This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-214 
entitled 'Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture 
from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain' which was 
released on March 9, 2005.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

March 2005: 

Homeland Security: 

Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but 
Important Challenges Remain: 

GAO-05-214: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-214, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

U.S. agriculture generates more than $1 trillion per year in economic 
activity and provides an abundant food supply for Americans and others. 
Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, there are new concerns about the 
vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to the deliberate introduction of 
animal and plant diseases (agroterrorism). Several agencies, including 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Defense 
(DOD), play a role in protecting the nation against agroterrorism. GAO 
examined (1) the federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities to 
protect against agroterrorism, (2) the steps that the agencies have 
taken to manage the risks of agroterrorism, and (3) the challenges and 
problems that remain. 

What GAO Found: 

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal agencies’ 
roles and responsibilities were modified in several ways to help 
protect agriculture from an attack. First, the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 established DHS and, among other things, charged it with 
coordinating U.S. efforts to protect against agroterrorism. The act 
also transferred a number of agency personnel and functions into DHS to 
conduct planning, response, and recovery efforts. Second, the President 
signed a number of presidential directives that further define 
agencies’ specific roles in protecting agriculture. Finally, Congress 
passed legislation that expanded the responsibilities of USDA and HHS 
in relation to agriculture security.

In carrying out these new responsibilities, USDA and other federal 
agencies have taken a number of actions. The agencies are coordinating 
development of plans and protocols to better manage the national 
response to terrorism, including agroterrorism, and, along with several 
states, have conducted exercises to test these new protocols and their 
response capabilities. Federal agencies also have been conducting 
vulnerability assessments of the agriculture infrastructure; have 
created networks of laboratories capable of diagnosing animal, plant, 
and human diseases; have begun efforts to develop a national veterinary 
stockpile that intends to include vaccines against foreign animal 
diseases; and have created new federal emergency coordinator positions 
to help states develop emergency response plans for the agriculture 
sector.

However, the United States still faces complex challenges that limit 
the nation’s ability to respond effectively to an attack against 
livestock. For example, USDA would not be able to deploy animal 
vaccines within 24 hours of an outbreak as called for in a presidential 
directive, in part because the only vaccines currently stored in the 
United States are for strains of foot and mouth disease, and these 
vaccines need to be sent to the United Kingdom (U.K.) to be activated 
for use. There are also management problems that inhibit the 
effectiveness of agencies’ efforts to protect against agroterrorism. 
For instance, since the transfer of agricultural inspectors from USDA 
to DHS in 2003, there have been fewer inspections of agricultural 
products at the nation’s ports of entry. 

Burning Carcasses during the 2001 U.K. Outbreak of Foot and Mouth 
Disease: 

What GAO Recommends: 

To enhance the agencies’ ability to reduce the risk of agroterrorism, 
GAO recommends, among other things, that (1) USDA examine the costs and 
benefits of developing stockpiles of ready-to-use vaccines and (2) DHS 
and USDA determine the reasons for declining agricultural inspections. 
USDA, DHS, and HHS generally agreed with our recommendations. DOD and 
EPA made technical comments but took no position on the report’s 
recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-214.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robert Robinson, 202-512-
3841, Robinsonr@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Federal Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities Were Modified to Protect 
against Agroterrorism: 

Since the Terrorist Attacks of 2001, Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps 
to Manage the Risks of Agroterrorism: 

The United States Still Faces Complex Challenges and Management 
Problems in Protecting against Agroterrorism: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Response: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: List of Experts GAO Consulted and Summary of Observations: 

Appendix III: Animal and Plant Diseases that Pose a Severe Threat to 
Agriculture: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Concentration of Cattle, Chicken, and Corn Production 
in 2002: 

Appendix V: Additional Information on National and Agency-Specific 
Steps Taken to Protect against Agroterrorism: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human 
Services: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: List of Select Animal Diseases Identified by USDA Pursuant to 
the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 as a Severe Threat to the Livestock 
Industry and Human Health: 

Table 2: List of All Plant Diseases Identified by USDA as Severe 
Threats to Plants Pursuant to the Bioterrorism Act of 2002: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Top Hog-Producing States in 2002: 

Figure 2: Top Soybean-Producing States in 2002: 

Figure 3: Agricultural Inspector Transferred to DHS Inspecting Suspect 
Cargo: 

Figure 4: Federal Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities as Defined by 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: 

Figure 5: Game Bird Infected with Exotic Newcastle Disease during the 
2002-2003 Outbreak in California: 

Figure 6: Top Cattle-Producing States in 2002: 

Figure 7: Top Chicken-Producing States in 2002: 

Figure 8: Top Corn-Producing States in 2002: 

Abbreviations: 

APHIS: Animal Plant Health Inspection Service: 

ARS: Agricultural Research Service: 

CBP: Customs and Border Protection: 

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

FDA: Food and Drug Administration: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

FMD: foot and mouth disease: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

HHS: Health and Human Services: 

HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive: 

NVSL: National Veterinary Services Laboratories: 

OIE: Office Internationale des Epizooties: 

PPQ: Plant Protection and Quarantine: 

USDA: United States Department of Agriculture: 

Letter March 8, 2005: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

U.S. agriculture annually generates more than $1 trillion in economic 
activity, including more than $50 billion in exports, and provides an 
abundant and economical supply of food for Americans and others around 
the world.[Footnote 1] Protecting agriculture is therefore critically 
important to the well-being of Americans and the U.S. economy. While 
the United States has never experienced a terrorist attack against 
agriculture, this important industry is vulnerable for a variety of 
reasons, including the relative ease with which livestock and crop 
diseases could be obtained and disseminated. Many of these diseases are 
endemic in other parts of the world and can be extracted from common 
materials, such as soil. Farms in general are easily accessible because 
they are located in rural areas and have minimal security, especially 
crop farms. Moreover, the highly concentrated breeding and rearing 
practices of our livestock industry make it a vulnerable target for 
terrorists because diseases could spread rapidly and be very difficult 
to contain. For example, between 80 and 90 percent of grain-fed beef 
cattle production is concentrated in less than 5 percent of the 
nation's feedlots. Therefore, the deliberate introduction of a highly 
contagious animal disease in a single feedlot could have serious 
economic consequences.

Most experts believe that the major effect of an attack on agriculture 
would be economic.[Footnote 2] While many animal diseases are not 
transmissible to humans, others are, and when this occurs there could 
be serious human health consequences. For example, one of these 
transmissible diseases, avian influenza, has caused 42 human deaths in 
Asia since January 2004, when accidental outbreaks infected poultry 
flocks. Experts also believe that livestock and poultry are more likely 
to be targets of a terrorist attack than crops because deliberately 
spreading plant diseases is inherently more difficult, requiring, among 
other things, favorable weather conditions such as wind. One scenario 
of particular concern is the intentional introduction of foot and mouth 
disease, a highly contagious livestock disease that does not typically 
affect humans. The 2001 accidental outbreak of the disease in the 
United Kingdom caused approximately $5 billion dollars in losses to the 
food and agriculture sector, as well as comparable losses in the 
tourism industry. By the time this disease was eradicated, over 4 
million animals had been slaughtered and burned, and the nation was 
banned from exporting livestock and animal products that could transmit 
the virus. Numerous other animal and plant diseases are also of 
concern, including classical swine fever and soybean rust. Appendix III 
provides information on the animal and plant diseases of primary 
concern that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) believes could 
be used in an attack against agriculture.

In 1998, we reported that the United States did not have a process in 
place to detect and respond to a terrorist attack against agriculture 
and that if such an attack were to occur, the country would rely on the 
process used to respond to naturally occurring diseases.[Footnote 3] 
Specifically, we reported that USDA--the agency primarily responsible 
for responding to major outbreaks of disease involving livestock, 
poultry, and crops--lacked a comprehensive, national strategy for 
responding to a widespread attack. Among the problems we identified 
were concerns about the ability of farmers, local veterinarians, and 
other experts to detect, correctly identify, and report cases of 
disease in a timely manner.[Footnote 4] We also found that some states 
had not developed or tested emergency response plans.

Since we last reported, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
have heightened concerns about agriculture's vulnerability to 
terrorism, including the deliberate introduction of livestock, poultry, 
and crop diseases. Attacks targeted at agriculture are commonly 
referred to as agroterrorism. For the purposes of this report, 
"agroterrorism" refers to the deliberate introduction of animal and 
plant diseases at the farm level, prior to further processing or 
production. Although other definitions of agroterrorism can be broader 
and include the entire food chain, our definition does not refer to the 
deliberate contamination of manufactured food items, which was outside 
the scope of this review. In this context, you asked that we address 
(1) changes that have taken place since September 2001 in the roles and 
responsibilities of federal agencies to protect against agroterrorism, 
(2) specific steps that the United States has taken to manage the risks 
of agroterrorism, and (3) what challenges and problems remain.

To identify the changes in agencies' roles and responsibilities to 
protect against agroterrorism, we reviewed laws, regulations, and 
presidential directives prior to and after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. We also interviewed officials from the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS); the USDA; the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA)[Footnote 5] and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Department of Defense (DOD); 
and the Department of Justice. To examine the specific steps that the 
United States has taken to manage the risks of agroterrorism, we 
reviewed and analyzed unclassified agency documents and contacted 
federal and state offices of Inspectors General to assess what work has 
been done in relation to agroterrorism.[Footnote 6] We also conducted 
structured interviews in person or via telephone with officials in five 
states, selected in part for their leading role in producing 
agricultural commodities sold before processing. These officials 
included representatives from state departments of agriculture, 
emergency management, and homeland security offices; agricultural 
inspectors from DHS and USDA; and veterinarians, plant health, and 
other officials from regional USDA and FDA offices. We examined the 
steps taken by the agencies in the context of our work on homeland 
security risk management.[Footnote 7] To determine what challenges may 
remain, we conducted structured interviews with experts from academia, 
private think tanks, and other research institutions. We also reviewed 
an extensive body of relevant literature, attended conferences, and 
spoke with industry and agency officials. Additional details about the 
scope and methodology of our review are presented in appendix I. We 
conducted our review from February 2004 through January 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief: 

Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, federal agencies' roles and 
responsibilities have been modified to protect against agroterrorism. 
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS was established and 
charged with responsibility for coordinating national efforts to 
protect against terrorism, including agroterrorism. As a result of this 
legislation, DHS also assumed responsibility for certain functions 
previously performed by other agencies, and some personnel who 
performed those functions were transferred to DHS. For example, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), including its personnel, 
was transferred to DHS which gave it the responsibility for planning 
for emergencies and major disasters. Most of USDA's agricultural 
inspectors were transferred to DHS, although USDA retains some 
functions related to inspecting agricultural products, such as 
conducting specialized inspections; developing and supervising 
training; and developing policies and procedures. This transfer gave 
DHS the role to prevent the entry of infectious diseases and pests into 
the United States. As a part of this transfer, DHS and USDA signed an 
interagency memorandum of agreement that, among other things, 
authorized USDA to request the use of DHS inspectors during a major 
outbreak--whether intentional or natural--of agricultural pests and 
diseases. Also, a number of presidential directives were issued that 
further define agencies' roles and responsibilities for protecting 
against agroterrorism. For example, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD)-9 defines how the various agencies will work together 
to protect the agriculture and food industries. Legislation has also 
expanded the responsibilities of USDA and HHS. Specifically, through 
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 (the "Bioterrorism Act of 2002"), USDA and HHS gained 
authority to regulate agents and toxins that pose a serious threat to 
public health, animals, plants, and animal and plant products. The 
agencies believe these agents could be used in a terrorist attack.

In carrying out their new roles and responsibilities, federal agencies 
have taken steps to better manage the risks of agroterrorism, including 
development of national plans and the adoption of standard protocols. 
For example, DHS led the development of a National Response Plan that, 
for the first time, spells out how the nation would work together in 
the event of a terrorist attack on its critical infrastructure sectors, 
including agriculture. In addition, federal agencies have adopted 
standard protocols for managing such emergencies and, through federal 
grants, have provided incentives for states to adopt similar protocols. 
Among other things, these protocols include establishing emergency 
operation centers and a chain of command. To test these protocols and 
response capability in general, federal and state officials are 
conducting test exercises. At the federal level, a number of other 
agency-specific actions are also under way, including the following: 

* FDA and USDA are in varying stages of conducting vulnerability 
assessments to determine which agricultural products are most 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

* USDA and HHS are enhancing their diagnostic and monitoring capability 
by creating laboratory networks.

