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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 
House of Representatives:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

January 2005:

Homeland Security:

Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges Regarding the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security:

GAO-05-33:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-33, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The National Strategy for Homeland Security sets forth a plan to 
improve homeland security through the cooperation of federal, state, 
local, and private sector organizations on an array of functions. These 
functions are organized into the six distinct “critical mission areas” 
of (1) intelligence and warning, (2) border and transportation 
security, (3) domestic counterterrorism, (4) protecting critical 
infrastructures and key assets, (5) defending against catastrophic 
threats, and (6) emergency preparedness and response. Within each of 
these mission areas, the strategy identifies “major initiatives” to be 
addressed. In all, the strategy cites 43 initiatives across the six 
mission areas.

GAO reviewed the strategy’s implementation to: 

* determine whether its initiatives are being addressed by key 
departments’ strategic planning and implementation activities, whether 
the initiatives have lead agencies identified for their implementation, 
and whether the initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 
by such agencies and

* identify ongoing homeland security challenges that have been 
reflected in GAO products since September 11, 2001, by both mission 
area and issues that cut across mission areas.

What GAO Found:

Key federal departments—Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State—have 
addressed the strategy’s 43 initiatives to some extent in their 
strategic planning and implementation activities. All 43 of the 
initiatives were included in some of the planning or implementation 
activities of at least one of these six departments. Most of the 
initiatives (42 of the 43) also had departments identified as the lead 
agencies for their implementation, which helps to ensure accountability 
for implementation. However, many of these 42 initiatives had multiple 
lead agencies, indicating that interagency coordination of roles and 
activities will be important, particularly on those initiatives 
involving domestic counterterrorism and critical infrastructure 
protection. All of the initiatives were being implemented in fiscal 
year 2004 by at least one department. While GAO determined that 
implementation was occurring, it did not assess the status or quality 
of the various departments’ implementation of the initiatives.

While departments have incorporated these initiatives into their 
planning and implementation activity, the United States faces 
significant challenges in fully implementing the strategy in a 
coordinated and integrated manner. Some of the most difficult 
challenges being confronted are those that cut across the various 
critical mission areas, such as balancing homeland security funding 
needs with other national requirements, improving risk management 
methods for resource allocation and investments, developing adequate 
homeland security performance measures, developing a national 
enterprise architecture for homeland security, and clarifying the roles 
and responsibilities among the levels of government and the private 
sector. GAO has also identified a large diversity of other challenges 
in each of the six critical mission areas since September 11. 

Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by Agency (budget 
authority in millions of dollars): 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-33.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin (202) 
512-3610 or rabkinn@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Scope and Methodology:

Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges:

Concluding Observations:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Intelligence and Warning:

Definition and Major Initiatives:

Agencies with Major Roles in Intelligence and Warning:

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

Challenges in Intelligence and Warning:

Appendix III: Border and Transportation Security:

Definition and Major Initiatives:

Agencies with Major Roles in Border and Transportation Security:

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

Challenges in Border and Transportation Security:

Border Security:

Transportation Security:

Appendix IV: Domestic Counterterrorism:

Definition and Major Initiatives:

Agencies with Major Roles in Domestic Counterterrorism:

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

Challenges in Domestic Counterterrorism:

Appendix V: Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets:

Definition and Major Initiatives:

Agencies with Major Roles in Critical Infrastructure Protection:

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

Challenges in Critical Infrastructure Protection:

Appendix VI: Defending Against Catastrophic Threats:

Definition and Major Initiatives:

Agencies with Major Roles in Defending against Catastrophic Threats:

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

Challenges in Defending Against Catastrophic Threats:

Appendix VII: Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Definition and Major Initiatives:

Agencies with Major Roles in Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

Challenges in Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Appendix VIII: Crosscutting Issues:

Crosscutting Challenges:

Appendix IX: Department Summary Across Critical Mission Areas:

Appendix X: Homeland Security Presidential Directives:

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Defense:

GAO Comment:

Appendix XII: Comments From the Department of Health and Human 
Services:

GAO Comment:

Appendix XIII: Comments From the Department of Homeland Security:

GAO Comment:

Appendix XIV: Comments From the Department of Justice:

GAO Comments:

Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Intelligence and Warning Mission Area's Five Initiatives:

Table 2: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Border and Transportation Security Mission Area's Six Initiatives:

Table 3: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Domestic Counterterrorism Mission Area's Six Initiatives:

Table 4: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Mission Area's Eight 
Initiatives:

Table 5. Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Defending Against Catastrophic Threats Mission Area's Six 
Initiatives:

Table 6: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Emergency Preparedness and Response Mission Area's Twelve 
Initiatives:

Table 7: Detailed Department Leadership and Planning/Implementation 
Activities in the Intelligence and Warning Mission Area's Five 
Initiatives:

Table 8: Detailed Department Leadership and Planning/Implementation 
Activities in the Border and Transportation Mission Area's Six 
Initiatives:

Table 9: Detailed Department Leadership and Planning/Implementation 
Activities in the Domestic Counterterrorism Mission Area's Six 
Initiatives:

Table 10: Detailed Department Planning/Implementation Activities in the 
Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets Critical Mission 
Area's Eight Initiatives:

Table 11: Detailed Department Planning/Implementation Activities in the 
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats Mission Area's Six Initiatives:

Table 12: Detailed Department Planning/Implementation Activities in the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Mission Area's Twelve Initiatives:

Table 13: Summary of Department Leads, Planning, and Implementation 
across the Six Critical Mission Areas of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security:

Figures:

Figure 1: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by 
Critical Mission Area:

Figure 2: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by 
Department:

Figure 3: The Five Threat Levels of the Homeland Security Advisory 
System:

Figure 4: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Intelligence and Warning:

Figure 5: U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Marine Officers on the Waters 
of the Rio Grande, along the United States and Mexico Border:

Figure 6: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Border & Transportation Security:

Figure 7: An FBI Evidence Response Team in Action at the Scene of a 
Terrorism-Related Exercise:

Figure 8: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Domestic Counterterrorism:

Figure 9: A U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Helicopter Patrols 
the Skies over the Nation's Capital:

Figure 10: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection:

Figure 11: First Responders Practice Emergency Decontamination:

Figure 12: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats:

Figure 13: Hazardous Materials Response Unit in Action at an Exercise:

Figure 14: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Emergency Preparedness:

Abbreviations:

APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service:

ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:

CAPPS: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening Program:

CBP: Customs and Border Patrol:

CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear:

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency:

CIP: Critical Infrastructure Protection:

CSI: container security initiative:

C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism:

CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention:

DBT: design basis threat:

DHS: Department of Homeland Security:

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency:

DOD: Department of Defense:

DOE: Department of Energy:

DOJ: Department of Justice:

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:

FPS: Federal Protective Service:

GAO: Government Accountability Office:

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:

GSA: General Services Administration:

HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:

HSAS: Homeland Security Advisory System:

HSC: Homeland Security Council:

HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive:

IAIP: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection:

ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:

IT: information technology:

MANPADS: Man-Portable Air Defense System:

MTSA: Maritime Transportation Security Act:

NIH: National Institutes of Health:

NCR: National Capital Region:

NMLS: National Money Laundering Strategy:

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive:

ODP: Office of Domestic Preparedness:

OJP: Office of Justice Programs:

OMB: Office of Management and Budget:

PDD: Presidential Decision Directive:

PSV: post-shipment verification:

UAV: unmanned aerial vehicle:

USDA: United States Department of Agriculture:

USPS: United States Postal Service:

US-VISIT: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator:

VA: Veterans Administration:

WMD: weapons of mass destruction:

SSN: Social Security Number:

TSA: Transportation Security Act:

TTIC: Terrorist Threat Integration Center:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

January 14, 2005:

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In an effort to increase homeland security following the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed 
legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 
November 2002.[Footnote 1] The strategy sets forth overall objectives 
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the 
recovery from attacks that may occur. To accomplish these overall 
objectives, the strategy describes six critical mission areas and 43 
initiatives. Since the strategy was issued, the President has also 
issued additional documents--known as Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives (or HSPDs)--that provide more detailed guidance on the 
mission areas and initiatives. The creation of DHS, which began 
operations in March 2003, represents a fusion of 22 federal agencies to 
coordinate and centralize the leadership of many homeland security 
activities under a single department. In addition to DHS, the 
Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services 
(HHS), Justice (DOJ), and State play an important role in implementing 
the strategy. These six key departments represent 94 percent of 
proposed federal spending for homeland security in fiscal year 2005.

With the strategy now more than 2 years old, and DHS more than a year 
old, you asked that we review the implementation of the strategy and 
organize our work by critical mission area. In response, we have:

* determined whether the initiatives in the strategy were being 
addressed by the key department's strategic planning and related 
activities; whether the initiatives had "lead" agencies identified for 
their implementation, and whether multiple departments were 
implementing the initiatives in fiscal year 2004; and:

* identified homeland security challenges as reflected in our products 
since September 11, 2001, by both mission area and issues that cut 
across mission areas.

This report establishes one framework from which to assess federal 
department implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. Since agency homeland security activities are ongoing, this 
report is intended to identify a baseline from which to assess progress 
toward meeting homeland security objectives. In this report, we first 
provide the proposed fiscal year 2005 homeland security-related budget 
by mission area and department. Then, we discuss the homeland security 
planning and implementation activities of the six departments under 
review, as well as remaining homeland security challenges, by mission 
area. The appendixes that follow provide more detailed assessments of 
each of these sections and are also arranged by mission area. (See app. 
I for more information on the scope and methodology.) Further, this 
report should be considered in the context of several companion efforts 
to provide baseline information. In February 2004, we testified on the 
desired characteristics of national strategies and whether various 
strategies--including the National Strategy for Homeland Security--
contained those desired characteristics.[Footnote 2] In March, we 
summarized strategic homeland security recommendations made by 
congressionally chartered commissions and us.[Footnote 3] We organized 
this analysis by critical mission area, as defined in the strategy. In 
July, we reported on our recommendations to DHS and the department's 
progress in implementing such recommendations.[Footnote 4] We organized 
this analysis by DHS directorate or division. In September, we compared 
9/11 Commission recommendations with those of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. We 
also provided a preliminary analysis of department planning and 
implementation activities with respect to the six mission 
areas.[Footnote 5] Together, these baseline efforts are intended to aid 
congressional oversight of federal homeland security activities.

Results in Brief:

Key federal departments have addressed the strategy's initiatives in 
their strategic planning and implementation activities. All 43 
initiatives indicated in the strategy were included in the activities 
of at least one of the six departments we reviewed. For most of the 
initiatives (42 of 43), the strategy or HSPDs identified lead agencies, 
thereby helping to ensure accountability for implementation. All 43 
initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 by at least one 
department. Thirty-three of the 43 initiatives (77 percent) were being 
planned or implemented by 3 or more departments. While we determined 
that implementation was occurring, we did not assess the status or 
quality of the various departments' implementation of the initiatives.

While departments have incorporated these initiatives into their 
planning and implementation activity, the United States still faces 
significant challenges in implementing the strategy in a well 
coordinated and integrated manner. A review of our products since 
September 11, 2001, shows that some of the most difficult challenges 
being confronted are those that cut across the various critical mission 
areas. These challenges include:

* balancing homeland security needs with other national requirements,

* improving risk management methods for resource allocation and 
investments,

* developing adequate homeland security performance measures,

* clarifying the roles and responsibilities among the levels of 
government and the private sector, and:

* developing a national blueprint--called an enterprise architecture--
to help integrate different organization's efforts to improve homeland 
security.

