This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-1041R entitled 'Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election- Related Voting Irregularities' which was released on October 14, 2004. This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. September 14, 2004: The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Governmental Affairs: United States Senate: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: Ranking Minority Member: Committee on Government Reform: House of Representatives: The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member: Committee on the Judiciary: House of Representatives: Subject: Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election- Related Voting Irregularities: Election-day problems in Florida and elsewhere in November 2000 raised concerns about voting systems that included, among other things, alleged voting irregularities that may have affected voter access to the polls. The term voting irregularities generally refers to a broad array of complaints relating to voting and/or elections that may involve violations of federal voting rights and/or federal criminal law for which the Department of Justice (DOJ) has enforcement responsibilities. You requested that we review activities at DOJ to help ensure voter access to the polls and actions to address allegations of voting irregularities. This report (1) identifies and describes changes DOJ has made since November 2000 to help ensure voter access to the polls; (2) identifies and describes actions that the Voting Section in DOJ's Civil Rights Division has taken to track, address, and assess allegations of election-related[Footnote 1] voting irregularities received between November 2000 and December 2003; and (3) assesses the Voting Section's internal control[Footnote 2] activities to help ensure relevant, accurate, and reliable recording and documentation of allegations of voting irregularities to accurately track actions taken in response to allegations and provide accurate and complete information to the public and congressional committees. We primarily performed our work at DOJ's Civil Rights Division, Voting Section. We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed responsible officials regarding DOJ's activities to help ensure voter access to the polls. To identify and describe changes made since November 2000, we reviewed documentation on DOJ's efforts to monitor and observe elections, increase emphasis on enforcement of minority language and overseas voters' rights, disseminate election-related guidance, and increase its resources to address voting issues. To identify and describe actions that the Voting Section took to track, address, and assess allegations of voting irregularities, we reviewed telephone logs and 34 files with information on a preliminary investigation, matters, and cases that the Voting Section considered to be election-related voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003. To assess the Voting Section's internal controls, we obtained available documentation of policies, procedures, and techniques the Voting Section has to manage allegations of voting irregularities and considered them in relation to GAO's internal control standards. We also interviewed officials and obtained documentation from DOJ's Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section (PIN), in relation to the coordination between the Voting Section and PIN to address voter access to the polls. On August 31, 2004, we provided your staffs a briefing document on the results of our work. Enclosure I contains the materials we presented at that time. Our audit work was performed in Washington, D.C., from May 2003 through August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Background: The Voting Section in the Civil Rights Division is charged with the responsibility of enforcing federal voting rights statutes that are designed to safeguard the right to vote of racial and language minorities; disabled, elderly, and illiterate persons; and military and overseas voters, among others. The Voting Section is also charged with the responsibility of enforcing federal statutes that, among other things, address issues such as voter registration, provisional voting, and voter information. Provisional voting permits eligible persons to vote on election day if their names are not on voter registration lists, with the understanding that each person's eligibility will be verified after the election and their votes counted, if eligible. (See enc. I, and attach. I, for more information on statutes that the Voting Section enforces.) The Voting Section, among other things, monitors election-day activities to ensure voting rights are protected and initiates investigations and opens matters--an activity that has not resulted in a court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information--to examine allegations of voting irregularities that fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Division. If warranted, a matter may culminate in a case--an activity that has resulted in the filing of a complaint, indictment, or information with a federal court. The Voting Section also may initiate matters to monitor private lawsuits. Voting Section attorneys are generally responsible for conducting investigations and prosecuting cases. The Voting Section also coordinates with PIN to refer allegations the Voting Section receives that involve violations of criminal statutes related to voting fraud. For example, in relation to the 2002 federal election, the Voting Section referred three matters deemed to be potential violations of criminal laws to PIN, which assumed responsibility for the investigations. In addition, the Voting Section and PIN have provided joint training to Assistant U.S. Attorneys, with the Voting Section presenting information about civil rights statutes that are to protect the right to vote and PIN presenting information about criminal statutes that are to prevent election fraud. Results: Since November 2000, DOJ has implemented changes to help ensure voter access to the polls. The Voting Section emphasized the importance of its monitoring of election-day activities and increased its monitoring of these activities. In 2000, DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored elections in 5 counties in 5 states. By 2002, the number of election jurisdictions monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff increased to 19 counties in 10 states, with monitoring of elections in counties in Florida accounting for the bulk of the increase. The Voting Section also (1) placed a greater priority on protecting the voting rights of language minority voters by helping to ensure that certain covered jurisdictions provided bilingual voting materials for elections; (2) placed a priority on enforcing and preparing for compliance with the federal statute to help ensure voting rights of overseas voters; (3) provided additional training to Assistant U.S. Attorneys on civil rights statutes to educate them about voters' rights; and (4) provided guidance to states regarding the implementation of sections of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) that DOJ enforces.