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entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 
Programs' which was released on March 31, 2005. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2005: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs: 

GAO-05-301: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-301, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to 
enhance warfighting and the way the department conducts business. Major 
investments are being made to develop improved weapon systems to combat 
various threats to U.S. security. While the weapons that DOD ultimately 
develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition 
remains a long-standing high-risk area. GAO’s reviews over the past 30 
years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as 
cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In 
addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the 
need to deliver its new major weapon programs within estimated costs 
and to obtain the most from those investments. DOD can help resolve 
these problems by using a more knowledge-based approach for developing 
new weapons. 

This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an 
independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs 
that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program’s 
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practice. It 
can also highlight those programs that employ practices worthy of 
emulation by other programs. GAO plans to update and issue this report 
annually. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO assessed 54 programs, which represent an investment of over $800 
billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser to 
the Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. GAO’s assessments 
are anchored in a knowledge-based approach to product development that 
reflects best practices of successful programs. This approach centers 
on attaining high levels of knowledge in three elements of a new 
product or weapon–technology, design, and production–at key consecutive 
junctures in development. If a program is not attaining these levels of 
knowledge, it incurs increased risk of technical problems, with 
significant potential cost and schedule growth implications (see 
figure). If a program is falling short in one element, like technology 
maturity, it is harder to attain the requisite amount of knowledge to 
prudently proceed in succeeding elements. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The majority of programs GAO assessed are costing more and taking 
longer to develop than planned. Most of the programs proceeded with 
less knowledge at critical junctures than suggested by best practices, 
although some programs came close to meeting best practice standards. 
For example, technology and design for the F/A-22 matured late in the 
program contributing to large cost growth and schedule delays. The 
JASSM program, in contrast, has achieved a high level of knowledge at 
critical junctures while experiencing minimal cost increases or 
schedule delays. 

Managing these levels of knowledge takes on additional significance as 
DOD’s share of the discretionary budget faces increasing pressure from 
the growth in mandatory spending and the demands of ongoing military 
operations. For these reasons, if DOD approves programs with low levels 
of knowledge and accepts the attendant likely adverse cost and schedule 
consequences, it will probably get fewer quantities for the same 
investment or face difficult choices on which investments it cannot 
afford to pursue. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-301. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202) 
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments: 

Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to Develop: 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF): 

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS): 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS): 

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS): 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System 
(ATIRCM/CMWS): 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC): 

CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F): 

Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM): 

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

DD(X) Destroyer: 

E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A): 

E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE): 

EA-18G: 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)-Atlas V, Delta IV: 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM): 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

F/A-22 Raptor: 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS: 

Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

Joint Common Missile (JCM): 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW): 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1: 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5: 

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS): 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

Land Warrior: 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS): 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA): 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

MQ-9 Predator B: 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB): 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Tactical Tomahawk Missile: 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS): 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Scope of Our Review: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power: 

Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems: 

Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004 Assessment and 
2005 Assessment: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding--Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs: 

Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key 
Junctures: 

Figure 4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

ACTS: AEHF Comsec/Transec System: 

BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance: 

BTERM: Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range Munition: 

DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: 

DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EKV: exoatmospheric kill vehicle: 

FY: fiscal year: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit: 

GPS: Global Positioning System: 

HEO: highly elliptical orbit: 

HLV: heavy lift vehicle: 

IMIS: Integrated Maintenance Information System: 

ISR: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance: 

JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition: 

JSSEO: Joint Single Integrated Air Picture Systems Engineering 
Organization: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

NA: not applicable: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

OT&E: Operational Test and Evaluation: 

PDR: Preliminary Design Review: 

RDT&E: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation: 

SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System: 

SM-3: Standard Missile 3: 

TBD: to be determined: 

TF/TA: Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: 

UHF: ultra high frequency: 

U.S.C.: United States Code: 

USMC: United States Marine Corps: 

March 31, 2005: 

Congressional Committees: 

Fiscal realities demand that the Department of Defense (DOD) get better 
outcomes from its weapon system investments. Federal discretionary 
spending, along with other federal policies and programs, will face 
serious budget pressures in the coming years. While providing for the 
common defense is in the Constitution, defense spending is considered 
"discretionary" from a budget sense. Furthermore, investments in new 
capabilities such as weapon systems are more discretionary than other 
aspects of defense spending, such as personnel costs and the costs of 
supporting and maintaining current force operations. As a result, it is 
imperative that DOD's limited resources be allocated to the most 
appropriate weapon system investments based on current and reasonably 
expected threats and that the investments yield the results promised 
(such as performance, cost, and timing) within the constraints imposed 
by those resources. 

We have assessed weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area since 1990. 
Although U.S. weapons are the best in the world, the programs to 
acquire them often take significantly longer and cost significantly 
more money than promised and often deliver fewer quantities and other 
capabilities than planned. It is not unusual for estimates of time and 
money to be off by 20 to 50 percent. When costs and schedules increase, 
quantities are cut, and the value for the warfighter--as well as the 
value of the investment dollar--is reduced. In these times of 
asymmetric threats and netcentricity, individual weapon system 
investments are getting larger and more complex. Just 4 years ago, the 
top five weapon systems cost about $281 billion; today, in the same 
base year dollars, the top five weapon systems cost about $521 billion. 
If these megasystems are managed with traditional margins of error, the 
financial consequences can be dire, especially in light of a 
constrained discretionary budget. 

Our work on the development of successful commercial and defense 
products has shown that it is possible to get better outcomes from 
investments if decisions are based on high levels of knowledge. Defense 
acquisition policies support such an approach to managing weapon system 
programs. However, actual practice is not yet consistently following 
written policy. As this annual assessment of major weapon acquisitions 
shows, most programs are proceeding with inadequate levels of 
knowledge, with attendant increased risks for traditional rates of cost 
growth, along with schedule delays and performance shortfalls. On the 
other hand, this assessment also includes programs that are proceeding 
with high levels of knowledge, showing that practice can follow policy. 

This is our third annual assessment of weapon system programs. The 
experiences catalogued in this report provide insights on how programs 
can be better positioned to succeed. To the extent that programs are 
not so positioned, the report can be used by decision makers to take 
actions to reduce risks by building higher levels of knowledge. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

Letter March 31, 2005: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to 
enhance warfighting capabilities. Primary among these efforts are the 
investments being made to develop improved weapon systems with 
technological superiority and enhanced lethality to combat threats to 
U.S. security. Investment in programs such as the Army's Future Combat 
Systems and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, the Missile 
Defense Agency's suite of land, sea, air, and space systems, the Navy's 
advanced ships such as the DD(X) Destroyer, and the Air Force's space 
systems such as the Transformational Satellite Communications System 
are likely to dominate the budget and doctrinal debate well into the 
next decade. Many of these embody the dual challenge of employing 
complex technology with a rapid pace of development. Fiscal realities, 
coupled with the larger scope of key acquisitions, reduce the ability 
of budgets to accommodate typical margins for error in terms of cost 
increases and schedule delays. Identifying risks early and addressing 
them before they become problems can lessen cost increases and schedule 
delays and thus enable budgets to buy what was planned. 

In this report, we assess 54 programs that represent an investment of 
approximately $800 billion.[Footnote 1] Our objective is to provide 
decision makers with independent, knowledge-based assessments of 
individual systems' attained knowledge and potential risks. 

A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments: 

DOD has entered a period of high investment. A significant portion of 
this investment is for the acquisition of weapon systems that offer 
technologically advanced capabilities. The investment in the research, 
development, and procurement of major weapon systems is expected to 
rise from $144 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $185 billion in fiscal 
year 2009. Major Defense Acquisition Programs make up about 45 percent, 
or $65 billion, as shown in figure 1, of the fiscal year 2005 
investment request.[Footnote 2] DOD's total planned investment in these 
programs is approximately $1.3 trillion, with about $812 billion of 
that investment yet to be made. 

Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding--Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

There are several challenges to getting the most from that investment. 
First, because DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the 
largest discretionary items in the federal budget, DOD's budget faces 
growing pressures from increases in mandatory federal 
spending.[Footnote 3] According to the Congressional Budget Office, 
federal deficits are expected to average $250 billion through fiscal 
year 2009 and new budgetary demands stemming from demographic trends 
lie beyond that time frame. In calendar year 2004, discretionary 
spending accounted for about 39 percent of the federal budget, and 
current projections show that because of increases in mandatory 
spending, discretionary spending is likely to decrease to 33 percent of 
the federal budget by fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 4] It will be 
difficult for DOD to increase its budget share to cover cost increases 
in weapon programs in that environment. 

Second, DOD faces competing demands within its own budget, such as from 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September 2001, DOD has 
needed $158 billion in supplemental appropriations to support the 
global war on terrorism.[Footnote 5] The budget implications of these 
operations further increase the demand made of the defense dollar and 
therefore the investment in new weapon programs. For example, current 
military operations are causing faster wear on existing weapons, which 
will need refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned. These needs 
will compete with the investment in new weapon programs. 

Third, DOD programs typically take longer to develop and cost more to 
buy than planned, placing additional demands on available funding. 
These programs increasingly compete for resources and are sometimes 
forced to make trade-offs in quantities, resulting in a reduction of 
buying power. As a result, funds are not available for other competing 
needs and programs yield fewer quantities for the same, if not higher, 
cost. Table 1 illustrates seven programs with the greatest reduction of 
buying power. Some of these programs experienced higher costs for the 
same initial quantity. 

Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

If DOD cannot deliver its major new programs within estimated costs, 
difficult choices have to be made regarding which investments to pursue 
and which to discontinue. 

Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to Develop: 

The majority of programs in our assessment are costing more and taking 
longer to develop than estimated. As shown in table 2, total RDT&E 
costs for 26 common set[Footnote 6] weapon programs increased by nearly 
$42.7 billion, or 42 percent, over the original business case (the 
first full estimate). The same programs have also experienced an 
increase in the time needed to develop capabilities with a weighted-
average schedule increase of nearly 20 percent.[Footnote 7]

Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems: 

Billions of constant 2005 dollars. 

Total cost; 
First full estimate: $479.6; 
Latest estimate: $548.9; 
Percent change: 14.5%. 

RDT&E cost; 
First full estimate: $102.0; 
Latest estimate: $144.7; 
Percent change: 41.9%. 

