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Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments' which was released 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

July 2005: 

Military Bases: 

Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base 
Closures and Realignments: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-785, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense submitted proposed base 
realignment and closure (BRAC) actions to an independent commission for 
its review. The Commission must submit its recommendations to the 
President by September 8, 2005, for his acceptance or rejection in 
their entirety. Congress has final action to accept or reject these 
recommendations in their entirety later this year. The law requires 
that GAO issue a report on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
recommendations and selection process by July 1, 2005. GAO’s objectives 
were to (1) determine the extent to which DOD’s proposals achieved its 
stated BRAC goals, (2) analyze whether the process for developing 
recommendations was logical and reasoned, and (3) identify issues with 
the recommendations that may warrant further attention. Time 
constraints limited GAO’s ability to examine implementation details of 
most of the individual recommended actions. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD had varying success in achieving its 2005 BRAC goals of (1) 
reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) furthering 
transformation, and (3) fostering jointness. While DOD proposed a 
record number of closures and realignments, exceeding all prior BRAC 
rounds combined, many proposals focused on reserve bases and relatively 
few on closing active bases. Projected savings are almost equally 
large, but most savings are derived from 10 percent of the 
recommendations. While GAO believes savings would be achieved, overall 
up-front investment costs of an estimated $24 billion are required, and 
there are clear limitations associated with DOD’s projection of nearly 
$50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much of the projected net 
annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating 
jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than 
reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected 
to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but 
also limit dollar savings available for other uses. Sizable savings 
were projected from efficiency measures and other actions, but 
underlying assumptions have not been validated and could be difficult 
to track over time. Some proposals represent efforts to foster 
jointness and transformation, such as initial joint training for the 
Joint Strike Fighter, but progress in each area varied, with many 
decisions reflecting consolidations within, and not across, the 
military services. In addition, transformation was often cited as 
support for proposals, but it was not well defined, and there was a 
lack of agreement on various transformation options. 

DOD’s process for conducting its analysis was generally logical, 
reasoned, and well documented. DOD’s process placed strong emphasis on 
data, tempered by military judgment, as appropriate. The military 
services and seven joint cross-service groups, which focused on common 
business-oriented functions, adapted their analytical approaches to the 
unique aspects of their respective areas. Yet, they were consistent in 
adhering to the use of military value criteria, including new 
considerations introduced for this round, such as surge and homeland 
defense needs. Data accuracy was enhanced by the required use of 
certified data and by efforts of the DOD Inspector General and service 
audit agencies in checking the data. 

Time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together 
an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment actions across the country 
into 222 individual recommendations caused GAO to focus more on 
evaluating major cross-cutting issues than on implementation issues of 
individual recommendations. GAO identified various issues that may 
warrant further attention by the Commission. Some apply to a broad 
range of recommendations, such as assumptions and inconsistencies in 
developing certain cost and savings estimates, lengthy payback periods, 
or potential impacts on affected communities. GAO also identified 
certain candidate recommendations, including some that were changed by 
senior DOD leadership late in the process that may warrant attention. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making a recommendation to DOD aimed at tracking and 
periodically updating savings, and is highlighting issues for the BRAC 
Commission’s consideration. 

In providing oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred 
with the recommendation to establish a system to track and periodically 
update BRAC savings estimates. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 
512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD's Recommendations Would Have Varying Degrees of Success in 
Achieving Goals for the 2005 BRAC Round: 

DOD Developed a Generally Logical and Reasoned Process for Making BRAC 
Decisions: 

Several Aspects of DOD's BRAC Recommendations and Rejected Proposals 
May Warrant Further Attention: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Glossary of BRAC-Related Terms: 

Appendix III: The Department of the Army Selection Process and 
Recommendations: 

Appendix IV: The Department of the Navy Selection Process and 
Recommendations: 

Appendix V: The Department of the Air Force Selection Process and 
Recommendations: 

Appendix VI: Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 
Process and Recommendations: 

Appendix VII: Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service 
Group Selection Process and Recommendations: 

Appendix VIII: Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process 
and Recommendations: 

Appendix IX: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process 
and Recommendations: 

Appendix X: Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 
Recommendations: 

Appendix XI: Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 
Process and Recommendations: 

Appendix XII: Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 
Recommendations: 

Appendix XIII: Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model: 

Appendix XIV: Economic Impact Assessments: 

Appendix XV: Draft DOD Transformational Options Recommended for 
Approval: 

Appendix XVI: Key GAO and Other Defense Audit Agency Products Related 
to DOD's 2005 Base Realignments and Closures: 

Appendix XVII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC 2005 with Previous Rounds: 

Table 2: Projected Costs and Savings from BRAC 2005 Recommendations: 

Table 3: Major Recommendations Supporting Joint Activity: 

Table 4: Payback Periods for BRAC Recommendations by DOD Component: 

Table 5: Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs for DOD's 
Recommended Major Base Closures: 

Table 6: Military Installations That Would Receive a Net Gain of Over 
2,000 Personnel due to BRAC Actions: 

Table 7: Candidate Recommendations That Were Deleted or Significantly 
Revised by the Infrastructure Executive Council: 

Table 8: Excess Capacity Identified by the Army for Selected Mission 
Areas: 

Table 9: Army Military Value Criteria Weights: 

Table 10: Financial Aspects of the Army's Recommendations: 

Table 11: Excess Capacity Identified by the Navy, by Function: 

Table 12: Navy Military Value Criteria Weights: 

Table 13: Financial Aspects of the Navy's Recommendations: 

Table 14: Comparison of Alternatives to Closing and Realigning Naval 
Air Station Brunswick and Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow: 

Table 15: Excess Capacity Identified by the Air Force, by Function: 

Table 16: Air Force Military Value Criteria Weights: 

Table 17: Financial Aspects of the Air Force's Recommendations: 

Table 18: Impact of Air Force BRAC Recommendations on Installations 
with Flying Missions, by Component: 

Table 19: Comparison of Alternatives to Closing or Realigning Grand 
Forks Air Force Base: 

Table 20: Excess Capacity Identified by the Education and Training 
Joint Cross-Service Group: 

Table 21: Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Military 
Value Criteria Weights: 

Table 22: Financial Aspects of the Education and Training Joint Cross-
Service Group's Recommendations: 

Table 23: Excess Capacity Identified by the Headquarters and Support 
Activities Joint Cross-Service Group: 

Table 24: Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group 
Military Value Criteria Weights: 

Table 25: Financial Aspects of the Headquarters and Support Activities 
Joint Cross-Service Group's Recommendations: 

Table 26: Impact of One-time Antiterrorism and Force Protection Savings 
on Recommendations Involving Leased Space: 

Table 27: Excess Capacity Identified by the Industrial Joint Cross-
Service Group: 

Table 28: Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria 
Weights: 

Table 29: Financial Aspects of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service 
Group's Recommendations: 

Table 30: Excess Capacity Identified by the Intelligence Joint Cross-
Service Group: 

Table 31: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value 
Criteria Weights: 

Table 32: Financial Aspects of the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service 
Group's Recommendations: 

Table 33: Excess Capacity Identified by the Medical Joint Cross-Service 
Group: 

Table 34: Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria 
Weights: 

Table 35: Financial Aspects of the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group's 
Recommendations: 

Table 36: Excess Capacity Identified by the Supply and Storage Joint 
Cross-Service Group: 

Table 37: Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value 
Criteria Weights: 

Table 38: Financial Aspects of the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-
Service Group's Recommendations: 

Table 39: Excess Capacity Identified by the Technical Joint Cross-
Service Group: 

Table 40: Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria 
Weights: 

Table 41: Financial Aspects of the Technical Joint Cross-Service 
Group's Recommendations: 

Table 42: Comparison of Alternatives to Personnel Reductions for the 
Recommendation to Create a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments 
Research, Development and Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation Center: 

Table 43: Estimated Costs and Savings for the Rejected Closure of Los 
Angeles Air Force Base: 

Table 44: Major Improvements to COBRA for the BRAC 2005 Round: 

Table 45: Five Economic Areas with the Greatest Negative Impact on 
Employment: 

Table 46: Five Economic Areas with the Greatest Positive Economic 
Impact on Employment: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: DOD's BRAC Leadership Structure: 

Figure 2: DOD's Selection Criteria for BRAC 2005 Round: 

Figure 3: DOD's BRAC 2005 Process: 

Figure 4: Major Base Closures with Plant Replacement Values Exceeding 
$100 Million: 

Figure 5: Major Base Realignments with a Net Loss of 400 or More 
Military and Civilian Personnel: 

Figure 6: Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings: 

Figure 7: Analytical Process Leading to BRAC Recommendations: 

Figure 8: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value for a Technical Facility: 

Figure 9: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of an Army Installation: 

Figure 10: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of Naval Aviation Operations: 

Figure 11: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of Fighter Aircraft: 

Figure 12: Realignment of Fighter Aircraft at Lambert-St. Louis Air 
Guard Station and Otis Air National Guard Base: 

Figure 13: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of Flight Training: 

Figure 14: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of Major Administrative and Headquarters 
Activities: 

Figure 15: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of Depot Maintenance Activities: 

Figure 16: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of an Intelligence Facility: 

Figure 17: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of Health Care Services: 

Figure 18: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of Supply and Storage Activities: 

Figure 19: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value of a Technical Facility: 

Letter July 1, 2005: 

Congressional Committees: 

It has been 10 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) last 
conducted a base realignment and closure (BRAC) round.[Footnote 1] As a 
result of prior BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, DOD reports 
that it has reduced its domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent in 
terms of plant replacement value,[Footnote 2] transferred hundreds of 
thousand of acres of unneeded property to other federal and nonfederal 
entities, and saved billions of dollars on an annual recurring basis 
for application to higher priority defense needs. Despite these 
infrastructure reductions, DOD recognized the need for additional 
closures and realignments following the 1995 closure round and made 
repeated efforts to gain congressional authorization for an additional 
closure round. 

We too have frequently reported in recent years on the long-term 
challenges DOD faces in managing its portfolio of facilities, halting 
degradation of facilities, and reducing unneeded infrastructure to free 
up funds to better maintain enduring facilities and meet other needs. 
Because of these long-standing issues, DOD's management of its support 
infrastructure has been included in our list of high-risk areas since 
1997. 

Congress authorized an additional BRAC round for 2005 with the passage 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (the 
Act).[Footnote 3] The 2002 Act essentially extended the authority of 
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,[Footnote 4] which 
had authorized the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, with some modifications 
for the 2005 base closure round. The BRAC legislation provides for an 
independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review 
the Secretary of Defense's realignment and closure recommendations, 
which were publicly announced on May 13, 2005, and present its findings 
and conclusions on the Secretary's recommendations, along with its own 
recommendations to the President, by September 8, 2005. The President, 
in turn, must either approve or disapprove the Commission's 
recommendations in their entirety by September 23, 2005. If approved, 
the recommendations are forwarded to Congress, which has 45 days or 
until the adjournment of Congress to disapprove the recommendations on 
an all-or-none basis; otherwise, they become binding.[Footnote 5] If 
the President disapproves the recommendations, the Commission must 
consider the President's objections and send a revised report back to 
the President no later than October 20, 2005. The President then has 
until November 7, 2005, to forward his approval of the revised 
Commission recommendations to Congress for its review. 

Considering changes in the national security environment and emerging 
threats, along with ongoing changes in the United States defense 
strategy to address these threats and protect our homeland, DOD has 
come to realize the need to reshape its base structure to more 
effectively support its military forces. In establishing goals for the 
2005 BRAC round, the Secretary of Defense, in a November 15, 2002, 
memorandum initiating the round, expressed his interest in (1) reducing 
excess infrastructure, which diverts scarce resources from overall 
defense capability, and producing savings; (2) transforming DOD by 
aligning the infrastructure with the defense strategy; and (3) 
fostering jointness by examining and implementing opportunities for 
greater jointness across DOD. 

