional, and Election Day voting--enhances eligible voters' opportunity to vote. At the same time, multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make the vote-counting process more complicated. In addition, short deadlines for certifying the final vote--as little as 2 days in 1 state--provide little time for election officials to review, verify, and count provisional and absentee ballots. Larger jurisdictions generally face more challenges than smaller jurisdictions because of the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types--absentee, provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for many jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in tracking, verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in November 2004, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited said that they are implementing new procedures for provisional voting, such as printing provisional ballots in a color different from other types of ballots or using paper ballots rather than direct recording electronic (DRE) machines for provisional voters. These procedures are intended to help election officials track provisional ballots to ensure that they are all accounted for and included in the vote count. Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington told us that they are moving to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a countywide basis by a new state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting eliminates some challenges that can affect accurate vote counting-- e.g., poll worker training on voting equipment operations and provisional voting or the chance of malfunctioning voting equipment at the polls--it magnifies the importance of other aspects of the process, such as accurately matching voter signatures and having clear guidance for determining voter intent from improperly or unclearly marked ballots. The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed the interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring an accurate vote count. In the initial statewide count, a mere 261 votes separated the two top candidates, and an initial recount reduced that margin of victory to just 42 votes out of more than 2.7 million cast, and the final recount resulted in a 129-vote margin of victory for the candidate who came in second in the first two vote counts. The experiences of election jurisdictions that had to conduct the recounts illustrated how small errors in the election administration process can affect the vote count. For example, in at least 11 counties provisional ballots were found by a Washington state superior court to have been counted without verifying voter signatures or before verification of voter registration status had been completed. Furthermore, 573 absentee ballots were erroneously disqualified in one county, and 22 absentee and provisional ballots were discovered in the base units of optical scan machines in another county after the election had been certified. Were any state's election processes subjected to the very close scrutiny that characterized the recount in Washington state, it is likely that imperfections would be revealed. Votes are cast and elections are conducted by people who are not and cannot be 100 percent error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the consistently error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve a consistently error-free count can help to ensure that any errors are reduced to the minimum humanly possible. Voting Methods and Technologies: The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local jurisdiction survey estimates. Figure 6 shows the estimated percentages of all jurisdictions' use of a predominant voting method in the 2000 and 2004 general elections. Two key patterns emerged in the use of voting methods between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. First, we estimate that the percentage of large jurisdictions using DREs doubled from 15 percent in the 2000 general election to 30 percent in 2004. The predominant voting method most often used for large jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE and precinct count optical scan in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the predominant voting methods most often used remained the same for small and medium jurisdictions (paper ballots and precinct count optical scan, respectively) from 2000 to 2004. Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan equipment before the 2006 general election. Second, in response to our state survey, 9 states reported that they eliminated the lever machine and punch card voting methods for the 2004 general election. In addition, 18 other states plan to eliminate lever or punch card voting methods for the 2006 general election. This greater state involvement in jurisdictions' choice of voting methods, the availability of federal funding to replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and certain HAVA requirements--among other factors--are likely influences on the adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods. Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing for updates to the federal voting system standards, including the performance components of those standards. According to our local jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance standards for accuracy, reliability, or efficiency for the 2004 general election--usually standards selected by their respective states. It is important that system performance be measured during an election, when the system is being used and operated according to defined procedures by voters and election workers, to provide a basis for determining where performance needs, requirements, and expectations are not being met so that timely corrective action can be taken. As was the case for the 2000 general election, jurisdictions collected various types of voting system performance measures for the 2004 general election, although some types of measures were collected by fewer jurisdictions than others--in part because they were not well suited to particular voting methods. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied with their systems' performance during the 2004 general election, even though performance data may not have been collected to an extent that would provide firm support for these views. The moderate collection levels of data on operational voting systems' performance may present a challenge to state and local election officials in their efforts to make informed decisions on both near-term and long-term voting system changes and investments. Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public confidence in the election process, and according to our local jurisdiction survey estimated results, accomplishing this was a shared responsibility among states, local jurisdictions, vendors, law enforcement officials, and others for most jurisdictions. According to our state survey, estimates from our local jurisdiction survey, and visits to jurisdictions, there were differences across states and jurisdictions in areas such as the adoption of system security standards and reported implementation of system security controls, which was generally consistent with what we reported in our October 2001 report on election processes. In addition, 27 states reported in our state survey that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply voluntary federal standards to voting systems used for the first time in the November 2006 general election that are outdated, unspecified, or entail multiple versions. In the area of testing, most states reported that they required national or state certification of their voting systems, but the systems covered by those requirements and the criteria used for certification also varied by state and by voting method. Readiness (logic and accuracy) testing continued to be commonly performed by an estimated 92 percent of local jurisdictions that used automated voting systems for the 2004 general election, but the local election officials we talked with described a variety of testing approaches.[Footnote 11] We estimate that two other forms of testing-- parallel testing and postelection auditing of voting equipment--were much less prevalent than readiness testing and were conducted by 2 percent and 43 percent of jurisdictions that used automated voting, respectively.[Footnote 12] Appropriately defined and implemented standards for system functions and testing processes are essential to ensuring the accuracy, integrity, and reliability of voting systems across all phases of the elections process. States and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and consistently applying appropriate standards and other directives for security management and testing to address vulnerabilities and risks in their specific election environments. The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 general election according to estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of integration we examined, such as electronic programming or setup and electronic management. Furthermore, relatively few local jurisdictions we visited reported having plans for integrating or further integrating their election-related systems and components for the 2006 general election, and in the instances where jurisdictions reported plans, the scope and nature of the plans varied. Nevertheless, there is real potential for greater integration among voting systems, election systems, and components as states and jurisdictions act on plans to acquire optical scan and DRE equipment that lends itself to integration. It is unclear if and when this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce more integrated election system environments. However, suitable standards and guidance for these interconnected components and systems--some of which remain to be developed--could facilitate the development, testing, operational management, and maintenance of components and systems, thereby maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election technologies and achieving states' and local jurisdictions' goals for performance and security. The challenge inherent in such a dynamic environment is to update system standards so that emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions are systematically addressed. Concluding Observations: The administration of election systems will never be error free or perfect. Each stage of the election process poses a major challenge for election officials. Effective management of the election system requires a variety of resources that must be prepared, mobilized, and deployed at regular intervals. These resources include the people who conduct the election and participate in it, the processes that govern what the people do and how the election is conducted, and the technology that facilitates the efforts of the people as they work through the election processes. Although responsibility for election administration falls largely on local governmental units, state and federal governments have a role to play in helping to minimize the types of errors that can occur. Thus, as technology evolves and circumstances warrant, state and federal governments might consider what, if any, actions on their part could help to improve election processes. GAO found that states have made changes--either as a result of HAVA or on their own--that addressed some of the challenges identified in the 2000 general election. GAO also found that some challenges continue and new challenges occurred in the 2004 general election. In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the voting administration system. It is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes, especially the requirement for statewide voter registration lists for federal elections and new voting systems, both of which are at different stages of implementation across the states. [End of section] Chapter 1: Introduction: The basic goal of the elections system in the United States is straightforward: All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, should be able to cast their votes and, if such votes have been properly cast by the voters, have those votes counted accurately. Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the foundation of our democracy. Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting equipment raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. After the events surrounding the November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being implemented.[Footnote 13] The November 2004 general election highlighted some of the same challenges as 2000 as well as some new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both elections highlighted the importance of the effective interaction of people, processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and maintaining public confidence that our election system works. Since 2001, GAO has issued a series of reports covering aspects of the election process primarily with respect to federal elections.