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Airliner Cabin Occupant Safety and Health' which was released on
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Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
October 2003:
AVIATION SAFETY:
Advancements Being Pursued to Improve Airliner Cabin Occupant Safety
and Health:
GAO-04-33:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-33, a report to the Ranking Democratic Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Airline travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in
the United States. Furthermore, there are survivors in the majority of
airliner crashes, according to the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). Additionally, more passengers might have survived if
they had been better protected from the impact of the crash, smoke, or
fire or better able to evacuate the airliner. As requested, GAO
addressed (1) the regulatory actions that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has taken and the technological and operational
improvements, called advancements, that are available or are being
developed to address common safety and health issues in large
commercial airliner cabins and (2) the barriers, if any, that the
United States faces in implementing such advancements.
What GAO Found:
FAA has taken a number of regulatory actions over the past several
decades to address safety and health issues faced by passengers and
flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins. GAO identified
18 completed actions, including those that require safer seats,
cushions with better fire-blocking properties, better floor emergency
lighting, and emergency medical kits. GAO also identified 28
advancements that show potential to further improve cabin safety and
health. These advancements vary in their readiness for deployment.
Fourteen are mature, currently available, and used in some airliners.
Among these are inflatable lap seat belts, exit doors over the wings
that swing out on hinges instead of requiring manual removal, and
photo-luminescent floor lighting. The other 14 advancements are in
various stages of research, engineering, and development in the United
States, Canada, or Europe.
Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin
safety and health advancements. For example, when advancements are
ready for commercial use, factors that may hinder their implementation
include the time it takes for (1) FAA to complete the rule-making
process, (2) U.S. and foreign aviation authorities to resolve
differences between their respective requirements, and (3) the
airlines to adopt or install advancements after FAA has approved their
use. When advancements are not ready for commercial use because they
require further research, FAA’s processes for setting research
priorities and selecting research projects may not ensure that the
limited federal funding for cabin safety and health research is
allocated to the most critical and cost-effective projects. In
particular, FAA does not obtain autopsy and survivor information from
NTSB after it investigates a crash. This information could help FAA
identify and target research to the primary causes of death and
injury. In addition, FAA does not typically perform detailed analyses
of the costs and effectiveness of potential cabin occupant safety and
health advancements, which could help it identify and target research
to the most cost-effective projects.
What GAO Recommends:
This report contains recommendations to FAA to initiate discussions
with NTSB to facilitate the exchange of medical information from
accident investigations and to improve the cost and effectiveness data
available for setting priorities for research on cabin occupant safety
and health. FAA generally agreed with the report’s contents and its
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-33.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Gerald Dillingham at
(202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Regulatory Actions Have Been Taken and Additional Advancements Are
Under Way to Improve Cabin Occupants' Safety and Health:
Several Factors Have Slowed the Implementation of Cabin Occupant Safety
and Health Advancements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Canada and Europe Cabin Occupant Safety and Health
Responsibilities:
Canada:
Europe:
Appendix III: Summary of Key Actions FAA Has Taken to Improve Airliner
Cabin Safety and Health Since 1984:
Appendix IV: Summaries of Potential Impact Safety Advancements:
Retrofitting All Commercial Aircraft with More Advanced Seats:
Improving the Ability of Airplane Floors to Hold Seats in an Accident:
Preventing Overhead Storage Bin Detachment to Protect Passengers in an
Accident:
Child Safety Seats:
Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bags:
Appendix V: Summaries of Potential Fire Safety Advancements:
Fuel Tank Inerting:
Arc Fault Circuit Breaker:
Multisensor Detectors:
Water Mist Fire Suppression:
Fire-Safe Fuels:
Thermal Acoustic Insulation Materials:
Ultra-Fire-Resistant Polymers:
Airport Rescue and Fire-Fighting Operations:
Appendix VI: Summaries of Potential Improved Evacuation Safety
Advancements:
Passenger Safety Briefings:
Exit Seat Briefing:
Photo-luminescent Floor Track Marking:
Crewmember Safety and Evacuation Training:
Acoustic Attraction Signals:
Smoke Hoods:
Exit Slide Testing:
Overwing Exit Doors:
Next Generation Evacuation Equipment and Procedures:
Personal Flotation Devices:
Appendix VII: Summaries of General Cabin Occupant Safety and Health
Advancements:
Advanced Warnings of Turbulence:
Preparations for In-flight Medical Emergencies:
Reducing Health Risks to Passengers with Certain Medical Conditions:
Improved Awareness of Radiation Exposure:
Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Flight Attendants:
Appendix VIII: Application of a Cost Analysis Methodology to Inflatable
Lap Belts:
Inflatable Lap Belts:
Summary of Results:
Methodology:
Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Regulatory Actions Taken by FAA to Improve Cabin Occupant
Safety and Health Since 1984:
Table 2: Advancements with Potential to Improve Cabin Occupant Safety
and Health:
Table 3: Status of 10 Significant FAA Rules Pertaining to Airliner Cabin
Occupants' Safety and Health, Fiscal Year 1995 through September of
Fiscal Year 2003:
Table 4: Costs to Equip an Average-sized Airplane in the U.S. Fleet with
Inflatable Lap Seat Belts, Estimated under Alternative Scenarios (In
2002 discounted dollars):
Table 5: Key Assumptions:
Figures:
Figure 1: Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bag Inflation Sequence:
Figure 2: Manual "Self Help" and "Swing Out" Over-Wing Exits:
Figure 3: Funding for Federal Research on Cabin Occupant Safety and
Health Issues, by Facility, Fiscal Years 2000-2005:
Figure 4: Allocation of Federal Funding for Aircraft Cabin Occupant
Safety and Health Research, Fiscal Year 2003:
Figure 5: Coach Seating and Impact Position in Coach Seating:
Figure 6: Examples of Child Safety Seats:
Figure 7: Water Mist Nozzle and Possible Placement:
Figure 8: Fire Insulation Blankets:
Figure 9: Flammable Cabin Materials and Small-scale Material Test
Device:
Figure 10: Airport Rescue and Fire Training:
Figure 11: Airline Briefing to Passengers on Safety Briefing Cards:
Figure 12: Floor Track Marking Using Photo-luminescent Materials:
Figure 13: Test Installation of Acoustic Signalling Device:
Figure 14: An Example of a Commercially Available Smoke Hood:
Figure 15: Drawing of Possible Emergency Slide Testing of FAA's 747 Test
Aircraft:
Figure 16: Airbus' Planned Double Deck Aircraft:
Abbreviations:
ACRM: Advanced Crew Resource Management:
CAMI: Civil Aerospace Medical Institute:
CRM: Crew Resource Management:
DGAC: Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
DOT IG: Department of Transportation's Inspector General:
DVT: deep vein thrombosis:
EASA: European Aviation Safety Agency:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:
JAA: European Joint Aviation Authorities:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NIOSH: National Institute of Safety and Health:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
OSHA: Occupational Health and Safety Administration:
TRL: Technical Readiness Level:
TSO: Technical Standing Order:
Letter October 3, 2003:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar
Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Oberstar:
Airline travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in
the United States, in large part because of the Congress's, Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA), commercial airlines', aircraft
manufacturers', and airports' combined efforts to prevent commercial
airliner accidents. Furthermore, although a few airliner accidents are
catastrophic, there are survivors in a majority of crashes. According
to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), passengers survived
in 19 of the 26 U.S. large commercial airliner accidents that occurred
from 1982 through 2001, and in these 19 accidents, over 76 percent of
the passengers (1,523 of 1,988) survived.[Footnote 1] Additionally,
some of the passengers who died in these accidents might have survived
if they had been better protected from the impact of the crash or from
the effects of smoke and fire and had been better able to evacuate the
airliner. This possibility of survival has led federal safety officials
to focus their efforts not only on preventing airliner accidents, but
also on increasing the chances of surviving them.
Over the past several decades, FAA has been taking regulatory actions
to require the implementation of technological and operational
improvements in cabin occupant safety and health to help increase
passengers' chances of surviving large commercial airliner accidents.
In addition, FAA and the aviation community have been conducting
research on new technological and operational improvements, which we
refer to in this report as advancements, whose implementation could
further increase passengers' chances of survival and improve the safety
and health of passengers and flight attendants. This report discusses
regulatory actions that FAA has taken as well as potential advancements
in cabin occupant safety and health that are (1) currently available
but not yet implemented or installed, and (2) not yet available and
subject to additional research to advance the technology or lower
costs. For implementation of these advancements to occur, FAA often has
to take regulatory action, that is, issuing regulations or
airworthiness directives that require the implementation of
technological and operational improvements in cabin occupant safety and
health. FAA continues to pursue regulatory initiatives as well as
conduct research to improve cabin occupant safety and health. The
aviation community is also attempting to enhance the safety and health
of those traveling and working in airliner cabins through such measures
as providing earlier warnings of turbulence and information on the
potential to develop blood clots on long-distance flights. Besides
increasing cabin occupants' safety and health, these actions and
efforts could benefit the airlines by helping to restore passengers'
confidence in the safety of flight and thereby increasing the demand
for air travel, which fell sharply after September 11, 2001, and still
remains below fiscal year 2000 levels.
In response to your request, this report addresses the following
questions: (1) What regulatory actions has FAA taken, and what key
advancements are available or being developed by FAA and others to
address safety and health issues faced by passengers and flight
attendants in large commercial airliner cabins? (2) What factors, if
any, slow the implementation of advancements in cabin occupant safety
and health? In addition, as requested, we identified some factors faced
by Canada and Europe in their efforts to improve cabin occupant safety
and health (see app. II).
To identify the regulatory actions FAA has taken and the key
advancements that are available or being developed to address safety
and health issues facing passengers and flight attendants (cabin
occupants), we reviewed the relevant literature, interviewed FAA
officials, and reviewed FAA's documentation on the regulatory actions
it has taken to enhance cabin occupant safety and health. As part of
this effort, FAA officials identified key regulatory actions that had
been completed in this area. In addition, we interviewed other aviation
safety experts in government, industry, and academia from the United
States, Canada, and Europe. (See app. I for additional information.)
Through our reviews and interviews, we found that FAA's regulatory
actions and advancements fell into four broad categories--three related
to safety in the event of a crash and one related to general cabin
occupant safety and health. The regulatory actions and advancements
related to safety in the event of a crash are those actions taken to
(1) minimize injuries from the impact of a crash, (2) prevent fire or
mitigate its effects, and (3) improve the chances and speed of
evacuation. In addition, we discuss the regulatory actions and
advancements FAA has taken to address a fourth category--improving the
safety and health of cabin occupants. Using the results of our reviews
and interviews, we identified and categorized 28 advancements that are
currently available or being developed, including 5 impact
advancements, 8 fire advancements, 10 evacuation advancements, and 5
cabin occupant safety and health advancements. For each of these
advancements, we discuss the background, research, and regulatory
status.[Footnote 2] We also discuss each advancement's technological
readiness for use in the existing commercial airliner fleet or in newly
produced commercial airplanes. To identify factors that have slowed
implementation of airliner cabin occupant safety and health
advancements, we interviewed FAA, NTSB, and industry officials. In
addition, we analyzed documentation from FAA, NTSB, and aviation safety
experts to identify factors relating to key issues within FAA and the
aviation community related to prioritizing and funding research,
choosing advancements for regulatory implementation, and gaining the
aviation community's acceptance of these advancements.
This report does not address cabin air quality because we are doing
work in this area for another congressional requester. In addition,
given the large scope of this review, the report does not focus on
safety and health issues for flight deck crews (pilots and flight
engineers) since they face some unique issues not faced by cabin
occupants. It also does not address aviation security issues, such as
hijackings, sabotage, or terrorist activities.
We conducted our review from January 2002 through September 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
FAA has taken a number of key regulatory actions over the past several
decades to improve the safety and health of passengers and flight
attendants in large commercial airliner cabins. We identified 18 such
completed regulatory actions that FAA has taken since 1984. Table 1
shows the number of such actions by category and provides an example
for each category of action.
Table 1: Regulatory Actions Taken by FAA to Improve Cabin Occupant
Safety and Health Since 1984:
Category of regulatory action: Minimize injuries from the impact of a
crash; Example: Stronger seats; Number of key actions taken: 2.
Category of regulatory action: Prevent fire or mitigate its effects;
Example: Fire-blocking seat cushions; Number of key actions taken: 7.