In the submission of his recommendations to the BRAC Commission on May 
13, 2005, the Secretary reported that his recommendations, if approved, 
would accomplish these goals. DOD reported that its 222 
recommendations, involving an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment 
actions--including 33 major base closures and 30 major realignments, 
plus numerous other closures and realignments would generate annual 
recurring savings of about $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012. 

Legislation authorizing the 2005 round maintained the requirement, 
applicable to three previous rounds, that we provide a detailed 
analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and the selection process. 
Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which DOD achieved 
its stated goals for BRAC 2005, (2) analyze whether DOD's selection 
process in developing recommended actions was logical and reasoned, and 
(3) identify issues regarding the recommendations that may warrant 
attention by the BRAC Commission. 

To analyze the selection process and the recommendations, we monitored 
various aspects of the process as it evolved over time leading up to 
and following the public release of the Secretary's recommendations. We 
sought to assure ourselves that DOD followed a logical, reasoned, and 
well-documented decision-making process leading to the proposed 
recommendations. Prior to the release of the recommendations, we abided 
by an agreement with DOD not to disclose details of the process due to 
the sensitivity of the information while the process evolved. With the 
approval of the large number of recommendations occurring in the final 
weeks of the process, the broad scope and complexity of the 
recommendations, and the limited time available for us to report our 
results, we generally focused greater attention following the 
announcement of the proposed closures and realignments on those issues 
affecting more than one recommendation than on issues pertaining to the 
implementation of individual recommendations. However, as time 
permitted, we visited selected installations to better gauge the 
operational and economic impact of the proposed recommendations. We 
generally experienced good access to relevant documentation and to key 
senior officials and staff involved in the BRAC process. 

We performed our work primarily at the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), the military services' base closure offices, and the 
offices of the seven joint cross-service groups that were established 
by the Secretary to propose cross-service recommendations.[Footnote 6] 
While we did not attend deliberative meetings, we had access to minutes 
of meetings and relevant documentation, as well as opportunities to 
meet periodically with senior leadership to provide observations or 
concerns we had as the process was unfolding. We relied on DOD's Office 
of the Inspector General, Army Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, and 
Air Force Audit Agency to validate the accuracy of the data used by the 
military services and joint cross-service groups in their decision-
making process. We met with staff members of these audit agencies 
periodically to discuss the results of their work as well as to observe 
their data validation efforts at selected locations. Based on these 
discussions and observations and a review of their reports, we believe 
the DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 
We conducted our work from October 2003, as DOD's process was 
beginning, through June 2005, shortly after the Secretary of Defense 
announced his proposed closures and realignments, in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details on 
the scope and methodology are described in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD's recommendations, if approved, would have varying degrees of 
success in achieving goals that were set forth by the Secretary of 
Defense, despite producing closure and realignment actions numbering 
more than those of all four previous rounds combined. The department's 
recommendations were dominated by relatively minor closures and 
realignments, and many were related to the reserve components.[Footnote 
7] DOD data indicate that implementing the proposed recommendations 
would reduce the defense infrastructure by about 5 percent based on the 
facilities' plant replacement value. We believe the recommendations 
overall, if approved, would produce savings. However, overall up-front 
investment costs of an estimated $24 billion are required, and there 
are limitations associated with DOD's projection of nearly $50 billion 
in net present value savings over a 20-year period.[Footnote 8] Most 
projected savings are derived from 10 percent of the 222 
recommendations. Also, much of the projected net annual recurring 
savings (47 percent) are associated with eliminating jobs currently 
held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength 
levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to 
other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit dollar 
savings available for other uses. Without recognition that these are 
not dollar savings that can be readily applied elsewhere, this could 
create a false sense of savings available for other purposes. 
Furthermore, about $500 million of the net annual recurring savings is 
based on business process reengineering efforts, but some of the 
assumptions supporting the expected efficiency gains have not been 
validated; while savings are likely to be realized, the precise 
magnitude of savings is uncertain. For example, one of DOD's 
recommendations--to create fleet readiness centers in the Navy by 
integrating different levels of maintenance to reduce repair time--is 
estimated to yield $215 million in annual recurring savings as a result 
of overhead efficiencies, but such assumptions have not been validated 
and actual savings will be shaped by how the recommendations are 
implemented. We have previously reported on limitations in DOD's 
efforts to track and update savings from prior BRAC rounds. Our 
concerns over this issue are heightened in this BRAC round, with the 
emphasis on business process reengineering efforts, because of past 
tendencies to reduce related operating budgets in advance of actual 
savings being known and fully realized. While DOD characterized many of 
its recommendations as transformational--whereby infrastructure would 
be aligned with the defense strategy--we found that the concept of 
transformation is not well defined, and many of the recommendations 
referencing it as support for the proposed BRAC actions are more 
appropriately categorized as efforts to improve business processes. 
Some proposed actions increase emphasis on jointness, such as 
establishing a single site for initial training for the Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft. However, the extent of joint and transformational 
progress varied, as shown by other DOD-proposed actions reflecting 
preferences to consolidate functions within rather than across 
services, and by a lack of agreement on transformational options 
despite frequent references to them in support of proposed actions. We 
are making a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to establish 
mechanisms for tracking and periodically updating savings estimates as 
the BRAC recommendations are implemented. 

DOD's decision-making process for developing its recommendations was 
generally logical, well documented, and reasoned. DOD established a 
structured and largely sequential process for obtaining and analyzing 
data that provided an informed basis for identifying and evaluating 
BRAC options. At the same time, initial difficulties in obtaining 
complete and accurate data in a timely manner often added to overlap 
and varying degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and 
other steps in the process. That notwithstanding, DOD's process relied 
on certified data,[Footnote 9] as required by the BRAC legislation, and 
the use of various analytical models to evaluate the data. Further, as 
the military services and joint cross-service groups assessed the 
importance of installations, facilities, and functions, they were 
consistent in following the key considerations set forth in the BRAC 
law--such as military value--although they varied somewhat in their 
analytical approaches based on unique aspects of the functions being 
evaluated. As Congress mandated, DOD updated and considered its 20-year 
force structure plan in completing its BRAC analysis.[Footnote 10] 
Further, DOD focused on the military value selection criteria as the 
predominant decision-making factor, including legislatively mandated 
emphasis for this BRAC round on such elements as homeland defense and 
surge capability. Military judgment also played a role throughout the 
process. While the effort to ensure the accuracy of the voluminous 
amounts of data used in the process proved challenging for the services 
and joint cross-service groups, the DOD Inspector General and the 
military service audit agencies played key roles in pointing out data 
limitations, fostering corrections, and improving the accuracy of the 
data used in the process through their validation efforts, and 
generally found the data sufficiently reliable to support BRAC decision 
making. 

We identified various issues regarding DOD's BRAC recommendations, as 
well as candidate recommendations[Footnote 11] that were not included 
on DOD's final list that may warrant further attention by the BRAC 
Commission. These issues include instances of lengthy payback periods, 
which is the time required to recoup up-front investment costs for 
closing or realigning a facility or function; inconsistencies in 
formulating cost and savings estimates; uncertainties in estimating 
total costs to the government for implementing recommended actions; and 
potential impacts on communities surrounding bases that are either 
losing or gaining large numbers of personnel. With respect to the 
latter issue, this BRAC round differs from prior rounds in that many 
communities will be facing increased growth with the return of 
thousands of forces from overseas locations and the consequent 
challenges of addressing increased needs in areas such as schools and 
housing. In a few instances, we identified implementation or 
operational issues related to some recommendations. We are also 
highlighting specific closure or realignment actions that were 
projected as having the potential to generate significant savings that 
the services or joint cross-service groups approved for further 
consideration, but which were either deleted or substantially revised 
by senior DOD leadership during the latter phases of the selection 
process. 

In providing oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred 
with the recommendation regarding the need for a system to track and 
periodically update BRAC savings estimates. 

Background: 

As described at the beginning of this report, DOD recognized the need 
for additional base closures and realignments following the 1995 
closure round and made repeated efforts to gain congressional 
authorization for an additional closure round. Congress authorized an 
additional round for 2005 with the passage of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.[Footnote 12] The 2002 Act 
essentially extended the authority of the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990,[Footnote 13] which had authorized the 1991, 
1993, and 1995 rounds, with some modifications for the 2005 base 
closure round. 

In a memorandum dated November 15, 2002, the Secretary of Defense 
issued initial guidance outlining goals and a leadership framework for 
the 2005 BRAC round. In doing so, he noted that "At a minimum, BRAC 
2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity; the operation, 
sustainment and recapitalization of which diverts scarce resources from 
defense capability." However, specific reduction goals were not 
established.[Footnote 14] At the same time, the Secretary's guidance 
for the 2005 round depicted the round as focusing on more than the 
reduction of excess capacity. He said that "BRAC 2005 can make an even 
more profound contribution to transforming the Department by 
rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy." He further 
noted that "A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning 
our base structure to meet our post-Cold War force structure, is to 
examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity." Toward 
that end, the Secretary indicated that organizationally the 2005 BRAC 
analysis would be two pronged. Joint cross-service teams would analyze 
common business-oriented functions, and the military departments would 
analyze service-unique functions. 

The Secretary of Defense established two senior groups to oversee and 
guide the BRAC 2005 process from a departmental perspective. The first 
was the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), which was designated 
the policy-making and oversight body for the entire process, and the 
second, a subordinate group, was the Infrastructure Steering Group 
(ISG), created to oversee the joint cross-service analyses and 
integrate that process with the military departments' own service-
unique analyses. Each of the military departments also established BRAC 
organizations, which had oversight from senior leaders. Likewise, each 
of the joint cross-service teams, under the purview of the ISG, was led 
by senior military or civilian officials, with representation from each 
of the services and relevant defense agencies. DOD's BRAC leadership 
structure is shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: DOD's BRAC Leadership Structure: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

DOD developed a draft set of 77 transformational options that once 
approved, were expected to constitute a minimum analytical framework 
upon which the military departments and joint cross-service groups 
would conduct their respective BRAC analyses. Because of a lack of 
agreement among the services and OSD, the draft options were never 
formally approved, but they remained available for consideration by 
analytical teams and were referenced by some groups in support of 
various BRAC actions being considered.[Footnote 15] (See app. XV for a 
list of the draft transformational options.) To some extent, the 
analyses and recommendations of each of the services and joint cross-
service groups were also influenced by various guiding principles or 
policy imperatives developed by the respective service or joint cross-
service groups, such as the need to preserve a particular capability in 
a particular location. 

The legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, enacted as part of the 
fiscal year 2002 Defense Authorization Act, required DOD to give 
priority to selection criteria dealing with military value and added 
elements of specificity to criteria previously used by DOD in prior 
BRAC rounds. Subsequently, The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005[Footnote 16] codified the entire 
selection criteria and added the word "surge" to one previously used 
criterion related to potential future contingencies and mobilization 
efforts. In large measure, the final criteria closely followed the 
criteria DOD employed in prior rounds, with greater specificity added 
in some areas, as required by Congress. Figure 2 shows DOD's selection 
criteria for 2005, with changes from BRAC 1995 denoted in 
bold.[Footnote 17]

Figure 2: DOD's Selection Criteria for BRAC 2005 Round: 

* Military value criteria: 

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 
operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, 
including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness; 
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 
airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, 
naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain 
areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland 
defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations; 
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and 
future total force requirements at both existing and potential 
receiving locations to support operations and training; 
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 

* Other criteria: 
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure 
or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs; 
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of 
military installations; 
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential 
receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel; 
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to 
potential environmental restoration, waste management, and 
environmental compliance activities. 