[Footnote 3] For example, the Voting Section provided guidance to states by issuing a press release that outlined provisions of HAVA that took effect on January 1, 2004, such as provisional voting and identification requirements for new voters who register by mail. The Attorney General directed the Civil Rights Division to work with civil rights leaders, state and local election officials, and U.S. Attorney Offices prior to election day in an effort to help ensure that citizens' voting rights are protected. The Attorney General also directed the Criminal Division to work with these same groups in helping to preserve ballot integrity and prevent election offenses. Almost all of the U.S. Attorney Offices reported that they had contacted various state or local officials prior to the November 2002 election. Voting Section officials reported that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division and staff from that division met with various civil rights organizations. According to Voting Section officials, DOJ plans to help ensure voter access for the upcoming November 2004 election include increasing its monitoring of elections, coordinating with civil rights organizations, and establishing procedures for bringing the concerns of civil rights organizations about specific issues or jurisdictions to DOJ on or before election day in November 2004. Voting Section officials also said that final decisions as to where monitoring will be conducted are not made public until shortly before an election. (See enc. I for more information.) The Voting Section has used several means of tracking allegations of voting irregularities and the Section's actions with regard to those allegations. First, the Voting Section used telephone logs to track telephone calls regarding allegations of voting irregularities it received related to the November 2000 and 2002 elections. According to the Voting Section, contractors were hired to help handle the unprecedented number of calls that were received concerning the November 2000 election situation to help ensure that the public would be able to voice opinions and concerns. Second, DOJ tracks matters and cases through its Interactive Case Management (ICM) system--its formal process for tracking and managing work activities. Prior to opening a matter, the Voting Section may make a determination that an allegation does not fall within DOJ's jurisdiction or may initiate a preliminary investigation about an allegation. Third, the Voting Section tracked monitoring of elections using logs and for some election-monitoring activities they opened matters; thus, it has not routinely tracked election-monitoring activities through the ICM system. (See enc. I for more information.) Actions that Voting Section attorneys took to address allegations of voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003 included contacting cognizant election officials at the state and local levels; obtaining data as appropriate; interviewing voters affected by alleged voting irregularities; meeting with minority groups; and assessing the merits of the allegations to determine what, if any, further action was needed. Attorneys in the Voting Section addressed allegations of voting irregularities by first determining whether the allegations were related to violations of federal civil rights statutes and then, if warranted, initiating a preliminary investigation or matter to determine whether an allegation had merit. If warranted, a matter may culminate in a case that is filed with a federal court. We reviewed files for 1 closed preliminary investigation, 25 closed matters, and 8 open and closed cases that the Voting Section considered election-related. The preliminary investigation and 13 matters were closed because they lacked merit. The remaining 12 matters were closed because the state or voting jurisdiction took action to remedy an issue, a state court issued an order addressing the issue, the voting jurisdiction implemented changes for future elections, or Voting Section attorneys provided election officials feedback following the on-site monitoring of elections. Six cases remain open pending fulfillment of consent decrees entered into on behalf of DOJ and the jurisdiction in alleged violation of federal statute, and two cases were closed because states had taken action in response to consent decrees. Enclosure I and attachment IV provide detailed information on actions taken regarding selected matters and cases that the Voting Section considered as involving election-related voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003. Regarding internal controls, we found that the Voting Section did not have a reliable method to consistently record and document telephone calls received alleging voting irregularities. According to Voting Section officials, the number of calls received following the November 2000 election far exceeded the number received in past elections. As a result, the Voting Section used a contractor to assist in handling the telephone calls. To track some of the telephone calls related to the November 2000 election, Voting Section and contractor staff used telephone logs that had several broad categories to capture the subject of the allegation, rows for states from which the calls originated and, for the most part, tabulated the numbers of calls using tick marks. Voting Section staff also kept two other types of logs to record some telephone calls, which included columns to record a caller's name, state, telephone number, and description of the call. Our analysis of the contractor telephone logs found, among other things, that these logs did not include a way to record calls from 4 states--Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota. According to Voting Section officials, these 4 states were left off the contractor logs inadvertently, although these officials noted that they were unaware