Category of regulatory action: Improve the chances and speed of
evacuation; Example: Emergency floor lighting; Number of key actions
taken: 6.
Category of regulatory action: Improve the safety and health of cabin
occupants; Example: Onboard emergency medical kits; Number of key
actions taken: 3.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We also identified 28 advancements that have the potential to increase
the chances of surviving a commercial airliner crash and to improve the
safety and health of cabin occupants--both passengers and flight
attendants. Table 2 shows the number of such advancements by category
and provides an example for each.
Table 2: Advancements with Potential to Improve Cabin Occupant Safety
and Health:
Category of advancement: Minimize injuries from the impact of a crash;
Example: Lap seat belts with inflatable air bags; Number of key
advancements: 5.
Category of advancement: Prevent fire or mitigate its effects; Example:
Reduced fuel tank flammability; Number of key advancements: 8.
Category of advancement: Improve the chances and speed of evacuation;
Example: Improved passenger safety briefings; Number of key
advancements: 10.
Category of advancement: Improve the safety and health of cabin
occupants; Example: Advanced warnings of turbulence; Number of key
advancements: 5.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
These 28 advancements vary in their readiness for deployment. For
example, 14 of the technologies are currently available but not yet
implemented or installed. Two of these, preparation for in-flight
medical emergencies and improved insulation, were addressed through
separate regulations. These regulations require airlines to install
additional emergency medical equipment (automatic external
defibrillators and enhanced emergency medical kits) by 2004, replace
flammable insulation (metalized Mylar®) with improved insulation by
2005, and manufacture new large commercial airliners with improved
(thermal acoustic) insulation beginning September 2, 2005. Another
currently available advancement is in FAA's rule-making process--
retrofitting the entire existing fleet with significantly stronger
seats. These seats, commonly referred to as 16g seats, for example, can
withstand the force of an impact 16 times a passenger's body weight
(16g), rather than 9 times (9g), as currently required primarily for
new generation commercial aircraft.[Footnote 3] For the remaining 11
currently available advancements, while FAA does not require their use,
some are being used by selected airlines. For example, some airlines
have elected to use inflatable lap seat belts, exit doors over the
wings that swing out on hinges instead of requiring manual removal, and
photo-luminescent floor lighting.[Footnote 4] In addition, some of
these advancements are available for purchase by the flying public,
including smoke hoods and child safety seats certified for use on
commercial airliners. The remaining 14 advancements are in various
stages of research, engineering, and development in the United States,
Canada, or Europe.
Several factors slow the implementation of advancements in cabin
occupant safety and health, including those that are currently
available, but have not yet been implemented or installed and those
that require further research to demonstrate their effectiveness or
lower their costs before they are ready for implementation. For those
that are ready, and for which design and certification standards have
been developed, FAA may undertake the rule-making process to require
their implementation. As our prior work has shown, this process can
take years. In addition, FAA and its international counterparts attempt
to reach agreement on, or harmonize, their requirements for aviation
procedures and equipment. The authorities' current harmonization
process has resulted in a backlog, which has slowed the implementation
of several cabin occupant safety and health advancements. Finally, the
airlines must implement the advancements. While some advancements, such
as improved safety briefings, can be implemented quickly and
economically, others, such as retrofitting commercial aircraft with
stronger passenger seats, require time-consuming, costly changes. FAA
may give the airlines several years to retrofit their fleets in order
to coordinate the change, when possible, with existing maintenance
schedules and allow the airlines to absorb the associated costs. For
advancements that require further research before they can be
considered for use, FAA's multistep process for identifying potential
cabin occupant safety and health research projects and allocating its
limited resources to research projects on the advancements is hampered
by a lack of autopsy and survivor information and cost and
effectiveness data. According to FAA researchers, they have not had
adequate access to autopsy reports and certain survivor information
that NTSB obtains from autopsy reports and interviews with survivors
during its investigations of commercial airliner accidents. This
information could help FAA to identify the principal causes of death
and injury and the major factors affecting survival, and to target
research to advancements addressing these critical causes and factors.
NTSB told us that while they provide large amounts of information on
the causes of death and injury in information they make publicly
available, they would consider making this additional information
available to FAA if steps were taken to safeguard the privacy of
victims and survivors. FAA's multistep process for selecting research
projects on advancements includes consideration of such factors as
their potential impact on accident prevention and accident mitigation;
however, it does not include developing comparable estimates of cost
and effectiveness for competing advancements to allow direct
comparisons between them on their potential to reduce injuries and
deaths. We developed a cost analysis methodology to illustrate how FAA
could develop comparable cost estimates, to enhance its current
process. The results of such analyses could be combined with similar
estimates of effectiveness using data available from a variety of
sources, including industry and academia. Using comparable cost and
effectiveness data across the range of advancements could position the
agency to choose more effectively between competing advancements,
taking into account estimates of the number of injuries and fatalities
that each advancement might prevent for the dollars invested. Such cost
and effectiveness data would provide a valuable supplement to FAA's
current process for setting research priorities and selecting projects
for funding.
This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of
Transportation to direct the FAA Administrator to initiate discussions
with NTSB to facilitate the exchange of medical information from
accident investigations. In addition, the report contains a
recommendation to the FAA Administrator to improve the analyses
available to decision makers responsible for setting research
priorities and selecting projects for improving the safety and health
of cabin occupants by (1) developing comparable cost estimates of
potential advancements competing for funding and (2) developing or
collecting data on the effectiveness of each potential advancement to
reduce injuries or fatalities. In commenting on a draft of this report,
FAA said that they generally agreed with the report's contents and its
recommendations.
Background:
The safe travel of U.S. airline passengers is a joint responsibility of
FAA and the airlines in accordance with the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended, and the Department of Transportation Act, as amended.
To carry out its responsibilities under these acts, FAA supports
research and development; certifies that new technologies and
procedures are safe; undertakes rule-makings, which when finalized form
the basis of federal aviation regulations; issues other guidance, such
as Advisory Circulars; and oversees the industry's compliance with
standards that aircraft manufacturers and airlines must meet to build
and operate commercial aircraft. Aircraft manufacturers are responsible
for designing aircraft that meet FAA's safety standards, and air
carriers are responsible for operating and maintaining their aircraft
in accordance with the standards for safety and maintenance established
in FAA's regulations. FAA, in turn, certifies aircraft designs and
monitors the industry's compliance with the regulations.
FAA's general process for issuing a regulation, or rule, includes
several steps. When the regulation would require the implementation of
a technology or operation, FAA first certifies that the technology or
operation is safe. Then, FAA publishes a notice of proposed rule-making
in the Federal Register, which sets forth the terms of the rule and
establishes a period for the public to comment on it. Next, FAA reviews
the comments by incorporating changes into the rule that it believes
are warranted, and, in some instances, it repeats these steps one or
more times. Finally, FAA publishes a final rule in the Federal
Register. The final rule includes the date when it will go into effect
and a time line for compliance.
Within FAA, the Aircraft Certification Service is responsible for
certifying that technologies are safe, including improvements to cabin
occupant safety and health, generally through the issuance of new
regulations, a finding certifying an equivalent level of safety, or a
special condition when no rule covers the new technology. The
Certification Service is also responsible for taking enforcement action
to ensure the continued safety of aircraft by prescribing standards for
aircraft manufacturers governing the design, production, and
airworthiness of aeronautical products, such as cabin interiors. The
Flight Standards Service is primarily responsible for certifying an
airline's operations (assessing the airline's ability to carry out its
operations and maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft) and for
monitoring the operations and maintenance of the airline's fleet.
FAA conducts research on cabin occupant safety and health issues in two
research facilities, the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center/Civil
Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the William
J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The institute
focuses on the impact of flight operations on human health, while the
technical center focuses on improvements in aircraft design, operation,
and maintenance and inspection to prevent accidents and improve
survivability. For the institute or the technical center to conduct
research on a project, an internal FAA requester must sponsor the
project. For example, FAA's Office of Regulation and Certification
sponsors much of the two facilities' work in support of FAA's rule-
making activities. FAA also cooperates on cabin safety research with
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), academic
institutions, and private research organizations.
Until recently, NASA conducted research on airplane crashworthiness at
its Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia. However, because of
internal budget reallocations and a decision to devote more of its
funds to aviation security, NASA terminated the Langley Center's
research on the crashworthiness of commercial aircraft in 2002. NASA
continues to conduct fire-related research on cabin safety issues at
its Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio.
NTSB has the authority to investigate civil aviation accidents and
collects data on the causes of injuries and death for the victims of
commercial airliner accidents. According to NTSB, the majority of
fatalities in commercial airliner accidents are attributable to crash
impact forces and the effects of fire and smoke. Specifically, 306 (66
percent) of the 465 fatalities in partially survivable U.S. aviation
accidents from 1983 through 2000 died from impact forces, 131 (28
percent) died from fire and smoke, and 28 (6 percent) died from other
causes.[Footnote 5]
Surviving an airplane crash depends on a number of factors. The space
surrounding a passenger must remain large enough to prevent the
passenger from being crushed. The force of impact must also be reduced
to levels that the passenger can withstand, either by spreading the
impact over a larger part of the body or by increasing the duration of
the impact through an energy-absorbing seat or fuselage. The passenger
must be restrained in a seat to avoid striking the interior of the
airplane, and the seat must not become detached from the floor. Objects
within the airplane, such as debris, overhead luggage bins, luggage,
and galley equipment, must not strike the passenger. A fire in the
cabin must be prevented, or, if one does start, it must burn slowly
enough and produce low enough levels of toxic gases to allow the
passenger to escape from the airplane. If there is a fire, the
passenger must not have sustained injuries that prevent him or her from
escaping quickly. Finally, if the passenger escapes serious injury from
impact and fire, he or she must have access to exit doors and slides or
other means of evacuation.
Regulatory Actions Have Been Taken and Additional Advancements Are
Under Way to Improve Cabin Occupants' Safety and Health:
Over the past several decades, FAA has taken a number of regulatory
actions designed to improve the safety and health of airline passengers
and flight attendants by (1) minimizing injuries from the impact of a
crash, (2) preventing fire or mitigating its effects, (3) improving the
chances and speed of evacuation, or (4) improving the safety and health
of cabin occupants. (See app. III for more information on the
regulatory actions FAA has taken to improve cabin occupant safety and
health.) Specifically, we identified 18 completed regulatory actions
that FAA has taken since 1984. In addition to these past actions, FAA
and others in the aviation community are pursuing advancements in these
four areas to improve cabin occupant safety and health in the future.
We identified and reviewed 28 such advancements--5 to reduce the impact
of a crash on occupants, 8 to prevent or mitigate fire and its effects,
10 to facilitate evacuation from aircraft, and 5 to address general
cabin occupant safety and health issues.
Minimizing Injuries from the Impact of a Crash:
The primary cause of injury and death for cabin occupants in an
airliner accident is the impact of the crash itself. We identified two
key regulatory actions that FAA has taken to better protect passengers
from impact forces. For example, in 1988, FAA required stronger
passenger seats for newly manufactured commercial airplanes to improve
protection in:
survivable crashes.[Footnote 6] These new seats are capable, for
example, of withstanding an impact force that is approximately 16 times
a passenger's body weight (16g), rather than 9 times (9g), and must be
tested dynamically (in multiple directions to simulate crash
conditions), rather than statically (e.g., drop testing to assess the
damage from the force of the weight alone without motion). In addition,
in 1992, FAA issued a requirement for corrective action (airworthiness
directive) for designs found not to meet the existing rules for
overhead storage bins on certain Boeing aircraft, to improve their
crashworthiness after bin failures were observed in the 1989 crash of
an airliner in Kegworth, England, and a 1991 crash near Stockholm,
Sweden.
We also identified five key advancements that are being pursued to
provide cabin occupants with greater impact protection in the future.
These advancements are either under development or currently available.
Examples include the following:
* Lap seat belts with inflatable air bags: Lap seat belts that contain
inflatable air bags have been developed by private companies and are
currently available to provide passengers with added protection during
a crash. About 1,000 of these lap seat belts have been installed on
commercial airplanes, primarily in the seats facing wall dividers
(bulkheads) to prevent passengers from sustaining head injuries during
a crash. (See fig. 1.):
* Improved seating systems: Seat safety depends on several interrelated
systems operating properly, and, therefore, an airline seat is most
accurately discussed as a system. New seating system designs are being
developed by manufacturers to incorporate new safety and aesthetic
designs as well as meet FAA's 16g seat regulations to better protect
passengers from impact forces. These seating systems would help to
ensure that the seats themselves perform as expected (i.e., they stay
attached to the floor tracks); the space between the seats remains
adequate in a crash; and the equipment in the seating area, such as
phones and video screens, does not increase the impact hazard.