[See PDF for image]

Source: DOD and P.L. 101-510, section 2913. 

Note: Bolding denotes changes from the 1995 BRAC round. 

[End of figure]

To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, OSD 
established a common analytical framework to be used by each military 
service and joint cross-service group. Each service and group adapted 
this framework, in varying degrees, to its individual activities and 
functions in evaluating facilities and functions and identifying 
closure and realignment options. Despite the diversity of bases and 
cross-service functions analyzed, each of the groups was expected to 
first analyze capacity and military value of its respective facilities 
or functions, and then to identify and evaluate various closure and 
realignment scenarios and provide specific recommendations. Scenarios 
were derived from data analysis and transformational options, as well 
as from goals and objectives each group established for itself as it 
began its work. Figure 3 depicts the expected progression of that 
process. 

Figure 3: DOD's BRAC 2005 Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

An initial part of the process involved an overall capacity analysis of 
specific locations or functions and subfunctions at specific locations. 
The analysis relied on data calls to obtain certified data to assess 
such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current 
usage, excess capacity, and capacity needed to meet surge requirements. 

The military value analysis consisted of assessments of operational and 
physical characteristics of each installation, or specific functions on 
an installation related to a specific joint cross-service group's area 
of responsibility. These would include an installation's or function's 
current and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to 
accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. This analysis also 
relied on data calls to obtain certified data on the various attributes 
and metrics used to assess each of the four military value criteria and 
permit meaningful comparisons between like installations/facilities 
with reference to the collective military value selection criteria. DOD 
officials used these data to develop comparative military value scores 
for each installation/facility or for categories of facilities serving 
like functions. 

The scenario development and analysis phase focused on identifying 
various realignment and closure scenarios for further analysis. These 
scenarios were to be derived from consideration of the department's 20-
year force structure plan, capacity analysis, military value analysis, 
and transformational options; applicable guiding principles, 
objectives, or policy imperatives identified by individual military 
services or joint cross-service groups; and military judgment. Each 
component had available for its use an optimization or linear 
programming model that could combine the results of capacity and 
military value analyses and other information to derive scenarios and 
sets of alternatives. The model could be used to address varying policy 
imperatives or objectives, such as minimizing the number of sites, 
minimizing the amount of excess capacity, or maximizing the average 
military value. A BRAC review group could also direct variations that 
would, for example, eliminate as much excess capacity as possible while 
maintaining an average military value at least as high as the original 
set of sites. 

OSD policy guidance has historically specified that priority 
consideration be given to military value in making closure and 
realignment decisions, but that priority was specifically mandated by 
the legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round. At the same time, 
historic practice and the 2005 authorizing legislation both required 
consideration of additional issues included in selection criteria 5 
through 8, detailed below: 

* Criterion 5--costs and savings: This criterion consists of measures 
of costs and savings and the payback periods[Footnote 18] associated 
with them. Each component assessed costs using the Cost of Base 
Realignment Actions (COBRA) model that was used in each of the BRAC 
rounds since 1988. Appendix XIII summarizes improvements that have been 
made to the model over time and more recently for the 2005 round. 

* Criterion 6--economic impact: This criterion measures the direct and 
indirect impacts of a BRAC action on employment in the communities 
affected by a closure or realignment. Appendix XIV provides a more 
complete description of how economic impact was assessed and the 
changes made to improve the assessment for this round. 

* Criterion 7--community infrastructure: Selection criterion 7 examines 
"the ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential 
receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel." The 
services and joint cross-service groups considered information on 
demographics, childcare, cost of living, employment, education, 
housing, medical care, safety and crime, transportation, and public 
utilities of the communities impacted by a BRAC action. 

* Criterion 8--environmental impact: Selection criterion 8 assesses 
"the environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to 
potential environmental restoration, waste management, and 
environmental compliance activities" of closure and realignment 
recommendations. In considering this criterion, the services and joint 
cross-service groups focused mainly on potential environmental impacts 
while acknowledging, when appropriate, known environmental restoration 
costs associated with an installation recommended for closure or 
realignment. Waste management and environmental compliance costs were 
factored into criterion 5. However, under OSD policy guidance, 
environmental restoration costs were not considered in the cost and 
savings analyses for evaluating individual scenarios under criterion 5. 
DOD is obligated to restore contaminated sites on military bases 
regardless of whether they are closed, and such costs could be affected 
by reuse plans that cannot be known at this time but would be budgeted 
for at a later time when those plans and costs are better identified. 

Each of the military departments produced reports with closure and 
realignment recommendations, as did each of the joint cross-service 
groups, the results of which are summarized in appendixes III through 
XII. Figures 4 and 5 show, respectively, the 33 major closures and 30 
major realignments that have been recommended by DOD where plant 
replacement values exceed $100 million for major base closures and net 
losses of 400 or more military and civilian personnel for major base 
realignments. 

Figure 4: Major Base Closures with Plant Replacement Values Exceeding 
$100 Million: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Figure 5: Major Base Realignments with a Net Loss of 400 or More 
Military and Civilian Personnel: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

While the 2005 BRAC round, like earlier BRAC rounds, was chartered to 
focus on United States domestic bases,[Footnote 19] DOD separately had 
under way a review of overseas basing requirements that had 
implications for the domestic BRAC process. In a September 2004 report 
to Congress, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provided an 
update on DOD's "global defense posture review." It noted that once 
completed, the changes stemming from the review would result in the 
most profound reordering of United States military forces overseas as 
the current posture has been largely unchanged since the Korean War. 
The report noted that over the next 10 years, it is planned that up to 
70,000 military personnel would return to the United States, along with 
approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees. It further 
noted that a net reduction of approximately 35 percent of overseas 
sites--bases, installations, and facilities--is planned. DOD had 
indicated that the domestic BRAC process would be used in making 
decisions on where to relocate forces returning to the United States 
from overseas bases. 

Separately, Congress in 2003 mandated the creation of a special 
commission to evaluate, among other things, the current and proposed 
overseas basing structure of the United States military 
forces.[Footnote 20] The Commission's observations are included in its 
May 2005 report.[Footnote 21] Among other things, the Commission cited 
the need for appropriate planning to ensure the availability of 
community infrastructure to support returning troops and to mitigate 
the impact on communities. 

DOD's Recommendations Would Have Varying Degrees of Success in 
Achieving Goals for the 2005 BRAC Round: 

The recommendations proposed by the Secretary of Defense would have 
varying degrees of success in achieving DOD's BRAC 2005 goals of 
reducing infrastructure and achieving savings, furthering 
transformation objectives, and fostering joint activity among the 
military services. While DOD proposed a record number of closure and 
realignment actions, exceeding those in all prior BRAC rounds combined, 
many proposals focus on the reserve component bases and relatively few 
on closing active bases. Projected savings are almost equally as large, 
as all prior BRAC rounds combined, but about 80 percent of the 
projected 20-year net present value savings (savings minus up-front 
investment costs) are derived from only 10 percent of the 
recommendations. While we believe the recommendations overall would 
achieve savings, up-front investment costs of about $24 billion are 
required to implement all recommendations to achieve DOD's overall 
expected savings of nearly $50 billion over 20 years. Much of these 
saving are related to eliminations of jobs currently held by military 
personnel but are not likely to result in end-strength reductions, 
limiting savings available for other purposes. Some proposed actions 
represent some progress in emphasizing transformation and jointness, 
but progress in these efforts varied without clear agreement on 
transformational options to be considered, and many recommendations 
tended to foster jointness by consolidating functions within rather 
than across military services. 

BRAC 2005 Round Differs from Past Rounds: 

The BRAC 2005 round is different from previous base closure rounds in 
terms of number of actions, projected implementation costs, and 
estimated annual recurring savings. While the number of major closures 
and realignments is just a little greater than individual previous 
rounds, the number of minor closure and realignments, as shown in table 
1, is significantly greater than those in all previous rounds combined. 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC 2005 with Previous Rounds: 

Dollars in billions. 

1988; 
Major bases: Closures: 16; 
Major bases: Realignments: 4; 
Minor closures and realignments: 23; 
Total actions: 43; 
Costs: $2.7; 
Net annual recurring savings: $0.9. 

1991; 
Major bases: Closures: 26; 
Major bases: Realignments: 17; 
Minor closures and realignments: 32; 
Total actions: 75; 
Costs: $5.2; 
Net annual recurring savings: $2.0. 

1993; 
Major bases: Closures: 28; 
Major bases: Realignments: 12; 
Minor closures and realignments: 123; 
Total actions: 163; 
Costs: $7.6; 
Net annual recurring savings: $2.6. 

1995; 
Major bases: Closures: 27; 
Major bases: Realignments: 22; 
Minor closures and realignments: 57; 
Total actions: 106; 
Costs: $6.5; 
Net annual recurring savings: $1.7. 

Total (for previous BRAC rounds); 
Major bases: Closures: 97; 
Major bases: Realignments: 55; 
Minor closures and realignments: 235; 
Total actions: 387; 
Costs: $22.0; 
Net annual recurring savings: $7.2. 

Total (for 2005 BRAC round); 
Major bases: Closures: 33; 
Major bases: Realignments: 30; 
Minor closures and realignments: 774; 
Total actions: 837; 
Costs: $24.4; 
Net annual recurring savings: $5.5. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table]

The large increase in minor closures and realignments is attributable 
partly to actions involving the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Air 
National Guard, and vacating leased space. 

The costs to implement the proposed actions are $24.4 billion compared 
to a $22 billion total from the four previous rounds through 2001, the 
end of the 6-year implementation period for the 1995 BRAC 
round.[Footnote 22] The increase in costs is due partly to significant 
military construction and moving costs associated with Army 
recommendations to realign its force structure, and to recommendations 
to move activities from leased space onto military installations. For 
example, the Army projects that it will need about $2.3 billion in 
military construction funds to build facilities for the troops 
returning from overseas. Likewise, DOD projects that it will need an 
additional $1.3 billion to build facilities for recommendations that 
include activities being moved from leased space. Time will be required 
for these costs to be offset by savings from BRAC actions and this in 
turn affects the point at which net annual recurring savings can begin 
to accrue. 

Finally, the projected net annual recurring savings are $5.5 billion 
compared to net annual recurring savings of $2.6 billion and $1.7 
billion for the 1993 and 1995 rounds respectively. The increased 
savings are partly attributable to significant reductions in the number 
of military positions and business process reengineering efforts. 

Infrastructure Would Likely Be Reduced with Some Limitations Noted: 

DOD projects that the proposed recommendations would reduce excess 
infrastructure capacity, indicating that the plant replacement value of 
domestic installations would be reduced by about $27 billion, or 5 
percent. However, the projected reductions in plant replacement value 
did not account for the $2.2 billion in domestic military construction 
projects associated with relocating forces from overseas. On the other 
hand, reductions in leased space are not considered in the plant 
replacement value analysis, since leased space is not government owned. 
DOD estimates that its recommendations will reduce about 12 million 
square feet of leased space. 

DOD Projects Recommendations Would Produce Savings, but there are 
Limitations Associated with the Savings Estimates: 

DOD projects that its proposed recommendations will produce nearly $50 
billion in 20-year net present value savings, with net annual recurring 
savings of about $5.5 billion. There are limitations associated with 
the savings claimed from military personnel reductions and we believe 
there is uncertainty regarding the magnitude of savings likely to be 
realized in other areas given unvalidated assumptions regarding 
expected efficiency gains from business process reengineering efforts 
and projected savings from sustainment, recapitalization, and base 
operating support.[Footnote 23]

Table 2 summarizes the projected one-time cost, the cost or savings 
anticipated during the 6-year implementation period for the closure or 
realignment, the estimated net annual recurring savings, and the 
projected 20-year net present value costs or savings of DOD's 
recommendations.[Footnote 24]

Table 2: Projected Costs and Savings from BRAC 2005 Recommendations: 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions. 