In addition to these and other crosscutting challenges, we have 
identified a large diversity of challenges related specifically to each 
of the six mission areas described in the strategy and provide details 
on them in the remainder of the report.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, DOJ, HHS, State, 
and the Homeland Security Council for comment. All except State and the 
Homeland Security Council provided comments, which generally consisted 
of technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. None of the 
departments disagreed with the substance of the report.

Background:

The National Strategy for Homeland Security sets out a plan to improve 
homeland security through the cooperation and partnering of federal, 
state, local, and private sector organizations on an array of 
functions.[Footnote 6] The strategy organizes these functions into six 
critical mission areas:[Footnote 7]

* Intelligence and Warning involves the identification, collection, 
analysis, and distribution of intelligence information appropriate for 
preempting or preventing a terrorist attack.

* Border and Transportation Security emphasizes the efficient and 
reliable flow of people, goods, and material across borders while 
deterring terrorist activity.

* Domestic Counterterrorism focuses on law enforcement efforts to 
identify, halt, prevent, and prosecute terrorists in the United States.

* Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets stresses securing 
the nation's interconnecting sectors and important facilities, sites, 
and structures.

* Defending Against Catastrophic Threats emphasizes the detection, 
deterrence, and mitigation of terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction.

* Emergency Preparedness and Response highlights damage minimization 
and recovery from terrorist attacks.

Since the strategy was issued in July 2002, the President has also 
issued 12 HSPDs that provide additional guidance related to these 
mission areas. For example, HSPD-4 focuses on defending against 
catastrophic threats and HSPD-7 focuses on protecting critical 
infrastructure. These HSPDs provided some of the details that were not 
in the strategy, particularly with respect to agency roles and 
milestones. See appendix X for a complete list and description of these 
HSPDs.

The strategy also identifies the major initiatives to be addressed 
within each of these six mission areas. For example, within the 
Intelligence and Warning mission area, 5 initiatives are indicated: (1) 
enhancing the analytic capabilities of the FBI; (2) building new 
capabilities through the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate of DHS; (3) implementing the Homeland Security 
Advisory System; (4) utilizing dual-use analysis to prevent attacks; 
and (5) employing "red team" techniques.[Footnote 8] Within the Border 
and Transportation Security mission area, 6 initiatives are cited: (1) 
ensuring accountability in border and transportation security, (2) 
creating "smart borders", (3) increasing the security of international 
shipping containers, (4) implementing the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act of 2001, (5) recapitalizing the U.S. Coast Guard, and (6) 
reforming immigration services. In all, the strategy cites 43 
initiatives across the six mission areas. See appendix IX for a 
complete list of all the initiatives by mission area.

The latest available funding data from the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for the six mission areas is illustrated in figure 1.

Figure 1: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by 
Critical Mission Area:

[See PDF for image]

Note: Budget authority in millions of dollars.

[End of figure]

The National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies a number of 
federal departments, as well as nonfederal organizations, that have 
important roles in implementing the mission areas and related 
initiatives. In terms of federal departments, DHS is intended to have a 
prominent role in implementing all of the mission areas. Other key 
federal departments specified in the strategy include, in alphabetical 
order, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and 
the Department of State (State). These departments have their own 
strategic plans, which indicate how they will implement their homeland 
security programs (as well as other programs unrelated to homeland 
security). Together, DHS and these other five departments constitute 
94 percent of the proposed $47.4 billion budget for homeland security-
related activities in fiscal year 2005. OMB did not report funding for 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) although it has activities 
related to the Intelligence and Warning mission area. As explained 
further in appendix II, we did not include the CIA in our analysis 
because of the lack of funding data and because the strategy provides 
little discussion of the agency. Figure 2 shows the proposed fiscal 
year 2005 funding for these departments as well as the proposed 
homeland security funding for all other agencies.

Figure 2: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by 
Department:

[See PDF for image]

Notes: Budget authority in millions of dollars.

[End of figure]

Other agencies includes the Departments of Agriculture ($651 million), 
Veterans Affairs ($297 million), Transportation ($243 million), 
Commerce ($150 million), and Treasury ($87 million), as well as the 
National Science Foundation ($344 million), National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration ($207 million), Social Security Administration 
($155 million), Environmental Protection Agency ($97 million), U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers ($84 million), General Services Administration 
($80 million), and several smaller agencies. Additionally, OMB reported 
the Intelligence Community figure in aggregate; it did not break it out 
by individual departments (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency).

The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the related HSPDs 
typically identify a specific federal department as being a "lead" 
agency for specific initiatives. However, the language varies in 
precision. In some cases, the documents use clear language to identify 
which department will lead efforts across the government. In other 
cases, the lead is more implied than stated. Sometimes, more than one 
department is identified as a lead agency--which can occur because some 
of the initiatives in the strategy are large in scope, and different 
departments lead different parts of the initiatives. The identification 
of lead agency is important in order to specify which agencies are 
accountable for the implementation of the initiatives, particularly if 
implementation requires the efforts of several different agencies 
exercising different statutory authorities. By clearly identifying the 
lead agency, the strategies and the HSPDs enable the federal, state, 
local, and private stakeholders to determine who is responsible and 
accountable for the implementation, and thus more effectively direct 
their inquiries and integrate their own actions, particularly where 
multiagency coordination is required. See appendix IX for a complete 
list of the initiatives and the departments identified as lead 
agencies.

Congress, because of concerns about terrorism in recent years, 
chartered four commissions to examine terrorist threats and the 
government's response to such threats, as well as to make 
recommendations to federal, state, local, and private organizations. 
These national commissions included the following:

* The Bremer Commission: the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired 
by Ambassador Paul Bremer, which issued its report in June 2000.

* The Gilmore Commission: the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, chaired by Governor James S. Gilmore, III, which issued 
its final report in December 2003.

* The Hart-Rudman Commission: the U.S. Commission on National Security/
21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, which 
issued its final report in February 2001.

* The 9/11 Commission: the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States, chaired by Governor Thomas H. Kean, which 
issued its final report in July 2004.

Scope and Methodology:

To determine whether the key federal departments addressed strategy 
initiatives in their planning and implementation activity, we 
identified the 43 major initiatives and the six key federal departments 
for review. We evaluated each department's high-level strategic 
planning documents related to homeland security to determine if they 
had planning or implementation activities related to each initiative. 
To satisfy the planning and implementation criteria, we generally 
required departments to provide documentary support for one such 
activity, per initiative. Where classified or undocumented activities 
were involved, we worked with department officials to verify the 
activity. We provided the results of our analyses to planning officials 
from the various departments for their verification. Additionally, we 
reviewed the language in the strategy and HSPDs to determine which 
departments had been identified as lead agencies in implementing the 
initiatives. In some cases, the leadership language was clear; in other 
cases, it was less precise or implied. We were then able to determine 
whether departments demonstrated planning or implementation activities 
in both lead and nonlead initiatives. Our analysis is necessarily a 
snapshot of activity as of particular points in time. The agencies 
reviewed provided us with information as to their planning and 
implementation as of various dates, including fiscal year 2004. We 
recognize that the agencies continue to plan and implement their 
strategies and programs and have and may continue to progress beyond 
the status portrayed in this analysis. Finally, our work did not assess 
the status or quality of the work being planned or implemented.

To determine homeland security challenges facing the nation, we 
reviewed our reports issued since September 11. This included over 250 
products cutting across the gamut of homeland security activities. We 
summarized and categorized the challenges by critical mission area and 
subtopic where appropriate (e.g., the Border and Transportation 
Security mission area was subdivided into border security and 
transportation security). While our summary is limited to challenges we 
identified, we have noted in the text where the congressionally 
chartered commissions have raised similar issues. We recognize that 
these commissions, Congress, the executive branch, and other 
organizations have identified additional challenges in each of the 
mission areas.

We conducted our work between February and November 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. For more details 
on our objectives, scope, and methodology, see appendix I.

Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges:

The following sections provide summaries of each mission area, as well 
as issues that cut across all six mission areas. These summaries 
include an analysis of federal departments' strategic planning and 
implementation activities and the challenges faced by these departments 
and the nation as a whole.

Intelligence and Warning:

The strategy identifies five initiatives under the Intelligence and 
Warning mission area. All of the initiatives are covered by at least 
two departments planning or implementation activities (see table 1). 
Examples include DOJ and DOE activities to enhance the analytic 
capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); DHS, State, 
and DOE activities to utilize dual-use analysis to prevent attacks; and 
DHS, DOD, and DOE activities to employ red-team techniques.

Four of the five initiatives have a department identified as a lead 
agency. Neither the strategy nor the HSPDs identified a lead agency on 
the fifth initiative, which relates to the employment of red-team 
techniques. According to DHS strategic planning officials, it is 
important that a number of agencies conduct red-team techniques to test 
their own specific programs, so no agency would necessarily have the 
overall lead. See appendix II for a more detailed discussion on the 
implications of not having an overall lead agency identified for red-
team techniques. For this mission area, the lead agency specifications 
are clear (rather than implied), and there are no multiple leads on any 
of the initiatives.

All five initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 as 
reported by two or more departments (see table 7). DHS and DOJ cited 
2004 implementation activity for each of the initiatives for which they 
were identified as lead agencies.

Table 1: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Intelligence and Warning Mission Area's Five Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Refer to appendix II for more specific details regarding department 
planning and implementation activities, including a discussion of 
fiscal year 2004 implementation. As explained further in appendix II, 
we did not include CIA in our analysis because of the lack of funding 
data and because the strategy provides little discussion of the agency.

Our work in the Intelligence and Warning mission area since 2001 has 
highlighted a number of challenges that need to be addressed. Many of 
these challenges are directly related to initiatives in this mission 
area. These challenges include:

* improving analysis capabilities at the FBI through better strategic 
information management,

* developing productive information-sharing relationships among the 
federal government and state and local governments and the private 
sector,

* overcoming the limitations in the sharing of classified national 
security information across sectors,

* ensuring that the private sector receives better information on 
potential threats,

* consolidating watch lists to promote better information and sharing, 
and:

* maintaining a viable and relevant homeland security advisory system.

These challenges are discussed in greater detail in appendix II. Many 
of these challenges were also discussed by one or more of the Bremer, 
Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions.

Border and Transportation Security:

There are six initiatives under the Border and Transportation Security 
mission area. All of the initiatives are covered by at least two 
departments' planning or implementation activities (see table 2). 
Examples include DHS, DOD, HHS, State, and DOE activities to ensure 
accountability in border and transportation security; DHS, DOD, State, 
and DOE activities to increase the security of international shipping 
containers; and DHS, DOJ, and State activities to reform immigration 
services.

All six initiatives have a department identified as a lead agency. One 
initiative (i.e., creating smart borders) has multiple lead agencies 
identified in the strategy and HSPDs. DHS is a lead on the most 
initiatives: a clear lead on two initiatives and an implied lead on 
four other initiatives.

All six initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 as 
reported by one or more departments (see table 8). DHS and State cited 
2004 implementation activity in each of the initiatives for which they 
were identified as leads. DOJ had been identified as a lead agency with 
respect to creating smart borders and reforming immigration services, 
but with the transfer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to 
DHS, DOJ officials indicated that the department was no longer serving 
as a lead on that initiative.

Table 2: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Border and Transportation Security Mission Area's Six Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Refer to appendix III for more specific details regarding department 
planning and implementation activities, including a discussion of 
fiscal year 2004 implementation.