of any calls received from these states. Our analysis of logs that Voting Section staff completed found that Voting Section staff recorded having received calls from some of these states. The Voting Section improved upon the telephone log for the November 2002 election by having one log that consistently provided for documenting the caller's name, telephone number, and action taken. Compared with the telephone log that contractor staff maintained and one of the three types of logs that Voting Section staff maintained after the November 2000 election, which had several columns to broadly categorize the subject of the telephone calls, the November 2002 log included one column to capture the subject of the telephone calls. The Voting Section plans to take several actions to address voting irregularities for the November 2004 election, including, among other things, using a telephone log similar to the one used for the November 2002 election. The Voting Section did not provide written instructions to contractors for completing the telephone logs related to the 2000 election. However, for the November 2002 federal election, the Voting Section provided instructions to DOJ staff for how to handle calls from citizens, the press, members of Congress, and others. In addition to its method for recording and documenting telephone calls received regarding voting irregularities, we found that the Voting Section did not routinely track its election- monitoring activities through its ICM system. The Voting Section said that it has plans to assign one identification number to track these activities in the future. (See enc. I for more information.) In conclusion, lack of specifics about allegations and actions limits DOJ's ability to have accurate and clear information to share with the public or Congress about the types of allegations received and actions taken. Predictions of another close presidential election in November 2004 combined with possible voter confusion over new requirements in the Help America Vote Act--such as the implementation of provisional voting in states that had not previously used provisional voting--and possible questions regarding voting equipment could result in the Voting Section again receiving a very large number of telephone calls. This could result in the need to use contractors to record voter allegations because much of the Voting Section staff will be monitoring election sites on election day. It is important that the information collected be as complete, accurate, and specific as possible regarding specific allegations. If the Voting Section collects more precise information about voter allegations, it is in a better position to assure the public that it has addressed allegations of voting irregularities. Moreover, if it documents actions taken more precisely, it is better able to reassure the public and Congress of its commitment to enforce federal voting rights statutes. The Voting Section emphasized the importance of its monitoring of election-day activities, but the monitoring program has not been routinely tracked in the Voting Section's ICM system. We believe the significance of this program warrants a more formal tracking of monitoring efforts and resources dedicated to the program to allow for reliable, relevant, and timely information for management decision making and for external reporting purposes. Recommendations for Executive Action: Confidence in our election processes is of utmost importance. To help ensure confidence in the integrity of voting processes, the Voting Section plays an important role in addressing voting irregularities. By accurately recording and documenting its activities in as clear a manner as possible, the Voting Section contributes to assuring the public and Congress of the integrity of our voting processes and that allegations of voting irregularities have been addressed. To reassure citizens of the integrity of our election processes and to reassure the public and Congress of DOJ's commitment to its responsibility to enforce federal voting rights statutes, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the Chief of the Voting Section to take the following two actions: * develop and implement procedures for the November 2004 election to help ensure that the Voting Section has a reliable method of tracking and documenting allegations of voting irregularities and actions taken to address them. Procedures could include more precise categories to record types of allegations and actions taken; development of instructions on completing the telephone logs; and development and implementation of training for contractors, should they be needed; and: * implement a method to track and report on election-monitoring activities in the ICM system. Agency Comments: We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for review and comment. The draft report sent to DOJ for comment reflected changes made as a result of DOJ's prior detailed review of attachment IV in enclosure I and changes DOJ requested in writing following our exit conference with them. In commenting on the draft, DOJ generally agreed with the report and recommendations. The Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division accepted both recommendations and said that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division has directed their implementation. In commenting on our recommendation for the Civil Rights Division to track and report on election-monitoring activities in the ICM system, DOJ noted that it currently has procedures that effectively track election-monitoring activities. Our report acknowledges that the Division had information on election monitoring. However, the Voting Section told us that they did not routinely track election-monitoring activities in the ICM system--its formal process for tracking and managing work activities. Because we had asked for clarification of the confusing and unclear information previously provided on election monitoring and tracking, the Civil Rights Division, in a May 25, 2004, written response provided clarifying information that explained the different databases and data from logs that were used to capture information on election monitoring. In this written response, the Civil Rights Division included four charts on election monitoring that had been recently created, one for each calendar year from 2000 through 2003 (but not for 2004, as the Division states it did). In addition, the Civil Rights Division said that it had asked for a program that would provide the types of reports and data that