DOD component: Army; 
One-time (cost): ($9,963.4); 
Net implementation (cost) or savings: ($8,519.1); 
Net annual recurring (cost) or savings[A]: $497.6; 
20-year net present value (cost) or savings[B]: ($3,038.6). 

DOD component: Navy; 
One-time (cost): ($2,099.8); 
Net implementation (cost) or savings: $440.7; 
Net annual recurring (cost) or savings[A]: $753.5; 
20-year net present value (cost) or savings[B]: $7,713.7. 

DOD component: Air Force; 
One-time (cost): ($1,883.1); 
Net implementation (cost) or savings: $2,635.5; 
Net annual recurring (cost) or savings[A]: $1,248.5; 
20-year net present value (cost) or savings[B]: $14,560.3. 

DOD component: Joint cross-service groups; 
One-time (cost): ($10,466.1); 
Net implementation (cost) or savings: $1,372.8; 
Net annual recurring (cost) or savings[A]: $2,985.1; 
20-year net present value (cost) or savings[B]: $29,569.1. 

Total; 
One-time (cost): ($24,412.4); 
Net implementation (cost) or savings: ($4,070.1); 
Net annual recurring (cost) or savings[A]: $5,484.7; 
20-year net present value (cost) or savings[B]: $48,804.5. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Projected annual recurring savings after the 6-year implementation 
period. 

[B] DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present 
value. 

[End of table]

Table 2 also shows the Navy, Air Force, and joint cross-service groups 
all projecting net savings within the 6-year implementation period, as 
well as significant 20-year net savings. In contrast, because of the 
nature of the Army's proposed actions and costs, such as providing 
infrastructure for troops returning from overseas and the consolidation 
and recapitalization of reserve facilities, the Army does not achieve 
net savings either during the implementation period or within 20 years, 
based on recommendations included in its BRAC report. 

Notwithstanding these projected savings, we identified limitations or 
uncertainties about the magnitude of savings likely to be realized. As 
figure 6 shows, 47 percent of the net annual recurring savings can be 
attributed to projected military personnel reductions. About 40 percent 
($2.1 billion) of the projected net annual recurring savings can be 
attributed to savings from operation and maintenance activities, which 
include terminating or reducing property sustainment and 
recapitalization, base operating support, and civilian payroll. 
Furthermore, about $500 million of the "other" savings is based on 
business process reengineering efforts, but some of the assumptions 
supporting the expected efficiency gains have not been validated. 

Figure 6: Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Analysis does not include data from one classified 
recommendation. 

[End of figure] 

Military Personnel Savings: 

Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) are 
associated with eliminating positions currently held by military 
personnel; but rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates 
the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, limiting 
dollar savings available for other uses. For example, although the Air 
Force projects net annual recurring savings of about $732 million from 
eliminating about 10,200 military positions, Air Force officials stated 
the active duty positions will be reinvested to relieve stress on high 
demand career fields and the reserve positions to new missions yet to 
be identified. Likewise, the Army is projecting savings from 
eliminating about 5,800 military positions, but it has no plans to 
reduce its end-strength. Finally, the Navy is projecting it will 
eliminate about 4,000 active duty military positions, which a Navy 
official noted will help it achieve the end-strength reductions already 
planned. As we noted during our review of DOD's process during the 1995 
BRAC round, since these personnel will be assigned elsewhere rather 
than taken out of the force structure, they do not represent dollar 
savings that can be readily reallocated outside the personnel 
accounts.[Footnote 25] Without recognition that these are not dollar 
savings that can be readily applied elsewhere, this could create a 
false sense of savings available for use in other areas traditionally 
cited as a beneficiary of BRAC savings, such as making more funds 
available for modernization and better maintenance of remaining 
facilities. 

Sustainment, Recapitalization, and Base Operating Support Savings: 

DOD is also projecting savings from the sustainment and 
recapitalization of facilities that are scheduled to be demolished, as 
well as from facilities that might remain in DOD's real property 
inventory when activities are realigned from one base to another. For 
example, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group is claiming about $20 
million in annual recurring savings from the recapitalization of 
facilities at installations responsible for destroying chemical weapons 
at three locations recommended for closure.[Footnote 26] However, the 
Army had already expected to demolish these chemical destruction 
facilities upon completing the destruction of the chemical weapons at 
each site and the Army has not identified future missions for these 
installations. As a result, we do not believe it is appropriate for the 
Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group to claim any recapitalization 
savings related to these installations. 

Likewise, DOD is projecting savings from the recapitalization and 
sustainment of facilities in cases where functions or activities would 
be realigned from one base to another. However, it is not clear to what 
extent the proposed realignments would result in an entire building or 
portion of a building being vacated, or if entire buildings are 
vacated, whether they would be declared excess and removed from the 
military services' real property inventory. Our analysis shows that the 
supply and storage group's recommendations project about $100 million 
in sustainment and recapitalization savings from realigning defense 
distribution depots. The group estimates its recommendations will 
vacate about 27 million square feet of storage space. Supply and 
storage officials told us their goal is to vacate as much space as 
possible by re-warehousing inventory and by reducing personnel spaces, 
but they do not have a specific plan for what will happen to the space 
once it is vacated. In addition, until these recommendations are 
ultimately approved and implemented, DOD will not be in a good position 
to know exactly how much space is available or how this space will be 
disposed of or utilized. As a result, it is unclear as to how much of 
the estimated $100 million in annual recurring savings will actually 
occur. 

Collectively, the issues we identified suggest the potential for 
reduced savings that are likely to be realized in the short term during 
the implementation period, which could further reduce net annual 
recurring savings realized in the long term. The short-term impact is 
that these reduced savings could adversely affect DOD's plans for using 
these BRAC savings to help offset the up-front investment costs 
required to implement the recommendations and could further limit the 
amount of savings available for transformation and modernization 
purposes. 

Savings Based on Business Process Reengineering: 

DOD projected net annual recurring savings in the "other" category as 
shown in figure 6 include about $500 million that is based on business 
process reengineering efforts. Our analysis indicates that four 
recommendations--one from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group and 
three from the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group--involve 
primarily business process reengineering efforts. However, the expected 
efficiency gains from these recommendations are based on assumptions 
that are subject to some uncertainty and have not been validated. For 
example, our analysis indicates that $215 million, or 63 percent, of 
the estimated annual recurring savings from the Industrial Joint Cross-
Service Group recommendation to create fleet readiness centers within 
the Navy is based on business reengineering efforts that would result 
in overhead efficiencies. Although the data suggest there is the 
potential for savings, we believe the magnitude of the savings is 
somewhat uncertain because the estimates are based on assumptions that 
have undergone only limited testing. Realizing the full extent of the 
savings would depend on actual implementation of the recommended 
actions and modifications to the Navy's supply system. The industrial 
group and the Navy assumed that combining depot and intermediate 
maintenance levels would reduce the time needed for an item to be 
repaired at the intermediate level, which in turn would reduce the 
number of items needing to be kept in inventory, as well as the number 
of items being sent to a depot for repair. These assumptions, which 
were the major determinant of the realignment savings, were reportedly 
based on historical data and pilot projects and have not been 
independently reviewed or verified by the Naval Audit Service, the DOD 
Inspector General, or us. 

Furthermore, our analysis indicates that $291 million, or about 72 
percent, of the net annual recurring savings expected from the Supply 
and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group's three recommendations are also 
based on business process reengineering. In the COBRA model, the 
savings are categorized as procurement savings and are based on the 
expanded use of performance-based logistics[Footnote 27] and reductions 
to duplicate inventory. Supply and storage group staff said that these 
savings accrue from reduced contract prices because the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) will have increased buying power since it is 
responsible for purchasing many more items that before were purchased 
by each of the services. In addition, savings accrue from increased use 
of performance-based agreements,[Footnote 28] a key component of 
performance-based logistics. The group estimates DLA can save 2.8 cents 
on each contract dollar placed on performance-based agreements. In 
addition, savings result from reductions in the amount of stock that 
must be held in inventory. Supply and storage staff said that these 
savings are attributable to reductions in the cost of money, cost of 
stock losses due to obsolescence, and cost of storage. Together the 
group estimates these factors save about 17 percent of the estimated 
value of the acquisition cost of the stock that is no longer required 
to be held in inventory. These savings estimates, for the most part, 
are based on historical documentation provided by DLA, which time did 
not allow us to validate. The extent to which these same savings will 
be achieved in the future is uncertain. As noted above, how these 
actions are implemented could also affect savings. We are concerned 
that this is another area that could lead to a false sense of savings 
and lead to premature reductions in affected budgets in advance of 
actual savings being fully realized, as has sometimes occurred in past 
efforts to achieve savings through business process reengineering 
efforts. We are also concerned that it could exacerbate a problem we 
have previously identified regarding past BRAC rounds involving the 
lack of adequate systems in place to track and update savings resulting 
from BRAC actions--the focus of our recommendation for the Secretary of 
Defense. These concerns are reinforced by limitations in DOD's 
financial management systems that historically have made it difficult 
to fully identify the costs of operations and provide a complete 
baseline from which to assess savings. 

Transformation Cited as Justification for Many Recommendations Despite 
Lack of Clear Agreement on Transformational Options: 

While furthering transformation was one of the BRAC goals, there was no 
agreement between DOD and its components on what should be considered a 
transformational effort. As part of the BRAC process, the department 
developed over 200 transformational options for stationing and 
supporting forces as well as for increasing operational efficiency and 
effectiveness. The OSD BRAC office narrowed this list to 77 options, 
but agreement was not reached within the department on these options, 
so none of them were formally approved. Nonetheless, each service and 
joint cross-service group was permitted to use the transformational 
options as appropriate to support its candidate recommendations. 
Appendix XV has a list of these 77 draft options. 

Collectively, these draft options did not provide a clear definition of 
transformation across the department. The options ranged from those 
that seemed to be service specific to those that suggested new ways of 
doing business. For example, some transformational options included 
reducing the number of Army Reserve regional headquarters; optimizing 
Air Force squadrons; and co-locating various functions such as 
recruiting, military and civilian personnel training, and research, 
development and acquisition and test and evaluation, across the 
military departments. In contrast, some options suggested consideration 
of new ways of doing business, such as privatizing some functions and 
establishing a DOD agency to oversee depot-level reparables. 

While the transformational options were never formally approved, our 
analysis indicates that many of DOD's recommendations reference one or 
more of the 77 transformational options. For example, 15 of the 
headquarters and support activities group recommendations reference the 
option to minimize leased space and move organizations in leased space 
to DOD-owned space. Likewise, 37 of the Army reserve component 
recommendations reference the option to co-locate guard and reserve 
units at active bases or consolidate guard and reserve units that are 
located in proximity to one another at one location. 

Conversely, a number of the scenarios that were initially considered 
but not adopted reference transformational options that could have 
changed existing business practices. For example, the education and 
training group developed a number of scenarios--privatizing graduate 
education programs and consolidating undergraduate fixed and rotary 
wing pilot training--based on the draft transformational options, but 
none were ultimately approved by the department. 

Some Progress Made in Fostering Joint Basing: 

DOD's recommendations make some progress toward the goal of fostering 
joint activity among the military services, based on a broad definition 
of joint activity. We found that for DOD's recommendations, joint 
activity included consolidating some training functions within the same 
service, co-locating like organizations and functions on the same 
installation, and moving some organizations or functions closer to 
installations in order to further opportunities for joint training. 
Although the recommendations achieve some progress in fostering 
jointness, we found other instances where DOD ultimately adopted a 
service-centric solution even though the joint cross-service groups 
proposed a joint scenario. Table 3 shows the major recommendations that 
foster joint activity. 