Weighted-average acquisition cycle time[A]; 
First full estimate: 146.6 months; 
Latest estimate: 175.3 months; 
Percent change: 19.6%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for 
the 26 programs based on total program costs at the first full and 
latest estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was 94.9 
months for the first full estimate and 114.7 months for the latest 
estimate, resulting in a 20.8 percent change. 

[End of table]

Quantities for 10 of the common set programs have been reduced since 
their first estimate.[Footnote 8] In addition, the weighted-average 
program acquisition unit cost of 25 of the 26 programs increased by 
roughly 50 percent.[Footnote 9]

During the last year, cost and schedule estimates for the same 26 
programs have increased noticeably since our last assessment, as shown 
in table 3. 

Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004 Assessment and 
2005 Assessment: 

Billions of constant 2005 dollars. 

Total cost; 
2004 assessment: $480.3; 
2005 assessment: $548.9; 
Percent change: 14.3%. 

RDT&E cost; 
2004 assessment: $127.3; 
2005 assessment: $144.7; 
Percent change: 13.7%. 

Weighted-average acquisition cycle time[A]; 
2004 assessment: 166.1 months; 
2005 assessment: 175.3 months; 
Percent change: 5.5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for 
the 26 programs based on total program cost estimates for the 2004 
assessment and the 2005 assessment. The simple average for these two 
estimates was 110.7 months for the 2004 assessment and 114.7 months for 
the 2005 assessment, resulting in a 3.6 percent change. 

[B] These estimates also include the Land Warrior program. Although 
this program was not included in the 2004 assessment, the program is 
included in the common set because data were available from the 
December 2002 Selected Acquisition Report for inclusion in this 
estimate. 

[End of table]

Some of DOD's largest programs have driven these increases. For 
example, research and development costs for the Army's Future Combat 
Systems, a $108 billion investment, increased by approximately 51 
percent over the past year while in the midst of a major restructuring 
of the program. Likewise, the Joint Strike Fighter, a $199 billion 
investment, has reported a research and development cost increase of 
over 19 percent in the past year. 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Over the last several years we have undertaken a body of work that 
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon 
lessons learned from best system development practices. We found that 
successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that 
their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their 
production processes are in control. Separating technology development 
from product development is important to this effort. Successful 
programs make a science and technology organization, rather than the 
program or product development manager, responsible for maturing 
technologies. Such steps can help to reduce costs and deliver a product 
on time and within budget. DOD's current acquisition guidance embraces 
the use of evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition practices proven 
to be more effective and efficient in developing new products. By fully 
implementing these practices, DOD can better leverage its investments 
by shortening the time it takes to develop capabilities with more 
predictable costs and schedules, thereby maintaining its buying power. 

Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge was 
achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these 
junctures as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated 
indicators are defined as follows: 

* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This level of knowledge 
occurs when a sound business case is made for the product--that is, a 
match is made between the customer's requirements and the product 
developer's available resources in terms of knowledge, time, and money. 
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 
development is an important indicator of whether this match has been 
made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product 
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended 
environment. 

* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This level of knowledge 
occurs when a program determines that a product's design is stable--
that is, it will meet customer requirements and cost and schedule 
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-
level critical design review, usually held midway through development. 
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system 
design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable. 

* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This level of 
knowledge is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the product 
can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best 
practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in 
statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and 
capable of consistently producing parts within the product's quality 
tolerances and standards--at the start of production. 

The attainment of each successive knowledge point builds on the 
preceding one. While the knowledge itself builds continuously without 
clear lines of demarcation, the attainment of knowledge points is 
sequential. In other words, production maturity cannot be attained if 
the design is not stable, and design stability cannot be attained if 
the critical technologies are not mature. 

Seeking to improve acquisition outcomes, DOD revised its acquisition 
policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based, evolutionary 
framework. The policy adopts lessons learned from successful commercial 
companies. For example, the policy attempts to separate technology 
development from product development and requires the demonstration of 
technologies to high readiness levels. The policy also allows managers 
to develop a product in increments rather than trying to incorporate 
all of the desired capabilities in the first version that comes off the 
production line. 

Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

Most of the programs we reviewed proceeded with lower levels of 
knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product 
knowledge later in development than specified in DOD policy, which 
resulted in cost increases and schedule delays. 

Development Start: 

Our work shows that the demonstration of technology maturity by the 
start of system development is the key measure for achievement of 
knowledge point 1. A program that proceeds into product development 
without demonstrating mature technologies does so with increased risk 
of cost growth and schedule delays throughout the life of the program. 

Only 15 percent of the programs we assessed began development having 
demonstrated all of their technologies mature, as illustrated in figure 
2. 

Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

More often than not, programs sought to mature technologies well into 
system development when they should have focused on maturing system 
design and preparing for production. The programs that started 
development with mature technologies experienced lower development and 
unit cost increases than those programs that started development with 
immature technologies. For example, RDT&E costs for the programs that 
started development with mature technology increased by an average of 9 
percent over the first full estimate, whereas the development costs for 
the programs that started development with immature technologies 
increased an average of 41 percent over the first full estimate. 
Likewise, program acquisition unit costs for the programs with mature 
technology increased by less than 1 percent, whereas the programs that 
started development with immature technologies experienced an average 
program acquisition unit cost increase of nearly 21 percent over the 
first full estimate.[Footnote 10] Finally, the programs with mature 
technology experienced an average schedule delay of 7 months--a 9 
percent increase--whereas the schedule for the programs that started 
development with immature technology increased an average of 13 months-
a 13 percent increase. 

Design Review: 

As illustrated in figure 3, 42 percent of the programs that held a 
design review achieved design stability at that key juncture. 

Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key 
Junctures: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

With the exception of the Navy's V-22, which has experienced 
significant design changes since development start in 1986, these 
programs have experienced a 6 percent increase in development costs and 
an average schedule increase of 11 months since the first full 
estimate.[Footnote 11] Those programs that did not achieve design 
stability have experienced a combined development cost increase of 46 
percent and an average schedule increase of 29 months since the first 
full estimate.[Footnote 12]

Design stability cannot be attained if key technologies are not mature. 
Ten programs held design review without demonstrating mature critical 
technologies.[Footnote 13] Out of the 10 programs, 7 had experienced a 
cost increase, schedule delay, or both.[Footnote 14] The unit cost of 5 
of these programs increased by at least 10 percent.[Footnote 15] In 
contrast, 3 programs entered product development with mature 
technologies. These three programs kept program unit cost increases to 
a minimum, with costs either falling or increasing by single 
digits.[Footnote 16]

Nine programs are scheduled to hold their system design review in the 
next year.[Footnote 17] Only two of those programs, the B-2 Radar 
Modernization and the Excalibur program, expect their technologies to 
be mature at the time of their design reviews. The remaining seven 
programs project that their technologies will not attain maturity until 
after their critical design reviews. 

Production Start: 

To determine if a product's design is reliable and producible, 
successful programs use statistical process control to bring 
manufacturing processes under control so they are repeatable, 
sustainable, and consistently producing parts within quality standards. 
The collection of process control data prior to a production decision 
can enable a smooth transition from product development to the 
production phase. Of the 19 programs in production or approaching a 
production decision in the next year, only 2 collected or plan to 
collect statistical process control data to measure the maturity of 
production processes.[Footnote 18] While the absence of the data does 
not mean that production processes were immature, it does prevent an 
assessment against an objective standard. 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

We assess each program in 2 pages and depict the extent of knowledge in 
a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of 
the first page. As illustrated in figure 4, the knowledge graph is 
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the 
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange), 
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted 
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment 
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. In some 
cases, we obtained projections from the program office of future 
knowledge attainment. These projections are depicted as dashed bars. 
The closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line, 
the more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and 
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by 
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice 
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces 
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks 
are discovered and resolved. 

Figure 4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system 
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing 
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design 
review as some technologies were still not mature and only a small 
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for 
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve 
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that 
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases. 

We conducted our review from July 2004 through March 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II 
contains detailed information on our methodology. 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Our assessments of the 54 weapon systems follow. 

[End of section]

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

MDA's ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of their 
flight. Carried aboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL 
employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the beam on a 
target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy 
missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute 
engagements. We assessed the Block 2004 design that is under 
development and expected to lead to an initial capability in a future 
block. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Kirtland AFB, N. Mex. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $2,386.9 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Total funding: $2,386.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2003: $5,515.8; 
Latest 07/2004: $5,055.3; 
Percent change: -8.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/2003: $5,515.8; 
Latest 07/2004: $5,055.3; 
Percent change: -8.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. 

[End of table]

Although program officials expected ABL to provide an initial 
capability during Block 2006, this event has been delayed and only one 
of its seven critical technologies is fully mature. During Block 2004, 
the program continues work on a prototype that is expected to provide 
the basic design for a future operational capability. Program officials 
expect to demonstrate the other six technologies during a prototype 
flight test that will assess ABL's lethality. Difficulty in integrating 
prototype components could delay this effort from 2005 to 2008. MDA has 
released about 94 percent of the engineering drawings for the 
prototype's design, which will be the basis for an initial operational 
capability during a future block if the test is successful. However, 
additional drawings may be needed if the design is enhanced or if 
problems encountered during flight testing force design changes. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ABL Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing the high-power 
beam--is fully mature. The program office assessed three technologies-
-the six-module laser, missile tracking, and atmospheric compensation-
-as nearly mature. The remaining three technologies--transmissive 
optics, optical coatings, and jitter control--are the least mature. 
According to program officials, all of these technologies are needed to 
provide the system with an initial operational capability. 

While the program office has assessed the six-module laser as being 
close to reaching full maturity, the power generated by grouping six 
laser modules together must be demonstrated before full maturity can be 
reasonably assessed. The recent demonstration of the simultaneous 
firing of all six laser modules reduces risk in this area. Additional 
testing, planned over the next 6 months, must still be completed to 
demonstrate the full power and duration of the laser segment prior to 
installation on the aircraft. 

The transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter control are the 
least mature critical technologies and consist of prototypes that have 
only been tested in the laboratory or demonstrated through analysis and 
simulation. The program plans to demonstrate all technologies in an 
operational environment during a flight test of the system prototype, 
referred to as lethal demonstration, in which ABL will attempt to shoot 
down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges with integrating the 
laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents could delay this test 
into 2008, but the final schedule is to be determined. Upon successful 
completion of this test, MDA expects to develop a second aircraft that 
will provide an initial operational capability. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability because ABL's initial 
capability will not be fully developed until the second aircraft--what 
is expected to provide an initial capability--is well underway. While 
the program has released 10,280 of the 10,910 engineering drawings for 
the prototype, it is unclear whether the design of the prototype 
aircraft can be relied upon as a good indicator of design stability for 
the second aircraft. More drawings may be needed if the design is 
enhanced or if problems encountered during flight testing force design 
changes. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of ABL because MDA has not 
made a production decision. The program is producing a limited quantity 
of hardware for the system's prototype. Program officials explained 
that they continue to experience problems maintaining a stable 
manufacturing base for prototype subcomponents. 

Other Program Issues: 

Technological challenges caused the prime contract to approach its cost 
ceiling during fiscal year 2004. In early April 2004, MDA directed the 
ABL program to restructure the contract, increase its cost ceiling, and 
refocus the contractor's efforts on making technical progress. As a 
result, the cost ceiling was increased by $1.5 billion and the period 
of performance was extended to 2008 from 2005. The contract is 
currently valued at approximately $3.6 billion. 

The focus of current work is on two near-term events. The first event 
was the six-module laser test in a ground test facility that the 
program completed in November 2004. The second event was the initial 
Beam Control/Fire Control flight test, which occurred in December 2004. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA maintained that the 
current design is stable despite the assessed technology maturity. 
Officials told us that because the ABL operational environment is 
impractical to duplicate on the ground, the technology maturity 
assessment will understate actual maturity until after 100 percent of 
the drawings are released. While the officials expect changes to future 
blocks as part of capability-based spiral acquisition, they believe the 
basic design will directly migrate to subsequent blocks. 

[End of section]

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being 
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed 
U.S. forces and critical assets from short-and medium-range ballistic 
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit-
to-kill interceptors, and command and control systems. It will also be 
used as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed only Block 2004 of the 
element's interceptor--the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon (SM-3); 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $4,005.3 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Total funding: $4,005.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2003: $7,071.6; 
Latest 07/2004: $7,878.9; 
Percent change: 11.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2003: $7,071.6; 
Latest 07/2004: $7,878.9; 
Percent change: 11.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: 65. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Table reflects total Aegis BMD program costs for all blocks--not only 
for Block 2004 SM-3--from program inception in fiscal years 1996 
through 2009. Procurement cost has yet to be determined. 

[End of table]

According to program officials, the first increment of SM-3 missiles 
being fielded during 2004-2005 has mature technologies and a stable 
design. However, the program has been struggling with the technology 
that maneuvers the missile's kinetic warhead (kill vehicle) to its 
target. Partial functionality of this "divert" technology was 
successful in 4 flight tests, but full functionality has only been 
demonstrated in ground tests--it failed during a June 2003 flight test. 
Design modifications were identified but will not be implemented in the 
first 8 missiles being fielded. Program officials noted that even with 
a reduced capability, these missiles provide a credible defense. All 
drawings for the first increment of missiles have been released to 
manufacturing. The program is not collecting statistical data on its 
production process but is using other means to gauge production 
readiness. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Aegis BMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials estimate that all three technologies critical to the 
SM-3 are mature. These technologies--the third stage rocket motor, the 
infrared seeker of the kinetic warhead, and the Solid Divert and 
Attitude Control System (SDACS) of the kinetic warhead--were all tested 
in flight. While the first two technologies were fully demonstrated in 
flight tests, the SDACS, which generates divert pulses to steer the 
kinetic warhead, was only partially demonstrated. As noted previously, 
full "divert" technology succeeded in ground testing but partially 
failed during a June 2003 flight test. According to program officials, 
the test failure was likely caused by a defective subcomponent within 
the SDACS, a problem that should be corrected through specific design 
modifications. Program officials note that only partial functionality 
of the SDACS is required for Block 2004, which was successfully 
demonstrated in flight tests. Although the kinetic warhead of these 
interceptors will have reduced divert capability, they provide a 
credible defense against a large population of the threat and can be 
retrofitted upon the completion of design updates and testing. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported that the design for the first eight 
interceptors being fielded during Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent 
of its drawings released to manufacturing. The program plans to 
implement design changes in subsequent configurations of the SM-3 
(delivered during 2006-2007) to resolve the SDACS failure witnessed in 
the June 2003 flight test. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of the missiles being 
procured for Block 2004. Program officials stated that given the low 
quantity of missiles being produced, statistical process control data 
on the production process would have no significance. The Aegis BMD 
program is using other means to assess progress in production and 
manufacturing--such as integrated product teams, risk reviews, and SM-3 
metrics--as part of its overall development of the SM-3. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegis-
equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software 
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic 
missile defense mission. In particular, the program is working to 
upgrade Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tracking of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Because this function is new to 
the element--allowed only after the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty--the program office faced a tight schedule to 
fully develop and test this added functionality, which it completed in 
September 2004 with the deployment of the first destroyer for this 
mission. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that Aegis BMD progress remains on track. For example, the program 
deployed the first operational destroyers (for the long-range 
surveillance and tracking mission) to the Sea of Japan, delivered 5 
missiles in November, and successfully ground tested the redesigned 
SDACS. It noted, however, that our review focused on the SM-3, a junior 
portion of the overall cost and development of the Aegis BMD system. 

In addition, the program office reiterated that SDACS technology was 
successful in four of five Aegis BMD flight tests. The current SDACS 
configuration is fully capable of defeating the Block 2004 threat set, 
and a design update is in progress to complete the final increment of 
capability. As an application of capabilities-based acquisition, the 
warfighter is provided a significant capability years earlier (albeit 
using partial SDACS functionality) instead of waiting for a perfect 
design. 

[End of section]

Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF): 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical 
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control 
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are 
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
partnership program that includes Canada, United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,819.5 million; 
Procurement: $501.6 million; 
Total funding: $2,321.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,222.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $4,502.2; 
Percent change: 6.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,249.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $501.6; 
Percent change: -59.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,471.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $5,003.7; 
Percent change: -8.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,094.362; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,667.910; 
Percent change: 52.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest 12/2003: 3; 
Percent change: -40.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 111; 
Latest 12/2003: 118; 
Percent change: 6.3%. 

[End of table]

According to the program office, the AEHF program's technologies are 
mature and the design is stable. However, the high risk strategy of 
concurrently developing two critical path items has led to further 
schedule delays and cost increases. The program is relying on the 
concurrent development of the AEHF Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) suite 
of cryptological equipment, which limits access to authorized users, 
and terminals used for satellite command and control. Both of these 
items are being developed outside the program office. Delivery delays 
of the ACTS and command and control terminals resulted in an additional 
12-month launch delay and an estimated 20 percent cost increase, 
incurring a Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 U.S.C. 2433) at the 15 percent 
threshold. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AEHF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All of the 14 critical technologies are mature, according to the 
program office. In addition, all 19 of the application-specific 
integrated circuits critical to functioning of the communications 
payload have been flight qualified through demonstration and testing. 

Design Stability: 

AEHF's design is now stable since more than 97 percent of the design 
drawings have been released. While the program completed its system 
level critical design review in April 2004 with only about two-thirds 
of the drawings released, the AEHF contractor has since resolved all 
outstanding issues from that review. 

Production maturity could not be assessed as the program office does 
not collect statistical process control data. In June 2004, the formal 
decision was made to acquire the third and final satellite. 

Other Program Issues: 

The concurrent development of two critical path items--the ACTS and the 
command and control terminals--has led to further schedule delays and 
cost growth. The ACTS is a suite of cryptological equipment installed 
in both the satellite and the terminals to limit access to authorized 
users and is being developed and produced by the National Security 
Agency. The ACTS has already experienced significant cost growth and 
schedule delays due to production problems and changing security 
requirements. In September 2003, ACTS delivery delays and development 
problems led the program office to delay the launch of the first two 
satellites by 4 months. The second critical path item--the command post 
terminals--is developed and funded by another Air Force program office. 
These terminals must be in place and tested prior to the first launch 
or there will be a day-for-day slip in the satellite launch schedule. 

The concurrent development of the AEHF satellites, terminals, and the 
ACTS has led to further delays and cost increases. Delayed delivery of 
the ACTS had resulted in an additional 12-month delay. Launches for the 
three AEHF satellites are now scheduled for April 2008, April 2009, and 
April 2010. The launch delays along with added payload component 
testing and replacement of critical electronic parts are expected to 
increase the overall program cost by about 20 percent. In December 
2004, the Air Force notified Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach at the 
15 percent threshold. 

In December 2002, satellites four and five were deleted from the AEHF 
program because the new Transformational Satellite Communications 
System (TSAT), assessed elsewhere in this report, is to replace these 
satellites if they are sufficiently developed. The Air Force scheduled 
an interim review point in November 2004 to determine whether to buy 
additional AEHF satellites or rely on TSAT. However, in light of the 12-
month program slip, the decision was delayed until November 2005. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section]

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F 
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon 
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current 
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the 
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness 
of the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be 
inserted in new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and 
above aircraft. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: McDonnell Douglas, Corp. 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $165.3 million; 
Procurement: $1,814.7 million; 
Total funding: $1,980.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 395. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2001: $526.8; 
Latest 12/2004: $599.1; 
Percent change: 13.7%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2001: $1,690.2; 
Latest 12/2004: $2,029.2; 
Percent change: 20.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2001: $2,217.0; 
Latest 12/2004: $2,628.3; 
Percent change: 18.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2001: $5.342; 
Latest 12/2004: $6.333; 
Percent change: 18.6%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2001: 415; 
Latest 12/2004: 415; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2001: 69; 
Latest 12/2004: 68; 
Percent change: -1.4%. 

Procurement funding for the radar is included in the funding for the 
F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft programs. 

[End of table]

The AESA radar's critical technologies were not mature at the start of 
system development or at the design review, but they now appear to be 
mature. The design also appears stable. However, radar development is 
continuing during production. The program is tracking a number of risks 
with the technical performance of the radar. If problems are 
discovered, they could require design changes while the radar is in 
production. For example, the software schedule leaves little room for 
error or rework, and development of the radar simulation model puts 
training at risk. In addition, there are some production risks that 
could affect the quality of the initial radars and the aircraft 
delivery schedule. Antitamper protection for the radar is currently in 
design. The AESA program also has interdependencies with other programs 
that could make the radar vulnerable to delays in their progress. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AESA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The latest technology readiness assessment for the radar determined 
that the four critical technologies were mature. To further ensure 
technology maturity, a mini-technology assessment is planned prior to 
the full-rate production decision. By then, the technologies should 
have been demonstrated in their final form and under expected 
conditions. 