Border and Transportation Security is another mission area where our 
work has indicated there are challenges to be addressed. Again, many of 
these challenges are directly related to initiatives in this mission 
area. These challenges include:

* striking an acceptable balance between security and the flow of 
commercial activity, travel, and tourism;

* processing people at our nation's land ports of entry and determining 
the proper role of biometric technologies for security applications;

* deploying the best available technologies for detecting radioactive 
and nuclear materials at U.S. ports of entry;

* developing a clear and comprehensive policy on the use of visas as an 
antiterrorism tool and improving the management and oversight of 
programs to track visitors;

* implementing an effective system to prescreen passengers prior to 
their arrival at the airport, as well as achieving and sustaining 
improvements in airline passenger and baggage screening; and:

* strengthening perimeter security at airports and countering the 
threat of hand-held missiles to commercial aviation.

These and other challenges are discussed in greater detail in appendix 
III. Many of these challenges were also discussed by one or more of the 
Bremer, Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions.

Domestic Counterterrorism:

The Domestic Counterterrorism mission area has six initiatives. All of 
the initiatives are covered by at least one department's planning or 
implementation activities (see table 3). Examples include DHS, DOJ, 
DOD, HHS, and DOE activities to improve intergovernmental law 
enforcement coordination; DHS, DOJ, DOD, and State activities to 
facilitate apprehension of potential terrorists; and DHS, DOJ, and 
State activities to target and attack terrorist financing.

Each of the six initiatives has a department that is identified as a 
lead agency. All indicated leads from the strategy and HSPDs are clear 
leads. For three of the six initiatives, multiple departments have been 
identified as leads.

All 6 initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 as 
reported by one or more departments (see table 9). DOJ cited 2004 
implementation activity on each of the six initiatives for which it was 
identified as a lead. DHS and State also cited implementation activity 
on all initiatives for which they were identified as lead agencies.

Table 3: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Domestic Counterterrorism Mission Area's Six Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Refer to appendix IV for more specific details regarding department 
planning and implementation activities, including a discussion of 
fiscal year 2004 implementation.

Domestic Counterterrorism is another mission area where our recent work 
has highlighted continuing challenges. These challenges threaten to 
undermine law enforcement agencies' ability to aggressively detect, 
deter, prevent, eradicate, and adjudicate terrorist activity. These 
challenges include:

* transforming the FBI from an investigative organization into a 
proactive entity focused on detecting and preventing terrorist 
activity,

* modifying the FBI's related workforce and business practices to focus 
on counterterrorism and intelligence-related priorities,

* improving interagency coordination to leverage existing law 
enforcement resources to investigate money laundering and terrorist 
financing,

* monitoring the use of alternate financing mechanisms by terrorists,

* identifying and apprehending terrorists already present in the United 
States, and:

* recognizing counterfeit documentation and the use of identity fraud 
at U.S. borders and other security checkpoints.

These challenges are discussed in greater detail in appendix IV. Many 
of these challenges were also discussed by one or more of the Bremer, 
Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions.

Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets:

The strategy identifies eight initiatives under the Protecting Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets--commonly referred to as Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP)--mission area. All of the initiatives 
are covered by at least four departments' planning or implementation 
activities (see table 4). Examples include DHS, DOJ, DOD, HHS, and DOE 
activities to unify America's infrastructure protection effort in DHS; 
DHS, DOD, HHS, and DOE activities to develop a national infrastructure 
protection plan and, all six departments' activities to secure 
cyberspace.

Each of the eight initiatives has a department identified as a lead 
agency. In the case of five of the eight initiatives, the leads are 
clear; only in the case of three initiatives (i.e., enabling effective 
partnership with state and local governments and the private sector, 
securing cyberspace, and partnering with the international community to 
protect our transnational infrastructure) are there implied leads. For 
three of the eight initiatives, multiple lead agencies have been 
identified. For example, DOD, HHS, and DOE are all sector leads on the 
same initiative--building and maintaining a complete and accurate 
assessment of America's critical infrastructure and key assets. These 
departments have the sector leads as follows, DOD for defense 
industrial base, HHS for public health, and DOE for the energy sector.

All eight initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 as 
reported by two or more departments (see table 10). DHS, DOD, HHS, 
State, and DOE cited implementation activity on all initiatives for 
which they were identified as lead agencies.

Table 4: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Mission Area's Eight 
Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Refer to appendix V for more specific details regarding department 
planning and implementation activities, including a discussion of 
fiscal year 2004 implementation.

Our work related to CIP has identified several challenges. Overcoming 
the challenges presented in this mission area is made even more 
difficult because increasing the security of one type of target, such 
as aircraft or federal buildings, increases the possibility that 
terrorists may choose another type of target, such as trains or ports. 
The challenges include:

* refining the federal government's role in managing CIP;

* developing a comprehensive and coordinated national CIP plan that 
delineates the roles, defines interims objectives and milestones, sets 
time frames, and establishes performance measures;

* developing productive information-sharing relationships within the 
federal government and among federal, state, and local governments and 
the private sector;

* improving the federal government's capabilities to analyze incident, 
threat, and vulnerability information related to critical 
infrastructures and key assets;

* improving the security of government facilities through a variety of 
methods, including better training and procedures to detect counterfeit 
documents and identity fraud; and:

* analyzing the strengths, interdependencies, and vulnerabilities of 
several specific industries, including the financial services sector, 
the shipping and postal system, drinking water, agriculture, the 
chemical industry, nuclear power plants, and nuclear weapons sites.

These challenges are discussed in greater detail in appendix V. Many of 
these challenges were also discussed by one or more of the Bremer, 
Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions.

Defending Against Catastrophic Threats:

There are six initiatives under the Defending against Catastrophic 
Threats mission area. All of the initiatives are covered by at least 
two departments' planning or implementation activities (see table 5). 
Examples include DHS, DOD, State, and DOE activities to prevent 
terrorist use of nuclear weapons through better sensors and procedures; 
DHS, DOD, HHS, and DOE activities to detect chemical and biological 
materials and attacks; and DHS, DOD, HHS, State, and DOE activities to 
harness the scientific knowledge and tools to counter terrorism.

Each of the six initiatives has a department identified as a lead 
agency. On half the initiatives, multiple departments have been 
identified as leads. In the case of three initiatives, the leads are 
clear; in the case of the remaining three initiatives, several leads 
are implied.

All six initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 as 
reported by one or more departments (see Table 11). DHS cited 
implementation activity in five of the six initiatives for which it was 
identified as a lead. It is not yet implementing the Select Agent 
Program. DOD, HHS, State, and DOE cited implementation activity on all 
the initiatives for which they were identified as the lead agency.

Table 5: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation 
Activity in the Defending Against Catastrophic Threats Mission Area's 
Six Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Refer to appendix VI for more specific details regarding department 
planning and implementation activities, including a discussion of 
fiscal year 2004 implementation.

The challenges the nation faces in defending itself against 
catastrophic threats--such as the terrorist use of chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons--are quite broad 
and could have devastating consequences if not effectively addressed. 
Our recent work in this mission area has highlighted challenges that 
include:

* strengthening efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
dual-use items (items having both commercial and military applications) 
out of the hands of terrorists,

* controlling the sale of excess items that can be used to produce and 
deliver biological agents, and:

* designating lead agencies for setting priorities for information 
systems related to terrorism.

These challenges are discussed in greater detail in appendix VI. Many 
of these challenges were also discussed by one or more of the Bremer, 
Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions.

Emergency Preparedness and Response:

For the Emergency Preparedness and Response mission area, the strategy 
identifies 12 initiatives. All of the initiatives are covered by at 
least two departments' planning or implementation activities (see table 
6). Examples include DHS, DOD, HHS, and DOE activities to create a 
national incident management system; DHS and HHS activities to enable 
seamless communications among all responders; and, DHS, DOD, HHS, and 
DOE activities to augment America's pharmaceutical and vaccine 
stockpiles.

Each of the 12 initiatives has a department identified as a lead 
agency. For 3 of the 12 initiatives, multiple lead agencies have been 
identified. All leads, with three exceptions, are clear leads.

All 12 initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 by two or 
more departments (see table 12). DHS, DOD and HHS cited implementation 
activity in 2004 for all initiatives for which they were identified as 
lead agencies.

Table 6: Department Leadership, Planning, or Implementation Activity in 
the Emergency Preparedness and Response Mission Area's Twelve 
Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Refer to appendix VII for more specific details regarding department 
planning and implementation activities, including a discussion of 
fiscal year 2004 implementation.

Our recent work has shown that there are many challenges in the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response mission area regarding efforts to 
effectively minimize the damage and successfully recover from terrorist 
attacks. We identified the following challenges:

* adopting an "all hazards" approach to emergency preparedness and 
response;

* providing better governmental planning and coordination with regard 
to first responder issues;

* preparing first responders for incidents involving catastrophic 
terrorism;

* restructuring the federal grant system for first responders;

* strengthening public health in a variety of areas, including better 
information sharing, preparations for catastrophic terrorism such as 
bioterrorism, and more hospital equipment;

* improving regional response planning involving multiple 
municipalities, states, and countries;

* establishing and implementing preparedness standards and measures;

* ensuring adequate communications among first responders and with the 
public; and:

* defining the roles and responsibilities of DOD in defending the 
homeland and providing military support to civil authorities.

These challenges are discussed in greater detail in appendix VII. Many 
of these challenges were also discussed by one or more of the Bremer, 
Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions.

Crosscutting Issues:

Our recent work has also identified homeland security challenges that 
cut across the various mission areas. While it is important that the 
major mission challenges be individually addressed, it is equally 
important that these challenges be addressed from a comprehensive 
national homeland security perspective (i.e., some mission areas 
overlap, some challenges are common across mission areas, some 
corrective actions have ramifications, and there are both positive and 
negative challenges across mission area boundaries). Coordinated 
actions may substantially enhance multiple mission performance. The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the corresponding strategic 
plans of the agencies accountable for achieving the national strategy's 
objectives must address and resolve the sometimes competing issues 
among homeland security mission areas and between homeland security and 
other important national priorities and objectives. These crosscutting 
issues are often the most difficult to address. Some of these 
challenges that we have identified are governmentwide in nature--they 
cut across the federal, state, and local governments, and sometimes 
private sectors. Such governmentwide challenges that we have identified 
include:

* balancing homeland security needs with other national requirements by 
formulating realistic budget and resource plans that support the 
implementation of an efficient and effective homeland security program;

* providing timely and transparent homeland security funding 
information that sets forth detailed information concerning the 
obligation of the funding provided;

* improving risk management methods for resource allocation and 
investments by developing a commonly accepted framework and supporting 
tools to guide agency analysts in providing information to management;

* establishing baseline performance goals and measures upon which to 
assess and improve prevention efforts, evaluate vulnerability 
reduction, and gauge responsiveness to damage and recovery needs at all 
levels of government;

* clarifying the roles and responsibilities within and between the 
levels of government and the private sector through the development and 
implementation of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the 
process;

* developing a national blueprint--called an enterprise architecture--
to help integrate different organizations' efforts to improve homeland 
security; and:

* improving governmentwide information technology management through 
the consistent application of effective strategic planning and 
performance measurement practices.

These challenges are discussed in greater detail in appendix VIII. Many 
of these challenges were also discussed by one or more of the Bremer, 
Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions.