* Child safety seats: Child safety seats could provide small children
with additional protection in the event of an airliner crash. NTSB and
others have recommended their use, and FAA has been involved in this
issue for at least 15 years. While it has used its rule-making process
to consider requiring their use, FAA decided not to require child
safety restraints because its analysis found that if passengers were
required to pay full fare for children under the age of 2, some parents
would choose to travel by automobile and, statistically, the chances
would increase that both the children and the adults would be killed.
FAA is continuing to consider a child safety seat requirement.
Figure 1: Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bag Inflation Sequence:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Appendix IV contains additional information on the impact advancements
we have identified.
Preventing Fire or Mitigating Its Effect:
Fire prevention and mitigation efforts have given passengers additional
time to evacuate an airliner following a crash or cabin fire. FAA has
taken seven key regulatory actions to improve fire detection, eliminate
potential fire hazards, prevent the spread of fires, and better
extinguish them. For example, to help prevent the spread of fire and
give passengers more time to escape, FAA upgraded fire safety standards
to require that seat cushions have fire-blocking layers, which resulted
in airlines retrofitting 650,000 seats over a 3-year period. The agency
also set new low heat/smoke standards for materials used for large
interior surfaces (e.g., sidewalls, ceilings, and overhead bins), which
FAA officials told us resulted in a significant improvement in
postcrash fire survivability. FAA also required smoke detectors to be
placed in lavatories and automatic fire extinguishers in lavatory waste
receptacles in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In addition, the agency
required airlines to retrofit their fleets with fire detection and
suppression systems in cargo compartments, which according to FAA,
applied to over 3,700 aircraft at a cost to airlines of $300 million.
To better extinguish fires when they do start, FAA also required, in
1985, that commercial airliners carry two Halon fire extinguishers in
addition to other required extinguishers because of Halon's superior
fire suppression capabilities.
We also identified 8 key advancements that are currently available and
awaiting implementation or are under development to provide additional
fire protection for cabin occupants in the future. Examples include the
following:
* Reduced flammability of insulation materials: To eliminate a
potential fire hazard, in May 2000, FAA required that air carriers
replace insulation blankets covered with a type of insulation known as
metalized Mylar® on specific aircraft by 2005, after it was found that
the material had ignited and contributed to the crash of Swiss Air
Flight 111.[Footnote 7] Over 700 aircraft were affected by this
requirement. In addition, FAA issued a rule in July 2003 requiring that
large commercial airplanes manufactured after September 2, 2005, be
equipped with thermal acoustic insulation designed to an upgraded fire
test standard that will reduce the incidence and intensity of in-flight
fires. In addition, after September 2, 2007, newly manufactured
aircraft must be equipped with thermal acoustic materials designed to
meet a new standard for burn-through resistance, providing passengers
more time to escape during a postcrash fire.
* Reduced fuel tank flammability: Flammable vapors in aircraft fuel
tanks can ignite. However, currently available technology can greatly
reduce this hazard by "blanketing" the fuel tank with nonexplosive
nitrogen-enriched air to suppress ("inert") the potential for explosion
of the tank. The U.S. military has used this technology on selected
aircraft for 20 years, but U.S. commercial airlines have not adopted
the technology because of its cost and weight. FAA officials told us
that the military's technology was also unreliable and designed to meet
military rather than civilian airplane design requirements. FAA fire
safety experts have developed a lighter-weight inerting system for
center fuel tanks, which is simpler than the military system and
potentially more reliable. Reliability of this technology is a major
concern for the aviation industry. According to FAA officials, Boeing
and Airbus began flight testing this technology in July 2003 and August
2003, respectively.[Footnote 8] In addition, the Air Transport
Association (ATA) noted that inerting is only one prospective component
of an ongoing major program for fuel tank safety, and that it has yet
to be justified as feasible and cost-effective.
* Sensor technology: Sensors are currently being developed to better
detect overheated or burning materials. According to FAA and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, many current smoke and
fire detectors are not reliable. For example, a recent FAA study
reported at least one false alarm per week in cargo compartment fire
detection systems. The new detectors are being developed by Airbus and
others in private industry to reduce the number of false alarms. In
addition, FAA is developing standards that would be used to approve
new, reduced false alarm sensors. NASA is also developing new sensors
and detectors.
* Water mist for extinguishing fires: Technology has been under
development for over two decades to dispense water mist during a fire
to protect passengers from heat and smoke and prevent the spread of
fire in the cabin. The most significant development effort has been
made by a European public-private consortium, FIREDETEX, with over 5
million euros of European Community funding and a total project cost of
over 10 million euros (over 10 million U.S. dollars). The development
of this system was prompted, in part, by the need to replace Halon,
when it was determined that this main firefighting agent used in fire
extinguishers aboard commercial airliners depletes ozone in the
atmosphere.
Appendix V contains additional information on advancements that address
fire prevention and mitigation.
Improving the Chances and Speed of Evacuation:
Enabling passengers to evacuate more quickly during an emergency has
saved lives. Over the past two decades, FAA has completed regulatory
action on the following six key requirements to help speed evacuations:
* Improve access to certain emergency exits, such as those generally
smaller exits above the wing, by providing an unobstructed passageway
to the exit.
* Install public address systems that are independently powered and can
be used for at least 10 minutes.
* Help to ensure that passengers in the seats next to emergency exits
are physically and mentally able to operate the exit doors and assist
other passengers in emergency evacuations.
* Limit the distance between emergency exits to 60 feet.
* Install emergency lighting systems that visually identify the
emergency escape path and each exit.
* Install fire-resistant emergency evacuation slides.
We also identified 10 advancements that are either currently available
but awaiting implementation or require additional research that could
lead to improved aircraft evacuation, including the following:
* Improved passenger safety briefings: Information is available to the
airlines on how to develop more appealing safety briefings and safety
briefing cards so that passengers would be more likely to pay attention
to the briefings and be better prepared to evacuate successfully during
an emergency. Research has found that passengers often ignore the oral
briefings and do not familiarize themselves with the safety briefing
cards. FAA has requested that air carriers explore different ways to
present safety information to passengers, but FAA regulates only the
content of briefings. The presentation style of safety briefings is
left up to air carriers.
* Over-wing exit doors: Exit doors located over the wings of some
commercial airliners have been redesigned to "swing out" and away from
the aircraft so that cabin occupants can exit more easily during an
emergency. Currently, the over-wing exit doors on most U.S. commercial
airliners are "self help" doors and must be lifted and stowed by a
passenger, which can impede evacuation. (See fig. 2.) The redesigned
doors are now used on new-generation B-737 aircraft operated by one
U.S. and most European airlines. FAA does not currently require the use
of over-wing exit doors that swing out because the exit doors that are
removed manually meet the agency's safety standards. However, FAA is
working with the Europeans to develop common requirements for the use
of this type of exit door.
* Audio attraction signals: The United Kingdom's Civil Aviation
Authority and the manufacturer are testing audio attraction signals to
determine their usefulness to passengers in locating exit doors during
an evacuation. These signals would be mounted near exits and activated
during an emergency. The signals would help the passengers find the
nearest exit even if lighting and exit signs were obscured by smoke.
Figure 2: Manual "Self Help" and "Swing Out" Over-Wing Exits:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Appendix VI contains additional information on advancements to improve
aircraft emergency evacuations.
Improving the Safety and Health of Cabin Occupants:
Passengers and flight attendants can face a range of safety and health
effects while aboard commercial airliners. We identified three key
actions taken by FAA to help maintain the safety and health of
passengers and the:
cabin crew during normal flight operations.[Footnote 9] For example, to
prevent passengers from being injured during turbulent conditions, FAA
initiated the Turbulence Happens campaign in 2000 to increase public
awareness of the importance of wearing seatbelts. The agency has
advised the airlines to warn passengers to fasten their seatbelts when
turbulence is expected, and the airlines generally advise or require
passengers to keep their seat belts fastened while seated to help avoid
injuries from unexpected turbulence. FAA has also required the airlines
to equip their fleets with emergency medical kits since 1986. In
addition, Congress banned smoking on most domestic flights in 1990.
We also identified five advancements that are either currently
available but awaiting implementation or require additional research
that could lead to an improvement in the health of passengers and
flight attendants in the future.
* Automatic external defibrillators: Automatic external defibrillators
are currently available for use on some commercial airliners if a
passenger or crew member requires resuscitation. In 1998, the Congress
directed FAA to assess the need for the defibrillators on commercial
airliners. On the basis of its findings, the agency issued a rule
requiring that U.S. airlines equip their aircraft with automatic
external defibrillators by 2004. According to ATA, most airlines have
already done so.
* Enhanced emergency medical kits: In 1998, the Congress directed FAA
to collect data for 1 year on the types of in-flight medical
emergencies that occurred to determine if existing medical kits should
be upgraded. On the basis of the data collected, FAA issued a rule that
required the contents of existing emergency medical kits to be expanded
to deal with a broader range of emergencies. U.S. commercial airliners
are required to carry these enhanced emergency medical kits by 2004.
Most U.S. airlines have already completed this upgrade, according to
ATA.
* Advance warning of turbulence: New airborne weather radar and other
technologies are currently being developed and evaluated to improve the
detection of turbulence and increase the time available to cabin
occupants to avert potential injuries. FAA's July 2003 draft strategic
plan established a performance target of reducing injuries to cabin
occupants caused by turbulence. To achieve this objective, FAA plans to
continue evaluating new airborne weather radars and other technologies
that broadly address weather issues, including turbulence. In addition,
the draft strategic plan set a performance target of reducing serious
injuries caused by turbulence by 33 percent by fiscal year 2008--using
the average for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 of 15 injuries per year
as the baseline and reducing this average to no more than 10 per year.
* Improve awareness of radiation exposure: Flight attendants and
passengers who fly frequently can be exposed to higher levels of
radiation on a cumulative basis than the general public. High levels of
radiation have been linked to an increased risk of cancer and potential
harm to fetuses. To help passengers and crew members estimate their
past and future radiation exposure levels, FAA developed a computer
model, which is publicly available on its Web site [Hyperlink, http://
www.jag.cami.jccbi.gov/cariprofile.asp] http://www.jag.cami.jccbi.gov/
cariprofile.asp. However, the extent to which flight attendants and
frequent flyers are aware of cosmic radiation's risks and make use of
FAA's computer model is unclear. Agency officials told us that they
plan to install a counter capability on its Civil Aerospace Medical
Institute Web site to track the number of visits to its aircrew and
passenger health and safety Web site. FAA also plans to issue an
Advisory Circular by early next year, which incorporates the findings
of a just completed FAA report, "What Aircrews Should Know About Their
Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation." This Advisory Circular
will include recommended actions for aircrews and information on solar
flare event notification of aircrews. In contrast, airlines in Europe
abide by more stringent requirements for helping to ensure that cabin
and flight crew members do not receive excessive doses of radiation
from performing their flight duties during a given year. For example,
in May 1996, the European Union issued a directive for workers,
including air carrier crew members (cabin and flight crews) and the
general public, on basic safety and health protections against dangers
arising from ionizing radiation. This directive set dose limits and
required air carriers to (1) assess and monitor the exposure of all
crew members to avoid exceeding exposure limits, (2) work with those
individuals at risk of high exposure levels to adjust their work or
flight schedules to reduce those levels, and (3) inform crew members of
the health risks that their work involves from exposure to radiation.
It also required airlines to work with female crew members, when they
announce a pregnancy, to avoid exposing the fetus to harmful levels of
radiation. This directive was binding for all European Union member
states and became effective in May 2000.