Table 3: Major Recommendations Supporting Joint Activity: 

Type of joint activity: Consolidation: 

Recommended action: The education and training group is proposing to 
consolidate: 
* initial Joint Strike Fighter aircraft training for the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Air Force at Eglin Air Force Base; 
* undergraduate navigator training for the Navy and Air Force at Naval 
Air Station Pensacola; and; 
* transportation management, religious studies, and culinary training 
among the military services; 
The medical group is proposing to establish; 
* the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, 
by consolidating the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National 
Naval Medical Center, and; 
* the San Antonio Regional Military Medical Center by relocating 
inpatient care from Wilford Hall Medical Center to the Brooke Army 
Medical Center; 
The headquarters and support activities group is proposing to 
consolidate the installation management functions across various bases. 

Type of joint activity: Co-location: 

Recommended action: The Army is proposing to move the Third Army 
Headquarters (Army component command to Central Command) to Shaw Air 
Force Base to be co-located with the Air Force component of Central 
Command; 
The Navy is proposing to move aircraft from Willow Grove Air Reserve 
Station to McGuire Air Force Base, and from Naval Air Station Atlanta 
to Robins Air Force Base; 
The technical group is proposing to co-locate: 
* the services' and defense agencies' extramural funding program 
managers at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland and; 
* gun and ammunition research and development and acquisition to 
Picatinny Arsenal; 
The headquarters and support activities group is proposing to co-locate 
DOD investigative agencies at Quantico Marine Corps Base. 

Type of joint activity: Proximity; 
Recommended action: The Air Force is proposing to move A-10 aircraft to 
Moody Air Force Base to enhance training Army units at Fort Benning and 
Fort Stewart; 
The Army is proposing to move a special operations unit from Fort Bragg 
to Eglin Air Force Base in proximity to the Air Force's Special 
Operations Command headquarters at Hurlburt Field. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table]

While the proposal to create joint bases by consolidating common 
installation management functions is projected to create greater 
efficiencies, our prior work suggests that implementation of these 
actions may prove challenging. The joint-basing recommendation involves 
one service being responsible for various installation management 
support functions[Footnote 29] at bases that share a common boundary or 
are in proximity to one another. For example, the Army would be the 
executive agent for Fort Lewis, Washington, and McChord Air Force Base, 
Washington, combined as Joint Base Lewis-McChord. However, as evident 
from our recent visit to both installations and discussions with base 
officials, concerns over obstacles such as seeking efficiencies at the 
expense of the mission, could jeopardize a smooth and successful 
implementation of the recommendation. 

In some cases, the joint cross-service groups proposed scenarios that 
would have merged various support functions among the services, but a 
service solution was adopted by DOD. For example, the Headquarters and 
Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group proposed to (1) 
consolidate civilian personnel offices under a new defense agency as 
DOD implements the national security personnel system, and (2) co-
locate all military personnel centers in San Antonio, Texas, in 
anticipation of a standard military personnel system being implemented 
across the department. However, in both cases, DOD decided to 
consolidate military and civilian personnel centers within each 
service. Likewise, the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group 
proposed scenarios to consolidate undergraduate fixed wing training 
activities between the Air Force and the Navy and rotary wing training 
activities between the Navy and the Army to eliminate excess capacity. 
However, the proposals were not adopted because the Navy and the Air 
Force expressed concerns that this recommendation would result in 
significant permanent change of station costs for the services, 
specifically the cost of students traveling to designated training 
locations. 

DOD Developed a Generally Logical and Reasoned Process for Making BRAC 
Decisions: 

Based on our analytical work, we believe DOD established and generally 
followed a logical and reasoned process for formulating its list of 
BRAC recommendations. The process was organized in a largely sequential 
manner with a strong emphasis on ensuring that accurate data were 
obtained and used. OSD established an oversight structure that allowed 
the seven individual joint cross-service groups to play a larger, more 
visible role in the 2005 BRAC process compared to BRAC 1995. Despite 
some overlap in data collection and other phases of the process, these 
groups and the military services generally followed the sequential BRAC 
process designed to evaluate and subsequently identify recommendations 
within their respective areas, with only the Army using a separate but 
parallel process to evaluate its reserve components. DOD also 
incorporated into its analytical process several key considerations 
required by the BRAC legislation, including the use of certified data, 
basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan and emphasizing 
its military value selection criteria, which included homeland defense 
and surge capabilities. In addition, DOD's Inspector General and the 
military service audit agencies helped to ensure the data used during 
the BRAC process were accurate and reliable. 

BRAC Process Was Logical and Largely Sequentially Structured: 

DOD provided overall policy guidance for the BRAC process, including a 
requirement that its components develop and implement internal control 
plans to ensure the accuracy and consistency of their data collection 
and analyses. These plans also helped to ensure the overall integrity 
of the process and the information upon which OSD considered each 
group's recommendations. The BRAC recommendations, for the most part, 
resulted from a data-intensive process that was supplemented by the use 
of military judgment as needed. The process began with a set of 
sequential steps by assessing capacity and military value, developing 
and analyzing scenarios, then identifying candidate recommendations, 
which led to OSD's final list of BRAC recommendations. Figure 7 
illustrates the overall sequential analytical process DOD generally 
employed to reach BRAC recommendations. 

Figure 7: Analytical Process Leading to BRAC Recommendations: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] A scenario is a proposal that has been declared for formal analysis 
by a military department or joint cross-service group deliberative body 
and is officially accounted for and tracked by OSD. 

[End of figure] 

It must be noted, however, that while the process largely followed the 
sequential process established by the department, initial difficulties 
associated with obtaining complete and accurate data in a timely manner 
added to overlap and varying degrees of concurrency between data 
collection efforts and other steps in the process. 

During the 2005 BRAC process, the seven individual joint cross-service 
groups played a larger, more visible role compared to their role during 
the 1995 BRAC round. Our analysis indicates that many, although not 
all, actions proposed by these groups were accepted by OSD and the 
military services. Based on lessons learned, OSD empowered these groups 
in 2005 to suggest BRAC recommendations directly to a senior-level 
group that oversaw the BRAC 2005 analysis. Moreover, we noted a closer 
coordination between these groups, the military services, and OSD than 
existed during the 1995 round. OSD's efforts to integrate the process 
among these seven joint cross-service groups with the military 
services' own efforts led to increased discussions, greater visibility, 
and more influence for the cross-service recommendations than in prior 
BRAC rounds. 

To assist in the process for analyzing and developing recommendations, 
the military services and joint cross-service groups used various 
analytical tools. These tools helped to ensure a more consistent 
approach to BRAC analysis and decision making. For example, all of the 
groups used the DOD-approved COBRA model to calculate costs, savings, 
and return on investment for BRAC scenarios and, ultimately for the 
final 222 BRAC recommendations. As noted in appendix XIII, the COBRA 
model was designed to provide consistency across the military services 
and the joint cross-service groups in estimating BRAC costs and 
savings. DOD has used the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC 
rounds and, over time, has improved upon its design to provide better 
estimating capability. In our past and current reviews of the COBRA 
model, we found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing 
potential costs and savings among various BRAC options. 

Furthermore, the military services and joint cross-service groups 
generally used a consistent process to assess and formulate BRAC 
recommendations, with one minor exception involving the Army reserve 
components. The Army created a separate yet parallel approach in 
reviewing its reserve components for several reasons, although it 
generally followed the BRAC process. With respect to its reserve 
components, the Army did not perform a military value rank-ordering of 
these various installations across the country, but instead assessed 
the relative military value that could be obtained by consolidating 
various facilities into a joint facility in specific geographical 
locales to support, among other things, reserve component training, 
recruiting, and retention efforts. This approach provided an 
opportunity for the Army reserve components to actively participate in 
the BRAC process along with the voluntary participation of the states. 
The Army reported that consulting with the states was crucial to ensure 
the support of the state governors and staff Adjutants General for 
issues related to recommendations that affected the National Guard. The 
Army's recommendations affected almost 10 percent of the Army's 4,000 
reserve components' facilities. More specifically, the Army recommended 
176 Army Reserve closures with the understanding that the state 
governors will close 211 Army National Guard facilities with the intent 
of relocating their units into 125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers. 
The Army reports that 38 states and Puerto Rico voluntarily 
participated in the BRAC process. 

The Air Force and the Navy also reviewed their reserve components' 
installations but did so within the common analytical structure 
established by OSD, yet with some differences in approach in involving 
affected stakeholders in the process. For example, the Air Force did 
not involve state officials or its State Adjutants General as it 
analyzed and developed its BRAC recommendations. However, senior Air 
National Guard and Reserve leadership were in attendance as voting 
members of the Air Force's Base Closure Executive Group, a senior 
deliberative body for the BRAC process. The Navy also reviewed its 
reserve components, including the Marine Corps Reserves, within the 
BRAC process, and worked closely with representatives from the Navy and 
Marine Corps reserve components to consolidate units within active duty 
installations or armed forces reserve centers without affecting 
recruiting demographics. 

BRAC Process Incorporated Key Legislative Requirements: 

DOD also incorporated into its analytical process the legal 
considerations for formulating its realignment and closure 
recommendations. As required by BRAC legislation, DOD based its 
recommendations on (1) the use of certified data, (2) its 20-year force 
structure plan, and (3) military value criteria as the primary 
consideration in assessing and formulating its recommendations. 

Use of Certified Data: 

DOD collected capacity and military value data that were certified as 
to their accuracy by hundreds of persons in senior leadership positions 
across the country.[Footnote 30] These certified data were obtained 
from corporate databases and from hundreds of defense installations. 
DOD continued to collect certified data, as needed, to support follow-
up questions, cost calculations, and to develop recommendations. In 
total, DOD projects that it collected over 25 million pieces of data as 
part of the BRAC process.[Footnote 31] Given the extensive volume of 
requested data from the 10 separate groups (3 military departments and 
7 joint cross-service groups), we noted that the data collection 
process was quite lengthy and required significant efforts to help 
ensure data accuracy, particularly from joint cross-service groups that 
were attempting to obtain common data across multiple military 
components, which, because of the diverse nature of the functions and 
activities, do not always use the same data metrics. In some cases, 
coordinating data requests, clarifying questions and answers, 
controlling database entries, and other issues led to delays in the 
data-driven analysis DOD originally envisioned. As such, some groups 
had to develop strategy-based proposals. As time progressed, however, 
these groups reported that they obtained the needed data, for the most 
part, to inform and support their scenarios. The DOD Inspector General 
and the service's audit agencies played an important role in ensuring 
that the data used in the BRAC analyses were accurate and certified by 
cognizant senior officials. 

Consideration of DOD's 20-year Force Structure Plan: 

As congressionally mandated, each of the military services and the 
seven joint cross-service groups considered DOD's 20-year force 
structure plan in its analyses. DOD based its force structure plan for 
BRAC purposes on an assessment of probable threats to national security 
during a 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. DOD provided 
this plan to Congress in March 2004, and as authorized by the statute, 
it subsequently updated it 1 year later in March 2005. Based on our 
analysis, updates to the force structure affected some ongoing BRAC 
analyses. For example, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 
reassessed its data pertaining to overhauling and repairing ships based 
on the updated force structure outlook and decided that one of its two 
smaller shipyards--Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard 
Portsmouth--could close. Ultimately, the Navy decided to close the 
Portsmouth shipyard in Maine. In addition, the Navy told us it 
recalculated its capacity based on updates to the force structure plan 
and determined that there was no significant change to its original 
analysis. The other groups, such as those examining headquarters and 
support activities, education and training, or technical functions, 
considered updates to the defense 20-year force structure and 
determined the changes would have no impact on their ongoing analyses 
or the development of recommendations. 