In addition to the challenges discussed earlier, DHS--as the department 
most responsible for Homeland Security--faces a number of challenges. 
Because of this, in January 2003, we designated the overall 
implementation and transformation of DHS as high-risk.[Footnote 9] We 
gave it this designation for three reasons. First, the size and 
complexity of the effort make the challenge especially daunting, 
requiring sustained attention and time to achieve the department's 
mission in an effective and efficient manner. Second, the components 
being merged into DHS already face a wide array of existing challenges 
that must be addressed. Finally, if DHS cannot effectively carry out 
its mission, it exposes the nation to potentially very serious 
consequences. We are currently in the process of reviewing the 
challenges faced by DHS and the progress it has made to address these 
challenges. The results of this review will be published in a 
forthcoming GAO report.

Concluding Observations:

All 43 initiatives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security were 
included in plans and implementation activities in fiscal year 2004 by 
at least one of the six key departments we reviewed. Further, 33 of the 
43 initiatives (77 percent) were being planned or implemented by at 
least three of the six departments. Additionally, we found that the 
strategy and HSPDs identified lead agencies for 42 of the 43 
initiatives. For these 42 initiatives where a lead had been identified, 
13 initiatives had leads that were implied rather than clear. While DHS 
was identified as the lead for the most initiatives (37), there were 
multiple leads for 12 of these 42 initiatives. Given the large number 
of initiatives being implemented by multiple agencies, the fact that 
some of the leads were implied rather than clear, and the fact that 
about a third of the initiatives had multiple leads, coordination 
across federal departments will be a key factor required for the 
successful implementation of the strategy. Such coordination would 
ensure that federal departments are working to support the lead agency, 
are complementing one anothers' leadership when there are multiple lead 
agencies, and are not unnecessarily duplicating one anothers' programs 
when there are multiple departments implementing the same initiatives.

When implementing the strategy's initiatives, these federal departments 
face a number of challenges that cut across all the mission areas. In 
terms of resources, the nation must find the appropriate balance 
between homeland security and other priorities. Finding this balance 
will require an improved risk management framework for resource 
allocation and investments. It will also require an improved set of 
performance and results measures to gauge our progress. Further, 
finding that balance must take into consideration nonfederal resources, 
but the strategy and HSPDs have not in many cases defined the roles and 
responsibilities of the state, local, and private sectors. Finally, an 
enterprise architecture would help coordinate the larger effort across 
the myriad of organizations involved in implementing the strategy.

One of the key challenges for the Congress is to provide oversight to 
ensure that federal departments are coordinating their activities as 
they attempt to implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DOE, DOJ, HHS, DHS, the 
State Department, and the Homeland Security Council for comment. We 
received written comments from DOD, HHS, DHS, and DOJ, which appear in 
appendixes XI -XIV respectively. In addition to providing their written 
comments, these departments and DOE provided technical comments, which 
we incorporated as appropriate. State and the Homeland Security Council 
declined to provide any comments on this report. DOD stated that the 
report was "a thorough and accurate report." DHS indicated our 
summation of the strategic planning, implementation, and leads of the 
six departments to be "particularly useful." DOE, DOJ, and HHS neither 
concurred nor disagreed with the report. In addition, agencies provided 
comments on the many GAO reports that cumulatively describe the range 
of implementation challenges featured in this capping report. These 
comments can be found in the appropriate reports, as cited in our 
footnotes and listed in the Related GAO Products section.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
after its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this 
report to appropriate departments and interested congressional 
committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web 
site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me on 512-6787. Other contacts and staff acknowledgments are 
listed in appendix XV.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

The first objective focuses on the extent to which key federal 
departments with homeland security responsibilities address the 43 
initiatives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security in their 
planning and implementation activities.

We selected departments based on a review of their fiscal year 2005 
budget requests for homeland security-related issues. The six 
departments with the largest budget requests were selected--together 
they account for 94 percent of the fiscal year 2005 budget requests for 
homeland security. The six departments are the Departments of Defense 
(DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security 
(DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State.

We defined three time-oriented indicators to distinguish the timing of 
the departments' strategic planning or implementation activities with 
respect to each of the 43 initiatives of the six mission areas.

* "Prior implementation" was defined as a departmental program or 
activity that occurred prior to fiscal year 2004.

* "Recent planning" was defined as either (1) a program or activity 
specifically indicated by the participating department as being 
developed in its latest high-level planning documents (which include 
the department's strategic plan, annual plan, or performance plan) or 
(2) a program or activity, not listed in these planning documents, but 
indicated by department officials as being under development since July 
2002 (when the strategy was issued).

* "2004 implementation," in turn, was defined as a departmental program 
or activity that occurred during all, or part, of fiscal year 2004.

A department could satisfy (a) neither of these indicators 
(demonstrating no strategic planning and implementation activities on a 
given initiative, within the prescribed time periods) or (b) 
combinations of one through three of these indicators, for each 
initiative (e.g., one department may have engaged in prior 
implementation that was carried over into fiscal year 2004 
implementation; a second department may have engaged in recent 
planning, followed by 2004 implementation; and a third department may 
have only engaged in prior implementation, as its activity was 
completed or terminated.)

We obtained and reviewed each department's latest strategic planning 
documents (i.e., their strategic plan, annual plan, and performance 
plan) to determine whether these documents provided specific 
information about the department's prior implementation and recent 
planning activities, with respect to each mission area initiative. We 
scored a department as engaging in prior implementation activity or 
recent planning if these documents demonstrated at least one such 
activity with respect to each initiative. We also reviewed the 
documents to determine if any programs or activities had been 
transferred to another department or agency. In some cases, this may 
account for prior implementation activity but no further planning or 
implementation activity.

Since the latest departmental strategic documents do not sufficiently 
address fiscal year 2004 implementation activities, we contacted 
strategic planning officials at each the six departments and asked them 
to provide evidentiary support for their 2004 implementation 
activities, with respect to each relevant initiative. We scored a 
department as implementing activities on a given initiative if the 
department could demonstrate at least one such activity occurring 
during fiscal year 2004 with respect to that initiative. We also 
requested department strategic planning officials to review our 
findings regarding planning and implementation and to make any 
modifications or additions necessary. Evidentiary support was requested 
for any such change. Very few changes were provided across all six 
departments. Departments provided the data during fiscal year 2004. We 
did not verify the accuracy of the data or the progress of particular 
activities.

In addition to identifying departmental engagement in planning and 
implementation activities, we also sought to determine departmental 
leadership responsibility on each initiative. To satisfy the leadership 
role, departments had to satisfy at least one of the following two 
indicators:

* leadership of the entire critical mission area initiative or:

* leadership in specific functional area(s) encompassed within that 
initiative.

We identified departmental leadership roles on specific initiatives, 
based on a review of the provisions in the strategy and Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) one through 12. In only a few 
instances did a department indicate to us that subsequent legislation, 
regulation, or transfer of activities absolved them of their leadership 
roles. Because the language of the strategies and HSPDs was not always 
precise, we identified departments as either (a) "clear" (explicit) 
leads, (b) "implied" leads, or (c) no leads for each initiative. In the 
mission area tables, in both the letter and appendixes, departments 
with a clear lead on a given initiative are indicated by a hard-line 
box; departments with an implied lead on a given initiative are 
indicated by a broken-line box; departments not having any lead on a 
given initiative have no box designations. Drafts of this section of 
the report were submitted to the departments for their review.

The second objective focuses on identifying the challenges the nation 
faces in homeland security implementation. This work is based 
exclusively on a review of challenges identified in GAO products issued 
since September 11, 2001. During this time period, we were able to 
identify over 250 relevant GAO products related to homeland security. 
These, and others, can be found in our Related Products section at the 
end of the report. The challenges identified are arrayed throughout the 
report by mission area and subtopical area.

We conducted our work between February and November 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Intelligence and Warning:

This appendix sets forth the definition and major initiatives of the 
Intelligence and Warning mission area and discusses the agencies with 
major roles, their funding, and the alignment of their strategic plans 
and implementation activities with the initiatives, and a summary of 
the key challenges faced by the nation. This appendix presents baseline 
information that can be used by Congress to provide oversight and track 
accountability for the initiatives in the Intelligence and Warning 
mission area.

Definition and Major Initiatives:

The National Strategy for Homeland Security categorizes homeland 
security activities into six critical mission areas, the first of which 
is Intelligence and Warning. This mission area includes intelligence 
programs and warning systems that can detect terrorist activity before 
it manifests itself in an attack so that proper preemptive, preventive, 
and protective action can be taken. Specifically, this mission area is 
made up of efforts to identify, collect, analyze, and distribute source 
intelligence information or the resultant warnings from intelligence 
analysis. Activities in this mission area often dovetail into the 
mission areas of domestic counterterrorism and, in some cases, critical 
infrastructure protection, as agencies move to take immediate action or 
develop long-term protective measures based on threat or vulnerability 
information.[Footnote 10] Figure 3 is an example of one of the 
initiatives found in the Intelligence and Warning mission area.

The strategy identifies the following initiatives in the Intelligence 
and Warning mission area:

* enhancing the analytic capabilities of the FBI,

* building new capabilities through the Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure protection Division of the Department of Homeland 
Security,

* implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System,

* utilizing dual-use analysis to prevent attacks, and:

* employing red team techniques.

Figure 3: The Five Threat Levels of the Homeland Security Advisory 
System:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Agencies with Major Roles in Intelligence and Warning:

Of the six departments under review, the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Department of Justice have major roles in the 
Intelligence and Warning mission area. Within DHS, the Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) analyzes 
terrorism-related threat information relevant to homeland security, 
associates threat analysis with infrastructures and people, and 
provides warnings and advisories to agencies, state and local 
governments, and select critical infrastructure owners and operators. 
The U.S. Secret Service, also a component of DHS, provides intelligence 
and advanced analysis for protective operations. The Department of 
Justice has two components involved in Intelligence and Warning 
activities--the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shares 
intelligence with other federal agencies, as well as with state and 
local authorities; while the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) funds 
counterterrorism training for senior law enforcement personnel at the 
state and local level.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that the total 
fiscal year 2005 funding request for the Intelligence and Warning 
mission area is $474 million, with the bulk of this funding going to 
DHS (61 percent), primarily for IAIP and the U.S. Secret Service. Other 
agencies with significant funding in this mission area include DOJ (19 
percent), primarily for the FBI, and the Intelligence Community (15 
percent) for the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).[Footnote 
11] Figure 4 summarizes the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the 
Intelligence and Warning mission area by agency.

Figure 4: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Intelligence and Warning:

[See PDF for image]

Notes: Budget authority in millions of dollars.

[End of figure]

"All other agencies" includes the Departments of Agriculture ($20 
million) and Treasury ($.6 million), as well as the Intelligence 
Community Management Account ($72 million). OMB reported the 
Intelligence Community figure in aggregate; it did not break it out by 
individual agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency).

OMB's reported data does not include funding for three departments that 
have activities under way in this mission area. These departments--
Defense, State, and Energy--have either planning or implementation 
activity on specific initiatives, as discussed in the next section of 
this appendix. On the basis of our previous work, we have noted several 
qualifications to OMB's figures to explain this discrepancy.[Footnote 
12] According to OMB officials, there is not always a clear distinction 
between homeland security activities and other related activities. The 
OMB staff must make judgment calls about how to characterize funding by 
mission areas. For example, some homeland security activities have 
multiple purposes, so funding for these activities can be allocated 
among several accounts covering multiple mission areas. Moreover, some 
of the departments' activities, such as planning, coordination, or 
providing advice may support Intelligence and Warning activities, but 
are not included in the amounts shown.