* Agencies have formed numerous working groups to protect agriculture. 
For example, DHS created a Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating 
Council to help the federal government and industry share ideas about 
how to mitigate the risk of an attack on agriculture. DHS recently 
created a Government Coordinating Council to oversee the tasks of the 
various working groups.

* USDA has established a steering committee to guide efforts to develop 
a National Veterinary Stockpile that, among other things, is intended 
to address what vaccines are needed to respond to animal diseases most 
damaging to human health and the economy.

* DHS, USDA, and HHS have funded research to address a range of issues 
related to agroterrorism. For example, DHS provided $33 million in 2004 
to establish two university-based Centers of Excellence to oversee 
research on post-harvest food protection and on diseases that affect 
livestock and poultry.

* USDA created 16 Area and Regional Emergency Coordinator positions to 
help states develop individual emergency response plans and to serve as 
a technical resource for states, industry, and other stakeholders.

While these actions are important and necessary steps, the United 
States still faces several complex challenges that limit the nation's 
ability to quickly and effectively respond to a widespread attack on 
livestock and poultry: 

* Many United States' veterinarians lack training needed to recognize 
the signs of foreign animal diseases. According to a 2004 report 
produced for USDA, while all U.S. veterinary schools offer information 
about foreign animal diseases, only about 26 percent of their graduates 
have taken a course specifically dedicated to foreign animal diseases. 
Furthermore, foreign animal disease training is not required for USDA- 
accredited veterinarians, the ones most likely to be called upon if 
livestock were attacked. Two years ago, USDA drafted a rule to make 
such training a prerequisite for accreditation, but other draft rules 
have taken precedence and caused it to be delayed.

* USDA does not use rapid diagnostic tools to test animals at the site 
of an outbreak. They employ this technology only within selected 
laboratories. According to experts, on-site use of these tools is 
critical to speeding diagnosis, containing the disease, and minimizing 
the number of animals that need to be slaughtered. DOD uses rapid 
diagnostic tools to identify disease agents on the battlefield, but 
USDA officials consider this technology to be still under development. 
Nevertheless, USDA officials told us that they agree it is important to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of developing and validating these 
tools for use outside of a laboratory setting.

* Vaccines cannot be deployed within 24 hours of an outbreak as called 
for in HSPD-9. First, supplies are limited because USDA maintains 
vaccines for only one foreign animal disease--foot and mouth disease-- 
since this disease is so highly contagious. USDA generally prefers to 
immediately slaughter diseased animals rather than to vaccinate them. 
Also, these vaccines cannot be rapidly deployed because they are not 
stored in a "ready-to-use" state and would first need to be sent to the 
United Kingdom for bottling and testing. USDA officials told us that it 
has recently established a steering committee that will address vaccine 
stockpiling issues, but it is not clear that the committee will address 
the costs and benefits of developing ready-to-use vaccines that can be 
quickly deployed against animal diseases of primary concern.

* Current USDA policy requires a complex process for deciding if and 
when to use vaccines--a process that could be too lengthy during an 
attack. USDA officials agree that they can explore the possibility of 
designing a more rapid decision-making process but cautioned this 
process is complex and takes into consideration many variables, such as 
the location of outbreaks in relation to susceptible animal 
populations, as well as trade concerns and restrictions.

We also found several management problems that reduce the effectiveness 
of the agencies' routine efforts to protect against agroterrorism.

* Agricultural inspections at ports of entry--the first line of defense 
against the entry of foreign animal and plant diseases--have declined 
over the past 2 years at a time when imports have increased. Neither 
USDA nor DHS officials can fully explain why this drop occurred. Since 
the transfer of most USDA agricultural inspectors to DHS, data show a 
decline in the number of agricultural inspections at ports of entry 
nationwide from 40.9 million in fiscal year 2002, when USDA was fully 
responsible for agricultural inspections, to 37.5 million in fiscal 
year 2004, when DHS had primary responsibility. However, officials 
pointed out some factors that may be contributing to this reduction, 
most importantly, the large number of unfilled vacancies for 
agricultural inspectors. DHS officials told us they plan to address 
this shortage by hiring more than 500 inspectors by fiscal year 2006, 
but also stated that the ability to hire and deploy new inspectors is 
impeded by the length of time needed for background checks. Inspectors 
also told us that another factor contributing to the decline in 
inspections is that they do not always receive timely information about 
high-risk cargo that needs to be inspected. While DHS officials told us 
these instances represent a small fraction of inspections, they agreed 
that changes can be made to improve the flow of information.

* There are weaknesses regarding the flow of critical information among 
key stakeholders. First, DHS is not promptly and effectively seeking 
input from key stakeholders on critical national guidance documents. 
For example, officials in key agricultural states and industry 
representatives told us that DHS did not give them enough time to 
review and comment on draft federal guidance, including the National 
Response Plan. As a result, state officials and industry 
representatives we spoke with are concerned that the response plan may 
set unrealistic expectations regarding the states' capabilities to meet 
the requirements of the plan. Second, "after-action" reports on the 
results of national and state-level test exercises that simulate the 
consequences of a major agroterrorism event and test the response 
capabilities needed to manage such an event, are not systematically 
shared among key stakeholders. DHS officials told us that they are 
developing a Homeland Security Information Network that could 
facilitate sharing this information.

* States are not receiving sufficient technical federal assistance in 
developing emergency response plans and other activities to effectively 
prepare them to deal with agroterrorism. This lack of assistance 
results in part from implementation problems associated with the Area 
and Regional Emergency Coordinators positions--USDA has not yet filled 
all 16 of these positions. USDA officials told us they face 
difficulties hiring these coordinators due to the extensive travel 
required since each coordinator must cover a broad geographic area. 
Federal and state officials we interviewed told us that, even if the 
vacancies were filled, the current number of emergency coordinators is 
insufficient, as each coordinator is responsible for up to 6 states on 
the animal health side and 27 states on the plant side.

* Shortcomings exist in DHS' coordination of federal working groups and 
research efforts. Although DHS has lead responsibility for coordinating 
efforts to protect against agroterrorism, officials from other agencies 
told us that the tasks assigned to various interagency working groups 
are not consistent with activities outlined in national guidance, 
including important documents such as the National Response Plan. This 
could lead to confusion and undermine the efforts of "national" 
planning. DHS has also not developed controls to coordinate research 
efforts with other agencies, even though HSPD-9 specifically designates 
DHS as the agency responsible for coordinating research efforts to 
protect against agroterrorism. For example, some of the DHS-supported 
activities at the Centers of Excellence, such as vaccine research, 
appear to duplicate research conducted by USDA. USDA officials told us 
they agree that there needs to be more coordination and cooperation 
between USDA and DHS on research activities.

* Finally, while steps are being taken to integrate agencies' 
diagnostic laboratory networks, USDA has not yet integrated the 
databases of the member laboratories within its own networks, nor have 
they integrated with HHS laboratories for diseases of common concern. 
As a result, USDA's ability to look at diagnostic data from across the 
country, detect trends, and implement a response is limited, and HHS 
may not receive timely information from USDA on agricultural diseases 
that could spread to humans. USDA plans to integrate information from 
its laboratory networks for diseases of concern by mid-2005 and has 
established an interagency working group with HHS to discuss 
integrating their respective laboratory networks.

We are making several recommendations aimed at improving agencies' 
efforts to mitigate and quickly and effectively respond to a widespread 
attack on animal agriculture and to address routine management problems 
that impair the agencies' ability to protect against agroterrorism in 
general. For example, we are recommending that the Secretary of 
Agriculture, within the context of the agency's overall risk management 
efforts, expedite the review and issuance of the draft rule on USDA's 
accreditation process for veterinarians, which would require training 
in recognizing foreign animal diseases; evaluate the costs and benefits 
of using rapid diagnostic tools at the site of an outbreak; examine the 
cost and benefits of developing stockpiles of ready-to-use vaccines 
that can be quickly deployed against animal diseases of primary 
concern; and simplify the decision-making process for determining if 
and/or when to use vaccines to control an outbreak to ensure that rapid 
decisions can be made in the event of a terrorist attack. We are also 
recommending that the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security 
work together to analyze agricultural inspections data to identify 
reasons for the decline in agricultural inspections and areas for 
improvement.

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA, DHS, and HHS generally 
concurred with the report's recommendations. USDA said that it found 
the report offered a number of insightful and appropriate 
recommendations but also raised some concerns regarding rapid 
diagnostic tools and vaccines. DHS noted that it was in the process of 
implementing several corrective actions in response to our report. HHS 
welcomed the attention to animal diseases. The agencies also provided 
additional information, comments, and clarifications on the report's 
findings that we have addressed as appropriate throughout the report. 
DOD and EPA took no position on the report's contents but provided 
minor technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

Background: 

Experts believe that the deliberate introduction of animal and plant 
diseases at the farm level would cause severe economic disruption given 
that agriculture accounts for 13 percent of the U.S. gross domestic 
product and 18 percent of domestic employment. In the event of 
agroterrorism, losses to farmers could result from decreases in the 
price of livestock, poultry, and crops; reductions in sales due to a 
decline or halt in productivity; inability to move animals to the 
market; and costs associated with disease control, including disposal 
of contaminated animals or plants. Losses could be particularly severe 
in states where animal and crop production is concentrated. For 
example, three states produce 53 percent of the total U.S. hog 
production and three states produce 39 percent of the total U.S. 
soybean production.[Footnote 8] (See figs. 1 and 2.) Substantial losses 
could also arise from halting exports; the value of U.S. agricultural 
exports in fiscal year 2003 exceeded $56 billion.

Figure 1: Top Hog-Producing States in 2002: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Three states did not disclose their information.

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: Top Soybean-Producing States in 2002: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Nine states do not produce soybeans. Six states did not disclose 
their information.

[End of figure] 

USDA has primary responsibility for protecting the agriculture sector. 
Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is 
responsible for protecting America's animals and plants from 
agricultural pests and diseases. APHIS's Veterinary Services operates 
the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), which is 
responsible for activities such as training and approving personnel 
from state and university diagnostic laboratories to conduct diagnostic 
tests for foreign animal diseases. NVSL is composed of four facilities, 
three of which are located in Ames, Iowa. The fourth, the Foreign 
Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, is located at the Plum Island 
Animal Disease Center off the coast of New York. The Plum Island Animal 
Disease Center also houses the North American Foot and Mouth Disease 
Vaccine Bank.[Footnote 9] Regarding plant health, APHIS' Plant 
Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) program is responsible for safeguarding 
crops from pests and diseases.[Footnote 10]

USDA also supports research into protecting the agricultural sector. 
USDA's Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service 
funds university-based agricultural research, including research on 
agricultural biosecurity. In addition, USDA's in-house research agency, 
the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), conducts research in fields 
that complement homeland security efforts, such as the development of 
vaccines. The Agricultural Research Service also conducts research at 
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.

USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service is responsible for the safety 
of meat, poultry, and certain egg products, while FDA is responsible 
for shell eggs, seafood, and milk. In fiscal year 2003, USDA received 
approximately $495 million for homeland security activities, which 
included those that address agroterrorism and other routine USDA 
programs. FDA received approximately $160 million in fiscal year 2003 
for homeland security efforts, including protecting against 
agroterrorism.

Other federal agencies play a part in protecting the agriculture 
sector. Examples include: 

* If an outbreak of zoonotic disease--that is, a disease that can 
infect and possibly cause death to both animals and humans--occurs, CDC 
becomes involved to help control the spread of the disease and minimize 
the impact of the outbreak.

* In the event of a disease outbreak, EPA provides technical support to 
federal and state agencies and the private sector to ensure protection 
of land, drinking water, and air from potential contamination 
associated with the disposal of diseased animal carcasses and infected 
plant material. EPA is also responsible for reviewing and approving the 
use of pesticides to prevent the spread of crop and animal diseases, 
both during an emergency and for prevention purposes.

* In the event of an agricultural emergency that USDA cannot handle 
alone, DOD provides veterinarians from its Veterinary Corps to USDA 
under a Memorandum of Understanding. In addition, the U.S. Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Maryland, 
conducts research designed to help protect soldiers from diseases, 
including many that are zoonotic and may be potential agroterrorism 
threats.