Design Stability: 

As of July 2004, all engineering drawings for the radar and its 
subsystems had been released. At the design review in 2001, 59 percent 
had been released. Development of the radar has continued during 
production. The program office has identified some development risks 
that could result in design changes. According to a program office risk 
assessment, the top current challenge involves the software. The lack 
of timely software delivery puts the program at significant risk, and 
could also require radar hardware rework due to delays in the flight 
test program. Another risk is that the radar simulation model 
integrated into the F/A-18 training simulator may not accurately 
represent the operation and performance of the radar, which could 
result in some training that is unrealistic. Further, the number of 
flight tests that can be conducted may not be adequate to mature radar 
software. Other current risks include whether the radar: will be able 
to track sufficient targets simultaneously; radiation emissions will 
interfere with F/A-18E/F weapon systems; and will have the capability 
to detect tail aspect targets at low altitude. Mitigation plans are in 
place to address all design risks. 

Production Maturity: 

During 4 low-rate production runs, 84 radars are planned--20 percent of 
the 415 radars to be procured. The program is currently in the second 
production run. Most radars are planned to be installed in F/A-18E/Fs 
on the aircraft production line. However, 135 radars will have to be 
retrofitted into already produced F/A-18E/Fs--a more costly process 
upfront, that, according to the Navy, is expected to save money on 
support costs later. We could not assess production maturity because 
statistical process control data are not being collected. Officials 
said they are comfortable with manufacturing processes based on audits 
and inspections conducted at some key manufacturers. Nonetheless, radar 
production currently faces a number of risks. The radar contractor may 
have difficulty transitioning from development to production due to 
production risks, which could cause some late aircraft deliveries. 
Other risks include reliability problems with one of the radar's 
critical technologies may not allow initial radars to meet a 
specification and qualification tests may not be complete in time, 
resulting in delivering radar hardware that is not fully qualified. 
Moreover, full-rate production costs could increase significantly if 
the projected payoff from cost reduction initiatives is not fully 
realized. However, program officials expect significant savings from 
the cost reduction initiatives. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program office is closely tracking interdependencies that could 
place the radar at risk. Successful development of other Navy programs 
is required for the radar to meet key performance parameters. Also, the 
radar program is being developed, in part, with funding from 
contractors. Changes in the flow of this funding would affect the AESA 
program, but program officials stated that almost all of the contractor 
funding has been provided. 

In 1999, DOD directed the services to implement antitamper protection 
to guard against exploitation of critical U.S. technologies. This 
protection was not one of the radar's original requirements. While 
officials said there is a requirement for this protection to have no 
effect on radar performance, operational tests of antitamper models are 
not planned until after operational tests of radars without this 
protection, which may identify problems that require design changes to 
the protection package. 

The program's strategy for a depot has changed. Plans have been 
canceled to stand up a Navy depot maintenance facility for the radar in 
2010 at North Island, California. Instead, Raytheon will conduct depot 
maintenance at its facility in El Segundo, California, at substantial 
cost savings, according to program officials. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section]

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS): 

The Navy's AMNS is designed to relocate, identify, and neutralize 
bottom or moored sea mines. AMNS consists of an operating console and a 
launch and handling system containing up to four neutralizers. When 
deployed, the MH-60S helicopter hovers near the target mine and lowers 
AMNS via a tow cable into the water. A neutralizer, controlled through 
fiber-optic cable, exits the launch and handling system and uses sonar 
to find the mine and fires a lethal charge, destroying the mine and the 
neutralizer. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon IDS; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $31.7 million; 
Procurement: $109.3 million; 
Total funding: $154.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 58. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2003: $53.1; 
Latest 08/2004: $66.7; 
Percent change: 25.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2003: $82.5; 
Latest 08/2004: $109.3; 
Percent change: 32.4%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2003: $148.7; 
Latest 08/2004: $189.1; 
Percent change: 27.2%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2003: $3.164; 
Latest 08/2004: $3.100; 
Percent change: -2.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2003: 47; 
Latest 08/2004: 61; 
Percent change: 29.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2003: 50; 
Latest 08/2004: 50; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

The procurement quantity of 58 units includes the acquisition of 58 
launch and handling systems and 580 neutralizers. 

[End of table]

The AMNS program began system development with none of its four 
critical technologies mature. While progress has been made since then, 
program officials do not expect to achieve technology maturity until 
developmental tests are conducted in mid-2005. The AMNS program's 
design is stable, with approximately 90 percent of the drawings 
complete. However, since the AMNS technologies are not expected to 
demonstrate maturity until developmental testing is conducted, the 
program runs the risk that problems identified during that testing will 
require drawings to be modified. To maintain an initial operational 
capability of June 2007, the program office requested a $13 million 
increase in research and development funds in order to support 
alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support delayed 
testing on the MH-60S helicopter. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AMNS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The AMNS launch and handling system, the deployment subassembly, the 
warhead assembly, and the neutralizer are not fully mature. The 
neutralizer, which was demonstrated in a relevant environment, is 
approaching full maturity. The program office describes the neutralizer 
as a nondevelopmental item because it is already operational. However, 
it needs to undergo safety and performance improvements before it will 
be ready for AMNS. The other three technologies have not been 
integrated or demonstrated outside of a laboratory environment, but 
program officials have stated that no technology hurdles remain, merely 
engineering challenges. Program officials expect all four technologies 
to demonstrate maturity during developmental testing that is scheduled 
to take place between May and October 2005. 

Among risks identified by program officials are concerns that the 
neutralizer will not launch properly in an environment of strong water 
currents. The program office is attempting to mitigate this risk by 
establishing plans and funding for testing the neutralizer in strong 
water currents, including flume tank testing. Additionally, program 
officials noted concerns about the survivability of the launch and 
handling system in an underwater explosives environment. The program 
office plans for this risk to be mitigated through an analysis of 
launch and handling system internal parts and an analysis to prove that 
the launch and handling system can tolerate environments of up to 50G 
levels. 

Design Stability: 

Approximately 90 percent of the AMNS drawings are currently releasable. 
Moreover, the program office projects all drawings to be releasable to 
manufacturing at the completion of the design readiness review in March 
2005. According to program officials, top level assembly drawings will 
be considered at the design readiness review. Detailed designs of AMNS 
components were validated through 17 interim design reviews held by the 
program office. 

Because the AMNS technologies are not expected to demonstrate maturity 
until developmental testing is conducted in mid-2005, the program runs 
the risk that any problems identified during testing would require 
drawings to be modified. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program office has requested an approximately $13 million increase 
in research and development funds for the fiscal year 2006 budget. 
According to program officials, this increase is required to support 
alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support a 16-month 
delay in completion of testing on the MH-60S helicopter. The MH-60S 
helicopter will not be available to support the current AMNS 
development and test schedule. Without alternate testing on the MH-53E 
helicopter, the program will not be able to make a low-rate initial 
production decision in February 2006 or, more importantly, maintain an 
initial operational capability of June 2007. For the MH-60S helicopter, 
development testing is not scheduled to start until 6 months after a 
low-rate initial production decision has been made. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
program quantity increased from 47 to 61 as a result of a change in 
Navy strategy to deploy the system from Littoral Combat Ships rather 
than aircraft carriers. Regarding technology maturity, it noted that 
currently the program's critical technologies, for example the warhead 
assembly, are slightly more mature than indicated in the assessment. In 
addition to performing an analysis to prove that the launch and 
handling system can tolerate high-pressure underwater environments, the 
Navy intends to conduct Underwater Explosive Testing as further risk 
mitigation. 

Regarding other program issues, the Navy stated that while alternate 
platform testing on the MH-53E helicopter would enable the program to 
meet its low-rate initial production decision and initial operational 
capability targets, alternate platform testing is pending approval by 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and 
Acquisition). It also indicated that constraints in the availability of 
MH-60S test assets have the potential to delay the program's schedule 
and increase its cost beyond the projections presented in the 
assessment. 

[End of section]

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS): 

The Army's APKWS is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed 
to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system will add a new 
laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and is 
expected to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the Hellfire 
missile. Future block upgrades are planned to improve system 
effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance technology used in the 
new seeker. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $23.2 million; 
Procurement: $1,531.4 million; 
Total funding: $1,710.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 89,539. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2002: $117.4; 
Latest 03/2004: $91.8; 
Percent change: -21.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2002: $1,546.9; 
Latest 03/2004: $1,531.4; 
Percent change: -1.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2002: $1,820.0; 
Latest 03/2004: $1,778.9; 
Percent change: -2.3%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2002: $0.020; 
Latest 03/2004: $0.020; 
Percent change: -2.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2002: 89,420; 
Latest 03/2004: 89,539; 
Percent change: 0.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2002: 60; 
Latest 03/2004: 69; 
Percent change: 15.0%. 

[End of table]

The APKWS entered system development and held its design review before 
demonstrating that its critical guidance technology was fully mature. 
While the system's design was otherwise stable at the time of the March 
2004 design review, initial system-level testing identified problems 
with the design. Program plans call for a production decision in 
September 2005 and low-rate production contract award in December 2005. 
We were unable to assess the program's production maturity because 
program officials do not expect to begin collecting statistical data on 
their key manufacturing processes until the start of production. 
Remaining efforts include completing developmental and operational 
testing. If subsequent testing identifies further problems with the 
design, additional costs of redesign and modification of drawings late 
in development could be incurred. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

APKWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The APKWS program has not demonstrated full maturity of its only 
critical technology--laser guidance. Although a prototype guidance 
system was successfully demonstrated under the Low Cost Precision Kill 
Advanced Technology Demonstration, the current design for the guidance 
system includes numerous hardware changes to improve system cost, 
performance, and producibility. The new guidance system will not be 
fully integrated and tested from an aircraft until winter 2005. Program 
officials noted that although the prototype system design exists, 
reverting to it would increase cost and degrade the system's 
performance and producibility. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials released 100 percent of the drawings after a system-
level design review in March 2004. Recently completed testing, however, 
uncovered the need for design changes. The APKWS, to date, has 
completed two test flights. The first test flight went as planned. The 
second flight test missile, however, experienced a mechanical failure 
of the wing lock mechanism, causing the test missile to veer off 
target. The program office identified a design solution, and flight 
testing resumed in September 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials expect that there will be nine key processes 
associated with manufacturing the APKWS. The program plans to collect 
statistical data on these processes when production begins in fiscal 
year 2006. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, the Army cut APKWS research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding by 22.1 percent due 
to other funding priorities. These officials noted that this reduction 
affects planned improvements to the warhead, fuze, seeker, and 
propulsion subsystems. Furthermore, the program has experienced a 15.3 
percent growth in acquisition cycle time as the result of slower 
initial production of the system than originally planned. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with 
this assessment. 