the Division is routinely asked to provide regarding the election-monitoring program. Our recommendation is directed toward improving the Voting Section's tracking of election-monitoring activities, which the Voting Section has emphasized as being a very important part of its efforts to help ensure voter access to the polls. Tracking election-monitoring activities in the ICM system would ensure that this important component of the Voting Section's work is incorporated into the Division's formal process for tracking and managing work activities. After we provided DOJ with a copy of the draft report that included this correspondence and its enclosure for review and comment, Civil Rights Division officials realized they had not provided us with information on all of the telephone logs used following the November 2000 election. The Civil Rights Division subsequently provided that additional information, which showed that Voting Section staff used two additional types of logs for the November 2000 election. These logs included columns to record callers' names, telephone numbers, states, and descriptions of the calls. This new information was incorporated into our report to accurately reflect the Voting Section's activities to track telephone calls following the November 2000 election. (See p. 5 in this letter and p. 42 in enc. I.) According to the Civil Rights Division, the November 2002 log, which it proposes as the basis for documenting telephone calls related to the upcoming November 2004 elections, was the only one used by Voting Section staff for the November 2002 election. DOJ noted that the draft report discussion of the Civil Rights Division's use of telephone logs focused almost exclusively on the logs maintained by contractors, that the draft report failed to note that these logs were only a small portion of all the records of telephone calls received by the Division, and that any shortcomings in these logs were extremely unlikely to have changed the course of subsequent investigations. As we note in our report, it was difficult to obtain precise information on the number of calls or the specific nature of alleged irregularities from the telephone logs on the November 2000 election. The information that the Voting Section collected on its telephone logs was not precise enough to support the Division's statements that upwards of 95 percent of the calls received regarding the November 2000 election reflected citizen frustration or anger over the election, that the vast majority of the calls that contractors received came from New York and California, or that the vast majority of the calls from those two states expressed frustration over the situation in Florida. Moreover, it is important to note that our recommendation with regard to recording complaints about voting irregularities for the November 2004 election is based on the limitations of the log used in November 2002 and the lack of a clear plan for accurately recording a potentially large volume of complaints that may arise from the November 2004 election. For example, November 2004 will be the first national election in which all states will be implementing HAVA's new voter identification and provisional voting requirements with which many voters may be unfamiliar. In its comments, DOJ said that the Civil Rights Division invited us to meet with Voting Section staff who worked during the time of the November 2000 election and that we declined this invitation. We did not receive an invitation from officials in the Civil Rights Division, who arranged our meetings with Voting Section staff, to meet to discuss the November 2000 election logs. Throughout this review, we requested meetings with Voting Section and Civil Rights Division officials. It is always our preference, as part of our work, to meet with agency officials to discuss issues and questions we may have about agency processes, procedures, and documentation. However, Civil Rights Division officials preferred that we provide questions in writing and to respond to those questions in writing. The Civil Rights Division sometimes took weeks to respond in writing, which contributed significantly to the length of time it took us to complete our review. Had Civil Rights Division officials been more willing to meet with us to explain the Voting Section's processes and discuss the documentation provided to us, rather than rely on written questions and responses, the time required for this review could have been significantly reduced. DOJ's written comments are in attachment V. DOJ also provided technical comments from the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section and from the Civil Rights Division, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Civil Rights Division provided additional information on cases initiated for calendar years 2002, 2003, and 2004. The 2002 and 2003 cases involved enforcement under Sections 2 and 208 of the Voting Rights Act and were not clearly identifiable in the ICM system as also involving language minority issues under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. The Civil Rights Division subsequently identified these cases as including enforcement of language minority violations, and we have included them in our report. Information on cases initiated in calendar year 2004 had not been included because our review covered complete calendar years, but we have added information on cases initiated in 2004 as of August 2004 as a courtesy to the Division. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Attorney General, Department of Justice; Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; Chairman, House Committee on Government Reform; Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary; Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on House Administration; and Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Copies of this report will be made available to other interested parties upon request. This report will also be available on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at jenkinswo@gao.gov or Linda Watson, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-8685 or by e-mail at watsonl@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report were Katherine Davis, Gina Flacco, Evan Gilman, Geoffrey Hamilton, Mary Martin, Maria Santos, and Daniele Schiffman. Signed by: William O. Jenkins, Jr. Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: Enclosures: Enclosure I: [See PDF for images] [End of slide presentation] Attachment I: Voting Laws Enforced by the Voting Section Relevant to Contents of Briefing and Its Attachments: According to the Voting Section, to carry out its mission, the Voting Section brings lawsuits against states, counties, cities, and other jurisdictions to remedy denials and abridgements of the right to vote; defends lawsuits that the Voting Rights Act authorizes to be brought against the Attorney General; reviews changes in voting laws and procedures administratively under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and monitors election day activities through the assignment of federal observers under Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act. Provided below are short descriptions of some of the primary voting laws enforced by the Voting Section. Voting Rights Act Provisions: * Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973): Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act establishes a nationwide ban against any state or local election practices or procedures that deny or abridge a citizen's right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.[Footnote 4] The Voting Rights Act provides that plaintiffs may establish a violation of Section 2 by demonstrating that "the political processes leading to nomination or election" deny members of the protected classes an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. A court, under the Voting Rights Act, may also consider the extent to which members of the protected class have been elected to office in the jurisdiction, though Congress made clear that Section 2 does not confer upon protected classes a right to proportional representation. * Sections 203 and 4(f)(4) of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1a, 1973b(f)(4)): Sections 203 and 4(f)(4) are the language minority provisions of the Voting Rights Act and require certain covered jurisdictions to provide bilingual election materials and assistance based on census data pertaining to the population of citizens of voting age with limited English proficiency and their rate of illiteracy. With respect to Section 203, the Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions to provide language minority assistance when certain criteria are met, such as when more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age or more than 10,000 of the citizens of voting age are members of a single language minority group, and are unable to speak or understand English adequately enough to participate in the electoral process. * Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6): Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act authorizes voting assistance for blind, disabled, or illiterate persons. A voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice, other than the voter's employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union. * Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973c): Under Section 5 of the Act, "covered"[Footnote 5] jurisdictions may not change their election practices or procedures until they obtain federal "preclearance" for the change. The act provides for either judicial or administrative preclearance. Under the judicial mechanism, covered jurisdictions may seek declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that the change has neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against protected minorities in exercising their voting rights. Under the administrative mechanism, covered jurisdictions may seek the same determination from the Attorney General. The Attorney General may deny preclearance by interposing and objection to the proposed change within 60 days of its submission. * Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973d): Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act provides for the appointment of federal examiners by order of a federal court or, with respect to certain covered jurisdictions, upon certification by the Attorney General. Federal examiners help to register voters by determining whether a citizen meets state eligibility requirements and must therefore be included in the registration rolls. A federal court, under the Voting Rights Act, may order the appointment of federal examiners to any jurisdiction sued under any statute to enforce certain constitutional voting guarantees.[Footnote 6] In covered jurisdictions, the Attorney General may appoint examiners upon certification that the Attorney General has received at least 20 meritorious written complaints of voting discrimination or that the Attorney General otherwise believes that the appointment of examiners is necessary to protect voting rights. * Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973f): Under Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act, federal observers may be appointed, upon request of the Attorney General, in any jurisdiction where an examiner is serving. Federal observers are to monitor elections and report whether persons entitled to vote were allowed to vote and whether their votes were properly counted. * Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b): Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act prohibits persons, whether acting under color of law or not, from intimidating, threatening, or coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten or coerce, any person for voting or attempting to vote. Section 11(b) further prohibits intimidation, threats, or coercion of those persons aiding other persons in voting or exercising certain powers or duties under the Act. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6): The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), in general, requires states and territories to allow absent uniformed service voters, their spouses and dependents, and certain other overseas voters to register and vote absentee in elections for federal office. UOCAVA requires, for example, that a presidential designee prescribe a federal write-in absentee ballot for all overseas voters in federal elections. The ballot is to be used if the overseas voter applies for, but does not receive, a state absentee ballot.[Footnote 7] While state law, in general, governs the processing of these federal write-in ballots, UOCAVA requires that states permit their use in federal elections.[Footnote 8] National Voter Registration Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10): The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) established procedures designed to "increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections Federal office," while protecting "the integrity of the electoral process" and ensuring the maintenance of "accurate and current voter registration rolls."