* Improved awareness of potential health effects related to flying: Air
travel may exacerbate some medical conditions. Of particular concern is
a condition known as Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT), or travelers'
thrombosis, in which blood clots can develop in the deep veins of the
legs from extended periods of inactivity. In a small percentage of
cases, the clots can break free and travel to the lungs, with
potentially fatal results. Although steps can be taken to avoid or
mitigate some travel-related health effects, no formal awareness
campaigns have been initiated by FAA to help ensure that this
information reaches physicians and the traveling public. The Aerospace
Medical Association's Web site [Hyperlink, http://www.asma.org/
publication.html] http://www.asma.org/publication.html includes
guidance for physicians to use in advising passengers with preexisting
medical conditions on the potential risks of flying, as well as
information for passengers with such conditions to use in assessing
their own potential risks.
See appendix VII for additional information on health-related advances.
Advancements Vary in Their Readiness for Deployment:
The advancements being pursued to improve the safety and health of
cabin occupants vary in their readiness for deployment. For example, of
the 28 advancements we reviewed, 14 are mature and currently available.
Two of these, preparation for in-flight medical emergencies and the use
of new insulation, were addressed through regulations. These
regulations require airlines to install additional emergency medical
equipment (automatic external defibrillators and enhanced emergency
medical kits) by 2004, replace flammable insulation covering (metalized
Mylar®) on specific aircraft by 2005, and manufacture new large
commercial airliners that use a new type of insulation meeting more
stringent flammability test standards after September 2, 2005. Another
advancement is currently in the rule-making process--retrofitting the
existing fleet with stronger 16g seats. The remaining 11 advancements
are available, but are not required by FAA. For example, some airlines
have elected to use inflatable lap seat belts and exit doors over the
wings that swing out instead of requiring manual removal, and others
are using photo-luminescent floor lighting in lieu of or in combination
with traditional electrical lighting. Some of these advancements are
commercially available to the flying public, including smoke hoods and
child safety seats certified for use on commercial airliners. The
remaining 14 advancements are in various stages of research,
engineering, and development in the United States, Canada, or Europe.
Several Factors Have Slowed the Implementation of Cabin Occupant Safety
and Health Advancements:
Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin
occupant safety and health advancements in the United States. When
advancements are available for commercial use but not yet implemented
or installed, their use may be slowed by the time it takes (1) for FAA
to complete the rule-making process,[Footnote 10] which may be required
for an advancement to be approved for use but may take many years; (2)
for U.S. and foreign aviation authorities to resolve differences
between their respective cabin occupant safety and health requirements;
and (3) for the airlines to adopt or install advancements after FAA has
approved their use, including the time required to schedule an
advancement's installation to coincide with major maintenance cycles
and thereby minimize the costs associated with taking an airplane out
of service. When advancements are not ready for commercial use because
they need further research to develop their technologies or reduce
their costs, their implementation may be slowed by FAA's multistep
process for identifying advancements and allocating its limited
resources to research on potential advancements. FAA's multistep
process is hampered by a lack of autopsy and survivor information from
past accidents and by not having cost and effectiveness data as part of
the decision process. As a result, FAA may not be identifying and
funding the most critical or cost-effective research projects.
FAA's Rule-making Process to Require Advancements Can Be Lengthy:
Once an advancement has been developed, FAA may require its use, but
significant time may be required before the rule-making process is
complete. One factor that contributes to the length of this process is
a requirement for cost-benefit analyses to be completed. Time is
particularly important when safety is at stake or when the pace of
technological development exceeds the pace of rule-making. As a result,
some rules may need to be developed quickly to address safety issues or
to guide the use of new technologies. However, rules must also be
carefully considered before being finalized because they can have a
significant impact on individuals, industries, the economy, and the
environment. External pressures--such as political pressure generated
by highly publicized accidents, recommendations by NTSB, and
congressional mandates--as well as internal pressures, such as changes
in management's emphasis, continue to add to and shift the agency's
priorities.
The rule-making process can be long and complicated and has delayed the
implementation of some technological and operational safety
improvements, as we reported in July 2001.[Footnote 11]In that report,
we reviewed 76 significant rules in FAA's workload for fiscal years
1995 through 2000--10 of the 76 were directly related to improving the
safety and health of cabin occupants.[Footnote 12] Table 3 details the
status or disposition of these 10 rules. The shortest rule-making
action took 1 year, 11 months (for child restraint systems), and the
longest took 10 years, 1 month (for the type and number of emergency
exits). However, one proposed rule was still pending after 15 years,
while three others were terminated or withdrawn after 9 years or more.
Of the 76 significant rules we reviewed, FAA completed the rule-making
process for 29 of them between fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 2000,
in a median time of about 2 ½ years to proceed from formal initiation
of the rule-making process through publication of the final rule;
however, FAA took 10 years or more to move from formal initiation of
the rule-making process through publication of the final rule for 6 of
these 29 rules.
Table 3: Status of 10 Significant FAA Rules Pertaining to Airliner
Cabin Occupants' Safety and Health, Fiscal Year 1995 through September
of Fiscal Year 2003:
Rule title: Flight attendant requirements; Initiation date[A]: 2/04/86;
Time elapsed: 9 years, 8 months; Status/disposition:
Terminated/withdrawn 6/06/96.
Rule title: Type and number of passenger emergency exits required in
transport category airplanes; Initiation date[A]: 10/15/86; Time
elapsed: 10 years, 1 month; Status/disposition: Final rule
published on 11/08/96.
Rule title: Airworthiness standards; occupant protection standards for
commuter category airplanes; Initiation date[A]: 5/29/87; Time elapsed:
11 years, 1 month; Status/disposition: Terminated/withdrawn;
6/30/98.
Rule title: Retrofit of improved seats in air carrier transport
category airplanes; Initiation date[A]: 1/26/88; Time elapsed: 15
years, 6 months; Status/disposition: Pending.
Rule title: Child restraint systems; Initiation date[A]: 5/30/90; Time
elapsed: 5 years, 9 months; Status/disposition: Terminated/
withdrawn; 2/13/96.
Rule title: Revised access to Type III exits; Initiation date[A]: 10/
30/92; Time elapsed: 9 years, 5 months; Status/disposition:
Withdrawn; 5/03/02.
Rule title: Child restraint systems; Initiation date[A]: 7/18/94; Time
elapsed: 1 year 11 months; Status/disposition: Final rule
published on 6/04/96.
Rule title: Child restraint systems; Initiation date[A]: 4/07/97; Time
elapsed: 6 years, 3 months; Status/disposition: Pending.
Rule title: Emergency medical equipment; Initiation date[A]: 10/5/98;
Time elapsed: 2 years, 8 months; Status/disposition: Final
rule published on; 6/12/01.
Rule title: Improved flammability standards for thermal acoustic
insulation materials in transport category aircraft; Initiation
date[A]: 12/04/98; Time elapsed: 4 years, 7 months; Status/
disposition: Final rule published on July 31, 2003.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
Note: In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA noted that examining
the years elapsed from the initiation date of the rule to disposition
can be unfair to some actions and that many of the delays were not the
fault of FAA.
[A] Initiation dates were identified in FAA's rule-making information
system as GAO reported in July 2001. This was the only source for data
on the agency's internal milestones, including "initiation date.":
[End of table]
Differences in U.S. and Foreign Requirements Can Hamper Adoption of
Advancements:
FAA and its international counterparts, such as the European Joint
Aviation Authorities (JAA), impose a number of requirements to improve
safety. At times, these requirements differ, and efforts are needed to
reach agreement on procedures and equipment across country borders. In
the absence of such agreements, the airlines generally must adopt
measures to implement whichever requirement is more stringent. In 1992,
FAA and JAA began harmonizing their requirements for (1) the design,
manufacture, operation, and maintenance of civil aircraft and related
product parts; (2) noise and emissions from aircraft; and (3) flight
crew licensing. Harmonizing the U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations with
the European Joint Aviation Regulations is viewed by FAA as its most
comprehensive long-term rule-making effort and is considered critical
to ensuring common safety standards and minimizing the economic burden
on the aviation industry that can result from redundant inspection,
evaluation, and testing requirements.
According to both FAA and JAA, the process they have used to date to
harmonize their requirements for commercial aircraft has not
effectively prioritized their joint recommendations for harmonizing
U.S. and European aviation requirements, and led to many
recommendations going unpublished for years. This includes a backlog of
over 130 new rule-making efforts. The slowness of this process led the
United States and Europe to develop a new rule-making process to
prioritize safety initiatives, focus the aviation industry's and their
own limited resources, and establish limitations on rule-making
capabilities. Accordingly, in March 2003, FAA and JAA developed a draft
joint "priority" rule-making list; collected and considered industry
input; and coordinated with FAA's, JAA's, and Transport Canada Civil
Aviation's management. This effort has resulted in a rule-making list
of 26 priority projects. In June 2003, at the 20TH Annual JAA/FAA
International Conference, FAA, JAA, and Transport Canada Civil Aviation
discussed the need to, among other things, support the joint priority
rule-making list and to establish a cycle for updating it--to keep it
current and to provide for "pop-up," or unexpected, rule-making needs.
FAA and JAA discussed the need to prioritize rule-making efforts to
efficiently achieve aviation safety goals; that they would work from a
limited agreed-upon list for future rule-making activities; and that
FAA and the European Aviation Safety Agency, which is gradually
replacing JAA, should continue with this approach.
In the area of cabin occupant safety and heath, some requirements have
been harmonized, while others have not. For example, in 1996, JAA
changed its rule on floor lighting to allow reflective, glow-in-the-
dark material to be used rather than mandating the electrically powered
lighting that FAA required. The agency subsequently permitted the use
of this material for floor lighting. In addition, FAA finalized a rule
in July 2003 to require a new type of insulation designed to delay fire
burning though the fuselage into the cabin during an accident. JAA
favors a performance-based standard that would specify a minimum delay
in burn-through time, but allow the use of different technologies to
achieve the standard. FAA officials said that the agency would consider
other technologies besides insulation to achieve burn-through
protection but that it would be the responsibility of the applicant to
demonstrate that the technology provided performance equivalent to that
stipulated in the insulation rule. JAA officials told us that these are
examples of the types of issues that must be resolved when they work to
harmonize their requirements with FAA's. These officials added that
this process is typically very time consuming and has allowed for
harmonizing about five rules per year.
Significant Time May Be Needed to Implement Advancements Once They Are
Required, but Some May Enhance Airlines' Competitiveness:
After an advancement has been developed, shown to be beneficial,
certified, and required by FAA, the airlines or manufacturers need time
to implement or install the advancement.[Footnote 13] FAA generally
gives the airlines or manufacturers a window of time to comply with its
rules. For example, FAA gave air carriers 5 years to replace metalized
Mylar® insulation on specific aircraft with a less flammable insulation
type, and FAA's proposed rule-making on 16g seats would give the
airlines 14 years to install these seats in all existing commercial
airliners. ATA officials told us that this would require replacement of
496,000 seats.
The airline industry's recent financial hardships may also delay the
adoption of advancements. Recently, two major U.S. carriers filed for
bankruptcy,[Footnote 14] and events such as the war in Iraq have
reduced passenger demand and airline revenues below levels already
diminished by the events of September 11, 2001, and the economic
downturn. Current U.S. demand for air travel remains below fiscal year
2000 levels. As a result, airlines may ask for exemptions from some
requirements or extensions of time to install advancements.
While implementing new safety and health advancements can be costly for
the airlines, making these changes could improve the public's
confidence in the overall safety of air travel. In addition, some
aviation experts in Europe told us that health-related cabin
improvements, particularly improvements in air quality, are of high
interest to Europeans and would likely be used in the near future by
some European air carriers to set themselves apart from their
competitors.
FAA's Multistep Process for Allocating Limited Resources to Research
Projects Is Hampered by Lack of Autopsy and Survivor Information and
Cost and Effectiveness Data:
For fiscal year 2003, FAA and NASA allocated about $16.2 million to
cabin occupant safety and health research. FAA's share of this research
represented $13.1 million, or about 9 percent of the agency's Research,
Engineering, and Development budget of $148 million for fiscal year
2003. Given the level of funding allocated to this research effort, it
is important to ensure that the best research projects are selected.
However, FAA's processes for setting research priorities and selecting
projects for further research are hampered by data limitations. In
particular, FAA lacks certain autopsy and survivor information from
aircraft crashes that could help it identify and target research to the
most important causes of death and injury in an airliner crash. In
addition, for the proposed research projects, the agency does not (1)
develop comparable cost data for potential advancements or (2) assess
their potential effectiveness in minimizing injuries or saving lives.
Such cost and effectiveness data would provide a valuable supplement to
FAA's current process for setting research priorities and selecting
projects for funding.