[End of section]

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS): 

The Special Operations Forces' ASDS is a battery-powered, dry interior 
minisubmarine developed for clandestine insertion and extraction of 
Navy SEALs and their equipment. It is carried to its deployment area by 
a specially configured SSN-688 class submarine. It is intended to 
provide increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, and endurance 
over current submersibles. The 65-foot long, 8-foot diameter ASDS is 
operated by a two-person crew and equipped with a lock out/lock in 
chamber to allow divers to exit and reenter the vehicle. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $8.5 million; 
Procurement: $1,218.0 million; 
Total funding: $1,259.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 5. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/1994: $141.8; 
Latest 10/2004: $465.1; 
Percent change: 228.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/1994: $125.7; 
Latest 10/2004: $1,347.5; 
Percent change: 972.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/1994: $281.7; 
Latest 10/2004: $1,876.6; 
Percent change: 566.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/1994: $93.913; 
Latest 10/2004: $312.759; 
Percent change: 233.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/1994: 3; 
Latest 10/2004: 6; 
Percent change: 100.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/1994: NA; 
Latest 10/2004: TBD. 

[End of table]

One of ASDS's three critical technologies--the lithium ion battery--has 
not reached maturity, and the first boat has required some design 
changes. The production decision has been delayed from June 2004 until 
December 2005 to allow time to produce and test a new battery and 
develop and test other vehicle design changes. The Navy selected a 
design for the lithium ion battery and, in May 2004, it awarded a 
contract to develop a full shipset unit for ASDS. Battery production 
will take about 1 year, and at-sea demonstration is expected in fiscal 
year 2005. Concurrent with battery replacement, other vehicle 
improvements are being developed and tested and design problems are 
being addressed. Acoustic signature issues are being addressed; 
however, this requirement does not have to be met until delivery of the 
second ASDS boat. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ASDS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Of the three critical technologies identified by the ASDS program 
office, one--the lithium ion battery--has not reached maturity. 
However, it is expected to be mature before the December 2005 
production decision for additional boats. 

Acoustic, or noise level, problems are being addressed; however, the 
first boat is not quiet enough to meet acoustic stealth requirements. 
In earlier tests, the ASDS propeller was the source of the most 
significant noise, and a new composite propeller was installed before 
operational test and evaluation in 2003. Although program officials 
believe it meets requirements, precise acoustic measurements have not 
been made and are not scheduled to be done before the production 
decision. Other acoustic issues will be addressed on a time-phased 
basis because the acoustic requirement has been deferred until delivery 
of the second boat. 

Design Stability: 

Although all engineering drawings for ASDS have been released to 
manufacturing, ASDS design changes have been required based on 
additional improvements, test results, and other issues since ASDS 
reached initial operational capability in November 2003. An assessment 
of ASDS survivability design features is also underway; however, the 
Vulnerability Assessment Report will not be completed until April 2005. 

An updated ASDS operational requirements document was approved in June 
2004. The number of key performance parameters (those elements that are 
so significant that a failure to meet them could call into question a 
system's ability to perform missions) were reduced from 16 to 8, and 
they include one new requirement (operational availability). Other 
requirements are categorized as system critical requirements. 

Until all requirements are addressed, technical problems are solved, 
and testing is completed, we believe ASDS's final design will remain 
uncertain and may have cost and schedule implications. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy completed an independent cost estimate, including life-cycle 
costs, in March 2004. However, data were not released, and the 
estimates are now out-of-date because they do not reflect the impact of 
the 2-year delay in production of the second boat. According to the 
June 2004 Selected Acquisition Report, the U.S. Special Operations 
Command was preparing a new proposed program plan to account for the 
delay in the production decision and updated cost information was 
expected to be reported in the December 2004 report. However, according 
to the Navy's January 2005 update, the revised program plan and updated 
cost estimate will be developed, reviewed, and approved as part of the 
production decision, which has been delayed until December 2005. Since 
the program's first cost estimate was originally approved in 1994, 
research and development costs have more than tripled. 

The Navy plans to conduct follow-on testing to verify that deficiencies 
and vulnerabilities identified during the May 2003 operational 
evaluation are corrected. However, not all results will be known before 
the scheduled production decision. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section]

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System: 

The Army's and the Special Operations Command's ATIRCM/CMWS is a 
component of the integrated infrared countermeasures suite planned to 
defend U.S. aircraft from advanced infrared guided missiles. The system 
will be employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. The system 
includes an active infrared jammer, a missile warning system, and a 
countermeasure dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, 
such as flares, chaff, and smoke. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $54.6 million; 
Procurement: $2,097.1 million; 
Total funding: $2,151.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,583. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/1996: $576.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $608.5; 
Percent change: 5.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/1996: $2,355.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,260.3; 
Percent change: -4.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/1996: $2,931.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,868.9; 
Percent change: -2.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/1996: $0.948; 
Latest 12/2003: $1.075; 
Percent change: 13.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/1996: 3,094; 
Latest 12/2003: 2,668; 
Percent change: -13.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/1996: Classified; 
Latest 12/2003: Classified; 
Percent change: Classified. 

[End of table]

The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with 
technologies mature and designs stable. Currently, the program's 
production processes are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion 
of the program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet 
urgent deployment requirements. However, full-rate production for both 
components was delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past 
several years, the program has had to overcome cost and schedule 
problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge: key technologies were 
demonstrated late in development and only a small number of design 
drawings were completed by design review. At the low-rate production 
decision point, the Army developed a new cost estimate reducing program 
procurement cost substantially. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ATIRCM/CMWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The ATIRCM/CMWS's five critical technologies are mature. However, they 
did not mature until after the design review in February 1997. Most of 
the early technology development effort was focused on the application 
to rotary wing aircraft. When system development began in 1995, the 
requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force fixed wing 
aircraft. This change caused problems that largely contributed to cost 
increases of more than 150 percent to the development contract. The 
Navy and the Air Force subsequently dropped out of the program, 
rendering the extra effort needless, but the Navy and the Army are 
currently pursuing future joint production planning. 

Design Stability: 

The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the 
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the 
time of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings 
complete. This was primarily due to the expanded requirements. It was 
not until 2 years after the design review that 90 percent of the 
drawings were released and the design was considered stable. This 
resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional testing, and 
a 3-year schedule delay. The system design was successfully 
demonstrated through engineering and manufacturing development and 
transitioned to production. 

Production Maturity: 

The production maturity could not be assessed based on the information 
provided by the program office. According to program officials, the 
ATIRCM/CMWS program has 16 key manufacturing processes in various 
phases of control. They stated that ATIRCM statistical process controls 
are in development, control plans are being enhanced and as the program 
continues in production and data are gathered, lessons learned will be 
included in the processes. The Army entered limited CMWS production in 
February 2002 to meet an urgent need of the U.S. Special Operations 
Command. Subsequently, full-rate production was delayed for both 
components due to reliability testing failures. The program implemented 
reliability fixes to six production representative subsystems that will 
be used for initial operational test and evaluation. These systems were 
delivered in March 2004. The full-rate production decision for the 
complete system is now scheduled for 2006. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army procured an initial 32 systems in fiscal year 2002 for use on 
the U.S. Special Operations Command's CH-47 helicopters. The Army plans 
to procure a total of 99 systems to outfit special operations aircraft 
between fiscal year 2003 and 2009. Currently, program officials are 
working to integrate CMWS on 16 additional platform types and models, 
which will result in an increase in quantity and funding. The CMWS low-
rate initial production quantity increased by 141 systems to a total of 
200. The Army procured all 200 of these systems, and deliveries are on 
schedule. 

At the low-rate production decision point, the Army developed a new 
cost estimate for the program that featured a variety of different 
program assumptions. For example, program officials deleted 17 years of 
Contractor Logistics Support, reducing potential duplication, and 
deleted 29 training systems. As a result, program officials report that 
procurement cost was reduced by 17 percent. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, the 
Army commented that in January 2004, it directed the acceleration of 
CMWS for deployment on Operation Iraqi Freedom aircraft. Initial 
operational tests and evaluation will be completed during fiscal year 
2005 for CMWS and in fiscal year 2006 for ATIRCM. 

[End of section]

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system 
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with 
federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to a band where the 
B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified radar system is 
being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of 
stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons delivery 
capabilities. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $693.7 million; 
Procurement: $510.6 million; 
Total funding: $1,204.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: 21. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $892.9. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $510.5. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $1,403.5. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $66.832. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 08/2004: 21. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 08/2004: 63. 

[End of table]

The B-2 RMP entered system development in August 2004 with two critical 
technologies mature and two approaching maturity. All critical 
technologies are planned to be mature by the June 2005 design review. 
The program has released 71 percent of its design drawings and plans to 
have 85 to 95 percent released by the June 2005 design review. Program 
officials indicated that production maturity metrics will be formulated 
during development and that these metrics may or may not include 
manufacturing process control data. The program plans to build six 
radar units during development for pilot training with the B-2 
operational wing prior to the planned completion of flight testing. 
Even though these units are necessary, building them early in 
development adds to the risk of later design changes because most of 
the radar flight-test activity will not occur until after these units 
are built. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

B-2 RMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The B-2 RMP entered development in August 2004 with two of four 
critical technologies mature and two others approaching maturity. Last 
year the program reported having two critical technologies, but a 
formal technology readiness assessment conducted in February 2004 
concluded that two additional technologies should be considered 
critical. The additional two technologies, the receiver/exciter for the 
electronic driver cards and aspects of the antenna designed to help 
keep the B-2's radar signature low, are not considered fully mature but 
are approaching maturity. There are no backup technologies for two 
technologies approaching maturity, but both completed their design 
phases in April 2004 and the program office estimates that both will be 
fully mature by the final design review in June 2005. 