International organizations also play a role, particularly the Office 
Internationale des Epizooties (OIE), an organization headquartered in 
Paris, France, that has 166 member countries, including the United 
States.[Footnote 11] OIE classifies member countries or certain zones 
within these countries as being disease-free if they meet certain 
criteria detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code. The 
international community generally places a high value on products from 
countries that OIE classifies as disease-free without the use of 
vaccination. Such countries can export both live animals and animal 
products easily to other countries. In contrast, countries that are 
classified as disease-free but who use vaccines are restricted in their 
ability to trade. Most countries that are foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
- free without vaccination resort to a "stamping out," or cull and 
burn, process to eradicate the disease. The United Kingdom followed 
this process during the FMD outbreak in 2001. As a member state of OIE, 
the United States would also generally follow this process.[Footnote 12]

Federal Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities Were Modified to Protect 
against Agroterrorism: 

Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, Congress and the President 
modified the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies to better 
protect against agroterrorism. Congress passed the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002,[Footnote 13]establishing the Department of Homeland 
Security as the chief coordinating agency for efforts to protect the 
United States from terrorist acts, including agroterrorism. To outline 
agency goals and tasks for protecting against agroterrorism, the 
President issued four Homeland Security Presidential Directives. 
Congress also passed legislation that clarifies USDA's responsibilities 
over agriculture and food security.

The Department of Homeland Security Is Responsible for Coordinating 
Efforts to Protect against Agroterrorism and Has Absorbed Staff and 
Functions from Other Agencies: 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland 
Security and assigned the new agency lead coordinating responsibility 
for protecting the nation against terrorist acts, including 
agroterrorism. The act transferred functions and personnel from other 
agencies to DHS, which allowed it to accomplish this role. For example, 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the functions and 
personnel of FEMA, which had been responsible for mitigating, planning 
for, and responding to natural emergencies and major disasters, into 
DHS to support the new agency's responsibility for protecting the 
United States from terrorist attacks. In addition, DHS is responsible 
for consolidating federal response plans for various emergencies, 
including agroterrorism, into a single coordinated plan, which is 
called the National Response Plan. DHS is also responsible, through 
FEMA, for providing emergency response to terrorist attacks, including 
managing the response, coordinating federal response resources, and 
aiding recovery.[Footnote 14] Under federal law, once the President 
makes an official declaration of an emergency or a major disaster, DHS 
is authorized to direct federal agencies to support state and local 
efforts; coordinate relief assistance; provide technical and advisory 
assistance to state and local governments for management, control, and 
reduction of immediate threats to public health and safety; and provide 
financial assistance.[Footnote 15]

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred most of USDA's 
responsibility for conducting agricultural import inspections to DHS, 
which provided DHS with the capability to recognize and prevent the 
entry of organisms that may be used for agroterrorism. The act also 
authorized the transfer of no more than 3,200 inspector positions from 
USDA's Plant Protection and Quarantine Unit to DHS.[Footnote 16] DHS 
and USDA signed an interagency Memorandum of Agreement that, among 
other things, further clarified the responsibilities of both agencies 
at the border. Pursuant to this agreement, USDA may request the use of 
DHS inspectors during a major animal or plant health incident of 
national significance--whether intentional or natural.[Footnote 17] DHS 
acquired USDA's authority to inspect passenger declarations and cargo 
manifests, international passengers, baggage, cargo, and 
conveyances,[Footnote 18] and hold suspect articles for quarantine to 
prevent the introduction of plant or animal diseases. (See fig. 3.) 
USDA retained its traditional authorities to conduct veterinary 
inspections of live, imported animals; establish policy for inspections 
and quarantine functions; provide risk analysis; develop and supervise 
training on agriculture for DHS and USDA inspectors; conduct 
specialized inspections of plant or pest material; and identify 
agricultural pests. Under DHS' usual practices, a DHS inspector who 
comes across a questionable agricultural product should hold it and 
turn the item over to USDA inspectors for a more thorough analysis of 
its potential threat to U.S. agriculture.

Figure 3: Agricultural Inspector Transferred to DHS Inspecting Suspect 
Cargo: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also consolidated research efforts in 
chemical, biological, and nuclear defense by transferring a number of 
research facilities to DHS, including USDA's Plum Island Animal Disease 
Center. The center is the only place in the United States where certain 
highly infectious foreign animal diseases are studied, including FMD. 
Since the transfer, DHS has assumed responsibility for the security and 
management of the facility. Although USDA still administers its own 
research and diagnostic programs on the island, DHS and USDA have 
established a Senior Leadership group at the center to integrate 
research efforts in general and to coordinate the management for joint 
research projects. For example, this group integrates USDA and DHS 
research efforts on FMD.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness and its grant-making functions from the Department of 
Justice's Office of Justice Programs to DHS.[Footnote 19] This transfer 
established DHS as the primary source of much federal homeland security 
funding to state and local governments. In fiscal year 2005, DHS will 
distribute formula and discretionary grants to the states through the 
Homeland Security Grant Program.[Footnote 20] These grants have 2-year 
performance periods and support expenditures, which include planning, 
organizing, equipment, training, test exercises, and management and 
administration. DHS gives states the flexibility to choose which 
emergency "disciplines"--such as law enforcement, hazardous material 
response, and public works--to fund, using the grants. Most DHS grant 
programs require states to obligate not less than 80 percent of the 
total grant award to local units of government.[Footnote 21] In the 
program application kit, DHS provides guidance on the types of 
expenditures that are allowable. Beginning in fiscal year 2004, DHS 
provided states with examples of resources, which could be acquired 
with grant funds for prevention, response, and recovery efforts related 
to agricultural and/or food security preparedness. These resources 
include agricultural response equipment, and agriculture-related test 
exercises and training.

Finally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate in DHS and 
transferred intelligence, law enforcement, and vulnerability assessment 
functions from other agencies into the directorate.[Footnote 22] 
Congress and the President have tasked DHS, through this directorate, 
with developing a comprehensive national plan to secure critical 
infrastructure sectors of the United States. Accordingly, DHS has 
developed its interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which 
includes strategies for securing the agriculture sector. In addition to 
developing the plan, DHS is responsible for assessing and identifying 
the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland based on 
information received and analyzed by other government agencies. To do 
so, DHS receives information from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, 
the Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies and 
assesses whether the combined information indicates a threat to 
critical infrastructures.

Presidential Directives Define Agency Responsibilities for Protecting 
against Agroterrorism: 

Following the creation of DHS, the President issued four directives 
that further define agencies' roles and responsibilities for protecting 
against terrorism. The most important of these directives in relation 
to agriculture is HSPD-9, which was released in January 2004. The 
directive establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and 
food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies. Specifically, HSPD-9 outlines goals and assigns lead and 
supporting roles to agencies to achieve these goals. (See fig. 4.) 
There are seven categories outlined in HSPD-9: awareness and warning; 
vulnerability assessments; mitigation strategies; response planning and 
recovery; outreach and professional development; research and 
development; and budget. Federal agencies, especially DHS, USDA, and 
HHS, are assigned lead responsibilities to achieve the stated goals. To 
accomplish the tasks outlined in the seven categories, lead agencies 
often must coordinate with secondary or supporting agencies and, in 
some instances, with states and private industry as well. For example, 
HSPD-9 directs DHS to improve awareness and warning capabilities by 
coordinating with other agencies to develop a biological threat 
awareness capacity that will enhance detection and characterization of 
agroterrorism. The directive also designates DHS as the lead agency in 
ensuring that the combined federal, state, and local response 
capabilities are adequate to respond quickly to a terrorist attack or 
other emergencies affecting agriculture or food. HSPD-9 also directs 
DHS to oversee a national biological surveillance system that will 
combine surveillance information collected from several agencies with 
threat and intelligence information to allow DHS to characterize 
threats more quickly. According to DHS officials, this interagency 
effort will help them differentiate between natural and intentional 
outbreaks.

Likewise, HSPD-9 assigns lead tasks to USDA and HHS for agriculture and 
food matters, respectively. Specific tasks for USDA and HHS include 
developing safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture laboratories 
that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal 
and zoonotic diseases.[Footnote 23] Also under HSPD-9, USDA and HHS, in 
coordination with EPA and DHS, are the lead agencies responsible for 
improving existing recovery systems that will stabilize agriculture 
production and rapidly remove and dispose of contaminated animals, 
plants, and food products, and decontaminate premises following an 
agroterrorism attack.

Figure 4: Federal Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities as Defined by 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

HSPD-9 builds upon and augments tasks outlined in prior Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives. HSPD-5 directs DHS to coordinate 
development of the new National Response Plan that incorporates 
national prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a 
single, all-hazard plan. USDA, in collaboration with other agencies 
including DHS, were tasked with writing the sections of the National 
Response Plan guiding U.S. efforts to respond to an attack on U.S. 
agriculture. HSPD-5 also directs DHS to consult with other federal 
agencies, state, and local governments to implement a common National 
Incident Management System, which standardizes planning, 
communications, and public information during an incident in which 
multiple federal and state agencies are involved. A key component of 
the National Incident Management System is the Incident Command System, 
which is designed to allow multiple agencies to coordinate the command, 
operations, planning, logistics, finances, and administration during an 
incident. HSPD-5 further directs agencies to require the adoption of 
the National Incident Management System as a condition for states to 
receive federal preparedness assistance.

HSPD-7 defines USDA and HHS as "sector-specific agencies" with 
responsibilities for securing the agriculture and food sectors. These 
agencies, in coordination with DHS, are tasked with collaborating with 
federal, local, and state governments, as well as private industry and 
other stakeholders to help protect their respective critical 
infrastructure sectors, including agriculture. Among other things, HSPD-
7 directs DHS to establish systems, mechanisms, and procedures to share 
homeland security information relevant to threats and vulnerabilities 
in critical infrastructures with other federal departments and 
agencies, state and local governments, and private industry in a timely 
manner.

Finally, HSPD-8 sets out a national preparedness goal for all hazards, 
including agriculture. The directive calls on federal agencies to 
establish readiness priorities, to deliver federal assistance to state 
and local governments effectively and expeditiously, and to ensure that 
first responders are prepared to respond to major events. The directive 
outlines criteria for federal preparedness assistance to the states 
based on assessments of population concentrations, critical 
infrastructure, and other risk factors such as terrorism threats.

Other Legislation Has Expanded USDA's and HHS's Traditional 
Responsibilities to Protect against Agroterrorism: 

The traditional responsibilities of USDA and HHS have been augmented 
through Congress' passage of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002.[Footnote 24] 
This act made USDA and HHS responsible for requiring companies, 
laboratories, and other entities to register materials that could be 
dangerous to agriculture production and human health. It also required 
USDA and HHS to develop an inventory of potentially dangerous agents 
and toxins that cause animal, plant, or human diseases. Furthermore, 
individuals who possess or use such materials must register with the 
Secretary of Agriculture or HHS and submit to a background check by the 
U.S. Attorney General. Also, the act directed USDA and HHS to take a 
number of steps to improve surveillance for such materials. 
Specifically, the act directed USDA and HHS to coordinate surveillance 
activities to detect zoonotic diseases. The act also authorized USDA to 
conduct and support research into the development of an agricultural 
bioterrorism early warning system. The system would enhance the 
capacity of and coordination between state veterinary diagnostic 
laboratories, federal and state agricultural research facilities, and 
public health agencies. The act also gave USDA the authority to 
coordinate with the intelligence community to better identify research 
needs and evaluate materials or information acquired by the 
intelligence community relating to potential threats to U.S. 
agriculture.

Since the Terrorist Attacks of 2001, Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps 
to Manage the Risks of Agroterrorism: 

In carrying out their new roles and responsibilities, federal agencies 
have taken steps to manage the risks of agroterrorism, including the 
development of a comprehensive national strategy that did not exist 
before September 11, 2001. As part of this strategy, DHS has overseen 
the development of national plans and the adoption of standard 
protocols that will help agencies coordinate in protecting against and 
responding to agroterrorism. Federal and state officials are also 
conducting joint exercises to test the new plans and protocols. In 
addition, federal agencies are taking a number of specific actions to 
protect against agroterrorism, including those summarized as follows.

National Plans Are Being Prepared, Emergency Protocols Have Been 
Adopted, and Test Exercises Are Being Conducted: 

DHS coordinated with other agencies to create an interim "National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan" to guide the efforts of federal, state, 
and local governments and private industry to protect critical 
infrastructure sectors, including agriculture, against terrorist 
attacks.[Footnote 25] The overall plan incorporates sector-specific 
plans that include processes, guidance, and mitigation strategies that 
address how DHS and other agencies will work with state and local 
governments, private industry, and foreign governments to safeguard the 
sectors. Additionally, the plan includes initiatives for sharing 
warning data with state and local governments and the private sector. 
(See app. V for more details about these plans.)