Federal Research on Aircraft Cabin Occupant Safety and Health Issues:
Both FAA and NASA conduct research on aircraft cabin occupant safety
and health issues. The Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) and the
Hughes Technical Center are FAA's primary facilities for conducting
research in this area. In addition, two facilities at NASA, the Langley
and Glenn research centers, have also conducted research in this area.
As figure 3 shows, federal funding for this research since fiscal year
2000, reached a high in fiscal year 2002, at about $17 million, and
fell to about $16.2 million in fiscal year 2003. The administration's
proposal for fiscal year 2004 calls for a further reduction to $15.9
million. This funding covers the expenses of researchers at these
facilities and of the contracts they may have with others to conduct
research. In addition, NASA recently decided to end its crash research
at Langley and to close a drop test facility that it operates in
Hampton, Virginia.
Figure 3: Funding for Federal Research on Cabin Occupant Safety and
Health Issues, by Facility, Fiscal Years 2000-2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: FAA Hughes Technical Center data includes work in fire-safe
fuels, fuel-tank inerting, arc fault circuit breakers, and airport
rescue and fire-fighting operations.
[End of figure]
In fiscal year 2003, FAA and NASA both supported research projects,
including aircraft impact, fire, evacuation, and health. As figure 4
shows, most of the funding for cabin occupant safety and health
research has gone to fire-related projects.
Figure 4: Allocation of Federal Funding for Aircraft Cabin Occupant
Safety and Health Research, Fiscal Year 2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Sum of bars exceeds $16.2 million due to rounding. FAA Technical
Center data includes work in fire-safe fuels, fuel-tank inerting, arc
fault circuit breakers, and airport rescue and fire-fighting
operations:
[End of figure]
FAA Research Selection Process Hampered by Lack of Autopsy and Survivor
Information and Cost and Effectiveness Analyses:
To establish research priorities and select projects to fund, FAA uses
a multistep process. First, within each budget cycle, a number of
Technical Community Representative Group subcommittees from within FAA
generate research ideas. Various subcommittees have responsibility for
identifying potential safety and health projects, including
subcommittees on crash dynamics, fire safety, structural integrity,
passenger evacuation, aeromedical, and fuel safety. Each subcommittee
proposes research projects to review committees, which prioritize the
projects. The projects are considered and weighted according to the
extent to which they address (1) accident prevention, (2) accident
survival, (3) external requests for research, (4) internal requests for
research, and (5) technology research needs. In addition, the cost of
the proposed research is considered before arriving at a final list of
projects. The prioritized list is then considered by the Program
Planning Team, which reviews the projects from a policy perspective.
Although the primary causes of death and injury in commercial airliner
crashes are known to be impact, fire, and impediments to evacuation,
FAA does not have as detailed an understanding as it would like of the
critical factors affecting survival in a crash. According to FAA
officials, obtaining a more detailed understanding of these factors
would assist them in setting research priorities and in evaluating the
relative importance of competing research proposals. To obtain a more
detailed understanding of the critical factors affecting survival, FAA
believes that it needs additional information from passenger autopsies
and from passengers who survived. With this information, FAA could then
regulate safety more effectively, airplane and equipment designers
could build safer aircraft, including cabin interiors, and more
passengers could survive future accidents as equipment became safer.
While FAA has independent authority to investigate commercial airliner
crashes, NTSB generally controls access to the accident investigation
site in pursuit of its primary mission of determining the cause of the
crash. When NTSB concludes its investigation, it returns the airplane
to its owner and keeps the records of the investigation, including the
autopsy reports and the information from survivors that NTSB obtains
from medical authorities and through interviews or questionnaires. NTSB
makes summary information on the crashes publicly available on its Web
site, but according to the FAA researchers, this information is not
detailed enough for their needs. For example, the researchers would
like to develop a complete autopsy database that would allow them to
look for common trends in accidents, among other things. In addition,
the researchers would like to know where survivors sat on the airplane,
what routes they took to exit, what problems they encountered, and what
injuries they sustained. This information would help the researchers
analyze factors that might have an impact on survival. According to the
NTSB's Chief of the Survival Factors Division in the Office of Aviation
Safety, NTSB provides information on the causes of death and a
description of injuries in the information they make publicly
available. In addition, although medical records and autopsy reports
are not made public, interviews with and questionnaires from survivors
are available from the public docket.
NTSB's Medical Officer was unaware of any formal requests from the FAA
for the NTSB to provide them with copies of this type of information,
although the FAA had previously been invited to review such information
at NTSB headquarters. He added that the Board would likely consider a
formal request from FAA for copies of autopsy reports and certain
survivor records, but that it was also likely that the FAA would have
to assure NTSB that the information would be appropriately safeguarded.
According to FAA officials, close cooperation between the NTSB and the
FAA is needed for continued progress in aviation safety.
Besides lacking detailed information on the causes of death and injury,
FAA does not develop data on the cost to implement advancements that
are comparable for each, nor does it assess the potential effectiveness
of each advancement in reducing injuries and saving lives.
Specifically, FAA does not conduct cost-benefit analyses as part of its
multistep process for setting research priorities. Making cost
estimates of competing advancements would allow direct comparisons
across alternatives, which, when combined with comparable estimates of
effectiveness, would provide valuable supplemental information to
decision makers when setting research priorities. FAA considers its
current process to be appropriate and sufficient. In commenting on a
draft of this report, FAA noted that it is very difficult to develop
realistic cost data for advancements during the earliest stages of
research. The agency cautioned that if too much emphasis is placed on
cost/benefit analyses, potentially valuable research may not be
undertaken. Recognizing that it is less difficult to develop cost and
effectiveness information as research progresses, we are recommending
that FAA develop and use cost and effectiveness analyses to supplement
its current process. At later stages in the development process, we
found that this information can be developed fairly easily through cost
and effectiveness analyses using currently available data. For example,
we performed an analysis of the cost to implement inflatable lap seat
belts using a cost analysis methodology we developed (see app. VIII).
This analysis allowed us to estimate how much this advancement would
cost per airplane and per passenger trip. Such cost analyses could be
combined with similar analyses of effectiveness to identify the most
cost-effective projects, based on their potential to minimize injuries
and reduce fatalities. Potential sources of effectiveness data include
FAA, academia, industry, and other aviation authorities.
Conclusions:
Although FAA and the aviation community are pursuing a number of
advancements to enhance commercial airliners' cabin occupant safety and
health, several factors have slowed their implementation. For example,
for advancements that are currently available but are not yet
implemented or installed, progress is slowed by the length of time it
takes for FAA to complete its rule-making process, for the U.S and
foreign countries to agree on the same requirements, and for the
airlines to actually install the advancements after FAA has required
them. In addition, FAA's multistep process for identifying potential
cabin occupant safety and health research projects and allocating its
limited research funding is hampered by the lack of autopsy and
survivor information from airliner crashes and by the lack of cost and
effectiveness analysis. Given the level of funding allocated to cabin
occupant safety and health research, it is important for FAA to ensure
that this funding is targeting the advancements that address the most
critical needs and show the most promise for improving the safety and
health of cabin occupants. However, because FAA lacks detailed autopsy
and survivor information, it is hampered in its ability to identify the
principal causes of death and survival in commercial airliner crashes.
Without an agreement with the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) to receive detailed autopsy and survivor information, FAA lacks
information that could be helpful in understanding the factors that
contribute to surviving a crash. Furthermore, because FAA does not
develop comparable estimates of cost and effectiveness of competing
research projects, it cannot ensure that it is funding those
technologies with the most promise of saving lives and reducing
injuries. Such cost and effectiveness data would provide a valuable
supplement to FAA's current process for setting research priorities and
selecting projects for funding. To facilitate FAA's development of
comparable cost data across advancements, we developed a cost analysis
methodology that could be combined with a similar analysis of
effectiveness to identify the most cost-effective projects. Using
comparable cost and effectiveness data across the range of advancements
would position the agency to choose more effectively between competing
advancements, taking into account estimates of the number of injuries
and fatalities that each advancement might prevent for the dollars
invested. In turn, FAA would have more assurance that the level of
funding allocated to this effort maximizes the safety and health of the
traveling public and the cabin crew members who serve them.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide FAA decision makers with additional data for use in setting
priorities for research on cabin occupant safety and health and in
selecting competing research projects for funding, we recommend that
the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to:
* initiate discussions with the National Transportation Safety Board in
an effort to obtain the autopsy and survivor information needed to more
fully understand the factors affecting survival in a commercial
airliner crash and:
* supplement its current process by developing and using comparable
estimates of cost and effectiveness for each cabin occupant safety and
health advancement under consideration for research funding.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of
Transportation for its review and comment. FAA generally agreed with
the report's contents and its recommendations. The agency provided us
with oral comments, primarily technical clarifications, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
:
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Transportation;
the Administrator, FAA; and the Chairman, NTSB. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report is
also available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, http://
www.gao.gov] http://www.gao.gov.
Contacts and staff acknowledgements for this report are included in
appendix IX. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me
or Glen Trochelman at (202) 512-2834:
Sincerely yours,
Gerald L. Dillingham
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
As requested by the Ranking Democratic Member, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, we addressed the following
questions: (1) What regulatory actions has the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) taken, and what key advancements are available or
being developed by FAA and others to address safety and health issues
faced by passengers and flight attendants in large commercial airliner
cabins? (2) What factors, if any, slow the implementation of
advancements in cabin occupant safety and health? In addition, as
requested, we identified some factors affecting efforts by Canada and
Europe to improve cabin occupant safety and health.
The scope of our report includes the cabins of large commercial
aircraft (those that carry 30 or more passengers) operated by U.S.
domestic commercial airlines and addresses the safety and health of
passengers and flight attendants from the time they board the airliner
until they disembark under normal operational conditions or emergency
situations. This report identifies cabin occupant safety and health
advancements (technological or operational improvements) that could be
implemented, primarily through FAA's rule-making process. Such
improvements include technological changes designed to increase the
overall safety of commercial aviation as well as changes to enhance
operational safety. The report does not include information on the
flight decks of large commercial airliners or safety and health issues
affecting flight deck crews (pilots and flight engineers), because they
face some issues not faced by cabin occupants. It also does not address
general aviation and corporate aircraft or aviation security issues,
such as hijackings, sabotage, or terrorist activities.
To identify regulatory actions that FAA has taken to address safety and
health issues faced by passengers and flight attendants in large
commercial airliner cabins, we interviewed and collected documentation
from U.S. federal agency officials on major safety and health efforts
completed by FAA. The information we obtained included key dates and
efforts related to cabin occupant safety and health, such as rule-
makings, airworthiness directives, and Advisory Circulars.
To identify key advancements that are available or are being developed
by FAA and others to address safety and health issues faced by
passengers and flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins,
we consulted experts (1) to help ensure that we had included the
advancements holding the most promise for improving safety and health;
and (2) to help us structure an evaluation of selected advancements
(i.e., confirm that we had included the critical benefits and drawbacks
of the potential advancements) and develop a descriptive analysis for
them, where appropriate, including their benefits, costs, technology
readiness levels, and regulatory status. In addition, we interviewed
and obtained documentation from federal agency officials and other
aviation safety experts at the Federal Aviation Administration
(including its headquarters in Washington, D.C; Transport Airplane
Directorate in Renton, Washington; William J. Hughes Technical Center
in Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center/
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma); National
Transportation Safety Board; National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA); Air Transport Association; Regional Airline
Association; International Air Transport Association; Aerospace
Industries Association; Aerospace Medical Association; Flight Safety
Foundation, Association of Flight Attendants; Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group; Airbus; Cranfield University, United Kingdom;
University of Greenwich, United Kingdom; National Aerospace Laboratory,
Netherlands; Joint Aviation Authorities, Netherlands; Civil Aviation,
Netherlands; Civil Aviation Authority, United Kingdom; RGW Cherry and
Associates; Air Accidents Investigations Branch, United Kingdom;
Syndicat National du Personnel Navigant Commercial (French cabin crew
union) and ITF Cabin Crew Committee, France; BEA (comparable to the
U.S. NTSB), France; and the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile
(DGAC), FAA's French counterpart.