Design Stability: 

The program has completed and released 71 percent of its engineering 
drawings to manufacturing. The program office has scheduled the design 
readiness review for June 2005 and plans to have 85 to 95 percent of 
its drawings released by that time. The program, however, does not use 
the release of design drawings as a measure of design maturity but 
instead uses the successful completion of design events, such as 
subsystem design reviews, as its primary measure of design maturity. 

Production Maturity: 

Production maturity metrics are planned to be formulated during 
development. These metrics, which may or may not include manufacturing 
process control data, are planned to be used as measures of progress 
toward production maturity during a production readiness review prior 
to the start of production in February 2007. The program is also 
involved in a proof-of-manufacturing effort to demonstrate that the 
transmit/receive modules can be built to specifications. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program plans to build six radar units during development and later 
modify these units for placement on operational B-2 aircraft. The Air 
Force needs these radar units available when the current B-2 radar 
frequency becomes unavailable, in order to continue air crew training 
and proficiency operations. Even though these units are necessary, 
building them early in development adds risk because most of the radar 
flight-test activity will not occur until after these units are built. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force concurred with this assessment. It commented that the 
program recognizes a level of risk associated with building the six 
development units prior to formal testing in order to satisfy a 
critical schedule constraint. It stated that, as a result, the program 
office has placed a heavy emphasis on risk reduction and that the 
program is progressing well thus far in system development. It further 
commented that it is important to note that these six development units 
are also planned to be used for collection of field level reliability 
and maintainability data. It also noted that the program has 
successfully completed its proof-of-manufacturing effort for the 
transmit/receive modules, has now delivered over 600 modules, and has 
completed and released approximately 70 percent of its engineering 
drawings. 

[End of section]

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and 
avionics for 14 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It 
consolidates and installs the mandated DOD Navigation/Safety 
modifications, the Global Air Traffic Management systems, and the C-130 
broad area review requirements. It also incorporates other reliability, 
maintainability, and sustainability upgrades and provides increased 
situational awareness capabilities and reduces susceptibility of 
Special Operations aircraft to detection/interception. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $815.0 million; 
Procurement: $2,936.1 million; 
Total funding: $3,751.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 479. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2001: $666.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,234.7; 
Percent change: 85.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2001: $2,883.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,936.1; 
Percent change: 1.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2001: $3,549.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $4,170.9; 
Percent change: 17.5%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2001: $6.839; 
Latest 12/2003: $8.512; 
Percent change: 24.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2001: 519; 
Latest 12/2003: 490; 
Percent change: -5.6%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2001: TBD; 
Latest 12/2003: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table]

The C-130 AMP is using primarily commercial and modified off-the-shelf 
technologies, and it entered system development with all but one of its 
six critical technologies mature. The remaining technology is nearing 
full maturity; however, there is concern that it may not meet current 
performance requirements. Program officials reached agreement with the 
user to field a lesser set of requirements equivalent to the current 
capability in fiscal year 2008. Program officials plan to release 90 
percent of engineering drawings by the design review and have made 
progress toward that goal. Currently, 48 percent of the engineering 
drawings are releasable compared to 14 percent a year ago. 
Additionally, the program office recently modified the contract to 
accelerate the installation on Special Operations aircraft by 1 year, 
placing additional pressure on the already compressed schedule. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-130 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Five of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature, as 
the program is primarily utilizing proven commercial and modified off-
the-shelf technology for all AMP capabilities. The remaining critical 
technology, the Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) 
capability, was demonstrated through the Air Force Research Lab's Quiet 
Knight advanced technology demonstration program and is nearing full 
maturity. There is a risk, however, that the TF/TA technology may not 
meet a key requirement to operate at 250 feet. Program officials worked 
with the user to agree on initially fielding TF/TA capability between 
250 and 1,000 feet, which is the current capability of the technology. 
Program officials plan to determine through analysis the residual 
capability of the TF/TA technology to fly lower. However, if such 
capability cannot be achieved, redesign may be necessary or the user 
will have to accept current capability. 

Design Stability: 

The program office has made progress toward meeting its goal of 
releasing 90 percent of the design drawings by design readiness review, 
scheduled for August 2005. This will be 9 months sooner than 
anticipated last year, due to the acceleration of key program dates to 
meet Special Operations Command requirements. Currently, 48 percent of 
the design drawings are complete and could be released to 
manufacturing. Program officials stated they are committed to meeting 
the required 90 percent drawing release by design review. 

The modernization effort is divided into a number of capability spirals 
due to the various aircraft designs. The first spiral will outfit C-130 
aircraft with core capabilities and an integrated defensive system. 
Special Operations C-130 aircraft will be outfitted first, and future 
spirals are planned for these aircraft because they require additional, 
and unique, defensive systems integration and enhanced situational 
awareness. 

Other Program Issues: 

Funding reductions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 
AMP's development program, which resulted in a rescheduling of program 
milestones and rebaselining of the program. The design review, low-rate 
initial production, and production readiness decisions were all 
delayed. While program officials stated that the delay in schedule 
would provide more time to resolve issues with the TF/TA technology and 
software, the delay in fielding was not acceptable to the Special 
Operations Command. They added funding to mature the TF/TA technology 
through a series of flight demonstrations prior to the formal 
developmental test and evaluation period. The system integration 
schedule was compressed by 9 months by accelerating installation of 
core and mission-unique capabilities on Special Operations aircraft; 
however, this allows less time to reduce manufacturing risks and 
further compresses an already optimistic time line. 

The program is also at risk if less software is reused than originally 
estimated, which may cause an increase in development costs and delay 
the program's schedule. Software integration remains a risk due to its 
complexity, number of suppliers, potential for developmental growth, 
certification of a secure operating system, and software safety 
standards. The program office is working to mitigate these risks 
through modeling and simulation, utilizing the systems integration 
laboratory built by the contractor, and through flight demonstrations. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
program officials worked with the user to agree on initially fielding 
TF/TA capability between 250 and 1,000 feet and that an analysis will 
be accomplished to determine residual TF/TA technology capability to 
fly lower. The Air Force also commented that funding reductions in 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 AMP development program. 
It further stated that a delay in fielding MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft 
until fiscal year 2010 was unacceptable to the Special Operations 
Command, which added funding to mature TF/TA technology through flight 
demonstrations prior to a formal developmental test and evaluation 
period. The Air Force also commented that the special operations 
warfighter needs are driving an aggressive schedule. 

[End of section]

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and 
reduce ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic 
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, 
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the 
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the 
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We 
assessed the C-5 AMP. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $10.8 million; 
Procurement: $204.2 million; 
Total funding: $215.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 27. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/1998: $344.6; 
Latest 02/2004: $372.2; 
Percent change: 8.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/1998: $602.8; 
Latest 02/2004: $407.1; 
Percent change: -32.5%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/1998: $947.4; 
Latest 02/2004: $779.3; 
Percent change: -17.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/1998: $7.519; 
Latest 02/2004: $14.169; 
Percent change: 88.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/1998: 126; 
Latest 02/2004: 55; 
Percent change: -56.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/1998: 83; 
Latest 02/2004: 83; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

[End of table]

The program office considers the C-5 AMP's critical technologies and 
design to be mature as they are relying on commercial-off-the-shelf 
technologies that are installed in other commercial and military 
aircraft. The C-5 AMP plans to complete developmental test and 
evaluation in December 2004, a 2 month slip from last year. The main 
challenge to the program is the development and integration of 
software--to which this schedule delay has been attributed. The Air 
Force plans to modify 55 of the 112 C-5 aircraft. The Air Force is also 
seeking funding to modify the remaining 57 C-5s, however, that decision 
will not be made until the Air Force determines the correct mix of C-5 
and C-17 aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift needs. If the Air Force 
decides to use the C-17s, it may not upgrade some, or all, of the 
remaining 57 C-5s. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-5 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the 
program used commercial technologies that are considered mature. 
Program officials stated that those technologies are in use on other 
aircraft and that they have not significantly changed in form, fit, or 
function. For example, the new computer processors are being used in 
the Boeing 777, 717, other commercial aircraft, the KC-10, and a Navy 
reconnaissance aircraft. 

Design Stability: 

The design appears stable as the contractor has released 100 percent of 
the drawings for the AMP. In addition, seven major subsystem-level 
design reviews were completed, and integration activities are currently 
ongoing. Demonstration of these integration activities is scheduled 
during development test and evaluation, which started in December 2002 
and should be completed in December 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity because most components are 
readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf items. This equipment is 
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. In addition, the 
C-5 AMP is incorporating many other off-the-shelf systems and 
equipment, such as the embedded global positioning system, the inertial 
navigation system, and the multifunction control and display units. To 
ensure production maturity, the program office is collecting data 
regarding modification kit availability and the installation schedules. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program officials indicated the greatest risk to the AMP is software 
development and integration. Several new software programs must be 
developed and integrated with several other commercial off-the-shelf 
software packages. According to officials, the 2 month slip in 
development test and evaluation can be attributed to software 
development delays as well as overall systems integration (hardware and 
software) delays. More specifically, program officials stated that the 
two primary causes for delays were (1) the unavailability of systems 
integration facilities, including equipment, simulation software, and 
engineering simulator, and (2) less robust than expected integration 
test scripts and computer software configuration item designs. Program 
officials stated that they have applied lessons learned from the AMP 
experience to the RERP program. The C-5 RERP is assessed elsewhere in 
this report. 

The overall quantity of the C-5 fleet has been reduced from 126 to 112 
due to the retirement of 14 aircraft. The C-5 aircraft must undergo the 
AMP modifications prior to the RERP modifications. However, only 55 
aircraft have been approved for the AMP upgrades, while 112 are 
awaiting the RERP upgrades. The Air Force needs to determine how many 
of the remaining 57 C-5s will receive the AMP upgrades. That decision 
will not be made until it determines the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 
aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift needs. According to program 
officials, the Air Force is currently performing mobility studies that 
will be used to make a mobility mix decision. Until it is decided 
whether to use C-17s to replace some, or all, of the earlier 57 C-5s, 
the number of aircraft to undergo the AMP and RERP modernization will 
remain uncertain. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated 
that the unit cost comparison between the November 1998 and the latest 
AMP position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth. The 
November 1998 position represents the original 126-aircraft program. 
The program has since been restructured to a 55-aircraft program. 
According to the Air Force, such a change would increase unit costs by 
a large amount because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost 
basis, to procure for a greater number of aircraft than it would be to 
procure for fewer aircraft. 