To outline how the nation will respond in the aftermath of an emergency 
or major disaster such as a terrorist attack, DHS released a "National 
Response Plan" in January 2005. The National Response Plan differs from 
earlier federal emergency plans in that it describes the roles and 
outlines the responsibilities for federal, state, and local responders 
in addressing the national response to outbreaks or other emergencies 
in the food and agriculture sector. DHS coordinated with USDA, HHS, and 
EPA to develop the appendixes contained in the plan that pertain to 
protecting agriculture and the food supply in emergencies, from first 
detection to the response and recovery phase.[Footnote 26]

To further improve the response to emergencies such as agroterrorism, 
DHS established the "National Incident Management System" in March 
2004. A key component of the National Incident Management System is the 
"Incident Command System," which is designed to coordinate the 
communication, personnel, and procedures of different agencies and 
levels of government within a common organizational structure during an 
emergency that requires the resources of multiple federal, state, and 
local responders. HSPD-5 directs federal agencies to require that 
states become compliant with the National Incident Management System in 
fiscal year 2005 as a condition for receiving federal grant aid for 
emergency preparedness. To support this directive, DHS has established 
a number of minimum requirements for states to implement during fiscal 
year 2005. A DHS official noted that as of December 2004, most states 
had already implemented the Incident Command System and other 
components of the National Incident Management System. (See app. V for 
more information on the National Incident Management System.)

To test response capability, including aspects of the National Incident 
Management System, federal and state agencies have collaborated in 
conducting test exercises to simulate outbreaks of foreign animal and 
plant diseases. For example, USDA, along with numerous other agencies, 
conducted a 1-day exercise in September 2002 called "Crimson Sky," 
which simulated the intentional introduction of the FMD virus in five 
different locations across the United States. Exercises have also been 
conducted to test response capability to address plant diseases. For 
example, USDA and Minnesota, with the assistance of Iowa,[Footnote 27] 
simulated an outbreak of soybean rust using the Incident Command System 
in September 2004. Two months later, there was an apparently natural 
outbreak of soybean rust in Louisiana and other southern states, and 
USDA officials told us that the lessons learned from the test exercise 
in coordinating their communications were incorporated in response to 
the real outbreak. Federal, state, and industry officials whom we 
interviewed said that these test exercises in general have been useful 
in allowing players to better understand their roles and 
responsibilities in a real-life event, to uncover shortfalls they had 
not necessarily foreseen in planning, and to test solutions. For 
instance, exercises have shown that some areas of agencies' 
jurisdiction needed to be better defined. Many participants have 
written unclassified "after-action" reports incorporating the lessons 
they learned and raising key issues to be resolved. (See app. V for 
more information on test exercises.)

A Number of Agency-Specific Actions Are Under Way: 

In addition to the broad national planning efforts discussed, other 
specific actions that federal agencies responsible for protecting 
against agroterrorism have taken since 2001 include the following: 

* FDA and USDA are in various stages of developing vulnerability 
assessments of the agriculture and food sectors, as called for in HSPD- 
9. As part of a continuing effort to anticipate threats to farm 
products, FDA has conducted vulnerability assessments of different 
categories of food for which FDA has statutory responsibility, to 
identify those products most vulnerable to deliberate contamination. 
Similarly, USDA is assessing vulnerabilities in USDA-regulated products 
but had not completed its preliminary assessments at the time of our 
review. Such assessments are generally not consistent across program 
areas because different maximum values for the impact of terrorist 
events are sometimes used. (See app. V for more details about FDA and 
USDA vulnerability assessments.)

* To increase early warning and monitoring capabilities, USDA and HHS 
have created laboratory networks to integrate existing federal, state, 
and university laboratory resources. These networks are intended to 
link laboratories that screen for animal, plant, and human health 
diseases across the nation and help to provide diagnostic surge 
capacity in the event of a disease outbreak. Within each network, the 
laboratories use standardized diagnostic protocols and procedures to 
ensure consistent results. For example, USDA provided funding and 
leadership for two networks that serve the nation: the National Animal 
Health Laboratory Network, which originally consisted of 12 state and 
university veterinary laboratories nationwide, and the National Plant 
Diagnostic Laboratory Network, which consists of 5 laboratories located 
at land grant universities. By December 2004, the National Animal 
Health Laboratory Network had expanded to 47 laboratories in 39 states 
surveying domestic and foreign animal diseases. When these network 
laboratories find positive test results for foreign diseases, USDA's 
own federal laboratories in Ames, Iowa; Plum Island, New York; and 
Beltsville, Maryland, still conduct their own diagnostic tests to 
confirm results before USDA announces the outbreak of a disease. 
Meanwhile, FDA, in conjunction with other agencies including USDA's 
Food Safety and Inspection Service, developed and have continuously 
expanded, the Food Emergency Response Network to integrate 93 local, 
state, and federal laboratories for the detection of biological, 
chemical, and radiological agents in food.[Footnote 28] Likewise, the 
CDC has expanded its Laboratory Response Network to address public 
health emergencies. This network now enlists the technology and 
capacity of 138 laboratories across the United States and abroad in the 
event of a suspected or known release of biological or chemical agents. 
These federal laboratory networks have operated during animal, plant, 
and human health emergencies in the past few years. For example, USDA's 
animal and plant laboratory networks tested samples in the 2002-2003 
exotic Newcastle disease outbreak in poultry and in the sudden oak 
death outbreak in California in 2004.[Footnote 29]

* Agencies are also working to enhance coordination and communication 
among multiple stakeholders. In particular, DHS, USDA, and other 
agencies have established numerous interagency working groups to 
coordinate their efforts to protect against agroterrorism. These 
working groups are, in turn, coordinated through a Government 
Coordinating Council, which DHS finalized in the fall of 2004. DHS, 
USDA, and HHS alternately chair the Government Coordinating Council on 
a rotating basis.[Footnote 30] DHS also helped the food and agriculture 
industry to establish the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating 
Council to facilitate the flow of alerts, plans, and other information 
between the federal and state governments and industry groups. Through 
the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council, DHS has been 
seeking the expertise of the industry groups to develop national 
guidance, such as the interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
In turn, this plan is intended to provide industry with a blueprint to 
develop strategies to protect their assets. (See app. V for more 
details about interagency working groups.)

* USDA has established a steering committee, which includes 
representatives from FDA and CDC, to guide efforts to develop a 
National Veterinary Stockpile that, among other things, is intended to 
address vaccines needed to respond to animal diseases most damaging to 
human health and the economy. The steering committee will also identify 
such things as reagents, personal protection equipment that would be 
needed, how to obtain vaccines, as well as prioritizing a stocking 
schedule for the National Veterinary Stockpile. This stockpile is being 
developed for foreign animal diseases other than FMD, since there is 
already a North American FMD Vaccine Bank. USDA is also creating a 
separate vaccine bank for certain strains of avian influenza that will 
be completed by May 2005.

* DHS, USDA, and HHS are funding research to enhance the nation's 
protection against agroterrorism. Of note, DHS is providing $33 million 
over 3 years to establish two university-based Centers of Excellence to 
oversee research into post-harvest food protection and diseases that 
affect livestock and poultry. In addition, as of 2004, USDA is 
supporting homeland security research, including university-based 
efforts to evaluate contaminated carcass disposal efforts, assess 
animal and plant disease test exercises, and analyze pathways by which 
foreign animal and plant diseases can enter the United States.[Footnote 
31] CDC has also provided $1 million in annual funding to a university 
for developing a center for food security and public health that will 
support efforts such as online programs to educate veterinarians in 
foreign animal diseases. (See app. V for more details about research 
efforts.)

* USDA's Veterinary Services has developed a National Animal Health 
Emergency Management System that provides comprehensive guidance on 
mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from an animal 
health emergency, including a terrorist attack. USDA officials believe 
the system's guidance is more efficient than that provided by previous 
animal health manuals. For example, rather than changing with each 
disease, the roles of various emergency response personnel change to 
fit only three scenarios: an outbreak of a highly contagious disease 
(e.g., FMD); an outbreak of a disease spread by "vectors" such as 
mosquitoes (e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis); or an outbreak 
of a disease that is not highly contagious (e.g., bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy). USDA officials believe that this approach will speed 
response times and be more effective in containing any outbreaks, 
whether natural or intentional. (See app. V for more details about 
USDA's National Animal Health Emergency Management System.)

* Since 2002, USDA has created 14 Area Emergency Coordinator positions 
across the nation for animal health, and 2 Regional Emergency 
Coordinator positions for plant health, to coordinate federal and state 
efforts in the event of an emergency, including agroterrorism.[Footnote 
32] Among other duties, these coordinators have assisted states in 
developing emergency response plans in keeping with federal guidelines, 
and helped organize test exercises.[Footnote 33] For example, an Area 
Emergency Coordinator was involved in developing Wisconsin's Animal 
Health Emergency Management System, the nation's first statewide plan 
that parallels the National Animal Health Emergency Management System 
and outlines tasks and responsibilities of agencies and organizations 
in an animal health emergency. The USDA emergency coordinators have 
also responded to recent natural outbreaks of plant and animal 
diseases, acting in key roles under the Incident Command System. For 
example, an Area Emergency Coordinator served as the liaison officer to 
the command staff for the widely reported bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy case in Washington state in January 2004. The Western 
Regional Emergency Coordinator helped respond to the soybean rust 
outbreak in Louisiana in November 2004 and acted as a coach for the 
incident management team.

The United States Still Faces Complex Challenges and Management 
Problems in Protecting against Agroterrorism: 

Although many important steps have been taken to prevent or reduce the 
impact of agroterrorism, the United States still faces complex 
challenges that limit the nation's ability to quickly and effectively 
respond to a widespread attack on animal agriculture. There are also 
some less complex management problems that impair the effectiveness of 
federal agencies' efforts to protect against agroterrorism.

The United States Faces Challenges in Quickly Responding to a 
Widespread Attack on Animal Agriculture: 

Experts we spoke with told us that to effectively control the spread of 
highly contagious foreign animal diseases, such as FMD, it is critical 
to quickly identify animals that may have the disease, promptly confirm 
the presence of the disease with diagnostic tools, and rapidly 
vaccinate animals in the surrounding area. However, the United States 
faces a shortage of veterinarians trained in foreign animal diseases, 
does not use rapid diagnostic tools at the site of an outbreak, and has 
insufficient vaccine stockpiles. These complex challenges impair the 
nation's ability to contain the spread of animal diseases that are of 
potential use in agroterrorism.

Many Veterinarians Lack Training in Foreign Animal Diseases: 

Many U.S. veterinarians lack training to recognize the signs of foreign 
animal diseases, according to a 2004 report produced for USDA. The 
report notes that while all U.S. veterinary schools offer information 
about foreign animal diseases, only about 26 percent of the nation's 
veterinary graduates have taken a course specifically dedicated to 
foreign animal diseases.[Footnote 34] According to the report, only 12 
of the 28 veterinary schools in the United States offer courses 
dedicated to foreign animal diseases. Further, among the 12 veterinary 
schools that offer such courses, 5 offer them as electives rather than 
as core courses. As a result, when federal or state veterinarians are 
called to determine whether symptoms suggest the presence of a foreign 
animal disease, they may not have the training or expertise needed to 
identify it, and the disease could go undetected. According to USDA 
officials, however, all veterinary students must take instruction in 
infectious diseases and pathology which, according to these officials, 
includes foreign animal diseases. USDA officials also told us they have 
worked to develop Web and CD-Rom-based training to strengthen 
veterinary student training in foreign animal diseases.