Primary Consideration of Military Value Criteria, Which Included 
Homeland Defense and Surge: 

DOD gave primary consideration to its military value selection criteria 
in its process. Specifically, military value refers to the first four 
selection criteria in figure 2 and includes an installation's current 
and future mission capabilities, condition, ability to accommodate 
future needs, and cost of operations. The manner in which each military 
service or joint cross-service group approached its analysis of 
military value varied according to the unique aspects of the individual 
service or cross-service function. These groups typically assessed 
military value by identifying multiple attributes or characteristics 
related to each military value criterion, then identifying qualitative 
metrics and measures and associated questions to collect data to 
support the overall military value analysis. For example, figure 8 
illustrates how the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group linked several 
of its military value attributes, metrics, and data questions to the 
mandated military value criteria. 

Figure 8: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 
Assess Military Value for a Technical Facility: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection 
criteria. 

[B] Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. 
The technical group used a total of five military value attributes. 

[C] Military value metrics are measures for the attribute. The 
technical group used a total of 30 military value metrics. 

[D] The technical group used a total of 44 data call questions. 

[End of figure]

Quantitative scoring plans were developed by each military service or 
joint cross-service group assigning relative weights to each of the 
military value criteria for use in evaluating and ranking facilities or 
functions in their respective areas. Appendixes III through XII 
highlight the use and linkages of military value criteria by each 
service and joint cross-service group. 

As noted earlier, based on congressional direction, there was enhanced 
emphasis on two aspects of military value--an installation's ability to 
serve as a staging area for homeland defense missions and its ability 
to meet unanticipated surge.[Footnote 32]

* Homeland defense: Each of the three military services considered 
homeland defense roles in its BRAC analysis and coordinated with the 
U.S. Northern Command--a unified command responsible for homeland 
defense and civil support. In October 2004, the U.S. Northern Command 
contacted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requesting to play 
a role in ensuring that homeland defense received appropriate attention 
in the analytical process. Our analysis shows that all three military 
departments factored in homeland defense needs, with the Air Force 
recommendations having the most impact. According to Air Force 
officials, the U.S. Northern Command identified specific homeland 
defense missions assigned to the Air Force, which they incorporated 
into its decision-making process. Navy officials likewise discussed the 
impact of potential BRAC scenarios on its maritime homeland defense 
mission with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the 
U.S. Coast Guard. In this regard, the Navy decided to retain Naval Air 
Station Point Mugu, California, was influenced, in part, because the 
U.S. Coast Guard wanted to consolidate its West Coast aviation assets 
at this installation for homeland defense purposes. According to Army 
officials, most of the their role in supporting homeland defense is 
carried out by the Army National Guard. The U.S. Northern Command 
reviewed the recommendations and found no unacceptable risk to the 
homeland defense mission and support to civil authorities. 

* Surge: DOD left it to each military service and joint cross-service 
group to determine how surge would be considered in the their analysis. 
Generally, all the groups considered surge by retaining a certain 
percentage of infrastructure, making more frequent use of existing 
infrastructure, or retaining difficult-to-reconstitute assets. For 
example, the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group set aside 10 percent 
of its facility infrastructure for surge, while the Industrial Joint 
Cross-Service Group factored in additional work shifts in its analysis. 
The military services retained difficult-to-reconstitute assets as the 
primary driver to satisfying the statutory requirement to consider 
surge capability. Both the Army and Navy gave strong consideration to 
infrastructure that would be difficult to reconstitute, such as large 
tracts of land for maneuver training purposes or berthing space for 
docking ships. For example, the Navy has a finite number of ships and 
aircraft and would likely have to increase operating tempo to meet 
surge needs. The Air Force addressed surge by retaining sufficient 
capacity to absorb temporary increases in operations, such as 
responding to emergencies or natural catastrophic events like hurricane 
damage, and the capacity to permanently relocate all of its aircraft 
stationed overseas in the United States if needed. 

Congress also mandated four other criteria to be considered in the 
analytical process: cost and savings of the BRAC recommendations, 
economic impact on affected communities, impact on communities' 
infrastructure, and environmental impact. The extent these other 
mandated considerations influenced recommendations varied. For example, 
high cost was the primary reason the Army decided not to develop a 
recommendation to restation troops returning from overseas to 
installations with large tracts of undeveloped land that could 
potentially accommodate these moves, such as Yuma Proving Ground, 
Arizona, or Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. Despite these installations 
having the capacity to provide large training ranges, they do not have 
existing infrastructure to immediately house 3,000 to 5,000 troops 
required for the Army's new modular combat brigades.[Footnote 33] 
Initially, the Army assessed the possibility of building new 
infrastructure at these locations, but Army BRAC officials told us it 
would be too costly given that the Army's COBRA analysis showed that at 
Yuma, for example, it would cost about $2 billion to build the required 
infrastructure. As a result, the Army decided to place units returning 
from overseas at installations currently used to base other operational 
units, notwithstanding limitations in existing training capacities. 

Although there was heavy reliance on data for completing analyses, 
military judgment was also a factor throughout the entire process, 
starting with an analytical framework to base analysis of the 20-year 
force structure plan and ending with the finalized list of 222 
recommendations submitted to the BRAC Commission. Military judgment 
also played a role in decisions on how military value selection 
criteria would be captured as attributes, with associated values or 
weights. Military judgment was also applied in deciding which proposed 
scenarios or actions should move forward for additional analysis. 
Generally, military judgment was exercised at this stage to delete or 
modify a potential recommendation for reasons such as strategic 
importance, as shown in the following examples: 

* Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, which has a lower military value 
than other shipyards, was eliminated from closure consideration because 
the shipyard was considered to have more strategic significance in the 
Pacific Ocean area compared to other alternatives. 

* Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii, which has a lower military value 
than some other bases, was eliminated from closure consideration 
because it is the only defense medical center of significant size in 
the Pacific Ocean area. 

* Naval Station Everett, Washington, which has a lower military value 
than some other bases, was eliminated from closure consideration 
because of strategic reasons regarding the number and the locations of 
the Navy's aircraft carriers on the West Coast and in the Pacific. 

* Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, which has a lower military 
value than some other bases, was eliminated from closure consideration 
because of the belief that a strategic presence was needed in the north 
central United States. Even though Grand Forks Air Force Base was 
retained for strategic reasons, Minot Air Force Base is also located in 
North Dakota and is not affected by any BRAC recommendations. 

DOD Audit Agencies Helped to Improve the Accuracy of Data Used during 
the BRAC Process: 

The oversight roles of the DOD Inspector General and the military 
services' audit agency staff, given their access to relevant 
information and officials as the process evolved, helped to improve the 
accuracy of the data used in the BRAC process. The DOD Inspector 
General and most of the individual service audit agencies' reports 
generally concluded that the extensive amount of data used as the basis 
for BRAC decisions was sufficiently valid and accurate for the purposes 
intended. In addition, with limited exceptions, these reports did not 
identify any material issues that would impede a BRAC recommendation. 

The DOD Inspector General and the services' audit agencies played an 
important role in ensuring that the data used in the BRAC analyses were 
accurate and certified by cognizant senior officials. Their frontline 
roles and the thousands of staff days devoted to reviewing the massive 
data collection efforts associated with the BRAC process added an 
important aspect to the quality and integrity of the data used by 
military services and joint cross-service groups. Through extensive 
audits of the capacity, military value, and scenario data collected 
from field activities, these audit agencies notified various BRAC teams 
of data discrepancies for corrective action. The audit activities 
included validation of data, compliance with data certification 
requirements employed throughout the chain of command, and examination 
of the accuracy of the analytical data. While the auditors initially 
encountered problems with regard to data accuracy and the lack of 
supporting documentation for certain questions and data elements, most 
of these concerns were resolved. In addition, the auditors worked to 
ensure certified information was used for BRAC analysis. These audit 
agencies also reviewed other facets of the process, including the 
various internal control plans, the COBRA model, and other modeling and 
analytical tools that were used in the development of recommendations. 
Appendix XVI lists these organizations' audit reports related to BRAC 
2005 to the extent they were available at the time this report was 
completed. Overall, these organizational audit agencies reported the 
following: 

* The Naval Audit Service reported that it visited 214 sites, covering 
45 data calls, and audited over 8,300 questions. It concluded that the 
data appeared reasonably accurate and complete and the Navy complied 
with statutory guidance and DOD policies and procedures. 

* The Air Force Audit Agency officials told us they visited 104 
installations, reviewed over 11,110 data call responses at 126 Air 
Force locations, 8 major commands, the Air National Guard, and 
Headquarters Air Force, and concluded that data used for Air Force BRAC 
analysis were generally reliable. 

* The Army Audit Agency reported that it visited 32 installations and 3 
leased facilities and reviewed for accuracy over 2,342 responses. It 
concluded that the data was reasonably accurate and that the Army BRAC 
office had a sound process in place to collect certified data. 

* DOD Inspector General officials told us they visited about 1,550 
sites covering 29 defense agencies and organizations and reviewed over 
15,770 responses. We were told that these responses were generally 
supported, complete, and reasonable. The DOD Inspector General also 
evaluated the validity, integrity, and documentation of data used by 
the seven joint cross-service groups and found they generally used 
certified data for the BRAC analysis. 

We closely coordinated with the DOD Inspector General and the three 
service audit agencies to maximize our individual and collective 
efforts and avoid duplication. As part of this coordination, we 
observed their audit efforts at selected military installations to 
verify the scope and quality of coverage they provided throughout the 
process and to give us insights into potential issues having broader 
applicability across the entire process. We also observed the work of 
these audit agencies to better familiarize ourselves with the types of 
issues being identified and resolved, with a view toward determining 
their materiality to the overall process. 

Several Aspects of DOD's BRAC Recommendations and Rejected Proposals 
May Warrant Further Attention: 

We identified issues regarding DOD's recommendations, and other actions 
considered during the selection process that may warrant further 
attention by the BRAC Commission. Many of the issues relate to how 
costs and savings were estimated while others relate to potential 
impacts on communities surrounding bases that stand to gain or lose 
missions and personnel as a result of BRAC actions. Further, we are 
highlighting candidate recommendations that were presented during the 
selection process by either the military services or the joint cross-
service groups to senior DOD leadership within the IEC that were 
projected as having the potential to generate significant savings, and 
which were substantially revised or deleted from further consideration 
during the last few weeks or days of the selection process. Additional 
discussion of issues targeted more specifically to the work and 
recommendations of the military services and joint cross-service groups 
is included in appendixes III through XII. 

Issues with DOD's BRAC Recommendations: 

We identified a number of issues, most of which apply to a broad range 
of DOD's recommendations, that may warrant further attention by the 
BRAC Commission. In addition to the issue previously discussed 
regarding military personnel eliminations being claimed as savings to 
the department, other issues include (1) instances of lengthy payback 
periods (time required to recoup up-front investment costs), (2) 
inconsistencies in how DOD estimated costs for BRAC actions involving 
military construction projects, (3) uncertainties in estimating the 
total costs to the government to implement DOD's recommended actions, 
and (4) potential impacts on communities surrounding bases that are 
expected to gain large numbers of personnel if DOD's recommendations 
are implemented. 

Some Lengthy Payback Periods: 

Many of the 222 recommendations DOD made in the 2005 round are 
associated with lengthy payback periods, which, in some cases, call 
into question whether the department would be gaining sufficient 
monetary value for the up-front investment cost required to implement 
its recommendations and the time required to recover this investment. 
Our analysis indicates that 143, or 64 percent, of DOD's 
recommendations are associated with payback periods that are 6 years or 
less while 79, or 36 percent, of the recommendations are associated 
with lengthier paybacks that exceed the 6-year mark or never produce 
savings. DOD officials acknowledge that the additional objectives of 
fostering jointness and transformation have had some effect on 
generating recommendations with longer payback periods. Furthermore, 
our analysis shows that the number of recommendations with lengthy 
payback periods varied across the military services and the joint cross-
service groups, as shown in table 4. 