[Footnote 14] This report focuses on the changing of such election processes in the United States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, primarily with respect to federal elections, our objectives were to examine each major stage of the election process to (1) identify changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the issues and challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election. Election Authority: Election authority is shared by federal, state, and local officials in the United States. Congressional authority to affect the administration of elections derives from various constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election.[Footnote 15] Congress has passed legislation in several major areas of the voting process. For example, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA),[Footnote 16] expanded the opportunities for citizens to register to vote for federal elections by, among other things, requiring most states to accept registration applications for federal elections by mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) and at certain other state agencies. The act also requires that in the administration of elections for federal office, states are to take certain steps to accurately maintain voter registration lists, and it limits the circumstances for removing names from voter lists. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) requires states to, among other things, permit uniformed services voters absent from the place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to vote, their dependents, and U.S. citizens residing outside the country to register and vote absentee in elections for federal office.[Footnote 17] The Help America Vote Act was enacted into law on October 29, 2002. As discussed below, the act includes a number of provisions related to voter registration, provisional voting, absentee voting, voting equipment, and other election administration provisions, and authorizes the appropriation of funds to be used toward implementing the law's requirements. HAVA also provides that the choices on the methods of implementation of such requirements, for example, a computerized statewide voter registration list, provisional voting, voter information requirements at the polling place, identification requirements, and voting system standards (for ballot verification, manual audit capacity, accessibility, and error rates), are left to the discretion of the states. HAVA further specifies that such requirements are minimum requirements and should not be construed to prevent states from establishing election technology and administration requirements that are stricter than HAVA requirements as long as they are not inconsistent with certain other specified provisions. HAVA, in general, applies to all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Areas covered by the law include: * Computerized statewide voter registration list: HAVA requires most states to implement a single, uniform, centralized, computerized statewide voter registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for federal office in each such state.[Footnote 18] Under HAVA, the computerized statewide voter registration list was to have been implemented by 2004. However, 40 states and the District of Columbia received waivers to extend the deadline until January 1, 2006. States are required to perform regular maintenance of the voter list by comparing it to state records on felons and deaths, and to match voter registration applicant information on the voter list with information in the state motor vehicle agency's records and Social Security Administration records, as appropriate. * Absentee ballots: HAVA contains various amendments to UOCAVA regarding absentee voting for absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States. The amendments, among other things, (1) required that the secretaries of each military department, to the maximum extent practicable, provide notice to military personnel of absentee ballot deadlines, (2) extended the time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application from UOCAVA voters, and (3) prohibited states from refusing to accept or process, with respect to federal elections, a voter registration application or an absentee ballot application by an absent uniformed services voter on the ground that the application was submitted before the first date that the state otherwise accepts or processes applications for that year from nonuniformed service absentee voters. * Provisional ballots: HAVA requires most states to implement provisional voting for elections for federal office.[Footnote 19] Under HAVA, in an election for federal office, states are to provide a provisional ballot to an individual asserting (1) to be registered in the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal election but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place. Provisional ballots are also to be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court-ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have closed. These various types of individuals, under HAVA, are to be permitted to cast the provisional ballot upon the execution of written affirmation at the polling place that they are registered voters in the jurisdiction and that they are eligible to vote in that election. If election officials determine that the individual is eligible under state law to vote, the individual's provisional ballot is to be counted as a vote in accordance with state law. HAVA also requires that a free access system be established to inform voters if their votes were counted, and if not, the reason why. * Polling places: HAVA provisions targeted, among other things, improving information at polling places and Election Day procedures. To improve the knowledge of voters regarding voting rights and procedures, HAVA requires election officials[Footnote 20] to post voting information at each polling place on the days of elections for federal office, including, for example, a sample ballot, polling place hours, how to vote, instructions for first-time voters who registered by mail, and general information on federal and state voting rights laws and laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. The act also authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states for educating voters concerning voting procedures, voting rights, and voting technology. Under HAVA, voting systems used in elections for federal office are required to meet specified accessibility requirements for individuals with disabilities. With respect to improving accessibility, HAVA also authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states to be used for improved accessibility of polling places for, among others, individuals with disabilities and those with limited English proficiency. HAVA also requires that such voting systems provide individuals with disabilities with the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters. In connection with this requirement, HAVA provides for the use of at least one direct recording electronic (DRE) device or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place.