Another reason for this lack of expertise in foreign animal diseases is 
that such training is not required to obtain USDA accreditation. More 
than 80 percent of veterinarians in the United States are USDA- 
accredited and are intended to be instrumental in maintaining effective 
disease surveillance and monitoring by accurately diagnosing and 
reporting animal diseases.[Footnote 35] To be accredited, an individual 
must have graduated from an accredited school of veterinary medicine, 
submitted an application certifying the ability to complete 16 tasks 
such as recognizing common breeds of livestock, completed a core 
orientation session, and be licensed or legally able to practice 
without supervision. USDA officials believe that because an accredited 
veterinarian must be licensed, this is an indication that they have 
received basic training in foreign animal diseases. However, this 
accreditation process does not require veterinarians to demonstrate 
their ability to recognize or diagnose basic clinical signs of foreign 
animal diseases.[Footnote 36] Furthermore, once granted, accreditation 
is valid for life and no continuing education is required.[Footnote 37] 
The Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges believes that 
this process could be more rigorous if, as a condition of 
accreditation, veterinarians were required to demonstrate an ability to 
recognize clinical signs of foreign animal diseases at the time of 
accreditation and also periodically throughout their careers. USDA 
recognizes the need to modernize its accreditation process and agrees 
that continuing education is needed. APHIS drafted a rule to modify its 
current program by developing a two-tiered National Veterinary 
Accreditation program, which would have requirements for supplemental 
training in such areas as emergency management and foreign animal 
diseases;[Footnote 38] however, after more than 2 years, it is still 
not in effect. According to the Chief of Staff of Emergency Management 
and Diagnostics at APHIS, the draft rule has been undergoing revisions 
but had to be set aside several times in an effort to pursue the 
development of other more important draft regulations and emergency 
regulations. According to this official, the draft rule is now being 
reviewed by USDA's Office of General Counsel. This official told us 
that this review can take several months, but if no problems are 
encountered, it is anticipated that the draft rule will be published as 
a proposed rule in the Federal Register during the first or second 
quarter of calendar year 2005. USDA officials told us that new efforts 
are also being made to strengthen APHIS' role in colleges of veterinary 
medicine to provide information on various aspects of regulatory 
medicine.

Finally, expertise in foreign animal diseases is lacking because most 
veterinarians work in private practice where this skill is not 
required. According to the American Veterinary Medical Association, 
approximately 74 percent of practicing veterinarians in the United 
States work in private practice.[Footnote 39] Similarly, the 
Association of American Veterinary Medicine reports that only about 
5,000 veterinarians work in public service,[Footnote 40] some of whom 
play an essential role in the detection, prevention, and control of 
foreign animal diseases. USDA officials told us they intend to increase 
the number of veterinarians entering public service by making new 
efforts to increase veterinary students' awareness of potential careers 
in public service.

USDA Does Not Use Rapid Diagnostic Tools on Site: 

Another complex challenge impairing the ability of the United States to 
quickly contain an outbreak and limit the loss of animals is the 
inability to rapidly diagnose diseases at the site of an outbreak. 
Currently, if an animal is suspected of having a foreign disease, a 
sample would be collected from the sick animal and a federal official 
would send it by Express Mail to one of USDA's reference laboratories-
-either the NVSL in Ames, Iowa, or the Foreign Animal Disease 
Diagnostic Laboratory located on Plum Island, New York.[Footnote 41] 
Using traditional techniques, USDA technicians would generally diagnose 
the disease in 3 to 4 days. During this time, the affected animals and 
other animals within the vicinity, or those that had recent contact 
with the sick animal, would be quarantined. Should USDA officially 
confirm the presence of a disease, such as FMD, the affected herd and 
all cattle, sheep, goats, swine, and susceptible wildlife--infected or 
not--within a minimum 10-kilometer zone around the infected farm would 
be killed. USDA would wait for confirmation before slaughtering animals 
to avoid causing unnecessary panic among producers and severe market 
fluctuations.[Footnote 42] If the disease were to spread beyond the 
initial zone, authorities would continue to quarantine and kill animals 
until the disease was "stamped out." USDA's "Crimson Sky" test exercise 
in 2002, estimated that, under the current "stamping out" approach, FMD 
would spread rapidly, necessitating the slaughter of millions of 
animals and cause staggering financial losses--precisely the type of 
high-visibility destruction that some experts told us terrorists seek.

According to the former Associate Administrator for Special Research 
Programs at USDA's Agricultural Research Service, the impact of a 
disease such as FMD can be mitigated if rapid diagnostic tools are used 
on site to speed diagnosis. In 2000, under the direction of this 
official, USDA developed state-of-the-art, rapid diagnostic tools to 
detect FMD, classical swine fever, African swine fever, Rinderpest, 
avian influenza, and Newcastle disease.[Footnote 43] According to this 
official, the rapid diagnostic tools are designed to yield results in 
less than an hour and are intended to be used outside of specialized 
laboratories, at the site of an outbreak. Importantly, the tools can 
detect disease before the animal shows clinical signs of infection. 
According to USDA, symptoms of FMD may take up to 14 days to appear, or 
even longer in sheep and goats. In fact, animals may show no symptoms 
at all. USDA's draft guidance for controlling FMD warns that if the 
first animal infected with FMD does not outwardly show clinical signs, 
detection may be delayed. The guidance further states that potential 
delays and difficulty in detection may complicate the decision-making 
process regarding appropriate disease control measures. According to 
the former Associate Administrator, rapid diagnostic tools would not 
only allow for a rapid diagnosis but would also permit the monitoring 
of nearby herds before symptoms appeared so that only infected herds 
would have to be killed. Slaughter would, therefore, be based not on 
proximity but on actual infection, thereby reducing the number of 
animals lost and lessening the impact of the attack.[Footnote 44] 
Overall, rapid diagnostic tools would be helpful because FMD would be 
detected in less than an hour, informed control measures could be 
implemented, and herds in the area would be under regular surveillance.

According to state officials, the use of these rapid tools on site 
would also help prevent laboratories from becoming overwhelmed with 
test samples, which would be an advantage if a terrorist attack 
involved the introduction of disease at multiple locations. In 2003, 
California state officials used rapid diagnostic tools to test animals 
for exotic Newcastle disease--a contagious and fatal viral disease 
affecting birds of all species. (See fig. 5.) These state officials 
told us that the tools used at the time allowed diagnostic results 
within 6 hours and enabled them to test up to 1,500 samples per day, 
many more samples than traditional testing methods. State officials 
also told us that rapid diagnostic tools would be useful during a 
widespread outbreak so that individual animals or herds could be tested 
in a temporary laboratory at the site of an outbreak, rather than 
waiting for results while samples were sent to laboratories distant 
from the outbreak.

Figure 5: Game Bird Infected with Exotic Newcastle Disease during the 
2002-2003 Outbreak in California: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

USDA officials believe that rapid diagnostic tools can be useful, but 
they told us most such technologies are not yet ready to be used at the 
site of an outbreak.[Footnote 45] While USDA has employed some of its 
rapid diagnostic tools for exotic Newcastle disease and avian 
influenza, it has done so only in select laboratories within the 
National Animal Health Laboratory Network.[Footnote 46]

There are several reasons why USDA is reluctant to use the tools 
outside of a laboratory setting. One reason is that samples put into 
the rapid diagnostic tests may contain a live virus. For highly 
contagious diseases such as FMD and classical swine fever, USDA 
believes that rapid diagnostic testing must be conducted in a 
specialized laboratory setting where certain procedures are taken to 
prevent the virus from escaping and infecting livestock and wildlife. 
According to the former Associate Administrator for Special Research 
Programs at ARS, this precaution is unnecessary. Once a sample is 
taken, it is inserted into a tube containing reagents that inactivate 
the virus if it is present. The tube, as well as the person who 
collected the sample, can then be decontaminated using a common 
solution, such as acetic acid in the case of FMD, and the sample can be 
tested using the rapid diagnostic tool in a mobile unit at, for 
example, the entrance to the farm.[Footnote 47] USDA officials agree 
that samples can be taken in this manner but told us that their current 
technique for collecting samples for the rapid diagnostic tools that 
USDA uses in its laboratories does not inactivate the sample. For that 
reason, samples of highly contagious diseases must be processed under 
special laboratory conditions. USDA uses this sampling technique in 
order to preserve the "live virus" sample necessary for the traditional 
method of diagnosing diseases. USDA officials told us they have 
initiated discussions about sampling using an "inactivation model" such 
as discussed above, but the sample would still be diagnosed using a 
rapid diagnostic tool located in a laboratory.

Unlike USDA, agencies within DOD are using rapid diagnostic tools in 
the field to obtain quick results during emergency situations or when a 
laboratory setting is not possible, such as in combat zones.[Footnote 
48] For example, the Army is using various types of rapid diagnostic 
tools in Iraq to detect pathogens used in biological warfare, such as 
anthrax. DOD officials told us that for samples that are a "true 
unknown," such as chemical substances they encounter in combat, they 
utilize many safety procedures, such as wearing protective clothing and 
opening samples in safety cabinets. The officials also told us that the 
reagents they use to detect agents used in biological warfare will 
inactivate viruses, allowing the test to be safely conducted without 
contaminating the surrounding area. A DOD official noted that with 
animal diseases, if samples are positive for a disease, then 
contaminating other animals within that herd is not a concern since 
these animals would have to be destroyed anyway.[Footnote 49]

Another reason USDA is reluctant to use rapid diagnostic tools at the 
site of an outbreak is that personnel need training to use the tools. 
According to the former ARS Associate Administrator, however, the tests 
are designed to be performed by persons with limited training, using 
quality-controlled standardized reagents and protocols that are 
consistent with international standards.[Footnote 50] DOD concurs that 
the tools are not difficult to use, but to ensure that samples are not 
contaminated and results are rigorous, the U.S. Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases requires personnel to undergo a 4-week 
training program and follow strict procedures, such as loading and 
capping pathogen samples before adding the control samples to help 
eliminate cross-contamination.[Footnote 51] To help increase confidence 
in the accuracy of the results, DOD also uses more than one type of 
rapid diagnostic tool to test a sample if it comes back positive. 
[Footnote 52]

USDA officials told us that although the rapid diagnostic tools have 
been developed, these tools still need to be validated before they can 
be used in order to rule out diseases with similar clinical signs or 
protein sequences that might result in a false positive result. 
Therefore, USDA would still make an initial diagnosis using traditional 
test procedures and confirmatory testing would still be done at NVSL in 
Ames, Iowa, or at the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic laboratory on 
Plum Island in New York. Once the initial diagnosis is confirmed, USDA 
believes there may be opportunities to use validated rapid diagnostic 
tools to evaluate herd health either on site or at a nearby laboratory. 
USDA further agrees that it is important to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of developing and validating these tools for use outside of a 
laboratory setting.

Vaccines Cannot Be Rapidly Deployed to Contain a Widespread Disease 
Outbreak: 

For several reasons, USDA would not be able to deploy vaccines rapidly 
enough to contain a widespread animal disease outbreak caused by a 
deliberate attack. First, USDA has very few supplies of vaccines. The 
only vaccines currently stored in the United States against foreign 
animal diseases are for various strains of FMD because this disease is 
so highly contagious. In place of vaccination, USDA generally prefers 
to immediately slaughter diseased animals because international rules 
that the United States and other countries have agreed to abide by are 
designed to prevent trade in infected or vaccinated animals. As a 
result, vaccine stockpiles have traditionally not been needed to 
control natural outbreaks. Also, vaccines have not yet been developed 
for all foreign animal diseases that USDA considers to be of primary 
concern.[Footnote 53] For example, worldwide, there is no vaccine 
currently available for African swine fever. USDA's ARS is researching 
new vaccines, but it is unlikely that vaccines will ever be developed 
for all strains of these diseases because of the vast number of strains 
and subtypes for each disease. For example, there are 7 different types 
of FMD with more than 60 different subtypes. According to an expert we 
consulted, it is not realistic to develop vaccines for all of these 
subtypes. It is also conceivable that a terrorist could genetically 
engineer a new strain.

Second, the only vaccines that are stockpiled in the United States-- 
vaccines for FMD--cannot be rapidly deployed because they are not 
stored in a "ready-to-use" state. Although HSPD-9 states that vaccines 
should be capable of deployment within 24 hours, USDA's stockpiles are 
concentrates that require additives to become a vaccine. Because the 
additive for the FMD vaccine is manufactured in the United Kingdom, 
USDA must first ship the stock there for bottling and subsequent 
testing. It can take up to 3 weeks to transform the stock into a 
vaccine once the concentrate arrives in the United Kingdom. Vaccines 
are not stockpiled in a ready-to-use state because vaccines generally 
have a shelf life of only 1 or 2 years before they must be used or 
destroyed, and replacing stocks on a regular basis would be expensive.

