This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-450 entitled 'Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 General Election' which was released on June 8, 2006. This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Report to Congressional Committees: Untied States Government Accountability Office: GAO: June 2006: Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 General Election: GAO-06-450: GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-06-450, a report to congressional committees. Why GAO Did This Study: The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the nation’s elections processes, not all of which had to be implemented by the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 local election jurisdictions about election administration activities (80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election system characteristics. What GAO Found: In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best practice guides and voluntary voting system standards and distributed federal funds to states for improving election administration, including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process. GAO found that states made changes—either as a result of HAVA or on their own—to address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 election. GAO also found that some challenges continued—such as problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter registration drives; larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote certification deadlines. Figure: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology: [See PDF for Image] [End of Figure] What GAO Recommends: GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-450]. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-451SP]. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-452SP]. To view the full product or the related surveys, click on the links above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512- 8777 or JenkinsWO@gao.gov. [End of Section] Contents: Transmittal Letter: Executive Summary: Purpose: Background: Results in Brief: Principal Findings: Concluding Observations: Chapter 1: Election Authority: Election System Elements: Scope and Methodology: Chapter 2: Overview: Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and Other NVRA Entities Remained a Challenge: Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large Volume of Voter Registration Applications for the November 2004 General Election: Concluding Observations: Chapter 3: Overview: Absentee Voting: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting: Early Voting: Concluding Observations: Chapter 4: Overview: HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election Administration: Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for All Prospective Voters: Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll Workers Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on Challenges Training Poll Workers: Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued to Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge: Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by Most Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in Other Jurisdictions Did Not: Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Third- Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election Day 2004: Concluding Observations: Chapter 5: Overview: Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA Requirement for Provisional Ballots: State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election 218: State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted: A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted: Concluding Observations: Chapter 6: Overview: In the 2004 General Election the Vote-Counting Process Remained Complex and Marked by Local Diversity: For the 2004 General Election, More States Had Requirements or Guidance for Determining Voter Intent: Recounts and Contested Elections Remained Uncommon for the November 2004 General Election: Several States Had Further Developed Their Specifications for an Election Recount since the 2000 General Election: Vote Count Audits Were Not Prevalent in the 2004 General Election, but Some States Reported Taking Action to Require Them: Local Jurisdictions Reported Some Mistakes and Technical Challenges in Counting Votes for the 2004 General Election: In the 2004 General Election, Some Election Jurisdictions Reported Difficulty Meeting Deadlines for Certifying the Final Vote Count: The Recount in Washington State Revealed the Intricacies of the Election Process, but Also Yielded Many State Reforms: Concluding Observations: Chapter 7: Overview: Voting Methods Vary among Jurisdictions and Are Being Influenced by States' Choices and HAVA: Voting Equipment Performance Was Not Consistently Measured during the 2004 General Election, but Estimated Levels of Performance Satisfaction Were High: Attention to Voting System Security Management Continues to Vary amid Published Concerns and Federal Improvement Efforts: Certain Types of Tests and Evaluations Were Widely Performed on Voting Systems, while Others Were Less Common: Information on Jurisdictions' Election Technology Integration Is Limited, but Current and Emerging Technologies Offer Greater Opportunities: Concluding Observations: Appendixes: Appendix I: Related GAO Products: Appendix II: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials: Appendix III: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions: Appendix IV: Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions GAO Visited: Appendix V: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: Appendix VI: Voter Registration Deadlines for States and the District of Columbia: Appendix VII: Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions Visited: Appendix VIII: Selected State Statutory Requirements for Absentee Voting: Appendix IX: State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods: Appendix X: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for Local Jurisdictions to Use Federal Standards for Voting Systems: Appendix XI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: Glossary: Tables: Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed Names from Voter Registration List for 2004 General Election for Various Reasons: Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged in Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering Completed Voter- Registration Applications: Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems in Processing Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When Absentee Ballot Applications Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in Processing Submitted Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when Absentee Ballots Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote More than Once, November 2004 General Election: Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were Actually Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, November 2004 General Election: Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by Jurisdiction Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error Problems on Absentee Applications That Used the Federal Post Card Application, November 2004 General Election: Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines from Inside and Outside the United States, November 2004 General Election: Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the District of Columbia, November 2004 General Election: Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Staff Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 2004 General Election: Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Methods to Train Early Voting Staff, November 2004 General Election: Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting Methods and Accommodations for the November 2004 General Election: Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter Education Prior to the November 2004 General Election: Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide That Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for the November 2004 Election under Various Scenarios: Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Various Methods to Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their Provisional Ballot, November 2004: Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected Jurisdictions: Table 21: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Having Written Ballot Security Policies and Procedures, November 2004 General Election: Table 22: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Particular Voting Methods by Ballot Type for the November 2004 Election: Table 23: States Reported Changes to Recount Provisions since 2000 for the 2004 General Election: Table 24: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: Table 25: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: Table 26: Voting System Security Topics Addressed in Security Plans Submitted by Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: Table 27: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with Common Time Frames and Responsibilities: Table 28: Population in Each State Group: Table 29: Local Election Survey Sample Allocation: Table 30: Local Election Jurisdiction Survey Response Rates, Overall and by Sample Strata: Table 31: Local Election Jurisdictions Visited: Table 32: States Reporting on November 2004 General Election Registration Deadlines: Table 33: Selected Information on Jurisdictions We Visited That Had Early Voting: Table 34: Selected State Requirements for Domestic Absentee Voting, November 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Table 35: States' Mail-in Absentee Ballot Application and Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines for Inside the United States, November 2004 General Election: Table 36: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places: Table 37: State Provisions for Alternative Voting Methods and Accommodations: Table 38: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places and Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities for the November 2004 General Election: Table 39: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for Use of Voluntary Federal Standards for New Voting Systems for the November 2006 General Election: Figures Figures: Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 2004 General Election: Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election: Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology: Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter Registration Information with State Records: Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of January 2006, Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter Registration List to Enter, Update, and Query Information: Figure 10: States' Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match Voter Registration Information with State Death Records and Felony Conviction Records: Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the Voter Had Registered Elsewhere: Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for First- Time Mail Registrants: Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process: Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for 2004 General Election: Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications Documented by a Large Jurisdiction in 2004: Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with Insufficient Election Workers to Process Voter Registration Applications: Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had Names on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to Be Fraudulent and Volume of Fraudulent Applications Identified for the 2004 General Election: Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process: Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the Inclusion of Affidavit Information--One with Certification on Inner Envelope and One with Certification on Outer Envelope--for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Problems Processing Absentee Applications because the Applicant Did Not Meet the Excuse Required by State Law, November 2004 General Election: Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking for Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General Election: Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after the November 2004 General Election: Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported Providing Early Voting as an Option in the November 2004 General Election: Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered Early Voting for Various Time Periods, November 2004 General Election: Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform Prospective Voters of New Identification Requirements: Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 General Election: Figure 30: States' Reported Identification Requirements for Prospective Voters for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Enough Poll Workers with Specific Political Party Affiliation for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Poll Workers with Information Technology Skills or Computer Literacy for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions We Visited: Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire: Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Were Accessible to Voters with Disabilities for November 2004 General Election: Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot: Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election Day: Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope: Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter Affidavit: Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for Poll Workers in Champaign, Illinois: Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General Election: Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted: Figure 47: Sealed Voting Equipment Bag: Figure 48: Punch Card Tabulator Connected to Computer: Figure 49: Punch Card Voting Booth: Figure 50: New Hampshire Guidance for Determining Voter Intent on Paper Ballots: Figure 51: Number of States Reporting Federal and Statewide Recounts for the 2004 Primary or General Elections: Figure 52: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election: Figure 53: Examples of Voting Equipment: Figure 54: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant Voting Methods in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Figure 55: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 56: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire Particular Voting Systems before the November 2006 General Election: Figure 57: State-Reported Status of Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment in 2000, 2004, and 2006: Figure 58: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Single and Multiple Voting Methods in the November 2004 General Election: Figure 59: Precinct Count Optical Scan Voting Equipment: Figure 60: State-Reported Involvement in the Use of Specific Voting Methods in the 2004 and 2006 General Elections: Figure 61: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Identifying Factors That Influenced Buying or Leasing Voting Equipment since the 2000 General Election: Figure 62: Federal Payments to States in Fiscal Year 2003 under HAVA to Replace Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment: Figure 63: Example of DRE Instructions and Equipment: Figure 64: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Voting System Performance Information for the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: Figure 65: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 66: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 67: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: Figure 68: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on Voting System Efficiency for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 69: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Satisfied with Voting System Performance for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 70: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Identified Security Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 71: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Security Controls in the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 72: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Documented Security Policies or Procedures for Their Voting Systems in the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 73: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Established Policies or Procedures for Electronic Transmission of Voted Ballots in the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: Figure 74: State-Reported Standards Required for Voting Systems: Figure 75: State-Reported Voting System Certification Requirements for the 2004 General Election: Figure 76: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Conducting Postelection Voting System Audits for the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: Figure 77: Examples of Portable Memory Cards and Cartridges Used with Voting Equipment: Figure 78: Examples of Ballot Tabulation Equipment and Environments: Figure 79: Example of an Assembly for Producing a Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail for DRE Voting Equipment: Figure 80: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Networking or Remote Access for Voting Equipment in the 2004 General Election: Figure 81: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Automated Election Support for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: Figure 82: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire Voting Equipment: Abbreviations: ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act: DRE: direct recording electronic: EAC: Election Assistance Commission: FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: FEC: Federal Election Commission: FPCA: Federal Post Card Application: FVAP: Federal Voting Assistance Program: HAVA: Help America Vote Act: MCD: minor civil division: MVA: motor vehicle agency: NASED: National Association of State Election Directors: NIST: National Institute for Standards and Technology: NVRA: National Voter Registration Act: PKI: public key infrastructure: SSA: Social Security Administration: UOCAVA: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: VVPT: Transmittal Letter: June 6, 2006: Congressional Committees: The November 2004 presidential election was not as close as the 2000 presidential election, but it still raised concerns about our election processes. Following the 2004 general election, a number of members of Congress asked GAO to review aspects of that election. In response to these requests, GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, for each major stage of the election process--voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting elections, provisional voting, and counting the votes--plus voting methods, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement the Help America Vote Act, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election. Copies of this report are being sent to the congressional leadership and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Science. Copies will also be sent to state election officials and the election official for the District of Columbia and local elections jurisdictions that participated in our research and will be made available to other interested parties upon request. As a courtesy, we are providing other members of Congress a copy of the report's highlights page and executive summary. If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777; or William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, at (202) 512-8757. They can also be reached by e-mail at rabkinn@gao.gov and jenkinswo@gao.gov, respectively. Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix XI. Signed by: David M. Walker: Comptroller General of the United States: List of Congressional Committees: The Honorable Trent Lott: Chairman: The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Rules and Administration: United States Senate: The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers, III: Chairman: The Honorable Juanita Millender-McDonald: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on House Administration: House of Representatives: The Honorable Arlen Specter: Chairman: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on the Judiciary: United States Senate: The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman: The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member: Committee on the Judiciary: House of Representatives: The Honorable Susan M. Collins: Chairman: The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: United States Senate: The Honorable Tom Davis: Chairman: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Government Reform: House of Representatives: [End of section] Executive Summary: Purpose: Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the foundation of our democracy. All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, should be able to cast their votes and have their validly cast votes counted accurately. Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting systems raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. Subsequently, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted,[Footnote 1] and major election reforms are now being implemented. The November 2004 general election highlighted some of the same challenges as in 2000 as well as some new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both elections highlighted the importance of the interaction of people, processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and maintaining public confidence that our election system works. The November 2004 general election was the first federal election that tested changes states have made to their systems of election administration since the 2000 general election and the first presidential election since the enactment of HAVA. HAVA includes a number of provisions related to the administration of federal elections affecting voter registration, absentee voting, voting systems, and other election administration activities. The November 2004 general election was not as close or contentious as the 2000 general election, but media reports, interest groups, and members of Congress raised concerns about various aspects of the elections process. Following the November 2004 election, a number of members of Congress asked us to review aspects of that election. In response to these requests, we initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress using an approach similar to that we used to examine election issues following the November 2000 election. During the design of the review, GAO kept key committees of jurisdiction and interested parties informed of its work. This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States and the November 2004 election. It discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election for each major stage of the election process--voter registration, absentee and early voting, Election Day preparation and activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--and for voting technology. Background: In the United States, election authority is shared by federal, state, and local entities. In addition to HAVA, federal laws have been enacted in several major areas of the voting process such as the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which was designed to expand the opportunities for citizens to register to vote in federal elections by allowing registration by mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) and other public agencies, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), which facilitated absentee voting by these populations. The U.S. election system is highly decentralized, with primary responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections residing at the local jurisdiction level--generally, the county level in most states, but some states have delegated election responsibility to subcounty governmental units. Subcounty election jurisdictions in 9 states account for about 75 percent of about 10,500 local election jurisdictions in the United States, but about 12 percent of the 2000 U.S. Census population. Local election jurisdictions vary widely in size and complexity, ranging from small New England townships to Los Angeles County, whose number of registered voters exceeds that of many states. Our election system is based upon a complex interaction of people (voters, election officials, and poll workers), processes (controls), and technology that must work effectively together to achieve a successful election. Every stage of the election process-- registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting Election Day activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--is affected by the interface of people, processes, and technology. Following the November 2000 general election, GAO issued a series of reports addressing a range of issues that emerged during that election.[Footnote 2] These reports also identified challenges that election officials reported they faced in major stages of the election process. We have also issued reports since the November 2004 general election on voter registration issues and security and reliability of electronic voting. As appropriate, information from our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide was used as a basis for determining changes since 2000.[Footnote 3] Our more recent reports were used to supplement this report on challenges election officials faced in the November 2004 election. Our methodology for this report included a Web-based survey of all 50 states and the District of Columbia (all 51 responded) and a mail questionnaire sent to a representative probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions nationwide, stratified by population (632, or 80 percent, responded). We also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of 28 local election jurisdictions in 14 states, selected to reflect variation in such factors as geographic location, whether early voting was offered, whether recounts for federal or statewide offices occurred, and voting technology used.[Footnote 4] Some of the 28 jurisdictions visited were among those we had visited for our 2001 election report. In stratifying our nationwide mail survey of local election jurisdictions, we grouped election jurisdictions by their 2000 U.S. Census population--small (less than 10,000), medium (10,000 to 100,000), and large (more than 100,000). These categories are also used in this report to describe jurisdictions we visited. The results of our state and local surveys are presented in two supplemental products that can be found on our Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 5] Results in Brief: The most prevalent changes to state and local elections systems since the 2000 presidential election were changes required under HAVA, which, among other things, established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) with wide-ranging duties that include providing information and assistance to states and local jurisdictions with regard to election administration. EAC is led by four Commissioners who are to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners who, under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives; however, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states' procurement of new voting systems and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. In addition, HAVA included specific changes to certain aspects of state administration of federal elections. Some key changes included requirements for states to implement statewide voter registration lists, a requirement that certain first-time mail registrants provide identification with their registration application or when they vote for the first time at the polls, and a requirement that most states permit, under certain circumstances, the casting of provisional ballots--those cast by voters at the polls whose eligibility to vote is unclear and to be determined later--in elections for federal office. HAVA also provided for funding to encourage states to replace their punch card and lever voting equipment, and set out voting system standards that state voting systems used in federal elections must meet. While HAVA defined some parameters for these requirements, the act leaves the states discretion in choosing the methods of implementing them. It is too early to determine the full effect that HAVA's requirements may have on the elections process because those requirements are in different stages of implementation. States had to implement HAVA's requirements for provisional voting and identification for first-time voters who register by mail prior to the November 2004 election. However, 41 states obtained waivers, allowed under HAVA, to delay the implementation of their statewide voter registration systems from January 1, 2004, to January 1, 2006. Moreover, states are in different stages of replacing their older voting equipment, such as punch card and lever machines, with newer technology. On the basis of our surveys of states and local jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, we found that states varied in their progress in implementing their statewide voter registration lists and how they have implemented their voting systems. Except for the 9 states that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA's requirements for establishing a statewide voter registration lists, all other states subject to the statewide list requirement were not required to perform list maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended waiver deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election, states were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related to their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and procedures at the state and local level for performing required list maintenance functions. Thus, states are still working to fully implement HAVA's voter registration requirements. As states gain more experience with their statewide voter registration and data-matching systems and processes, it is likely their systems and processes will evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is to be expected. We also found that implementation of the identification provision for certain first-time mail registrants varied. One noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration: Some local jurisdictions we visited said that applications received through voter registration drives would be treated as mail registrations and thus would be subject to the HAVA identification requirements. Other local jurisdictions we visited said applications from registration drives were not to be treated as mail registrations and therefore were not subject to the HAVA identification requirements. As to the other two provisions, the results of GAO's survey of state and local officials and jurisdictions we visited showed that states varied in their implementation of HAVA's requirement for provisional voting. One variation of particular note during the November 2004 election was the difference in state requirements regarding the location where voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for them to be counted. For example, in some jurisdictions, once the voter's eligibility to vote had been verified, the provisional ballot was counted if it was cast within the voter's county of residence, while in other jurisdictions the ballot was counted only if the voter had cast it in the assigned precinct. Notwithstanding these variations for implementing provisional voting, it is clear that provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote. Many states have taken advantage of federal funding to replace their punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that large jurisdictions are replacing older voting equipment with more technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and constitute the majority of jurisdictions across the United States. On the basis of states' reported plans and local jurisdictions' estimated plans for acquiring voting systems for future elections, the election technology environment can be characterized as varied and evolving. Accordingly, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall election process. In addition to reporting the required HAVA changes, some states reported having taken other actions since the 2000 general election to reform election administration; for example, 6 states reported they had eliminated the need for an excuse to vote absentee, and 9 states reported establishing procedures to conduct an automatic recount (audit), in full or in part, of the vote tabulation to help ensure accuracy of the vote prior to certification. Election officials identified challenges faced in the November 2004 general election. Some of these challenges were also identified as challenges in GAO's October 2001 comprehensive report on the election processes, while others were raised with us for the first time. Continuing Challenges in 2004: * Voter registration. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local jurisdictions reported that they continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as difficulties related to voter registration applications with inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations by the same person, or ineligible voters appearing on the list. Election jurisdictions also continued to face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities. * Absentee voting. The results of our nationwide survey indicate that election jurisdictions continued to experience absentee voting challenges that included receiving late absentee voter applications and ballots, managing large workloads with inadequate resources, addressing voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee applications, and preventing potential fraud. Although election officials in jurisdictions we visited provided examples of procedures used to help protect against fraud such as comparing signatures on absentee applications to signatures on registration applications, election officials still suspected instances of fraud. In 1 jurisdiction we visited, election officials reported they referred to the district attorney for investigation matters pertaining to 44 individuals who allegedly voted absentee ballots with invalid signatures. * Election Day activities. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local jurisdictions reported that they encountered many of the same challenges preparing for and conducting Election Day activities in the November 2004 general election as they did in November 2000, including recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled poll workers, locating a sufficient number of polling places that met requirements, designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were many candidates or issues to include, having long lines at polling places, and handling the large volume of telephone calls received from voters and poll workers on Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that large jurisdictions and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions encountered these challenges more than small jurisdictions. * Vote counting. On the basis of interviews with election officials, many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology for vote counting that had confronted election officials across the country in the November 2000 general election continued to be a challenge for them in the 2004 general election. Voting equipment problems, poll worker errors, and voter errors were reported as making it difficult to tabulate the votes quickly and accurately. * Voting technology. According to our local jurisdiction survey and visits, voting system performance measures have not been systematically embraced, reliable performance data have not been collected, and security and testing activities have not been consistently required and performed for all voting systems. As a result, effective management of voting technology remains a challenge for many states and local jurisdictions because election officials may continue to use a patchwork of operational indicators and anecdotal experiences, rather than requirements-based information on voting system performance, to support decisions regarding voting system investments and operations. New Challenges in 2004: * Registrations from registration drives. Election officials in some local election jurisdictions we visited reported that efforts of various groups to "get out the vote" by registering new voters through voter registration drives created new challenges not identified to us in the 2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines for registration. The conditions that election officials reported experiencing in processing the volume of voter registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully train temporary workers, can result in data entry errors that would have the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not identifying ineligible voters. Moreover, while not reported as a prevalent problem, applications received from voter registration drives was a challenge reported by election officials, who said that some of these applications had incomplete or invalid addresses, fictitious names, or questionable signatures. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names. * Early voting. Election officials reported encountering new challenges managing early voting. Some local jurisdictions we visited reported that they experienced long lines at early voting locations resulting from larger than expected early voter turnout. In some jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that factors such as inadequate planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that could be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management of large early voter turnout. * New UOCAVA provision. A new challenge could develop for election officials as a result of a HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States, this 2002 amendment extended the period of time that can be covered by a single application from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the next two subsequent general elections for federal office, or 4 years. However, election officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when uniformed services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, absentee ballots may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the Federal Post Card Application form where voters can indicate that they want ballots for one federal election only, election officials were concerned that many absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable. * Third-party polling place activities. Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited in states where the presidential race was considered close (often referred to as battleground states) reported encountering challenges with disruptive third-party (e.g., poll watchers, observers, and electioneers) activities at polling places on Election Day. In some instances, these third parties simply increased the number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling location; in others, election officials told us third-party observers' behavior negatively affected poll workers and voters. * Provisional voting. The implementation of provisional voting requirements as specified under HAVA highlighted another instance where states varied in their election systems, with somewhat distinct approaches for providing and counting provisional ballots. That is, states reported various differences in their counting processes such as the prescribed location (e.g., county or precinct) in which a voter must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be counted. Another way states varied included circumstances, apart from those specified in HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot. States also varied in the design of provisional ballots and how they tracked them. * Vote counting deadlines. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to election officials with respect to counting the votes: Some jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps required to verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for tallying the final vote count. * Voting systems. States and local jurisdictions face a broad challenge in ensuring consistent accuracy, integrity, and security among their voting systems in light of their adoption of various versions of federal voluntary voting system standards containing somewhat different--and, in some cases, outdated--performance thresholds for voting equipment. Adoption of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines by EAC on December 13, 2005, provided updated criteria that states and local jurisdictions can choose to apply when evaluating and certifying their voting equipment. Organizations involved with voting system certification--including federal, state, and local governments; testing authorities; and vendors--may need the capacity to assume the workloads associated with the adoption of current standards, including upgrading, testing, and certifying newly acquired voting systems to meet the standards, particularly if the standards are to be applied to the 2006 general election. Furthermore, as states and jurisdictions move to a more integrated suite of election systems, proactive and systematic efforts in areas such as standards will be essential to addressing emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions among systems and managing risks in this dynamic election environment. Principal Findings: Voter Registration: In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons of registering to vote, and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the registration lists. During 2004 and 2005, many states were in the process of implementing their HAVA- required statewide voter registration lists and associated requirements for maintaining such a list. Thus, the potential benefits to be gained from HAVA's requirement for a statewide voter registration list were not evident in many states at the time of the November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA intended to help states and local election jurisdictions have access to more accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying duplicate registrations and matching the voter information against other state agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being able to verify voter registration application information with state motor vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists with a state agency's records to identify felons who may be ineligible to vote. Local jurisdictions also encountered instances where voters claimed to be registered to vote and their names were not on the voter registration list. When this occurs, under HAVA's provisional voting requirements, states must permit voters to cast provisional ballots if the voters assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction where they desire to vote and are eligible to vote in a federal election. The results of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that many local jurisdictions encountered problems determining whether a provisional ballot was eligible to be counted where voters claimed to have registered at a motor vehicle agency or at another NVRA entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter had submitted a registration application at one of those offices. While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system generally, applying to register and being registered are not synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the voter registration applications they receive. Local election jurisdictions continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists for the November 2004 election such as difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations, and ineligible voters appearing on the lists. The surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of registration with assurances that only eligible voters are on the registration rolls. In some cases, election officials reported that hundreds or thousands of applications were submitted just before the registration deadline and close to Election Day. According to our nationwide survey and visits to selected jurisdictions, entering voter registrations in a timely manner presented a challenge for some election officials in marshaling the needed resources, including in some cases hiring and training temporary employees, to review the applications, obtain missing or incomplete information from applicants, determine that the registrants were eligible to vote in the jurisdiction, and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were added to the voter registration rolls prior to Election Day. As shown in figure 1, we estimate that 19 percent of jurisdictions nationwide received applications just prior to the registration deadline that posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day, with large jurisdictions experiencing problems more than medium and small jurisdictions.[Footnote 6] Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. [End of figure] During our site visits, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that on a daily basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data entry. As a result, election officials reported that they hired 80 full- time temporary workers who worked two full-time shifts to enter all eligible applications into the voter registration list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in another large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about 10,000 last-minute registration applications. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and election officials in jurisdictions we visited, many local election jurisdictions had processes to help manage receipt of voter registration applications such as training for MVA and other NVRA entities' staff and local election office's staff for data entry and tracking of registration application forms. However, some local jurisdictions did not report having such management processes. We estimate that 76 percent of all jurisdictions provided training to data entry staff about the processing and inputting of registration applications, and we estimate that over half of all jurisdictions tracked incoming registration applications to ascertain the total number received, the number entered into registration lists, and the number not processed because of omission or application error, and to identify ineligible voters based on age or residence. In addition, some local jurisdictions we visited reported that they implemented processes such as tracking the number of applications distributed and the source from which applications are received, and providing receipts to voter registrants to help alleviate problems encountered with properly registering voters. In addition to challenges encountered processing the large volume of registration applications received through voter registration drives, on the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported receiving voter registration applications that had irregularities. For example, election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported receiving applications that were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were incomplete, or had invalid addresses. Election officials in another jurisdiction also reported receiving applications with fictitious names and fake signatures. Generally, election officials reported that the number of applications that were irregular were few in number, especially in relation to the total number of applications received. Absentee and Early Voting: Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote absentee or early. For the November 2004 general election, 3 additional states reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct on Election Day to vote absentee. Three states reported expanding their provisions for permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the elderly or individuals with disabilities), allowing voters to receive absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, such as 4 years. One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in absentee voters provide an affidavit from a notary or witness for their signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Furthermore, HAVA amended UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application by absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the two next regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. Absentee voting. Voting prior to Election Day can make voting easier for voters but can also create challenges for election officials. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, more than half of all jurisdictions encountered problems receiving absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots from voters too late to process--an estimated 55 percent of jurisdictions received applications too late and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too late, as shown in figure 2. Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions. [End of figure] Although the extent of the problem in terms of the number of applications and ballots that could not be processed is unknown, the estimated number of jurisdictions encountering the problem would seem to be of some concern to state and local election officials. Absentee application deadlines close to Election Day provide citizens increased time to apply to vote absentee. But such deadlines can create difficulties for election officials, providing a short period of time to ensure that eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to vote, including having time to notify voters and have the voters correct errors on their ballot applications, such as failing to sign them. The impact of absentee ballot application deadlines on voters' ability to complete and return the absentee application and ballot in time for their votes to be counted is another example of the difficulties of balancing voter access and ease of voting with appropriate election administration processes and controls. Election officials identified problems related to voter errors on absentee ballot applications and ballots. On the basis of our nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, we estimate that almost half of the jurisdictions encountered problems with missing or illegible signatures on absentee ballot applications, and our survey results also indicate that local jurisdictions encountered problems with, among other things, missing or inadequate voting residence addresses on absentee applications and missing or incomplete witness information for a voter's signature or information. In jurisdictions that we visited, some election officials told us of steps they took, when time permitted, to address voter errors. States reported having information on their Web sites that included information on the basic requirements for requesting and casting an absentee ballot. In addition, some absentee voting applications and ballots provided to us by elections jurisdictions we visited included instructions for voting absentee. Mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to be particularly susceptible to fraud. Election fraud could include such activities as completion of a ballot by someone other than the registered voter or an attempt by a voter to cast more than one ballot in an election. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimated that a majority of jurisdictions used procedures in the November 2004 election designed to help ensure that absentee voters did not vote more than once and that absentee ballots were actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. However, some mail-in absentee voter fraud concerns remained. In particular, election officials expressed concern regarding absentee voters being unduly influenced or intimidated while voting by third parties who went to voters' homes and offered to assist them in voting ballots. Election officials also expressed concerns about the influence of third parties on voters for early voting when voters waiting in line were approached by candidates and poll watchers. Uniformed military and overseas absentee voters. Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited told us of a possible unintended consequence that may create a challenge with respect to provisions in UOCAVA as amended by HAVA, whereby the Federal Post Card Application can possibly cover as many as two subsequent general elections for federal office. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited said that when uniformed service personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, ballots might not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Election officials in some of these jurisdictions said they were taking steps to help ensure that absentee ballots would be sent to the correct address for the 2006 general election, such as requesting e-mail addresses as a means to obtain information to update mailing addresses or conducting mass mailings to these voters to confirm mailing addresses. However, election officials were concerned that if these efforts are not successful, a number of the ballots mailed to addresses provided on the Federal Post Card Application for the November 2006 election would be returned as undeliverable. This was a concern for these election officials because the jurisdictions would have to absorb the expense of mailing ballots that would be undeliverable. Furthermore, a potential effect may be that some uniformed services voters, who applied to vote absentee using the Federal Post Card Application, may not receive their ballots for subsequent general elections. As noted in our April 2006 report on election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, one of the top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for these voters was that they were undeliverable.[Footnote 7] Early voting. With respect to early voting, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited identified obtaining adequate staffing for conducting early voting as a challenge, especially when given the unanticipated large early voter turnout. In 11 of the 14 early voting jurisdictions visited, election officials emphasized the importance of staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. According to our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 30 percent of jurisdictions used permanent staff to work early voting polling locations. Our nationwide survey also showed that jurisdictions used other types of staff and combinations of staff such as permanent and part-time staff. Depending on the number of early voting locations to be staffed, using experienced staff may not always be feasible, and using other staff may affect the speed with which voters can be processed and may contribute to long lines. As states fully implement their statewide voter registration lists, processing voters at early voting locations may become easier as the voter registration systems evolve and systems become user-friendly so that all types of staff can be more effective in processing voters. Conducting Elections: States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA requirements and other state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United States. HAVA established requirements with respect to elections for federal office for, among other things, certain voters who register by mail to provide identification prior to voting; mandated that voting equipment accessible to individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; and required that voter information be posted at polling places on Election Day. Since the November 2000 general election, some states have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for all voters. Many of the challenges that election officials reported encountering in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election were not new challenges. Recruiting and training an adequate supply of poll workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing communications on Election Day were challenges that we identified in our October 2001 report on the November 2000 general election.[Footnote 8] As shown in figure 3, on the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that more large jurisdictions encountered difficulties than medium and small jurisdictions when it came to obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers. Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [B] The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant. [C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [D] Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of reasons, including that poll workers are not recruited, but elected or appointed; that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; or that the election officials themselves serve as poll workers. [E] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [End of figure] Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor that involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and technologies associated with numerous activities. However, we found in our survey of local jurisdictions and site visits to 28 localities that more large and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions reported that they encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election than small jurisdictions did. This may be because the complexity of administering an election and the potential for challenges increase with the number of people and places involved and the scope of activities and processes that must be conducted, such as the need to provide ballots and voter assistance in languages other than English. The results of our local election jurisdiction survey indicate that more large and medium jurisdictions than small jurisdictions took steps--such as through voter education or providing instructions at polling places for poll workers--designed to minimize potential problems. Many of the election officials in large jurisdictions we visited told us that being well prepared, having established policies and procedures in place, and having high-quality election staff were factors that contributed to a smooth Election Day. One problem that election officials in some jurisdictions reported encountering on Election Day was actions by poll watchers and other third parties that election officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that election officials may need to include in their Election Day preparations and training. Provisional Voting: Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions regarding the voters' eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 2004, states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for federal office by voters who assert that they are eligible to vote and registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter registration list.[Footnote 9] Such states are also required under HAVA to provide provisional ballots in federal elections under other circumstances, such as for certain voters who registered by mail and do not have required identification. While HAVA requires that states permit an individual under certain circumstances to cast a provisional ballot in a federal election, the act left the specific choices on the methods of implementation to the discretion of the states. Under HAVA, election officials receiving provisional voter information are to determine whether such individuals are eligible to vote under state law. If an individual is determined to be eligible, HAVA specifies that such individual's provisional ballot be counted as a vote in that election in accordance with state law. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, our nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, and our visits to jurisdictions, states and local jurisdictions varied in a number of ways in how they implemented HAVA's provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 election. For example, in addition to those specified in HAVA, the circumstances reported by states and local jurisdictions when a provisional ballot would be offered varied, with some jurisdictions allowing voters claiming they did not receive an absentee ballot to vote provisionally. The results of our survey of state elections officials showed that states also varied as to the location where voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for such ballots to be eligible to be counted, as shown in figure 4. Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin and Wyoming) authorize some measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast their votes in the specific precincts in which they are registered in order for their votes to be eligible to be counted. [End of figure] On the basis of our interviews with local election officials, local election procedures and unique circumstances add to the differences among jurisdictions. For example, in some jurisdictions we visited, election officials described various factors that affected the counting of provisional ballots, such as the time allowed for provisional voters to provide missing identification. Specifically, in 1 jurisdiction, voters had to provide the required identification before the polls closed for the ballot to be counted, while in other jurisdictions the ballot would be counted if the voter provided the required identification within a specified number of days after Election Day. These variations in provisional voting implementation highlight how individual state rules, procedures, and practices may have affected the number of provisional ballots cast and counted in the November 2004 election. These differences and limited data availability make it difficult to determine with certainty how many provisional ballots were cast and counted nationally in the November 2004 election. However, the data that are available indicate that the HAVA requirement for provisional voting has helped to better facilitate voter participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote. Counting the Votes: Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is the same across the nation: to accurately process those ballots requiring verification and accurately count every valid ballot. As with the elections process overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not a simple process. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail, and the seamless integration of people, processes, and technology. In 2004, vote counting remained an intricate multistep process characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a local jurisdiction's technology, size, and preferences. The multistep process can involve such activities as the initial vote count, a vote count audit to verify the accuracy of the count, certification of the vote count, and recounts of the votes when an election is close.[Footnote 10] There were some notable developments related to conducting recounts that may be mandatory (because of a close margin of victory) or requested. Some states reported that they added rules for mandatory recounts. Others reported that they changed their guidance for who may request a recount. Regarding vote count audits, while 29 states and the District of Columbia reported they did not require audits of vote counts, 21 states reported having provisions that required or allowed audits of vote counts, as shown in figure 5. Furthermore, 9 states reported having taken some legislative or executive steps toward doing so since November 2004. Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] Includes District of Columbia. [End of figure] Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a jurisdiction for casting their ballots--early, absentee, provisional, and Election Day voting--enhances eligible voters' opportunity to vote. At the same time, multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make the vote-counting process more complicated. In addition, short deadlines for certifying the final vote--as little as 2 days in 1 state--provide little time for election officials to review, verify, and count provisional and absentee ballots. Larger jurisdictions generally face more challenges than smaller jurisdictions because of the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types--absentee, provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for many jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in tracking, verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in November 2004, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited said that they are implementing new procedures for provisional voting, such as printing provisional ballots in a color different from other types of ballots or using paper ballots rather than direct recording electronic (DRE) machines for provisional voters. These procedures are intended to help election officials track provisional ballots to ensure that they are all accounted for and included in the vote count. Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington told us that they are moving to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a countywide basis by a new state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting eliminates some challenges that can affect accurate vote counting-- e.g., poll worker training on voting equipment operations and provisional voting or the chance of malfunctioning voting equipment at the polls--it magnifies the importance of other aspects of the process, such as accurately matching voter signatures and having clear guidance for determining voter intent from improperly or unclearly marked ballots. The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed the interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring an accurate vote count. In the initial statewide count, a mere 261 votes separated the two top candidates, and an initial recount reduced that margin of victory to just 42 votes out of more than 2.7 million cast, and the final recount resulted in a 129-vote margin of victory for the candidate who came in second in the first two vote counts. The experiences of election jurisdictions that had to conduct the recounts illustrated how small errors in the election administration process can affect the vote count. For example, in at least 11 counties provisional ballots were found by a Washington state superior court to have been counted without verifying voter signatures or before verification of voter registration status had been completed. Furthermore, 573 absentee ballots were erroneously disqualified in one county, and 22 absentee and provisional ballots were discovered in the base units of optical scan machines in another county after the election had been certified. Were any state's election processes subjected to the very close scrutiny that characterized the recount in Washington state, it is likely that imperfections would be revealed. Votes are cast and elections are conducted by people who are not and cannot be 100 percent error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the consistently error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve a consistently error-free count can help to ensure that any errors are reduced to the minimum humanly possible. Voting Methods and Technologies: The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local jurisdiction survey estimates. Figure 6 shows the estimated percentages of all jurisdictions' use of a predominant voting method in the 2000 and 2004 general elections. Two key patterns emerged in the use of voting methods between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. First, we estimate that the percentage of large jurisdictions using DREs doubled from 15 percent in the 2000 general election to 30 percent in 2004. The predominant voting method most often used for large jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE and precinct count optical scan in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the predominant voting methods most often used remained the same for small and medium jurisdictions (paper ballots and precinct count optical scan, respectively) from 2000 to 2004. Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan equipment before the 2006 general election. Second, in response to our state survey, 9 states reported that they eliminated the lever machine and punch card voting methods for the 2004 general election. In addition, 18 other states plan to eliminate lever or punch card voting methods for the 2006 general election. This greater state involvement in jurisdictions' choice of voting methods, the availability of federal funding to replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and certain HAVA requirements--among other factors--are likely influences on the adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods. Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing for updates to the federal voting system standards, including the performance components of those standards. According to our local jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance standards for accuracy, reliability, or efficiency for the 2004 general election--usually standards selected by their respective states. It is important that system performance be measured during an election, when the system is being used and operated according to defined procedures by voters and election workers, to provide a basis for determining where performance needs, requirements, and expectations are not being met so that timely corrective action can be taken. As was the case for the 2000 general election, jurisdictions collected various types of voting system performance measures for the 2004 general election, although some types of measures were collected by fewer jurisdictions than others--in part because they were not well suited to particular voting methods. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied with their systems' performance during the 2004 general election, even though performance data may not have been collected to an extent that would provide firm support for these views. The moderate collection levels of data on operational voting systems' performance may present a challenge to state and local election officials in their efforts to make informed decisions on both near-term and long-term voting system changes and investments. Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public confidence in the election process, and according to our local jurisdiction survey estimated results, accomplishing this was a shared responsibility among states, local jurisdictions, vendors, law enforcement officials, and others for most jurisdictions. According to our state survey, estimates from our local jurisdiction survey, and visits to jurisdictions, there were differences across states and jurisdictions in areas such as the adoption of system security standards and reported implementation of system security controls, which was generally consistent with what we reported in our October 2001 report on election processes. In addition, 27 states reported in our state survey that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply voluntary federal standards to voting systems used for the first time in the November 2006 general election that are outdated, unspecified, or entail multiple versions. In the area of testing, most states reported that they required national or state certification of their voting systems, but the systems covered by those requirements and the criteria used for certification also varied by state and by voting method. Readiness (logic and accuracy) testing continued to be commonly performed by an estimated 92 percent of local jurisdictions that used automated voting systems for the 2004 general election, but the local election officials we talked with described a variety of testing approaches.[Footnote 11] We estimate that two other forms of testing-- parallel testing and postelection auditing of voting equipment--were much less prevalent than readiness testing and were conducted by 2 percent and 43 percent of jurisdictions that used automated voting, respectively.[Footnote 12] Appropriately defined and implemented standards for system functions and testing processes are essential to ensuring the accuracy, integrity, and reliability of voting systems across all phases of the elections process. States and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and consistently applying appropriate standards and other directives for security management and testing to address vulnerabilities and risks in their specific election environments. The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 general election according to estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of integration we examined, such as electronic programming or setup and electronic management. Furthermore, relatively few local jurisdictions we visited reported having plans for integrating or further integrating their election-related systems and components for the 2006 general election, and in the instances where jurisdictions reported plans, the scope and nature of the plans varied. Nevertheless, there is real potential for greater integration among voting systems, election systems, and components as states and jurisdictions act on plans to acquire optical scan and DRE equipment that lends itself to integration. It is unclear if and when this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce more integrated election system environments. However, suitable standards and guidance for these interconnected components and systems--some of which remain to be developed--could facilitate the development, testing, operational management, and maintenance of components and systems, thereby maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election technologies and achieving states' and local jurisdictions' goals for performance and security. The challenge inherent in such a dynamic environment is to update system standards so that emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions are systematically addressed. Concluding Observations: The administration of election systems will never be error free or perfect. Each stage of the election process poses a major challenge for election officials. Effective management of the election system requires a variety of resources that must be prepared, mobilized, and deployed at regular intervals. These resources include the people who conduct the election and participate in it, the processes that govern what the people do and how the election is conducted, and the technology that facilitates the efforts of the people as they work through the election processes. Although responsibility for election administration falls largely on local governmental units, state and federal governments have a role to play in helping to minimize the types of errors that can occur. Thus, as technology evolves and circumstances warrant, state and federal governments might consider what, if any, actions on their part could help to improve election processes. GAO found that states have made changes--either as a result of HAVA or on their own--that addressed some of the challenges identified in the 2000 general election. GAO also found that some challenges continue and new challenges occurred in the 2004 general election. In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the voting administration system. It is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes, especially the requirement for statewide voter registration lists for federal elections and new voting systems, both of which are at different stages of implementation across the states. [End of section] Chapter 1: Introduction: The basic goal of the elections system in the United States is straightforward: All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, should be able to cast their votes and, if such votes have been properly cast by the voters, have those votes counted accurately. Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the foundation of our democracy. Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting equipment raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. After the events surrounding the November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being implemented.[Footnote 13] The November 2004 general election highlighted some of the same challenges as 2000 as well as some new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both elections highlighted the importance of the effective interaction of people, processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and maintaining public confidence that our election system works. Since 2001, GAO has issued a series of reports covering aspects of the election process primarily with respect to federal elections.[Footnote 14] This report focuses on the changing of such election processes in the United States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, primarily with respect to federal elections, our objectives were to examine each major stage of the election process to (1) identify changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the issues and challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election. Election Authority: Election authority is shared by federal, state, and local officials in the United States. Congressional authority to affect the administration of elections derives from various constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election.[Footnote 15] Congress has passed legislation in several major areas of the voting process. For example, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA),[Footnote 16] expanded the opportunities for citizens to register to vote for federal elections by, among other things, requiring most states to accept registration applications for federal elections by mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) and at certain other state agencies. The act also requires that in the administration of elections for federal office, states are to take certain steps to accurately maintain voter registration lists, and it limits the circumstances for removing names from voter lists. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) requires states to, among other things, permit uniformed services voters absent from the place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to vote, their dependents, and U.S. citizens residing outside the country to register and vote absentee in elections for federal office.[Footnote 17] The Help America Vote Act was enacted into law on October 29, 2002. As discussed below, the act includes a number of provisions related to voter registration, provisional voting, absentee voting, voting equipment, and other election administration provisions, and authorizes the appropriation of funds to be used toward implementing the law's requirements. HAVA also provides that the choices on the methods of implementation of such requirements, for example, a computerized statewide voter registration list, provisional voting, voter information requirements at the polling place, identification requirements, and voting system standards (for ballot verification, manual audit capacity, accessibility, and error rates), are left to the discretion of the states. HAVA further specifies that such requirements are minimum requirements and should not be construed to prevent states from establishing election technology and administration requirements that are stricter than HAVA requirements as long as they are not inconsistent with certain other specified provisions. HAVA, in general, applies to all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Areas covered by the law include: * Computerized statewide voter registration list: HAVA requires most states to implement a single, uniform, centralized, computerized statewide voter registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for federal office in each such state.[Footnote 18] Under HAVA, the computerized statewide voter registration list was to have been implemented by 2004. However, 40 states and the District of Columbia received waivers to extend the deadline until January 1, 2006. States are required to perform regular maintenance of the voter list by comparing it to state records on felons and deaths, and to match voter registration applicant information on the voter list with information in the state motor vehicle agency's records and Social Security Administration records, as appropriate. * Absentee ballots: HAVA contains various amendments to UOCAVA regarding absentee voting for absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States. The amendments, among other things, (1) required that the secretaries of each military department, to the maximum extent practicable, provide notice to military personnel of absentee ballot deadlines, (2) extended the time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application from UOCAVA voters, and (3) prohibited states from refusing to accept or process, with respect to federal elections, a voter registration application or an absentee ballot application by an absent uniformed services voter on the ground that the application was submitted before the first date that the state otherwise accepts or processes applications for that year from nonuniformed service absentee voters. * Provisional ballots: HAVA requires most states to implement provisional voting for elections for federal office.[Footnote 19] Under HAVA, in an election for federal office, states are to provide a provisional ballot to an individual asserting (1) to be registered in the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal election but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place. Provisional ballots are also to be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court-ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have closed. These various types of individuals, under HAVA, are to be permitted to cast the provisional ballot upon the execution of written affirmation at the polling place that they are registered voters in the jurisdiction and that they are eligible to vote in that election. If election officials determine that the individual is eligible under state law to vote, the individual's provisional ballot is to be counted as a vote in accordance with state law. HAVA also requires that a free access system be established to inform voters if their votes were counted, and if not, the reason why. * Polling places: HAVA provisions targeted, among other things, improving information at polling places and Election Day procedures. To improve the knowledge of voters regarding voting rights and procedures, HAVA requires election officials[Footnote 20] to post voting information at each polling place on the days of elections for federal office, including, for example, a sample ballot, polling place hours, how to vote, instructions for first-time voters who registered by mail, and general information on federal and state voting rights laws and laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. The act also authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states for educating voters concerning voting procedures, voting rights, and voting technology. Under HAVA, voting systems used in elections for federal office are required to meet specified accessibility requirements for individuals with disabilities. With respect to improving accessibility, HAVA also authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states to be used for improved accessibility of polling places for, among others, individuals with disabilities and those with limited English proficiency. HAVA also requires that such voting systems provide individuals with disabilities with the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters. In connection with this requirement, HAVA provides for the use of at least one direct recording electronic (DRE) device or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place.[Footnote 21] * Identification requirements: Under HAVA, states are to require that certain voters who register by mail to provide specified types of identification when voting at the polls or send a copy of the identification with their mailed applications.[Footnote 22] Acceptable identification includes a current and valid photo identification or current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter. Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met the identification requirement may cast a vote under HAVA's provisional voting section. Similarly, mail-in ballots from persons who have not provided the required identification also are to be counted as HAVA provisional ballots. * Election administration: HAVA also established an agency with wide- ranging duties to help improve state and local administration of federal elections. The Election Assistance Commission is to be involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to states implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements to some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop testing for voting systems, and standards for election equipment. EAC is led by four Commissioners, who are to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners, who, under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives. Among other things, EAC has held hearings on the security of voting technologies and the national poll worker shortage; established a clearinghouse for information on election administration by issuing two best practices reports; distributed payments to states for election improvements, including payments for voter education and voting equipment replacement; drafted changes to existing federal voluntary standards for voting systems; and established a program to accredit the national independent certified laboratories that test electronic voting systems against the federal voluntary standards. However, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states' procurement of new voting equipment and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. * Voting systems: One of the primary HAVA provisions relates to encouraging states to replace punch card voting systems and lever voting systems and authorizing appropriations for payments to support states in making federally mandated improvements to their voting systems. A voting system includes the people, processes, and technology associated with any voting method. It encompasses the hardware and software used to define the ballot, conduct the vote, and transmit and tally results, and system maintenance and testing functions. With respect to standards for voting systems used in elections for federal office, HAVA requirements for such systems include providing voters with the ability to verify their votes before casting their ballots, producing permanent paper records for manual auditing of voting systems, and compliance of voting system ballot counting error rates with those set out in specified federal voting system standards. HAVA also directs that updates to the federal voluntary voting system standards for these requirements be in place by January 1, 2004,[Footnote 23] and provides for additional updates to the voluntary standards as approved by the Election Assistance Commission. Mechanisms are also specified that can be used by states and localities in acquiring and operating voting systems, including accreditation of laboratories to independently test and evaluate voting systems and federal certification for voting systems that undergo independent testing. The time frames for implementing various HAVA requirements ranged from as early as 45 days after enactment (a deadline for establishing a grant program for payment to the states for improved election administration) to as late as January 1, 2006, for various voting system standards.[Footnote 24] Several key deadlines were set for January 1, 2004, including implementation of HAVA's provisional voting requirements and the establishment of a statewide voter registration list (or to request a waiver from the deadline until January 1, 2006). States receiving funds to replace punch card voting systems or lever voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1, 2006; otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November 2004 general elections. The deadline for states and jurisdictions to comply with specific requirements for voting systems, such as producing a paper record for audit purposes, was January 1, 2006. HAVA vests enforcement authority with the Attorney General to bring a civil action against any state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry out specified uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements under HAVA. These requirements pertain to HAVA voting system standards, provisional voting and voting information requirements, the computerized statewide voter registration list requirements, and requirements for persons who register to vote by mail. The enforcement of federal statutes pertaining to elections and voting has, with certain exceptions, been delegated by the Attorney General to the Civil Rights Division. Election System Elements: The U.S. election system is highly decentralized and based upon a complex interaction of people (election officials and voters), processes, and technology. Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia has its own election system with a somewhat distinct approach. Within each of these 51 systems, the guidelines and procedures established for local election jurisdictions can be very general or specific. Each election system generally incorporates elements that are designed to allow eligible citizens to vote and ensures that votes are accurately counted. While election systems vary from one local jurisdiction to another, most election systems have the elements identified in figure 7. Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Delegation of Election Responsibility: Typically, states have decentralized elections so that the details of administering elections are determined at the local jurisdiction. States can be divided into two groups according to how they delegate election responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first group include 41 states where election responsibilities are delegated to counties, with a few of these states delegating election responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state that delegates these responsibilities to election regions. We included the District of Columbia along with this group. The second group is composed of 9 states that delegate election responsibilities to subcounty governmental units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor civil divisions (MCD). However, in 1 of these states, Minnesota, election functions are split between county-level governments and MCDs. For example, registration is handled exclusively by county officials, and functions, such as polling place matters, are handled by MCDs. Overall, about 10,500 local government jurisdictions are responsible for conducting elections nationwide, with the first group of states containing about one-fourth of the local election jurisdictions and about three-fourths of the local election jurisdictions located in the states delegating responsibilities to MCDs. Although more election jurisdictions are in the 9 states, most of the population (88 percent of the U.S. population based on the Census of 2000) lives in the states delegating responsibilities primarily to counties. Voter Registration: While voter registration is not a federal requirement, the District of Columbia and all states, except North Dakota, generally require citizens to register before voting.[Footnote 25] The deadline for registering, and what is required to register, varies; at a minimum, state eligibility provisions typically require a person to be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident of the state, with some states requiring a minimum residency period. Citizens apply to register to vote in various ways, such as at motor vehicle agencies, during voter registration drives, by mail, or at local voter registrar offices. Election officials process registration applications and compile and maintain the list of registered voters to be used throughout the administration of an election. Prior to HAVA, voter registration lists were not necessarily centralized at the state level, and separate lists were often managed by local election officials. HAVA requires voter registration information for federal elections to be maintained as a statewide computerized list and matched with certain state data, and that voter registration application information be matched with certain state data and, in some cases, with federal data, to help ensure that the voter list is accurate. Absentee and Early Voting: All states and the District of Columbia have provisions allowing voters to cast their ballot before Election Day by voting absentee with variations on who may vote absentee, whether the voter needs an excuse, and the time frames for applying and submitting absentee ballots. In addition, some states also allow early voting, in which the voter goes to a specific location to vote in person prior to Election Day. As with absentee voting, the specific circumstances for early voting--such as the dates, times, and locations--are based on the state and local requirements. In general, early voting allows voters from any precinct in the jurisdiction to cast their vote before Election Day either at one specific location or at one of several locations. The early voting locations are staffed by poll workers who have a registration list for the jurisdiction and ballots specific to each precinct. The voter is provided with and casts a ballot for his or her assigned precinct. Conducting Elections: Election officials perform a broad range of activities in preparation for and on Election Day itself. Prior to an election, officials recruit and train poll workers to have the skills needed to perform their Election Day duties, such as opening and closing the polls, operating polling place equipment, and explaining and implementing provisional voting procedures for certain voters such as those who are not on the registration list. Where needed and required, election officials must also recruit poll workers who speak languages other than English. Polling places have to be identified as meeting basic standards for accessibility and having an infrastructure to support voting machines as well as voter and poll worker needs. Ballots are designed and produced to meet state requirements, voter language needs, and identify all races, candidates, and issues on which voters in each precinct in their jurisdiction will vote. Election officials seek to educate voters on topics such as what the ballot looks like, how to use a voting machine, and where their particular polling place is located. Finally, election officials seek to ensure that voting equipment, ballots, and supplies are delivered to polling places. On Election Day, poll workers set up and open the polling places. This can include tasks such as setting up the voting machines or voting booths, readying supplies, testing equipment, posting required signs and voter education information, and completing paperwork such as confirming that the ballot is correct for the precinct. Before a voter receives a ballot or is directed to a voting machine, poll workers typically are to verify his or her eligibility. The assistance provided to voters who are in the wrong precinct depends on the practices for that particular location. Provisional Voting: One of the most significant post-2000 election reforms found in HAVA, according to the Election Assistance Commission, is that states are required to permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in federal elections.[Footnote 26] More specifically, states are to provide a provisional ballot to an individual asserting to be (1) registered in the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal election, but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place. In addition, provisional ballots are to be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court- ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have closed. Although many states had some form of provisional balloting prior to the passage of HAVA, 44 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia were required to provide provisional ballots for the 2004 general election. Under HAVA, 6 states were exempt from HAVA's provisional voting requirements because they either permitted voters to register on Election Day or did not require voter registration.[Footnote 27] If individuals are determined to be eligible voters, their provisional ballots are to be counted as votes in accordance with state law, along with other types of ballots, and included in the total election results. Vote Counting and Recounting: Following the close of the polls, election officials and poll workers complete a number of basic steps to get the votes counted and determine the outcome of the election. Equipment and ballots are to be secured, and votes are to be tallied or transferred to a central location for counting. The processes used to count or to recount election votes vary with the type of voting equipment used in a jurisdiction, state statutes, and local jurisdiction policies. Votes from Election Day, absentee ballots, early votes (where applicable), and provisional ballots are to be counted and consolidated for each race to determine the outcome. While preliminary results are available usually by the evening of Election Day, the certified results are generally not available until days later. Some states establish a deadline for certification of results, while other states do not. Voting Methods and Technologies: Voting methods are tools for accommodating the millions of voters in our nation's approximately 10,000 local election jurisdictions. Since the 1980s, ballots in the United States have been cast and counted using five methods: paper ballots, lever machines, punch cards, optical scan, and DREs. Four of the five methods by which votes are cast and counted involve technology; only the paper ballot system does not use technology. The three newer methods--punch card, optical scan, and DRE- -depend on computers to tally votes. Punch card and optical scan methods rely on paper ballots that are marked by the voter, while many DREs use computers to present the ballot to the voter. Voting systems utilize technology in different ways to implement these basic voting methods. For instance, some punch card systems include the names of candidates and issues on the printed punch card, while others use a booklet of candidates and issues that must be physically aligned with the punch card. The way systems are designed, developed, tested, installed, and operated can lead to a variety of situations where misunderstanding, confusion, error, or deliberate actions by voters or election workers can, in turn, affect the equipment's performance in terms of accuracy, ease of use, security, reliability, and efficiency. In fact, some recent election controversies have been specifically associated with particular voting methods and systems. Nevertheless, all voting methods and systems can benefit from established information technology management practices that effectively integrate the people, processes, technologies. Scope and Methodology: For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a nationally representative stratified random probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with election officials in 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Copies of the survey instruments are in appendixes II and III. In addition, the results of our state and local surveys are presented in two supplemental GAO products that can be found on our Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 28] Appendix IV provides a summary of jurisdictions we visited. In reporting the state survey data, actual numbers of states are provided. When reporting local jurisdiction survey data, we provide estimates for jurisdictions nationwide. Unless otherwise noted, the maximum sampling error, with 95 percent confidence, for estimates of all jurisdictions from our local jurisdiction survey is plus or minus 5 percentage points (rounded).[Footnote 29] We also provide some national estimates by jurisdiction population size, and the sampling errors for these estimates are slightly higher. For these estimates, large jurisdictions are defined as those with a population over 100,000, medium jurisdictions have a population of over 10,000 to 100,000, and small jurisdictions have a population of 10,000 or less. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from our local jurisdiction survey are within our planned confidence intervals. Jurisdictions in which we conducted on-site interviews were chosen based on a wide variety of characteristics, including voting methods used, geographic characteristics, and aspects of election administration, such as whether early voting was offered. We did not select jurisdictions we visited on the basis of size, but as appropriate, we identify the size of a jurisdiction we visited using the same groupings we used for our nationwide mail survey. We also reviewed extensive prior GAO work and other national studies and reports, and attended an annual election official conference. A comprehensive description of our methodology for this report is contained in appendix V. We conducted our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in Washington, D.C; Dallas; Los Angeles; and 28 local election jurisdictions in 14 states, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. [End of section] Chapter 2: Voter Registration: In general, the goal of a voter registration system is to ensure that eligible citizens who complete all the steps required of them to register to vote in their jurisdictions are able to have their registrations processed accurately and in a timely fashion, so they may be included on the rolls in time for Election Day. The November 2000 general election resulted in widespread concerns about voter registration in the United States. Headlines and reports questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration by highlighting accounts of individuals who thought they were registered being turned away from polling places on Election Day, the fraudulent use of the names of dead people to cast additional votes, and jurisdictions incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration lists. With the passage of HAVA,[Footnote 30] with respect to federal elections, most states were required to establish statewide computerized voter registration lists and perform certain list maintenance activities as a means to improve upon the accuracy of voter registration lists.[Footnote 31] List maintenance is performed by election officials and consists of updating registrants' information and deleting duplicate registrations and the names of registrants who are no longer eligible to vote. The voter registration process includes the integration of people, processes, and technology involved in registering eligible voters and in compiling and maintaining accurate and complete voter registration lists. In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons registering to vote, and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter registration lists. This has been a challenging task, and remains so, as we and others have noted. While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system generally, applying to register and being registered are not synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the voter registration applications they receive. This chapter describes various HAVA and state changes related to the voter registration processes that have occurred since the 2000 general election. It also examines continuing and new registration challenges encountered by local jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. Overview: With respect to voter registration, a significant change since the 2000 general election is the HAVA requirement for states to each establish a single, uniform, statewide, computerized voter registration list for conducting elections for federal office. The HAVA requirements for states to develop statewide lists and verify voter information against state and federal agency records presented a significant shift in voter list management in many states. While the initial deadline to implement HAVA's statewide list requirement was January 1, 2004, more than 40 states took advantage of a waiver allowing an extra 2 years to complete the task, or until January 1, 2006. The statewide registration lists for federal elections are intended to implement a system capable of maintaining voter registration lists that are more accurate by requiring states to (1) match voter registration application information against other state and federal agency databases or records to help ensure that only eligible voters are added to such lists, (2) identify certain types of ineligible voters whose names should be removed from the lists, and (3) identify individual voter names that appear more than once on the list to be removed from the lists. While HAVA defined some parameters for the required statewide voter registration lists and required matching voter information with certain state and federal records, the act leaves the choices on the methods of implementing such statewide list requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, states varied in the progress made in implementing their statewide voter registrations lists, how they have implemented these systems, and the capabilities of their systems to match information with other state and federal agency records as well as many other features of the state systems. In addition to requiring states to develop statewide voter registration lists, HAVA provides that states must require that mail registrants who have not previously voted in a federal election in the state are to provide certain specified types of identification with their mail application, and if they do not provide such identification with their application, these first-time mail registrants are to provide the identification at the polls. Furthermore, if such a voter does not have the requisite identification at the polls, HAVA requires that the voter be provided a provisional ballot with the status of his or her ballot to be determined by the appropriate state or local official. As with the statewide voter registration list requirement, HAVA leaves the choices on the methods of implementing the provisional voting requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of interviews of officials in 28 local election jurisdictions, implementation of the requirement for first-time voters who registered by mail varied. One noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration, where some local jurisdictions we visited told us that applications received through voter registration drives would be treated as mail registrations subject to HAVA identification requirements and other local jurisdictions we visited told us applications from registration drives were not treated as mail registrations and therefore were not treated as subject to HAVA identification requirements. As noted above, during 2004 and 2005 many states were in the process of implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and associated requirements for maintaining the lists. Thus, the potential benefits to be gained from HAVA's requirement for the statewide voter registration lists were not evident in many states at the time of the November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA intended to help states and local election jurisdictions to have access to more accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying duplicate registrations and matching the voter information against other state agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being able to verify voter registration application information with state motor vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists with state vital statistics agency records to identify deceased persons, and to appropriate state agency's records to identify felons who may be ineligible to vote. Thus, on the basis of our nationwide survey and local election jurisdictions we visited, many local jurisdictions continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations, or ineligible voters appearing on the list. In addition, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us they continued to face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities.[Footnote 32] In addition, for some local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that efforts on the part of various groups to get out the vote by registering new voters through voter registration drives created new challenges not identified to us as a problem in the 2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines for registration, which included challenges in some large jurisdictions to resolve issues of incomplete or inaccurate (and potentially fraudulent) applications submitted by entities conducting voter registration drives. Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: HAVA requires states to, among other things, (a) implement a single, uniform, computerized statewide voter registration list for conducting elections for federal office;[Footnote 33] (b) perform regular maintenance by comparing the voter list against state records on felons and deaths; (c) verify information on voter registration applications with information in state motor vehicle agency databases or with a Social Security Administration database, as appropriate. In addition, HAVA imposes new identification requirements for certain mail registrants--such as, individuals who register by mail and have not previously voted in a federal election within the state.[Footnote 34] HAVA Requirements for Statewide Voter Registration List: Historically, to ensure that only qualified persons vote, states and local jurisdictions have used various means to establish and compile voter registration lists.[Footnote 35] Prior to HAVA, we noted in our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide that in compiling these lists, election officials used different methods to verify the information on registration forms, check for duplicate registrations, and update registration records, and we noted that states' capabilities for compiling these lists varied. At the time, some states had statewide voter lists, but others did not and were not required to do so. Moreover, most jurisdictions we visited at the time maintained their own local, computerized voter lists.[Footnote 36] Under HAVA, this has changed. HAVA requires the chief election official in the state to implement a "single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive, computerized statewide voter registration list" that must contain the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the state. Under HAVA, states were required to be in compliance with the statewide voter registration list requirement by January 2004 unless they obtained a waiver until January 2006. Forty- one states and the District of Columbia obtained a waiver and thus, for the 2004 general election, were not required to have their statewide voter registration lists in place.[Footnote 37] With respect to the HAVA required statewide voter registration list, states are to, among other things: * Make the information in such lists electronically accessible to any election officials in the state. * Ensure that such voter lists contain registration information on every legally registered voter in the state, with a unique identifier assigned to each legally registered voter. * Verify voter identity; most states are required to match voter information obtained on the voter registration application for the applicant's drivers' license number or the last four digits of the voter's Social Security number, when available, to state MVAs or the Social Security Administration databases. In connection with this requirement to verify voter registration application information, states must require that individuals applying to register to vote provide a current and valid driver's license number, or the last four digits of their Social Security number; if neither has been issued to the individual, then the state is to assign a unique identifier to the applicant. The state MVA must enter into an agreement with the Social Security Administration (SSA), as applicable, to verify the applicant information when the last four digits of the Social Security number are provided, rather than a driver's license number or state ID number.[Footnote 38] * Perform list maintenance on the statewide voter registration lists by coordinating them on a regular basis with state records on felony status and deaths, in order to identify and remove names of ineligible voters.[Footnote 39] List maintenance is also to be conducted to eliminate duplicate names. * Implement safeguards ensuring that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from statewide lists. * Include technological security measures as part of the statewide list to prevent unauthorized access to such lists. Except for the 9 states that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA's requirements for establishing a statewide voter registration list, all other states subject to the statewide list requirement were not required to perform list maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended waiver deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election, states were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related to their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and procedures at the state and local levels for performing required list maintenance functions. Many states reported that their statewide voter registration systems implementing the statewide list requirement include or will include additional election management features not required under HAVA. Progress Establishing Statewide Voter Registration Lists Varied: Voter registration system development was an ongoing process in 2004 and 2005. For the November 2004 general election, the use of technology to compile voter registration information remained an issue. Developing and implementing statewide computerized voter lists has been an ongoing process for many states, and state and local election officials reported encountering difficulties along the way. Our state survey and site visits suggest that states and jurisdictions were still coming to terms, as of the last half of calendar year 2005, with how their systems should be updated and whether states or jurisdictions should control the flow of information into statewide registration systems. As mentioned in chapter 1, HAVA vests the Attorney General with the responsibility of enforcing certain HAVA requirements with respect to the states. In January 2006, the Justice Department asked all states, the District of Columbia, and other covered territories to provide a detailed statement of their compliance with voting systems standards and implementation of a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list. If the states, the District of Columbia, or covered territories were not implementing HAVA's requirements for the computerized statewide voter registration lists as of January 2006, the Justice Department reported that it then asked them to identify steps they planned to take to achieve full implementation of the HAVA-compliant statewide voter registration list and the date on which each step would be accomplished. According to Justice Department officials, they are reviewing the information provided by the states, the District of Columbia, and such territories to make determinations of what, if any, enforcement action might be needed. The Department of Justice reports that it entered into a memorandum of agreement with California in November 2005 after that state realized it would not be able to fully meet HAVA's requirements by the January 1, 2006, deadline. On March 1, 2006, the Department of Justice also filed suit in a federal district court against the state of New York alleging the state not to be in compliance with, among other things, HAVA's requirement for a computerized statewide voter registration list and seeking a judicial determination of noncompliance and a court order requiring the state to develop a plan for how it will come into compliance.[Footnote 40] During our site visits in 2005, we asked local election officials about the status of their statewide registration systems. Election officials in some local jurisdictions we visited cited difficulties related to implementing their statewide voter registration systems involving, among other things, internal politics and technology-related challenges. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction reported that a disagreement between the State Board of Elections and local election officials over the type of system to implement delayed the project for a year. State election officials wanted a system requiring all voter registrations to be entered at the state level but maintained locally. The local election officials expressed the view that such a system would result in a lack of control over data entry at the local level at the front end, while imposing accountability on them on the back end (data maintenance). During our interview in August 2005, these election officials told us that a statewide registration system had not been implemented yet. In some jurisdictions, the difficulties cited by election officials may have reflected the fact that they were establishing statewide voter registration systems for the first time. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction that was establishing a HAVA voter registration list from scratch, local election officials noted that at the time of our interview in August, the system was behind schedule, lacked the ability to identify duplicates, had no quality control, and was not planned to function as a real-time system. State Capabilities for Matching Voter Registration Lists with State and Federal Records, as Required by HAVA, Were Under Way or Not Yet Achieved: In our survey of states and the District of Columbia, and our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, among other things, we inquired about the status of their capabilities for meeting HAVA provisions for (1) verifying voter registration application information against MVA and SSA databases and (2) maintaining the statewide voter lists by comparing information on the statewide voter registration list against state death records and felon information, and discussed the issues during our local site visits. Our work focused on how states had matched or planned to match voter registration lists against other state records, as required by HAVA. However, it is important to note that the success of such matching in ensuring accurate voter registration lists is dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of the data in the databases used for matching. If that state's MVA databases, felon records, death records, or other records used for matching are inaccurate, they can result in voter registration list errors. Matching to MVA Databases: When a driver's license or driver's license number is presented as identification when registering to vote in an election for federal office, HAVA requires that states match the voter registration application information presented with that in the MVA records.[Footnote 41] In our survey of state election officials, we asked states whether their voter registration systems would have the capability to perform electronic matching of such voter registration information with state motor vehicle agency records for the purposes of verifying the accuracy of information on the registration application. Twenty-seven states reported they will have or currently had the capability to match on a real-time basis, 15 states and the District of Columbia reported they will have or currently had capability to match in batches, and 4 states reported they would not have the capability to perform electronic matching. The remaining 4 states included 2 states that reported that they are not subject to HAVA's registration information verification requirement because they collect the full Social Security numbers on voter registration applications;[Footnote 42] 1 state, North Dakota, which does not require voter registration, did not respond, and 1 state reported that it was uncertain of its capability to perform electronic matching. Matching with SSA Records: With respect to matching voter information with SSA data when a Social Security number is presented instead of a driver's license, in our state survey, 7 states had and 26 states and the District of Columbia reported that they would have the capability, by January 1, 2006, to electronically match voter registration information with SSA (through the MVA); 10 states reported they planned to have this capability in place but not by January 2006; and 6 states had not yet determined whether they could do so. Many states reported concerns with whether SSA would be able to return responses to verify requests in a timely manner. Specifically, 30 states and the District of Columbia reported some level of concern about the issue. When asked whether they thought local jurisdictions would be able to resolve nonmatches resulting from SSA verification checks, opinions were divided, with a number of states (21) expressing some degree of concern about this, while a nearly equal number (22 states and the District of Columbia) did not. In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists, we found that in one state (Iowa) that had verified its voter registration list with SSA before the 2004 general election, there was no unique match for 2,586 names, according to the SSA records.