This appendix does not have any discussion of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) or the Intelligence Community as a whole, although they 
have activities related to the Intelligence and Warning mission area. 
There are two reasons for this omission. First, OMB's reported data do 
not include funding for the CIA. Second, the strategy itself is 
relatively silent on the CIA in terms of specific initiatives in this 
mission area. For example, the strategy only mentions the CIA once in 
the Intelligence and Warning mission area--the CIA was to provide 
intelligence analysts to assist the FBI enhance its analytic 
capabilities. Most of the initiatives in the strategy, as discussed in 
the next section, are led by DHS or DOJ. Similarly, there is little 
information on the Intelligence Community. While OMB reported data 
include $72 million in spending by the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, it does not break this amount out by specific 
departments or agencies. While the strategy mentions the Intelligence 
Community with respect to this mission area, it does not identify 
specific departments or agencies with specific initiatives. One 
potential reason for relatively little discussion of CIA and the 
Intelligence Community is the unclassified nature of the cost data and 
the strategy.

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

This section provides more detailed information about the Intelligence 
and Warning mission area initiatives, and the departments involved in 
conducting activities related to these initiatives. This includes a 
discussion of specific departmental planning and implementation 
activities, lead agency designation, and implementation activities in 
fiscal year 2004, with respect to each initiative. The data are 
summarized in table 7.

Table 7: Detailed Department Leadership and Planning/Implementation 
Activities in the Intelligence and Warning Mission Area's Five 
Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Summary of Departmental Activities on the Initiatives:

All five Intelligence and Warning initiatives are being addressed in at 
least two of the key departments' planning and implementation 
activities (see table 7). For example, DHS, DOD, and DOE implemented 
Homeland Security Advisory System initiative activities during fiscal 
year 2004. More specifically, DHS implemented the system and issued 
advisories; DOD personnel interacted with DHS; and DOE aligned its 
security system and condition alert level to meet the Homeland Security 
Advisory System requirements of DHS. In addition, DHS, DOD, and DOE 
implemented new intelligence and warning capabilities through the IAIP 
initiative of DHS during fiscal year 2004. Specifically, DHS conducted 
assessments of critical infrastructures and key assets using the IAIP 
system; DOD worked in conjunction with DHS on the IAIP system; and DOE 
enacted a Safeguard and Security Program (using infrastructure 
information and analysis to gauge vulnerability assessments) and plays 
a role in disseminating threat information to energy sector industries.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also has activities 
related to Intelligence and Warning, but these activities are not 
directly included under the initiatives as laid out by the strategy. 
For example HHS operates the Laboratory Response Network, the Epidemic 
Information Exchange, and the Food and Drug Administration's food 
inspection activities. In addition, it supports the DHS-managed 
BioWatch program. While the strategy does not list these as specific 
initiatives, they provide surveillance of infectious diseases and could 
provide early warning of a bioterrorism attack. For more on HHS's role, 
particularly with respect to bioterrorism, see appendix VI, on 
Defending against Catastrophic Threats.

While we have identified department activities related to these 
initiatives, we did not determine the quality, status, or progress of 
such activities with respect to stated goals or targets within this 
mission area.

Identification of Lead Agencies on the Initiatives:

For four of the five initiatives, a lead agency is identified either in 
the strategy or Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). The 
one initiative where there was no lead identified was "the employment 
of red-team techniques." Red team techniques are techniques where the 
U.S. government would create a team (sometimes known as a red cell) to 
play the role of terrorists in terms of identifying vulnerabilities and 
planning attacks. Three departments (DHS, DOD, and DOE) had implemented 
activities related to this initiative. According to DHS strategic 
planning officials, it is important that a number of agencies conduct 
red-team techniques to test their own specific programs, so no agency 
would necessarily have the overall lead. However, terrorists are 
opportunistic and may purposefully plan attacks that take advantage of 
the seams between department programs or jurisdictions. Thus, there is 
some value in employing red-team techniques that look across federal 
departments, as well as across the state, local, and private sectors. 
Without an overall lead agency identified for this initiative, it is 
unclear which federal department will be accountable for employing red-
team techniques at the interagency level against the nation as a whole.

As shown in table 7, DHS is the lead on the most initiatives in this 
critical mission area--three out of the five initiatives (including 
building new capabilities through the Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection Division, implementing the Homeland Security 
Advisory System, and utilizing dual-use analysis to prevent attacks). 
It is understandable that DHS would be the department with the most 
initiative leads given that DHS's strategic goals and objectives are to 
be directed toward preventing terrorist attacks in the United States 
and reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism--both of which 
require Intelligence and Warning system information to achieve their 
aims. The Department of Justice is a lead on one initiative, enhancing 
the analytic capabilities of the FBI. This, too, is understandable 
given that the FBI is an agency (or component) of DOJ.

The strategy and HSPDs did not identify multiple leads on any of the 
five Intelligence and Warning initiatives (see table 7). In addition, 
these strategic documents clearly named all leads. DHS is named as a 
clear lead on three Intelligence and Warning initiatives; DOJ is 
identified as a clear lead on one initiative.

Fiscal Year 2004 Implementation of the Initiatives:

In fiscal year 2004, implementation activity occurred with respect to 
each of the five Intelligence and Warning initiatives (see table 7). 
DHS implemented activity in each of the three initiatives for which it 
was identified as a lead. DOJ implemented activity in the one 
initiative for which it was named as the lead (enhancing the analytic 
capabilities of the FBI).

Additionally, several of the departments under review implemented 
multiple Intelligence and Warning initiative activities for which they 
were not identified as a lead. During fiscal year 2004, DOE cited 
implementation activities in four of the five Intelligence and Warning 
initiatives for which it did not have a lead (prior to fiscal year 
2004, it cited implementation activity with respect to three of the 
five initiatives.) DOD cited fiscal year 2004 implementation activities 
in 3 of 5 initiatives for which it did not have a lead. DHS cited 
planning and implementation activities during fiscal year 2004 on the 
one initiative for which it did not have lead responsibilities; and 
State cited both prior implementation and 2004 implementation activity 
on the one initiative for it was not cited as a lead in the strategy or 
HSPDs.

Challenges in Intelligence and Warning:

With the element of surprise on their side, terrorists have the 
potential to do massive damage to an unwitting and unprepared target. 
It therefore follows that the United States must take appropriate 
action to develop and implement an effective Intelligence and Warning 
system that is capable of detecting planned terrorist activity, so that 
proper preemptive, preventive, and protective action can be taken. Our 
recent work in the Intelligence and Warning mission area has identified 
a number of challenges. These challenges include enhancing the 
analytical capabilities of the FBI, improving the coordination and 
mechanisms for sharing intelligence information across levels of 
government and the private sector, consolidating terrorist watch lists, 
and strengthening the homeland security advisory system.

Enhancing the FBI's Analytical Capabilities:

The strategy has an initiative to enhance the FBI's analytic 
capabilities in order to address the agency's top priority--preventing 
terrorist attacks. The FBI is, therefore, "creating an analytical 
capability that can combine lawfully obtained domestic information with 
information lawfully derived from investigations, thus facilitating 
prompt investigation of possible terrorist activity within the United 
States." To accomplish this, the FBI has changed its priorities and 
accelerated modernization of its information technology (IT) systems. 
However, we reported in September 2003 that the FBI will be facing a 
number of challenges as it begins this modernization without having yet 
developed a modernization blueprint, commonly referred to as an 
enterprise architecture (a plan that defines how an organization 
operates today, intends to operate tomorrow, and intends to invest in 
IT systems to transition to this future state).[Footnote 13] 
Architectures are essential to effectively managing such complex 
endeavors and are recognized as hallmarks of successful public and 
private organizations. The challenge for the FBI will be to make 
architecture development an institutional management priority; until 
this is accomplished and the architecture is developed and implemented, 
the FBI faces the challenge of ensuring systems currently being 
developed and deployed will be consistent with the yet-to-be-developed 
architecture. Our research and experience at federal agencies has shown 
that attempting a major modernization effort without a well-defined and 
enforceable architecture results in systems that are duplicative and 
not well integrated, are unnecessarily costly to operate and maintain, 
and do not effectively optimize mission performance. Additional 
challenges related to the FBI's transformation are contained in 
appendix IV, on domestic counterterrorism. The Bremer, Hart-Rudman, 
Gilmore, and 9/11 Commissions all made recommendations related to this 
challenge.

Improving Intelligence Information Sharing:

According to the strategy, "homeland security intelligence and 
information must be fed instantaneously into the Nation's domestic 
anti-terrorism efforts, and "this effort must be structured to provide 
all pertinent homeland security intelligence and law enforcement 
information--from all relevant sectors including state and local law 
enforcement as well as federal agencies--to those able to take 
preventive or protective action." Since September 11, federal, state, 
and local governments have established initiatives to meet the 
challenge of sharing information to prevent terrorism. DHS has 
initiatives under way to enhance information sharing (including the 
development of a homeland security enterprise architecture to integrate 
sharing among federal, state, and local authorities). In addition, the 
FBI increased the number of its Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) entered into an information-sharing 
partnership with the state of California and the city of New York; and 
Massachusetts has established an antiterrorism network of state, local, 
and federal agencies. However, our August 2003 report[Footnote 14] 
noted that these initiatives, while beneficial for the partners, 
presented challenges because they (1) were not well coordinated, 
(2) rsked limiting participants' access to information, and (3) 
potentially duplicated the efforts of some key agencies at each level 
of government. We also found that despite various legislation, 
strategies, and initiatives, federal agencies, states, and cities did 
not consider the information sharing process to be effective. For 
example, information on threats, methods, and techniques of terrorists 
was not routinely shared, and the information that was shared was not 
perceived as timely, accurate, or relevant. Additionally, federal 
agencies were challenged by the inability of state or city governments 
to properly handle classified information and their lack of security 
clearances. The Gilmore and 9/11 Commissions made recommendations 
related to this challenge.

Better Dissemination of Threat Information to the Private Sector:

The strategy discusses the need for threat-vulnerability integration, 
providing that "mapping terrorist threats and capabilities--both 
current and future--against specific facility and sectoral 
vulnerabilities will enable authorities to determine which 
organizations pose the greatest threat and which facilities are most at 
risk." However, in a March 2003 report we noted that one of the 
nation's challenges is to develop and implement methods for effectively 
sharing information between government and the private sector.[Footnote 
15] For example, officials in several commercial industries have said 
that they need better threat information from law enforcement agencies, 
as well as better coordination among agencies providing threat 
information. Specifically, these officials stated that they did not 
receive sufficient specific threat information, and frequently received 
threat information from multiple government agencies. Similarly, DOJ 
observed that chemical facilities need more specific information about 
potential threats in order to design their security systems and 
protocols. Threat information also forms the foundations for some of 
the tools available to industry to assess facility vulnerabilities. 
Threat information is the foundation for hypothesizing about threat 
scenarios, which form the basis for determining site vulnerabilities. 
In reviewing security considerations involving commercial seaports, we 
found that similar challenges existed. Specifically, on the basis of 
visits to several of the commercial seaports designated by DOD as 
critical for use by the military for overseas deployments, we reported 
in October 2002 that although the organizations responsible for seaport 
security increased emphasis on security planning since September 11, 
there remained no single mechanism to analyze, coordinate, and 
disseminate threat information on a routine basis on the broad range of 
threats at each port. Most threat information was coordinated on an 
informal basis, increasing the risk that threats--both traditional and 
nontraditional ones--may not be recognized or that threat information 
may not be communicated in a timely manner to all relevant 
organizations, including private sector organizations, at the ports. 
The Gilmore and 9/11 Commissions made recommendations related to this 
challenge.