Yet until animals are vaccinated, USDA will have no recourse but to 
slaughter animals in a systematic manner to contain the spread of the 
disease. While this approach may be adequate for containing a limited 
outbreak, the recent USDA test exercise of an intentional introduction 
of FMD in multiple locations suggests that this approach would have 
catastrophic results.[Footnote 54] Although USDA officials raise 
concerns about the use of vaccination to control an outbreak, such as 
the limited number of fully trained personnel to administer the 
vaccine, it is now acknowledged that the ability to vaccinate, in 
conjunction with culling, may be a necessary measure to contain an FMD 
outbreak. A recent evaluation by the National Audit Office in the 
United Kingdom reports that the government has substantially increased 
stocks of vaccines for FMD to better contain the spread of FMD should 
another outbreak occur.[Footnote 55] Furthermore, USDA's draft response 
plan for an outbreak of FMD disease or other highly contagious animal 
disease notes that vaccines may be used strategically to create 
barriers between infected zones and disease-free zones.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention faces similar challenges 
in stocking vaccines used to protect humans. Because many animal 
diseases can affect humans, CDC is participating in the steering 
committee to help USDA create its National Veterinary 
Stockpile.[Footnote 56] An expert suggests, and CDC officials agree, 
that USDA could contract with pharmaceutical companies to supply a 
stockpile of ready-to-use vaccines. Once the shelf life for those 
vaccines neared expiration,[Footnote 57] the contractor could replenish 
the stock and then sell the supply of vaccines nearing expiration in 
the commercial marketplace to countries that routinely vaccinate 
livestock. Where the market would not support such sales, USDA could 
donate the old, yet still effective, vaccines to other countries where 
the disease is endemic and there is still a demand.[Footnote 58] USDA 
officials agree that it would be useful to have the FMD virus vaccine 
available within 24 hours.[Footnote 59] They also told us they have 
plans to consider options to cut some of the time delay for obtaining 
finished, ready-to-use vaccines. One option could be storing the frozen 
bulk antigen concentrate needed to produce the vaccine at the site of 
the foreign manufacturer. While it is the responsibility of the 
steering committee to consider options and recommend specific processes 
for each of the foreign animal diseases of concern to the United 
States, it is not clear if the steering committee will address the 
costs and benefits of developing ready-to-use vaccines that can be 
quickly deployed against diseases of primary concern.

Finally, even if USDA were to overcome the difficulties discussed above 
and develop adequate stockpiles of ready-to-use vaccines, current USDA 
policy would require a complex decision-making process to determine if 
vaccines would be deployed in an outbreak. In 2000, USDA decided to use 
a decision tree flowchart combined with decision matrices that evaluate 
multiple factors to determine when and if to use vaccines to control an 
outbreak. Because the use of vaccines would affect trade and have major 
consequences for both USDA and producers, the decision tree is complex 
and may not be designed for rapid decision-making, such as would be 
needed during a terrorist attack.[Footnote 60] For example, it requires 
information on the availability of human resources, public opinion and 
perception of government, industry acceptance, and vaccination costs, 
as well as slaughter and disposal capacity. USDA officials agree that 
this process is lengthy, but this is because of the many variables, 
including the location of the outbreak in relation to susceptible 
animal populations as well as trade concerns and restrictions that 
impact this decision-making process. As previously noted, HSPD-9 
requires that vaccines be deployed within 24 hours of an outbreak, but 
such rapid deployment may not be achievable under the current, complex 
decision-making process. USDA officials told us they can explore the 
possibility of designing a more rapid decision-making process; however, 
they noted that it would take additional time to select, deploy, equip, 
and direct vaccination crews in a manner that would be advantageous to 
disease eradication and not cause the virus to spread from farm to farm 
due to the vaccination process. Hastily applied vaccination programs 
could prove detrimental. A USDA official also told us that it is not 
possible to estimate how long it would take to determine whether to use 
FMD vaccines based on the decision tree flow chart, due to the many 
variables involved in the process.

Federal Agencies Have Not Addressed Several Management Problems: 

In addition to the complex challenges discussed above, federal agencies 
are encountering management problems that further impair the 
effectiveness of their efforts to protect against agroterrorism. First, 
since the transfer of agricultural inspectors to DHS, inspections and 
interceptions of prohibited agricultural products and pests have 
declined nationally, and inspectors are less available to respond to 
agricultural emergencies. Second, there are weaknesses regarding the 
flow of critical information among key stakeholders. Third, USDA has 
not hired a sufficient number of Area and Regional Emergency 
Coordinators to help states prepare for an agricultural emergency. 
Fourth, DHS has not developed controls to avoid duplication of effort 
among agencies. Finally, federal agencies' diagnostic laboratory 
networks are not yet integrated for diseases of common concern.

Agricultural Inspections and Interceptions Have Declined, and Fewer 
Inspectors Are Available to Respond to Agricultural Emergencies since 
the Transfer of USDA Inspectors to DHS: 

Since the transfer of most USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) 
inspectors to DHS in March 2003,[Footnote 61] government officials, 
reports, and data indicate that the nation may be more vulnerable to 
the introduction of foreign animal and plant diseases through ports of 
entry into the United States.[Footnote 62] In addition, the transfer of 
inspectors has reduced USDA's ability to respond to agricultural 
emergencies.

Inspectors Have Performed Fewer Agricultural Inspections and Made Fewer 
Interceptions of Prohibited Plant and Animal Products and Pests: 

USDA officials, as well as agricultural inspectors who now work at DHS, 
told us that inspections of agricultural products have decreased at 
some land border crossings, airports, and maritime ports--including 
three major ports that receive a high percentage of the nation's 
agricultural imports and international flights. USDA provided us with 
data showing an overall decline in the number of inspections nationwide 
since 2002[Footnote 63]--the last year when USDA had sole 
responsibility of agricultural inspections. This decrease occurred at a 
time when imports and international air traffic have increased. In 
fiscal year 2002, there were 40.9 million agricultural inspections at 
ports of entry; in fiscal year 2003, the year when USDA inspectors 
transferred to DHS, 35.0 million inspections were conducted; and in 
fiscal year 2004, there were 37.5 million agricultural inspections. 
USDA data also show that inspections have decreased at certain types of 
ports and by certain modes of entry nationwide, such as passenger 
baggage and cargo.[Footnote 64] In particular, USDA officials and DHS 
inspectors told us that the number of agricultural inspections has 
declined at three specific air and sea ports that receive a large 
proportion of international cargo and passenger baggage. For example, 
at one of these ports, former and current DHS agricultural inspectors 
told us they had cut their inspections in late 2004 by more than 50 
percent, from an average of about 1,200 cargo containers per week to 
500 per week. These inspectors said they reduced inspections, in part, 
because of an instruction by the DHS port director to cut their "holds" 
of agricultural cargo and conduct fewer inspections of tile, which are 
often packed in a regulated material that can contain pests such as 
snails and beetles.[Footnote 65] In August 2004, this port intercepted 
a species of live, wood-boring beetles as a result of holding and 
inspecting cargo tile shipments. However, another shipment at this port 
that was not inspected was later found to contain the same beetles, 
which belong to the Asian longhorned beetle family and are costly to 
treat. These inspectors were concerned that if DHS continued to 
decrease agricultural inspections at that port, importers would direct 
more illegal shipments there. DHS officials acknowledged that, since 
the transfer of inspectors, inspections have declined overall. However, 
they also pointed out that some ports have increased their inspections 
in the past 2 years. For example, USDA data show that inspections at 
land border crossings increased from 21.2 million agricultural 
inspections in fiscal year 2002 to 22.5 million such inspections in 
fiscal year 2004.

USDA data also indicate a decline in the number of agricultural 
interceptions--seizures of prohibited plant and animal products, and 
agricultural pests--at ports of entry nationwide since the transfer of 
inspectors to DHS. Interceptions dropped from 1.8 million in fiscal 
year 2002, when USDA had sole responsibility for inspections, to 1.6 
million in 2004, when DHS had primary responsibility for agriculture 
inspections. However, in 2003, a transitional year, interceptions 
totaled 1.8 million. Interceptions of reportable pests in particular 
have declined each fiscal year--from 77,886 in 2002, to 72,988 in 2003, 
and to 54,109 in 2004. USDA officials told us that interceptions are a 
meaningful indicator of effective inspections because the purpose of 
inspecting agricultural products is to intercept prohibited items and 
pests. USDA is concerned that the decrease in interceptions may 
indicate a decline in the quality of inspections or a switch to less 
effective methods. For example, USDA and DHS officials told us that 
while agricultural inspectors rove several ports of entry with sniffing 
dogs--an effective method for detecting and therefore intercepting 
prohibited items--they are now used less frequently. DHS and USDA 
officials also noted that the number of interceptions can vary based on 
a number of factors aside from inspection quality, including changes in 
the amount or type of agricultural products entering the country and in 
international passenger travel patterns. However, we found that both 
agricultural imports and international air passengers entering the 
United States had increased over the past 2 fiscal years.[Footnote 66] 
USDA officials told us that the number of interceptions should 
generally increase accordingly. At the time of our report, DHS 
officials told us they were not aware of changes in inspection methods 
or the risk management approach used at ports that could account for 
the decline in agricultural inspections and interceptions. According to 
agency officials, neither USDA nor DHS has analyzed the inspections and 
interceptions data to identify trends and potential areas for 
improvement, but headquarters officials at both agencies told us they 
would analyze the data in early 2005.[Footnote 67]

Although USDA and DHS officials have not begun an analysis to determine 
the reasons for declining agricultural inspections, they believe that 
several factors are responsible for the decline in agricultural 
inspections and interceptions. First, there is a shortage of 
agricultural inspectors nationwide. In March 2003, USDA transferred 
1,517 full-time inspectors, according to DHS officials.[Footnote 68] 
Recently, DHS has been able to hire new agricultural inspectors, but 
numerous departures left DHS with 1,446 agricultural inspectors and 426 
vacancies as of mid-October 2004.[Footnote 69] DHS told us that the 
agency intends to hire more than 500 additional agricultural inspectors 
by February 2006. However, DHS officials said the agency's ability to 
quickly hire new inspectors is impeded by the length of time needed for 
conducting security background checks. These background checks, which 
are required before a newly hired inspector can report for duty, can 
take more than a year to process, by which time applicants might find 
other work. Agricultural inspectors working at the ports suggested to 
us that DHS could allow new inspectors to perform nonsensitive 
procedures while background checks are pending. According to a DHS 
headquarters official, the agency is allowing some new inspectors with 
modified background checks to start work under certain circumstances 
while their full background investigations are pending.

Second, DHS agricultural inspectors are sometimes used for other 
purposes, such as helping reduce immigration lines at airports. For 
example, a DHS supervisor of agricultural inspectors at a capital city 
airport told us that his inspectors are regularly pulled from their 
agricultural duties to inspect other types of cargo or to assist in 
clearing passengers though immigration. DHS officials told us that they 
need the flexibility to occasionally shift inspectors' duties to 
respond to different priorities and needs, such as searching for drugs 
rather than inspecting agricultural products for diseases or pests. For 
this reason, all customs, immigration, and agricultural inspectors are 
cross-trained to perform aspects of each other's work.

Third, DHS agricultural inspectors do not always receive timely 
information about high-risk cargo that should be held for inspection. 
For example, after Canada confirmed a case of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy in 2003, inspectors at one border crossing did not 
receive a warning from USDA to hold shipments of Canadian beef in time 
to intercept it, and let the shipment through. In another instance, DHS 
inspectors at a sea port in a major agricultural state told us they did 
not receive an alert in late 2004 about an outbreak of a strain of 
avian influenza that can cause death in humans, until a week after the 
warning was released. DHS headquarters officials told us that while 
some cargo alerts issued by USDA do not get to every agricultural 
specialist in a timely manner, these instances represent a small 
fraction of inspections. However, these officials agreed that 
improvements can be made to improve the flow of information. 
Agricultural inspectors and other port officials attributed the delay 
in receiving information to the transfer of some inspection roles and 
responsibilities from USDA to DHS. This transfer has created additional 
layers of communication that have impeded the rapid delivery of 
critical information to port inspectors. Whereas USDA used to 
communicate critical information directly to its agricultural 
inspectors, DHS inspectors told us that now they receive information 
indirectly through DHS headquarters. While DHS officials told us this 
practice is not the agency's policy, they acknowledged that some ports 
follow a hierarchical chain of command. The memorandum of agreement 
between the two agencies, which is designed to delineate new roles and 
responsibilities, does not detail how DHS should convey alerts, 
warnings, directives, or guidelines that come from USDA.