Table 4: Payback Periods for BRAC Recommendations by DOD Component: 

DOD component: Army; 
Number of recommendations: 56; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 26; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 3; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 22; 
Payback period: Never: 5. 

DOD component: Navy; 
Number of recommendations: 53[A]; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 45; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 2; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 6; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Air Force; 
Number of recommendations: 42; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 29; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 6; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 7; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Education and training; 
Number of recommendations: 9; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 5; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 0; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 3; 
Payback period: Never: 1. 

DOD component: Headquarters and support activities; 
Number of recommendations: 21; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 14; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 2; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 5; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Industrial; 
Number of recommendations: 17; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 13; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 3; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 1; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Intelligence; 
Number of recommendations: 2; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 0; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 2; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 0; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Medical; 
Number of recommendations: 6; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 3; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 1; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 2; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Supply and storage; 
Number of recommendations: 3; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 3; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 0; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 0; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Technical; 
Number of recommendations: 13; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 5; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 5; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 3; 
Payback period: Never: 0. 

DOD component: Total; 
Number of recommendations: 222; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 143; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 24; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 49; 
Payback period: Never: 6. 

DOD component: Percentage; 
Number of recommendations: 100; 
Payback period: Immediate to 6 years: 64; 
Payback period: 7 to 9 years: 11; 
Payback period: 10 years and greater: 22; 
Payback period: Never: 3. 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data. 

[A] While the DOD BRAC report lists 21 Navy recommendations, several of 
these have multiple actions, thus bringing the total to 53 
recommendations. 

[End of table]

As shown in table 4, the Army has five recommendations and the 
education and training group has one recommendation that never payback, 
as described below: 

* Army realignment of a special forces unit from Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;

* Army realignment of a heavy brigade from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort 
Carson, Colorado;

* Army realignment of a heavy brigade to Fort Bliss, Texas, and 
infantry and aviation units to Fort Riley, Kansas;

* Army reserve component consolidations in Minnesota;

* Army reserve component consolidations in North Dakota; and: 

* Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group's establishment of 
Joint Strike Fighter aircraft training at Eglin Air Force Base, 
Florida. 

According to Army officials, their five recommendations have no payback 
because, in part, they must build additional facilities to accommodate 
the return of about 47,000 forces currently stationed overseas to the 
United States as part of DOD's Integrated Global Presence and Basing 
Strategy initiative (see app. III for further discussion of the 
restationing initiative). According to the education and training 
group, its one recommendation with no payback period is due to the high 
military construction costs associated with the new mission to 
consolidate initial training for the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft for 
the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Air Force. 

Similarly, the Army has nearly 50 percent of the total number of DOD 
recommendations with payback periods of 10 years or longer. Our 
analysis of Army data shows that these lengthy paybacks are 
attributable to many of the recommendations regarding the reserve 
components. These recommendations typically have a combination of 
relatively high military construction costs and relatively low annual 
recurring savings, which tend to lengthen the payback period. 

We also identified some portions of DOD's individual recommendations 
that are associated with lengthy payback periods for certain BRAC 
actions but are embedded within larger bundled recommendations. The 
following are a few examples: 

* A proposal initially developed by the Headquarters and Support 
Activities Joint Cross-Service Group to move the Army Matériel Command 
from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, had more 
than a 100-year payback period with a net cost over a 20-year period. 
However, the proposal did not include some expected savings that, if 
included, would have reduced the payback period to 32 years. 
Concurrently, the group developed a separate proposal to relocate 
various Army offices from leased and government-owned office space onto 
Fort Sam Houston, Texas, which would have resulted in a 3-year payback 
period. The headquarters group decided to combine these two stand-alone 
proposals into one recommendation, resulting in an expected 20-year net 
present value savings of about $123 million with a 10-year payback. 

* Many of the individual Air Force proposals involving the Air National 
Guard and Air Force Reserve had payback periods ranging from 10 to more 
than 100 years. These individual proposals were subsequently revised by 
combining them with other related proposals to produce recommendations 
that had significant savings, minimized the longer payback periods, and 
linked operational realignment actions. We found that this change 
occurred in the realignment of Lambert-St. Louis International Airport 
Air Guard Station, Missouri, which originally had a 63-year payback 
period and resulted in a 20-year net present value cost of about $22 
million. However, this realignment is now a part of the closure of Otis 
Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, and the realignment of Atlantic 
City Air Guard Station, New Jersey. The combined recommendation results 
in a 20-year net present value savings of $336 million and a 3-year 
payback period. 

Inconsistencies in DOD's Estimated Costs for Military Construction 
Projects: 

While the military services used the COBRA model to estimate the costs 
for military construction projects needed to implement BRAC 
recommendations, we found some inconsistencies in how they estimated 
some costs associated with these projects. While the impact of these 
inconsistencies on savings is likely not as great as others noted in 
this report, it nevertheless contributes to the overall imprecision of 
the cost estimates of DOD's recommended actions. 

One area of inconsistent accounting involves the relative amounts of 
estimated support costs--such as the cost of connecting a new facility 
to existing water, sewage, and electrical systems--associated with 
military construction projects across the services. In its estimates, 
the Army considered these additional support costs as one-time costs 
whereas the Navy and the Air Force included them in the cost of the 
military construction projects for each project. By including these 
support costs in the cost of each project, the Navy and Air Force 
generally generated higher relative recurring costs than the Army for 
the recapitalization of facilities over time. Specifically, the Army 
increased its military construction cost estimates by 18.5 percent to 
account for the connection of the projected new facilities' utilities. 
The Air Force, on the other hand, increased its construction costs for 
support services from 8 to 40 percent, depending on the type of 
facility, while the Navy included support costs at only two locations. 
According to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for 
BRAC, the Navy assigned teams to review all proposed military 
construction projects by location to determine any support costs 
necessary for connection of utilities. Our analysis shows that had the 
Army used the same methodology as the Navy and the Air Force, the Army 
would incur about $66 million in additional recapitalization costs for 
all of its proposed military construction projects. 

The services were also inconsistent in considering the costs associated 
with meeting DOD's antiterrorism force protection standards in their 
estimated costs for military construction projects.[Footnote 34] The 
Air Force increased the expected costs of its military construction 
projects by 2.3 percent, or about $18 million, to meet DOD's standards. 
Air Force officials noted that these funds would provide enhancements 
such as security barriers and blast proof windows. The Army and the 
Navy, on the other hand, did not include additional costs to meet the 
department's standards in their proposed military construction 
projects. If the Army and the Navy estimated costs similarly to the Air 
Force, the cost of their proposed military construction projects would 
have increased by about $146 million and $25 million, respectively. 

Uncertainties in Accounting for All Expected Costs or Savings to the 
Federal Government: 

DOD's cost and savings estimates for implementing its recommendations 
do not fully reflect all expected costs or savings that may accrue to 
the federal government. The BRAC legislation requires that DOD take 
into account the effect of proposed closure or realignment on the costs 
of any other activity of the department or any other federal agency 
that may be required to assume responsibility for activities at 
military installations.[Footnote 35] While the services and joint cross-
service groups were aware of the potential for these costs, estimated 
costs were not included in the cost and savings analysis because it was 
unclear what actions an agency might take in response to the BRAC 
action. One such agency was the U.S. Coast Guard, which currently 
maintains some of its ships or various units at several installations 
that are slated to close. Navy BRAC officials briefed the U.S. Coast 
Guard about its recommendations prior to the list being published, but 
the Air Force did not meet with the Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard 
was still in the process of evaluating various responses to take as a 
result of the proposed BRAC actions and did not complete its analysis 
in time for it to be included in this report. 

Further, as noted earlier, estimated costs for the environmental 
restoration of bases undergoing closure or realignment are not included 
in DOD's cost and savings analyses. Such costs would be difficult to 
fully project at this point without planned reuse of the unneeded 
property being known. Consistent with the prior BRAC rounds, DOD 
excluded estimates for base environment restoration actions from its 
costs and savings analysis and in determining payback periods, on the 
premise that restoration is a liability that the department must 
address regardless of whether a base is kept open or closed and 
therefore should not be included in the COBRA analysis. Nevertheless, 
DOD did give consideration to such costs in addressing selection 
criterion 8, and included available information on estimated 
restoration costs as part of the data supporting its BRAC 
recommendations. DOD estimates that the restoration costs to implement 
its major closures would be about $949 million, as shown in table 5. 
(See fig. 4 in the Background section for a map of DOD's major base 
closures.)

Table 5: Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs for DOD's 
Recommended Major Base Closures: 

Dollars in millions. 

Army; 
Number of major closures: 14; 
Estimated environmental restoration costs[A]: $723.3. 

Navy; 
Number of major closures: 9; 
Estimated environmental restoration costs[A]: $154.5. 

Air Force; 
Number of major closures: 10; 
Estimated environmental restoration costs[A]: $71.3. 

Total; 
Number of major closures: 33; 
Estimated environmental restoration costs[A]: $949.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Estimated costs include some costs not specifically reported in 
DOD's May 2005 report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission. While the Army and Navy generally reported these costs, the 
Air Force did not but its costs were noted in supporting documentation. 

[End of table]

Based on the data provided, the Army would incur the largest share of 
estimated restoration costs due to the closure of several ammunition 
plants and chemical depots. The largest expected costs for any one 
location across DOD, about $383 million, would be for restoration at 
Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada. While the DOD report does not 
specifically identify the potential for some additional restoration 
costs at its installations, available supporting documentation does 
identify some additional costs. For example, the Army estimated the 
range restoration at Hawthorne Army Depot could cost from about $27 
million to $147 million, which is not included in the estimates in 
table 5. Further, the Army recognizes that additional restoration costs 
could be incurred at six additional locations that have ranges and 
chemical munitions, but these costs have not yet been determined. 

Our prior work has shown that environmental costs can be significant, 
as evidenced by the nearly $12 billion in total cost DOD expected to 
incur when all restoration actions associated with the prior BRAC 
rounds are completed. Service officials told us that the projected cost 
estimates for environmental restoration are lower, in general, because 
the environmental condition of today's bases is much better than the 
condition of bases closed during the prior BRAC rounds, primarily 
because of DOD's ongoing active base environmental restoration program. 
Nonetheless, our prior work has indicated that as closures are 
implemented, more intensive environmental investigations occur and 
additional hazardous conditions may be uncovered that could result in 
additional, unanticipated restoration and higher costs. Finally, the 
services' preliminary estimates are based on restoration standards that 
are applicable for the current use of the base property. Because reuse 
plans developed by communities receiving former base property sometimes 
reflect different uses for the property this could lead to more 
stringent and thus more expensive restoration in many cases. 

Based on experiences from prior BRAC rounds, we believe other costs are 
also likely to be incurred, although not required to be included in 
DOD's cost and savings analysis but which could add to the total costs 
to the government of implementing the BRAC round. These costs include 
transition assistance, planning grants, and other assistance made 
available to affected communities by DOD and other agencies. DOD 
officials told us that such estimates were not included in the prior 
rounds' analyses and that it was too difficult to project these costs, 
given the unknown factors associated with the number of communities 
affected and the costs that would be required to assist them. 
Additionally, as we reported in January 2005,[Footnote 36] in the prior 
four BRAC rounds, DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment, the Department 
of Labor, the Economic Development Administration within the Department 
of Commerce, and the Federal Aviation Administration provided nearly $2 
billion in assistance through fiscal year 2004 to communities and 
individuals, and according to DOD officials, these agencies are slated 
to perform similar roles for the 2005 round. However, while the 
magnitude of this assistance is unknown at this time, it is important 
to note that assistance will likely be needed in this round, as 
contrasted with prior rounds, for not only those communities that 
surround bases losing missions and personnel but also for communities 
that face considerable challenges dealing with large influxes of 
personnel and military missions. For example, DOD stated in its 2005 
BRAC report that over 100 actions significantly affect local 
communities, triggering federal assistance from DOD and other federal 
agencies. Also, as discussed more fully later, the number of bases in 
the 2005 BRAC round that will gain several thousand personnel from the 
recommended actions could increase pressure for federal assistance to 
mitigate the impact on community infrastructure, such as schools and 
roads, with the potential for more costs than in the prior rounds. 