Consolidating Terrorist Watch Lists:

The strategy recognizes the need for "fully accessible sources of 
information related to suspected terrorists" through the establishment 
of a consolidated terrorism watch list. In April 2003 we reported that 
changing the federal government's diffused and nonstandard approach to 
developing and using terrorist watch lists--which are essential tools 
for performing, among other things, the nation's border security 
mission--involve addressing key management, technical, and legal 
challenges.[Footnote 16] One of these challenges involves defining and 
implementing a new approach that overcomes individual agencies' unique 
culture and mission requirements. For example, a key reason for the 
varying extent to which watch list sharing is done involves cultural 
differences among the government and private sector agencies involved 
in securing our borders. Another challenge to be overcome involves the 
tendency of the watch lists to have overlapping but not identical sets 
of data, which makes their consolidation difficult. Additionally, the 
extent to which such sharing is accomplished electronically is 
constrained by fundamental differences in the watch lists' systems 
architecture (that is, the hardware, software, network, and data 
characteristics of the systems). Finally, while legal requirements have 
historically been another challenge to sharing, recent legislation has 
begun to address this barrier. For example, Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT ACT, which has significantly changed the legal framework for 
information sharing when fully implemented, it should diminish the 
effect of existing legal barriers. The 9/11 Commission made 
recommendations related to this challenge.

Strengthening the Homeland Security Advisory System:

The strategy calls for the implementation of the Homeland Security 
Advisory System as a means of disseminating information regarding the 
risk of terrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities; the 
private sector; and the American people. Utilizing five color-coded 
threat levels, the system was established by HSPD-3 in March 2002. 
However, in a March 2004 testimony, we reported that DHS faces 
challenges in strengthening the advisory system and keeping it relevant 
and viable. For example, the system has generated questions concerning 
the quality and timeliness of the threat information being 
disseminated.[Footnote 17] Specifically, DHS had not yet officially 
documented communication protocols for threat information and guidance 
to federal agencies and states, with the result that some federal 
agencies and states first learn about changes in the national threat 
level from the media. An additional challenge relates to the 
comprehensiveness of information provided with regard to actions to be 
taken in response to changes in the threat level. For example, public 
warnings did not include guidance on actions to be taken in response to 
a specific threat. Moreover, federal agencies responding to our 
inquiries indicated that an additional challenge involves their 
inability to determine appropriate protective measures to be 
implemented because of a lack of specific threat information. For 
example, federal agencies indicated to us that, particularly, region-, 
sector-, site-, or event-specific threat information--to the extent 
that it is available--would be helpful. Since the time of our report, 
DHS has provided more specific warnings by both sector (e.g., the 
financial sector) and location (e.g., New York and Washington, D.C.). 
The Gilmore Commission made recommendations related to this challenge.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Border and Transportation Security:

This appendix sets forth the definition and major initiatives of the 
Border and Transportation Security mission area and discusses the 
agencies with major roles, their funding, the alignment of their 
strategic plans and implementation activities with the major 
initiatives, and a summary of the key challenges faced by the nation. 
This appendix presents baseline information that can be used by 
Congress to provide oversight and track accountability for the 
initiatives in the Border and Transportation Security mission area.

Definition and Major Initiatives:

The National Strategy for Homeland Security categorizes homeland 
security activities into six critical mission areas, the second of 
which is Border and Transportation Security. This mission area includes 
programs designed to fully integrate homeland security measures into 
existing domestic transportation systems and focuses on promoting the 
efficient and reliable flow of people, goods, and services across 
borders, while preventing terrorists from using transportation 
conveyances or systems to deliver implements of destruction. Activities 
in this mission area often dovetail into domestic counterterrorism as 
agencies take law enforcement action to address potential threats to 
the homeland that may originate along our borders or in our 
transportation systems. Also, because transportation is a critical 
infrastructure sector, this mission area is also closely related to the 
critical infrastructure protection mission area. For example, homeland 
security actions at seaports would involve activities in both mission 
areas.[Footnote 18] Figure 5 shows an example of the type of activities 
found in the Border and Transportation Security mission area.

The strategy identifies the following major initiatives in the border 
and transportation mission area:

* ensuring accountability in border and transportation security,

* creating smart borders,

* increasing the security of international shipping containers,

* implementing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001,

* recapitalizing the U.S. Coast Guard, and:

* reforming immigration services.

Figure 5: U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Marine Officers on the Waters 
of the Rio Grande, along the United States and Mexico Border:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Agencies with Major Roles in Border and Transportation Security:

Of the six agencies under review, DHS and State have major roles in 
Border and Transportation Security. Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) conducts inspections at ports of entry to 
detect and prevent people and goods from entering the country 
illegally, while the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) investigates and enforces laws against the unlawful presence of 
people and goods in the country; the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) performs some aviation security activities, while 
overseeing others, and coordinates the development of security measures 
for nonaviation modes of transportation; and the U.S. Coast Guard leads 
security activities at the nation's ports. State plays a role in this 
mission area through its administration of the visa program to ensure 
against travel into the United States by terrorists or others whose 
presence may undermine U.S. national security. Although not one of six 
agencies we reviewed, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) also has a 
role in border and transportation security. Specifically, USDA's Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) performs agricultural 
quarantine activities and risk analysis at U.S. ports of entry.

OMB reported that the total fiscal year 2005 funding request for border 
and transportation security is $17 billion, with the majority of this 
going to DHS (almost $16 billion, or 93 percent), largely for CBP, TSA, 
and the Coast Guard. Other DHS bureaus, as well as other agencies--such 
as USDA and State--have significant funding in this mission area as 
well.[Footnote 19] Figure 6 summarizes the fiscal year 2005 budget 
request for the border and transportation security mission area by 
agency.

Figure 6: Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding for 
Border & Transportation Security:

[See PDF for image]

Notes: Budget authority in millions of dollars.

"All other agencies includes USDA ($169 million) and the Department of 
Transportation ($19 million).

[End of figure]

OMB's reported data do not include funding for three departments that 
have activities under way in this mission area. These departments--DOD, 
HHS, and DOE--have either planning or implementation activity on 
specific initiatives, as discussed in the next section of this 
appendix. On the basis of previous work, we have noted several 
qualifications to OMB's figures to explain this discrepancy.[Footnote 
20] According to OMB officials, there is not always a clear distinction 
between homeland security activities and other related activities. OMB 
staff must make judgment calls about how to characterize funding by 
mission areas. For example, some homeland security activities have 
multiple purposes, and funding for these activities is comingled in 
accounts that can cover multiple mission areas. In addition, some of 
the departments' activities, such as planning, coordination, or 
providing advice may support Border and Transportation Security 
activities but are not included in the amounts shown.

Alignment of Department Activities with the Major Initiatives:

This section provides more detailed information about the Border and 
Transportation Security mission area initiatives and the departments 
involved in conducting activities related to these initiatives. This 
includes a discussion of specific departmental planning and 
implementation activities, lead agency designations, and 
implementation activities in fiscal year 2004, with respect to each 
initiative. The data are summarized in table 8.

Table 8: Detailed Department Leadership and Planning/Implementation 
Activities in the Border and Transportation Mission Area's Six 
Initiatives:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Summary of Departmental Activities on the Initiatives:

All six Border and Transportation Security initiatives are being 
addressed in at least two of the key departments' planning and 
implementation activities (see table 8). At least three departments 
cited activity in four of the six initiatives. For example, DHS, DOD, 
State, and DOE implemented shipping container security initiative (CSI) 
activities in fiscal year 2004. DHS deployed Customs and Border 
Protection officers to Malaysia to conduct CSI activity; DOD provided 
an intelligence perspective on container and port security 
vulnerabilities, aiding in the development and deployment of 
technologies; State engaged in diplomatic efforts with additional 
countries to conclude further CSI agreements; and DOE worked with 
Lithuania to install nuclear detection equipment at the Vilnius 
Airport, as well as other airports and other locations in other foreign 
countries. Additionally, DHS, HHS, and State demonstrated 
implementation activities in fiscal year 2004 with respect to creating 
smart borders. DHS developed, acquired, and deployed biometrically 
enabled, travel document reader technology, at air, sea, and land ports 
of entry; the Food and Drug Administration within HHS established 
guidance requiring the registration of domestic and foreign facilities 
that manufacture, process or hold food for consumption in the United 
States; and State deployed biometric collection capability to consular 
posts worldwide.

All six departments have been engaged in Border and Transportation 
Security initiatives.

While we have identified department activities relates to these 
initiatives, we did not determine the quality, status, or progress of 
such activities with respect to stated goals or targets within this 
mission area.

Identification of Lead Agencies on the Initiatives:

For all six initiatives, a lead agency is identified either in the 
strategy or HSPDs. As shown in table 8, DHS is the lead on the most 
initiatives in the mission area--six of six initiatives. It is 
understandable that DHS would be the department with the most 
initiative leads, given that the initiatives (a) emphasize DHS's twin 
goals of preventing terrorist attacks and reducing border 
vulnerability; and (b) reflect a transfer of the Customs Service, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Coast Guard to DHS. State 
is also identified as a lead on the initiative to create smart borders. 
Given the initiative's emphasis on visa issuance and consular office 
participation in detecting potential terrorists, it seems appropriate 
that State would be identified in a leadership capacity. DOJ had been 
identified as a lead agency with respect to two initiatives, creating 
smart borders and guarding America's critical infrastructure and key 
assets against "inside" threats. However, given the transfer of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the National Infrastructure 
Protection Center programs to the Department of Homeland Security, DOJ 
officials indicated the department no longer serves as the lead on 
these two initiatives.

Creating smart borders is the only initiative for which there are 
multiple leads in the Border and Transportation Security area (see 
table 8). The two department leads in this initiative are DHS and 
State. Additionally, departmental documents show that DHS is a clear 
lead on two initiatives and an implied lead on three initiatives. State 
is a clear lead on its single initiative.

Fiscal Year 2004 Implementation of the Initiatives:

In fiscal year 2004 implementation activity occurred with respect to 
all six Border and Transportation Security initiatives (see table 8). 
DHS implemented activity in all five initiatives for which it was 
identified as a lead. State implemented activity in the one initiative 
where it was designated a lead.

Additionally, several of the departments under review implemented 
multiple Border and Transportation Security initiatives for which they 
were not identified as a lead agency in the strategy and HSPD. During 
fiscal year 2004, DOD cited implementation activities in three 
initiatives for which it did not have any lead responsibilities (prior 
to fiscal year 2004, DOD cited planning/implementation activity with 
respect to four of the six initiatives). State cited fiscal year 2004 
and prior year implementation activity on three initiatives, for which 
it was not identified as the lead; HHS cited 2004 implementation 
activity on two initiatives without lead responsibilities; and DOE 
cited both 2004 and prior implementation with respect to one 
initiative.

DOJ has not demonstrated fiscal year implementation activity in any 
initiative within this critical mission area; a DOJ official indicated 
that this is due to program transfers. In accordance with the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, DOJ transferred its Immigration and 
Naturalization Service programs to DHS.

Challenges in Border and Transportation Security:

The strategy calls for ensuring the "efficient and reliable flow of 
people, goods, and services across borders, while preventing terrorists 
from using transportation conveyances or systems to deliver implements 
of destruction." Our recent work in the Border and Transportation 
Security mission area has identified a number of challenges. Among the 
challenges faced is striking a balance between increased border 
security with concerns for facilitating legitimate travel and the flow 
of goods, the need to address problems associated with processing 
people at the nation's ports of entry, training border security 
personnel to detect counterfeit documents and fictitious identities, 
determining the proper role for biometric technologies for security 
applications, developing a clear and comprehensive visa process, and 
improving the management of key programs. The challenges that we have 
identified in ensuring that our transportation system is secure include 
implementing an effective system to prescreen airline passengers; 
achieving and sustaining improvements in airline passenger, baggage, 
and cargo screening; strengthening perimeter security and access 
controls at airports; adequately addressing rail and mass transit 
security issues; and recapitalizing the U.S. Coast Guard.