Finally, DHS and USDA have different databases and information 
technology systems, including email, which has further hindered their 
ability to share information. For example, agricultural inspectors who 
transferred to DHS have experienced difficulty in accessing USDA's 
intranet site, where the Work Accomplishment Data System, the primary 
agricultural inspections database, can be viewed. DHS agricultural 
inspectors told us they still cannot enter USDA's electronic Emergency 
Action Notification System, which was created after September 11, 2001, 
to track problematic or prohibited imported goods at ports of entry. 
DHS officials acknowledged technical problems in the integration of the 
two agencies' systems, but said that they are working with USDA to 
address these problems.[Footnote 70]

As a related matter, some DHS inspectors we spoke with expressed 
concern that the cross-training for "legacy" customs and immigration 
inspectors on agricultural laws, policies, and inspection procedures is 
insufficient--and that these legacy inspectors are thus not able to 
increase the number of items they refer to agricultural inspectors for 
further examination.[Footnote 71] For example, while legacy customs 
inspectors receive weeks of cross-training on immigration functions, 
they receive only 3 hours of computer-based training on agriculture. 
Inspectors told us that while the computer-based training raises 
awareness of the importance of agriculture, it has not enabled legacy 
customs and immigration inspectors to increase the amount of prohibited 
items they refer to agricultural inspectors. Furthermore, the training 
is not always supervised by an agricultural inspector who could answer 
questions.[Footnote 72] DHS officials agree that training for legacy 
customs and immigration inspectors should be enhanced, and told us that 
much training enabling legacy officers to make referrals to agriculture 
specialists has been accomplished. These officials also told us that 
all inspectors will be required to take a new course on agriculture 
procedures that will be launched in fiscal year 2005. This course, 
which will combine 16 to 24 hours of classroom and on-the-job training, 
is intended to help customs and immigration inspectors better screen 
and refer suspicious items to agricultural inspectors.[Footnote 73]

Fewer Inspectors Are Available to Help USDA Manage Agricultural 
Emergencies: 

In addition to the decline in inspections and interceptions, DHS has 
not been able to loan sufficient numbers of inspectors to respond to 
agricultural emergencies managed by USDA, according to USDA 
officials.[Footnote 74] Since the transfer of agricultural inspectors 
to DHS, the memorandum of agreement between the two agencies 
implementing the transfer provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 states that DHS and USDA agreed to develop procedures for USDA use 
of DHS employees, but it does not detail how many employees DHS must 
loan, or for what time period. While DHS has dispatched some 
agricultural inspectors on temporary duty, USDA officials said that 
compared to the assistance available prior to the transfer to DHS, the 
number of such personnel and the length of time they were available 
have been inadequate. For example, USDA's Western Regional Office 
requested 83 agricultural inspectors from DHS to help control and 
contain the exotic Newcastle disease outbreak in California over 2 
months in 2003. DHS provided 26 employees, but declined USDA's requests 
for further assistance. As a result, USDA officials are concerned that 
DHS will not loan a sufficient number of specialists to help treat and 
contain future agricultural emergencies, including the likely infection 
of the 2005 soybean crop with soybean rust--a plant disease identified 
by USDA pursuant to the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 as having the 
potential to pose a severe threat.[Footnote 75] DHS officials told us 
they have not been able to loan greater numbers of inspectors to USDA 
to respond to agricultural emergencies because of the staff shortage. 
DHS officials also said their policy is to loan agricultural inspectors 
with specific expertise, but the agency's first priority is to clear 
ports of entry. Once DHS feels the ports are adequately staffed with 
agricultural inspectors, the agency will be in a better position to 
dispatch agricultural inspectors to USDA for emergency purposes.

Experts say that routine inspections at ports of entry cannot, by 
themselves, prevent the accidental or intentional introduction of 
diseases. However, experience has shown that inspections can be 
successful in intercepting harmful diseases. In 2004, for example, DHS 
and USDA agricultural inspectors at a California mail facility 
prevented an outbreak of citrus canker when they successfully 
intercepted an illegal package of branch cuttings from Japan that were 
intended to start a new variety of citrus groves. An outbreak of citrus 
canker--a highly contagious bacterial disease--would threaten the 
state's crop and billion-dollar citrus industry, the second-largest in 
the nation.[Footnote 76] The state of Florida, for example, has lost 
2.1 million citrus trees due to the spread of the disease since 1995.

There Are Weaknesses Regarding the Flow of Critical Information Among 
Key Stakeholders: 

Federal agencies face barriers to promptly and effectively sharing 
critical guidance that is important to state and industry stakeholders 
to better protect the agriculture sector. State and industry officials 
told us they did not receive draft national guidance in a timely 
fashion; DHS may not be providing states sufficient guidance to 
allocate homeland security grant funding for agriculture; and after- 
action reports on test exercises and real outbreaks are not routinely 
shared with many stakeholders who could benefit from the lessons 
learned.

While efforts have been made to include agricultural stakeholders in 
the development of national guidance through various working groups, 
state and industry officials told us they were not given sufficient 
time to review and comment on key draft national guidance from DHS 
pertaining to protecting infrastructure and preparing for emergencies. 
Specifically, officials said that they had as little as 3 days to 
review and submit comments on both the draft National Response Plan and 
the draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan, even though they 
will be expected to implement critical sections of these plans. As a 
result, state and industry officials we spoke with are concerned that 
these plans may set unrealistic expectations. Although we asked, DHS 
officials did not explain to us how they distributed the National 
Response Plan to stakeholders. When distributing the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, DHS officials sent the plan to the 
offices of State Homeland Security Advisors, which had the 
responsibility to solicit comments from appropriate stakeholders within 
a 2-week period. DHS officials told us that they had no input over 
which state agencies received the draft plan, and they believe that in 
some instances state officials may have delayed distribution to state 
departments of agriculture. DHS also distributed the draft plan for 
review through the Government Coordinating Council and the Food and 
Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council. DHS officials told us that 
limiting the comment period to 2 weeks was necessary in order to meet 
the timelines set by HSPD-7. DHS officials further noted that because 
of the limited time allowed for initial review of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, they released the plan as an interim 
document, allowing public and private stakeholders to have more input 
in the final plan. DHS officials acknowledged that in the future, they 
will use different procedures to distribute drafts for state and 
industry comments.

Furthermore, DHS may not be providing sufficient guidance to the states 
on how to use the Homeland Security Grant Program to obtain federal 
emergency preparedness assistance to support the agricultural 
sector.[Footnote 77] Although states must fulfill a number of 
requirements to receive DHS emergency preparedness grants, DHS gives 
leeway regarding which disciplines--such as fire, law enforcement, or 
agriculture--states choose to fund with DHS grants. However, according 
to federal and state officials, in the past, states used grant funding 
mainly for "traditional" emergency disciplines such as law enforcement. 
Prior to 2004, DHS grant application kits did not refer to agriculture 
as a sector eligible for emergency assistance. DHS grant program 
officials told us that, based on feedback from the states, in 2004 they 
included agriculture as an emergency discipline toward which states can 
apply DHS funding. However, despite the inclusion of agriculture in the 
application guidance, state officials told us that they have received 
limited funding from DHS relative to other emergency disciplines. For 
example, one official from a major agriculture state told us that in 
fiscal year 2004 the state had set aside less than $600,000 for 
agroterrorism projects out of a total of over $20 million that DHS had 
allocated to the state.[Footnote 78] The same state had received a $2- 
million grant to head a multistate partnership to protect against 
agroterrorism in fiscal year 2003, but because this amount was in the 
form of a directed grant, it could not be used to purchase equipment or 
training for state or local responders. Federal officials believe that 
agriculture continues to receive limited emphasis in the fiscal year 
2005 grant kit relative to other funding priorities. For example, in 
several instances throughout the fiscal year 2005 grant kit, 
agriculture does not appear in lists of other disciplines that are 
eligible for funding. Federal officials told us that without additional 
guidance or emphasis, state governments would continue to fund 
traditional emergency preparedness disciplines without considering 
agriculture.

Finally, state and industry officials told us that there is no 
mechanism to share lessons learned from federal and other state or 
industry test exercises or from real-life animal and plant disease 
outbreaks--such as the exotic Newcastle disease outbreak in California 
or from the karnal bunt outbreak in Texas. Several state and industry 
representatives expressed interest in receiving after-action reports so 
they could benefit from lessons learned. They also believe that lessons 
learned do not have to be industry-specific. For example, one crop 
industry group official told us it would be helpful to learn from FMD 
exercises, as well as the real-life bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
outbreak, about ways to better communicate during an outbreak. DHS 
officials told us that they will soon deploy a secure Web site for the 
food and agriculture sector as a component of DHS' Homeland Security 
Information Network. According to these officials, this new Web site, 
now in development, will provide government and industry the capability 
for information sharing; disseminating alerts and warnings; sharing 
best practices; and coordinating efforts between the states, industry, 
and federal agencies in a protected environment. However, this effort 
is still in its early stages, and to date the proposed Web site does 
not include after-action reports. In addition, federal, state, and 
industry officials we spoke with were apparently unaware of the Web 
site's development.

USDA Currently Has an Inadequate Number of Area and Regional Emergency 
Coordinators, Resulting in Insufficient Technical Assistance to the 
States: 

USDA faces another management challenge in helping states prepare for 
animal and plant emergencies because of an insufficient number of Area 
and Regional Emergency Coordinators. As a result, states are not 
receiving sufficient federal assistance in developing emergency 
response plans and other activities. In 2002, USDA created 14 Area 
Emergency Coordinator positions for animal health issues, and 1 
Regional Emergency Coordinator position for each of the eastern and 
western regions for plant disease outbreaks. By the time of our report, 
USDA had filled 13 of the 14 coordinator positions on the animal side, 
and both of the plant health positions. However, 2 of the animal health 
emergency coordinator positions--which together span six states, 
including the two biggest agricultural states--were vacant until late 
2004. Federal officials also told us that the current number of 
emergency coordinator positions is insufficient to cover their areas or 
regions, even if all the positions were filled. This is because the 
emergency coordinators are responsible for large geographic areas. On 
average, Area Emergency Coordinators cover 3 states, while Regional 
Emergency Coordinators are responsible for up to 27 states, plus 
territories. As a result of this heavy workload, USDA officials said, 
states are not receiving the maximum benefit of a coordinator's 
guidance and assistance in preparing state emergency response plans and 
other preparedness activities. For example, 10 states had not completed 
their required planning documents to identify resources needed in a 
plant health emergency, by the September 30, 2004, deadline.[Footnote 
79] And of those plans submitted, USDA found some to be of 
unsatisfactory quality. USDA officials attributed these delays and 
deficiencies, in part, to the fact that the Regional Emergency 
Coordinators cannot spend adequate time with state and federal 
agricultural officials in each state. They added that if there were a 
greater number of emergency coordinators, each coordinator would have 
fewer states to cover and thus more time to devote to their advisory 
responsibilities.

USDA is also struggling to attract an adequate number of qualified 
applicants due to the heavy travel involved to cover their areas or 
regions.[Footnote 80] In addition, the job requires traveling to animal 
or plant health emergency locations anywhere in the United States with 
as little as 24 hours notice, and for several weeks or more at a time. 
For example, one animal health emergency coordinator made 29 trips away 
from his duty station in 14 months on the job, not including other 
meetings in his three-state area. These trips were necessary for test 
exercises, conferences, regional FEMA meetings, USDA meetings, and the 
exotic Newcastle disease outbreak, which occurred in a state outside 
his area. USDA officials say that APHIS' goal is to put an Area 
Emergency Coordinator in each of the 43 states where there is an Area 
Veterinarian in Charge, and to increase the Regional Emergency 
Coordinators for plant disease outbreaks.

Shortcomings Exist in DHS' Coordination of Federal Working Groups and 
Research Efforts: 

Government and industry officials have expressed concern about 
shortcomings in DHS' coordination of national efforts to protect 
against agroterrorism. Since the issuance of HSPD-9 in January 2004, 
DHS and other federal agencies established several interagency working 
groups to address the tasks set out in the directive. To oversee these 
working groups, DHS recently established a Government Coordinating 
Council for agriculture. According to DHS officials, the council's 
charter outlines the specific tasks for federal agencies and the 
numerous working groups that have been established to address HSPD- 
9.[Footnote 81] However, other federal officials have expressed concern 
that because the working groups were established prior to the 
development of the council, activities under way are not well 
coordinated. For example, according to agency officials, the task list 
developed by the Government Coordinating Council Charter does not 
correspond to the tasks outlined in other important national guidance 
documents, such as the National Response Plan. This discrepancy could 
lead to confusing implementation of national guidance. Furthermore, 
state and industry officials we interviewed said they did not 
understand the roles and responsibilities of these various groups and 
that no one seemed to be tracking the specific purpose of various 
efforts.