Finally, the BRAC costs and savings estimates do not include any 
anticipated revenue from such actions as the sale of unneeded former 
base property or the transfer of property to communities through 
economic development conveyances.[Footnote 37] The potential for 
significant revenue may exist at certain locations. For example, the 
Navy sold some unneeded property from prior round actions in California 
at the former El Toro Marine Corps Air Station for about $650 million 
and the former Tustin Marine Corps Air Station for $208.5 million. The 
extent to which sales will play a role in the disposal of unneeded 
property arising from the 2005 BRAC round remains to be seen. 

Impact of BRAC Recommended Actions on Communities: 

The recommended actions for the 2005 BRAC round will have varying 
degrees of impact on communities surrounding bases undergoing a closure 
or realignment. While some will face economic recovery challenges as a 
result of a closure and associated losses of base personnel, others, 
which expect large influxes of personnel due to increased base 
activity, face a different set of challenges involving community 
infrastructure necessary to accommodate growth. 

In examining the economic impact of the 222 BRAC recommendations as 
measured by the percentage of employment, DOD data indicate that most 
economic areas across the country are expected to be affected very 
little but a few could face substantial impact. Almost 83 percent of 
the 244 economic areas affected by BRAC recommendations fall between a 
1 percent loss in employment and a 1 percent gain in 
employment.[Footnote 38] Slightly more than 9 percent of the economic 
areas had a negative economic impact of greater than 1 percent, but for 
some of these areas, the projected impact is fairly significant, 
ranging up to a potential direct and indirect loss of up to nearly 21 
percent. Almost 8 percent of the economic areas had a positive economic 
impact greater than 1 percent. Appendix XIV provides additional detail 
on our economic analyses. 

Of those communities facing potential negative economic impact, six 
communities face the potential for a fairly significant impact. They 
include communities surrounding Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; 
Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada; Naval Support Activity Crane, Indiana; 
Submarine Base New London, Connecticut; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; 
and Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, where the negative impact 
on employment as a percent of area employment ranges from 8.5 percent 
to 20.5 percent. Our prior work has shown that a variety of factors 
will affect how quickly communities are able to rebound from the 
negative economic consequences of closures and realignments. They 
include such factors as the trends associated with the national, 
regional, and local economies; natural and labor resources; effective 
planning for reuse of base property; and federal, state, and local 
government assistance to facilitate transition planning and execution. 
In a series of reports that have assessed the progress in implementing 
closures and realignments in prior BRAC rounds, we reported that most 
communities surrounding closed bases have been faring well in relation 
to key national economic indicators--unemployment rate and the average 
annual real per capita income growth rates.[Footnote 39] In our January 
2005 report for example, we further reported that while some 
communities surrounding closed bases were faring better than others, 
most have recovered or are continuing to recover from the impact of 
BRAC, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some negative 
impact from the economic downturn nationwide in recent years. 

The 2005 round, however, also has the potential to significantly affect 
a number of communities surrounding installations, which are expected 
to experience considerable growth in the numbers of military, civilian, 
and civilian support personnel. These personnel increases are likely to 
place additional demands on community services, such as providing 
adequate housing and schools, for which the communities may not have 
adequate resources to address in the short term. The total gains can be 
much more than just those personnel with the consideration of 
accompanying families. Table 6 shows that 20 installations are expected 
to realize gains of over 2,000 military, civilian, and mission support 
contractor personnel for an aggregate increase of more than 106,000 
personnel. 

Table 6: Military Installations That Would Receive a Net Gain of Over 
2,000 Personnel due to BRAC Actions: 

Installation: Fort Belvoir, VA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 4,521; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 15,837; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 20,358. 

Installation: Fort Bliss, TX; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 11,354; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 147; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 11,501. 

Installation: Fort Benning, GA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 9,221; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 618; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 9,839. 

Installation: Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 7,648; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 1,716; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 9,364. 

Installation: Fort Lee, VA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 6,139; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 1,205; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 7,344. 

Installation: Fort Meade, MD; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 682; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 4,679; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 5,361. 

Installation: Fort Carson, CO; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 4,178; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 199; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 4,377. 

Installation: Fort Bragg, NC; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 4,078; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 247; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 4,325. 

Installation: Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 3,579; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 319; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 3,898. 

Installation: Fort Sill, OK; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 3,444; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 158; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 3,602. 

Installation: Defense Finance and Accounting Service, IN; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 114; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 3,381; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 3,495. 

Installation: Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 3,245; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 122; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 3,367. 

Installation: Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 446; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 2,567; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 3,013. 

Installation: Fort Riley, KS; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 2,415; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 440; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 2,855. 

Installation: Naval Station Norfolk, VA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 3,447; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: (640); 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 2,807. 

Installation: Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 154; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 2,315; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 2,469. 

Installation: Eglin Air Force Base, FL; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 2,140; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 78; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 2,218. 

Installation: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: (3,411); 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 5,587; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 2,176. 

Installation: Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 177; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 1,859; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 2,036. 

Installation: Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 1,902; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 123; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 2,025. 

Installation: Total; 
Net gain of military personnel to an installation: 65,473; 
Net gain of civilians and mission support contractors to an 
installation: 40,957; 
Total net gain of personnel to an installation: 106,430. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table]

As shown in table 6, most of the gaining installations are Army 
installations with the gains attributable to a number of actions, 
including the return of large numbers of personnel from overseas 
locations under DOD's integrated global presence and basing strategy 
and the consolidation of various activities, such as combat-support 
related activities at Fort Lee, Virgina. Fort Belvoir, Virginia, has 
the largest expected growth, due in large measure to some consolidation 
of various activities from lease space in the Washington, D.C. area. 

The challenges facing communities surrounding gaining bases can be 
many, including increased housing demand, increased demands for roads 
and utilities, and adequate schools. These challenges can be formidable 
as communities may be faced with inadequate resources to address 
concerns in these areas as follows: 

* Housing: If history is any indication, while some of the personnel 
transferring into a base may live on-base, the majority may not, as the 
military services are turning more to housing privatization. 
Installation officials at Fort Riley, Kansas, told us about concerns 
about the nearby availability of housing (within a 20-mile radius) to 
support the expected influx of military and civilian personnel and 
their families transferring to the base. For those installations where 
adequate housing is not available in the surrounding communities 
existing housing privatization projects would need to be revised and 
expedited to provide for additional units. Fort Bliss, Texas, officials 
told us that they expect the need to accelerate their existing housing 
privatization efforts, but would require additional funds to do so. 
Currently, housing privatization has taken place or is in the process 
of taking place at several of these installations and similar efforts 
may be needed there as well. 

* Schools: Effects on bases with the greatest gain in personnel 
resulting from BRAC vary between whether dependents attend schools 
operated on base by DOD (Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, and Marine Corps 
Base Quantico as shown in table 6) or schools operated by local 
educational agencies. We recently reported on challenges likely to be 
faced by both DOD operated schools and those operated by local 
educational agencies in the post BRAC environment at these and other 
locations.[Footnote 40] Recently, in visiting selected bases affected 
by the BRAC recommendations, installation officials told us that while 
local educational authorities should be able to absorb additional 
students into their school systems, they are more concerned about the 
potential shortage of teachers. Another concern is that make-shift 
trailers or temporary modular facilities might be used. For example, 
while Kings Bay, Georgia, officials told us that the local school 
system should be able to accommodate the increase of students, it may 
need to resort to the use of portable classrooms. All installations 
that are expected to gain more than 2,000 personnel have local 
community-administrated school systems with the exceptions of Fort 
Benning, Fort Bragg, and Marine Corps Base Quantico which have DOD-
administrated school systems. If additional capacity is required at 
these three locations, additional military constructions funds would 
likely be needed. 

* Other infrastructure: Installation officials we spoke to also 
expressed some concern for the increased demand for various community 
services, such as health care, transportation, and utilities to 
accommodate personnel increases. Fort Carson, Colorado, officials told 
us that with its expected personnel increases, the local community will 
need more TRICARE providers to meet the expected demand. In other 
cases, such as at Fort Belvoir, Virgina, discussion has ensued 
regarding the need for increased mass transit capability, which may 
involve requests for millions of dollars in federal grant assistance. 

As previously noted, it is likely that these concerns may increase 
federal governmental expenditures that are not included in the BRAC 
cost and savings analyses. 

Candidate Recommendations That Were Deleted or Revised during the Final 
Weeks of the Selection Process: 

We also identified several candidate recommendations that were 
presented by the military services or joint cross-service groups to the 
IEC--DOD's senior BRAC leadership group--that were substantially 
revised or deleted from further consideration during the last few weeks 
of the BRAC section process. In aggregate, based on projected savings, 
these actions reduced the overall potential for estimated net annual 
recurring savings by nearly $500 million and estimated 20-year net 
present value savings by over $4.8 billion, as shown in table 7. 

Table 7: Candidate Recommendations That Were Deleted or Significantly 
Revised by the Infrastructure Executive Council: 

Dollars in millions. 

Proposals deleted by the IEC: 

Candidate recommendations: Close Naval Postgraduate School, CA; 
Initial proposal: Net annual recurring savings: $90; 
Initial proposal: 20-year savings: $1,120; 
IEC decision: Net annual recurring savings: $0; 
IEC decision: 20-year savings: $0; 
Change: Net annual recurring savings: ($90); 
Change: 20-year savings: ($1,120). 

Candidate recommendations: Close Uniformed Services of the University 
of the Health Sciences, MD; 
Initial proposal: Net annual recurring savings: $58; 
Initial proposal: 20-year savings: $575; 
IEC decision: Net annual recurring savings: $0; 
IEC decision: 20-year savings: $0; 
Change: Net annual recurring savings: ($58); 
Change: 20-year savings: ($575). 

Candidate recommendations: Close Natick Soldier Systems Center, MA; 
Initial proposal: Net annual recurring savings: $20; 
Initial proposal: 20-year savings: $114; 
IEC decision: Net annual recurring savings: $0; 
IEC decision: 20-year savings: $0; 
Change: Net annual recurring savings: ($20); 
Change: 20-year savings: ($114). 

Candidate recommendations: Close Adelphi Laboratory Center, MD; 
Initial proposal: Net annual recurring savings: $166; 
Initial proposal: 20-year savings: $949; 
IEC decision: Net annual recurring savings: $144; 
IEC decision: 20-year savings: $1,026; 
Change: Net annual recurring savings: ($22); 
Change: 20-year savings: $77. 

Candidate recommendations: Close Carlisle Barracks, PA; 
Initial proposal: Net annual recurring savings: $50; 
Initial proposal: 20-year savings: $555; 
IEC decision: Net annual recurring savings: $0; 
IEC decision: 20-year savings: $0; 
Change: Net annual recurring savings: ($50); 
Change: 20-year savings: ($555). 

Candidate recommendations: Close Air Force Institute of Technology, OH; 
Initial proposal: Net annual recurring savings: $8; 
Initial proposal: 20-year savings: $14; 
IEC decision: Net annual recurring savings: $0; 
IEC decision: 20-year savings: $0; 
Change: Net annual recurring savings: (