Border Security:

Balancing Security Concerns with Economic Needs:

The strategy recognizes the long-standing challenge of balancing our 
nation's security and commercial needs and states that the "efficient 
flow of people, goods, and conveyances engaged in legitimate economic 
and social activities" must not be impeded. Primary responsibility for 
ensuring the balance between security and commercial needs falls on 
DHS's CBP. In a June 2003 testimony, we reported that CBP faces many 
challenges in trying to accomplish its mission.[Footnote 21] Concerning 
the efficient flow of people, challenges include detecting false 
admissibility documents, unifying and enhancing inspector training, 
providing timely intelligence to the field, and successfully 
implementing the new entry-exit system. With respect to cargo, CBP has 
attempted to select and inspect the highest-risk incoming cargo while 
enabling legitimate cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. These 
efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability of threat 
assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of 
nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful 
contraband. Additional challenges faced by CBP include the need to 
improve its trade compliance program and to successfully implement its 
new trade-processing information system. The Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 
9/11 Commissions made recommendations related to this challenge.

Effectively Processing People at Land Ports of Entry:

The strategy calls for DHS to "verify and process the entry of people 
in order to prevent the entrance of contraband, unauthorized aliens, 
and potential terrorists." However, in a June 2003 testimony and an 
August 2003 report, we indicated that CBP, the entity within DHS that 
is responsible for carrying out this task, faces several challenges at 
land ports of entry related to the determination of traveler 
admissibility and other vulnerabilities in the inspection 
process.[Footnote 22] In 2003, we testified that CBP inspectors faced a 
variety of challenges at the ports, including the need to make quick 
decisions on whether to immediately admit a traveler into the country 
or refer the traveler for more intensive inspection. This task is made 
more challenging because (1) United States and certain Canadian 
citizens may enter this country without presenting a travel document if 
they make an oral claim of citizenship that satisfies the inspector and 
(2) travelers who are required to show an identity document can present 
a variety of documents, some of which can be easily counterfeited. In 
fact, in October 2003, we testified about the challenges posed by 
identity fraud and how counterfeit identification can be easily 
produced and used to create fraudulent identities. We also identified 
other challenges for CBP at the borders, including ensuring that 
inspectors are adequately trained in conducting inspections and 
detecting fraudulent documents and challenges regarding the collection, 
analysis, and use of intelligence information in the field. The 
Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and 9/11 Commissions made recommendations related 
to this challenge.

Effectively Employing Biometric Technologies:

The strategy states that the "United States will require visitors to 
present travel documentation that includes biometric indicators." 
However, in a November 2002 report and in March and September 2003 
testimonies, we reported that challenges exist in determining the 
proper role of biometric technologies for security 
applications.[Footnote 23] The first challenge involves recognizing 
that the use of biometric technology not a panacea for the border 
security problem. Instead, it is just a piece of the overall decision 
support system that helps determine whether or not a person is allowed 
to enter the United States. For example, while biometrics may be useful 
in reducing document fraud, it may not have much effect on the ability 
of people to enter the United States through other than official ports 
of entry. Another major challenge involves questions regarding the 
technical and operational effectiveness of biometric technologies in 
applications as large as border control. Additional challenges to be 
addressed include determining (1) the system's effect on existing 
border control procedures and people; (2) the costs and benefits of the 
system, including secondary costs resulting from changes in processes 
or personnel to accommodate the biometrics; and (3) the system's effect 
on privacy, convenience, the economy, and relations with other 
countries. The 9/11 Commission made recommendations related to this 
challenge.

Deploying Effective Technologies for the Detection of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction:

The strategy states that the nation will "develop and deploy non-
intrusive inspection technologies to ensure rapid and more thorough 
screening of goods and conveyances." We reported in October 
2002,[Footnote 24] however, that challenges exist with regard to the 
acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment. In 
particular, we have concerns that DHS has not yet deployed the best 
available technologies for detecting radioactive and nuclear materials 
at U.S. border crossings and ports of entry. Specifically, we have 
found that CBP's primary radiation detection equipment--radiation 
pagers--have certain limitations and may be inappropriate for the task. 
For example, according to U.S. radiation detection vendors and DOE 
laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction 
with other radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors and 
radio isotope identifiers. A further challenge is the need for a 
comprehensive plan for installing and using radiation detection 
equipment at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry. A 
comprehensive plan would address, among other things, vulnerabilities 
and risks; identify the complement of radiation detection equipment 
that should be used at each type of border entry point--air, rail, 
land, and sea--and whether the equipment could be immediately deployed; 
identify longer-term radiation detection needs; and develop measures to 
ensure that the equipment is adequately maintained. Finally, there is a 
challenge that goes beyond simply deploying equipment--personnel must 
be effectively trained in radiation science, the proper use of the 
detection equipment, and how to identify and respond to alarms.

Using Visas as an Antiterrorism Tool:

The strategy calls on DHS to "build an immigration services 
organization that administers immigration laws in an efficient, 
expeditious, fair, and humane manner" while ensuring "that foreign 
visitors comply with entry conditions." In carrying out its goal of 
reforming our nation's immigration services, DHS faces a number of 
challenges.

The first involves the development of a clear policy on how to balance 
national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate 
travel when issuing visas. Specifically, we reported in October 2002 
that this process should be strengthened for use as an antiterrorism 
tool.[Footnote 25] We also identified the need for more coordination 
and information sharing to realize the full potential of the visa 
process. In addition, there is a need for more human resources and more 
training for consular officers.

An additional challenge concerns the lack of a governmentwide policy on 
the interagency visa revocation process. This process is an important 
tool for preventing potential terrorists from entering the country and 
identifying potential terrorists who have already entered. However, we 
testified in June 2003 that weaknesses in the process we first 
identified in June 2003 have not been eliminated, especially those 
related to the timely transmission of information among government 
agencies.[Footnote 26] Our review of visas revoked for terrorism 
concerns from October through December 2002 showed that delays occurred 
in screening names of suspected terrorists for visa holders, 
transmitting recommendations to revoke individuals' visas, revoking 
visas after receiving recommendations to do so, and posting lookouts. 
We also found delays in notifying immigration officials of the need to 
investigate individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country 
and in initiating field investigations of those individuals. Finally, 
challenges exist because of unresolved legal and policy issues 
regarding the removal of individuals from the United States based 
solely on their visa revocation. For example, there needs to be clear, 
comprehensive policies governing visa processes and procedures so that 
all agencies involved agree on the level of security screening for 
foreign nationals both at our consulates abroad and at ports of entry.

A third challenge concerns the Visa Waiver Program. This involves 
discussing the process established by the Departments of Justice and 
State for determining whether a country is eligible to participate in 
the program. For example, one of the laws passed since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, requires participating countries to issue 
passports that contain biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints. 
However, it is unclear whether these requirements will be fully 
implemented by the deadlines called for in the law. In our November 
2002 report,[Footnote 27] we also pointed out that the national 
security challenges created by eliminating the Visa Waiver Program are 
difficult to determine, but that doing so could affect U.S. relations 
with other countries, U.S. tourism, and State Department resources 
abroad. For example, if the program were eliminated, we estimated that 
the department's initial costs to process the additional workload would 
range between $739 million and $1.28 billion, and annual recurring 
costs would likely range between $522 million and $810 million. It 
could take 2 to 4 years or longer to put the necessary people and 
facilities in place to handle the increased workload, according to 
State officials.

An additional challenge involves reducing the time taken to adjudicate 
visas for science students and scholars. Specifically, we reported in 
February 2004[Footnote 28] that the time it takes to adjudicate a visa 
for a science student or scholar depends largely on whether an 
applicant must undergo a security check that is designed to protect 
against sensitive technology transfers. We took a random sample of 
these security checks for science students and scholars sent from posts 
abroad between April and June 2003 and found it took an average of 67 
days for security checks to be processed and for State to notify the 
post. Officials from the State Department and FBI acknowledged there 
have been lengthy waits, but reported having measures under way that 
they believe will improve the process. However, additional challenges 
remain, such as interoperability issues between State's and FBI's 
computer systems.

Finally, a challenge exists in balancing national security concerns 
with the expeditious processing of visa applications. Specifically, we 
reviewed[Footnote 29] the visa operations at U.S. posts in Canada and 
provided information on the perceptions of consular staff that 
adjudicate U.S. visas regarding the importance of national security in 
the visa process, including impediments that could interfere with 
efforts to make security a top priority in visa processing. Consular 
officers and managers at U.S. posts in Canada said that despite rising 
workloads and increasingly labor-intensive visa-processing 
requirements, they were placing an emphasis on security in visa 
operations. Some officers reported that new post-September 11 
processing requirements for visas could reduce the time available for 
face-to-face interviews. While most officers believed that they had 
enough time to screen applicants carefully for possible security risks, 
some of the newer officers at posts in Canada expressed concern about 
their ability to remain vigilant if the workload increased.

The Bremer and 9/11 Commissions made recommendations related to the 
challenges found in this section.

Improving the US-VISIT Program:

Integral to the effort to reform immigration services and the 
strategy's call for a "border of the future," is the implementation of 
the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator (US-VISIT) 
program, which is designed to collect, maintain, and share information, 
including biometric identifiers, on selected nationals who travel to 
the United States. We testified in March 2004[Footnote 30] that this 
implementation is challenging because of the type of program it is and 
the way it is being managed. US-VISIT is to perform a critical, 
multifaceted mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a 
demanding implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. 
One critical aspect of the program's mission is to prevent the entry of 
persons who pose a threat to the United States. DHS estimated that the 
program would cost $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, but this 
estimate did not include all costs and underestimated some others. In 
addition, several factors related to the program's management increase 
the risk of not delivering mission value commensurate with costs or not 
delivering defined program capabilities on time and within budget. 
Also, the requirements for interim facilities at high-volume land ports 
of entry are not only demanding, they are based on assumptions that, if 
altered, could significantly affect facility plans. Despite these 
challenges, the first increment was deployed at the beginning of 2004. 
DHS's fiscal year 2004 US-VISIT expenditure plan and related 
documentation at least partially satisfies all conditions imposed by 
Congress. US-VISIT largely met its commitments for implementing an 
initial operating capability in early January 2004, including the 
deployment of entry capability to 115 air and 14 seaports of entry. 
However, challenges remain because DHS has not employed rigorous, 
disciplined management controls typically associated with successful 
programs. More specifically, testing of the initial phase of the 
implemented system was not well managed and was completed after the 
system became operational. In addition, multiple test plans were 
developed during testing, and only the final test plan, completed after 
testing, included all required content. Such controls, while 
significant for the initial phases of US-VISIT, are even more critical 
for the later phases, as the size and complexity of the program will 
only increase. Finally, as we reported in May 2004,[Footnote 31] DHS's 
plans for future US-VISIT resource needs at the land ports of entry are 
based on questionable assumptions, making future resource needs 
uncertain. The 9/11 Commission made recommendations related to this 
challenge.