[Footnote 43] As we stated in our report, Iowa officials said that the biggest problem they faced was that SSA did not specify what specific voter information did not match (i.e., was the mismatch in name, date of birth, or final four-digit Social Security number). Without that information, they were not able to efficiently resolve the non-matching problems. In that same report, we also noted that an SSA official said that the system established to perform the HAVA matching on the four- digit Social Security number is not able to provide that detail. In addition, we found that use of SSA's database to identify deceased registrants, which is linked with the system established to perform the HAVA verification of voter registration application information, had matching and timeliness issues. Overall Matching Challenges: As shown in figure 8, many states reported that they faced significant challenges when trying to match voter registration information with state records. For example, in our survey, 29 states and the District of Columbia reported that records with incomplete data posed a challenge; 19 states and the District of Columbia reported that obtaining records not maintained electronically was a challenge; and 23 states reported that verifying information against incompatible electronic record systems was also a challenge. Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter Registration Information with State Records: [See PDF for image] [A] Includes the District of Columbia. [End of figure] During our site visits to local jurisdictions, we obtained additional views on how well, in general, states were believed to perform various data-matching functions.[Footnote 44] We asked local election officials to describe their state system's ability to match voter registration information with MVA and SSA records and the system's ability to verify information on eligibility status for felons, noncitizens, and others with other state databases or records. One jurisdiction in Illinois reported it was not sure how or if its voter registration system would be able to match data with MVA and SSA databases or to verify eligibility status for felons and by age. An official in a jurisdiction in Florida said that Florida's system could not verify information on the eligibility status of felons, noncitizens, the mentally incompetent, or the underaged--though plans were under way to obtain information from the Clerk of Courts Information System to perform some of these tasks. Removing Voters Names from the Registration List: HAVA's list maintenance provisions require states to match the statewide voter registration list information against certain state records to identify ineligible voters and duplicate names.[Footnote 45] If a voter is ineligible under state requirements and is to be removed from the statewide voter registration list, states are generally required to remove such names in accordance with NVRA provisions relating to the removal of voter names from registration lists for federal elections. Under NVRA, in the administration of voter registration for federal elections, states may not remove the names of people who are registered to vote for nonvoting and names may be removed only for certain specified reasons: at the request of the registrant; by reason of criminal conviction, as provided by state law; by reason of mental incapacity, as provided by state law; or pursuant to a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists by reason of the death of the voter or on the ground that the voter has changed address to a location outside the election jurisdiction on the basis of change of address information from the U.S. Postal Service (but only if either (1) the voter confirms in writing a change of address to a place outside the election jurisdiction or (2) the voter has failed to respond to a confirmation mailing and the voter has not voted or appeared to vote in any election between the time of such notice and the passage of two federal general elections).[Footnote 46] Reasons Names Removed from Registration Lists: In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked about the reasons names were removed from voter registration lists. On the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, the following table shows various reasons that jurisdictions removed names from voter registration lists for the 2004 general election and our estimates of how frequently names were removed for that reason. For example, the most frequent reason was the death of the voter (76 percent). Names were removed with about equal frequency because the voter requested that his or her name be removed (54 percent) or the registrant's name appeared to be a duplicate (52 percent). The least frequent reason was for mental incompetency (10 percent). In many jurisdictions, names were not removed but rather placed on an inactive list for a period of time. In our survey of local jurisdictions, nearly half, or an estimated 46 percent, took this step. Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed Names from Voter Registration List for 2004 General Election for Various Reasons: Name removed because:: Information received from state/county vital statistics offices identified registrants as deceased; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 76. Name removed because:: Registrants requested that their names be removed from the voter registration list (e.g., moved out of jurisdiction or other reason); Percentage of all jurisdictions: 54. Name removed because:: Registrant's name appeared to be a duplicate; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 52. Name removed because:: Change of address information received from U.S. Postal Service showed that the registrants had moved outside of the jurisdiction where registered; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 45. Name removed because:: Registrant failed to respond to a notice from the registrar and had not voted or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 38. Name removed because:: Felony records received from federal/state/local governmental entities identified registrant as ineligible to vote or register to vote because of a felony conviction; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 38. Name removed because:: Newspaper obituaries identified registrant as deceased; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 31. Name removed because:: Names removed from the voter registration list for other reasons; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 11. Name removed because:: Information received from federal/state/local courts indicating that registrant had been judged to be mentally incompetent; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 10. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [End of table] In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists,[Footnote 47] on the basis of interviews of election officials in 14 jurisdictions and 7 state election offices, we reported that in larger jurisdictions, the task of identifying and removing registrants who died can be substantial. For example, in the city of Los Angeles, in 1 week in 2005 alone, almost 300 persons died. The issue of felons voting unlawfully--that is, voting when their felony status renders them ineligible to voter under state law--was a high-profile issue in some jurisdictions. According to an election official in a Washington jurisdiction we visited, this issue was identified during the November 2004 general election. This official also told us that the Secretary of State is working to establish a database that will indicate felony status and cancel the registration of felons. This election official noted that the jurisdiction rarely receives information from federal courts on felony convictions. Under federal law, U.S. Attorneys are to give written notice of felony convictions in federal district courts to the chief state election official of the offender's state of residence.[Footnote 48] In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists,we found that U.S. Attorneys had not consistently provided this information, and while the law did not establish a standardized time frame or format for forwarding the federal felony conviction information, election officials in 7 states we visited reported that the felony information received from U.S. Attorneys was not always timely and was sometimes difficult to interpret.[Footnote 49] We recommended that the U.S. Attorneys provide information in a more standardized manner. Removing Duplicate Names: Under HAVA, duplicate names on the statewide voter registration list are also to be identified and removed. In our state survey, 49 states and the District of Columbia reported that their voter registration systems will include a function for checking duplicate voter registration records.[Footnote 50] On the basis of our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 percent of local jurisdictions employed a system of edit checks (automated controls to identify registration problems) to identify duplicates. Our prior work has also found that states were, for the most part, able to handle duplicate registrations--though obtaining timely, accurate data to facilitate the identification of duplicate registrations has been viewed as a challenge among some state election officials. Specifically, in our February 2006 report on certain states' (9 states that did not seek a waiver until January 1, 2006 and were to implement a computerized statewide voter registration list by January 1, 2004) experiences with implementing HAVA's statewide voter registration lists, we found that 8 of the 9 states we reviewed screened voter applications to identify duplicate registrations, and most did so in real time.[Footnote 51] We also reported that 8 of these 9 states checked voter registration lists for duplicate registrations on an annual, monthly, or other periodic basis. And 4 of the 9 states reported that implementing the HAVA requirements led to some or great improvement in the accuracy of their voter lists by reducing duplicate registrations or improving the quality of voter information before it was entered into the statewide voter list. Checking for duplicates remained a challenge for some in 2004 and 2005, however. In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists, we noted that officials in 7 of the 21 local election jurisdictions we spoke with during 2004 and 2005 had some concern about the accuracy and timeliness of data they received to identify duplicate registrants and verify that registrants resided within the jurisdiction.[Footnote 52] They noted that the matching and validation of names are complex and made more so when considering aliases and name changes, as are matches such as "Margie L. Smith" with "Margaret Smith." Officials from several states who reported, at the time of our review, that their state had not implemented a statewide voter registration system noted that there was no way to identify duplicates outside their jurisdiction. Most States Reported Having Established Centralized Voter Registration Systems, and Half Reported They Can Enter Voter Information on a Real- Time Basis: While HAVA requires that both state and local election officials have immediate electronic access to information in the statewide voter registration list, HAVA grants states discretion as to the method used to ensure that this capability is established.[Footnote 53] According to EAC, state and local election officials may determine whether to establish (a) a top-down system, whereby the statewide voter registration list resides on a state database hosted on a single, central platform (e.g., a mainframe or client servers), which state and local election officials may query directly; (b) a bottom-up system, whereby the statewide voter list is stored on a state-level database that can be downloaded to jurisdictions and updated by the state only when the jurisdictions send new registration information back to the state;[Footnote 54] or (c) take another approach. According to the EAC voluntary guidance on HAVA's statewide voter registration system, the top-down approach most closely matches HAVA requirements--but other configurations may be used as long as they meet the HAVA requirement for a single, uniform list that allows election officials to have immediate access. Our 2005 survey of state election officials sought information on how states were implementing statewide computerized voter registration systems. We asked, among other things, whether states were using a top- down or a bottom-up approach. In response, 40 states and the District of Columbia reported that they have a database maintained by the state, with information supplied by local jurisdictions (top-down system); 4 states reported that local jurisdictions retain their own lists and transmit information to a statewide list (a bottom-up system); and 5 states reported they use a hybrid of these two options. We also asked whether state election officials would have immediate, real-time access to their state lists for the purposes of entering new voter registration information, updating existing information, and querying voter registration records. About half the states and the District of Columbia reported they had or would have all these capabilities. Specifically, 24 states and the District of Columbia reported they had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access for entering new voter registration information, while 23 states reported they did not plan to do so and 2 states did not respond. In addition, 26 states and the District of Columbia reported that they had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access for updating existing voter registration information, while 21 states reported they did not plan to do so and 2 states did not respond. And 47 states and the District of Columbia reported they had or would have as of January 2006 real-time access for querying all state voter registration records, while 1 state reported it would not do so and 1 state did not respond. For each of these questions, one state reported it too would have these capabilities, but not by the January 1, 2006, HAVA deadline. We also sought state election officials' views on whether election officials in local jurisdictions would have immediate, real-time access to voter list information for the same three purposes stated above: entering new information, updating existing information, and querying records. In our state survey, most states and the District of Columbia reported that local jurisdictions had these capabilities. Specifically, 46 states and the District of Columbia reported that local jurisdictions had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access for entering new voter registration information, and 3 other states reported that they planned to do so as well, but not by January 1, 2006. Also, 46 states and the District of Columbia reported that local jurisdictions had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access for updating existing voter registration information, and 3 other states planned to do so as well, but not by the deadline. Finally, 47 states and the District of Columbia reported local jurisdictions had or would have as of January 2006 the capability to query records for their jurisdictions in real time, and 2 states planned to do so, but not by January 2006. Figure 9 compares the capability of state and local jurisdiction election officials to access the voter registration lists to perform certain tasks. Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of January 2006, Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter Registration List to Enter, Update, and Query Information: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Most States Reported They Will Match Statewide Voter Registration List Information Electronically against State Databases: While HAVA's list maintenance provisions require states to coordinate statewide voter registration list information with certain other state records within their state in order to identify and remove ineligible names, the act does not specifically provide that such coordination must be done electronically. However, to determine whether state systems had or would have the capability to perform electronic data matching, our survey asked states about existing or planned electronic capability. As shown in figure 10, more than half the states reported that they had, or planned to have, the ability to match voter registration information electronically with state records on felony convictions and deceased registrants. Specifically, 25 states reported they had and 15 states reported that they would have the capability to electronically match against state death records as of January 2006, and 6 states and the District of Columbia planned to have the capability, but not by January 2006. Three states reported that they did not plan to have this capability. With respect to identifying ineligible felons, 16 states reported they had, and 15 reported they would have the capability to electronically match against felony conviction records as of January 2006, while 9 states planned to do so but would not have done so by January 2006. In addition, 7 states and the District of Columbia did not plan to have this capability, and 2 states had not determined whether to have the capability. Figure 10: States' Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match Voter Registration Information with State Death Records and Felony Conviction Records: [See PDF for image] [A] Includes District of Columbia. [End of figure] On the topic of states' efforts to meet HAVA's data-matching requirements electronically--as opposed to transmitting paper records- -EAC recommends that voter registration information be transmitted electronically, particularly between states and their MVAs. EAC further recommends that to the extent allowed by state law and available technologies, the electronic transfer between statewide voter registration lists and coordinating verification databases should be accomplished through direct, secure, interactive, and integrated connections. While EAC provided guidance to states for their statewide systems, under HAVA, the states are to define the parameters for implementing interactive and integrated systems. Security of Voter Information in the Statewide Voter Registration Lists: HAVA requires election officials to provide adequate technological database security for statewide voter registration lists that is designed to prevent unauthorized access.[Footnote 55] EAC provided states with voluntary guidance, issued in July 2005, to help clarify HAVA's provisions for computerized statewide voter registration lists. Among other things, the EAC guidance noted that such computer security must be designed to prevent unauthorized users from altering the list or accessing private or otherwise protected information contained on the list. Access may be controlled through a variety of tools, including network-or system-level utilities and database applications (such as passwords and "masked" data elements). Special care must be taken to ensure that voter registration databases are protected when linked to outside systems for the purposes of coordination. Any major compromise of the voter registration system could lead to considerable election fraud.[Footnote 56] We sought information on what documented standards or guidance for computer and procedural controls would be in place to prevent unauthorized access to the lists. In our state survey, 45 states and the District of Columbia reported having such standards or guidance, 3 plan to do so, and 1 reported that it did not know. We also asked states what actions they had taken or planned to take to deal with privacy and intrusion issues. We asked, for instance, what, if anything, had been done to install or activate mechanisms to detect or track unauthorized actions affecting the state's computerized voter registration system. A majority of states reported actions had been taken or were to be taken at some point. Specifically, 26 states reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while 12 states and the District of Columbia reported they would do so by January 1, 2006. An additional 4 states reported that actions were planned, but at no particular point in time. In a related question, we asked what actions had been taken or were planned to install or activate mechanisms to protect voter privacy. Again, a majority of states reported actions had been taken or were to be taken at some point. Specifically, 32 states reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while 13 states and the District of Columbia reported they would do so by January 1, 2006. Two other states reported actions would be taken at a later point in time. During our site visits, we asked local election officials what standards or procedures were used for the November 2004 general election to help ensure that the registration list was secure and that the privacy of individuals was protected. Election officials in most jurisdictions reported that voter information (such as name and address) is public information if it is to be used for political purposes--though some do not release Social Security numbers, and others limit access to this information by requiring a fee. Some local election officials noted that security standards for this information were not set by the state but rather at the county or local level, though many look to the state for future guidance on standards. The type of security in place to restrict access to voter registration records varied by jurisdiction; among the procedures commonly used were password protection (so that only certain election officials could log onto the voter registration system to access the information); storage of voter registration records in locked facilities; use of "best practice" protocols such as system firewalls; and in some cases, registration information is maintained on a computer system that is separate from the jurisdiction's central system. Along these lines, 1 jurisdiction noted that it planned to implement a public key infrastructure (PKI). A PKI is a system of computers, software, policies, and people that can be used to facilitate the protection of sensitive information and communications. The official noted it is a felony in that jurisdiction to use a PKI authorization without authorization from the State Board of Elections. Election officials in another jurisdiction we visited told us that all voter registration system users must log on using unique user IDs and passwords, which are maintained by the county registrar. The system tracks all data entries and changes, which user made them, and when they were made. In a few jurisdictions, election officials said they grant additional privacy to the records of voters involved in domestic disputes or other law enforcement matters. When asked whether they had any plan to develop or change existing security standards or procedures, local election officials in 16 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us there were no plans to alter current practices, though some noted they were not sure. Among those indicating that security procedures were being enhanced, election officials in 1 large jurisdiction said they planned to enclose their computer systems server in a secure case with restricted access. Another official in a large jurisdiction in another state said that because of a change in state law in 2004, a hard copy of voter records was no longer available for public inspection. Sharing Registration and Eligibility Information among States Is Limited: As mentioned earlier, the HAVA computerized statewide voter registration list provisions require states to perform list maintenance to identify duplicate registrations, deceased registrants, and registrants who may be ineligible to vote under state law based upon a felony conviction. However, we note that requirements for matching voter registration lists with certain state records leaves some potential gaps for incomplete and inaccurate voter registration lists because election officials may not have information regarding registered voters who die out of state or who are in prison in another state and ineligible because of a criminal conviction. To determine whether states went beyond HAVA requirements to share voter registration data with other states to identify registrants who died in another state, were incarcerated in another state, or registered in another state, we asked on our survey of state election officials whether they had taken action to electronically exchange voter registration information with at least 1 other state and whether they were sharing registration information routinely with other states. In our state survey, 31 states and the District of Columbia reported that they did not plan to electronically exchange voter registration information with another state. However, 35 states and the District of Columbia reported they share information with states when a new registrant indicates he or she previously resided in another state. Other types of information sharing across state lines were less common. For instance, 6 states reported sharing voter registration information with neighboring states, and 1 state reported that it shared information with states where an individual is known to reside part of the year. In our state survey, 14 states reported they do not currently share voter registration information with other states. We analyzed state and federal voter registration applications to determine whether these applications provided space for applicants to indicate they were registered in other states or in other jurisdictions within the same state to identify duplicate registrations.[Footnote 57] We obtained state application forms during site visits with local election jurisdictions, from state Web sites or, if not available from there, we obtained the application from the state. Registration forms were those on the Web site or obtained from the states as of January 2006. Applications for the 46 states and the District of Columbia and both federal applications had a place on their registration application where registration applicants could indicate prior registration in another state on their forms. Three states (Kentucky, Texas, and Wyoming) did not include a place on their registration forms to identify prior registration information in another state.[Footnote 58] Forty-five states and the District of Columbia included a space for registration applicants to indicate prior registration in another jurisdiction within their state on their forms, or in the case of the District of Columbia applicants were to indicate the address of their last registration. Four states (Alaska, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Wyoming) did not provide space to indicate prior registration within their state. Figure 11 is an example of a state registration form that provided a space for the voter registration applicant to indicate that he or she had registered in another state. Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the Voter Had Registered Elsewhere: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] On the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimated that 12 percent of local jurisdictions administered their own registration application form in addition to the state registration application. Of the 12 percent who had their own form, we estimate that 70 percent had space on their voter registration applications so that an applicant can indicate whether he or she was previously registered in another state.[Footnote 59] However, we estimate that about a third did not capture this information on their forms. Many States Have or Plan to Have Additional Election Management Features in Voter Registration Systems: Although HAVA's voter registration-related provisions focus primarily on state election management activities for developing, verifying, and maintaining voter lists, we sought information on what other types of registration system upgrades, if any, states planned, and we asked at the sites we visited what additional system capabilities, if any, had been implemented or planned. In our state survey, 15 states reported taking action to upgrade the processing speed or records capacity of their systems as of August 2005; 6 states reported that such actions would be taken by January 2006; and 12 states and the District of Columbia reported they would take such action at a later time. In other recent work, we have also looked at selected states' efforts to enhance their statewide voter list systems. In our February 2006 report on certain states' experiences with implementing HAVA's statewide voter registration lists, we found that 7 of 9 states that reported implementing HAVA provisions for a computerized, statewide voter registration system by January 1, 2004, also reported that they have upgraded or enhanced their systems, or planned to so do, to include additional election management capabilities.[Footnote 60] For example, Arizona reported plans to upgrade its current system to reflect reciprocity agreements with other states, so that election officials can be alerted when a voter moves from state to state, and will allow election officials to retrieve data on such issues as voter petitions, provisional ballots, poll worker training, and polling locations. Other states reported adding or planning similar enhancements. Kentucky reported another type of enhancement: It has used its statewide computerized voter registration system to establish voter information centers on the state's Web site, to assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process. During our site visits, we asked local election officials to comment on the election management functions their voter registration systems might perform. While some local election officials noted they were not certain whether their new statewide voter registration systems would include the same array of features as the local county versions, other local election officials in some jurisdictions responded that they expect their statewide systems to be able to perform some or all of the following functions: * maintain records confirming mailings to new registrants, * generate letters informing rejected applicants of reasons for rejection, * generate forms or mailing labels, * note status or date of absentee applications and ballots sent and received, * identify polling places for use on Election Day, and: * identify poll workers. In some jurisdictions, other capabilities were mentioned; 2 large jurisdictions noted, for instance, that bar coding would be used to identify registrants, and 2 other large jurisdictions indicated that their systems would track and maintain candidate petition information. Not all jurisdictions expressed equal confidence in the extra (non- HAVA-related) capabilities of their systems. Election officials in a couple of large jurisdictions, for instance, told us they were not certain their statewide voter system would have features comparable to those already in place, and that their vendor or state was taking a one- size-fits-all approach for all jurisdictions regardless of size, rather than taking specific local needs into account. In some jurisdictions, election officials stated that their statewide systems were still too new to know whether these additional functions would be operational, and some said they were not yet familiar with all the system's capabilities. Implementation of Identification Requirements for First-Time Mail Registrants Varied: HAVA imposed new identification requirements for certain mail registrants--such as, individuals who register by mail and have not previously voted in a federal election within the state.[Footnote 61] These individuals (first-time mail registrants) must provide certain specified types of identification either by submitting copies of such identification during the mail registration process or by presenting such identification when voting in person for the first time following their mail registration.[Footnote 62] Moreover, first-time mail registrants are to be informed on the application that appropriate identifying information must be submitted with the mailed form in order to avoid additional identification requirements upon voting for the first time. An individual who asserts that he or she has registered by mail and desires to vote in person but who does not meet the identification requirements may cast a provisional ballot under HAVA's provisional language. However, according to election officials in some jurisdictions we visited, casting a provisional ballot requires that these voters are to provide identification to election officials by a specified time (e.g., by close of polls on Election Day or within a certain number of days following Election Day) to have their ballot count. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that 32 percent of local jurisdictions encountered a problem in counting provisional ballots because voters did not provide identification as specified by HAVA for mail-in registrants and were voting for the first time in the precinct or jurisdiction.[Footnote 63] Our discussion of provisional voting processes appears in chapter 5. HAVA, in general, provides states with discretion as to the methods of implementing HAVA's identification requirements for first-time mail registrants, such as ensuring that voters comply with the requirements and, subject to certain limitations, allows states to establish requirements that are stricter than those required under HAVA.[Footnote 64] According to our state survey, 7 states reported that such HAVA requirements were already covered by existing state legislation or some type of state executive action (such as orders, directives, regulations, or policies); 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that they enacted new legislation or took some type of state executive action (such as orders, directives, regulations, or polices) to address the identification requirements in HAVA for first-time mail registrants.[Footnote 65] We analyzed state and federal (NVRA) voter registration application forms to determine whether the applications provided instructions on identification requirements for individuals registering in a jurisdiction for the first time. We obtained some state application forms during site visits with local election jurisdictions, and others from state Web sites or, if not available from there, we obtained the application from the state. Registration forms were those on the Web site or obtained from the states as of January 2006. Our analysis showed that 39 states and the District of Columbia had information on their application forms and 10 states did not provide this information on their forms.[Footnote 66] The NVRA voter registration form included this information. Figure 12 is an example of a voter registration form that included instructions for first-time mail registrants. Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for First- Time Mail Registrants: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] During our site visits, we asked local election officials whether they considered registering by mail to only include when someone mails in a single application or to also include mailed-in applications from voter registration drives. Five local jurisdictions told us that applications received by mail as a result of voter registration drives are not treated as mail-in applications and therefore are not treated as subject to mail registration identification requirements under HAVA; 3 jurisdictions told us that applications submitted by voter registration drives were treated as mail-in applications subject to HAVA's mail registration identification requirements. Election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions told us that under their state law (Pennsylvania) all voters who are voting for the first time in a district must show a valid form of identification, regardless of how they registered to vote. Also, during our site visits we asked local election officials how they processed voter registration applications from first-time mail registrants for the 2004 general election. Election officials reported taking different approaches, many involving mailed communications from election officials sent back to the applicant, particularly if required information was missing. For example, at least 2 large jurisdictions reported that first-time voters who did not mail in identification with their applications were sent letters instructing them to do so. Similarly, officials in 2 jurisdictions in another state said letters were sent to applicants whose applications were incomplete, advising them of the need to provide photo ID--and informed applicants that if they failed to do so, they may have to use a provisional ballot on Election Day, which would be subject to the voter subsequently providing identification. In other jurisdictions, though local election officials reported taking steps to process incomplete applications from first-time voters, they did not necessarily give the applicant a chance to correct the application prior to Election Day. For example, in a medium jurisdiction we visited, first-time voter applicants who did not submit proper identification were to have been given provisional ballots. However, the election official told us her office did not inform them about this in advance for the 2004 general election. In addition to contacting applicants to inform them of the need to provide identification discussed above, 1 jurisdiction we visited told us that it periodically provided a list of applicants who provided driver's license numbers but did not provide identification at the time of registration to the state MVA as another means to verify the registrant's identity. In this case, the MVA compared the county clerk office's registration list against its list of licensed drivers to see if the name, date of birth, and driver's license number matched, and returned the results to election officials. If all these data elements matched, the election official certified the records and these prospective voters were not required to show identification at the polling place. If a registrant did not provide identification prior to Election Day, local election officials at all 28 sites we visited reported having a system for recording first-time voters who failed to provide identification and transferring that information to a polling site by annotating the poll book. One large jurisdiction, for example shaded the voter line in the poll book, while another printed the words "ID required" next to the voter's name. With respect to voters who presented themselves at a polling place and did not have identification, election officials at some local jurisdictions we visited described different ways that the voter's provisional ballot could become verified. For example, a jurisdiction in Georgia said that if a voter did not provide identification at the polls, it allowed the voter to vote a provisional ballot and the voter had until 2 days after the election to provide identification. Another jurisdiction in Kansas told us that the voter had until the day that votes were canvassed to provide identification. Other jurisdictions told us that voters would have until the close of the polls on Election Day to provide identification to election officials. A local jurisdiction in Washington told us that if the voter did not have identification on Election Day, the voter would vote a provisional ballot and election officials would subsequently have the voter's signature matched against the registration application to verify the voters identity. Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and Other NVRA Entities Remained a Challenge: Citizens generally have numerous opportunities to apply to register to vote. Figure 13 shows several of these opportunities--such as applying at a local election office, at a motor vehicle agency, or through a voter registration drive--and the processes used to submit an application. Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Problems with applications submitted to MVAs have been identified as a challenge since 1999. Our October 2001 report on election processes found that 46 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide had problems processing applications submitted at MVAs and other public registration sites designated pursuant to NVRA requirements.[Footnote 67] In its reports to Congress on the impact of NVRA on federal elections in 1999 through 2002, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) found that several states reported problems with election officials receiving applications from MVA offices in a timely manner, resulting in, the FEC stated, "the effective disenfranchisement" of citizens who had applied to vote but were not processed by Election Day.[Footnote 68] FEC recommended in both reports that states develop ongoing training programs for personnel in NVRA agencies, such as MVAs. HAVA includes requirements providing that voters who contend that they registered (at MVAs or through other means) in the jurisdiction in which they desire to vote, but whose names are not on the voter registration list for that polling place, be allowed to cast a provisional ballot.[Footnote 69] HAVA also requires that voters who an election official asserts is not eligible to vote also be permitted to cast a provisional ballot. Election officials would determine the voter's eligibility under state law and whether the vote should count as part of the vote counting process. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that for the 2004 general election, 61 percent of local jurisdictions had a problem in counting provisional ballots because of insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at MVAs.[Footnote 70] In addition, we estimate that 29 percent of local jurisdictions had a problem in counting provisional ballots because of insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at NVRA agencies other than MVAs.[Footnote 71] Also, our September 2005 report on managing voter registration reported that 4 of 12 jurisdictions we surveyed reported that election office staff experienced challenges,[Footnote 72] either to a great extent or some extent, receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies.[Footnote 73] They reported taking steps to address the problem by hiring additional staff to handle the volume of applications received and by contacting applicants to obtain correct information. There is evidence that, at least in 1 jurisdiction, election officials took steps since the 2000 general election to address the MVA voter registration issue, though problems persisted for the November 2004 general election. When we revisited the same small jurisdiction in 2005 that we had visited in 2001, election officials reported they were still experiencing problems receiving registration forms from the MVA, for all those who registered to vote there--but noted that the process had improved. For example, they said elections staff now have access to the MVA database directly, so they can verify whether someone who claimed to have registered at the MVA actually did so. In our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that few jurisdictions provided training to MVA or other NVRA agencies. Specifically, for the 2004 general election, we estimate that 12 percent of local jurisdictions provided training or guidance to MVA offices and an estimated 3 percent provided training to other NVRA entities regarding procedures for distributing and collecting voter registration applications. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small or medium jurisdictions, and medium jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that 34 percent of large jurisdictions provided training to MVA offices, an estimated 18 percent of medium jurisdictions did so, and an estimated 9 percent of small jurisdictions did this. In addition, large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions in providing training to other NVRA entities. In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide, we identified measures such as improving the training of MVA staff as a means of addressing challenges related to applications received from MVAs.[Footnote 74] After the November 2004 general election, the National Task Force on Election Reform--composed almost exclusively of officials who served in voter registration and administration of elections capacities[Footnote 75]--reported that while the NVRA expanded the number of locations and opportunities where citizens can apply to register to vote, supporting the voter registration application process is a secondary duty for entities that do so under this law. The task force report noted that it is a challenge for these entities to provide this service in a consistent manner and to transfer the registrations collected accurately and efficiently to voter registration offices. Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large Volume of Voter Registration Applications for the November 2004 General Election: In our October 2001 report on election processes, some election officials noted that while extending voter registration deadlines gave voters additional chances to register, it shortened the time for processing applications.[Footnote 76] And a few election officials raised concerns about short time frames for processing applications in relation to the possibility of voter fraud if there was insufficient time to verify an applicant's eligibility. For the 2004 general election, the time frame for processing applications had the potential to pose an even greater challenge given the increase in the number of voter registration applications that elections officials reported receiving for the November 2004 general election. The conditions that election officials experienced in processing the volume of voter registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully train temporary workers, could have resulted in data entry errors that would have had the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not identifying ineligible voters. During our site visits to local jurisdictions, election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, entering applications in a timely manner was possible--but challenges did arise, and election officials described actions taken to help ensure that voters were properly registered. Furthermore, on the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 81 percent of local jurisdictions were able to process applications received just prior to the registration deadline--though we estimate 19 percent of the jurisdictions received applications just prior to the registration deadline that posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day. As shown in figure 14, we estimate that large jurisdictions experienced problems in entering the number of voter registration applications more than small and medium jurisdictions. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. This may be attributable to larger jurisdictions having larger populations with more registration activity, among other things. Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. [End of figure] All jurisdictions we visited reported that they were able to enter all eligible applications into the voter registration lists. Nevertheless, most reported it was a challenge to process the large volume of applications received. For example, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that on a daily basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data entry. As a result, election officials reported that they hired 80 full-time temporary workers who worked two full-time shifts to enter all eligible applications into the voter registration list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in another large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about 10,000 last-minute registrants. Another large jurisdiction reported it was "swamped" with registration applications right before the registration deadline and was not prepared for the volume of applications submitted. Several jurisdictions required permanent employees to work extended hours or on weekends. To manage registration workloads, other jurisdictions reported hiring temporary workers and recruiting county employees to handle processing workloads. Figure 15 shows the reported spike in voter registration applications received prior to Election Day in 1 large jurisdiction. Some applications were received after the final week allowed for voter registration and could not be registered for the 2004 general election but were registered for future elections. Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications Documented by a Large Jurisdiction in 2004: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In our state survey, a few states reported that since the 2000 general election they increased the time that voters in their states have to register. Although setting registration deadlines close to Election Day itself provides citizens increased time to apply to register, reducing the number of days from the registration deadline to Election Day can make it difficult for election officials to ensure that all eligible voters are included on the voter registration list. Specifically, in our state survey, 3 states (Maryland, Nevada, and Vermont) reported changing their registration deadlines for the November 2004 general election. For the 2000 general election, Maryland's registration deadline had been 25 days before the election, but for the 2004 general election, the deadline for registration was 21 days before the election, extending the time that voters could register by 4 days. Nevada's 2000 registration deadline (9 p.m. on the fifth Saturday preceding any primary or general election) remained the same for mail- in registrations. However, for the 2004 general election, the state extended in-person registration by 10 days. Vermont's voter registration deadline changed from the second Saturday before the election to the second Monday before the election, allowing voters 2 more days to register. Appendix VI provides information on state laws pertaining to registration deadlines. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, entering all voter registration applications for the time between the registration deadline and the November 2004 general election posed problems for large jurisdictions more than it did for small and medium jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that 41 percent of large jurisdictions experienced problems, 18 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 13 percent of small jurisdictions. Large jurisdictions are significantly different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Inasmuch as large jurisdictions have more potential registrants, it is reasonable to expect that they would experience more difficulty entering all voter registration applications by Election Day than smaller ones would. For the 2004 general election, while many states reported having registration deadlines that were 20 to 30 days prior to Election Day, a few states reported having registration deadlines that were 10 days or less prior to Election Day, and some states reported having same-day registration. Four states (Alabama, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) reported having registration deadlines that were 10 days or less prior to Election Day. Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming reported having Election Day registration at the polling place. According to Our Nationwide Survey and Jurisdictions Visited, Some Jurisdictions Lacked Sufficient Staff to Process Applications: Having sufficient staff to process the increased number of voter registration applications was an issue for large local election jurisdictions. On the basis of our nationwide survey, most local jurisdictions (an estimated 89 percent) had a sufficient number of election workers (whether full-time, part-time, or temporary) who were able to enter registration applications in a timely manner. However, we estimate that 11 percent had an insufficient workforce for this task. Large jurisdictions experienced problems with insufficient election workers to enter voter registrations applications more than small and medium jurisdictions did, as shown in figure 16. The difference between large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. This difference could be attributable to larger jurisdictions having a greater need for additional staff. Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with Insufficient Election Workers to Process Voter Registration Applications: [See PDF for image] Note: The difference between large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. [End of figure] Several jurisdictions we visited reported that there was a price to pay for the large volume of registration applications received, such as the need to hire temporary workers or extend the hours of permanent employees in order to process voter registration applications for the November 2004 general election. Election officials in several jurisdictions we visited commented on the financial impact of the temporary workers hired, overtime hours, and the purchase of needed equipment, such as computers. In our September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we noted that all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we surveyed faced challenges receiving and processing voter registration applications during the 2004 general election and took various steps to address them.[Footnote 77] For example, election officials in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions reported challenges checking voter registration applications for completeness, or for accuracy, or for duplicates. At that time, as in our more recent site visits, jurisdictions reported hiring extra staff, among other things, to address these challenges. Larger Jurisdictions More Likely than Small or Medium Ones to Provide Training to Staff and Track Receipt of Voter Applications: Providing training to data entry staff and tracking applications provide ways for election officials to manage the flow of applications for processing that can help ensure that voter registration applications are appropriately entered into the voter registration list. As part of our inquiry into the methods jurisdictions used to enter completed registration application data into voter lists, our questionnaire to local election jurisdictions asked how they went about accomplishing this task. On the basis of our survey, we estimate that 76 percent of all local jurisdictions provided training to data entry staff about the processing and inputting of registration applications. Seventy-five percent of small jurisdictions provided this training, 73 percent of medium jurisdictions did so, and 94 percent of larger jurisdictions did so, too. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Another activity that election officials undertook when entering completed registration applications included tracking incoming registrations. The results of our survey show that over half of local jurisdictions tracked incoming registration applications to ascertain the total number received, the number entered into registration lists, and the number not processed because of omission or application error, and to identify ineligible voters based on age or residence. Again, large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Table 2 provides information on the different activities that local election jurisdictions undertake when entering completed registration applications into the official voter registration list. Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged in Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering Completed Voter- Registration Applications: Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering completed registration applications: Provided training to data entry staff about the processing and inputting of registration applications[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 76; Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 75; Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 73; Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 94. Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering completed registration applications: Employed a system of edit checks in the voter registration database to identify duplicates[B]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 72; Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 66; Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 82; Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 95. Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering completed registration applications: Employed a system of edit checks in the voter registration database to identify ineligibles based on age[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 67; Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 62; Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 74; Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 89. Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering completed registration applications: Employed a system of edit checks in the voter registration database to identify ineligibles based on residence[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 64; Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 61; Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 68; Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 84. Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering completed registration applications: Verified input of data by the same or a different individual to confirm initial input accuracy[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 60; Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 57; Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 64; Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 77. Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering completed registration applications: Tracked incoming registration applications for total number received, number entered into registration list, and number not processed because of an omission or error on application[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 59; Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 55; Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 64; Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 74. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. [B] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [C] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions. [End of table] Processing Applications Obtained through Voter Registration Drives Posed Additional Challenges for Some Jurisdictions: Nongovernmental organizations in many states sponsored voter registration drives for the November 2004 general election in an effort to increase the number of citizens eligible to vote. Voter registration drives pose a dilemma for some election officials. On one hand, voter registration drives provide another means by which persons can apply to register to vote. On the other hand, they pose challenges in assessing the validity of submitted registrations and in processing large numbers of registrations submitted close to the registration deadline. For the November 2004 general election, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us they encountered challenges validating and processing the large number of voter registration applications obtained through voter registration drives that employed either paid staff (where workers are paid for each voter registration application completed and submitted to election authorities prior to Election Day)[Footnote 78] or used volunteers. For example, Wisconsin's state legislative audit bureau conducted an evaluation of the 2004 general election in its state.[Footnote 79] It found, among other things, that many registration deputies appointed for the November 2004 general election worked for special interest groups or political parties interested in increasing voter turnout.