To describe the status of key advancements that are available or under
development, we used NASA's technology readiness levels (TRL). These
levels form a system for ranking the maturity of particular
technologies and are as follows:
* TRL 1: Basic principles observed and reported:
* TRL 2: Technology concept and/or application formulated:
* TRL 3: Analytical and experimental critical function and/or
characteristic proof-of-concept developed:
* TRL 4: Component validation in laboratory environment:
* TRL 5: Component and/or validation in relevant environment:
* TRL 6: System or subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a
relevant environment:
* TRL 7: System prototype demonstrated in a space environment:
* TRL 8: Actual system completed and "flight qualified" through test
and demonstration:
* TRL 9: Actual system "flight proven" through successful mission
operations:
To determine what factors, if any, slow the implementation of
advancements in cabin occupant safety and health, we reviewed the
relevant literature and interviewed and analyzed documentation from the
U.S. federal officials cited above for the 18 key regulatory actions
FAA has taken since 1984 to improve the safety and health of cabin
occupants. We used this same approach to assess the regulatory status
of the 28 advancements we reviewed that are either currently available,
but not yet implemented or installed, or require further research to
demonstrate their effectiveness or lower their costs. In identifying 28
advancements, GAO is not suggesting that these are the only
advancements being pursued; rather, these advancements have been
recognized by aviation safety experts we contacted as offering promise
for improving the safety and health of cabin occupants. To determine
how long it generally takes for FAA to issue new rules, in addition to
speaking with FAA officials, we relied on past GAO work and updated it,
as necessary. In order to examine the effect of FAA and European
efforts to harmonize their aviation safety requirements, we interviewed
and analyzed documentation from aviation safety officials and other
experts in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Furthermore, to
examine the factors affecting airlines' ability to implement or install
advancements after FAA requires them, we interviewed and analyzed
documentation from aircraft manufacturers, ATA, and FAA officials.
In addition, to determine what factors slow implementation we examined
FAA's processes for selecting research projects to improve cabin
occupant safety and health. In examining whether FAA has sufficient
data upon which to base its research priorities, we interviewed FAA and
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials about autopsy and
survivor information from commercial airliner accidents. We also
examined the use of cost and effectiveness data in FAA's research
selection process for cabin occupant safety and health projects. To
facilitate FAA's development of such cost estimates, we developed a
cost analysis methodology to illustrate how the agency could do this.
Specifically, we developed a cost analysis for inflatable lap belts to
show how data on key cost variables could be obtained from a variety of
sources. We selected lap belts because they were being used in limited
situations and appeared to offer some measure of improved safety.
Information on installation price, annual maintenance and refurbishment
costs, and added weight of these belts was obtained from belt
manufacturers. We obtained information from FAA and the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Bureau of Transportation Statistics on a number
of cost variables, including historical jet fuel prices, the impact on
jet fuel consumption of carrying additional weight, the average number
of hours flown per year, the average number of seats per airplane, the
number of airplanes in the U.S. fleet, and the number of passenger
tickets issued per year. To account for variation in the values of
these cost variables, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation.[Footnote
15] In this simulation, values were randomly drawn 10,000 times from
probability distributions characterizing possible values for the number
of seat belts per airplane, seat installation price, jet fuel price,
number of passenger tickets, number of airplanes, and hours flown. This
simulation resulted in forecasts of the life-cycle cost per airplane,
the annualized cost per airplane, and the cost per ticket. There is
uncertainty in estimating the number of lives potentially saved and
their value because accidents occur infrequently and unpredictably.
Such estimates could be higher or lower, depending on the number and
severity of accidents during a given analysis period and the value
placed on a human life.
To identify factors affecting efforts by Canada and Europe to improve
cabin occupant safety and health we interviewed and collected
documentation from aviation safety experts in the United States,
Canada, and Europe.
We provided segments of a draft of this report to selected external
experts to help ensure its accuracy and completeness. These included
the Air Transport Association, National Transportation Safety Board,
Boeing, Airbus, and aviation authorities in the United Kingdom, France,
Canada and the European Union. We incorporated their comments, as
appropriate. The European Union did not provide comments.
We conducted our review from January 2002 through September 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Canada and Europe Cabin Occupant Safety and Health
Responsibilities:
The United States, Canada, and members of the European Community are
parties to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
established under the Chicago Convention of 1944, which sets minimum
standards and recommended practices for civil aviation. In turn,
individual nations implement aviation standards, including those for
aviation safety. While ICAO's standards and practices are intended to
keep aircraft, crews, and passengers safe, some also address
environmental conditions in aircraft cabins that could affect the
health of passengers and crews. For example, ICAO has standards for
preventing the spread of disease and for spraying aircraft cabins with
pesticides to remove disease-carrying insects.
Canada:
In Canada, FAA's counterpart for aviation regulations and oversight is
Transport Canada Civil Aviation, which sets standards and regulations
for the safe manufacture, operation, and maintenance of aircraft in
Canada. In addition, Transport Canada Civil Aviation administers,
enforces, and promotes the Aviation Occupational Health and Safety
Program to help ensure the safety and health of crewmembers on board
aircraft.[Footnote 16] The department also sets the training and
licensing standards for aviation professionals in Canada, including air
traffic controllers, pilots, and aircraft maintenance engineers.
Transport Canada Civil Aviation has more than 800 inspectors working
with Canadian airline operators, aircraft manufacturers, airport
operators, and air navigation service providers to maintain the safety
of Canada's aviation system. These inspectors monitor, inspect, and
audit Canadian aviation companies to verify their compliance with
Transport Canada's aviation regulations and standards for pilot
licensing, aircraft certification, and aircraft operation.
To assess and recommend potential changes to Canada's aviation
regulations and standards, the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory
Council was established. This Council is a joint initiative between
government and the aviation community. The Council supports regulatory
meetings and technical working groups, which members of the aviation
community can attend. A number of nongovernmental organizations--
including airline operators, aviation labor organizations,
manufacturers, industry associations, and groups representing the
public--are members.
The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada is similar to NTSB in
the United States. TSB is a federal agency that operates independently
of Transport Canada Civil Aviation. Its mandate is to advance safety in
the areas of marine, pipeline, rail, and aviation transportation by:
* conducting independent investigations, including public inquiries
when necessary, into selected transportation occurrences in order to
make findings as to their causes and contributing factors;
* identifying safety deficiencies, as evidenced by transportation
occurrences;
* making recommendations designed to reduce or eliminate any such
deficiencies; and:
* reporting publicly on their investigations and findings.
Under its mandate to conduct investigations, TSB conducts safety-issue-
related investigations and studies. It also maintains a mandatory
incident-reporting system for all modes of transportation. TSB and
Transport Canada Civil Aviation use the statistics derived from this
information to track potential safety concerns in Canada's
transportation system.
TSB investigates aircraft accidents that occur in Canada or involve
aircraft built there. Like NTSB, the Transportation Safety Board can
recommend air safety improvements to Transport Canada Civil Aviation.
Europe:
Europe supplements the ICAO framework with the European Civil Aviation
Conference, an informal forum through which 38 European countries
formulate policy on civil aviation issues, including safety, but do not
explicitly address passenger health issues. In addition, the European
Union issues legislation concerning aviation safety, certification, and
licensing requirements but has not adopted legislation specifically
related to passenger health. One European directive requires that all
member states assess and limit crewmembers' exposure to radiation from
their flight duties and provide them with information on the effects of
such radiation
exposure. The European Commission[Footnote 17] is also providing flight
crewmembers and other mobile workers with free health assessments prior
to employment, with follow-up health assessments at regular intervals.
Another European supplement to the ICAO framework is the Joint Aviation
Authorities (JAA), which represents the civil aviation regulatory
authorities of a number of European states[Footnote 18] that have
agreed to cooperate in developing and implementing common safety
regulatory standards and procedures. JAA uses staff of these
authorities to carry out its responsibilities for making,
standardizing, and harmonizing aviation rules, including those for
aviation safety, and for consolidating common standards among member
counties. In addition, JAA is to cooperate with other regional
organizations or national European state authorities to reach at least
JAA's safety level and to foster the worldwide implementation of
harmonized safety standards and requirements through the conclusion of
international arrangements.
Membership in JAA is open to members of the European Civil Aviation
Conference, which currently consists of 41 member countries. Currently,
37 countries are members or candidate members of JAA. JAA is funded by
national contributions; income from the sale of publications and
training; and income from other sources, such as user charges and
European Union grants. National contributions are based on indexes
related to the size of each country's aviation industry. The "largest"
countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) each pay around 16
percent and the smallest around 0.6 percent of the total contribution
income. For 2003, JAA's total budget was about 6.6 million euros.
In early 1998, JAA launched the Safety Strategy Initiative to develop a
focused safety agenda to support the "continuous improvement of its
effective safety system" and further reduce the annual number of
accidents and fatalities regardless of the growth of air traffic. Two
approaches are being used to develop the agenda:
* The "historic approach" is based on analyses of past accidents and
has led to the identification of seven initial focus areas--controlled
flight into terrain, approach and landing, loss of control, design
related, weather, occupant safety and survivability, and runway safety.
* The "predictive approach" or "future hazards approach" is based on an
identification of changes in the aviation system.
JAA is cooperating in this effort with FAA and other regulatory bodies
to develop a worldwide safety agenda and avoid duplication of effort.
FAA has taken the lead in the historic approach, and JAA has taken the
lead in the future hazards approach.
JAA officials told us that they use a consensus-based process to
develop rules for aviation safety, including cabin occupant safety and
health-related issues. Reaching consensus among member states is time
consuming, but the officials said the time invested was worthwhile.
Besides making aviation-related decisions, JAA identifies and resolves
differences in word meanings and subtleties across languages--an effort
that is critical to reaching consensus. JAA does not have regulatory
rule-making authority. Once the member states are in agreement, each
member state's legislative authority must adopt the new requirements.
Harmonizing new requirements with U.S. and other international aviation
authorities further adds to the time required to implement new
requirements.
According to JAA officials, they use expert judgment to identify and
prioritize research and development efforts for aviation safety,
including airliner cabin occupant safety and health issues, but JAA
plans to move toward a more data-driven approach.[Footnote 19] While
JAA has no funding of its own for research and development, it
recommends research priorities to its member states. However, JAA
officials told us that member states' research and development efforts
are often driven by recent airliner accidents in the member states,
rather than by JAA's priorities. The planned shift from expert judgment
to a more data-driven approach will require more coordination of
aviation research and development across Europe. For example, in
January 2001, a stakeholder group formed by the European Commissioner
for Research issued a planning document entitled European Aeronautics:
A Vision for 2020, which, among other things, characterized European
aeronautics as a cross-border industry, whose research strategy is
shaped within national borders, leading to fragmentation rather than
coherence. The document called for better decision-making and more
efficient and effective research by the European Union, its member
states, and aeronautics stakeholders. JAA officials concurred with this
characterization of European aviation research and development.
Changes lie ahead for JAA and aviation safety in Europe. The European
Union recently created a European Aviation Safety Agency, which will
gradually assume responsibility for rule-making, certification, and
standardization of the application of rules by the national aviation
authorities. This organization will eventually absorb all of JAA's
functions and activities. The full transition from JAA to the safety
agency will take several years--per the regulation,[Footnote 20] the
European Aviation Safety Agency must begin operations by September 28,
2003, and transition to full operations by March 2007.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary of Key Actions FAA Has Taken to Improve Airliner
Cabin Safety and Health Since 1984:
Key improvement areas: Impact.
Key improvement areas: Stronger (16g) passenger seats; Action taken:
Impact: FAA required that seats for newly developed aircraft be
subjected to more rigorous testing than was previously required. The
tests subject seats to the forward, downward, and other directional
movements that can occur in an accident. Likely injuries under various
conditions are estimated by using instrumented crash test dummies;
Purpose: Impact: To improve the crashworthiness of airplane seats and
their ability to prevent or reduce the severity of head, back, and
femur injuries; Status: Impact: This rule was published on May 17,
1988, and became effective June 16, 1988. However, only the newest
generation of airplanes is required to have fully tested and
certificated 16g seats. FAA proposed a retrofit rule on October 4,
2002, to phase in 16g seats fleetwide within 14 years after adoption of
the final rule.
Key improvement areas: Overhead bins; Action taken: Impact: FAA issued
an airworthiness directive requiring corrective action for overhead bin
designs found not to meet the existing rules; Purpose: Impact: To
improve the crashworthiness of some bins after failures were observed
in a 1989 crash in Kegworth, England; Status: Impact: The
airworthiness directive to improve bin connectors became effective
November 20, 1992, and applied to Boeing 737 and 757 aircraft.