Transportation Security:

Effectively Prescreening Aviation Passengers:

Developing an effective system to prescreen passengers before they even 
arrive at the airport is one of the challenges alluded to in the 
strategy's discussion of the implementation of the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001. DHS's solution to this 
challenge was the development of the Computer-Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening Program (CAPPS II), which was designed to identify 
passengers requiring additional security attention. As we said in a 
February 2004 report and in a March 2004 testimony,[Footnote 32] key 
activities in the development of this program have been delayed or not 
addressed. We also identified three additional challenges TSA faces 
that may impede the success of CAPPS II. These challenges are 
developing the international cooperation needed to obtain passenger 
data, managing the possible expansion of the program's mission beyond 
its original purpose, and ensuring that identity theft cannot be used 
to negate the security benefits of the system. Recently the 
Transportation Security Administration scrapped the CAPPS II program 
and created a follow-on program called Secure Flight, which could face 
many of the same challenges we identified. The 9/11 Commission made 
recommendations related to this challenge.

Improving Airline Passenger and Baggage Screening:

Another of the challenges alluded to in the strategy's discussion of 
ATSA is the effective and efficient screening of passengers and 
baggage. This has been a long-standing concern, and although 
significant actions have been taken, we testified in February and March 
2004 that challenges in achieving and sustaining improvements 
remain.[Footnote 33] For example, while TSA met its mandate to 
establish a federal screener workforce by November 2002, it continues 
to face challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and baggage 
screeners. Additionally, while TSA is making progress in measuring the 
performance of passenger screeners, it has collected limited 
performance data related to its baggage screening operations. Moreover, 
testing of screeners has identified weaknesses in their ability to 
detect threat objects, while essential training is hampered by staffing 
shortages and a lack of adequate technical capability to access online 
training programs. Still another challenge involves deploying and 
leveraging screening equipment and technologies. For example, TSA 
continues to face operational and funding challenges in its efforts to 
achieve a mandate to screen all baggage using explosive detection 
systems. The 9/11 Commission made recommendations related to this 
challenge.

Strengthening Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls:

Another key requirement of ATSA, as discussed in the strategy, is the 
"protection of critical infrastructure assets," including airports. In 
June 2004[Footnote 34] we reported that while TSA has begun evaluating 
the security of airport perimeters and access controls, the agency has 
not yet determined how the results will be used to address the 
challenges faced. Specifically, these challenges include addressing 
concerns with perimeter and access control security that have been 
raised in compliance inspections and vulnerability assessments; setting 
priorities for funding airport security needs, developing a plan for 
implementing new technologies to meet security needs, and implementing 
certain mandated actions to reduce the security threats posed by 
airport workers.

Countering Threats Posed by Hand-Held Missiles:

Another consideration for ensuring the security of our aviation system 
involves the issue of aircraft protection, specifically countering the 
threats posed by Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). These 
hand-held missile systems have been used by terrorists against 
commercial aircraft.

In January 2004, we reported[Footnote 35] that DHS faces significant 
challenges in adapting a military counter-MANPADS system to commercial 
aircraft, such as establishing system requirements, developing 
technology and design to sufficient maturity, and setting reliable cost 
estimates. Our work on the best practices of product developers in 
government and industry has found that such challenges can be 
successfully overcome by using a knowledge-based approach.

Additionally, in a May 2004 report,[Footnote 36] we found that further 
improvements are needed in U.S. efforts to keep MANPADS out of the 
hands of terrorists. Although the State Department made important 
progress in 2003 to control the global proliferation of MANPADS, its 
ability to assess further progress is limited because multilateral 
forums have no mechanisms to monitor members' implementation of 
commitments. DOD has sold thousands of Stinger missiles (a U.S. 
MANPADS) to 17 countries and Taiwan, but DOD agencies responsible for 
end-use monitoring are not required to maintain records on the number 
and destination of Stinger sales. In addition, DOD officials overseas 
use inconsistent practices when inspecting Stinger inventories because 
DOD lacks procedures for conducting these inspections. For example, DOD 
has no requirements for DOD organizations responsible for end-use 
monitoring to keep records on the number and destinations of these 
Stingers.

Effectively Addressing Rail and Mass Transit Security Issues:

The strategy recognizes "the importance of security for all forms of 
transportation." As we testified[Footnote 37] in March and September 
2003, certain characteristics of mass transit systems make them 
inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and a challenge to secure. 
By design, mass transit systems are open (i.e., have multiple access 
points and, in some case, no barriers) so that they can move large 
numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the aviation system is housed 
in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness 
of mass transit systems can leave them vulnerable because transit 
officials cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves the systems. 
In addition, other characteristics of some transit systems--high 
ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location 
(e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--also make 
them attractive targets because of the potential for mass casualties 
and economic damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make 
mass transit systems difficult to secure. For example, the number of 
riders that pass through a mass transit system--especially during peak 
hours--makes some security measures, such as metal detectors, 
impractical. In addition, the multiple access points along extended 
routes make the costs of securing each location prohibitive.

Further complicating transit security is the challenge faced by transit 
agencies in balancing security concerns with accessibility, 
convenience, and affordability. Because transit riders often could 
choose another means of transportation, such as personal automobile, 
transit agencies must compete for riders. To remain competitive, 
transit agencies must offer convenient, inexpensive, and high-quality 
service. Therefore, security measures that limit accessibility, cause 
delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause inconvenience could push 
people away from mass transit and back into their cars.

The size and diversity of the freight rail system make it a challenge 
to adequately secure. The freight rail system's extensive 
infrastructure crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders 
to move millions of tons of freight each day. There are over 100,000 
miles of rail in the United States. The extensiveness of the 
infrastructure creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. In 
addition, protecting freight rail assets from attack is made more 
difficult because of the tremendous variety of freight hauled by 
railroads. For example, railroads carry freight as diverse as dry bulk 
(grain) and hazardous materials.[Footnote 38] The transport of 
hazardous materials is of particular concern because serious incidents 
involving these materials have the potential to cause widespread 
disruption or injury. In 2001, over 83 million tons of hazardous 
materials were shipped by rail in the United States across the rail 
network, which extends through every major city as well as thousands of 
small communities. The 9/11 Commission made recommendations related to 
this challenge.

Effectively Implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act:

The strategy calls for "targeted improvements in the areas of maritime 
domain awareness, command and control systems, and shore-side 
facilities." In response to concerns regarding port security, Congress 
passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), mandating 
specific security preparations for America's maritime ports. Passed in 
November 2002, MTSA imposed an ambitious schedule of requirements on a 
number of federal agencies. MTSA called for a comprehensive security 
framework--one that included planning, personnel security, and careful 
monitoring of vessels and cargo. Agencies responsible for implementing 
the security provisions of MTSA and have made progress in meeting their 
requirements. However, in a September 2003 testimony, we identified 
challenges that merit attention and further oversight.[Footnote 39]

The main security-related challenge involves the implementation of a 
vessel identification system. MTSA called for the development of an 
automatic identification system. Coast Guard implementation calls for a 
system that would allow port officials and other vessels to determine 
the identity and position of vessels entering or operating within the 
harbor area. Such a system would provide an "early warning" of an 
unidentified vessel or a vessel that was in a location where it should 
not be. To implement the system effectively, however, requires 
considerable land-based equipment and other infrastructure that is not 
currently available in many ports. As a result, for the foreseeable 
future, the system will be available in less than half of the 25 
busiest U.S. ports.

Challenges also exist regarding the proposed approach for meeting 
MTSA's requirement that the Secretary of DHS approve security plans for 
all vessels operating in U.S. waters. Vessel security plans include 
taking such steps as responding to assessed vulnerabilities, 
designating security officers, conducting training and drills, and 
ensuring that appropriate preventive measures will be taken against 
security incidents. To implement this MTSA requirement, the Coast Guard 
has stated, in general, that it is not the Coast Guard's intent to 
individually approve vessel security plans for foreign vessels. The 
Coast Guard provides that it will deem a flag-state approval of a 
vessel security plan to constitute the MTSA-required approval of MTSA 
vessel security plans. However, MTSA does not mention any role for 
foreign nations in the required approval of vessel security plans, and 
some concerns have been raised about the advisability of allowing flag 
states--some with a history of lax regulation--to ensure the security 
of vessels traveling to the United States.

Another security-related challenge involves the Coast Guard's efforts 
to address MTSA's security planning requirements through a series of 
security assessments of individual ports. Security assessments are 
intended to be in-depth examinations of security threats, 
vulnerabilities, consequences, and conditions throughout a port, 
including not just transportation facilities but also factories and 
other installations that pose potential security risks. The Coast Guard 
had begun these assessments before MTSA was passed and decided to 
continue the process, changing it as needed to meet MTSA planning 
requirements, which include developing area security plans based on the 
evaluation of specific facilities throughout the port. Issues were 
found in the scope and quality of the assessments and their usefulness 
to port stakeholders. The Gilmore Commission made recommendations 
related to this challenge.

Improving Container Cargo Security:

The strategy states that "containers are an indispensable but 
vulnerable link in the chain of global trade" and has an initiative to 
"increase the security of international shipping containers." As we 
stated in our July 2003 report,[Footnote 40] CBP has taken steps to 
address the challenge of terrorist threats to oceangoing cargo 
containers through a targeting strategy. CBP faces continuing 
challenges in targeting containers for inspections. CBP needs upon 
which to target containers for inspection. CBP does not have a national 
system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics, and the data 
are generally not readily available by risk level (e.g., low, medium, 
high), were not uniformly reported, were difficult to interpret, and 
were incomplete. Further, we testified in March 2004, space limitations 
and safety concerns about inspection equipment constrain some ports in 
their utilization of screening equipment, which has affected the 
efficiency of examinations.[Footnote 41] The Gilmore Commission made 
recommendations related to this challenge.

Directly related to the challenge of improving cargo container security 
are the challenges associated with the CBP's implementation of its 
Container Security Initiative, which allows CBP officials to screen for 
high-risk containers at key overseas ports, and its Customs-Trade 
Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which is designed to improve 
global supply chain security in the private sector. Both of these 
programs were launched quickly in an effort to secure ocean containers 
bound for the United States. However, a number of challenges must be 
overcome if these programs are going to accomplish the desired outcome 
and achieve long-term effectiveness. One of the these challenges is the 
development of human capital plans that clearly describe how CSI and C-
TPAT will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing 
demands as they expand to other countries and implement new program 
elements. Another challenge involves the expansion of efforts already 
initiated to develop performance measures for CSI and C-TPAT that 
include outcome-oriented indicators. Finally, strategic plans must be 
developed that clearly lay out CSI and C-TPAT goals, objectives, and 
detailed implementation strategies.

Recapitalizing the U.S. Coast Guard:

The continued recapitalization of the U.S. Coast Guard is specifically 
called for in the homeland security strategy. In 2002, the Coast Guard 
began its largest and most complex recapitalization challenge in its 
history, the Integrated Deepwater System program. As part of the 
Deepwater program, the Coast Guard is estimated to spend about $17 
billion over 20 years to replace or modernize its fleet of cutters, 
aircraft, and communications equipment used for missions generally 
beyond 50 miles from shore. Just 3 years into the program, the Coast 
Guard has already experienced management challenges. In March 
2004,[Footnote 42] we reported that key components needed for the Coast 
Guard to manage the program and oversee the system integrator's 
performance have not been effectively implemented. For example, we 
reported that the Coast Guard's integrated product teams have struggled 
to effectively collaborate and accomplish their missions, and 
management has not measured the extent of competition among suppliers 
or held the system integrator accountable for taking steps to increase 
competition in order to control future costs. In addition, in June 
2004,[Footnote 43] we expressed concern that the Coast Guard had not 
updated Deepwater's original 2002 acquisition schedule. We noted that 
maintaining a current acquisition schedule for programs of similar 
scope--s