GAO Comments: 

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the November 1998 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes, 
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's 
history. 

[End of section]

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The 
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability of the aircraft through the 
replacement of engines and modifications to subsystems such as the 
electrical, fuel, hydraulic and flight controls systems, while the C-5 
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) is designed to enhance the 
avionics. These upgrades are part of a two-phased modernization effort 
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and 
reduce ownership costs. We assessed the C-5 RERP. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $908.2 million; 
Procurement: $7,565.1 million; 
Total funding: $8,476.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 109. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2001: $1,505.3; 
Latest 02/2004: $1,537.4; 
Percent change: 2.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2001: $7,858.0; 
Latest 02/2004: $7,565.1; 
Percent change: -3.7%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2001: $9,366.5; 
Latest 02/2004: $9,105.9; 
Percent change: -2.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2001: $74.338; 
Latest 02/2004: $81.302; 
Percent change: 9.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2001: 126; 
Latest 02/2004: 112; 
Percent change: -11.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2001: 100; 
Latest 02/2004: 116; 
Percent change: 16.0%. 

[End of table]

The RERP is utilizing demonstrated commercial off-the-shelf components 
that require little or no modification.The program ensured that the 
technology was mature and that the design was stable at critical points 
in development, closely tracking best practice standards. The program 
is currently in system development and plans to enter low-rate 
production in March 2007. The major challenge to the program is 
software development and integration. Also, the program is dependent on 
the number of aircraft approved to undergo the C-5 AMP modernization 
program. Until additional aircraft are approved for the AMP, it is 
uncertain how many aircraft will undergo the RERP. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-5 RERP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent 
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. New engines 
account for 64 percent of the expected improvement in mission 
capability rate for the aircraft. The new engines are commercial jet 
engines currently being used on numerous aircraft. According to the Air 
Force technology assessment, these engines have over 70 million flying 
hours of use. 

Design Stability: 

The C-5 RERP's design is stable. As of November 2003, 98 percent of the 
design drawings were complete. In addition, the seven major subsystem-
level design reviews were completed before the December 2003 system-
level design review. 

According to program officials, the greatest risk to the RERP is 
software development and integration activities. Several new software 
programs must be developed, and these programs as well as other 
commercial off-the-shelf software packages must be integrated. The 
program has experienced software problems in the past and has taken 
actions to improve software activities. The program is taking advantage 
of AMP-developed products and lessons learned in the RERP to reduce the 
risk of schedule slips associated with software development and 
integration. For example, according to program officials, the baseline 
software and systems integration facilities that were developed for the 
AMP will not have to be completely redeveloped for RERP activities. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air 
Force is buying commercially available items. However, we expect that 
production maturity would be at a high level because the engines have 
been commercially available for many years. 

Other Program Issues: 

The C-5 RERP is dependent on the C-5 AMP (assessed elsewhere in this 
report), as the aircraft has to undergo avionics modernization prior to 
other enhancements. Over the past year, software development resources 
that were planned for the RERP were shifted to the AMP to ensure 
completion of its software activities. According to program officials, 
while shifting of resources currently has not caused a significant 
schedule slip to the RERP, they do acknowledge that it will have a 
greater impact on the RERP if the AMP continues to slip and resources 
originally planned for use on the RERP are retained to complete the AMP 
work. 

Due to the retirement of 14 aircraft, the quantity of C-5 RERP aircraft 
was reduced from 126 to 112. Although the RERP program has been 
authorized for 112 aircraft, the avionics modernization has only been 
authorized for 55 aircraft. Therefore, until the Air Force decides on 
how many C-5 aircraft will undergo avionics modernization, it is 
uncertain how many aircraft will undergo the RERP. That decision is 
contingent upon the results of ongoing mobility studies that are 
examining the appropriate mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft for DOD's 
overall airlift needs. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated 
that the unit cost comparison between the November 2001 and the latest 
RERP position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth. 
The November 2001 position represents the original 126-aircraft 
program. The program has since been restructured to a 112-aircraft 
program. It further stated that such a change would increase unit costs 
by a large amount because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost 
basis, to procure for a greater number of aircraft than it would be to 
procure for fewer aircraft. 

GAO Comments: 

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the November 2001 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes, 
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's 
history. 

[End of section]

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC): 

The Navy's CEC is designed to connect radar systems to enhance 
detection and engagement of air targets. Ships and planes equipped with 
their version of CEC hardware and software will share real-time data to 
create composite radar tracks--allowing the battle group to see the 
same radar picture. A CEC-equipped ship can then detect and engage 
targets its radar cannot see. We assessed the current shipboard and 
airborne versions of the CEC. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon Systems Corporation; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $405.3 million; 
Procurement: $1,180.1 million; 
Total funding: $1,585.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 181. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/1995: $1,172.4; 
Latest 06/2004: $2,524.6; 
Percent change: 115.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/1995: $1,308.8; 
Latest 06/2004: $2,171.6; 
Percent change: 65.9%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/1995: $2,528.0; 
Latest 06/2004: $4,696.2; 
Percent change: 85.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/1995: $13.814; 
Latest 06/2004: $16.594; 
Percent change: 20.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/1995: 183; 
Latest 06/2004: 283; 
Percent change: 54.6%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/1995: 16; 
Latest 06/2004: 16; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

[End of table]

The CEC's production maturity could not be assessed because the 
government does not collect the necessary data on the commercially 
available portions of the ship-based and airborne versions of the CEC. 
However, program and contractor officials consider the production 
processes capable of producing a quality product on time and within 
cost. The technologies and design of both the ship-based and airborne 
versions of the CEC are fully mature. In April 2002, the shipboard 
version was approved for full-rate production. The airborne version 
remains in low-rate production and may proceed to full-rate production 
pending a full-rate production decision anticipated in September 2005. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CEC Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All six of the CEC's critical technologies are mature. While the 
shipboard and airborne versions have different hardware, they share the 
same critical technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The CEC's basic design appears stable, as all of the drawings needed to 
build the shipboard and airborne versions have been released to 
manufacturing. Additional drawings for each version continue to be 
released to incorporate advances in commercially available 
technologies, which comprise approximately 60 percent of CEC hardware. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity as data were not available. 
According to program officials, CEC production is mature and 
noncommercial portions do not involve critical manufacturing processes. 
Officials indicated that they do not have insight into whether the 
manufacturing processes for the commercial portions are critical and 
are under statistical control. However, program officials are confident 
that a quality product can be delivered on time and within cost given 
contractor past performance. 

The program office plans to seek full-rate production approval for the 
airborne version in September 2005. During operational testing, the 
airborne version was determined to be operationally effective but not 
operationally suitable. According to the program office, it is 
implementing corrections that will be verified in time to support the 
full-rate production decision. 

Other Program Issues: 

In November 2003, the Navy announced plans to improve CEC 
interoperability by pursuing open architecture and functionality 
changes with the Joint Single Integrated Air Picture Systems 
Engineering Organization (JSSEO). The CEC Program Office discontinued 
planning for a Block 2 development effort and began working with JSSEO 
to jointly engineer sensor measurement and radar tracking management 
solutions that will be available to all services to ensure optimum 
interoperability across the battlespace. The joint track management 
software being developed is intended to interface with CEC software to 
improve data sharing throughout different computing environments and to 
facilitate component upgrades without redesigning the entire system. 

CEC officials consider the joint track management software a technical 
risk since JSSEO is using a relatively new approach for combat system 
software development. The officials also consider it a schedule risk 
that could impact timely delivery of Navy platforms, including the 
DD(X) and the Littoral Combat Ship, which are to be equipped with CEC. 
To mitigate risks, the CEC program manager is closely monitoring joint 
track manager progress to determine whether the software can be 
incorporated into the CEC on schedule. If JSSEO does not deliver an 
acceptable product by September 2005, the Navy plans to continue using 
current CEC software and explore alternatives. 

With discontinuation of a Block 2 effort, the program also initiated a 
preplanned product improvement effort for CEC hardware. This effort 
takes advantage of advances in technology to reduce size, weight, and 
cost without adding new critical technologies. Improved hardware will 
operate with current CEC software and joint track manager software, 
once ready. The program began testing of the improved hardware in 
August 2004 and plans to obtain Office of the Secretary of Defense 
approval for incorporating improvements by October 2005. The program is 
also developing a miniterminal land version for the Marine Corps. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that it 
generally concurred with our assessment but provided clarifying 
comments. Regarding the schedule risk associated with joint track 
management, the Navy stated that it, along with the other services, is 
working with JSSEO to reach agreement on a joint architecture for track 
management, combat identification, and tactical data link integration. 
It explained that the joint architectural agreement will allow 
appropriate existing solutions to be integrated into the joint track 
manager and will be extensible to multiple networks and different 
communication devices. The Navy stated that this will reduce the risk 
of providing joint track management capability in fiscal year 2008. 

[End of section]

CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F): 

The Army's CH-47F heavy lift helicopter is intended to provide 
transportation for tactical vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment, 
personnel, and logistical support equipment. It is also expected to 
operate in both day and night. The program is to enhance performance 
and extend the useful life of the CH-47. This effort includes 
installing a digitized cockpit, rebuilding the airframe, and reducing 
aircraft vibration. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Helicopters; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $0.0 million; 
Procurement: $5,499.9 million; 
Total funding: $5,499.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 314. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/1998: $149.4; 
Latest 12/2003: $172.3; 
Percent change: 15.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/1998: $2,615.9; 
Latest 12/2003: $6,221.3; 
Percent change: 137.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/1998: $2,765.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $6,393.6; 
Percent change: 131.2%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/1998: $9.157; 
Latest 12/2003: $18.860; 
Percent change: 106.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/1998: 302; 
Latest 12/2003: 339; 
Percent change: 12.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/1998: 82; 
Latest 12/2003: 113; 
Percent change: 37.8%. 