[Footnote 21] * Identification requirements: Under HAVA, states are to require that certain voters who register by mail to provide specified types of identification when voting at the polls or send a copy of the identification with their mailed applications.[Footnote 22] Acceptable identification includes a current and valid photo identification or current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter. Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met the identification requirement may cast a vote under HAVA's provisional voting section. Similarly, mail-in ballots from persons who have not provided the required identification also are to be counted as HAVA provisional ballots. * Election administration: HAVA also established an agency with wide- ranging duties to help improve state and local administration of federal elections. The Election Assistance Commission is to be involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to states implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements to some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop testing for voting systems, and standards for election equipment. EAC is led by four Commissioners, who are to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners, who, under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives. Among other things, EAC has held hearings on the security of voting technologies and the national poll worker shortage; established a clearinghouse for information on election administration by issuing two best practices reports; distributed payments to states for election improvements, including payments for voter education and voting equipment replacement; drafted changes to existing federal voluntary standards for voting systems; and established a program to accredit the national independent certified laboratories that test electronic voting systems against the federal voluntary standards. However, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states' procurement of new voting equipment and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. * Voting systems: One of the primary HAVA provisions relates to encouraging states to replace punch card voting systems and lever voting systems and authorizing appropriations for payments to support states in making federally mandated improvements to their voting systems. A voting system includes the people, processes, and technology associated with any voting method. It encompasses the hardware and software used to define the ballot, conduct the vote, and transmit and tally results, and system maintenance and testing functions. With respect to standards for voting systems used in elections for federal office, HAVA requirements for such systems include providing voters with the ability to verify their votes before casting their ballots, producing permanent paper records for manual auditing of voting systems, and compliance of voting system ballot counting error rates with those set out in specified federal voting system standards. HAVA also directs that updates to the federal voluntary voting system standards for these requirements be in place by January 1, 2004,[Footnote 23] and provides for additional updates to the voluntary standards as approved by the Election Assistance Commission. Mechanisms are also specified that can be used by states and localities in acquiring and operating voting systems, including accreditation of laboratories to independently test and evaluate voting systems and federal certification for voting systems that undergo independent testing. The time frames for implementing various HAVA requirements ranged from as early as 45 days after enactment (a deadline for establishing a grant program for payment to the states for improved election administration) to as late as January 1, 2006, for various voting system standards.[Footnote 24] Several key deadlines were set for January 1, 2004, including implementation of HAVA's provisional voting requirements and the establishment of a statewide voter registration list (or to request a waiver from the deadline until January 1, 2006). States receiving funds to replace punch card voting systems or lever voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1, 2006; otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November 2004 general elections. The deadline for states and jurisdictions to comply with specific requirements for voting systems, such as producing a paper record for audit purposes, was January 1, 2006. HAVA vests enforcement authority with the Attorney General to bring a civil action against any state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry out specified uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements under HAVA. These requirements pertain to HAVA voting system standards, provisional voting and voting information requirements, the computerized statewide voter registration list requirements, and requirements for persons who register to vote by mail. The enforcement of federal statutes pertaining to elections and voting has, with certain exceptions, been delegated by the Attorney General to the Civil Rights Division. Election System Elements: The U.S. election system is highly decentralized and based upon a complex interaction of people (election officials and voters), processes, and technology. Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia has its own election system with a somewhat distinct approach. Within each of these 51 systems, the guidelines and procedures established for local election jurisdictions can be very general or specific. Each election system generally incorporates elements that are designed to allow eligible citizens to vote and ensures that votes are accurately counted. While election systems vary from one local jurisdiction to another, most election systems have the elements identified in figure 7. Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Delegation of Election Responsibility: Typically, states have decentralized elections so that the details of administering elections are determined at the local jurisdiction. States can be divided into two groups according to how they delegate election responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first group include 41 states where election responsibilities are delegated to counties, with a few of these states delegating election responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state that delegates these responsibilities to election regions. We included the District of Columbia along with this group. The second group is composed of 9 states that delegate election responsibilities to subcounty governmental units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor civil divisions (MCD). However, in 1 of these states, Minnesota, election functions are split between county-level governments and MCDs. For example, registration is handled exclusively by county officials, and functions, such as polling place matters, are handled by MCDs. Overall, about 10,500 local government jurisdictions are responsible for conducting elections nationwide, with the first group of states containing about one-fourth of the local election jurisdictions and about three-fourths of the local election jurisdictions located in the states delegating responsibilities to MCDs. Although more election jurisdictions are in the 9 states, most of the population (88 percent of the U.S. population based on the Census of 2000) lives in the states delegating responsibilities primarily to counties. Voter Registration: While voter registration is not a federal requirement, the District of Columbia and all states, except North Dakota, generally require citizens to register before voting.[Footnote 25] The deadline for registering, and what is required to register, varies; at a minimum, state eligibility provisions typically require a person to be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident of the state, with some states requiring a minimum residency period. Citizens apply to register to vote in various ways, such as at motor vehicle agencies, during voter registration drives, by mail, or at local voter registrar offices. Election officials process registration applications and compile and maintain the list of registered voters to be used throughout the administration of an election. Prior to HAVA, voter registration lists were not necessarily centralized at the state level, and separate lists were often managed by local election officials. HAVA requires voter registration information for federal elections to be maintained as a statewide computerized list and matched with certain state data, and that voter registration application information be matched with certain state data and, in some cases, with federal data, to help ensure that the voter list is accurate. Absentee and Early Voting: All states and the District of Columbia have provisions allowing voters to cast their ballot before Election Day by voting absentee with variations on who may vote absentee, whether the voter needs an excuse, and the time frames for applying and submitting absentee ballots. In addition, some states also allow early voting, in which the voter goes to a specific location to vote in person prior to Election Day. As with absentee voting, the specific circumstances for early voting--such as the dates, times, and locations--are based on the state and local requirements. In general, early voting allows voters from any precinct in the jurisdiction to cast their vote before Election Day either at one specific location or at one of several locations. The early voting locations are staffed by poll workers who have a registration list for the jurisdiction and ballots specific to each precinct. The voter is provided with and casts a ballot for his or her assigned precinct. Conducting Elections: Election officials perform a broad range of activities in preparation for and on Election Day itself. Prior to an election, officials recruit and train poll workers to have the skills needed to perform their Election Day duties, such as opening and closing the polls, operating polling place equipment, and explaining and implementing provisional voting procedures for certain voters such as those who are not on the registration list. Where needed and required, election officials must also recruit poll workers who speak languages other than English. Polling places have to be identified as meeting basic standards for accessibility and having an infrastructure to support voting machines as well as voter and poll worker needs. Ballots are designed and produced to meet state requirements, voter language needs, and identify all races, candidates, and issues on which voters in each precinct in their jurisdiction will vote. Election officials seek to educate voters on topics such as what the ballot looks like, how to use a voting machine, and where their particular polling place is located. Finally, election officials seek to ensure that voting equipment, ballots, and supplies are delivered to polling places. On Election Day, poll workers set up and open the polling places. This can include tasks such as setting up the voting machines or voting booths, readying supplies, testing equipment, posting required signs and voter education information, and completing paperwork such as confirming that the ballot is correct for the precinct. Before a voter receives a ballot or is directed to a voting machine, poll workers typically are to verify his or her eligibility. The assistance provided to voters who are in the wrong precinct depends on the practices for that particular location. Provisional Voting: One of the most significant post-2000 election reforms found in HAVA, according to the Election Assistance Commission, is that states are required to permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in federal elections.[Footnote 26] More specifically, states are to provide a provisional ballot to an individual asserting to be (1) registered in the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal election, but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place. In addition, provisional ballots are to be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court- ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have closed. Although many states had some form of provisional balloting prior to the passage of HAVA, 44 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia were required to provide provisional ballots for the 2004 general election. Under HAVA, 6 states were exempt from HAVA's provisional voting requirements because they either permitted voters to register on Election Day or did not require voter registration.