In addition, DHS lacks controls to coordinate research efforts with 
other agencies, even though HSPD-9 specifically designates DHS as the 
agency responsible for coordinating research efforts to protect against 
agroterrorism. For example, some of the DHS-supported activities at the 
Centers of Excellence appear to duplicate research conducted by USDA's 
Agricultural Research Service and the Cooperative State Research, 
Education, and Extension Service. Specifically, one center is 
developing rapid diagnostic tools for FMD and other foreign animal 
disease research that is apparently already under way at USDA. DHS 
officials told us that while program staff at DHS, HHS, USDA, and other 
agencies have engaged in some preliminary discussions, there is no 
overall departmental coordination of policy and budget issues 
concerning agriculture and food security within DHS and with other 
departments and agencies. USDA officials stated that while they are not 
aware of any overlap in the programs supported by USDA and DHS, they 
are also not aware of the full scope of the activities of the Centers 
of Excellence.[Footnote 82] USDA officials agree that more coordination 
and cooperation is needed between USDA and DHS regarding research 
activities.

Agencies' Diagnostic Laboratory Networks Are Not Yet Integrated: 

While the development of USDA and HHS national diagnostic laboratory 
networks is a positive step, their effectiveness in sharing diagnostic 
information about diseases is compromised because their databases are 
not yet integrated. At the time of our review, USDA had not integrated 
the databases of its own national laboratory networks due to 
compatibility and confidentiality issues. Because the USDA-affiliated 
laboratories operated independently prior to the creation in 2002 of 
the National Animal Health Laboratory Network and the National Plant 
Diagnostic Network, the member laboratories are still using their 
individual databases. USDA officials say these individual databases use 
different codes and messaging systems and thus do not communicate well 
with each other. For example, each National Animal Health Laboratory 
Network facility enters animal disease diagnostic information into its 
own database, but neither of the other laboratories in the network nor 
USDA's NVSL--which is responsible for officially testing foreign animal 
diseases--can read that information. Instead, USDA relies on 
traditional communication channels, such as emails and phone calls, to 
relay test results and the recipients do not have electronic access to 
the detailed data. This approach limits USDA's ability to look at 
diagnostic data from across the country, detect trends, and implement a 
response as quickly as it could with an integrated, real-time system. 
USDA officials told us that if their laboratories' diagnostic databases 
were linked to each other nationally, the agency would be able to 
better monitor and respond more quickly to disease outbreaks. USDA 
stresses that the ability to share diagnostic information quickly is 
particularly important for diseases that spread rapidly, such as FMD, 
because response time is critical in controlling the spread of the 
disease and reducing the economic impact.

In addition, the Food Emergency Response Network, CDC's Laboratory 
Response Network, and USDA's National Animal Health Laboratory Network 
and National Plant Diagnostic Network have not yet linked their 
databases to each other for diseases of common concern. USDA and HHS 
officials say it is important for their agencies to rapidly share 
complete diagnostic test results with each other regarding diseases of 
concern to all of the agencies involved. For example, if USDA found a 
chicken with a strain of avian influenza that is transferable to 
humans, it would be important for CDC to immediately become aware of 
this information so that it could take appropriate measures to protect 
human health. Similarly, if USDA confirmed a cow with bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy, it would be important for FDA to know quickly so that 
it could investigate whether the infected products had entered the food 
chain and take any necessary action. In addition, USDA officials say 
that an integrated diagnostic information system would aid federal 
agencies' ability to gather evidence in investigations, including 
criminal ones, of disease outbreaks.

Federal agencies are aware of the importance of integrating databases 
and are taking steps to link their networks. As authorized by the 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002, USDA is currently working on integrating all 
of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network facilities so that 
they are able to send diagnostic information in real-time to a 
national, electronic database. This new database will allow diagnostic 
information to be sorted and analyzed by USDA's Centers for 
Epidemiology and Animal Health to track animal diseases across the 
United States and detect any trends. If a positive test result from any 
of the laboratories enters this new database, it will automatically 
trigger a series of events to notify relevant parties. USDA officials 
say that while they will still rely on phone calls and other 
communication channels, this integrated, real-time database will 
improve accuracy and speed in the event of an emergency. So far, USDA 
has piloted the integration of some of the National Animal Health 
Laboratory Network facilities' databases for two foreign animal 
diseases, and it plans to launch the national database for one of those 
diseases in February 2005. By the end of 2005, USDA plans to integrate 
information from 12 pilot National Animal Health Laboratory Network 
laboratories into the database for the eight diseases of highest 
concern if this project is fully funded.[Footnote 83] In addition, USDA 
is planning to integrate its plant disease and pest databases for use 
in the National Plant Diagnostic Network to monitor outbreaks 
nationwide.[Footnote 84]

USDA officials told us that integrating the different laboratories' 
databases is a challenge because of the concern for the leak of 
information. This concern arises because in the event of an outbreak, 
there would be international trade repercussions, and USDA would be 
responsible for reimbursing producers for animals that would have to be 
destroyed. Other laboratories face similar security concerns. However, 
the member laboratories within CDC's Laboratory Response Network, which 
has been in place since 1999, are able to securely share diagnostic 
results with each other, and officials told us it is important for USDA 
to overcome this problem. Similarly, FDA uses a secure data exchange 
vehicle to share information across its diagnostic laboratory network. 
In an effort to address security concerns, USDA has begun building 
firewalls and developing a set of protocols to protect data and ensure 
confidentiality in such an environment.

As called for in HSPD-9, USDA and HHS created an interagency working 
group in late 2004 to begin the process of coordinating their networks 
for zoonotic disease surveillance.[Footnote 85] For example, USDA and 
FDA are looking at how they can share animal disease and food pathogen 
test results through a secure data exchange. However, the agencies must 
also work out common testing benchmarks and protocols in order to 
interpret each other's diagnostic information accurately. For instance, 
if CDC was aware of the type of diagnostic tools that USDA was using, 
the agency would be better able to interpret results and take 
appropriate action. Agency officials added that DHS' planned National 
Biosurveillance Integration System intends to use information from the 
various federal laboratory networks and combine this with threat and 
intelligence data to further improve surveillance efforts for potential 
terrorist activity. DHS officials indicated that the National 
Biosurveillance Integration System would have an initial capability for 
integrating data from these laboratories by spring 2005.

Conclusions: 

Prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, relatively little attention had 
been focused on agroterrorism. Recently, however, agriculture is 
receiving more attention as experts and government officials 
increasingly recognize the need to reduce the vulnerability of this 
sector to the deliberate introduction of animal or plant diseases. 
Federal and state agencies are investing considerable resources to 
better identify and manage the risks of agroterrorism and have ramped 
up planning and coordination efforts to respond to such an event. There 
are still, however, several important challenges that should be 
addressed to better equip our nation to manage agroterrorism. First, 
the United States must enhance its ability to quickly identify and 
control diseases. Until USDA requires accredited veterinarians to be 
trained to recognize the clinical signs of foreign animal diseases, 
such diseases may not be detected and confirmed as early as possible, 
wasting valuable time that could be spent containing them. Similarly, 
until USDA evaluates the costs and benefits of using rapid diagnostic 
tools at the site of an outbreak, the agency may be missing an 
opportunity to reduce the impact of agroterrorism. Without on-site 
diagnosis to help monitor neighboring herds, animals would likely be 
slaughtered based on proximity rather than confirmed infection, 
unnecessarily magnifying the impact of an attack. Once diseases have 
been accurately diagnosed, the United States needs to quickly decide 
whether vaccines should be used to control an outbreak and have the 
ability to deploy ready-to-use vaccines within 24 hours. Otherwise, 
during an emergency, valuable time could be lost while deliberating 
whether to use vaccines and waiting for vaccines to be transformed into 
a ready-to-use state.

Several less complex managerial problems should also be addressed in 
the short term to improve the nation's ability to protect against 
agroterrorism. Our nation's ports could be unnecessarily vulnerable to 
the intentional introduction of a disease or pest, unless agencies 
analyze the reasons for declining agricultural inspections and 
streamline the flow of information between USDA and DHS inspectors at 
ports of entry. Furthermore, states and industry may not have the 
ability and information to fulfill their assigned roles in protecting 
agriculture unless DHS provides them with meaningful opportunities to 
comment on national guidance; agencies share after-action reports of 
test exercises and real-life emergencies with these stakeholders; and 
USDA identifies ways to fill and expand Area and Regional Emergency 
Coordinator positions. Finally, until DHS ensures that tasks outlining 
agency responsibilities are consistent with national plans and 
guidelines and DHS develops a method to adequately track federally 
funded research efforts, the United States will lack a coordinated 
national approach to protect against agroterrorism, possibly resulting 
in gaps or needless duplication of effort. By overcoming these 
challenges, the United States will be in a better position to protect 
against and respond to a disease outbreak, whether natural or 
intentional.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To address significant and complex challenges that limit the United 
States' ability to quickly and effectively respond to a widespread 
attack on animal agriculture, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Agriculture address the following four challenges in the context of the 
agency's overall risk management efforts: 

* expedite the review and issuance of the draft rule on USDA's 
accreditation process for veterinarians, which would require training 
in recognizing foreign animal diseases;

* evaluate the costs and benefits of using rapid diagnostic tools at 
the site of an outbreak;

* examine the costs and benefits of developing stockpiles of ready-to- 
use vaccines that can be quickly deployed against animal diseases of 
primary concern; and: 

* simplify the decision-making process for determining if and/or when 
to use vaccines to control an outbreak to ensure that rapid decisions 
can be made in the event of a terrorist attack.

To address management problems that reduce the effectiveness of 
agencies' routine efforts to protect against agroterrorism, we 
recommend the following seven actions: 

* the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture work together to 
identify the reasons for declining agricultural inspections and to 
identify potential areas for improvement;

* the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture streamline the 
flow of information between USDA and DHS agricultural inspectors, and 
expedite the integration of the two agencies' databases and information 
technology systems at the port level;

* the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a mechanism to promptly 
and effectively seek input from key stakeholders on national guidance 
that affects their roles in protecting agriculture and responding to an 
emergency;

* the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Health and 
Human Services, and the Acting Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency compile relevant after-action reports from test 
exercises and real-life emergencies and disseminate the reports through 
the Homeland Security Information Network that DHS is developing;

* the Secretary of Agriculture develop a strategy to increase the 
number of Area and Regional Emergency Coordinator positions so that the 
agency faces less difficulty filling these positions and is better able 
to assist states in preparing for an agriculture emergency, including a 
terrorist attack;

* the Secretary of Homeland Security work to ensure that task lists for 
the various agencies and working groups engaged in securing agriculture 
are consistent with national plans and guidelines; and: 

* the Secretary of Homeland Security develop controls to better 
coordinate and track federally funded research efforts with other 
agencies to protect against agroterrorism.

Agency Comments and Our Response: 

We provided USDA, DHS, HHS, EPA, and DOD with a draft of this report 
for their review and comment. We received written comments on the 
report and its recommendations from USDA, DHS, and HHS. EPA and DOD 
provided minor technical clarifications.

USDA commented that the report provided a number of appropriate and 
insightful recommendations. In several instances, USDA said it could 
take actions that relate to our recommendations. For example, USDA said 
that the department could explore the possibility of speeding up its 
process for deciding when to use vaccines and that it will consider 
options to cut some of the delay in obtaining ready-to-use vaccines. 
The department also raised some concerns regarding various aspects of 
our report. For example, as we recommend, USDA noted that there may be 
opportunities to use rapid diagnostic tools to help with diagnosis of 
animal diseases, but said that the tools need to be validated. Further, 
USDA commented that the agency would in all cases still require 
confirmation that relies on traditional testing procedures. As stated 
in our report, we continue to believe that use of these tools at the 
site of an outbreak would help reduce the impact of a terrorist attack 
because, among other things, these tools would help prevent 
laboratories from becoming overwhelmed with test samples. USDA's 
written comments and our detailed responses to their concerns appear in 
appendix VI. USDA also provided technical comments that we 
incorporated, as appropriate, throughout the report.

DHS generally concurred with the report's recommendations and indicated 
that the agency is in the process of taking several corrective actions 
addressing two of our recommendations. For example, as we recommend, 
DHS is working with USDA to identify the reasons for declining 
agricu