Key improvement areas: Fire.
Key improvement areas: More stringent flammability standards for
interior materials; Action taken: Impact: In 1986, FAA upgraded the
fire safety standards for cabin interior materials in transport
airplanes, establishing a new test method to determine the heat release
from materials exposed to radiant heat and set allowable criteria for
heat release rates; Purpose: Impact: To give airliner cabin occupants
more time to evacuate a burning airplane by limiting heat releases and
smoke emissions when cabin interior materials are exposed to fire;
Status: Impact: FAA required that all commercial aircraft produced
after August 20, 1988, have panels that exhibit reduced heat releases
and smoke emissions to delay the onset of flashover. Although there was
no retrofit of the existing fleet, FAA is requiring that these improved
materials be used whenever the cabin is substantially refurbished.
Key improvement areas: "Fire-blocking" seat cushions; Action taken:
Impact: In 1984, FAA issued a regulation that enhanced flammability
requirements for seat cushions; Purpose: Impact: To retard burning of
cabin materials to increase evacuation time; Status: Impact: This rule
applies to transport category aircraft after November 26, 1987.
Key improvement areas: Halon fire extinguishers; Action taken: Impact:
In March 1985, FAA issued a rule requiring at least two Halon fire
extinguishers on all commercial airliners, in addition to other
required extinguishers; Purpose: Impact: To extinguish in-flight
fires; Status: Impact: This rule became effective April 29, 1985, and
required compliance by April 29, 1986.
Key improvement areas: Smoke detectors in lavatories; Action taken:
Impact: In March 1985, FAA issued a rule requiring air carriers to
install smoke detectors in lavatories within 18 months; Purpose:
Impact: To identify and extinguish in-flight fires; Status: Impact:
This rule became effective on April 29, 1985, and required compliance
by October 29, 1986.
Key improvement areas: Fire extinguishers built in to lavatory waste
receptacles; Action taken: Impact: In March 1985, FAA required air
carriers to install automatic fire extinguishers in the waste paper
bins in all aircraft lavatories; Purpose: Impact: To identify and
extinguish prevent in-flight fires; Status: Impact: This rule became
effective on April 29, 1985; This rule required compliance by April
29, 1987.
Key improvement areas: Cargo compartment protection; Action taken:
Impact: In 1986, FAA upgraded the airworthiness standards for ceiling
and sidewall liner panels used in cargo compartments of transport
category airplanes; Purpose: Impact: To improve fire safety in the
cargo and baggage compartment of certain transport airplanes.[A];
Status: Impact: This rule required compliance on March 20, 1998.
Key improvement areas: Cargo compartment fire detection and
suppression; Action taken: Impact: In 1998, FAA required air carriers
to retrofit the U.S. passenger airliner fleet with fire detection and
suppression systems in certain cargo compartments. This rule applied to
over 3,400 airplanes in service and all newly manufactured airplanes;
Purpose: Impact: To improve fire safety in the cargo and baggage
compartment of certain transport airplanes.[A]; Status: Impact: This
rule became effective March 19, 1998, requiring compliance on March 20,
2001.
Key improvement areas: Evacuation.
Key improvement areas: Access to exits: Type III exits; Action taken:
Impact: This rule requires improved access to the Type III emergency
exits (typically smaller, overwing exits) by providing an unobstructed
passageway to the exit. Transport aircraft with 60 or more passenger
seats were required to comply with the new standards; Purpose: Impact:
To help ensure that passengers have an unobstructed passageway to exits
during an emergency; Status: Impact: This rule became effective June
3, 1992, requiring changes to be made by December 3, 1992.
Key improvement areas: Public address system: independent power source;
Action taken: Impact: This rule requires that the public address system
be independently powered for at least 10 minutes and that at least 5
minutes of that time is during announcements; Purpose: Impact: To
eliminate reliance on engine or auxiliary-power-unit operation for
emergency announcements; Status: Impact: This rule became effective
November 27, 1989, for air carrier and air taxi airplanes manufactured
on or after November 27, 1990.
Key improvement areas: Exit row seating; Action taken: Impact: This
rule requires that persons seated next to emergency exits be physically
and mentally capable of operating the exit and assisting other
passengers in emergency evacuations; Purpose: Impact: To improve
passenger evacuation in an emergency; Status: Impact: This rule became
effective April 5, 1990, requiring compliance by October 5, 1990.
Key improvement areas: Location of passenger emergency exits; Action
taken: Impact: Rule issued to limit the distance between adjacent
emergency exits on transport airplanes to 60 feet; Purpose: Impact: To
improve passenger evacuation in an emergency; Status: Impact: This
rule became effective July 24, 1989, imposing requirements on airplanes
manufactured after October 16, 1987.
Key improvement areas: Floor proximity emergency escape path marking;
Action taken: Impact: Airplane emergency lighting systems must visually
identify the emergency escape path and identify each exit from the
escape path; Purpose: Impact: To improve passenger evacuation when
smoke obscures overhead lighting; Status: Impact: This rule became
effective November 26, 1984, requiring implementation for large
transport airplanes by November 26, 1986.
Key improvement areas: Fire-resistant evacuation slides; Action taken:
Impact: Emergency evacuation slides manufactured after December 3,
1984, must be fire resistant and comply with new radiant heat testing
procedures.[B]; Purpose: Impact: To improve passenger evacuation;
Status: Impact: This technical standard became effective for all
evacuation slides manufactured after December 3, 1984.
Key improvement areas: General safety and health.
Key improvement areas: Preparation for in-flight emergencies; Action
taken: Impact: In 1986, FAA issued a rule requiring commercial airlines
to carry emergency medical kits; Purpose: Impact: To improve air
carriers' preparation for in-flight emergencies; Status: Impact: This
rule became effective August 1, 1986, requiring compliance as of that
date.
Key improvement areas: Ban on smoking for majority of domestic
commercial flights; Action taken: Impact: In 1988 and 1989, the
Congress passed legislation banning smoking on domestic flights of
varying durations; Purpose: Impact: To limit the impact of poor cabin
air quality on occupants' health; Status: Impact: These laws became
effective in 1988, and 1990, respectively.
Key improvement areas: Prevention of in-flight injuries; Action taken:
Impact: In June 1995, following two serious events involving
turbulence, FAA issued a public advisory to airlines urging the use of
seat belts at all times when passengers are seated but concluded that
existing rules did not require strengthening; ; In May 2000, FAA
instituted the Turbulence Happens public awareness campaign; Purpose:
Impact: To prevent passenger injuries from turbulence by increasing
public awareness of the importance of wearing seatbelts; Status:
Impact: Information is currently posted on FAA's Web site.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA information.
[A] Technical Class C category cargo compartments are required to have
built-in extinguishing systems to control fire in lieu of crewmember
accessibility. Class D category cargo compartments are required to
completely contain a fire without endangering the safety of the
airplane occupants.
[B] Standard Order (TSO)-C69B (''Emergency Evacuation Slides, Ramps,
Ramp/Slides, and Slide/Rafts'') prescribes minimum performance
standards for emergency evacuation slides, ramps, ramp/slides, and
slide/rafts, including standards for resistance to radiant heat
sources.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summaries of Potential Impact Safety Advancements:
This appendix presents information on the background and status of
potential advancements in impact safety that we identified, including
the following:
* retrofitting all commercial aircraft with more advanced seats,
* improving the ability of airplane floors to hold seats in an
accident,
* preventing overhead luggage bins from becoming detached or opening,
* requiring child safety restraints for children under 40 pounds, and:
* installing lap belts with self-contained inflatable air
bags.[Footnote 21]
Retrofitting All Commercial Aircraft with More Advanced Seats:
:
:
Background:
In commercial transport airplanes, the ability of a seat to protect a
passenger from the forces of impact in an accident depends on reducing
the forces of impact to levels that a person can withstand, either by
spreading the impact over a larger part of the person's body or by
decreasing the duration of the impact through the use of energy-
absorbing seats, an energy-absorbing fuselage and floors, or restraints
such as seat belts or inflatable seat belt air bags adapted from
automobile technology. In a 1996 study by R.G.W Cherry & Associates,
enhancing occupant restraint was ranked as the second most important of
33 potential ways to improve air crash survivability.[Footnote 22]
Boeing officials noted that the industry generally agrees with this
view but that FAA and the industry are at odds over the means of
implementing these changes.
According to an aviation safety expert, seats and restraints should be
considered as a system that involves:
* the seats themselves,
* seat restraints such as seat belts,
* seat connections to the floor,
* the spacing between seats, and:
* furnishings in the cabin area that occupants could strike in an
accident.
To protect the occupant, a seat must not only absorb energy well but
also stay attached to the floor of the aircraft. In other words, the
"tie-down" chain must remain intact. Although aircraft seat systems are
designed to withstand about 9 to 16 times the force of gravity, the
limits of human tolerance to impact substantially exceed the aircraft
and seat design limits. A number of seat and restraint devices have
been shown in testing to improve survivability in aviation accidents.
Several options are to retrofit the entire current fleet with fully
tested 16g seats, use rearward-facing seats, require three-point auto-
style seat belts with shoulder harnesses, and install auto-style air
bags.
FAA regulations require seats for newly certified airplane designs to
pass more extensive tests than were previously required to protect
occupants from impact forces of up to 16 times the force of normal
gravity in the forward direction; seat certification standards include
specific requirements to protect against head, spine, and leg injuries
(see fig. 5).[Footnote 23] FAA first required 16g seats and tests for
newly designed, certificated airplanes in 1988; new versions of
existing designs were not required to carry 16g seats.[Footnote 24]
Since 1988, however, in anticipation of a fleetwide retrofit rule,
manufacturers have increasingly equipped new airplanes with "16g-
compatible" seats that have some of the characteristics of fully
certified 16g seats.[Footnote 25] Certifying a narrow-body airplane
type to full 16g seat certification standards can cost
$250,000.[Footnote 26],[Footnote 27]
Figure 5: Coach Seating and Impact Position in Coach Seating:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In 1998 FAA estimated that 16g seats would avoid between about 210 to
410 fatalities and 220 to 240 serious injuries over the 20-year period
from 1999 through 2018. A 2000 study funded by FAA and the British
Civil Aviation Authority estimated that if 16g seats had been installed
in all airplanes that crashed from 1984 through 1998, between 23 to 51
fewer U.S. fatalities and 18 to 54 fewer U.S. serious injuries would
have occurred over the period. A number of accidents analyzed in that
study showed no benefit from 16g seats because it was assumed that 16g
seats would have detached from the floor, offering no additional
benefits compared with older seats.[Footnote 28] Worldwide, the study
estimated, about 333 fewer fatalities and 354 fewer serious injuries
would have occurred during the period had the improved seats been
installed. Moreover, if fire risks had been reduced, the estimated
benefits of 16g seats might have increased dramatically, as more
occupants who were assumed to survive the impact but die in the ensuing
fire would then have survived both the impact and fire.[Footnote 29]
Status:
Seats that meet the 16g certification requirements are currently
available and have been required on newly certificated aircraft designs
since 1988. However, newly manufactured airplanes of older
certification, such as Boeing 737s, 757s, or 767s, were not required to
be equipped with 16g certified seats. Recently, FAA has negotiated with
manufacturers to install full 16g seats on new versions of older
designs, such as all newly produced 737s.[Footnote 30] In October 2002,
FAA published a new proposal to create a timetable for all airplanes to
carry fully certified 16g seats within 14 years.[Footnote 31] The
comment period for the currently proposed rule ended in March 2003.
Under this proposal, airframe manufacturers would have 4 years to begin
installing 16g seats in newly manufactured aircraft only, and all
airplanes would have to be equipped with full 16g seats within 14 years
or when scheduled for normal seat replacement. FAA estimated that
upgrading passenger and flight attendant seats to meet full 16g
requirements would avert approximately 114 fatalities and 133 serious
injuries over 20 years following the effective date of the rule. This
includes 36 deaths that would be prevented by improvements to flight
attendant seats that would permit attendants to survive the impact and
to assist more passengers in an evacuation.