[Footnote 27] If individuals are determined to be eligible voters, their provisional ballots are to be counted as votes in accordance with state law, along with other types of ballots, and included in the total election results. Vote Counting and Recounting: Following the close of the polls, election officials and poll workers complete a number of basic steps to get the votes counted and determine the outcome of the election. Equipment and ballots are to be secured, and votes are to be tallied or transferred to a central location for counting. The processes used to count or to recount election votes vary with the type of voting equipment used in a jurisdiction, state statutes, and local jurisdiction policies. Votes from Election Day, absentee ballots, early votes (where applicable), and provisional ballots are to be counted and consolidated for each race to determine the outcome. While preliminary results are available usually by the evening of Election Day, the certified results are generally not available until days later. Some states establish a deadline for certification of results, while other states do not. Voting Methods and Technologies: Voting methods are tools for accommodating the millions of voters in our nation's approximately 10,000 local election jurisdictions. Since the 1980s, ballots in the United States have been cast and counted using five methods: paper ballots, lever machines, punch cards, optical scan, and DREs. Four of the five methods by which votes are cast and counted involve technology; only the paper ballot system does not use technology. The three newer methods--punch card, optical scan, and DRE- -depend on computers to tally votes. Punch card and optical scan methods rely on paper ballots that are marked by the voter, while many DREs use computers to present the ballot to the voter. Voting systems utilize technology in different ways to implement these basic voting methods. For instance, some punch card systems include the names of candidates and issues on the printed punch card, while others use a booklet of candidates and issues that must be physically aligned with the punch card. The way systems are designed, developed, tested, installed, and operated can lead to a variety of situations where misunderstanding, confusion, error, or deliberate actions by voters or election workers can, in turn, affect the equipment's performance in terms of accuracy, ease of use, security, reliability, and efficiency. In fact, some recent election controversies have been specifically associated with particular voting methods and systems. Nevertheless, all voting methods and systems can benefit from established information technology management practices that effectively integrate the people, processes, technologies. Scope and Methodology: For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a nationally representative stratified random probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with election officials in 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Copies of the survey instruments are in appendixes II and III. In addition, the results of our state and local surveys are presented in two supplemental GAO products that can be found on our Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 28] Appendix IV provides a summary of jurisdictions we visited. In reporting the state survey data, actual numbers of states are provided. When reporting local jurisdiction survey data, we provide estimates for jurisdictions nationwide. Unless otherwise noted, the maximum sampling error, with 95 percent confidence, for estimates of all jurisdictions from our local jurisdiction survey is plus or minus 5 percentage points (rounded).[Footnote 29] We also provide some national estimates by jurisdiction population size, and the sampling errors for these estimates are slightly higher. For these estimates, large jurisdictions are defined as those with a population over 100,000, medium jurisdictions have a population of over 10,000 to 100,000, and small jurisdictions have a population of 10,000 or less. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from our local jurisdiction survey are within our planned confidence intervals. Jurisdictions in which we conducted on-site interviews were chosen based on a wide variety of characteristics, including voting methods used, geographic characteristics, and aspects of election administration, such as whether early voting was offered. We did not select jurisdictions we visited on the basis of size, but as appropriate, we identify the size of a jurisdiction we visited using the same groupings we used for our nationwide mail survey. We also reviewed extensive prior GAO work and other national studies and reports, and attended an annual election official conference. A comprehensive description of our methodology for this report is contained in appendix V. We conducted our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in Washington, D.C; Dallas; Los Angeles; and 28 local election jurisdictions in 14 states, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. [End of section] Chapter 2: Voter Registration: In general, the goal of a voter registration system is to ensure that eligible citizens who complete all the steps required of them to register to vote in their jurisdictions are able to have their registrations processed accurately and in a timely fashion, so they may be included on the rolls in time for Election Day. The November 2000 general election resulted in widespread concerns about voter registration in the United States. Headlines and reports questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration by highlighting accounts of individuals who thought they were registered being turned away from polling places on Election Day, the fraudulent use of the names of dead people to cast additional votes, and jurisdictions incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration lists. With the passage of HAVA,[Footnote 30] with respect to federal elections, most states were required to establish statewide computerized voter registration lists and perform certain list maintenance activities as a means to improve upon the accuracy of voter registration lists.