[End of table]

CH-47F production maturity could not be assessed as the program is not 
collecting statistical process control data on key manufacturing 
processes. Program officials believe that CH-47F production is low risk 
because no new technology is being inserted into the aircraft, two 
prototypes have been produced, and the production process was 
demonstrated during the delivery of one low-rate initial production 
aircraft. The CH-47F technologies appear mature and the design stable, 
with 100 percent of the engineering drawings released for 
manufacturing. The Army has regained 6 months of a schedule delay 
anticipated when it was directed to produce additional MH-47s for 
special operations. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CH-47F Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess technology maturity or determine the number of 
critical technologies in detail. The CH-47F is a modification of the 
existing CH-47D helicopter. Program officials believe that all critical 
technologies are mature and have been demonstrated prior to integration 
into the CH-47F development program. 

Design Stability: 

The Army completed the CH-47F engineering development and manufacturing 
phase, with 100 percent of the drawings released to manufacturing. 
However, at the design review, only 37 percent of the system's 
engineering drawings were complete. Since that time, the number of 
drawings completed increased substantially. The majority of the new 
drawings were instituted to correct wire routing and installation on 
the aircraft; changes the program office believed could not be 
determined until after the first prototype was delivered. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the CH-47F program does 
not collect statistical process control data on its production of 
helicopters. The program office relies on inspections as its means to 
ensure acceptable production results. 

According to the program office, the CH-47 production is low risk 
because two prototypes have been produced during development and the 
Army recently took delivery of its first low-rate initial production 
aircraft. Further, the program reported that during low-rate 
production, it made significant advances in the development and 
refinement of the system that are designed to increase production 
efficiencies. Advances include the implementation of the automated 
management execution system and the introduction of laser tracking to 
identify key mounting points. These enhancements are geared toward 
improving the manufacturing learning curve. However, the program office 
acknowledges that the program will lose some of the learning benefits 
during the anticipated break in production of the CH-47F in favor of 
producing more MG-47s during the next lot of production. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2002, DOD directed the Army to produce 16 MH-47G aircraft for the 
Special Operations Command before the start of the Army's low-rate 
production for the CH-47F helicopters and to deliver those aircraft as 
soon as possible. The Army initially estimated that this transfer of 16 
aircraft for special operations would result in a 15-month delay in its 
first unit equipped date for the CH-47F. However, according to the 
program office, scheduling issues between the Army and the Special 
Operations Command have been resolved. The Army now estimates that the 
15-month schedule slip has been reduced by about 6 months. The program 
office reported that the CH-47F and MH-47G program strategy has been 
approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive. 

Further, the Army has recently approved the production of additional CH-
47F aircraft in the most recent Program Objective Memorandum 
submission. Additionally, the Army included in this submission an 
escalation of 19 CH-47F aircraft that had previously been scheduled at 
the end of the program. These quantity changes resulted from the recent 
Army Aviation Transformation Group's recommendations. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, it 
commented that the full-rate production decision was approved on 
November 22, 2004, by the Army Acquisition Executive. Further, the 
program was rebaselined to include a revised Acquisition Objective of 
510 aircraft. Details of this rebaselined program will be outlined in 
the December 2004 Selected Acquisition Report. 

[End of section]

Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM): 

The Army's CKEM is a hypervelocity missile designed to provide superior 
lethality against current tanks, bunkers, buildings, and future 
advanced threat armor. It is designed to provide a high rate of fire 
and a high probability of kill beyond the range of tank guns, and at 
half the size and weight of current kinetic energy missiles. The CKEM 
is a potential candidate for use on the current Stryker Brigade and 
Future Combat System vehicles. The Army is currently developing the 
CKEM in an Advanced Technology Demonstration program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin-Missiles and Fire Control; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $63.6 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $63.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $229.2. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $229.2. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 07/2004: NA. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 07/2004: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. 

[End of table]

Program officials believe the CKEM technologies will be mature when the 
program enters system development. The Army is using an advanced 
technology demonstration to develop the CKEM technologies to satisfy 
future Army missile requirements. The technologies have already been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. Work remains to reduce the 
technologies to the right size and show they can withstand the high g-
force environment. Funding inconsistencies and increased costs have 
hampered technology development efforts and increased program risk. 
Program officials expect at least one design change iteration once the 
CKEM enters system development, which could happen in 2006 after full-
scale weapon system flight testing. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CKEM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Although none of its critical technologies are fully mature, the CKEM 
is over a year from entering system development and all four 
technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Program 
officials believe all CKEM critical technologies will be fully mature 
when the program proceeds with system development. The missile's four 
critical technologies are a solid rocket motor, an attitude control 
system, penetrator/lethality mechanisms, and guidance systems. CKEM 
engineers are pioneering many of the system's technologies to satisfy 
future missile requirements, which include reduced infrared signatures, 
longer ranges, nondetonable propellants, and smaller size and weight. 

Existing missile guidance and control components will not satisfy the 
size and weight requirements and will not withstand the g-forces 
potentially exerted by the CKEM. As a result, CKEM developers are 
working to miniaturize existing components and improve tolerances for 
use under greater velocities. The program completed testing of smaller 
guidance and control prototypes in a high g-force environment. 
Engineers are also designing a motor with an increased burn rate, 
advanced materials, and innovative structural designs. They 
successfully tested a new solid-fuel rocket motor, and they plan to 
begin controlled flight testing in April 2005. They also demonstrated 
the missile's lethality against a tank target with advanced armor. 
However, system officials said that additional technology funding is 
needed to fully develop component technologies and produce a missile 
that will meet the size and performance goals. 

Program officials believe they can mature technologies to the point 
that only a single design iteration will be needed to satisfy Army 
objective requirements during system development. They noted that the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology instructed them to forego involvement in the development of 
fire control systems and instead focus solely on missile development. 
This could result in integration problems that would require future 
design changes. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program officials believe that inconsistent funding has hampered 
development efforts. Over the last 3 years, the budget has been reduced 
over $21 million. Those reductions were offset by reprogramming $17 
million back into the program. Initially, competitive contracts were 
awarded to two prime contractors. Citing funding discontinuity and 
higher-than-expected contractor proposals, program officials did not 
exercise an option for the second contractor's continued involvement. 
They also cited funding as the reason the Army suspended international 
cooperative agreements for assistance in developing associated 
technologies. 

The Army has not included a CKEM system development program in its 
future funding plans. Nonetheless, program officials hope to have the 
system ready to transition to system development in late 2006. CKEM 
technologies can also be used to improve existing kinetic energy 
missiles, namely the Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank missile. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with our assessment. 

[End of section]

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft 
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion, 
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability. 
These technologies will allow for increased sortie rates and decreased 
manning rates as compared to existing systems. Many of the technologies 
were intended for the second ship in the class, but they were 
accelerated into the first ship in a December 2002 restructuring of the 
program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,630.8 million; 
Procurement: $24,760.5 million; 
Total funding: $27,391.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $4,125.7. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $26,430.2. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $30,555.9. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $10,185.315. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 04/2004: 3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 04/2004: 183. 

[End of table]

The CVN-21 entered system development in April 2004 with very few of 
its critical technologies fully mature. This is due in part to DOD's 
decision to accelerate the installation of a number of technologies 
from the second ship to the first. The accelerated technologies are at 
much lower levels of maturity. Program officials state that the 
extended construction and design period that ends in 2014 allows 
further time for technology development. Program officials have 
established a risk reduction strategy that includes decision points for 
each technology's inclusion based on a demonstrated maturity level. 
These points coincide with key design milestones and include 
consideration of the fallback use of mature technologies for all but 
two technologies. The program office has stated that those two 
technologies are already mature and operational. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CVN-21 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials reported that 3 of the 14 critical technologies were 
mature at development start and that 4 more were approaching maturity. 
An additional 7 were at much lower levels of readiness. The Navy 
expects that 10 of the 14 technologies will be mature or close to 
mature by the design review in fiscal year 2006. 

Some of the CVN-21 critical technologies are being developed by other 
programs, not by the CVN-21 program. As a result, events in those 
programs could affect the CVN-21 development time line. Those 
technologies are the Volume Search Radar, Multi-Function Radar, 
Advanced Arresting Gear, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and Joint 
Precision Approach and Landing System. CVN-21 program officials 
reported that they are working closely with all critical technology 
leads in those offices to ensure that their time lines are integrated 
with the needs of the CVN-21 program. In case those technologies do not 
mature in time for insertion into the carrier, the CVN-21 program has 
identified existing or fully mature alternate systems as backup 
technologies. 

Since entering development, the program office has added 9 1,100-ton 
air conditioning plants as a critical technology, and has added them to 
the baseline design for the ship. The plants are not near maturity. The 
Navy added the plants because the CVN 21's requirements for chilled 
water are significantly higher than existing aircraft carriers. The 
Navy considers this a low-risk development effort since they are using 
a proven commercial design with upgrades to meet military shock, 
vibration, and noise requirements. 

Two of the four remaining technologies that are not mature, the Omni-
Directional Vehicle and Automated Weapons and Materials Movement 
Technologies, are primarily mobile vehicles that can be accommodated 
late in the design and construction schedule because they are not 
installed as part of the ship. In addition, the Advanced Arresting Gear 
is not near maturity, but according to program officials, it does not 
pose a significant risk to the program because it is located high in 
the ship and as such will be integrated in the latter stages of 
construction. 

Program officials stated that it is not possible to mature some systems 
to the best practices standard this early in development. One such 
system is the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a replacement for 
the current steam catapult system used to launch aircraft off carriers. 
This system has been in development since the late 1990s, but due to 
the size and complexity of the system, a prototype of it cannot be 
tested aboard a surrogate ship. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program cost estimates increased by more than $18 billion over the 
amount reported last year as a result of the development start 
decision, which added a second follow-on ship to the program, for a 
total production run of three ships. Previous estimates were based on a 
single follow-on ship and were not fully developed estimates for the 
entire program. In addition, the cost estimates at development start 
more accurately reflect potential inflation incurred by the shipbuilder 
during design and construction of the ship. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy generally concurred with this assessment and reiterated that 
the time frames for design and construction of an aircraft carrier 
allow for evolving technologies to be brought to the ship later in the 
construction cycle. It stated that if a certain technology does not 
mature in time for ship construction, the technology will be replaced 
by a fall back technology that may not meet projected capability, but 
it will at least be equal to current capability. 

[End of section]

DD(X) Destroyer: 

The Navy's DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to 
provide advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and 
contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. The 
program is currently in the system design phase, and the Navy plans to 
authorize detailed design and construction of the lead ship in March 
2005. The Navy plans to demonstrate the ship's critical technologies by 
building and testing 10 developmental subsystems, referred to as 
engineering development models. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Prog