[Footnote 80] The evaluation states that investigators found that registration deputies had submitted 65 falsified names for the 2004 general elections and that district attorneys in two counties charged four individuals with submitting fraudulent registration forms. According to the evaluation report, these registration deputies were reportedly paid by their employer on a per registrant basis, which may have encouraged them to submit fraudulent registration forms to increase their compensation. Such questions about the integrity of the voter registration process were of particular concern in battleground states such as Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, where margins of victory were slim and accurate tallies of eligible votes were therefore of consequence.[Footnote 81] In our state survey several states reported that their state election provisions do not address the issue of voter registration drives that involve payment per application, while relatively fewer states reported prohibiting them outright. Specifically, 19 states and the District of Columbia reported that state laws or executive actions are silent about these drives (that is, it is left up to each local jurisdiction to decide). However, 1 of these 19 states further reported that while its state law does not address voter registration drives that involve payment per application, the conduct of such drives is not left up to each local jurisdiction--the local jurisdictions have no authority in regulating such matters. Sixteen states reported that voter registration drives are allowed either by state law or by executive action, 13 states reported that they are prohibited by state law, and 2 states did not respond. In addition, our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions inquired about their awareness and handling of registration drives, and any actions taken to deter fraudulent applications from being submitted by persons or groups participating in paid registration drives, and we discussed this matter during our site visits to selected jurisdictions as well. In our nationwide survey, we estimate that 91 percent of all local jurisdictions were not aware of such drives, while 9 percent were aware. About a third (an estimated 32 percent) of the large jurisdictions--those with populations greater than 100,000--were aware of such drives. We also queried local election jurisdictions whether any names on voter registration applications appeared to be fraudulent. On the basis of our local survey, nearly all jurisdictions--an estimated 95 percent--did not have any names that appeared to be fraudulent. Although only 5 percent of local election jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names, an estimated 70 percent identified receiving 10 fraudulent applications or fewer, an estimated 14 percent identified receiving 10 or more fraudulent applications, and an estimated 16 percent did not know the volume of fraudulent applications received. The distribution of the volume of fraudulent applications received is of a smaller subset of our total sample and therefore has larger confidence intervals than other estimates. Figure 17 shows the extent to which local jurisdictions identified experiencing fraudulent voter registration applications. Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had Names on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to Be Fraudulent and Volume of Fraudulent Applications Identified for the 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: The distribution of the volume of fraudulent applications received is of a smaller subset of our total sample and therefore has larger confidence intervals than other estimates. For the category of 10 or fewer fraudulent applications the confidence interval is +/-17 percent, for the category of 10 or more the confidence level is +/-16 percent, and for the category of don't know the confidence level is +/ -12 percent. Furthermore, not all respondents who had names on voter registration applications that appeared to be fraudulent answered our question about the volume of these applications. Therefore, our estimate of the subset for the volume of applications that were received is based on 4 percent of jurisdictions that answered that question. [End of figure] In addition, our prior work raised concerns about the quality of voter registration applications obtained through voter registration drives. In our September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we reported that among 12 of 14 local jurisdictions we surveyed, processing applications received from voter registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations posed a challenge to election officials because applications were incomplete or inaccurate.[Footnote 82] Election Officials' Views on Irregular Voter Registration Applications from Registration Drives: During our site visits, we sought local officials' views on a host of issues related to the integrity of the voter registration process, including how or whether voter registration drive applications were tracked, how many registration applications were submitted by volunteer or paid registration drives in calendar year 2004 leading up to the November election, and how their jurisdictions dealt with irregular applications. (We defined irregular applications as those using fictitious names, unusual dates of birth, nonexistent addresses, or fake signatures or party affiliations.) We also asked election officials whether they had the ability to determine if individuals were using false or fictitious names. Many local jurisdictions that we visited told us that they did not have specific procedures to ensure that voter applications obtained through voter registration drives were collected or tracked. This was because, in some cases, the application forms could simply be downloaded from the Internet. One large jurisdiction that did not track applications coming from various sources told us it planned to begin doing so, using a drop-down menu in its statewide voter registration system that will allow staff to record the information. Overall, at local jurisdictions that we visited where applications from voter registration drives were tracked or at least estimated, the number and proportion of applications submitted through voter registration drives relative to total registrations--and the number and proportion considered irregular--varied widely. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction, election officials reported that approximately 30,000 registrations received in 2004--about 90 percent--were submitted by registration drives. Of these, the election officials estimated that only about 50 applications were irregular--that is, they were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were incomplete, or had invalid addresses. The election official from this jurisdiction noted that it appeared some of the applications had been filled out by individuals who took addresses from the phone book and changed them slightly. In another large jurisdiction in a battleground state, local election officials estimated that 70,000 registration applications were submitted by volunteer or paid registration drives, and here too irregularities were noted--such as fictitious names and fake signatures--but election officials stated that these irregular applications represented a "low" percentage of the total. In other large jurisdictions, fewer voter registration applications were received; 1 jurisdiction, for example, in another battleground state, reported receiving 2,500 such applications and estimated that about 20 percent of them were irregular. Two medium jurisdictions we visited reported receiving a few hundred voter registration applications or fewer, and both reported that there were no irregularities. One small jurisdiction did not report any voter registration drives taking place. When we asked local election officials during our site visits whether they had the ability to determine whether a person actually tried to vote using a false or fictitious name, responses were mixed: Election officials in 3 large jurisdictions we visited told us they did not have the ability to make this determination. An election official in another large jurisdiction stated that "there is no way to know if someone falsely registered has voted." Others, however, reported that they were able to determine whether false identities had been used. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction, election judges check voter IDs and signatures at the polls to prevent the use of fictitious identities. One large jurisdiction verifies voter registration information against Social Security and driver's license information and checked voter history internally; election officials in this jurisdiction reported that they believe anyone who attempted to use a false or fictitious name in the November 2004 general election would have been caught. And in another jurisdiction, election officials told us that if an individual attempted to vote using a fictitious name that was not in the poll book, that individual would be issued a provisional ballot--which would not be verified if it was determined that the name was indeed fictitious. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited said there was no way to know whether the poll book already contained fictitious names. When asked what steps, if any, local jurisdictions we visited took to notify law enforcement or other legal authorities on irregular registration applications received, most reported taking some actions. For example, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported providing irregular registration applications to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the district attorney's office and to the Secretary of State's office for investigation. Both the FBI and the district attorney declined to pursue the matter on the ground that they were understaffed, the jurisdiction reported. The Secretary of State's office concluded that while the registration applications were fraudulent or fictitious, a purposeful fraud was not committed and that the people completing the fake applications were not trying to alter an election, but to obtain money by working for the registration drives. Four other jurisdictions that we visited said they contacted appropriate state or federal authorities, such as state law enforcement, a State's Attorney, a state election enforcement agency, or the FBI, but election officials did not know whether any action had been taken. In addition, in our June 2005 report on maintaining voter registration lists, we reported that election officials in seven locations we visited referred reported instances of voter registration fraud allegations to appropriate agencies, such as the district attorney and the U.S. Attorney for investigation.[Footnote 83] Also, EAC issued voluntary guidance in July 2005 to help states implement HAVA. EAC's guidance suggested that when the voter registration verification process indicates the possible commission of an election crime, such as the submission of false registration information, such matters should be forwarded to local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities for investigation. Some Jurisdictions Have Controls to Manage Registration Drives: When we asked local jurisdictions that we visited whether they had procedures in place for registration groups to follow when submitting applications, election officials in most jurisdictions reported that some type of system was in place to control registration drives. For example, 1 large jurisdiction reported that it had a program to train volunteer field registrars to register citizens on behalf of the county registrar; these field registrars were to comply with all registration rules and laws and must themselves be registered voters, and noncandidates, have proof of identify, complete a 2-hour training course, and pass a brief examination before taking an oath. In addition, this same jurisdiction required that any group requesting more than 50 voter registration forms was required to provide a plan to the state elections department for when, where, and how it would distribute the forms--all of which were numbered so that election offices could track them. Some jurisdictions reported, however, that no procedures were in place that registration groups had to follow. One large jurisdiction, for instance, reported that anyone can run a voter registration drive simply by downloading the voter registration form from the election office Web site. On the topic of what actions, if any, local jurisdictions had taken to deter paid registration drives from submitting fraudulent registration applications, from our nationwide survey, we estimate that roughly half of the estimated 9 percent of local jurisdictions that were aware that paid registration drives were occurring provided training or guidance on how to accurately complete an application, and an estimated 41 percent of these jurisdictions notified the persons or groups engaged in paid registration drives that they had submitted incomplete, inaccurate, or fraudulent applications.[Footnote 84] In addition, on the basis of our survey, 41 percent of local jurisdictions that were aware of the drives helped prevent submission of incomplete, inaccurate, or fraudulent applications by working with persons and groups engaged in paid registration drives.[Footnote 85] Actions Taken to Help Prevent Fraudulent Registrations and Ensure Submission of Registrations to Election Offices: In a couple of jurisdictions, election officials told us they took other steps, such as meeting with registration drive organizers and contacting the registrant identified on the application, to help prevent fraudulent registrations. A jurisdiction in Colorado reported that numerous complaints had been received from voters who claimed to have completed registrations through a drive but for whom the county had no record of application. The jurisdiction reported that Colorado's legislature passed a bill pertaining to voter registration drives. Subsequently, Colorado enacted legislation effective in June 2005 that, among other things, requires voter registration organizers to file a statement of intent with the Secretary of State, fulfill training requirements pursuant to rules promulgated by the Secretary of State, and, in general, submit or mail registration applications within 5 business days. In addition, the 2005 state legislation provides that voter registration organizers may not compensate persons circulating voter registration application forms based on the number of applications distributed or collected. The Secretary of State issued rules in November 2005 implementing such requirements, including rules that require registration drive organizers to file a statement of intent with the Secretary of State and require persons circulating such application forms to ensure that the tear-off receipt on the application is completed and given to the applicant. Election officials in 17 jurisdictions we visited told us that they had procedures in place for managing voter registration drives to some extent. For example, in 1 medium jurisdiction, election officials stated that groups or persons seeking to run registration drives must be trained and deputized by the registrar's office. Concluding Observations: In 43 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, successfully registering to vote prior to Election Day is a prerequisite for casting a ballot and having that ballot counted. States are still working to fully implement HAVA's voter registration requirements. As states gain more experience with their statewide voter registration and data matching systems and processes, it is likely their systems and processes will evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is to be expected. For election officials, the voter registration process presents a continuing challenge in balancing ease of registration for eligible voters with sufficient internal controls to help ensure that only eligible voters are added to and remain on the voter registration rolls. To maintain accurate voter registration lists, election officials must use and rely upon data from a number of sources, such as state death and criminal records and applications from MVAs. HAVA's requirements for creating and maintaining statewide voter registration lists and its identification requirements for first-time voters who register by mail were designed to help improve the accuracy of voter registration lists and reduce the potential for voter fraud. Specifically, HAVA's requirements for creating and maintaining a statewide voter registration list was designed to improve voter registration list accuracy by identifying duplicate registrations within the state and identifying those ineligible to vote because of death, criminal status, or other reasons. HAVA requires states to match the names and other identifying information on their statewide voter registration lists against death and felony records in the state. States may voluntarily match their voter registration lists with the voter registration lists, death, felony, or other records in other states. In the absence of voluntary cross-state matching, it is possible to fully implement HAVA's statewide voter registration provisions and still have ineligible persons on the state's voter registration rolls on Election Day, such as those who died out of state or were convicted in federal courts or other states.[Footnote 86] Nor would implementing HAVA's statewide matching requirements identify persons who are registered to vote in more than one state. Although some states report sharing registration and eligibility information among states, the practice was generally limited to neighboring states or dependent upon a registrant indicating that he or she previously resided in another state. HAVA includes a provision that requires certain first-time voters who register by mail to provide identification as proof of their identity and eligibility to vote in the jurisdiction. Which voters must present identification either with their mail application or when they vote for the first time depends upon how states and local jurisdictions define "mail registrations" subject to HAVA's identification requirement. In our site visits, we found that some local jurisdictions considered registration applications submitted by registration drives to be mail registrations subject to HAVA's identification requirement for first- time voters, while other jurisdictions did not consider such registrations to be mail registrations subject to the identification requirement. This distinction has importance on Election Day for first- time voters who registered through registration drives. In those jurisdictions that considered mail registrations to include registration drive applications, first-time voters who registered through registration drives would be required to show an acceptable form of identification at the polls on election day. If they did not do so, they are to be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, but the ballot would only be counted upon a state determination that the voter is eligible to vote under state law. In contrast, in those jurisdictions that did not consider mail applications to include those submitted through registration drives, first-time voters would not be treated as subject to the HAVA identification requirement and could generally cast a regular ballot that would be counted with all other regular ballots. Election jurisdictions continue to face challenges in obtaining voter registration applications from NVRA entities, including MVAs. Some local jurisdictions have established processes to manage receipt of voter registration applications from these entities, such as training for staffs of these agencies. To the extent that NVRA entities do not track and forward to the appropriate election jurisdiction the voter applications that they have received, voters may be required to cast provisional ballots instead of regular ones because their names do not appear on the voter registration lists. In addition, the provisional ballot will not be counted if the voter's valid registration cannot be verified. Our survey of local election jurisdictions found that many local jurisdictions encountered problems counting provisional ballots in cases where voters claimed to have registered at an MVA or some other NVRA entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter had submitted a registration application at the MVA or NVRA entity. A surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of registration with assurance that only eligible voters are on the registration rolls. Some election jurisdictions reported registration drive groups submitted hundreds or thousands of applications just before the registration deadline. When the registration deadline is close to Election Day, processing these applications presents a tremendous challenge in checking applications for completeness, having time to contact applicants to obtain missing information, verifying applicants' eligibility to vote, and adding the name of eligible voters to the registration list. Some jurisdictions reported hiring and training temporary employees to process the applications. The enormous workload and time constraints associated with processing large numbers of last-minute applications can increase the chances that errors will be made in determining voter eligibility, and the names of some eligible voters may not be added to the list in time for Election Day. [End of section] Chapter 3: Absentee and Early Voting: A growing number of citizens seem to be casting their ballots before Election Day using absentee and early voting options that are offered by states and local jurisdictions. However, circumstances under which these voters vote and the manner in which they cast their ballots before Election Day differ because there are 51 unique election codes.[Footnote 87] Because of the wide diversity in absentee and early voting requirements, administration, and procedures, citizens face different opportunities for obtaining and successfully casting ballots before Election Day. To collect information about absentee and early voting options, in our state and local surveys we asked questions about each of these voting options separately. We defined absentee voting as casting a ballot, generally by mail, in advance of Election Day (although ballots could be returned through Election Day and dropped off in person). We defined early voting as generally in-person voting in advance of Election Day at specific polling locations, separate from absentee voting. However, there is some measure of overlap between absentee voting and early voting reported by the states, especially where states have reported in- person absentee voting to be, in effect, early voting. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the relational statutory framework for early voting and absentee voting varies among the states--with some states, for example, providing early voting within the context of the state's absentee voting provisions, while others, for example, provide for absentee voting within the context of the state's early voting provisions. Similarly, local jurisdictions that completed our survey may also have had some measure of overlap in relation to their practices for absentee and early voting. During our interviews with local election officials in jurisdictions that offered early voting, we were able to obtain more detailed information about absentee and early voting procedures and practices for those jurisdictions. On the basis of our site visits to jurisdictions that had early voting, absentee and early voting were similar in some ways and distinct in others. Election officials described to us that when voters cast absentee ballots, they typically followed a specific process including applying for and receiving the ballot and returning their marked ballots before Election Day or, in some cases, returning the ballot up until the close of polls on Election Day.[Footnote 88] According to the description that election officials gave us, early voting was distinct from in-person absentee voting in that in-person absentee voters usually applied for and received a ballot, and cast it at the registrar's office, while early voters reported to a voting location where early voting staff verified their eligibility to vote, usually by accessing the jurisdiction's voter registration list. Also, early voting usually did not require citizens to provide an excuse, as some states required for absentee voting, and it was usually allowed for a shorter period of time than absentee voting. For example, in the 14 jurisdictions we visited in 7 states that reported having early voting, the time frame allowed for absentee voting was almost always at least twice as long as that for early voting (e.g., Colorado allowed 30 days for absentee voting and 15 days for early voting). Early voting was similar to Election Day voting in that the voting methods were usually the same. However, according to election officials in jurisdictions we visited that had early voting, voters were not limited to voting in their precinct because all early voting locations had access to a complete list of registered voters for the jurisdiction (not just precinct specific) and had appropriate ballots that included federal, state, and precinct-specific races. Appendix VII provides a description of selected characteristics of the early voting jurisdictions we visited. In this chapter, we will discuss changes since 2000 and challenges related to (1) absentee voting in general, (2) overseas military and civilian absentee voting, and (3) early voting. Overview: Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote absentee or early. For the November 2004 general election, 21 states reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct on Election Day to vote absentee--an increase of 3 states from the November 2000 general election. Three states reported expanding their provision for permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the elderly or those with disabilities), allowing voters to receive absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, such as 4 years. One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in absentee voters provide an attestation from a notary or witness for their signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Eliminating the need for a notary or witness removes a potential barrier to an absentee ballot being counted. According to election officials in 2 jurisdictions in 1 state we visited that required a notary or witness signature, an absentee ballot may not be counted if voters neglect to have their ballots witnessed or notarized. Furthermore, HAVA amended the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to, among other things, extend the period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application by absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the two next regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. Election officials reported facing some of the same challenges in the November 2004 general election that they had identified to us for the November 2000 general election, and they also reported some new challenges. Continuing absentee voting challenges included (1) receiving late absentee voter applications and ballots; (2) managing general workload, resources, and other administrative constraints; (3) addressing voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee applications and ballot materials; and (4) preventing potential fraud. Election officials also told us that they encountered new challenges in the November 2004 general election. Some election officials said that the increased early voter turnout during this election resulted in long lines. In some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that factors such as inadequate planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that could be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management of large early voter turnout. In addition, some election officials reported that they encountered a challenge handling disruptive third parties as they attempted to approach early voters who were in line to vote. Another challenge could develop as a result of a 2002 HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States, this 2002 amendment, as noted above, extended the period of time that can be covered by a single application from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the next two subsequent general elections for federal office. Election officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when uniformed services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, absentee ballots may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the ballot request form whereby voters can indicate that they want ballots for one federal election only, election officials in 3 of these jurisdictions were concerned many absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable. Absentee Voting: Absentee voting allows citizens the opportunity to vote when they are unable to vote at their precinct on Election Day. Although availability, eligibility requirements, administration, and procedures vary across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, absentee voting generally follows a basic process. As figure 18 shows, this process included four basic steps for the November 2004 general election. Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process: [See PDF for image] [A] In general, for a mail-in absentee ballot application to be approved, it must meet certain state or local requirements. For example, in some states, the voter must be registered, and in some jurisdictions, the signature on the absentee application must match the one on the voter registration application, among other things. [End of figure] Jurisdictions we visited typically provided absentee ballot applications that registered voters used to request absentee ballots in a standard state or jurisdiction form, as shown in figure 19. Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] According to our state survey, state election officials reported that registered voters could visit or write their local election office, or in some cases visit a state or local election Web site, to obtain an application or learn what information was required to request an absentee ballot. State election officials reported registered voters could return a completed absentee ballot application via the U.S. mail or in many other different ways as allowed by state absentee ballot provisions. Also, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that voters could complete any part of the absentee voting process in person at their local elections office. Table 3 shows the various options allowed by states for requesting and returning absentee ballot applications. However, it is important to note that particular local jurisdictions might not have offered all of the options described below. Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: Options: Allowed for requesting absentee ballot applications; Number of states[A]: [Empty]. Options: In person; Number of states[A]: 51. Options: U.S. mail; Number of states[A]: 51. Options: Telephone; Number of states[A]: 41. Options: E-mail; Number of states[A]: 42. Options: Via facsimile; Number of states[A]: 48. Options: Via state Web site; Number of states[A]: 30. Options: Download from Web site; Number of states[A]: 41. Options: Allowed for returning absentee ballot applications; Number of states[A]: [Empty]. Options: In person; Number of states[A]: 51. Options: U.S. mail; Number of states[A]: 51. Options: E-mail; Number of states[A]: 11. Options: Via facsimile; Number of states[A]: 34. Options: Via state Web site; Number of states[A]: 4. Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials. [A] States include the 50 states and the District of Columbia. [End of table] According to our state survey results, states reported that applicants could find out the status of their absentee ballot application after it was submitted and offered at least one of several ways, including telephoning a state or local jurisdiction office, telephoning a hotline or toll-free number, or e-mailing a state or local jurisdiction office. For example, in 49 states and in the District of Columbia, applicants could telephone a state or local jurisdiction office, and in 47 states and in the District of Columbia, applicants could e-mail a state or local jurisdiction office to find out their absentee ballot applications' status. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia notified the applicant if the application was rejected. While absentee ballots are generally provided to the voter through the mail, unless voting in person, on the basis of our survey of a representative sample of local jurisdictions nationwide, some jurisdictions provided absentee ballots using fax and e-mail. Specifically, for the November 2004 general election, we estimate that 17 percent of local jurisdictions provided absentee ballots by fax, and 4 percent of local jurisdictions provided absentee ballots by e-mail. On the basis of our discussions with election officials in jurisdictions we visited, absentee ballots are generally returned through the mail. Election officials in most jurisdictions we visited said that voters used a combination of envelopes for returning completed absentee ballots so that voters' identities would be distinct from the ballots they were casting. For example, a voter would place the completed ballot in a secrecy (inner) envelope, which would then be placed in an outer envelope. The secrecy envelope would be to ensure that the voted ballot was not linked to the voter, while the voter's affidavit information, such as a name, address, and signature, needed to certify that the voter was eligible to vote, would be marked on the outer envelope. Election officials in some jurisdictions provided examples of the envelopes used to return absentee ballots. One of these examples had a separate affidavit envelope, which was to be placed in a pre- addressed return envelope and mailed to the local elections jurisdiction. Other examples allowed the voter to include the affidavit information on the back of the pre-addressed return envelope. Once the local elections jurisdiction certified that the absentee ballots could be counted using the affidavit information, election officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that they removed the secrecy envelope (with the voted ballot sealed inside) and set it aside for counting. Figure 20 shows examples of absentee ballot return envelopes and the inclusion of affidavit information. Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the Inclusion of Affidavit Information--One with Certification on Inner Envelope and One with Certification on Outer Envelope--for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In our survey of state election officials, we asked whether absentee voters were able to find out the status of their submitted absentee ballots in various ways. According to our state survey, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that absentee voters were able to telephone a state or local jurisdiction office, 32 states and the District of Columbia reported that absentee voters were able to e-mail a state or local jurisdiction office, 16 states reported that absentee voters could telephone a hotline or toll-free number, and 5 states reported that absentee voters' ballot status was available via a Web site. Furthermore, 16 states reported that either state or local jurisdictions would notify the voter if the absentee ballot was not counted. However, 6 states reported that they do not allow voters to check the status of their absentee ballots at all. For example, Vermont reported that state law does not allow voters to find out whether or not the absentee ballot was counted. Kentucky reported that it does not track whether or not an individual voter's ballot was counted because linking a voted ballot back to a specific voter violates that voter's right to a secret ballot. A Few States Reported Changes to Absentee Voting Requirements since 2000: A few states reported changes to their requirements with respect to absentee voting by (1) no longer requiring a reason or excuse for voting absentee; (2) eliminating the need for a mail-in absentee voter to have a notary or witness for the voter's signature to accompany the ballot; and (3) not limiting permanent absentee voting status to individuals with disabilities or the elderly. Excuse Requirement: According to our state survey regarding the November 2004 general election, all 50 states and the District of Columbia had some provisions allowing registered voters to vote before Election Day, but not every registered voter was eligible to do so. Twenty-one states reported allowing voters to vote absentee for the November 2004 general election without first having to provide a reason or excuse. The other 29 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring voters to meet one of several criteria, or "excuses," to be eligible to vote before Election Day, such as having a disability, being elderly, or being absent from the jurisdiction on Election Day. The following are examples of excuses that some states required: * absent from the state or county on Election Day; * a member of the uniformed services or a dependent; * a permanent or total disability; * ill or having a temporary disability; * over a certain age, such as 65; * at a school, college, or university; * employed on Election Day in a job for which the nature or hours prevent the individual from voting at his or her precinct, such as an election worker; and: * involved in emergency circumstances, such as the death of a family member. In our survey of local jurisdictions, we asked about problems encountered when processing absentee ballot applications. As shown in figure 21, we estimate that 9 percent of local jurisdictions received absentee applications that did not meet the excuse required by law, in states where excuses were required. The issue of applicants not meeting the required excuse is more of a problem for large jurisdictions than small or medium jurisdictions. Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Problems Processing Absentee Applications because the Applicant Did Not Meet the Excuse Required by State Law, November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: The difference between large jurisdictions and small and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant. [End of figure] According to our state survey, the number of states that allowed absentee voting without an excuse increased from 18 in 2000 to 21 in 2004. Since November 2004, 2 more states reported that they have eliminated their excuse requirement. Specifically, during visits to local jurisdictions in New Jersey, election officials told us that state law had changed since the November 2004 general election. According to these officials, no-excuse absentee voting was adopted by the New Jersey legislature and became effective in July 2005. Ohio also amended its absentee voter provisions, effective January 2006, to provide for no-excuse absentee voting. Notary or Witness Signature Requirement: Election officials in 2 jurisdictions in 1 state we visited told us that if voters returned a completed (voted) ballot without having the signature notarized or affirmed by a witness, the vote would be disqualified and not counted. For the November 2004 general election, according to our state survey, 12 states reported requiring that mail- in absentee ballots contain attestation by a notary or witness for a voter's signature to accompany the absentee ballot. From the November 2000 election to the November 2004 election, Florida was the only state that reported in our state survey that it had dropped the requirement that mail-in absentee ballots contain attestation by a notary or witness for a voter's signature. Permanent Absentee Voting: Permanent absentee voting, which typically was available to individuals with disabilities or the elderly, was another way some states sought to help enfranchise certain categories of voters. Permanent absentee status, where offered, generally allowed the voter to apply for mail-in absentee ballots once (rather than for each separate election) over a specified time period. State requirements dictated when and how often a voter must apply for permanent absentee status. For example, for the November 2004 general election, in a New Jersey jurisdiction that we visited, election officials told us that state law required those eligible for permanent absentee status to apply at the beginning of the calendar year to receive absentee ballots for that year. According to the absentee ballot application provided by this jurisdiction, a voter's permanent absentee status remains in effect throughout that year unless the voter notifies the election office otherwise. An election official in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited said that his state allowed permanent absentee voters to apply once every 4 years. In this state, permanent absentee voters were to receive absentee ballots for all elections during the 4-year period, according to the election official. In 2 Washington jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that any voter could qualify for permanent absentee status for all future elections (e.g., no time period specified). In one of these Washington jurisdictions, election officials provided a copy of the permanent absentee application instructing voters that their permanent absentee status would be terminated upon the (1) voter's written request, (2) cancelation of the voter's registration record, (3) death or disqualification, or (4) return of an ongoing absentee ballot as undeliverable. Our state survey results showed that since the November 2000 general election, 3 states (California, Rhode Island, and Utah) reported state changes that expanded, in some manner, the use of permanent absentee voting. For example, California, reported changes for the November 2004 election that allowed any voter to apply for and receive permanent absentee status. For the November 2000 general election, California previously reported that only certain categories of voters with disabilities (e.g., blind voters) were eligible for permanent absentee status. Overall, the results of our state survey showed that at the time of the November 2004 general election, 17 states reported having some provision for permanent absentee status, 32 states and the District of Columbia reported that they did not provide for permanent absentee status, and Oregon reported conducting its election entirely by mail--making permanent absentee status unnecessary in this state. Appendix VIII provides information on states' requirements for no- excuse absentee voting and witness or notary signature provisions for the November 2000 and 2004 general elections and shows where changes occurred. States did not report any changes to their permanent absentee requirements since the November 2000 general election. Receiving Late Absentee Ballot Applications and Ballots for the November 2004 General Election Continued to Be a Challenge: The results from our state survey show that deadlines for voters to both apply for absentee ballots and return them to local jurisdictions to be counted differed among states. According to our state survey for the November 2004 general election, 47 states and the District of Columbia reported that they had absentee ballot application deadlines that ranged from Election Day (5 states: Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Dakota) to 21 days before Election Day (Rhode Island). Three states (Florida, New Hampshire, and Oregon) reported having no absentee ballot application deadline, although ballots in these states had to be returned by the close of polls on Election Day.[Footnote 89] With respect to state deadlines for returning absentee ballots, many states reported having more than one deadline to correspond with differing methods of returning such ballots to election officials. In our state survey, 44 states reported having provisions requiring that absentee ballots be returned by or on Election Day; 7 states reported having provisions requiring that absentee ballots be returned a certain number of days before Election Day; and 8 states and the District of Columbia reported having provisions allowing mailed absentee ballots to be returned a certain number of days after Election Day, if such ballots were postmarked by a specified date. For example, for the 2004 November general election, Alaska reported two deadlines: (1) mail-in absentee ballots were to be received by close of business on the 10th day after the election when postmarked on or before Election Day, and (2) in-person absentee ballots were to be delivered by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. Also, according to our state survey, Nebraska reported that for absentee ballots returned by mail, the deadline changed from no later than 2 days after Election Day for the November 2000 general election to the close of polls on Election Day for the November 2004 general election. According to our state survey, these deadlines may be different for absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside the United States, a subject that will be discussed later in this chapter. In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes, we reported that election officials for the 2000 general election identified receiving applications and ballots after state statutory deadlines as a challenge.[Footnote 90] According to our nationwide survey, local jurisdictions encountered similar problems with processing absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots for the November 2004 general election. More specifically, on the basis of our survey, we estimate that 55 percent of local jurisdictions received absentee ballot applications too late to process. We also estimate 77 percent of local jurisdictions encountered problems in processing absentee ballots because ballots were received too late. Furthermore, we asked jurisdictions about which problems were encountered most frequently. An estimated 25 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the ballot lateness problem most frequently. Figure 22 shows that medium and large jurisdictions encountered lateness with absentee ballots more than small jurisdictions did. Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions. [End of figure] Appendix VIII summarizes states' deadlines for receiving domestic mail- in absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots. Election officials in the local jurisdictions we visited told us that they tried to approve applications and mail absentee ballots to voters as quickly as possible, assuming that the ballots had been finalized and printed. In 8 jurisdictions we visited in 5 states (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Washington), election officials said that their states mandated that local election jurisdictions process absentee ballot applications within a specified time period, such as within 24, 48, or 72 hours of receipt of the application. In 2 Pennsylvania jurisdictions we visited, election officials stated that they established a local policy encouraging election staff to process absentee ballot applications faster (such as on the day of receipt) than the time period specified in state law (which was 48 hours). In 1 Illinois and 1 Nevada jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that while a 24-or 48-hour turnaround time for absentee ballot applications was not mandated in state law, local office policy was to process them as quickly as possible--such as within 24 hours of receipt of the application. During our site visits, election officials in 9 jurisdictions stated that they received large numbers of mail-in absentee ballot applications just prior to the deadlines prescribed by state law. Most of these election officials said they were able to meet their state- mandated or office policy application-processing time, although they had to work long hours and hire additional staff to process the absentee ballot applications by the deadline. In 1 Florida jurisdiction we visited, local election officials said that even though they had no absentee ballot application deadline, they processed applications using "long hours and extra people" and tried to send out absentee ballots within 24 hours of receiving a complete application. In jurisdictions we visited in Pennsylvania and Colorado, election officials said that sometimes the 24-or 48-hour turnaround was impossible to meet because the state did not finalize the ballots for printing until the days immediately preceding Election Day for the November 2004 election. For example, an election official in the Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told us that determining whether or not an independent presidential candidate's name was to be included on the November 2004 general election ballot proved to be a challenge. In this jurisdiction, the validity of petition signatures supporting the independent candidate's request to be included on the ballot was challenged in state court about 10 weeks before the election. As a result, according to the election official, election officials were required to participate in a court-mandated process of verifying the signatures. According to the election official, it took about 10 days in court to resolve the situation, which delayed the printing of the ballots. In 6 jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that slowness in the delivery of the mail added to the processing time crunch during the week before Election Day--a problem that is out of election officials' control and may contribute to the local election officials' receipt of absentee voting materials after state-mandated deadlines. Although envelopes can use an "official election mail" designation, election officials in these 6 jurisdictions we visited said that the U.S. Postal Service did not always process absentee voting materials in a timely manner. For example, in one New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that they experienced serious problems with the U.S. Postal Service delivering absentee ballot applications. These officials felt that the post office ignored the envelopes' official election mail designation and did not process and deliver them quickly. Election officials in this jurisdiction said that their telephone system crashed numerous times leading up to Election Day in November 2004, given the heavy volume of incoming calls from voters checking on the status of their absentee ballot applications. In one Pennsylvania jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that postal concerns were raised when some college students' absentee ballot applications were received after Election Day. These officials could not definitely say at what point these applications might have been delayed and explained that the mail delivery delay could have been attributable to either the U.S. Postal Service or the university's mailing center. Figure 23 illustrates the use of special postal markings for absentee ballot materials. Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking for Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] While election officials in 6 jurisdictions we visited told us about challenges with mail delivery, election officials in 7 jurisdictions we visited told us that they did not have problems with mail delivery or coordinating with the U.S. Postal Service. In an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that prior to the election, staff from his office met with the postmaster to establish a good working relationship. Election officials in a New Hampshire and Ohio jurisdiction we visited stated that the post office was very helpful. In a Nevada jurisdiction we visited election officials said that they received excellent service from the postal service. When an absentee application was received after the state-mandated deadline, election officials in 13 jurisdictions we visited told us that they often sent these applicants a letter explaining that their application was received too late. In 5 of these same jurisdictions, election officials said they also provided an alternative to absentee voting such as early voting, voting on Election Day, or in-person absentee voting, where the voter could visit the election office and complete the absentee voting process in person. Voter Errors in the November 2004 Election Continued to Be a Challenge with Processing Absentee Ballot Applications and Ballots: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that election officials for the 2000 general election identified voters' failure to provide critical information, with respect to signatures and addresses, as challenges to successfully processing mail-in absentee applications and verifying ballots for counting.[Footnote 91] According to our nationwide survey for the November 2004 election, local jurisdictions encountered similar voter errors that could affect the jurisdictions' ability to establish voter eligibility or approve the ballot for counting when processing absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots. Absentee Ballot Applications: In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems they encountered in processing absentee ballot applications. We estimate that 48 percent of them identified problems receiving absentee ballot applications that contained a missing or illegible voter signature. Furthermore, we asked about which problems were encountered most frequently. An estimated 20 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the problem of receiving absentee ballot applications that contained a missing or illegible voter signature most frequently. Table 4 shows our estimates of the types of voter errors local jurisdictions encountered with absentee ballot applications submitted for the November 2004 general election. Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems in Processing Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: Problem: Missing or illegible signature[A]; All jurisdictions: 48; Small: (< 10,000): 44[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 55; Large: (>100,000): 73[D]. Problem: Missing or inadequate voting residence address[A]; All jurisdictions: 35; Small: (< 10,000): 30[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 42; Large: (>100,000): 70[D]. Problem: Applied to wrong jurisdiction[A]; All jurisdictions: 33; Small: (< 10,000): 32[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 32; Large: (>100,000): 58[D]. Problem: Missing or inadequate voting mailing address[B]; All jurisdictions: 32; Small: (< 10,000): 25[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 43; Large: (>100,000): 74[D]. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions. BAll size jurisdictions are statistically different from one another. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 percentage points. [D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [End of table] On the basis of our nationwide survey, large jurisdictions had more of a problem than small or medium jurisdictions concerning missing or illegible signatures. Specifically, we estimate that 73 percent of large jurisdictions encountered this problem, while we estimate 44 percent and 55 percent of small and medium jurisdictions respectively encountered it. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and small jurisdictions. When elections officials were unable to process absentee ballot applications, our nationwide survey showed that some local jurisdictions contacted applicants to inform them of the status of their application using the methods listed in table 5. Specifically, on the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 percent of all jurisdictions telephoned applicants when their absentee applications could not be processed. We found no significant difference based on the size of the jurisdiction with regard to this contact method. However, we estimate that 84 percent of medium jurisdictions and 90 percent of large jurisdictions contacted absentee applicants by U.S. mail. In contrast, 63 percent of small jurisdictions contacted absentee applicants with problem applications via U.S. mail. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions. We also estimate that 10 percent of local jurisdictions did not inform any applicants about the status of their application. Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When Absentee Ballot Applications Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Telephoned the applicant; All jurisdictions: 72; Small: (< 10,000): 72[D]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 73; Large: (>100,000): 77. Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Contact by mail[A]; All jurisdictions: 69; Small: (< 10,000): 63[D]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 84; Large: (>100,000): 90. Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Contact by e- mail[B]; All jurisdictions: 20; Small: (< 10,000): 18[D]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 21; Large: (>100,000): 46. Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Other[C]; All jurisdictions: 15; Small: (< 10,000): 18[D]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 9; Large: (>100,000): 11. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions. [B] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions. [C] "Other" included contact by facsimile or contacting voters' relatives, among other things. [D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 percentage points. [End of table] In an Illinois jurisdiction that we visited, elections officials told us that they would do everything possible in an attempt to obtain complete absentee applications from voters. If the absentee ballot application was incomplete, election office staff said they contacted the voter and attempted to resolve the problem in the best way practical, according to the election officials. For example, if the application was missing the voter's signature and there was enough time, the staff mailed the application back to the voter for signature. If time was limited, the staff called the voter and asked him or her to visit the election office to sign the application. An election official in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told us that if applicants forgot to include one part of an address, such as a ZIP code, but election staff could match the rest of the address and voters' identifying information with their registration information, the application was approved. Election officials in another Pennsylvania jurisdiction and a Nevada jurisdiction told us that the voter registration system automatically generated letters to voters when the application could not be processed for any reason. Absentee Ballots: In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems they encountered in processing submitted absentee ballots. We estimate that 61 percent of all jurisdictions reported that absentee ballots were received without the voter's signature on the envelope. We estimate 54 percent of small jurisdictions, 76 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 90 percent of large jurisdictions encountered this problem. Jurisdictions of all sizes are statistically different from one another. Table 6 shows our estimates of the types of problems election officials encountered on absentee ballots. We estimate that 81 percent of local jurisdictions encountered at least one of the problems listed. Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in Processing Submitted Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: Problems encountered: Envelope not signed[A]; All jurisdictions: 61; Small: (< 10,000): 54; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 76; Large: (>100,000): 90[C]. Problems encountered: Missing or incomplete witness signature or information; All jurisdictions: 36; Small: (< 10,000): 38; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 33; Large: (>100,000): 36[C]. Problems encountered: Improper or missing notary signature; All jurisdictions: 18; Small: (< 10,000): 19; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 16; Large: (>100,000): 12[C]. Problems encountered: Signature on the envelope did not match the application or digitized signature on file[B]; All jurisdictions: 13; Small: (< 10,000): 9; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 18; Large: (>100,000): 48[C]. Problems encountered: Voter identification marks on envelope or ballot[B]; All jurisdictions: 9; Small: (< 10,000): 9; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 7; Large: (>100,000): 23[C]. Problems encountered: Voter identification number not included; All jurisdictions: 3; Small: (< 10,000): 2; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 5; Large: (>100,000): 7[C]. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Jurisdictions of all sizes are statistically different from one another. [B] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [End of table] If the ballot was not able to be verified, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that they attempted to contact the voter, time permitting, so that the affidavit envelope could be corrected and approved for counting. In 10 jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that they reviewed the affidavit envelope information to approve the ballots as they received them rather than waiting until Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that 40 percent of local jurisdictions contacted the voter by mail in an attempt to address a problem with the affidavit envelope, and 39 percent contacted the voter via telephone. Table 7 shows our estimates of the contact methods used by local jurisdictions when absentee ballots had problems that could prevent them from being approved for counting if not corrected. Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when Absentee Ballots Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Contacted the voter by mail[A]; All jurisdictions: 40; Small: (< 10,000): 31[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 61; Large: (>100,000): 66. Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Telephoned the voter; All jurisdictions: 39; Small: (< 10,000): 38[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 42; Large: (>100,000): 41. Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Did not inform voters; All jurisdictions: 27; Small: (< 10,000): 29[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 24; Large: (>100,000): 25. Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Did not receive any ballots that could not be processed; All jurisdictions: 21; Small: (< 10,000): 25[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 12; Large: (>100,000): 3. Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Contacted the voter by e-mail; All jurisdictions: 8; Small: (< 10,000): 8[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 7; Large: (>100,000): 15. Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Other[B]; All jurisdictions: 11; Small: (< 10,000): 11[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 7; Large: (>100,000): 16. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Small jurisdictions are statistically different than medium and large jurisdictions. [B] "Other" included contacting the voter by facsimile, contacting a family member of the voter, or providing a hotline number for voters to check their ballot status, among other things. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 percentage points. [End of table] Differences in whether voters were contacted by mail when there were problems with their absentee ballots were based on the size of the local elections jurisdiction. Specifically, we estimate that 31 percent of small, 61 percent of medium, and 66 percent of large jurisdictions contacted voters by mail. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions. While election officials in 10 jurisdictions we visited told us that they qualified absentee ballots prior to Election Day--allowing them time to follow up with voters, in 6 local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that they qualified or approved absentee ballots for counting on Election Day. According to election officials in these jurisdictions, contacting the voter for corrected or complete ballot information was not a viable option because there was not enough time. These election officials stated that absentee ballots with incomplete or inaccurate information on the affidavit envelope would not be qualified or counted. Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that voters can visit local election offices and complete all or part of the absentee process in person. Some election officials told us that when voters vote in-person absentee, officials are well situated to help ensure that the application and ballot are complete and accurate before accepting them. For example, in one Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they did not have incomplete absentee ballot applications from voters who visited the office in person because they reviewed the application and required the person to correct any errors before leaving. Some Election Jurisdictions Continued to Have Concerns about Fraud and Had Procedures to Address the Potential for Fraud: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that election officials for the 2000 general election had concerns with mail- in absentee voting fraud, particularly regarding absentee voters being unduly influenced or intimidated while voting.[Footnote 92] However, we also reported that election officials identified that they had established procedures to address certain potential for fraud, such as someone other than the registered voter completing the ballot or voters casting more than one ballot in the same election. Once the voters received and voted absentee ballots in accordance with any state or local requirements (such as providing a signature or other information on the affidavit envelope), such ballots were to be returned to specified election officials. In general, local election officials or poll workers were to review the information on the affidavit envelope and subsequently verified or disqualified the ballot for counting based on compliance with these administrative requirements, according to election officials in some local jurisdictions we visited. In our state survey, we asked states whether they specified how local jurisdictions were to determine eligibility of absentee ballots. According to our survey, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that at the time of our survey, they specified how to determine absentee ballot eligibility, while 6 states reported that they did not. Colorado, for example, specified that the poll worker is to compare the signature of the voter on a self-affirmation envelope with a signature on file with the county clerk and recorder. Wisconsin specified, among other things, that inspectors ascertain whether a certification has been properly executed, if the applicant is a qualified elector of the ward or election district, and that the voter has not already voted in the election. Our survey of local elections jurisdictions asked election officials if they used any of the procedures described in table 8 to ensure that the absentee voter did not vote more than once for the November 2004 general election. These procedures could have been conducted either manually by elections officials or through system edit checks. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 69 percent of jurisdictions checked the Election Day poll book to determine whether the voter had been sent an absentee ballot, and 68 percent of jurisdictions checked the Election Day poll book to determine whether the voter had completed an absentee ballot. Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote More than Once, November 2004 General Election: Procedure: Election Day poll book checked to determine whether the voter had been sent an absentee ballot; All jurisdictions: 69; Small: (< 10,000): 65[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 77; Large: (>100,000): 82. Procedure: Election Day poll book checked to determine whether the voter had completed an absentee ballot; All jurisdictions: 68; Small: (< 10,000): 66[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 74; Large: (>100,000): 56. Procedure: Election Day poll book checked against the absentee ballots prior to counting them[A]; All jurisdictions: 64; Small: (< 10,000): 68[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 54; Large: (>100,000): 48. Procedure: Applications or voter registration system checked to determine whether the voter had already applied for an absentee ballot[B]; All jurisdictions: 58; Small: (< 10,000): 52[C]; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 70; Large: (>100,000): 85. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Small jurisdictions are significantly different from medium and large jurisdictions. [B] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 percentage points. [End of table] On our survey of local jurisdictions, we also asked if any of the procedures listed in table 9 were in place to ensure that the absentee ballots were actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 70 percent of jurisdictions compared the absentee ballot signature with the absentee application signature. Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were Actually Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, November 2004 General Election: Procedure: Absentee ballot signature was compared with the absentee application signature[A]; All jurisdictions: 70; Small: (< 10,000): 72; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 69; Large: (>100,000): 40[C]. Procedure: Absentee ballot signature had to be witnessed (in only those states that required it)[B]; All jurisdictions: 54; Small: (< 10,000): 64; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 28; Large: (>100,000): 25[C]. Procedure: Absentee ballot signature was compared with the voter registration signature; All jurisdictions: 39; Small: (< 10,000): 36; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 47; Large: (>100,000): 62[C]. Procedure: Absentee ballot signature had to be notarized (in only those states that required it); All jurisdictions: 8; Small: (< 10,000): 7; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 14; Large: (>100,000): 6[C]. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions. [B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-8 percentage points. [End of table] With respect to comparing the absentee ballot application signature with the absentee ballot signature, there were differences based on the size of the jurisdiction. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 percent of small, 69 percent of medium, and 40 percent of large jurisdictions compared these signatures. Large jurisdictions are significantly different from small and medium jurisdictions. One reason that large jurisdictions may differ is that they have a large volume of absentee ballots to process and it may be too resource intensive to compare signatures, among other things. During our site visits, elections officials provided examples of the procedures they used to ensure against fraud. For example in 20 local jurisdictions that we visited, election officials said that when the ballot signature was compared with the absentee application signature, voter registration signature, or some other signature on file, the signatures had to match for the ballot to be approved and counted. In addition to matching signatures, election officials in 2 Illinois jurisdictions and 1 New Jersey jurisdiction we visited told us that during the Election Day absentee ballot qualification process, poll workers were instructed to check the poll book to determine if the voter had cast an Election Day ballot. In 1 of these Illinois jurisdictions, if poll workers found both an Election Day and absentee ballot were cast, they were instructed to void the absentee ballot so that it would not be counted. In addition to matching signatures, election officials in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that they used an electronic poll book to manage absentee, early, and Election Day voting to ensure that voters cast only one ballot. Once a ballot was cast in this jurisdiction, the electronic poll book was annotated and the voter was not allowed to cast another ballot. Although election officials in the 20 jurisdictions mentioned above told us that they had procedures in place designed to help prevent fraud during the absentee voting process, election officials told us that they still suspected instances of fraud. For example, in a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they referred 44 individuals who allegedly voted absentee ballots with invalid signatures to the district attorney for investigation. In a New Mexico jurisdiction that we visited, election officials told us that organized third parties went door to door and encouraged voters to apply for absentee ballots. Once these voters received their ballots, according to election officials, the third parties obtained the voters' names (in New Mexico this is public information, according to such officials), and went to the voters' homes and offered to assist them in voting the ballots. These election officials said that they were concerned that the latter part of this activity might be intimidating to voters and could result in voter fraud. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting: In general, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act requires, among other things, that states permit absent uniformed services members and U.S. citizen voters residing outside the country to register and vote absentee in elections for federal office.[Footnote 93] In addition, states also generally offer some measure of absentee voting for registered voters in their states not covered under UOCAVA. The basic process for absentee voting under UOCAVA is generally similar to that described in figure 18 for absentee voters not covered under UOCAVA in that UOCAVA voters also must establish their eligibility to vote on their absentee ballot application, and the ballot must be received by the voter's local jurisdiction to verify it for counting. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that they allow UOCAVA voters to submit a voted ballot via facsimile--a method that might not be allowed for absentee voters not covered under UOCAVA because of concerns about maintaining ballot secrecy. In 6 jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that they require voters under UOCAVA to submit a form acknowledging that ballot secrecy could be compromised when ballots are faxed. One mechanism used to simplify the process for persons covered by UOCAVA to apply for an absentee ballot is the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), which states are to use to allow such absentee voters to simultaneously register to vote and request an absentee ballot. On our survey of local jurisdictions, we asked if any problems were encountered in processing absentee applications when the applicant used the FPCA. We estimate that 39 percent of local jurisdictions received the FPCA too late to process--a problem also encountered with other state-provided absentee ballot applications. Table 10 shows our estimates of problems local jurisdictions encountered when processing Federal Post Card Applications. In addition, we asked about which problems were encountered most frequently when the FPCA was used, and an estimated 19 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the problem of receiving the FPCA too late to process more frequently than other problems. Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by Jurisdiction Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error Problems on Absentee Applications That Used the Federal Post Card Application, November 2004 General Election: Problems: Application received too late[A]; All jurisdictions: 39; Small: (< 10,000): 32; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 53; Large: (>100,000): 70. Problems: Missing or inadequate voting residence address[A]; All jurisdictions: 31; Small: (< 10,000): 24; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 41; Large: (>100,000): 75. Problems: Applied to wrong jurisdiction[B]; All jurisdictions: 29; Small: (< 10,000): 25; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 36; Large: (>100,000): 60. Problems: Missing or inadequate voting mailing address[A]; All jurisdictions: 24; Small: (< 10,000): 17; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 36; Large: (>100,000): 67. Problems: Missing or illegible signature[B]; All jurisdictions: 21; Small: (< 10,000): 16; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 27; Large: (>100,000): 57. Problems: Application not witnessed, attested, or notarized; All jurisdictions: 13; Small: (< 10,000): 13; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 13; Large: (>100,000): 14. Problems: Did not meet excuse required by state law; All jurisdictions: 3; Small: (< 10,000): 2; Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 4; Large: (>100,000): 13. Source: GAO analysis of local election jurisdiction survey data. [A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [B] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions. [End of table] Also, uniformed services voters and U.S. citizen voters residing outside of the country are allowed to use the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot to vote for federal offices in general elections. This ballot may be used when such voters submit a timely application for an absentee ballot (i.e., the application must have been received by the state before the state deadline or at least 30 days prior to the general election, whichever is later) but do not receive a state absentee ballot. Some states' absentee ballot application forms included serving in a uniformed service or residing outside the country as excuses for voting absentee. According to our state survey, 4 states (Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island) reported that they require attestation by a notary or witness for a voter's signature on voted mail-in absentee ballots but do not require uniformed service voters and U.S. citizen voters outside the country to provide this on their voted ballots. For the 2004 November general election, according to our state survey, 9 states reported having absentee ballot deadlines for voters outside the United States that were more lenient than the ballot deadlines for voters inside the United States. Table 11 lists these 9 states and the difference between the mail-in ballot deadline from inside the United States and the mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States. Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines from Inside and Outside the United States, November 2004 General Election: State: Alaska; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 10 days after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 15 days after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day. State: Arkansas; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 days after Election Day. State: Florida; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: No later than 10 days after Election Day if postmarked or signed and dated by Election Day (federal races only). State: Louisiana; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 1 day before Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: Election Day. State: Maryland; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 1 day after Election Day if postmarked before Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 days after Election Day and postmarked before Election Day. State: Massachusetts; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 days after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day. State: Ohio; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 days after Election Day. State: Pennsylvania; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 4 days before Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: Deadline extended per court order for November 2004 general election for not only absentee ballots from outside the United States but also for those voters covered by UOCAVA, including domestic uniformed service members, who are nonetheless absent from the place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to vote. State: Texas; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: Election Day; Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 5 days after Election Day. Source: GAO 2005 survey state election officials. [End of table] HAVA amended the UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application--the Federal Post Card Application--by absent uniformed service voters and citizen voters residing outside the United States from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the two next regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. To illustrate, if uniformed service voters or civilian voters residing outside the United States submitted a completed FPCA in July 2004, they would have been allowed to automatically receive ballots for the next two federal general elections, including those held in 2004 and 2006. (See fig. 24 for an example of the FPCA used in 2004.) In 4 local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that the amendment described above may present a challenge for successfully delivering absentee ballots to the uniformed services members because they tend to move frequently. For example, in a North Carolina jurisdiction that we visited, election officials stated that addresses on file for such voters at the time of the November 2004 general election may be no longer correct and that mail sent to these voters could be returned as undeliverable. Also, in 1 jurisdiction in Georgia that we visited, election officials told us that they were concerned that many of the absentee ballots sent in subsequent general elections would be returned as undeliverable. In an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, elections officials expressed concerns about paying the postage for mail that may be undeliverable will be a challenge in future years. Also, we noted in our March 2006 report on election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, that one of the top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for UOCAVA voters was that the ballots were undeliverable.[Footnote 94] The Federal Post Card Application was revised in October 2005, after the November 2004 general election, and now allows overseas military and civilians to designate the time period for which they want to receive absentee ballots. (See figure 24 for the revised FPCA.) Those who do not wish to receive ballots for two regularly scheduled general elections can designate that they want an absentee ballot for the next federal election only and then complete the form and request a ballot for each subsequent federal election separately. The FPCA used at the time of the November 2004 election did not allow overseas military and civilian voters to make this designation. Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Even with the revised FPCA, some applications might not have this box checked, and jurisdictions could continue to have absentee ballots returned as undeliverable. In an attempt to mitigate these problems, election officials in 3 local jurisdictions we visited told us that they planned several activities in an attempt to maintain and update the addresses of uniformed services voters and civilian voters residing outside the country. In a Washington jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they began requesting e-mail addresses from such voters so that any problems with these applications or ballots could be corrected more efficiently. In previous elections, when e-mail addresses were not available, elections officials in this jurisdiction told us that many absentee applications and ballots sent to uniformed services members and civilian voters residing outside the United States were often returned as undeliverable. In a Georgia jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that they planned to create a subsystem within their voter registration system. This subsystem will, according to the election officials, allow staff in the election office to produce a form letter for each uniformed services voter that will verify the voter's current address. The election officials also told us letters will be mailed in January asking the voter to contact the jurisdiction to confirm that he or she continues to reside at the address on the letter. If the jurisdiction does not receive confirmation from the uniformed services voter, the election officials told us that they will contact the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) for assistance in locating the voter.[Footnote 95] In an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that they plan to canvass all uniformed services members and civilians residing outside the United States who are registered in the state in 2006. Election officials in this jurisdiction told us that they had approximately 7,400 such registered voters who completed the FPCA and that the jurisdiction planned to canvass these voters to confirm that they continued to reside at the address on the FPCA. This jurisdiction expects that as many as half of these canvass cards will be returned as undeliverable. Once the cards are returned, state law allows those voters whose canvass cards are returned to be deleted from the voter registration list, according to the election officials. Early Voting: Early voting is another way to provide registered voters with the opportunity to cast ballots prior to Election Day. However, conducting early voting is generally more complicated for election officials than conducting Election Day voting. In the jurisdictions we visited in 7 states with early voting, election officials described early voting as generally in-person voting at one or more designated polling locations usually different from polling locations used at the precinct level on Election Day. The voting may or may not be at the election registrar's office. Early voting is distinct from in-person absentee voting in that in-person absentee voters usually apply for an absentee ballot at the registrar's office and vote at the registrar's office at that time. Also, early voting usually does not require an excuse to vote, which some states require for absentee voting, and in the jurisdictions we visited in 7 states with early voting, it was usually offered for a shorter period of time than absentee voting.[Footnote 96] The time frame allowed for absentee voting was almost always at least twice as long as for early voting. For example, election officials in the Colorado jurisdictions we visited said that they allow 30 days for absentee voting and 15 days for early voting. In the jurisdictions we visited in 7 states with early voting, election officials said early voting is similar to Election Day voting in that the voter generally votes using the same voting method as on Election Day. However they added that it differs from Election Day voting in that voters can vote at any early voting polling location because all early voting locations have access to a list of all registered voters for the jurisdiction (not just precinct specific) and can provide voters with appropriate ballots that include federal, state, and precinct-specific races. Proponents argue that early voting is convenient for voters and saves jurisdictions money by reducing the number of polling places and poll workers needed on Election Day, and also provides the voter with more opportunity to vote. Opponents counter that those who vote early do so with less information than Election Day voters, and there is no proof that early voting increases voter turnout. Statistics on voter turnout for early voting can be difficult to come by, partly because some states and localities combine early and absentee voting numbers.[Footnote 97] Nevertheless, early voting in certain jurisdictions appears to be popular with voters and on the rise. In a New Mexico jurisdiction, election officials told us that early voting accounted for about 34 percent of the ballots cast in that jurisdiction. In North Carolina and Colorado elections jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that early voters cast about 35 and 38 percent of the jurisdictions' total votes in the November 2004 election, respectively. In a Nevada jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that the percentage of voters who voted early steadily increased over time. The officials said that in 1996, about 17 percent of voters voted early; in 2000, 43 percent voted early; and in the November 2004 general election, about 50 percent (271,500) of their voters voted early. Our prior work on the 2000 general election did not identify states that offered early voting as we have defined it. Rather, we reported on absentee and early voting together. Thus, we are unable to identify the change in the number of states that offered early voting for the November 2000 general election and the November 2004 general election. We describe the availability of early voting throughout the nation and the challenges and issues that election officials encountered in the November 2004 general election as they conducted early voting in selected jurisdictions. Many early polling locations in Florida and elsewhere received media publicity about voters standing in long lines and waiting for long periods of time to vote early. In half of the local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials described encountering challenges that included long lines, and some identified challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities at the polls. Early Voting Appears to Be Gaining in Popularity: For the November 2004 general election, in our state survey, 24 states and the District of Columbia reported offering early voting. In addition, 2 states--Illinois and Maine--reported, in our state survey, that they had enacted legislation or taken executive action since November 2004 to provide for early voting in their states. Another 7 states reported that with respect to early voting, they (1) had legislation pending, (2) considered legislation in legislative session that was not enacted, or (3) had an executive action that was pending or was considered. Figure 25 shows where early voting was provided for the November 2004 general election. Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported Providing Early Voting as an Option in the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 23 percent of jurisdictions were in states that offered early voting. Furthermore, we estimate that 16 percent of small jurisdictions, 40 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 52 percent of large jurisdictions were in states that offered early voting. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and large jurisdictions. The Number of Days and Hours to Conduct Early Voting: The number of days that early voting was available in these 24 states and the District of Columbia varied. In some cases, early voting was allowed no sooner than a day or a few days prior to Election Day, while in other cases voters had nearly a month or longer to cast an early ballot. Table 12 shows the range of days for early voting among the states and the District of Columbia that reported providing early voting for the November 2004 election. Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the District of Columbia, November 2004 General Election: States that reported providing early voting: Alaska; Statutory early voting period[A]: 16 days. States that reported providing early voting: Arizona; Statutory early voting period[A]: At least 30 days. States that reported providing early voting: Arkansas; Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. States that reported providing early voting: California; Statutory early voting period[A]: 30 days. States that reported providing early voting: Colorado; Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. States that reported providing early voting: Florida; Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. States that reported providing early voting: Georgia; Statutory early voting period[A]: 5 days. States that reported providing early voting: Hawaii; Statutory early voting period[A]: 10 days. States that reported providing early voting: Idaho; Statutory early voting period[A]: Beginning of early voting period is unspecified-early voting period ends on the day before the election. States that reported providing early voting: Iowa; Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 40 days. States that reported providing early voting: Kansas; Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 20 days. States that reported providing early voting: Louisiana; Statutory early voting period[A]: 12 to 6 days. States that reported providing early voting: Montana; Statutory early voting period[A]: 45 days. States that reported providing early voting: Nebraska; Statutory early voting period[A]: Beginning of early voting period is unspecified-early voting period ends by close of polls on Election Day. States that reported providing early voting: Nevada; Statutory early voting period[A]: 14 days. States that reported providing early voting: New Mexico; Statutory early voting period[A]: 17 days. States that reported providing early voting: North Carolina; Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 19 days. States that reported providing early voting: North Dakota; Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. States that reported providing early voting: Oklahoma; Statutory early voting period[A]: 3 days. States that reported providing early voting: Tennessee; Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 20 days. States that reported providing early voting: Texas; Statutory early voting period[A]: 14 days. States that reported providing early voting: Utah; Statutory early voting period[A]: Beginning of early voting period is unspecified-early voting period ends on the day before the election. States that reported providing early voting: Vermont; Statutory early voting period[A]: Unspecified. States that reported providing early voting: West Virginia; Statutory early voting period[A]: 18 days. States that reported providing early voting: District of Columbia; Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. Source: GAO analysis. [A] For the purposes of this table, the phrase "early voting period" refers to the period of time during which in-person early ballots may be cast in elections for federal office. Different time periods may be applicable under state laws with respect to early ballot applications and nonfederal elections. [End of table] On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 75 percent of the jurisdictions that offered early voting offered it for 2 or more weeks prior to Election Day. Figure 26 shows the estimated percentage of local jurisdictions that offered early voting for various time periods. Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered Early Voting for Various Time Periods, November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: The 95 percent interval for these percentages is +/-10 percentage points or less. Figures do not total 100 because of rounding. [End of figure] Among the local jurisdictions that we visited in the 7 states that provided early voting, we found that the shortest time frame allowed for early voting was in Georgia, which had 5 days, and the longest time frame allowed for early voting was in New Mexico, with 28 days. Furthermore, in the local jurisdictions we visited in the 7 states that provided early voting, election officials supplied information on early voting hours that ranged from weekday business hours to those that included weekends and evenings. For more details on the characteristics of early voting sites we visited, see appendix VII. During the course of our work, a limited review of state statutes showed, for example, that Nevada statute requires early voting polling places be open Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., during the first week of early voting and possibly to 8 p.m. during the second week, dependent upon the county clerk's discretion. In addition, under the Nevada provision, polling places must be open on any Saturdays within the early voting period from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., and may be open on Sundays within the early voting period dependent upon the county clerk's discretion. Under these provisions, the early voting period is to begin the third Saturday prior to an election and end the Friday before Election Day. Similarly, Oklahoma statute provides that voters be able to cast early ballots from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on the Friday and Monday immediately before Election Day, and from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. on the Saturday immediately before Election Day. Some states' statutes are less prescriptive, such as those of Florida, where the statute specifies that early voting should be provided for at least 8 hours per weekday during the early voting period, and at least 8 hours in the aggregate for each weekend during the early voting period, without specifying the specific hours such voting is to be offered. Other states, such as Kansas, however, do not specify in statute the hours for voting early.[Footnote 98] Kansas statute, in general, leaves it to county election officials to establish the times for voting early. Officials at some local jurisdictions we visited said that their hours of operations were set based on the hours of the election office or by the hours of the facility that was hosting early voting such as a shopping mall or a library. According to our survey of local jurisdictions, an estimated 34 percent[Footnote 99] of local jurisdictions that provided early voting for the November 2004 general election offered early voting during regular business hours (e.g., from 8 a.m. until 4 p.m.) on weekdays, and 16 percent[Footnote 100] offered early voting during regular business hours on weekdays and during other hours. Other hours included weekday evenings (after 4 p.m. or 5 p.m. until 7 p.m. or 9 p.m.) and Saturdays (all day) and Sundays (any hours) for about 2 percent of the jurisdictions, respectively. Determining Number and Types of Early Voting Locations: As with early voting time frames, some states reported having requirements for local election jurisdictions regarding the number of early voting locations. In our state survey, 17 of the 25 entities (including 24 states and the District of Columbia) that reported offering early voting for the November 2004 general election also reported having requirements for local jurisdictions regarding the number or distribution of early voting locations. Kansas election standards, for example, provide for one such voting location per county unless a county's population exceeds 250,000, in which case the election officer may designate additional sites as needed to accommodate voters. Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited said that state statute determined the number of locations, while election officials in 13 other jurisdictions told us they decided the number of locations. For example, New Mexico's early voting statutory provisions specifically require that certain counties with more than 200,000 registered voters establish not fewer than 12 voting locations each. During our site visits, we asked jurisdictions how they determined the number of early voting locations. In a Nevada jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that the number of locations was determined by the availability of resources such as fiscal and manpower needs. In a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, an election official said he would like to have had more early voting locations but could not because the jurisdiction did not have the funds to pay for additional costs associated with additional sites, such as the cost for computer connections needed for electronic voter registration list capability. In a North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that they had only one early voting location because they did not have election staff that would be needed to manage another site. Conducting Early Voting: In many ways, early voting is conducted in a manner substantially similar to Election Day voting in that polling locations are obtained, workers are recruited to staff the sites for each day polling locations are to be open, and voting machines and supplies are delivered to the polling locations. However, as described by election officials in jurisdictions we visited that had early voting, early voting differs from Election Day voting in that staff are generally required to perform their voting day-related duties for more than 1 day, and staff generally do not use poll books to identify eligible voters and check them in. Instead, as described by some of these jurisdictions, early voting staff usually access the jurisdiction's voter registration list to identify eligible voters and to indicate the voter voted early to preclude voting on Election Day or by absentee ballot. Also, election officials told us that, generally, staff must possess some computer skills and need to be trained in using the jurisdiction's voter registration system. Furthermore, staff must be aware that ballots are specific to the voter's precinct. In our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we asked about the type of staff who worked at early voting polling places. According to our survey for the November 2004 general election, local election jurisdictions relied on permanent election jurisdiction staff most often to work at early voting polling locations. As table 13 shows, we estimate 30 percent of local jurisdictions offered early voting using only permanent election jurisdiction staff to work at the early voting polling places; we estimate that 14 percent of local jurisdictions used poll workers exclusively; and we estimate 14 percent used other staff (e.g., county or city employees). Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Staff Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 2004 General Election: Staff: Permanent staff; Percent: 30[A]. Staff: Poll workers; Percent: 14[ B]. Staff: Other (respondents wrote in other categories); Percent: 14[C]. Staff: Permanent and temporary part-time staff; Percent: 7[D]. Staff: Permanent staff and poll workers; Percent: 4[D]. Staff: Permanent, temporary full-time, and temporary part-time staff and poll workers; Percent: 4[D]. Staff: Permanent and temporary full-time staff; Percent: 4[D]. Staff: Permanent and temporary part-time staff and poll workers; Percent: 4[D]. Staff: Temporary part-time staff and poll workers; Percent: 3[D]. Staff: Temporary full-time staff and poll workers; Percent: 2[D]. Staff: Permanent, temporary full-time, and temporary part-time staff; Percent: 2[D]. Staff: Temporary full-time and temporary part-time staff and poll workers; Percent: 1[D]. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-9 percentage points. [B] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +7 or -6 percentage points. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 or -6 percentage points. [D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +6 or -4 percentage points. [End of table] Election officials at 11 jurisdictions we visited emphasized the importance of staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. Even with experienced staff working early voting locations, election officials at local jurisdictions we visited mentioned that staff were required to take training and were provided tools to help them perform their duties. In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions that provided early voting about the ways that staff were trained for early voting. As shown in table 14, the majority of jurisdictions used methods, such as providing a checklist of procedures, written guidance for self-study or reference, and quick reference materials for troubleshooting, to train early voting staff. Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Methods to Train Early Voting Staff, November 2004 General Election: Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided a checklist of procedures; Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 80. Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided written guidance for self-study or reference; Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 78. Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided quick reference materials for troubleshooting; Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 74. Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided classroom training; Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 56. Ways that early voting staff were trained: Viewed training video; Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 31. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] The 95 percent confidence interval for all percentages is +/-11 percentage points or less. [End of table] Local jurisdictions could do more than one of the above ways to train early voting staff. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that 14 percent of local jurisdictions used classroom training, written guidance for self-study or reference, a checklist of procedures, and quick reference materials for troubleshooting to train early voting staff.[Footnote 101] When asked about what worked particularly well during early voting, election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited in Colorado said that that they provided 8 hours of training and had on-site supervision that they thought contributed to a successful early voting experience. The election officials also said they used a feature in their electronic poll book system to track the number of ballots used at each site to determine whether sites had adequate inventories of ballots. The program for the poll book system had an alarm that went off if any site was running low on ballots, according to these election officials. Two other jurisdictions we visited in Kansas and Florida noted the importance of having experienced staff for early voting, with the election officials in 1 Kansas jurisdiction saying that designating a group of workers to work on early voting helped the process run effectively and the election officials in 1 Florida jurisdiction saying that having the supervisor of elections office staff on site to support early voting helped make the process work well. Some Local Jurisdictions We Visited Encountered Long lines Resulting from Larger than Expected Early Voter Turnout: When asked about challenges with early voting faced during the November 2004 general election, in half of the local jurisdictions we visited that offered early voting election officials identified long lines as a major challenge. Election officials at 5 local jurisdictions we visited said that they had not anticipated the large number of voters who had turned out to vote early. Officials attributed challenges handling the large number of voters and resulting long lines to problems with technology, people, and processes. Election officials at local jurisdictions we visited made the following comments: * Election officials in one Florida jurisdiction we visited said that their jurisdiction faced more early voters than anticipated and this fact, coupled with slowness in determining voter eligibility, resulted in long lines. They said that on the first day of early voting, staff was unable to access the voter registration list because laptops were not functioning properly. To address the problem, a worker at the early voting location paired with another worker, who called the supervisor of elections office to obtain voter registration information and provide information on the voter seeking to vote early. * An election official in another Florida jurisdiction said that while state law provides for early voting in the main office of the supervisor of elections, other locations may be used only under certain conditions. For example, in order for a branch office to be used, it must be a full-service facility of the supervisor and must have been designated as such at least 1 year prior to the election. In addition, a city hall or public library may be designated as an additional early voting location, but only if the sites are located so as to provide all voters in the county an equal opportunity to cast a ballot, insofar as is practicable. The official thought more flexibility was needed to allow him to either have more early voting locations or use other types of facilities, such as a local community center, that could accommodate more voters. * An election official in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that the jurisdiction's process flow was inadequate to handle the large turnout for early voting. The election official said that the jurisdiction had not planned sufficiently to manage the large turnout for early voting and did not have enough staff to process voters. The election official said that in the future, he will hire temporary workers and will assign one person to be in charge of each process (e.g., checking in voters, activating the DRE machine, etc.) In addition, the election official said that, in hindsight, he made a questionable decision to close all but two early voting locations for the last day of early voting. The closing of all but two locations on the last day of early voting coincided with a state holiday so children were out of school. The decision to close all but two locations caused 3 to 3˝ hours of wait time, with parents waiting in line with children. The election official said he has set a goal for the future that no wait time should be longer than half an hour.[Footnote 102] To address challenges related to heavy early voter turnout, election officials in 1 Nevada jurisdiction said they have gradually added new early voting locations each year to keep up with the increasing number of people who vote early. In a New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that they used a smaller ratio of voters to machines than required by state statute. According to these election officials, the state required at least one machine for every 600 voters, and during early voting, the election officials said they used one machine for every 400 voters registered in the jurisdiction. In 1 Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that they addressed the challenge of long lines by having greeters inform voters about the line and make sure the voters had required identification with them. They said they provided equipment demonstrations and passed out sample ballots so people in line could consider their choices, if they had not already done so. They also said they offered people in line the option of absentee ballot applications. Some Jurisdictions We Visited Encountered Challenges Dealing with Disruptive Third-Party Activities: In 3 jurisdictions we visited, election officials stated that they encountered challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities at early voting sites. In particular, concerns were raised about various groups attempting to campaign or influence voters while the early voters waited in line. State restrictions on various activities in or around polling places on Election Day include prohibitions relating to, for example, the circulation of petitions within a certain distance of a polling place, the distribution of campaign literature within a certain distance of the polls, the conduction of an exit or public opinion poll within a certain distance of the polls, and disorderly conduct or violence or threats of violence that impede or interfere with an election. Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited stated that campaign activities too close to people waiting in line were a concern to the extent that police were called in to monitor the situation at one early voting location. Election officials in a Florida jurisdiction we visited said that they were concerned about solicitors, both candidates and poll watchers, approaching people waiting in line to vote early and offering them water or assistance in voting.[Footnote 103] While Florida's statutory provisions in place for the November 2004 general election contained restrictions of various activities in or around polling places on Election Day, such provisions did not explicitly address early voting sites. Amendments to these provisions, effective January 2006, among other things, explicitly applied certain restrictions of activities in or around polling places to early voting areas. With respect to poll watchers, these amendments also prohibit their interaction with voters to go along with the pre- existing prohibition on obstructing the orderly conduct of any election by poll watchers. Concluding Observations: Making voting easier prior to Election Day has advantages for voters and election officials, but also presents challenges for elections officials. Many states and local jurisdictions appear to be moving in the direction of enabling voters to vote before Election Day by eliminating restrictions on who can vote absentee and providing for early voting. Many states allowed voters to use e-mail and facsimiles to request an absentee ballot application and, in some cases, to return applications. To the extent that large numbers of voters do vote absentee or early, it can reduce lines at the polling place on Election Day and, where permitted by state law, ease the time pressures of vote counting by allowing election officials to count absentee and early votes prior to Election Day. However, there are also challenges for election officials. An estimated 55 percent of jurisdictions received absentee ballot applications too late to process, and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too late. Although we do not know the extent of these problems in terms of the number of applications and ballots that could not be processed, the estimated number of jurisdictions encountering these problems may be of some concern to state and local election officials. Absentee application deadlines close to Election Day provide citizens increased time to apply to vote absentee. However, the short time period between when applications are received and Election Day may make it difficult for election officials to ensure that eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to vote and return them before the deadline for receipt at election offices. Voter errors on their absentee applications and ballots also create processing problems for election officials. These include missing or illegible signatures, missing or inadequate voting residence addresses, and missing or incomplete witness information for a voter's signature or other information. In addition, mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to be particularly susceptible to fraud. This could include such activities as casting more than one ballot in the same election or someone other than the registered voter completing the ballot. Despite efforts to guard against such activities, election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited expressed some concerns, particularly regarding absentee voters being unduly influenced or intimated by third parties who went to voters' homes and offered to assist them in voting their ballots. Some election officials expressed similar concerns about the influence of third parties on early voters waiting in line who were approached by candidates and poll watchers. After this happened in Florida in November 2004, the state amended its election provisions to prohibit such activity with respect to early voters. Getting absentee ballots to uniformed service personnel and overseas citizens is a continuing challenge. UOCAVA permitted such voters to request an absentee ballot for the upcoming election, and HAVA extended the covered period to include up to two subsequent general elections for federal office. Because the duty station of uniformed service personnel may change during the period covered by the absentee ballot requests, election officials in jurisdictions we visited were concerned that they have some means of knowing the current mailing address. Some jurisdictions are taking action to ensure that they have the correct address for sending absentee ballots for the November 2006 election, such as requesting e-mail addresses that can be used to obtain the most current address information prior to mailing the absentee ballot. To the extent there are problems identifying the correct address, uniformed service personnel and overseas civilians may either not receive an absentee ballot or receive it too late to return it by the deadline required for it to be counted. [End of section] Chapter 4: Conducting Elections: Whether voters are able to successfully vote on Election Day depends a great deal on the planning and preparation that occur prior to the election. Election officials carry out numerous activities--including recruiting and training poll workers; selecting and setting up polling places; designing and producing ballots; educating voters; and allocating voting equipment, ballots, and other supplies to polling places--to help ensure that all eligible voters are able to cast a ballot on Election Day with minimal problems.[Footnote 104] In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide we described these activities as well as problems encountered in administering the November 2000 general election.[Footnote 105] Since then, federal and state actions have been taken to help address many of the challenges encountered in conducting the November 2000 general election. However, reports after the November 2004 general election highlighted instances of unprepared poll workers, confusion about identification requirements, long lines at the polls, and shortages of voting equipment and ballots that voters reportedly encountered on Election Day. This chapter describes changes and challenges--both continuing and new--that election officials encountered in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election. Overview: States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA provisions and other state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United States. In addition to establishing a commission--the U.S. Election Assistance Commission--with wide-ranging duties that include providing information and assistance to states and local jurisdictions--HAVA also established requirements with respect to elections for federal office for, among other things, certain voters who register by mail to provide identification prior to voting; mandated that voting systems accessible to individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; and required voter information to be posted at polling places on Election Day. HAVA also authorized the appropriation of federal funds for payments to states to implement these provisions and make other improvements to election administration. Since the November 2000 general election, some states have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for all voters. Election officials reported encountering many of the same challenges preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election as they did in 2000, including recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled poll workers, locating a sufficient number of polling places that met requirements, designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were many candidates or issues (e.g., propositions, questions, or referenda), having long lines at polling places, and handling the large volume of telephone calls received from voters and poll workers on Election Day. Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited also reported encountering new challenges not identified to us in the 2000 general election with third-party (e.g., poll watchers, observers, or electioneers) activities at polling places on Election Day. On the basis of our survey of a representative sample of local election jurisdictions nationwide and our visits to 28 local jurisdictions, the extent to which jurisdictions encountered many of these continuing challenges varied by the size of election jurisdiction. Large and medium jurisdictions--those jurisdictions with over 10,000 people--generally encountered more challenges than small jurisdictions. In most results from our nationwide survey where there are statistical differences between the size categories of jurisdictions, large jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions. HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election Administration: HAVA established EAC to provide voluntary guidance and assistance with election administration, for example, by providing information on election practices to states and local jurisdictions and administering programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements to some aspects of election administration.[Footnote 106] HAVA also added a new requirement for states to in turn require certain first-time voters who register by mail who have not previously voted in a federal election in the state to provide identification prior to voting,[Footnote 107] and jurisdictions reported taking steps to implement this requirement and inform voters about it. In addition, HAVA includes provisions to facilitate voting for individuals with disabilities, such as requirements for accessible voting systems in elections for federal office.