FAA estimated the costs to avert 114 fatalities and 133 serious
injuries at $245 million in present-value terms, or $519 million in
overall costs, which, according to FAA's analysis, would approximate
the monetary benefits from the seats.[Footnote 32] FAA estimated that
about 7.5 percent of airplane seats would have to be replaced before
they would ordinarily be scheduled for replacement. FAA's October 2002
proposal divides seats into three classes according to their
approximate performance level. Although FAA does not know how many
seats of each type seat are in service, it estimates that about 44
percent of commercial-service aircraft are equipped with full 16g
seats, 55 percent have 16g-compatible seats, and about 1 percent have
9g seats. The 16g-compatible or partial 16g seats span a wide range of
capabilities; some are nearly identical to full 16g seats but have been
labeled as 16g-compatible to avoid more costly certification, and other
partial 16g seats offer only minor improvements over the older
generation of 9g seats. To determine whether these seats have the same
performance characteristics as full 16g seats, it may be sufficient, in
some cases, to review the company's certification paperwork; in other
cases, however, full crash testing of actual 16g seats may be necessary
to determine the level of protection provided.
FAA is currently considering the comments it received on its October
2002 proposal. Industry comments raised concerns about general costs,
the costs of retrofitting flight attendant seats, and the possibility
that older airplanes designed for 9g seats might require structural
changes to accommodate full 16g seats. One comment expressed the desire
to give some credit for and "grandfather" in at least some partial 16g
seats.
Improving the Ability of Airplane Floors to Hold Seats in an Accident:
:
:
:
Background:
In an accident, a passenger's chances of survival depend on how well
the passenger cabin maintains "living space" and the passenger is "tied
down" within that space. Many experts and reports have noted floor
retention--the ability of the aircraft cabin floor to remain intact and
hold the passenger's seat and restraint system during a crash--as
critical to increasing the passenger's chances of survival. Floor
design concepts developed during the late 1940s and 1950s form the
basis for the cabin floors found in today's modern airplanes.
Accident investigations have documented failures of the floor system in
crashes.[Footnote 33] New 16g seat requirements were developed in the
1980s. 16g seats were intended to be retrofitted on aircraft with
traditional 9g floors and were designed to maximize the capabilities of
existing floor strength. While 16g seats might be strong, they could
also be inflexible and thus fail if the floor deformed in a crash.
Under the current 16g requirement, the seats must remain attached to a
deformed seat track and floor structure representative of that used in
the airplane.[Footnote 34] To meet these requirements, the seat was
expected to permanently deform to absorb and limit impact forces even
if the 16g test conditions were exceeded during a crash.
A major accident related to floor deformation occurred at Kegworth,
England, in 1989. A Boeing 737-400 airplane flew into an embankment on
approach to landing. In total, only 21 of the 52 triple seats--all
"16g-compatible" --remained fully attached to the cabin floor; 14 of
those that remained attached were in the area where the wing passes
through the cabin and the area is stronger than other areas to support
the wing.[Footnote 35] In this section of the airplane, the occupants
generally survived, even though they were exposed to an estimated peak
level of 26gs. The front part of the airplane was destroyed, including
the floor; most of these seats separated from the airplane, killing or
seriously injuring the occupants. An FAA expert noted that the impact
was too severe for the airplane to maintain its structural integrity
and that 16g seats were not designed for an accident of that severity.
The British Air Accidents Investigation Branch noted that fewer
injuries occurred in the accident than would probably have been the
case with earlier-generation seats. However, the Branch also noted that
"relatively minor engineering changes could significantly improve the
resilience and toughness of cabin floors . . . and take fuller
advantage of the improved passenger seats." The Branch reported that
where failures occurred, it was generally the seat track along the
floor that failed, and not the seat, and that the rear attachments
generally remained engaged with the floor, "at least partially due to
the articulated joint built into the rear attachment, an innovation
largely stemming from the FAA dynamic test requirements." The Branch
concluded that "seats designed to these dynamic requirements will
certainly increase survivability" but "do not necessarily represent an
optimum for the long term . . . if matched with cabin floors of
improved strength and toughness."[Footnote 36]
Status:
Several reports have recommended structural improvements to floors. A
case study of 11 major accidents for which detailed information was
available found floor issues to be a major cause of injury or
fatalities in 4 accidents and a minor cause in 1 accident. Another
study estimated the past benefits of 16g seats in U.S. accidents
between 1984 and 1998 and found no hypothetical benefit from 16g seats
in a number of accidents because the floor was extensively disrupted
during impact.[Footnote 37] In other words, unless the accidents had
been less severe or the floor and seat tracks had been improved beyond
the 9g standard on both new and old jets, newer 16g seats would not
have offered additional benefits compared with the older seats that
were actually on the airplane during the accidents under study.
A research program on seat and floor strength was recently conducted by
the French civil aviation authority, the Direction Générale de
l'Aviation Civile. Initial findings of the research program on seat-
floor attachments have not shown dramatic results and showed no rupture
or plastic deformation of any cabin floor parts during a 16g test.
However, French officials noted that they plan to perform additional
tests with more rigid seats. Because many factors are involved it is
difficult to identify the interrelated issues and interactions between
seats and floors. A possible area for future research, according to
French officials, is to examine dynamic floor warping during a crash to
improve impact performance.
FAA officials said they have no plans to change floor strength
requirements. FAA regulations require floors to meet impact forces
likely to occur in "emergency landing conditions," or generally about
9gs of longitudinal static force. According to several experts,
stronger floors could improve the performance of 16g seats. In
addition, further improvement in seats beyond the 16g standard would
likely require improved floors.
Preventing Overhead Storage Bin Detachment to Protect Passengers in an
Accident:
Background:
In an airplane crash, overhead luggage bins in the cabin sometimes
detach from their mountings along the ceiling and sidewalls and can
fall completely or allow pieces of luggage to fall on passengers' heads
(See fig. 6.). While only a few cases have been reported in which the
impact from dislodged overhead bins was the direct cause of a crash
fatality or injury, a study for the British Civil Aviation Authority
that attempted to identify the specific characteristics of each
fatality in 42 fatal accidents estimated that the integrity of overhead
bin stowage was the 17th most important of 32 factors used to predict
passenger survivability.[Footnote 38] Maintaining the integrity of bins
may also help speed evacuation after a crash.
Safer bins have been designed since bin problems were observed in a
Boeing 737 accident in Kegworth, England, in 1989, when nearly all the
bins failed and fell on passengers. FAA tested bins in response to that
accident. The Kegworth bins were certified to the current FAA 9g
longitudinal static loading standards, among others. When FAA
subsequently conducted longitudinal dynamic loading tests on the types
of Boeing bins involved, the bins failed. Several FAA experts said that
the overhead bins on 737s had a design flaw. FAA then issued an
airworthiness directive that called for modifying all bins on Boeing
737 and 757 aircraft. The connectors for the bins were strengthened in
accordance with the airworthiness directive, and the new bins passed
FAA's tests.
The British Air Accidents Investigation Branch recommended in 1990 that
the performance of both bins and latches be tested more rigorously,
including the performance of bins "when subjected to dynamic crash
pulses substantially beyond the static load factors currently
required." NTSB has made similar recommendations.
Turbulence reportedly injures at least 15 U.S. cabin occupants a year,
and possibly over 100. Most of these injuries are to flight attendants
who are unrestrained. Some injuries are caused by luggage falling from
bins that open in severe turbulence. Estimates of total U.S. airline
injuries from bin-related falling luggage range from 1,200 to 4,500
annually, most of which occur during cruising rather than during
boarding or disembarking.[Footnote 39]
The study for the British Civil Aviation Authority noted above found
that as many as 70 percent of impact-related accidents involve overhead
bins that become detached. However, according to the report, bin
detachment does not appear to be a major factor in occupants' survival
and data are insufficient to support a specific determination about the
mechanism of failure. FAA has conducted several longitudinal and drop
tests since the Kegworth accident, including drops of airplane fuselage
sections with overhead storage bins installed. A 1993 dynamic vertical
drop test showed some varying bin performance problems at about 36gs of
downward force. An FAA longitudinal test in 1999 tested two types of
bins at 6g, at the 9g FAA certification requirement, and at the 16g
level; in the 16g longitudinal test, one of the two bins broke free
from its support mountings.
Status:
In addition to the requirement that they withstand forward
(longitudinal) loads of slightly more than 9gs, luggage bins must meet
other directional loading requirements.[Footnote 40] Bin standards are
part of the general certification requirements for all onboard objects
of mass. FAA officials said that overhead bins no longer present a
problem, appear to function as designed, and meet standards. An FAA
official told us that problems such as those identified at Kegworth
have not appeared in later crashes. Another FAA official said that
while Boeing has had some record of bin problems, the problems are
occasional and quickly rectified through design changes. Boeing
officials told us that the evidence that bins currently have latch
problems is anecdotal.
Suggestions for making bins safer in an accident include adding
features to absorb impact forces and keep bins attached and closed
during structural deformation; using dynamic 16g longitudinal impact
testing standards similar to those for seats; and storing baggage in
alternative compartments in the main cabin, elsewhere in the aircraft,
or under seats raised for that purpose.
Child Safety Seats:
:
Background:
Using a correctly-designed child safety seat that is strapped in an
airplane seat offers protection to a child in an accident or turbulence
(see fig. 6). By contrast, according to many experts, holding a child
under two years old on an adult's lap, which is permitted, is unsafe
for both the child and for other occupants who could be struck by the
child in an accident. Requiring child safety seats for infants and
small children on airplanes is one of NTSB's "most wanted"
transportation safety improvements. The British Air Accidents
Investigation Branch made similar recommendations, as did a 1997 White
House Commission report on aviation.
Figure 6: Examples of Child Safety Seats:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
:
An FAA analysis of survivable accidents from 1978 through 1994 found
that 9 deaths, 4 major injuries, and 8 minor injuries to children
occurred. The analysis also found that the use of child safety seats
would have prevented 5 deaths, all the major injuries, and 4 to 6 of
the minor injuries. Child safety advocates have pointed to several
survivable accidents in which children died--a 1994 Charlotte, North
Carolina, crash; a 1990 Cove Neck, New York, accident; and a 1987
Denver, Colorado, accident--as evidence of the need for regulation.
A 1992 FAA rule required airlines to allow child restraint systems, but
FAA has opposed mandatory child safety seats on the basis of studies
showing that requiring adults to pay for children's seats would induce
more car travel, which the study said was more dangerous for children
than airplane travel. One study published in 1995 by DOT estimated that
if families were charged full fares for children's seats, 20 percent
would choose other modes of transportation, resulting in a net increase
of 82 deaths among children and adults over 10 years.
If child safety seats are required, airlines may require adults wishing
to use child safety seats to purchase an extra seat for the child's
safety seat. FAA officials told us that they could not require that the
seat next to a parent be kept open for a nonpaying child. However, NTSB
has testified that the scenarios for passengers taking other modes of
transportation are flawed because FAA assumed that airlines would
charge full fares for infants currently traveling free. NTSB noted in
1996 that airlines would offer various discounts and free seats for
infants in order to retain $6 billion in revenue that would otherwise
be lost to auto travel. Airlines have already responded to parents who
choose to use child restraint systems with scheduling flexibility, and
many major airlines offer a 50 percent discount off any fare for a
child under 2 to travel in an approved child safety seat. The 1995 DOT
study, however, estimated that even if a child's seat on an airplane
were discounted 75 percent, some families would still choose car travel
and that the choice by those families to drive instead of fly would
result in a net increase of 17 child and adult deaths over 10 years.
In FAA tests, some but not all commercially available automobile child
restraint systems have provided adequate protection in tests simulating
airplane accidents. Prices range from less than $100 for a child safety
seat marketed for use in both automobiles and airplanes to as much as
$1,300 for a child safety seat developed specifically for use in
airplanes.
A drawback to having parents, rather than airlines, provide child
safety seats for air travel is that some models may be more difficult
to fit into airplane seat belts, making a proper fit more challenging.
While the performance of standardized airline-provided seats may be
better than that of varied FAA-certified auto-airplane seats, one
airline said that providing seats could present logistical problems for
them. However, Virgin Atlantic Airlines supplies its own specially
developed seats and prohibits parents from using their own child seats.
Because turbulence can be a more frequent danger to unrestrained
children than accidents, one expert told us that a compromise solution
might include allowing some type of alternative in-flight restraint.
Status:
Child safety seats are currently available for use on aircraft. The
technical issues involved in designing and manufacturing saf