[Footnote 31] List maintenance is performed by election officials and consists of updating registrants' information and deleting duplicate registrations and the names of registrants who are no longer eligible to vote. The voter registration process includes the integration of people, processes, and technology involved in registering eligible voters and in compiling and maintaining accurate and complete voter registration lists. In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons registering to vote, and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter registration lists. This has been a challenging task, and remains so, as we and others have noted. While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system generally, applying to register and being registered are not synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the voter registration applications they receive. This chapter describes various HAVA and state changes related to the voter registration processes that have occurred since the 2000 general election. It also examines continuing and new registration challenges encountered by local jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. Overview: With respect to voter registration, a significant change since the 2000 general election is the HAVA requirement for states to each establish a single, uniform, statewide, computerized voter registration list for conducting elections for federal office. The HAVA requirements for states to develop statewide lists and verify voter information against state and federal agency records presented a significant shift in voter list management in many states. While the initial deadline to implement HAVA's statewide list requirement was January 1, 2004, more than 40 states took advantage of a waiver allowing an extra 2 years to complete the task, or until January 1, 2006. The statewide registration lists for federal elections are intended to implement a system capable of maintaining voter registration lists that are more accurate by requiring states to (1) match voter registration application information against other state and federal agency databases or records to help ensure that only eligible voters are added to such lists, (2) identify certain types of ineligible voters whose names should be removed from the lists, and (3) identify individual voter names that appear more than once on the list to be removed from the lists. While HAVA defined some parameters for the required statewide voter registration lists and required matching voter information with certain state and federal records, the act leaves the choices on the methods of implementing such statewide list requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, states varied in the progress made in implementing their statewide voter registrations lists, how they have implemented these systems, and the capabilities of their systems to match information with other state and federal agency records as well as many other features of the state systems. In addition to requiring states to develop statewide voter registration lists, HAVA provides that states must require that mail registrants who have not previously voted in a federal election in the state are to provide certain specified types of identification with their mail application, and if they do not provide such identification with their application, these first-time mail registrants are to provide the identification at the polls. Furthermore, if such a voter does not have the requisite identification at the polls, HAVA requires that the voter be provided a provisional ballot with the status of his or her ballot to be determined by the appropriate state or local official. As with the statewide voter registration list requirement, HAVA leaves the choices on the methods of implementing the provisional voting requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of interviews of officials in 28 local election jurisdictions, implementation of the requirement for first-time voters who registered by mail varied. One noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration, where some local jurisdictions we visited told us that applications received through voter registration drives would be treated as mail registrations subject to HAVA identification requirements and other local jurisdictions we visited told us applications from registration drives were not treated as mail registrations and therefore were not treated as subject to HAVA identification requirements. As noted above, during 2004 and 2005 many states were in the process of implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and associated requirements for maintaining the lists. Thus, the potential benefits to be gained from HAVA's requirement for the statewide voter registration lists were not evident in many states at the time of the November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA intended to help states and local election jurisdictions to have access to more accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying duplicate registrations and matching the voter information against other state agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being able to verify voter registration application information with state motor vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists with state vital statistics agency records to identify deceased persons, and to appropriate state agency's records to identify felons who may be ineligible to vote. Thus, on the basis of our nationwide survey and local election jurisdictions we visited, many local jurisdictions continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations, or ineligible voters appearing on the list. In addition, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us they continued to face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities.[Footnote 32] In addition, for some local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that efforts on the part of various groups to get out the vote by registering new voters through voter registration drives created new challenges not identified to us as a problem in the 2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines for registration, which included challenges in some large jurisdictions to resolve issues of incomplete or inaccurate (and potentially fraudulent) applications submitted by entities conducting voter registration drives. Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: HAVA requires states to, among other things, (a) implement a single, uniform, computerized statewide voter registration list for conducting elections for federal office;[Footnote 33] (b) perform regular maintenance by comparing the voter list against state records on felons and deaths; (c) verify information on voter registration applications with information in state motor vehicle agency databases or with a Social Security Administration database, as appropriate. In addition, HAVA imposes new identification requirements for certain mail registrants--such as, individuals