[Footnote 108] HAVA established voter information requirements at polling places on the day of election for federal office[Footnote 109] and authorized the appropriation of funding for payments to states to expand voter education efforts. HAVA Established EAC to Provide Guidance and Assistance with Election Administration: HAVA established EAC, in part, to assist in the administration of federal elections by serving as a national clearinghouse for information and providing guidance and outreach to states and local officials.[Footnote 110] In our October 2001 report on election processes, we estimated that on the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions in 2001, 40 percent of local election jurisdictions nationwide were supportive of federal development of voluntary or mandatory standards for election administration similar to the voluntary standards available for election equipment. We also reported in 2001 that some election officials believed that greater sharing of information on best practices and systematic collection of information could help improve election administration across and within states.[Footnote 111] To assist election officials, since its establishment, EAC has produced two clearinghouse reports, one of which covers election administration.[Footnote 112] EAC released a Best Practices Toolkit on Election Administration on August 9, 2004, to offer guidance to election officials before the November 2004 general election. The document is a compilation of practices used by election officials that covers topics such as voter outreach, poll workers, polling places, and election operations. Of note, this compilation provided election officials with a checklist for HAVA implementation that covers identification for new voters, provisional voting, complaint procedures, and access for individuals with disabilities. EAC has made this guidance available to states and local jurisdictions via its Web site and engaged in public hearings and outreach efforts to inform the election community about the resource tool. EAC also administers programs that provide federal funds for states under HAVA to make improvements to aspects of election administration, such as implementing certain programs to encourage youth to become involved in elections; training election officials and poll workers; and establishing toll-free telephone hotlines that voters may use to, among other things, obtain general election information. The results of our state survey of election officials show that as of August 1, 2005, most states reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for a variety of activities related to improving election administration. For example, 45 states and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for training election officials, and 32 states and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating funding to establish toll-free telephone hotlines. HAVA Added a New Requirement for Certain Voters, and Jurisdictions Reported Taking Steps to Inform Voters: As discussed in chapter 2, under HAVA, states are to require certain first-time voters who registered to vote by mail to provide identification prior to voting.[Footnote 113] Voters who are subject to this provision are those individuals who registered to vote in a jurisdiction by mail and have not previously voted in a federal election in the state, or those who have not voted in a federal election in a jurisdiction which is located in a state that has not yet established a computerized voter registration list, as required by HAVA. When voting in person, these individuals must (if not already provided with their mailed application) present a current and valid photo identification, or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter. Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met this identification requirement may cast a vote under HAVA's provisional voting provisions. Additional information on provisional voting processes and challenges is presented in chapter 5. Election officials in 21 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported encountering no problems implementing the HAVA first-time voter ID requirement, and officials in some of these jurisdictions provided reasons why there were no problems.[Footnote 114] For example, election officials in 2 jurisdictions in Colorado told us that they did not encounter implementation problems because all voters, under state requirements, were required to show identification. Election officials in some other jurisdictions we visited reported that they took steps to inform voters of the new HAVA ID requirement for such voters registering by mail. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Ohio reported that they contacted about 300 prospective voters twice, either by phone or by letter, prior to the election to inform them that that they needed to show identification. Figure 27 illustrates a poster used in a jurisdiction we visited to inform prospective voters about the new identification requirements. Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform Prospective Voters of New Identification Requirements: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] HAVA Includes Provisions to Facilitate Voting for Individuals with Disabilities: HAVA contains provisions to help facilitate voting for individuals with disabilities,[Footnote 115] including requirements for the accessibility of voting systems used in elections for federal office, effective January 1, 2006. HAVA also authorized the appropriation of funding for payments to states to improve the accessibility of polling places. In October 2001, we issued a report that examined state and local provisions and practices for voting accessibility, both at polling places and with respect to alternative voting methods and accommodations.[Footnote 116] We reported in 2001 that all states and the District of Columbia had laws or other provisions concerning voting access for individuals with disabilities, but the extent and manner in which these provisions addressed accessibility varied from state to state. In addition, in our 2001 report we noted that various features of the polling places we visited had the potential to prove challenging for voters with certain types of disabilities. On the basis of our observations on Election Day 2000, we also estimated that most polling places in the contiguous United States had one or more physical features, such as a lack of accessible parking or barriers en route to the voting room, that had the potential to pose challenges for voters with disabilities.[Footnote 117] Results from our 2005 surveys show that at the time of the November 2004 general election, many states and local jurisdictions had taken steps to meet HAVA's requirement for accessible voting systems, as well as making other changes to help improve the accessibility of voting for individuals with disabilities. HAVA Requirements for Accessible Voting Systems: HAVA requires that, effective January 1, 2006, each voting system used in a federal election must meet certain accessibility requirements. These voting systems are required to provide individuals with disabilities with the same opportunity for access and participation (including independence and privacy) as for other voters. These HAVA requirements specify that such accessibility include nonvisual accessibility for voters who are blind or visually impaired. HAVA provides for the use of at least one DRE or other voting system equipped for voters with disabilities at each polling place. The results of our state survey show that as of August 1, 2005, 41 states and the District of Columbia reported having laws (or executive action) in place to provide each polling location with at least one DRE voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities by January 1, 2006. Of the remaining 9 states, 5 reported having plans to promulgate laws or executive action to provide each polling location with at least one DRE voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities, and 4 reported that they did not plan to provide such equipment or were uncertain about their plans.[Footnote 118] Some local election jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at polling places for the November 2004 general election. On the basis of our survey of a representative sample of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we estimate that 29 percent of all jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at each polling place in the November 2004 general election.[Footnote 119] Further, more large and medium jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines than small jurisdictions. We estimate that 39 percent of large jurisdictions, 38 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 25 percent of small jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at each polling place. The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. Election officials from some small jurisdictions who provided written comments on our survey questionnaire expressed concerns about how this requirement would be implemented in their jurisdictions and whether electronic voting machines were the best alternative. For example, one respondent wrote: "We [live] in a small town … and use paper ballots and that has worked very well in the past and I believe will work very well in the future. Voting machines should be decided on for much larger areas with a lot more than our 367 population with 150 voters." Another wrote: "We are a small rural township with about 160 voters. Our 2004 election went well; as usual, we had no problems. We use paper ballots. We have some concerns with the implementation of HAVA. We are being forced to use expensive voting machines that will require expensive programming for every election. We are concerned about these costs.… If our limited budget can't afford those expensive machines and programming, we may need to combine our township polling place with another township--maybe several townships. The additional driving to a different polling place miles away will discourage voters from voting--particularly our elderly residents. So these efforts (HAVA) to help voters will actually hinder voters." In an effort to address these issues, Vermont, which has about 250 small and medium election jurisdictions that use paper and optical scan ballots, took an alternative approach to meeting the HAVA requirement, according to an election official. Instead of providing one DRE machine for each of its 280 polling places, Vermont plans to implement a secure vote-by-phone system that allows voters to mark a paper ballot, in private, using a regular telephone at the polling place. According to the Vermont's Secretary of State's Office, a poll worker uses a designated phone at the polling place to call a computer system located at a secure location and access the appropriate ballot for the voter. The computer will only permit access to the system from phone numbers that have been entered into the system prior to the election, and only after the proper poll worker and ballot access numbers have been entered. The phone system reads the ballot to the voter, and after the voter makes selections using the telephone key pad, the system prints out a paper ballot that is automatically scanned by the system and played back to the voter for verification. The voter may then decide to cast the ballot or discard it and revote. The system does not use the Internet or other data network, and it produces a voter-verified paper ballot for every vote cast. In addition, according to an election official, voters are able to dial into a toll-free telephone number for at least 15 days prior to an election to listen to, preview, and practice with the actual ballot they will vote on Election Day. This is a way of providing a sample ballot to voters, as well as providing an opportunity for voters to become familiar with using the telephone system. Provisions for Polling Place Accessibility and Other Accommodations: For our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, our analysis included a review of state statutes, regulations, and written policies pertaining to voting accessibility for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as policies and guidelines for a statistical sample of 100 counties.[Footnote 120] As part of our 2005 surveys, we asked states to report on provisions concerning accessibility and local jurisdictions whether they provided accommodations or alternative voting methods for individuals with disabilities in the November 2004 general election. While the methodologies in the 2001 report and this report differ, results of our 2005 surveys show that states and local jurisdictions have taken actions to help improve voting for individuals with disabilities by, for example, using HAVA funds, taking steps to help ensure accessibility of polling places, and providing alternative voting methods or accommodations. Most states reported that they had spent or obligated HAVA funding to improve the accessibility of polling places, including providing physical or nonvisual access. The results of our state survey of election officials show that as of August 1, 2005, 46 states and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for this purpose. For instance, election officials in a local jurisdiction we visited in Colorado told us they had used HAVA funds to improve the accessibility of polling places by obtaining input from the disability community, surveying the accessibility of their polling places, and reviewing the DRE audio ballot with representatives of the blind community. States and local jurisdictions reported taking a variety of actions designed to help ensure that polling places are accessible for voters with disabilities, including specifying guidelines or requirements, inspecting polling places to assess accessibility, and reporting by local jurisdictions on polling place accessibility to the state. In our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, we noted that state involvement in ensuring polling places are accessible and the amount of assistance provided to local jurisdictions could vary widely. For example, in 2001 we reported that 29 states had provisions requiring inspections of polling places, and 20 states had provisions requiring reporting by local jurisdictions.[Footnote 121] According to our 2005 state survey, 43 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring or allowing inspections of polling places, and 39 states and the District of Columbia reported that they required or allowed reporting by local jurisdictions. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 83 percent of jurisdictions nationwide used state provisions to determine the accessibility requirements for polling places. During our site visits to local jurisdictions, we asked election officials to describe the steps they took to ensure that polling places were accessible. Election officials in many of the jurisdictions we visited told us that either local or state officials inspected each polling location in their jurisdiction using a checklist based on state or federal guidelines. For example, election officials in the 4 jurisdictions we visited in Georgia and New Hampshire told us that state inspectors conducted a survey of all polling locations. Election officials in the 2 jurisdictions we visited in Florida told us that they inspected all polling places using a survey developed by the state. Appendix IX presents additional information about state provisions for alternative voting methods and accommodations for the November 2000 and 2004 general elections. In addition to making efforts to ensure that polling places are accessible, some local jurisdictions provided alternative voting methods pursuant to state provisions (such as absentee voting) or accommodations at polling places (such as audio or visual aids) that could facilitate voting for individuals with disabilities. Table 15 presents results from our survey of local election jurisdictions about the estimated percentages of jurisdictions that provided alternative voting methods or accommodations to voters for the November 2004 general election. Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting Methods and Accommodations for the November 2004 General Election: Provision[A]: Early voting[ B]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 27; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 20; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 41; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 49[C]. Provision[A]: Absentee voting (no excuse or an allowable excuse); Percentage of all jurisdictions: 86; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 84; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 91; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 89. Provision[A]: Permanent absentee voting (for instance, absentee voting status for a time period or number of elections)[B]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 58; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 52[D]; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 74; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 68. Provision[A]: Curbside voting; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 55; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 55[D]; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 54; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 60. Provision[A]: Audio or visual aids to assist voters with disabilities (magnifying lens)[E]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 42; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 38[D]; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 50; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 57[C]. Provision[A]: Braille ballots or voting methods; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 15; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 15; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 16; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 10. Provision[A]: Large-font ballots or instructions; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 13; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 11; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 19; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 21. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] Some provisions, such as early voting, might not be provided by some jurisdictions because state provisions do not authorize them. Some provisions may not be applicable for the type of voting system a jurisdiction uses. [B] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-8 percentage points. [D] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-6 percentage points. [E] The difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. [End of table] HAVA Helped to Expand State and Local Jurisdictions' Voter Education Efforts: Election officials' efforts to educate citizens can help minimize problems that could affect citizens' ability to successfully vote on Election Day. Informing the public about key aspects of elections includes communicating how to register, what opportunities exist to vote prior to Election Day, where to vote on Election Day, and how to cast a ballot. This information can be distributed through a number of different media, including signs or posters, television, radio, publications, in-person demonstrations, and the Internet. In our October 2001 report on election processes, we stated that lack of funds was the primary challenge cited by election officials in expanding voter education efforts. From our 2001 survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimated that over a third of jurisdictions nationwide believed that the federal government should provide monetary assistance for voter education programs.[Footnote 122] Since the November 2000 election, changes in voter education efforts include HAVA requiring certain information to be posted at polling places and authorizing the payment of federal funds to states to use for educating voters, and states and local jurisdictions reported expansion of voter education efforts. HAVA Required Voter Information at Polling Places and Provided for Funding to States: To help improve voters' knowledge about voting rights and procedures, HAVA required election officials to post voting information at each polling place on the day of each election for federal office and authorized the payment of funding to states for such purposes. This required voting information includes a sample ballot, polling place hours, instructions on how to vote, first-time mail-in instructions, and general information on federal and state voting rights laws and laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. Results of our state survey of election officials show that as of August 1, 2005, 40 states and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for voting information, such as sample ballots and voter instructions, to be posted at polling places. Election officials in all 28 jurisdictions we visited told us they posted a variety of voter information signs at polling places on Election Day 2004. Figure 28 illustrates examples of some of these signs. Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] HAVA also authorized the payment of funding for voter education programs in general, and according to our state survey, as of August 1, 2005, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for these programs. For example, according to its HAVA plan, Florida required local election officials to provide descriptions of proposed voter education efforts, such as using print, radio, or television to advertise to voters, in order to receive state HAVA funds in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited in Florida provided us information about voter education campaigns that they implemented. Election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions reported designing election advertisements to be shown on movie theater screens in the beginning of the summer season; election officials in the other jurisdiction told us they implemented a "Get Out the Vote" television advertising campaign with a cable company intended to reach hundreds of thousands of households during the weeks prior to the November 2004 general election. Variety of Local Election Jurisdictions' Actions to Educate Prospective Voters: More local election jurisdictions appear to have taken steps to educate prospective voters prior to Election Day in 2004 than in 2000, and on the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, more large and medium jurisdictions took these steps than small jurisdictions. In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that local election jurisdictions provided a range of information to prospective voters through multiple media. For example, on the basis of our 2001 survey of local jurisdictions, we reported that between 18 and 20 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide indicated they placed public service ads on local media, performed community outreach programs, or put some voter information on the Internet. On the basis of our 2005 survey, we estimate that more jurisdictions provided these measures. For instance, we estimate that 49 percent of all jurisdictions placed public service ads on local media, and 43 percent of all jurisdictions listed polling places on the Internet. However, increases in the overall estimates from the 2001 and 2005 surveys are, in part, likely due to differences in the sample designs of the two surveys and how local election jurisdictions that were minor civil divisions (i.e., subcounty units of government) were selected. Because of these sample design differences, comparing only election jurisdictions that are counties provides a stronger basis for making direct comparisons between the two surveys' results.[Footnote 123] These county comparisons show increases as well. For instance, for the November 2000 election, we estimate that 21 percent of county election jurisdictions placed public service ads on local media, while for the November 2004 election, we estimate that 61 percent of county election jurisdictions placed such ads.[Footnote 124] In our 2005 survey, we also looked at whether there were differences between the size categories of jurisdictions, and generally, more large jurisdictions provided voter education prior to Election Day than medium and small jurisdictions. For instance, we estimate that 88 percent of large jurisdictions, 46 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 38 percent of small jurisdictions listed polling place locations on Internet Web sites. Table 16 presents estimated percentages of jurisdictions that provided various voter education steps prior to the November 2004 general election. Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter Education Prior to the November 2004 General Election: Step: Provided sample ballots, either by mail or by printing in newspaper; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 87; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 86; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 91; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 86. Step: Placed polling place locations on Internet Web site[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 43; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 38[B]; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 46; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 88. Step: Placed public service ads on local media, such as TV, radio, or newspapers[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 49; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 43[B]; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 62; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 63. Step: Conducted outreach with local organizations, such as political parties or charitable or social groups[D]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 26; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 16; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 43; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 76. Step: Mailed vote-casting instructions on using the jurisdiction's voting system to registered voters[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 12; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 11; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 9; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 28. Step: Demonstrations of voting equipment (at county fairs, registrar's office, public events)[D]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 28; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 21; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 41; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 61. Step: Provided information to voters about their specific polling place location[E]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 83; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 82; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 83; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 92. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] The differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically significant: [B] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-6 percentage points. [C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [D] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [E] The difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. [End of table] Large jurisdictions may have provided voter education through multiple media in order to reach a broader audience of prospective voters. For instance, Web sites were used to provide information to voters by nearly all large jurisdictions. On the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 93 percent of large jurisdictions, 60 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 39 percent of small jurisdictions had a Web site. The differences between all size categories are statistically significant. During our site visits, election officials in large jurisdictions described a variety of voter education mechanisms used to reach a number of prospective voters. For example, election officials in a large Nevada jurisdiction we visited told us that their office partnered with power, water, and cable companies to provide voter registration information in subscribers' billing statements. Election officials in other jurisdictions we visited reported using a variety of other media to encourage participation or provide information to a broad audience of prospective voters. For example, figure 29 illustrates a billboard, cab-top sign, and milk carton used in local jurisdictions we visited. Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for All Prospective Voters: Whether or not all voters should be required to show identification prior to voting is an issue that has received attention in the media and reports since the November 2000 general election. Recent state initiatives, such as those in Georgia, that in general require voters to provide photo identification, exemplify the challenge that exists throughout the election process in maintaining balance between ensuring access to all prospective voters and ensuring that only eligible citizens are permitted to cast a ballot on Election Day. Results of our state and local jurisdiction surveys show that while providing identification could be one of several methods used to verify identity, it was not required by the majority of states, nor was it the only way used to verify voters' identities in the majority of local jurisdictions for the November 2004 election. Voter identification requirements vary in flexibility, in the number and type of acceptable identification allowed, and in the alternatives available for verifying identity if a voter does not have an acceptable form of identification. Results of our state survey of election officials show that for the November 2004 general election 28 states reported that they did not require all prospective voters to provide identification prior to voting in person.[Footnote 125] Twenty-one states reported that they required all voters to provide identification prior to voting on Election Day 2004. However, 14 of these states reported allowing prospective voters without the required identification an alternative. In 9 of these 14 states the alternative involved voting a regular ballot in conjunction with, for example, the voter providing some type of affirmation as to his or her identity. For example, Connecticut, in general, allowed voters who were unable to provide required identification to swear on a form provided by the Secretary of State's Office that they are the elector whose name appears on the official registration list. Kentucky allowed an election officer to confirm the identity of a prospective voter by personal acquaintance or by certain types of documents if the prospective voter did not have the required identification. The other 5 states reporting that they offered an alternative did so through the use of a provisional ballot if a prospective voter did not have the required identification. For the November 2004 election, 5 of the 21 states that reported having identification requirements also had statutory provisions requiring, in general, that such identification include a photograph of the prospective voter.[Footnote 126] For the other 16 states that reported requiring identification, there was a range of acceptable forms of identification, including photo identification, such as a driver's license, and other documentation, such as a copy of a government check or current utility bill with a voter's name and address. Figure 30 presents information on the identification requirements for prospective voters for the November 2004 general election for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Figure 30: States' Reported Identification Requirements for Prospective Voters for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions about how they checked voters' identities, such as by asking voters to state their name and address, verifying voters' signatures, or asking voters to provide a form of identification or documentation. On the basis of this survey, we estimate that 65 percent of all local jurisdictions checked voters' identification as one way to verify their identities on Election Day. However, in an estimated 9 percent of all jurisdictions, providing identification was the only way voters could verify their identities. Since the November 2004 general election, several states have reported that they have considered establishing identification requirements for all prospective voters, and some reported that they have implemented requirements. Results of our state survey show that at the time of our survey, 9 states reported having either considered legislation (or executive action) or legislation (or executive action) was pending to require voters to show identification prior to voting on Election Day.[Footnote 127] Four states, at the time of our survey, reported having taken action since November 2004 to require that voters show identification for in-person Election Day voting. For example, changes in Arizona law and procedure emanating from a November 2004 ballot initiative were finalized in 2005 after receiving approval from the Department of Justice. These Arizona changes require voters to present, prior to voting, one form of identification with the voter's name, address, and photo, or two different forms of identification that have the name and address of the voter. Indiana enacted legislation in 2005 requiring, in general, that voters provide a federal-or state-of- Indiana-issued identification document with the voter's name and photo prior to voting, whereas 2005 legislation in New Mexico and Washington imposed identification requirements but allowed prospective voters to provide one of several forms of photo or nonphoto forms of identification. In all four states, if voters are not able to provide a required form of identification, they are allowed to cast a provisional, rather than a regular, ballot. Finally, a state that had identification requirements in place for the November 2004 general election may have taken additional actions to amend such requirements. Georgia, for instance, required voters in the November 2004 general election to provide 1 of 17 types of photo or nonphoto identification. In 2005 Georgia enacted legislation that, in general, amended and reduced the various forms of acceptable identification and made the presentation of a form of photo identification, such as a driver's license, a requirement to vote.[Footnote 128] Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll Workers Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Having enough qualified poll workers to set up, open, and work at the polls on Election Day is a crucial step in ensuring that voters are able to successfully vote on Election Day. The number of poll workers needed varies across jurisdictions, and election officials recruit poll workers in a variety of ways using different sources and strategies. Some poll workers are elected, some are appointed by political parties, and some are volunteers. Election officials in jurisdictions we visited reported considering several different factors--such as state requirements, registered voters per precinct, historical turnout, or poll worker functions at polling places--to determine the total number of poll workers needed. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that recruiting enough poll workers for the November 2004 general election was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. However, large and medium jurisdictions encountered difficulties to a greater extent than small jurisdictions. To meet their need, election officials recruited poll workers from numerous sources, including in some cases, high schools and local government agencies, to help ensure that they were able to obtain enough poll workers for Election Day. Poll workers with specialized characteristics or skills were also difficult for some large and medium jurisdictions to find. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported that finding qualified poll workers could be complicated by having a limited pool of volunteers willing to work long hours for low pay. Poll worker reliability continued to be a challenge for some jurisdictions- -especially large jurisdictions--that depend on poll workers to arrive at polling places on time on Election Day. Recruiting Enough Poll Workers Was Not Difficult for the Majority of Jurisdictions, but Many Large and Medium Jurisdictions Encountered Difficulties: We estimate that recruiting enough poll workers for the November 2004 general election was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions, and may have been less of a challenge for the November 2004 election than it was for the November 2000 election. For example, on the basis of our 2001 survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 51 percent of county election jurisdictions found it somewhat or very difficult to find a sufficient number of poll workers for the November 2000 election.[Footnote 129] In contrast, from our 2005 survey, we estimate that 36 percent of county election jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining enough poll workers for the November 2004 election. In our 2005 survey, there are differences between size categories of election jurisdictions in the difficulties encountered obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers, with more large and medium jurisdictions encountering difficulties than small jurisdictions. As shown in figure 31, we estimate that 47 percent of large jurisdictions, 32 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 14 percent of small jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers. Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [B] The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant. [C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [D] Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of reasons, including that poll workers are not recruited, but elected or appointed; that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; or that the election officials themselves serve as poll workers. [E] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [End of figure] Election officials in large and medium jurisdictions, with typically more polling places to staff, are generally responsible for obtaining more poll workers than officials in small jurisdictions. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois told us that recruiting enough poll workers for Election Day was always a challenge and November 2004 was no different. They said that state law specifies a minimum of 5 poll workers per precinct, and there were 2,709 precincts in their jurisdiction for the November 2004 general election, requiring at least 13,545 poll workers. In contrast, election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire told us that they never had difficulties finding poll workers because they were able to use a pool of volunteers to staff the 9 poll worker positions at their one polling place. While election officials in 10 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions we visited told us they had difficulties recruiting the needed number of poll workers, election officials in the other 17 jurisdictions did not report difficulties. These officials provided a variety of reasons why they did not encounter difficulties, including having a set number of appointed or elected poll workers for each precinct, having a general public interest in being involved in a presidential election, and using a variety of strategies and sources to recruit poll workers. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in New Mexico told us that their lack of problems with recruitment was due to the fact that they had a full-time poll worker coordinator who began the search for poll workers very early and, as a result, was able to fill all of the positions needed (about 2,400) for the November 2004 election. Election officials in other large jurisdictions reported that they were able to obtain enough poll workers by relying on multiple sources. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas told us that they made an exhaustive effort to recruit about 1,800 poll workers for the November 2004 general election that included soliciting from an existing list of poll workers, working with organizations, using a high school student program to obtain about 300 student poll workers, recruiting from a community college, using county employees, and coordinating with the political parties. On our nationwide survey we asked local jurisdictions about the sources they used to recruit poll workers for the November 2004 general election, and table 17 presents estimates from this survey on a variety of sources that jurisdictions used. Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: Source: Lists or rosters of poll workers from past elections[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 89; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 86; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 96; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 98. Source: Referrals from poll workers[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 62; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 48[B]; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 92; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 97. Source: Political parties[A]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 48; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 36[B]; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 72; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 82. Source: High schools[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 21; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 13; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 36; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 59[D]. Source: Colleges[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 11; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 4; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 18; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 64[D]. Source: Public announcements or information posted on jurisdiction's Web site[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 18; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 9; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 31; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 77. Source: City/county government offices[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 18; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 12; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 25; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 65[D]. Source: Local school districts[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 10; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 5; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 17; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 43[D]. Source: Civic, cultural, or religious organizations[C]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 10; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 3; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 21; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 63[D]. Source: Private firms[E]; Percentage of all jurisdictions: 2; Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 0; Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 2; Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 24[F]. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. [A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [B] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-6 percentage points. [C] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [D] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-8 percentage points. [E] The differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [F] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 and - 7 percentage points. [End of table] In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified several recruiting strategies that election officials reported helped in their efforts to obtain enough poll workers.[Footnote 130] On the basis of our local jurisdictions survey, student poll workers and county or city employees were used as sources for poll workers by many medium and large jurisdictions in the November 2004 general election, as shown in table 17. These two sources were also cited as having worked well by election officials in several of the jurisdictions we visited. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado told us that their high school student poll worker programs helped them to obtain a sufficient number of skilled poll workers and reported that 200 of their about 600 poll workers were high school students. Election officials in other jurisdictions we visited reported that high school students often helped them in obtaining enough poll workers with specialized skills or characteristics, such as needed language skills. According to our state survey, 38 states and the District of Columbia reported allowing poll workers to be under the age of 18. Local government offices were another source of poll workers for the November 2004 general election. As shown in table 17, we estimate that 65 percent of large jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 12 percent of small jurisdictions recruited poll workers from city or county government offices. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that the chief poll worker at most of the jurisdiction's 329 polling places is a county employee, and described benefits of recruiting local government employees as poll workers, including their experience in dealing with the public. According to Our Nationwide Survey, Poll Workers with Specialized Skills Were Difficult to Find for Some Jurisdictions: The specific skills and requirements needed for poll workers varies by jurisdiction, and in some cases by precinct, but can include political party affiliation, specific technical or computer skills, or proficiency in languages other than English. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that most jurisdictions nationwide did not encounter difficulties recruiting poll workers with these specific skills and requirements. However, the results show that the ease of obtaining poll workers with these skills varied by the size of the election jurisdiction, with large and medium jurisdictions generally experiencing more difficulties than small jurisdictions. Some states require political balance between poll workers at polling places. For example, New York election law, which requires that each election district must be staffed with four election inspectors (i.e., chief poll workers) and a variable number of poll workers (depending upon specified conditions), requires that appointments to such positions for each election district be equally divided between the major political parties. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that even though not required, they tried to maintain a balance in poll workers' political party affiliation. Recruiting enough poll workers with specific political party affiliations continued to be a challenge for some, in particular large and medium jurisdictions. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 49 percent of large jurisdictions, 41 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 22 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties recruiting enough Democratic or Republican poll workers, as shown in figure 32. Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Enough Poll Workers with Specific Political Party Affiliation for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [B] The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant. [C] Not all local jurisdictions are required to obtain poll workers with specific party affiliations. [D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [End of figure] Election officials in 11 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported experiencing some difficulties finding enough poll workers with needed party affiliations. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Connecticut told us that because their jurisdiction was predominantly one political party it was difficult to find minority party poll workers. Election officials in these 11 jurisdictions told us that they recruited independents, unaffiliated persons, or student poll workers to fill minority party poll worker positions. Recruiting poll workers with necessary information technology skills or computer literacy was also a challenge for some large and medium jurisdictions, according to our survey of local jurisdictions. We estimate that 34 percent of large jurisdictions and 28 percent of medium jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to obtain poll workers with these skills, whereas, we estimate that 5 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties, as shown in figure 33. Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Poll Workers with Information Technology Skills or Computer Literacy for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [B] The difference between small and large jurisdictions is statistically significant. [C] Jurisdictions may not need to recruit poll workers with technical or computer skills because they, among other reasons, use paper or mechanical voting systems, use paper poll books, or specifically train poll workers for any skills needed in these areas. [D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 percentage points. [End of figure] Election officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that computer or technically skilled poll workers were not needed in their jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. However, election officials in some of these jurisdictions reported that they foresaw a need for poll workers with these skills with the implementation of electronic poll books or new voting technology. Among the reasons cited for not needing technically skilled poll workers were the use of paper ballots or lever machines, the ease of use of DRE voting equipment, and that any needed skills were taught. In addition, election officials in many jurisdictions we visited told us that they recruited and trained technicians or troubleshooters to maintain, repair, and in some cases set up voting equipment prior to Election Day. Some jurisdictions may be required under the language minority provisions of the Voting Rights Act to, in general, provide voting assistance and materials in specified minority languages in addition to English. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions whether jurisdictions encountered difficulties recruiting poll workers who were fluent in the languages covered under the Voting Rights Act for their jurisdiction and estimate that for the majority (61 percent) of all jurisdictions, this requirement was not applicable. We estimate that 15 percent of all jurisdictions indicated that recruiting poll workers fluent in languages other than English was difficult or very difficult.[Footnote 131] Jurisdictions of all size categories may encounter difficulties recruiting poll workers with needed language skills for different reasons. For instance, small jurisdictions may find it difficult to recruit enough poll workers fluent in other languages because of a limited pool of potential recruits, whereas large jurisdictions may be required to provide voters with assistance in multiple languages other than English. Los Angeles County, for example, was required to provide voters assistance in six languages other than English for the November 2004 election. Election officials in some of the large jurisdictions we visited reported encountering difficulties obtaining poll workers with needed language skills, but these officials also told us about their efforts to recruit poll workers with language skills. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Illinois reported that they recently established an outreach department to assist in the recruitment of poll workers with specialized language skills. The jurisdiction has hired outreach coordinators for the Hispanic, Polish, and Chinese communities to assist with recruiting. Figure 34 illustrates materials used by election officials in some jurisdictions we visited to recruit poll workers with a variety of skills for the November 2004 general election. Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions We Visited: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Described Factors That Affected Recruiting Poll Workers: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified long hours, low pay, and an aging volunteer workforce as factors that complicated election officials' efforts to recruit enough poll workers.[Footnote 132] Election officials in some, but not all, of the jurisdictions we visited in 2005 told us that one or more of these factors complicated their efforts to find enough quality poll workers for the November 2004 general election. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that it was difficult to find people who wanted to work, considering that most families are two- income households and Election Day is a long--14 hours--grueling day. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Washington told us that they never have enough poll workers, noting that the pay is minimal, the hours are long, and the majority of the poll worker population is elderly. Election officials in several of these jurisdictions we visited reported concerns about finding poll workers in light of a limited pool of volunteers. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Colorado told us the average age of poll workers was over 70 years old and expressed concerns about obtaining poll workers who could physically work a 12-hour day. Alternatively, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Florida told us that the younger generation does not have the same commitment to civic duty that the older poll worker generation had and recruiting enough qualified poll workers may be a challenge in the future. These officials noted that about three-quarters of their poll workers are return participants. An election official in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, where the median age of poll workers is about 75 years old, suggested that serving as a poll worker should be treated similarly as serving on jury duty--it should be everyone's civic duty to serve as a poll worker. Poll Worker Reliability Continued to Be a Challenge, Especially in Large Jurisdictions: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that poll worker reliability was a challenge for election officials, who depended on poll workers to arrive on time, open, and set up polling places.[Footnote 133] Poll worker absenteeism was a challenge for large and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions in the November 2004 general election. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 61 percent of large jurisdictions, 20 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 2 percent of small jurisdictions encountered problems with poll workers failing to show up on Election Day. The differences between all size categories are statistically significant. One way that election officials in several large jurisdictions we visited minimized the impact of poll worker absenteeism was to recruit backup poll workers to ensure that polling places were set up and adequately staffed, even if some poll workers failed to show up. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois reported that approximately 1 to 2 percent of about 13,000 poll workers did not show up on Election Day. However, these officials reported that they had recruited stand-by judges who were to report to the elections office on Election Day in case an already scheduled judge did not show up. Election officials in a few other jurisdictions we visited told us that they called poll workers before Election Day to help ensure they showed up. For instance, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania told us that they called all of the chief poll workers--about 1,300 people--during the week prior to the election. Election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in Connecticut went a step further, reporting that in addition to placing wake-up calls to all of the chief poll workers, they offered rides to poll workers to help ensure they showed up on time. Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on Challenges Training Poll Workers: Voters' experiences on Election Day are largely informed by their interactions with poll workers, who are responsible for conducting many Election Day activities, such as setting up polling places, checking in voters and verifying their eligibility to vote, providing assistance to voters, and closing the polling places. Although these workers are usually employed only for 1 day, the success of election administration partly depends on their ability to perform their jobs well. Depending on the applicable state requirements and the size of the jurisdiction, the steps that election officials take to adequately prepare all of their poll workers can vary, but may include training, testing, or certification. Ensuring that poll workers were adequately trained for Election Day was a challenge reported by some election officials in large and medium jurisdictions we visited, but these officials also reported a variety of steps they took to help prepare poll workers for Election Day. State Requirements for Training Poll Workers Varied: Most states and the District of Columbia reported having training requirements for poll workers for the November 2004 general election, but the frequency and content of training varied. Some states also reported providing guidance related to the training of poll workers. According to our state survey, for the November 2004 general election, 18 states reported having had poll worker training requirements and providing guidance; 20 states and the District of Columbia reported having had training requirements; 9 states reported providing guidance; 1 state reported that it did not require training nor provide guidance; and Oregon, which conducted all-mail voting on Election Day 2004, indicated this requirement was not applicable.[Footnote 134] Figure 35 shows reported state requirements for training for the chief poll worker at a precinct or polling place and for poll workers. Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] Includes the District of Columbia. [B] The total does not add to 50 because 2 states indicated that this requirement was not applicable--1 of which was Oregon, which conducted all-mail voting on Election Day 2004. [C] The total does not add to 50 because 1 state did not respond to this question on our survey and Oregon indicated this requirement was not applicable. [End of figure] About half of the states with training requirements reported requiring that poll workers be trained prior to every election or every general election. According to our survey, of the 38 states and the District of Columbia that reported having training requirements for poll workers, 22 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring poll workers to be trained prior to every election or every general election. For example, Florida provisions in place for the November 2004 general election required that poll workers have a minimum of 3 hours of training prior to each election and demonstrate a working knowledge of the laws and procedures relating to voter registration, voting system operation, balloting, and polling place procedures, and problem-solving and conflict resolution skills. These Florida provisions also require, among other things, that local election officials are to contract with a "recognized disability-related organization" to develop and assist with training for disability sensitivity programs, which must include actual demonstrations of obstacles confronted by persons with disabilities during the voting process, including obtaining access to the polling place and using the voting system. Ten states reported requiring that poll workers be trained on a scheduled basis (e.g., yearly or every 2 years). For example, under provisions in place for the November 2004 general election, New Jersey required that all district board members attend training sessions for each election at least once every 2 years. The other 6 states reported that training was required at least once, but not prior to every general election; that the frequency of training was not specified; or that they did not know. For the November 2004 general election, fewer states reported requiring testing or certification than training for poll workers. According to our state survey, 12 states reported having requirements for testing or certification for poll workers, and 16 states reported having these requirements for the chief poll worker at a precinct or polling place. Election officials in 6 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that poll workers were certified or tested after training. Election officials in 6 other jurisdictions told us that they used informal tests or quizzes or informally monitored poll workers performance in training. For instance, election officials in a jurisdiction in Kansas told us that they gave poll workers a nongraded quiz at the end of training. In Nevada, where state election officials indicated in our state survey that there are no requirements for poll worker training or testing, election officials in the 2 jurisdictions we visited told us that they required poll workers to attend training. Election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions required all poll workers to attend a training class each year and to pass a hands-on performance test in which they demonstrate their ability to perform their assigned function, such as checking in voters or programming the DRE voting equipment. Election Officials Reported on Training Conducted and Challenges Encountered: Training provided to poll workers varies greatly among local election jurisdictions. Therefore, we asked questions about training challenges as part of our site visits only where we were able to gain an understanding of the types of training and specific conditions faced by local jurisdictions. Election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire reported that they did not conduct training for the November 2004 general election because poll workers only receive training if they have not previously worked in the polling place, and all nine poll workers had worked in the polling place before. Election officials in the 27 other jurisdictions we visited described the training that they provided poll workers for the November 2004 general election. According to these officials, poll worker training generally occurred in the weeks or month before the election and ranged from 1 hour to 2 days, depending on the type of poll worker being trained. Election officials in most of these jurisdictions reported that training was mandatory. However, the frequency varied, with election officials in the majority of jurisdictions reporting that they required training prior to every election. Election officials in a few jurisdictions reported that poll workers received training at least once or on a scheduled basis, such as once every 2 years. Election officials in many jurisdictions told us that poll workers were paid to attend training, and payments could range from $5 to $50. While election officials in nearly all of these jurisdictions reported that training was conducted by these officials and their staffs, the manner in which the training was conducted varied. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll workers were trained in a workshop fashion in which 15 to 20 poll workers were provided hands-on training for their specific function, such as operating voting machines or processing voters. In a large jurisdiction in Kansas, election officials told us that they conduct the training for between 70 and 100 poll workers using a formal presentation as well as the documents poll workers use on Election Day and the voting equipment. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Washington told us that poll worker training consisted of a PowerPoint presentation conducted in a train-the-trainer style where election officials trained the chief poll workers, who then trained the poll workers. Election officials in 9 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions we visited reported encountering some challenges with training poll workers, but generally reported that they overcame them. Some of the challenges reported by these officials included keeping poll workers informed about new or changing requirements, conveying a vast amount of information about election processes to a large number of people in a limited time, and ensuring that poll workers understand their tasks and responsibilities. For instance, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Ohio told us that it was challenging keeping up with state changes and incorporating such changes into poll worker training. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Connecticut told us that effectively training poll workers on a variety of new changes (such as those required by HAVA) could be challenging because the procedures can be difficult to understand, especially for tenured poll workers who have been working at the polls for many years. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas noted that addressing the need to have a systematic way to evaluate poll worker performance at polling places was a challenge. These officials said that they currently rely on the fact that the poll worker showed up, general observations of the poll workers' performance, and feedback cards completed by voters exiting the polls. Election officials in the jurisdictions we visited reported taking steps to address these challenges, such as providing poll workers training manuals or booklets for reference on Election Day, training poll workers to perform one function, and conducting training in a workshop fashion with smaller class sizes. Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions: Election officials and poll workers perform many tasks throughout the day to ensure that elections run smoothly and that voters move efficiently through the polling place. These activities can include checking in voters, providing instructions for voting machine operation, or assisting voters at the polls. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions whether for the November 2004 general election jurisdictions encountered poll workers failing to follow procedures for a variety of activities, including, among others, procedures for voter identification requirements, providing correct instructions to voters, and voting machine operation. Overall, according to this survey, most local election jurisdictions nationwide did not encounter problems with poll worker performance. For example, we estimate that: * 90 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to follow procedures related to voter identification requirements, * 92 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to provide correct instructions to voters, and: * 94 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to follow procedures for voting machine operation. However, we estimate that poll worker performance problems encountered varied by size category of jurisdiction, with more large jurisdictions encountering problems than medium and small jurisdictions. For example, we estimate that 37 percent of large jurisdictions, 19 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 3 percent of small jurisdictions encountered problems with poll workers failing to follow procedures related to voter identification requirements. In terms of providing correct instructions to voters, we estimate that 31 percent of large jurisdictions, 12 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions encountered problems with poll worker performance in this area. For both results, the differences between all size categories are statistically significant. Large jurisdictions could have encountered problems for a variety of reasons, including having more poll workers to train and oversee or having fewer options for recruiting skilled poll workers. While jurisdictions may have reported on our survey that they encountered problems with a particular aspect of poll workers' performance, written comments provided on the questionnaire indicated that these problems may not have been widespread or may have been easily remedied after they occurred. For example, one survey respondent wrote: "Errors were few and far between, but with 4,500 poll workers, it is very difficult to answer that [our jurisdiction did not encounter any problems with poll workers' performance.]" Election officials in 12 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that they encountered some problems with poll workers' performance, but that generally the majority of poll workers performed well. For example, an election official in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania we visited told us that while the jurisdiction did not encounter serious problems with performance, in the official's opinion, it would be disingenuous to report that there were no problems with the 6,500 poll workers working the polls on Election Day. Most Jurisdictions Provided Guidance at Polling Places to Help Poll Workers: In an effort to minimize poll worker confusion or performance problems, many jurisdictions provided written guidelines or instructions for poll workers to use at the polling place. On our nationwide survey we asked local jurisdictions whether or not for the November 2004 general election they had written guidelines or instructions at the polling place for poll workers covering a variety of topics, such as voting equipment operation; procedures related to verifying voters' eligibility to vote; and assisting voters with special needs, such as voters with disabilities or who spoke a language other than English. We estimate that 94 percent of all jurisdictions had at least one set of written guidelines at polling places for poll workers. Further, more large and medium jurisdictions provided instructions to poll workers than small jurisdictions. For example, we estimate that 99 percent of large jurisdictions, 96 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 80 percent of small jurisdictions provided written instructions for poll workers to use at polling places if a voter's name was not on the poll list. In addition, we estimate that 96 percent of large jurisdictions, 92 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 71 percent of small jurisdictions provided written guidelines to use at the polls for identification requirements for first-time voters who registered by mail and did not provide identification with their registration. For both of these results, small jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and large jurisdictions. During our site visits, election officials in 26 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that they provided written instructions or checklists for poll workers to have at polling places. Election officials in the 2 smallest population size jurisdictions we visited reported that they did not provide written instructions for poll workers. As the officials in a small jurisdiction in New Hampshire said, they are at the polling place to resolve issues personally as they arise. Figure 36 illustrates examples of some checklists that election officials in jurisdictions we visited provided to us. Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Written instructions and checklists may help poll workers, but problems on Election Day can still be encountered with some issues, in particular issues related to voter registration. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions whether for the November 2004 general election jurisdictions maintained a written record to keep track of issues or problems that occurred on Election Day. We estimate that 55 percent of all jurisdictions nationwide maintained a written record to keep track of issues. Of those that did maintain a record and provided written comments on our survey, the issues most frequently cited by election officials were problems with voter registration (e.g., not being registered, being registered at another polling location, or being in the wrong polling location). Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued to Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: Election officials are responsible for selecting and securing a sufficient number of polling places that meet basic requirements and standards. Polling place locations vary across jurisdictions but can include public and private facilities, such as schools, government buildings, fire departments, community centers, libraries, churches, and residential facilities. To meet the needs of the voting population, polling places should be easily accessible to all voters, including voters with disabilities. Polling places also need to have a basic infrastructure, including electricity, heating and cooling units, and communication lines, to support some voting machines and be comfortable for voters and poll workers. In our October 2001 report on election processes, we stated that obtaining polling places for the November 2000 election was not a major challenge for most jurisdictions.[Footnote 135] On the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, obtaining a sufficient number of polling places was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. However, finding polling places that met these standards was generally more difficult for large and medium jurisdictions than for small jurisdictions. Election officials in many jurisdictions reported combining precincts in one polling place, with minimal challenges, for the November 2004 general election. Finding a Sufficient Number of Polling Places Was Difficult for Some, but Not Most, Jurisdictions: For the November 2004 election, obtaining a sufficient number of polling places was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 3 percent of all jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of polling places for the November 2004 general election. However, the difficulty encountered in finding enough polling places varied by the size category of jurisdiction. We estimate that 14 percent of large jurisdictions, 8 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining enough polling places, as presented in figure 37. Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [B] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [C] All size categories are statistically different from each other. [D] Jurisdictions may indicate not applicable if they do not use polling places on Election Day because of all mail balloting, or because only one polling location is used on Election Day. [End of figure] Small jurisdictions may not experience difficulties obtaining polling places for a variety of reasons, among them because they do not have to find as many locations to support an election as large jurisdictions do. For example, election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire told us that because of the small voting population (about 1,200), they only needed to use one polling place--the town hall--for the November 2004 general election, as shown in figure 38. Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In contrast, large jurisdictions could be responsible for selecting hundreds of polling places for Election Day. Election officials from a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois reported that they used over 1,800 polling places for the November 2004 election and hired staff to find polling places that met standards for their jurisdiction. Although election officials in some large and medium jurisdictions told us that they needed to find numerous polling places, officials in only 1 large jurisdiction we visited in Kansas told us that they encountered difficulties finding suitable polling places, in part because of low payments provided to use polling place facilities. Election officials in this jurisdiction reported that in 2003 they implemented a campaign to "recruit" polling places and sent letters to schools and other possible locations in addition to conducting site visits and inspections. These election officials reported that after their efforts, they added about 70 polling places for use on Election Day 2004. Finding Accessible Polling Places and Polling Places with Parking and Phone Lines Was Difficult for Some Jurisdictions: Selecting accessible polling places includes assessing parking areas, routes of travel, exterior walkways, and entrances, as well as interior voting areas. In our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, we identified a variety of challenges faced by election officials in improving the accessibility of voting--including the limited availability of accessible buildings and the lack of authority to modify buildings to make them more accessible.[Footnote 136] Finding accessible polling places continued to be a challenge for some jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 36 percent of large jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 5 percent of small jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to find enough accessible polling places, as shown in figure 39. Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Were Accessible to Voters with Disabilities for November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] [A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. [B] All size categories are statistically different from one another. [C] Jurisdictions may indicate not applicable if they do not use polling places on Election Day because of all mail balloting, or because only one polling location is used on Election Day. [End of figure] Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that they encountered challenges finding accessible polling places. For example, election officials in 2 large jurisdictions we visited reported that it was challenging to find polling places that were accessible because many of the public buildings in their jurisdiction were older facilities and were not compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). However, election officials reported taking steps to help ensure that polling places were accessible. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Georgia reported that they hired a private company to conduct surveys of the polling locations and determine whether they were accessible and what, if any, changes needed to be made to make the facilities compliant. Some election officials described making minor or temporary modifications to polling places to ensure that they were accessible, for example, by adding ramps, using doorstops for heavier doors, or clearly identifying accessible entrances. In addition to being accessible for all voters, polling places should have sufficient parking for voters and phone lines to provide for communication on Election Day. From our local jurisdiction survey, more large and medium jurisdictions encountered difficulties in finding polling places with these characteristics than small jurisdictions. On the basis of this survey, we estimate that 38 percent of large jurisdictions, 18 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 4 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining polling places with adequate parking. The differences between all size categories are statistically significant. In terms of finding polling places with adequate phone lines, we estimate that 35 percent of large jurisdictions, 33 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 9 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining polling places with adequate phone lines. Providing cell phones to poll workers was one way for some jurisdictions to help ensure communication between polling places and the election office on Election Day. Also on the basis of our survey, we estimate that cell phones provided by the jurisdiction were the primary means of communication for 29 percent (plus or minus 9 percent) of large jurisdictions, 15 percent (+9 percent, -6 percent) of medium jurisdictions, and 3 percent of small jurisdictions.[Footnote 137] For both of these results, the differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. Election officials in some large jurisdictions we visited included cell phones as part of the supplies provided to each polling place. For example, officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in Nevada told us they paid poll workers $5 to use their own cell phones. Combining Precincts at a Polling Location Continues to Be a Strategy to Address Challenges with Obtaining Polling Places: We identified several strategies in our October 2001 report on election processes that election officials said helped in their efforts to obtain enough polling places, including locating more than one precinct at a single polling place.[Footnote 138] Results of our 2005 state and local surveys and site visits show that combining precincts at a polling location continued to be a strategy used by local jurisdictions, predominantly large and medium jurisdictions, to find adequate polling locations for voters in all precincts. According to our state survey, nearly all states (47) reported that they allowed precincts to be colocated in a polling place for the November 2004 general election.Ten states reported allowing colocation only under specified conditions, for instance, if no suitable polling place existed for a precinct, and 37 states reported allowing colocation but did not specify conditions. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 33 percent of all jurisdictions had multiple precincts located in the same polling place. However, more large and medium jurisdictions combined precincts than small jurisdictions. We estimate that 78 percent of large jurisdictions, 63 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 19 percent of small jurisdictions had multiple precincts located in the same polling location. The differences between all size categories are statistically significant. During our site visits, election officials in 22 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that they combined precincts in the same polling location for the November 2004 general election. Included in the 6 jurisdictions that did not report combining precincts in a single polling place were the 1 small and 2 medium jurisdictions we visited. Further, in many of the large jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that most of their polling places had more than one precinct. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Ohio told us that there was an average of three precincts per polling location, but that there could be up to nine precincts in one polling place. Although combining precincts may help solve the issue of obtaining a sufficient number of voting places that meet requirements, other challenges may surface, including voter confusion in not finding the correct precinct at a location, poll worker confusion about eligibility if a voter is not in the correct precinct poll book at a polling place, and the possibility of voters voting on the wrong voting machine for their precinct. However, on the basis of our local survey, few challenges were encountered in polling places where precincts were combined for the November 2004 general election. We estimate that of the 33 percent of jurisdictions with multiple precincts at a polling location, 85 percent (+6 percent, -5 percent) did not experience challenges in terms of voters locating their correct precinct.[Footnote 139] Election officials in jurisdictions we visited described steps they took to help ensure that voters were able to easily find their correct precinct, including posting signage to direct voters to the correct precinct, using specially designated poll workers as greeters to direct voters as they entered the polling location, setting up separate tables or voting areas for each precinct, and locating the precincts in distinct areas of the building, for example, in the gym and cafeteria of a school building. Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited told us that they consolidated functions, such as the check-in table or voting equipment, for precincts located in the same polling location in order to avoid voter confusion or problems with voting. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Kansas reported that they used one registration table with a consolidated poll book for all precincts at a polling location. As a result, voters only needed to locate one table. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada reported that once voters checked in, they were able to vote on any voting machine in the polling location because the machines were programmed with ballots from each of the precincts located at the polling place, and poll workers activated the particular ballot style for a particular voter. Beyond consolidating some functions at a polling place, in 2004 Colorado authorized the use of "vote centers," which are polling places at which any registered voter in the local election jurisdiction may vote, regardless of the precinct in which the voter resides. Each vote center is to use a secure electronic connection to a computerized registration list maintained by the local election office to allow all voting information processed at any vote center to be immediately accessible to computers at all other vote centers in the jurisdiction. Larimer County, with 143 precincts and about 200,000 registered voters, reported using 31 vote centers for the November 2004 general election. Election officials in Larimer County described several benefits of vote centers, including voter convenience; cost-effectiveness; minimal voter wait time on Election Day; and overall easier management, including requiring fewer poll workers. Election officials told us that voters liked the convenience of being able to vote anywhere in the jurisdiction, regardless of the precinct they live in. Vote centers can also be cost-effective, according to election officials, for jurisdictions faced with replacing voting equipment to comply with HAVA accessibility requirements for voting systems used in federal elections. Using vote centers also reduces the number of polling places a jurisdiction needs, which can be cost-effective with respect to finding enough accessible polling places. Election officials also told us that on Election Day they were able to avoid having long lines at most vote centers by issuing media announcements to voters throughout the day specifying which vote centers were busy and which were not, and by using their electronic poll book technology to process voters quickly and to monitor ballots and supplies. Officials told us that on average there was a 15-minute wait time for voters. Finally, officials told us that from the perspective of election officials, vote centers facilitated aspects of election administration because there were fewer locations (about 30 instead of about 140) and fewer poll workers overall to recruit and train. While other jurisdictions in Colorado have used vote centers since the November 2004 election or are planning to pilot vote centers in elections in 2006, election officials in a second jurisdiction we visited in Colorado explained why their jurisdiction opted to not use vote centers.[Footnote 140] Officials told us that their jurisdiction assessed the feasibility of implementing vote centers and concluded that despite several advantages offered by vote centers, the cost of implementation was prohibitive. For example, election officials identified costs including the connectivity for the electronic poll books, so that voters can be credited with voting in real time; potential rental costs for facilities, such as hotels, to house vote centers; and the expense of purchasing additional voting equipment. Because a voter in a jurisdiction using vote centers can vote at any vote center, each vote center needs to be stocked with all applicable ballot styles for an election or have DRE voting machines capable of being programmed with all applicable ballot styles, according to election officials. For the November 2004 general election, these officials told us that they used optical scan for absentee and Election Day voting and DREs for early voting. To avoid the cost and confusion of having to print and keep track of ballot styles for their 378 precincts--compared to Larimer County's 143 precincts--election officials said that they would need to purchase additional DRE voting machines if they were to implement vote centers. Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge: Election officials are responsible for designing ballots that meet various state requirements, possibly federal requirements under the minority language provisions of the Voting Rights Act relating to offering voting materials in specified minority languages in addition to English, and the requirements of the particular voting equipment, and these ballots must be easy for voters to understand. Ballot design generally involves both state and local participation. Most states (46 states and the District of Columbia) were involved in ballot design for the November 2004 general election. For instance, according to our state survey, 17 states and the District of Columbia reported designing ballots for local jurisdictions, 3 states reported requiring approval of the ballot design, and 26 states reported having requirements for local jurisdictions regarding ballot design (e.g., layout, candidate order, or paper stock).[Footnote 141] Specifically, election officials must determine all races, candidates, and issues that voters in each precinct in a jurisdiction will vote on and construct layouts for these races and issues for the particular types of ballots used with their election equipment. Figure 40 illustrates an optical scan ballot used in El Paso County, Colorado, for the November 2004 general election. Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that despite the controversy over the "butterfly ballot" and other ballot problems in the aftermath of Florida's 2000 general election, very few jurisdictions nationwide thought that confusing ballot design was a major problem.[Footnote 142] Ballot design problems were not highlighted by voters as a problem in the November 2004 election; therefore, we did not inquire about the extent of ballot design problems in our local survey of jurisdictions. However, we asked about ballot design processes and problems during our visits to local election jurisdictions. Election officials in all of the jurisdictions we visited reported that they did not encounter voter problems with confusing ballot designs for the November 2004 general election. However, election officials in 7 jurisdictions we visited told us that designing easily understood ballots that meet the particular constraints of the voting equipment can be challenging when there are a large number of races or issues to include on the ballot. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in Colorado that used optical scan ballots told us that fitting all of the races and questions on the ballot is always challenging, but they managed to do so by limiting the number of words on ballot questions and using small fonts. These officials noted that they provided magnifying glasses at polling places to assist voters. Election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in Florida reported that they had to use oversized optical scan ballots to accommodate the number of constitutional amendments that had to be included on the ballot. Some ballot design options taken to help ensure clarity for voters could lead to problems later. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Kansas reported that they used a two-sided ballot design requiring that the optical scan counting equipment read the ballot front and back, which presented a problem. Chapter 6 discusses challenges with counting ballots. The requirements of the voting equipment may also limit options election officials can take related to ballot design. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Illinois that used punch cards reported that lengthy ballots could have been a problem in the November 2004 election, but they decided to change the type of punch card ballot used. These officials told us that increasing the number of punch positions allowed for more space on the ballot and prevented challenges related to length of ballot. However, with punch card ballots, the greater the number of choices on a punch card, the greater the potential for voter error in punching the preferred choice, as voters must align the ballot carefully. Election officials in jurisdictions we visited that designed their ballots described steps they took to ensure that ballots were clear to voters, including using templates from the state or election management systems, proofreading both before and after printing, and public viewing or testing of ballots. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado told us that prior to printing they send proofs of the ballot designs to candidates for their review. After printing, election officials said that staff members and representatives of the political parties test the ballot designs to ensure that there are no problems with how the ballots are processed through the counting equipment. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Colorado reported conducting a mock election with county employees to review the ballot and test a ballot from each package of printed ballots. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Ohio told us that they displayed the ballots for the general public to view and test. Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by Most Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: The activities and plans that election officials undertake related to preparing ballots or voting equipment can have a direct impact on a voter's Election Day experience. For example, reports about the November 2004 election highlighted shortages of ballots and voting machines at some polling places. While election officials may not be able to prepare for every contingency that could affect a voter's wait time or experience at the polls, ensuring that there is a sufficient number of ballots or voting machines can minimize potential problems. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that few jurisdictions had problems with ballot or voting equipment shortages for the November 2004 general election. We estimate that 4 percent of all jurisdictions experienced problems with Election Day ballot shortages, and an estimated 4 percent of all jurisdictions did not have enough voting equipment on Election Day. However, there were statistical differences between large and small jurisdictions in having enough voting equipment. We estimate that 12 percent of large jurisdictions, 4 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 3 percent of small jurisdictions did not have enough voting equipment. Election officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that they encountered no challenges with preparing and delivering ballots, voting equipment, and supplies for the November 2004 general election. However, these activities could present logistical challenges for jurisdictions if there are unexpected delays, or for jurisdictions that are required to prepare ballots in multiple languages or prepare and deliver numerous voting machines to a large number of polling places. To ensure that there is an adequate supply of machine-readable paper ballots on Election Day, election officials may conduct numerous activities, such as designing, reviewing, proofreading, printing, and testing ballots. Uncertainties about ballot content, such as whether or not certain candidates or issues will be included on the ballot, could affect these activities by delaying printing or leading to a last- minute rush to ensure that ballots are printed in time for the election. While election officials in most of the jurisdictions we visited did not report encountering these uncertainties, election officials did in 4 jurisdictions. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado reported that ballot printing was delayed by three statewide lawsuits regarding the content of the ballot. These officials reported that they prepared two ballot designs--one with a particular candidate's name and one without--so that they would be prepared to send the ballots to an external printer regardless of the lawsuits' outcome. Some jurisdictions are required to provide ballots in languages other than English. Producing ballots in multiple languages can add to the complexity of preparing ballots because election officials must take steps to ensure proper translation and printing for each required language. On the basis of our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that 6 percent of jurisdictions nationwide provided ballots in other languages. We estimate that significantly more large jurisdictions provided ballots in languages other than English than medium and small jurisdictions. We estimate that 26 percent of large jurisdictions (compared to 10 percent of medium jurisdictions and 3 percent of small jurisdictions) provided ballots in languages other than English.[Footnote 143] Once voting equipment, ballots, and supplies have been prepared, ensuring that they are transported to polling places can be a logistical challenge for jurisdictions with thousands of voting machines and hundreds of polling places. Election officials in 18 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that they contracted with moving companies to deliver voting equipment to polling places prior to Election Day. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Pennsylvania told us that they contract with a moving company that transports about 1,000 DREs to about 400 polling places in the week prior to Election Day. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada told us that to ensure that voting machines were delivered to the correct polling places, they bar-coded each DRE and also assigned a bar code to each polling place. Upon delivery, contract movers used scanners to read the bar codes on each DRE and the bar code for the specific polling place. Prior to Election Day, these officials said that teams of election staff technicians then went to each polling place to set up the DREs and verify the scanned bar codes. After setting up the DREs, the rooms in which they were located were secured until Election Day. In contrast, in a jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire, two election workers delivered 12 optical scan counters to the 12 polling places at 4:00 a.m. on Election Day. Figure 41 shows stored voting equipment--with accompanying delivery instructions for each DRE for 1 location--in 3 large jurisdictions we visited that needed to be prepared and delivered to polling places prior to Election Day. Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election Day: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in Other Jurisdictions Did Not: Long voter wait times are a problem that election officials try to avoid. However, voters waiting in line at the polls was an issue identified in reports reviewing the November 2004 general election. These reports identified a variety of factors, including confusion about a voter's registration status, ballot or voting equipment shortages, or malfunctioning voting equipment that led to long voter wait times. We asked election officials during our site visits whether or not any polling places in their jurisdictions had long lines during the November 2004 general election and to describe factors they thought contributed to or helped to reduce long lines. Election officials in 17 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported having long lines at one or more polling places in their jurisdiction at some point on Election Day. However, there was variation in the reported voter wait times, times of day, and numbers of polling places with lines. For instance, election officials described voter wait times that ranged from 15 minutes to 1 ˝ hours. Some election officials reported that the longer lines occurred in the morning; others told us that they kept polling places open past the official closing time to accommodate voters who were in line when the polls closed. Election officials in over half these 17 jurisdictions attributed long lines to higher than expected voter turnout, both in general and at peak voting times. Some of these jurisdictions were located in states where the presidential race was considered close (often referred to as "battleground states").[Footnote 144] For example, the election official in a jurisdiction in Nevada attributed long lines to using a new voting system in addition to being a battleground state and encountering high voter turnout. This official estimated that there were between 30,000 and 35,000 more voters for the November 2004 general election than in previous elections. Election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited in Ohio told us that higher than expected voter turnout in some precincts led to long lines. For example, election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions reported that at a polling place where two precincts were located there was higher than expected turnout because of a school board race. According to these officials, at this polling place there was a single line for voters from both precincts to check in at the registration table, and this line backed up. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Ohio told us that some precincts had long lines, and one precinct in particular had a waiting time of up to 1 hour. These officials said that one precinct closed 30 to 45 minutes after closing time for the voters that were in line at 7:30 p.m. Election officials in 11 of 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that none of the polling places in their jurisdictions had long lines, and some described factors that helped to reduce or prevent lines. High voter turnout prior to Election Day--either during early voting or through absentee voting--was one factor they identified. For example, election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited--a second jurisdiction in Nevada and 1 in New Mexico--told us that about 60 percent of those who cast ballots voted early or absentee. Election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in Washington (which reported that it did not require or allow early voting) told us that they attributed their lack of long lines on Election Day to the fact that two-thirds of voters in their jurisdiction vote by absentee ballot. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Florida reported that in planning for the November 2004 general election, they decided to encourage early and absentee voting as alternatives to Election Day voting in anticipation that there would be heavy turnout for the general election. Their voter education campaign, which included buying airtime on radios and in movie theaters, stressed early voting options. In the end, about 40 percent of voters cast early ballots, which, according to election officials, made crowds easier to manage on Election Day. Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions: On Election Day, poll workers may need to communicate with election officials at the central office for a variety of reasons--to inquire about a person's eligibility to vote if his or her name does not appear in the poll book, to report voting equipment problems, or to report other issues that could occur at a polling place on Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, for the November 2004 general election, we estimate that for 48 percent of all jurisdictions, the primary means of communication between polling places and the central office was telephones installed at polling places. Cell phones were also used as a primary means of communication in some jurisdictions. For example, on the basis of our local survey results, we estimate that for 25 percent of all jurisdictions, personal cell phones were the primary means of communication. Having inadequate communication lines on Election Day was a problem for election officials in the November 2000 election, as we noted in our October 2001 report on election processes.[Footnote 145] On the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, communication problems between polling places and the election office on Election Day were a challenge for some jurisdictions in the November 2004 election, and these problems varied by the size category of jurisdiction, with more large jurisdictions encountering major problems than medium and small jurisdictions. We estimate that 36 percent of large jurisdictions, 63 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 89 percent of small jurisdictions encountered no major problems with the communication system used at polling places. Small jurisdictions may not have experienced communication problems on Election Day for a variety of reasons, among them because a single polling place is located in the same building as the central election office, allowing the election officials to be physically present to resolve any questions or issues. Election officials in small jurisdictions provided comments on our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions about the primary communication system used in their jurisdictions on Election Day, including "personal contact--the clerk's office is across the hall from the polling place," "[we] yelled across the room," or "we are the central office and the polling place." In addition, the election official in the small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire told us that the town clerk was on site at the one polling place. Election Day communication problems encountered by some large and medium jurisdictions included overloaded phones because of the volume of calls. On the basis of our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that 49 percent (plus or minus 8 percent) of large jurisdictions, 14 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions experienced overloaded phone systems.[Footnote 146] The differences between all size categories are statistically significant. Election officials in many large jurisdictions we visited reported receiving numerous phone calls on Election Day, both from polling places and from the public. In addition to poll workers calling from polling places, election officials at the central office may receive phone calls from citizens asking about the location of their polling place or whether or not they are registered to vote. For example, a large jurisdiction we visited in Nevada reported receiving over 35,000 calls on Election Day 2004, about three times the number reportedly received in 2000. Election officials reported that most calls received were from people wanting to know whether or not they were registered or where their polling place was, despite providing polling place locations on their Web site, printing the locations in the newspaper, and mailing a sample ballot listing polling place locations to every registered voter in the jurisdiction. Election officials in 2 other large jurisdictions in Florida and Kansas reported that the volume of calls received was extremely high and that most inquiries concerned voter eligibility. In 1 of these 2 jurisdictions, election officials told us that many poll workers could not get through to the elections office to verify voter registration information, which may have increased the number of provisional ballots issued during the election. Election officials in many of the large jurisdictions we visited reported taking steps to manage, or even reduce, the volume of calls from both polling places and the public. These actions included setting up call centers or phone banks, installing additional phone lines in their offices, or hiring temporary workers. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania reported that after experiencing problems being able to handle the volume of calls on Election Day 2000, they implemented a call center at their office with 30 phone lines for the November 2004 election. While these election officials reported receiving "a lot" of calls for the 2004 general election, they said they were able to successfully handle the volume because of the new phone lines. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Illinois reported that a feature, new for the November 2004 election, on the jurisdiction's Web site that allowed voters to determine their polling place online helped to reduce the number of phone calls received from people asking about polling location. Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Third- Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election Day 2004: After the November 2004 general election, some reports highlighted allegations of voter intimidation by third parties (e.g., poll watchers, observers, or electioneers) at polling places. To gain a better understanding of the extent to which this alleged behavior occurred and because the range of behaviors and circumstances in which they could have occurred was difficult to capture on a structured survey, we asked election officials during our site visits about challenges they faced conducting voting on Election Day--specifically, we asked them about any problems they encountered with voter intimidation. Election officials in 19 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited did not report experiencing problems with third parties on Election Day. However, election officials in 9 jurisdictions we visited in battleground states reported challenges with disruptive third-party activities.[Footnote 147] In some instances these third parties simply increased the number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling location; in others, election officials told us third-party observers provided misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll watchers were the biggest challenge on Election Day. Poll watchers, according to election officials, had been bused in from another state to observe the election because Nevada was a battleground state, which led to having 14 poll watchers at some locations. These officials noted that while most poll watchers simply observed, the poll watchers did increase the number of people at polling places, creating more for poll workers to manage. Election officials in other jurisdictions reported that third-party behavior negatively affected poll workers and voters. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Pennsylvania reported that one of the biggest challenges on Election Day was managing poll workers' stress levels in an especially contentious election where poll watchers and observers yelled at them throughout the day. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Nevada told us that outside observers' behavior was disruptive and noted that the observers were contentious, violated electioneering limits at the polling place, and questioned every action that poll workers made. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado reported that at one polling location on a college campus, poll watchers and representatives of a national organization were encouraging students to go to the polling place at one time to create a disruption. Students were also being encouraged to get back in line after they had voted, which caused long lines for other voters. Election officials said that they ended up calling security officers to help manage the situation. In other instances, election officials reported that observers provided misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Florida reported that third-party organizations caused confusion at polling places by misinforming voters and staging demonstrations. In a jurisdiction we visited in Colorado, election officials told us that poll watchers caused problems at some polling places by providing misinformation to voters, such as informing them that their provisional ballots would not be counted. In a jurisdiction in New Mexico, election officials said that one polling place had to remain open until 10:30 p.m. because voters were encouraged by local political advocates to go to that polling place to vote even though the polling location for their precinct had been changed. As a result, according to these officials, hundreds of provisional ballots were cast at the polling place, which made for long waiting times. Election officials in another jurisdiction in New Mexico reported that outside candidate advocates and observers from political parties tried intimidation tactics and treated people at the polls "terribly." For example, these election officials told us that some advocates were observed taking photographs of the license plates of Hispanic voters as they arrived at polling places. We did not ask a specific question about third-party activities at polling places on our survey of local jurisdictions because of the complexities in capturing the range of alleged behaviors on a structured survey. However, we asked whether local election jurisdictions maintained a written record of issues that occurred on Election Day and, if so, what issue or problem occurred most frequently on Election Day. Several election officials from jurisdictions in battleground states that provided comments on our nationwide survey wrote that electioneering or poll watchers did. For example, election officials from Florida, Colorado, and Iowa wrote "voters complained about being harassed by demonstrators while waiting in line to vote," "poll watchers acting aggressively," and "poll watchers (who were attorneys, mostly) were interfering with the process, intimidating precinct officials, and giving erroneous advice to voters who showed up at the wrong polling place." Concluding Observations: Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor that involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and technologies associated with numerous activities. Many of the challenges that election officials reported encountering in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 election were not new. Recruiting and training an adequate supply of poll workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing communications on Election Day were challenges we identified in our October 2001 report on the November 2000 election. Data from our local elections jurisdiction survey and site visits to 28 locations, indicate that more large, and to some extent medium, jurisdictions encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election than did small jurisdictions. This is not surprising. Larger, diverse jurisdictions may face challenges smaller jurisdictions do not, such as recruiting poll workers with non- English language skills. Larger jurisdictions are also likely to need to rely to a greater degree on technology to manage their elections administration process, and this brings its own set of challenges. The complexity of administering an election and the potential for challenges increase with the number of people and places involved, the ethnic diversity and language skills of the voting population, and the scope of activities and processes that must be conducted. Many of the election officials in large jurisdictions we visited told us that being well prepared, having established policies and procedures in place, and having qualified election staff were factors that contributed to a smooth Election Day. One problem that occurred on Election Day in some jurisdictions that election officials reported encountering was the actions of poll watchers and other third parties that election officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that election officials may need to include in their Election Day preparations and training. [End of section] Chapter 5: Provisional Voting: A goal of the election process is to ensure that every eligible voter is able to cast a vote and have that vote counted. In the November 2000 general election, reports of some voters showing up at the polls and not being able to vote raised concerns about eligible voters' names not appearing on the voter registration list at the polling place or poll workers not otherwise being able to determine voters' eligibility. While many jurisdictions reported in 2001 having at least one procedure in place to help resolve eligibility questions for voters whose names did not appear on a polling place registration list, only 20 states plus the District of Columbia reported using some form of provisional ballot for the 2000 general election.[Footnote 148] One of the major changes since the 2000 general election has been the implementation of a HAVA provision requiring, in general, that states permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast provisional ballots in elections for federal office. In general, under HAVA, voters who claim to be eligible to vote and registered in the jurisdiction they desire to vote in but whose names do not appear on the polling place registration list are to be allowed to cast provisional ballots in a federal election. These ballots are called provisional because they are counted only if an election official determines that the voter is eligible under state law to vote. In terms of ballot access, provisional ballots benefit voters by allowing an individual to cast a vote, in general, when there is some question as to the individual's eligibility such as when the individual's name is not on the registration list or the individual's eligibility has been questioned by an election official. In terms of ballot integrity, provisional ballots benefit election officials by allowing them to determine voter eligibility prior to counting such ballots (i.e., verifying provisional ballots). In this chapter, we describe (1) events that preceded HAVA's provisional voting requirements, (2) how states and local jurisdictions implemented the requirement to provide provisional ballots, (3) how states and local election jurisdictions qualified provisional ballots for counting, and (4) the difficulties of estimating and comparing the number of provisional ballots that were cast and counted. Overview: Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions regarding the voters' eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 2004, most states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for federal office by voters who affirm in writing that they believe they are eligible to vote and registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter registration list.[Footnote 149] Such states are also required under HAVA to provide provisional ballots in federal elections under other circumstances such as for certain voters who registered by mail and do not have required identification, and where an election official asserts that an individual is ineligible to vote. Provisional votes cast under HAVA's provisional voting requirements are to be counted in accordance with state law if election officials determine that the voter is eligible to vote under state law. Under HAVA, 6 states are exempt from the act's provisional voting requirements because they either permitted the voter to register on Election Day or did not require voter registration.[Footnote 150] On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions varied in a number of ways regarding how they implemented HAVA's provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 election. Among other things, we found variation in the: * additional circumstances, apart from those circumstances specified in HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot; * design of ballots themselves and how they were tracked; and: * voting method used for casting provisional ballots, such as optical scan ballots or DRE. With respect to the counting of provisional votes, states reported various differences in their counting processes such as the prescribed location from which a voter must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be counted. Also, with respect to the counting of provisional ballots, according to our estimates from our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, a voter not meeting residency requirements was the most frequently cited problem, followed by insufficient evidence that the voter was registered. In jurisdictions we visited, election officials also varied in how they handled a lack of information from the voter that was needed to verify a provisional ballot. National figures on provisional ballots for the November 2004 election are difficult to estimate because of a lack of data on provisional ballots cast and counted, and variation in how states implemented provisional voting. Nevertheless, we estimate that between 1.1 million and 1.7 million provisional ballots were cast in the November 2004 election. The variation in how provisional voting was implemented makes it difficult to compare the use and counting of provisional ballots among jurisdictions. A number of factors can affect the number of provisional ballots cast and counted. For example, one such factor could be an instance in which the polling location hours were extended and votes cast during the extended hours were cast provisionally. Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA Requirement for Provisional Ballots: Following the November 2000 election, in our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide, we noted that the biggest problems on Election Day involved resolving questions about voter eligibility.[Footnote 151] Typically, a voter's eligibility is established before a voter receives a ballot, most often by a poll worker examining a poll book or registration list for the person's name. If the name appears on the list and other identification requirements are met, the voter is given a regular ballot and is allowed to vote. We also noted in our report that in the November 2000 election, a large number of voters with eligibility issues created frustration for voters, long lines, and problems communicating between the polls and election headquarters as workers tried to resolve eligibility issues. For the 2000 general election, when the voter's name did not appear on the registration list, we reported in October 2001 that jurisdictions had different procedures for dealing with the question of the voter's eligibility. More specifically, we reported that 20 states plus the District of Columbia used some form of provisional ballot when a voter's name was not on the voter list, with verification of registration conducted after the election.[Footnote 152] As we reported, provisional balloting measures went by different names among the states, including provisional ballot, challenged ballot, special ballot, emergency paper ballot, and escrow ballot. Further, in 5 states in the 2000 general election, we reported that voters could complete an affidavit when voting with no further verification of their registration information being required by state law prior to the ballot being counted. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that of the 19 million registered voters who did not vote in 2000, 6.9 percent did not vote because of uncertainty regarding their registration.[Footnote 153] In our October 2001 report, we noted that headlines and reports questioned the effectiveness of voter registration by highlighting accounts of individuals who thought they were registered being turned away from polling places on Election Day and jurisdictions incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration lists. Our report also found that almost half of the jurisdictions nationwide in 2000 reported having problems with registration applications submitted at motor vehicle agency offices that election officials believed could result in individuals showing up at the polls to vote and discovering that they were not registered. Numerous recommendations were made for federal regulations to require that all states provide provisional voting. For example, the Federal Election Commission in June 2001 recommended that all states devise procedures for voters to cast provisional ballots at the polls under certain conditions, as did the National Commission of Federal Election Reform in August 2001 and the National Task Force on Election Reform in July 2001, among others. Under HAVA, in an election for federal office, most states are to permit individuals to cast a provisional ballot under certain circumstances.[Footnote 154] The statutory deadline for implementing HAVA's provisional voting requirement was January 1, 2004. For federal elections, states are, in general, required to allow the casting of a provisional ballot by an individual: * asserting to be registered in the jurisdiction in which the individual desires to vote and eligible to vote but whose name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place, or: * whom an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, or: * who registered to vote by mail but does not have (and has not previously provided) the required registration identification when trying to vote in person or by mail, or: * casting a vote pursuant to a court order or other type of order extending poll closing times. HAVA requires that an individual be permitted to cast a provisional ballot upon the execution of a written affirmation before an election official at the polling place. The written affirmation must state that the individual is registered to vote in that jurisdiction and eligible to vote in that election. HAVA specifies that either the provisional ballot or the written affirmation information be transmitted to an appropriate election official for a determination as to whether the individual is eligible to vote under state law. Under HAVA, if an individual is determined to be eligible, the provisional ballot is to be counted as a vote in accordance with state law. Election officials, under HAVA, are to give the individual written information on how to ascertain whether the vote was counted and, if the vote was not counted, the reason the vote was not counted. HAVA directs that state or local election officials establish a free access system, such as a toll-free number, for provisional voters to ascertain such information. While HAVA established conditions under which an individual must be allowed to cast a provisional ballot, states are not prohibited from offering provisional ballots for other reasons, or from using ballots with other names (e.g., a challenged ballot) to serve provisional vote purposes. HAVA explicitly provides that the specific choices on the methods of complying with certain act requirements, including the provisional voting requirements, are left to the discretion of the state.[Footnote 155] In addition, HAVA provides that a state may establish election technology and administration requirements that are stricter than HAVA requirements, so long as they are not inconsistent with other specified federal requirements.[Footnote 156] State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election: On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions provided for provisional voting in a variety of ways for the November 2004 election. These differences contributed to the variation in the number of provisional votes cast among jurisdictions. The results of our state survey of election officials show that states reported using new or existing legislative or executive actions (which included executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies) to implement HAVA's provisional voting requirements. Specifically, our state survey showed: * 27 states reported enacting new legislation or taking executive action to meet HAVA's provisional voting requirements; * 11 states and the District of Columbia reported using the state's existing legislative or executive action to meet the requirements;[Footnote 157] * 7 states said HAVA provisional requirements were met by a combination of new legislation or executive action and existing actions;[Footnote 158] * 5 states (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wisconsin), in response to the question of how their state established the provisional voting requirements set forth in HAVA, answered that they were exempt from such requirements; these 5 states are exempt from HAVA provisional requirements, in general, because they have same-day voter registration or no voter registration.[Footnote 159] Connecticut officials responded, for example, that the state enacted legislation after HAVA to establish HAVA provisional voting requirements. Connecticut state laws were enacted in June 2003 related to the application for a provisional ballot, casting of the ballot, and determination of eligibility for counting of provisional ballots, among other things. In contrast, Alaska election officials reported that existing legislation met HAVA's provisional voting requirements. According to Alaska's 2005 updated HAVA plan, the state had an existing provisional voting process known as Questioned Voting. This process, established in the early 1980s, required only minimal changes to meet HAVA provisional voting requirements. Alaska requires use of a questioned ballot for any voter who votes at a polling location where his or her name does not appear on the precinct register, or if the voter does not have identification and is not personally known by the election official. In our state survey, New Jersey reported meeting HAVA provisional voting requirements with a combination of existing and new legislation. In one New Jersey jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that state provisional voting procedures were first established in 1999. According to these officials, the state amended its provisional ballot election law after HAVA to allow use for voting by court (or other) order after the polls have closed, and by first- time mail registrants who do not provide identification. Paper Ballots and DRE Were Voting Methods Used to Cast Provisional Ballots: Election officials in 25 of the 26 jurisdictions we visited that provide for provisional voting told us that they used some form of paper ballot for Election Day provisional voting for the November 2004 election.[Footnote 160] For example, election officials in the Illinois jurisdictions we visited said that the regular punch card ballot was used by provisional voters, and then placed in provisional ballot envelopes. In the New Jersey jurisdictions we visited officials said that provisional votes were cast on paper ballots that could be counted with optical scan machines (if voters were determined to be eligible). Election officials in Connecticut jurisdictions said that they used hand-counted paper ballots for provisional voters. According to election officials in 1 Ohio jurisdiction and 1 Nevada jurisdiction, DRE was used for Election Day provisional voters.[Footnote 161] According to election officials or documents they provided in the 2 jurisdictions we visited that used DRE for provisional voting on Election Day, the processes used for casting provisional votes were as follows: * In the Ohio jurisdiction, election officials said voters first completed an affidavit statement with a preprinted code number, and signed a special section of the poll book. The poll worker then inserted a unit into the DRE that contained the ballot for the precinct. The poll worker then pressed the provisional ballot selection on the DRE and entered the code number for the individual voter associated with the voter's affidavit statement. The individual then voted. * In one Nevada jurisdiction, DREs were used for Election Day provisional voting, but optical scan ballots were used for provisional voters participating in early voting. According to the poll worker's manual provided by election officials, Election Day provisional voters completed an affirmation with identifying information and the reason they were casting a provisional ballot. As described to us by election officials at this jurisdiction, the poll worker then added precinct information, and both signed the affirmation. The poll worker then activated the DRE with a card. To indicate that the ballot was provisional, the poll worker pressed "0" and the machine provided a provisional voter identification number that the poll worker copied onto the voter affirmation and provisional voter receipt. The voter then voted. The Provisional Ballot Design and Tracking Procedures Varied among States: According to election officials in the jurisdictions we visited, the design of provisional ballots varied for the November 2004 election. The provisional ballot differences included variation in terms of the races included, ballot and envelope color, the envelopes they were placed in, and the information included on the provisional ballot envelopes. For example, in the Nevada jurisdictions, the provisional ballot only included races for federal offices, while in the Kansas jurisdictions, officials said that the provisional ballot was the same as a regular ballot. In 1 Georgia jurisdiction, election officials stated that they were using an absentee ballot for provisional voters but were inserting it into a salmon-colored envelope, whereas in an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, "Provisional" was printed in pink letters across the punch card ballot used in that jurisdiction so that these ballots were distinguishable from other ballots. The provisional ballot envelopes also varied in terms of what information was provided in the jurisdictions we visited, according to example envelopes provided to us (or described) by election officials. The outside of the provisional ballot envelopes in most of the jurisdictions we visited served as the voter's written affirmation that is required by HAVA. For example, in a jurisdiction in Illinois, the ballot envelope included instruction to voters on how to cast a provisional ballot; in a Florida jurisdiction (as well as in Illinois) the provisional envelope includes information on the reason why the provisional ballot was cast. In New Mexico and Colorado jurisdictions we visited, the envelope included a tear-off tab with information on how voters could find out whether their vote counted, and if not, why it was not counted. In addition, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited described provisional ballots being placed in envelopes, sometimes with a second security envelope covering the ballot inside. Figure 42 shows an example of a provisional ballot envelope. Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Officials in jurisdictions we visited described a variety of methods used for tracking provisional ballots in the November 2004 election. Methods included having individual ballots numbered, maintaining an inventory or log, accounting for provisional ballots at the beginning and end of Election Day, and using specially colored ballots or envelopes for holding provisional ballots. The following are examples of how election officials in four jurisdictions we visited said they tracked provisional ballots for the November 2004 election: * In a Pennsylvania jurisdiction, election officials tracked provisional ballots cast at the polling place on a form provided by the election officials. Provisional ballots were marked with a sticker indicating that they were provisional. The sticker also had an identification number for tracking the ballot, and the voter was provided a receipt with the identification number to use when calling for information on the status of their ballot. All provisional ballots were placed inside of green envelopes. * In a New Mexico jurisdiction, an election official said that ballots were numbered sequentially, so that the poll workers could track the numbers. The precinct judges certified the numbers of the ballots they received, used, delivered, and destroyed. * In a New Jersey jurisdiction, the municipal clerk issued a specific number of provisional ballots (25) to each precinct, with a "Custody Receipt" form that identified who was in possession of the orange bag with the provisional ballots and an accounting of all ballots originally issued. A ballot that had been voted was enclosed in a gray envelope and then put back in the orange bag. * In a Kansas jurisdiction, separate poll books, separate envelopes for provisional ballots, and separate pouches for envelopes containing provisional ballots (all blue in color) facilitated tracking the ballots as separate items from regular Election Day ballots. No tracking of the actual ballot occurred (before it was voted) because the same optical scan paper ballot was used for regular Election Day voters. Additional Circumstances for Using Provisional Ballots Varied for the November 2004 Election: Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the circumstances specified in HAVA, some jurisdictions we surveyed or spoke with had additional reasons for providing provisional ballots to voters in the November 2004 election and other types of ballots that could be used for different circumstances. In addition, election officials in jurisdictions we visited told us about different approaches for offering provisional ballots. Provisional Ballots Were Provided for a Variety of Reasons in Jurisdictions We Visited: In the local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials described various circumstances, in addition to those required by HAVA, in which a provisional ballot was provided to a prospective voter in the November 2004 election. The additional circumstances under which provisional ballots were provided are established by state officials. For example, * In one Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that provisional ballots were available to voters who did not have the identification required of all voters in the state and also available if a person was listed as a felon in the poll book. Further, election officials told us that the Colorado Secretary of State issued guidance just prior to the 2004 general election that allowed individuals-- claiming to have registered at a voter registration drive but for whom the jurisdiction had no record--to vote provisionally. * Election officials in jurisdictions we visited in Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Ohio, and Washington said that voters claiming they had not received their absentee ballots were provided with provisional ballots. In other jurisdictions, such as the 2 we visited in Connecticut, voters were allowed to vote regularly if their absentee ballot did not arrive. * Kansas election officials reported that they allowed voters to cast provisional ballots if the voter did not trust the voting machines and wanted a paper ballot, or if the voter had a different last name than the listed one because of marriage or divorce. The extent to which voters are provided with provisional ballots varied depending on whether states required identification of all voters or only certain voters, according to our state survey. Some states reported that they require all voters to provide identification; some reported that they require only provisional voters to produce identification, while others reported that they do not require identification from voters other than first-time voters who registered by mail, as required by HAVA.[Footnote 162] Chapter 4 on conducting elections discusses state requirements for voter identification for all voters. According to our state survey, 6 states--Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, and Wisconsin--reported requiring identification from only provisional voters in the November 2004 election, but Michigan and Utah reported allowing an alternative to identification for provisional voters who did not have required identification. In Michigan, for example, a voter receiving a provisional ballot who was unable to meet the identification requirement was permitted, according to election officials responding to our state survey, to fax, mail, or hand-deliver an acceptable form of photo identification to the clerk anytime during the 6 days following the election. Alternatives to Provisional Voting Available in Some Jurisdictions We Visited: Some jurisdictions we visited reported that Election Day voting options other than provisional ballots were available. For example, election officials in jurisdictions we visited in Ohio said that provisional ballots were the only special ballots available for that election. In contrast, in a New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials said the state offered an in-lieu-of ballot for voters who requested an absentee ballot, and claimed it did not arrive. These election officials said the in-lieu-of ballot was the same as a provisional ballot, but it was placed in a different sleeve for later determination of whether an absentee ballot had been cast or not. At a Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, election officials described the state's presidential ballot, available at the clerk's office on Election Day for the November 2004 election. A presidential ballot, according to election officials and documents they provided, allowed voting for president and vice-president by former Connecticut residents who had moved to another state within 30 days of the election and for that reason could not vote in their new state of residence.[Footnote 163] Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited, such as 1 jurisdiction in Florida and 2 jurisdictions in New Jersey, said their procedures allowed challenged voters to sign a statement, such as an affidavit declaring their eligibility, and to vote on a regular ballot that would be counted with other ballots on Election Day. According to poll worker guidance provided by election officials in the Florida jurisdiction, a written challenge must be submitted under oath and given to the voter; then the voter has the right to submit an oath affirming his or her eligibility. The polling place clerk and inspectors must resolve the challenge by majority vote, providing a regular ballot if the decision is in the prospective voter's favor. The guidance states that a challenged voter who refuses to sign the oath must be offered a provisional ballot. In both jurisdictions we visited in New Jersey, voters who were challenged were not issued a provisional ballot, according to documents provided by election officials. As stated in the poll worker manual for one of the jurisdictions for the 2004 general election, a voter who was challenged completed a challenged voter affidavit, as shown in figure 43. The manual stated that the location's four poll workers take a vote to decide whether the voter would be allowed to vote. On the basis of the decision, the challenged voter cast a regular ballot or was not allowed to vote, according to the manual (in case of a tie, the voter was allowed to vote). Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter Affidavit: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked for information on the use of provisional ballots, challenged ballots, or other types of ballots under various scenarios for the November 2004 election.[Footnote 164] Table 18 shows the extent to which we estimate that local jurisdictions provided provisional ballots as compared to providing other types of ballots. Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide That Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for the November 2004 Election under Various Scenarios: Scenario: Individuals who registered by mail (without providing identification),voted for the first time, and did not bring proper identification with them to the polling place; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 49; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 6; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 7; Not applicable: 39. Scenario: Individuals who claimed they were at the correct polling place but were not on the voter registration list at the polling place; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 48; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 7; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 13; Not applicable: 33. Scenario: Individuals who were challenged by an election official as ineligible to vote; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 23; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 23; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 3; Not applicable: 49. Scenario: Individuals who voted after the polling place closing times when the polling place was kept open late because of a federal court, state court, or other order extending the polling place hours; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 6; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 1; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 2; Not applicable: 91. Scenario: Individuals who said they had requested an absentee ballot but that the ballot never arrived; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 18; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 1; Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 19; Not applicable: 60. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. Note: Jurisdictions could indicate using more than one type of ballot for a particular scenario; therefore, the row of percentages may not add to 100 percent. [End of table] Jurisdictions Varied in Their Approach to Providing Provisional Ballots: Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the circumstances specified in HAVA, election officials in jurisdictions we visited described differing approaches under which provisional ballots were utilized for the November 2004 election. Election officials in most of the 28 jurisdictions we visited said that in the November 2004 election they would not refuse an individual a provisional ballot. In a Colorado jurisdiction, election officials said that election judges were instructed to direct all voters meeting the criteria for voting provisionally (e.g., claiming to be registered and eligible, but with some eligibility question) to the provisional voting table. In 1 Nevada jurisdiction, the election official said that anyone could receive a provisional ballot. He said that they had Las Vegas tourists who wanted to vote a provisional ballot, even though they were informed that it would not be counted. Election officials in 1 Washington jurisdiction said voters knew that they could cast a ballot regardless of circumstances, and election officials in the other Washington jurisdiction said that provisional ballots served as a conflict avoidance tool at the polls. Election officials in both New Mexico jurisdictions said that if a voter was not on the registration list, he or she was immediately given a provisional ballot. According to the New Mexico election officials, precinct officials were not to direct a voter to the correct precinct; instead, under the provisional voting rule, they were to offer a provisional ballot to the voter. Election officials in some other jurisdictions we visited told us that poll workers may have taken certain steps before providing a voter with a provisional ballot. In 1 Illinois jurisdiction, an election official said that if a potential voter was not listed, the poll workers first tried to determine if the voter was registered in another jurisdiction. If that was the case, the poll workers then directed the voter to that jurisdiction, but they did not refuse to provide a provisional ballot if a voter requested one. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, election officials told us that if a voter was registered in Ohio, everything was done to get the voter to the correct precinct. In a New Jersey jurisdiction we visited, election officials explained that poll workers take several steps when the voter's name was not listed in the poll book. Poll workers were instructed, according to the poll worker's manual, to check the poll book for misspellings or for the name being out of alphabetical sequence, and to check the county street guide to see if the voter was in the wrong location. Election officials in this jurisdiction also told us that voters who were in the wrong location were directed to the correct location. They added that voters who did not wish to vote provisionally were told to go before a superior court judge to plead their cases. In 5 jurisdictions we visited, election officials said there were instances where election officials would refuse to provide a provisional ballot on Election Day. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, election officials said that a provisional ballot was provided if the potential voter appeared at the polling place. However, if the person came to the election office on Election Day and no record of voter registration was found by the Registrar, then the voter was not allowed to vote provisionally. A potential voter stating that he or she was not registered or not a resident was a reason not to offer the individual a provisional ballot, according to election officials in 1 jurisdiction in Nevada, and 1 in New Jersey, and both jurisdictions in North Carolina. Officials in 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited said that an individual might not be offered a provisional ballot if he or she was on the voter registration list and therefore eligible to vote a regular ballot. Whether a provisional ballot was provided or not might have been based, in part, on the size of the jurisdiction and the familiarity of the poll workers with the voters. Several election officials in small local jurisdictions included in our nationwide survey made this point in written comments. For example, comments included the following: * "This is a small township. We don't have the problems big cities have. People know who lives in the township. They know their neighbors." * "Most voters are personally known, including their addresses." * "We were told that the state voter list was the bible for the day. But we had one lady who should have been provisional but we all knew where she lived so we let her vote. It was the choir lady's niece. Her signature was on file." In larger jurisdictions, poll workers might be less likely to know the voters in the precinct and may have made greater use of provisional ballots than in smaller jurisdictions. Newness of Providing Provisional Ballots Presented Some Challenges in November 2004: Some jurisdictions we visited reported that knowing how many provisional ballots to have available for the November 2004 election was a challenge. However, on the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that for the November 2004 election, only 1 percent of jurisdictions had a shortage of provisional ballots. The difficulty with anticipating the need for provisional ballots, according to an Illinois jurisdiction election official, was that officials had no historical experience to rely upon in deciding how many to make available at each site. In this jurisdiction, provisional ballots were used for the first time in the November 2004 election, according to the election official. Similarly, in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that they had no basis to plan for the number needed, and that they had to rush to produce (e.g., placing a provisional ballot sticker over an absentee ballot) additional provisional ballots at the last minute because some precincts needed more than were initially allocated. Election officials in one Nevada jurisdiction we visited said some polling places were overstocked while others were understocked, requiring them to shuttle the ballots between polling places. In a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that last-minute changes by state officials created a need for more provisional ballots because this change allowed individuals who registered during a voter registration drive but who were not on the voter list to vote provisionally. On the basis of our local survey, poll workers failing to follow procedures for conducting provisional voting surfaced as an issue in some jurisdictions in the November 2004 election. We estimate that 12 percent of jurisdictions nationwide encountered poll worker performance problems related to their failure to follow procedures with provisional voting. The newness of the provisional procedures or last-minute changes in the guidance were challenges that confused poll workers, according to election officials in jurisdictions we visited. Specifically, * In a Georgia jurisdiction, election officials told us there was a question regarding whether several college students were eligible to vote provisionally, and state election officials were called for clarification (the students were allowed to vote provisionally). * In a Connecticut jurisdiction, election officials said poll workers were confused about the process, issuing provisional ballots in some cases before checking with the Registrar to try to locate the prospective voters in the statewide database. * In both Nevada jurisdictions, election officials we visited identified poll worker training needs; for example, in 1 of the Nevada jurisdictions election officials said provisional ballot materials were not adequately tracked and returned. * In an Ohio jurisdiction, election officials identified poll worker handling of provisional ballots as an area for improvement based on finding valid provisional ballots returned in envelopes for soiled and defaced ballots. In addition, they said about half of the provisional voters did not sign the poll book, as they were supposed to have done under this jurisdiction's requirements. Furthermore, voters were to place their provisional ballots in a colored provisional sleeve for determination of eligibility before the vote was submitted, but the election official estimated that about 10 percent of the provisional ballots were placed directly in the ballot box instead. Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited described actions they took to implement provisional voting that worked well for the November 2004 election. Several identified training given to poll workers that prepared them for provisional voting, or had staff dedicated to handling provisional votes, or poll workers with prior provisional voting experience. For example, election officials in 1 Colorado jurisdiction said that they had election judges whose sole responsibility was conducting provisional voting. According to these election officials, the election judges (i.e., poll workers) were well trained and sat at a separate table to handle provisional voting. One jurisdiction we visited in Illinois had specific instructions on the voter affidavit for election workers to follow. Figure 44 provides an example of the affidavit. Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for Poll Workers in Champaign, Illinois: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted: HAVA specifies that voters casting ballots under HAVA's provisional balloting requirements must, in general, execute a written affirmation stating that they are registered in the jurisdiction in which they desire to vote and that they are eligible to vote in that election. Polling place officials, under HAVA, are to transmit either the ballot or the written affirmation information to an appropriate election official for verification to ascertain if the individual is eligible to vote under state law. In the November 2004 election, state requirements regarding the location from which voters had to cast their provisional ballot in order for it to be counted (e.g., in the specific precinct in which the voter is registered or anywhere within the county--city, parish, township--in which the voter was registered) was one key difference among states. States also varied in how missing voter information was handled and how voters were informed whether their vote was counted or not. On the basis of our national survey of local jurisdictions, the most frequent problem encountered by local jurisdictions in counting provisional ballots was that voters did not meet residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction. Location Where Voters Must Cast Their Ballots in Order to Be Counted Varied among States: HAVA requires states to provide provisional balloting where, among other things, individuals assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction in which they desire to vote. The term "jurisdiction" in HAVA's provisional voting requirements is not specifically defined. As a result, states establish, under their own election codes, the applicable jurisdiction where voters must cast their provisional ballot from in order for such ballot to be eligible to be counted. For example, in some states this location is the specific precinct in which the voter is registered, and in other states, the voter may be anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in which the voter resides and is registered. Our survey of state election officials asked where a provisional voter needed to cast a vote in order for it to be counted for the November 2004 election. Figure 45 shows where states reported that provisional voters needed to cast their votes in order for such votes to be eligible to be counted. Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General Election: [See PDF for image] Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin and Wyoming) authorize some measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast their votes in the specific precincts in which they are registered in order for their votes to be eligible to be counted. [End of figure] Variation in state requirements as to the location where a provisional ballot must have been cast in order to be counted was also evident in the jurisdictions we visited. For example, voters in Kansas could, according to election officials, vote provisionally in precincts other than where they were registered (but within the same county) and if otherwise eligible to vote have their vote partially counted (e.g., for county, state, or federal offices or issues). Nevada election officials said they count provisional votes cast anywhere in the county where the voter was registered and otherwise eligible, but all provisional ballots only included federal races. Election officials in both Washington jurisdictions we visited reported that a voter in the November 2004 election was allowed to cast a provisional ballot anywhere in the state of Washington, and the ballot would be forwarded to the correct county (if the ballot was cast in a county other than the one in which the voter was registered) and counted if the voter was eligible. Election officials in 1 Washington jurisdiction we visited said that county election workers mailed the provisional ballots for non-Washington residents to the Secretary of State of the state where the voter claimed to be registered, but these officials were not knowledgeable of what became of the ballots. Election officials in several states have faced court challenges to their state requirements regarding the location where a provisional ballot must have been cast in order to be counted. The litigation has primarily arisen in states requiring that a provisional voter had to cast a vote in the specific precinct in which he or she was registered, in order for that vote to be counted. In this context, the courts have generally held that HAVA does not require a state to count provisional votes cast in the wrong precinct as legal votes when they would otherwise be considered invalid under state law.[Footnote 165] In our state survey, we also asked state election officials if they anticipated that their state would change, by November 2006, where a provisional voter must cast a vote for it to be counted. Forty states reported that they did not anticipate such rules would change. Election officials in 4 states reported they anticipated a change by November 2006. Three out of the 4 states (Arkansas, Nevada, and New Jersey) reporting that they anticipated a change for 2006 had reported for the November 2004 general election that a provisional voter could have cast a vote anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in which the voter resides and have such vote counted. The fourth state, Colorado, had reported for the November 2004 general election that provisional voters had to cast their votes in the specific precincts in which they were registered in order for their votes to be counted. Georgia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia said they did not know whether rules specifying where a provisional voter must cast a ballot in order to be counted could be anticipated to change, and the remaining 4 states responded that they will not have provisional voting. These 4 states are not subject to provisional voting requirements. Residency Requirements and Evidence of Registration Were the Most Frequent Problems Nationwide Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Were Counted: In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked about problems that local jurisdictions encountered during the November 2004 election in counting provisional ballots. On the basis of our survey, in jurisdictions where provisional ballots were cast we estimate that the most frequent problems concerned voters not meeting residency requirements or lacking evidence that the voter was registered. Specifically, we estimate: * 66 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) of jurisdictions had a problem with voters not meeting residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction,[Footnote 166] * 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) received insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at motor vehicle agency offices, * 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had instances of insufficient evidence that individuals had registered or tried to register directly with the election office, * 34 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had registration applications received by the registrar very close to or after the registration deadline, * 32 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had voters not providing identification as specified by HAVA for registrants who registered by mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or jurisdiction, * 29 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) received insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at National Voter Registration Act agencies other than motor vehicle agency offices, * 28 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) had provisional ballot envelopes or ballots that were incomplete or illegible, and: * 20 percent of jurisdictions had problems with voters who did not sign a sworn statement that they met the qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precinct or jurisdiction. Written comments made by local election officials in our nationwide survey identified some additional problems encountered with counting provisional ballots. Examples included uncertainty whether a convicted felon's voting rights, lost as a result of such conviction, had been restored; a voter's registration records that had been sealed by a court; and the state changing the rules several times right up to Election Day, creating confusion, according to election officials. Jurisdictions Visited Identified Variations in How Missing Information Was Handled when Provisional Ballots Were Counted: In addition to variation in where states required provisional ballots to be cast in order to be counted for the November 2004 election, local jurisdictions we visited reported a variation in how to handle a lack of identification or a missing signature. For example, election officials in one New Mexico jurisdiction we visited said that first- time voters that did not provide the required identification had until the close of the polls on Election Day to bring their identification to the county clerk's office. In contrast, according to election officials in a New Jersey and a Georgia jurisdiction, provisional voters were allowed up to 2 days to produce identification for their vote to be counted, and in a Nevada jurisdiction, voters had until 5:00 p.m. the Friday after the election. With respect to mail registrants who were permitted to cast provisional ballots because they did not provide required identification when voting for the first time, election officials in 1 Illinois jurisdiction we visited reported a lack of clarity as to what subsequent identification-related verification was needed prior to counting provisional ballots. According to the Illinois election officials, the state's guidance resulted in a situation where one Illinois jurisdiction required the voter to provide to the county clerk's office identification with an address that matched the address in the voter registration list within 48 hours after the election in order to be counted, while another jurisdiction did not require the two such addresses match. The Illinois officials stated that this issue has been clarified. Jurisdictions we visited also varied in how they handled a missing voter signature. For example, in 1 Colorado jurisdiction, election officials said that they mailed letters to voters who failed to sign their provisional ballot envelopes and allowed the voters up to 10 days after the election to come in and sign so that their votes would be counted. This was not a procedure described in all jurisdictions we visited. In 1 jurisdiction in New Mexico, ballots would not be counted for voters who did not sign the provisional ballot affidavit or roster. In 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited, voters had to complete a new voter registration form or their provisional ballots were not counted. Telephone Was Used Most Often to Provide Voters with the Outcome of Their Provisional Vote: HAVA requires that provisional voters be provided with written information about how to find out whether their vote was counted (and if not, why) using a free access system established by state or local election officials. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the majority of local jurisdictions that had provisional ballots cast used the telephone (often toll-free) as the free access system for voters in the November 2004 election to obtain information on whether their provisional ballot was counted, and if not counted, why not. Table 19 shows the estimated percentage of jurisdictions that used various methods. Some jurisdictions used more than one method. Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Various Methods to Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their Provisional Ballot, November 2004: Method used: Local election office telephone number; Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 84[A]. Method used: State election office telephone number; Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 50[B]. Method used: Letter informing voters of the outcome of their provisional ballot; Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 51[B]. Method used: Internet Web site address; Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 35[B]. Method used: E-mail informing voters of the outcome of their provisional ballot; Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 3[C]. Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. The estimates are based on a subgroup of jurisdictions where provisional ballots were cast. [A] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 percentage points. [B] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points. [C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +6,-3 percentage points. Note: Jurisdictions could indicate using more than one method, therefore the percentages add to more than 100 percent. [End of table] Election officials from jurisdictions we visited described a number of ways that provisional voters were provided information about how to learn the outcome of their votes for the November 2004 election, such as ballot receipts, a copy of the voter's affidavit, a form letter, or a tear-off portion of the provisional ballot envelope. In a New Jersey jurisdiction we visited, provisional voters were given a toll-free number at which to leave their name and address, and then the results were mailed to them, according to election officials. The jurisdiction election officials noted that this process worked well. Figure 46 provides examples of the information voters were provided to inquire whether their vote was counted. Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In our local jurisdiction survey, we asked how soon after Election Day information on the outcome of a provisional ballot was made available to voters. According to written comments, feedback was reported by some election officials to be available to voters after the November 2004 election as early as the next day, or within 7 days after the election, although some allowed 1 month, or until the election was certified. Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited reported that few voters called to find out if their provisional votes were counted. For example, in a Colorado jurisdiction, officials reported approximately 100 calls out of over 6,100 ballots cast; a Kansas jurisdiction election official estimated receiving calls from 6 provisional voters out of over 3,600 that voted; a New Jersey jurisdiction reported receiving 69 inquiries from voters out of over 6,300 cast; and in 3 other jurisdictions we visited, election officials reported no one called to find out if his or her vote was counted. A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted: Estimating the number of provisional ballots initially cast and those that were counted in the November 2004 election is difficult because complete information is not available, and because of differences in how state and local jurisdictions have implemented HAVA provisional voting requirements affecting how and whether such ballots are provided and counted. Those same factors limit the value of comparing provisional ballots cast and counted among jurisdictions. Although estimation is difficult, our survey allowed us to estimate provisional ballots cast, but with strong caveats. While HAVA required that most states permit individuals to cast provisional ballots under certain circumstances, not all jurisdictions reported having provisional ballots cast in their jurisdiction in the November 2004 election. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that provisional votes were cast in 33 percent of jurisdictions and none were cast in 67 percent of jurisdictions.[Footnote 167] Our estimates varied by size of jurisdiction regarding whether provisional votes were cast or not. We estimate that in 99 percent of large jurisdictions, 84 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 12 percent of small jurisdictions provisional votes were cast in the November 2004 election. The differences between all sizes of jurisdictions were statistically significant. The difference between different sizes of jurisdictions' use of provisional ballots may be explained in part by comments from election officials in local jurisdictions surveyed and from officials in jurisdictions we visited. For example, officials in several smaller jurisdictions included in our nationwide survey who reported that provisional ballots were not cast in their jurisdiction had indicated in written comments that election workers are likely to have personal knowledge of a voter's eligibility. As one election official from a Wisconsin jurisdiction wrote, provisional ballots were available, but use of the ballots was not necessary. Similarly, in a small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire, election officials told us that given the town's small population of roughly 1,600 residents, 99 percent of the time someone in the room knew the individual and could vouch for his or her identity. In this circumstance, according to election officials, no verification was necessary at the poll to ensure the voter's identification. Data Were Lacking for National Estimate of Provisional Votes Cast and Counted: The number of provisional ballots cast and counted nationally is difficult to estimate with precision because of the limited data available and data quality concerns. Estimates that are available, however, do serve as an indication that the HAVA provisional voting requirements have allowed potentially eligible voters who otherwise might have been turned away to participate. We requested November 2004 data on provisional ballots cast and counted in our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, but because of missing information and other methodological concerns, our estimate is provided only with strong caveats. We estimate that a total of between 1.1 million and 1.7 million provisional ballots were cast. Our range reflects the fact that an estimated 20 percent of the jurisdictions in our survey did not provide data on how many provisional ballots were cast. We could not estimate the number of provisional ballots that were counted with any level of certainty, because of a very high level of missing data--an estimated 40 percent of the jurisdictions did not provide data on the number of provisional ballots counted. In addition, some jurisdictions in our survey providing the number of provisional ballots cast may have actually provided the number of provisional votes counted. It is possible this may have occurred because jurisdictions would more likely have a record of the number of provisional votes determined to be qualified and counted than they would have the number of provisional votes originally submitted at polling places (cast).[Footnote 168] For example, in 1 jurisdiction we visited, provisional ballot numbers were provided only on the number of provisional votes that were counted. If some responses to our survey of local jurisdictions actually provided the number of votes counted rather than the number of votes cast, then our estimate of provisional votes cast may be an underestimate. HAVA specifies that information be made available to individuals through a free access system (such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet Web site) regarding whether their provisional votes were counted and, if a vote was not counted, the reason it was not counted.[Footnote 169] The specifics of implementing such a system, such as the methods by which such information is to be identified, collected, and maintained, however, under HAVA, are left to the discretion of state and local election officials. The National Task Force on Election Reform recommended that states develop a uniform method for reporting provisional ballots at the state and national levels, and also that states collect data on the number of provisional ballots cast on Election Day.[Footnote 170] Some states might require the information on ballots cast and counted be sent for statewide figures. Election officials in a Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, for example, said that the Registrar completed a provisional ballot report for the Secretary of State in accordance with state guidance. Other national estimates of the number of provisional votes cast and counted in the November 2004 election have been affected by data quality issues. The Election Assistance Commission, using data from its survey of election administrators,[Footnote 171] estimated that 1.9 million voters cast provisional ballots at the polls in November 2004, and that 1.2 million of those votes cast were counted.[Footnote 172] As with our estimates, EAC cautioned that the coverage, or response rate, for its estimates was limited. The response rate for provisional ballots cast and counted was 46 percent and 38 percent, respectively. The report authors stated that data quality issues, such as missing data or data error entries (such as in 15 jurisdictions in the EAC report where the number of provisional ballots counted was greater than the jurisdiction reported as cast) were identified and corrected where possible. On the basis of data collected at different times from different sources in different states, electionline.org estimated that over 1.6 million provisional ballots were cast, and nearly 1.1 million of them were counted. However, readers are cautioned here as well about the limitations of the available data. For example, figures are not definitive because of the variation in requirements and procedures among (or even within) states, and estimates are based on incomplete information.[Footnote 173] The authors stated that they provided provisional voting estimates with the intent of moving the discussion of provisional voting forward. Number of November 2004 Provisional Votes Cast and Counted in Local Jurisdictions We Visited: Information provided by some of the jurisdictions we visited illustrates the variation in the reported number of provisional ballots cast and counted during the November 2004 election, as shown in table 20. Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected Jurisdictions: Jurisdiction: El Paso, CO; Provisional: ballots cast: 6,158; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 4,779; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 78; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 242,888. Jurisdiction: Larimer, CO; Provisional: ballots cast: 2,636; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 1,798; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 68; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 147,112. Jurisdiction: New Haven, CT; Provisional: ballots cast: 75; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 67; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 89; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: Not available. Jurisdiction: Dougherty, GA; Provisional: ballots cast: 130; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 12; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 9; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 33,809. Jurisdiction: Muscogee, GA; Provisional: ballots cast: 210; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 107; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 51; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 64,336. Jurisdiction: Champaign, IL; Provisional: ballots cast: 292; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 64; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 22; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 84,153. Jurisdiction: Chicago, IL; Provisional: ballots cast: 22,611; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 13,838; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 61; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 1,063,860. Jurisdiction: Johnson, KS; Provisional: ballots cast: 10,942; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 7,375; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 67; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 259,599. Jurisdiction: Wyandotte, KS; Provisional: ballots cast: 3,664; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 2,780; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 76; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 53,630. Jurisdiction: Clark, NV; Provisional: ballots cast: 4,352; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 1,543; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 35; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 546,858. Jurisdiction: Washoe, NV; Provisional: ballots cast: 1,465; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 880; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 60; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 159,511. Jurisdiction: Bernalillo, NM; Provisional: ballots cast: 12,367; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 6,233; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 50; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 263,054. Jurisdiction: Santa Fe, NM; Provisional: ballots cast: 580; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 230; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 40; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 67,782. Jurisdiction: Carteret, NC; Provisional: ballots cast: 1,099; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 888; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 81; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 31,770. Jurisdiction: Guilford, NC; Provisional: ballots cast: 2,260; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 1,291; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 57; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 201,854. Jurisdiction: Cuyahoga, OH; Provisional: ballots cast: 25,309; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 16,750; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 66; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 687,255. Jurisdiction: Mahoning, OH; Provisional: ballots cast: 2,786; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 2,350; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 84; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 134,290. Jurisdiction: Clark, WA; Provisional: ballots cast: 5,214; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 4,215; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 81; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 172,277. Jurisdiction: King, WA; Provisional: ballots cast: 31,712; Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 28,010; Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 88; Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 898,238. Source: GAO summary of information provided by jurisdictions we visited. [End of table] When looking at provisional ballots cast and counted for a particular jurisdiction, the variability in the implementation of provisional voting by states and jurisdictions makes interpretation and comparison among jurisdictions difficult. As mentioned earlier, the number of provisional votes cast and counted may vary based on a number of factors. In general, states and jurisdictions vary in why and how provisional ballots are provided to potential voters, as well as the state and local procedures for how provisional ballots are counted. A partial list of these factors includes the following: * State provisions varied regarding the additional circumstances (apart from the minimum requirements specified in HAVA) under whi