[Footnote 9] NVRA requires all states to adopt certain federal voter registration procedures, except for those states that have no registration requirements or that permit election-day registration with respect to federal elections.[Footnote 10] NVRA, for example, requires states to allow applicants for driver's licenses to register to vote on the same form.[Footnote 11] NVRA also requires states to provide voter registration forms and accept completed applications at various state agencies, including any office in the state providing public assistance, any office in the state that provides state-funded disability programs, and other agencies chosen by the state, such as state licensing bureaus, county clerks' offices, public schools and public libraries.[Footnote 12] NVRA also contains detailed requirements regarding state removal of names from federal registration rolls.[Footnote 13] Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee to 1973ee-6): Congress has passed legislation intended to improve access for elderly and handicapped individuals to registration facilities and polling places for federal elections. The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 requires, with some exceptions, that political subdivisions within each state that are responsible for conducting elections assure that polling places and registration sits are accessible to handicapped and elderly voters.[Footnote 14] If the political subdivision is unable to provide an accessible polling place, it must provide an alternative means for casting a ballot on election day upon advance request by the voter.[Footnote 15] The act's requirements also include, for example, that each state or political subdivision provide a reasonable number of accessible permanent registration facilities, and that each state make available certain types of voting and registration aids such as large-type instructions and information by telecommunication devices for the deaf.[Footnote 16] Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 to 12134) (enforced by the Disability Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division): Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in all programs, activities, and services of public entities. It applies to all state and local governments, their departments and agencies, and any other instrumentalities or special purpose districts of State and local governments. According to the Voting Section, as construed by the courts, Title II requires that polling places be accessible to persons with disabilities with certain exceptions. Help America Vote Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 15301 to 15545): The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), among other things, established a program to provide funds to states to replace punch care voting systems, established the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of federal elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain federal election laws and programs, and established minimum election administration standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for the administration of federal elections. Certain HAVA provisions including those relating to voting system standards, provisional voting and voting information requirements, and computerized statewide voter registration lists are to be enforced by the Attorney General. [Footnote 17] [End of section] Attachment II: Role of the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section in Federal Elections: The Public Integrity Section (PIN), in conjunction with the 93 U. S. Attorneys and the FBI, is responsible for enforcing federal criminal laws applicable to federal election fraud offenses, among other things. Election fraud is conduct that corrupts the electoral processes for: (1) obtaining, marking, or tabulating ballots; (2) canvassing and certifying election results; or (3) registering voters. Election fraud can be committed with or without the participation of voters. Examples of election fraud that does not involve voter participation are ballot box stuffing, ghost voting, and "nursing home" frauds. Examples of election fraud that involves, at least to some extent, voter participation are vote buying schemes, absentee ballot fraud, voter intimidation schemes, migratory-voting or floating-voter schemes, and voter "assistance" fraud in which the voters' wishes are ignored or not sought. According to a PIN official, its attorneys spend about 10 percent of their time on election fraud investigations and trials. PIN is also responsible for overseeing the U.S. Attorneys' and the FBI's investigation and prosecution of federal election fraud, one of the most common types of alleged federal election crimes. PIN's oversight entails (1) advising investigators and prosecutors on the application of federal criminal laws to election crimes, (2) reviewing all major election crime investigations and all proposed election crime charges, and (3) assisting with implementing DOJ's District Election Officer (DEO) program. Under the DEO program, PIN asks each of the 93 U.S. Attorneys to appoint an Assistant U.S. Attorney to serve a 2-year term as a DEO and provides training and guidance to DEOs on carrying out their responsibilities. DEOs, whose responsibilities are performed in conjunction with their other responsibilities, are to: * screen and conduct preliminary investigations of complaints, in conjunction with the FBI and PIN, to determine whether they constitute potential election crimes and should become matters for investigation; * oversee the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and other election crimes in their districts; * coordinate their district's (investigative and prosecutorial) efforts with DOJ headquarters prosecutors; * coordinate election matters with state and local election and law enforcement officials and make them aware of their availability to assist with election-related matters; * issue press releases to the public announcing the names and telephone numbers of DOJ and FBI officials to contact on election day with complaints about voting or election irregularities and answer telephones on election day to receive these complaints; and: * supervise a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and FBI special agents who are appointed to handle election-related allegations while the polls are open on election day. Our analysis of information from PIN on election fraud matters showed that U.S. Attorneys and PIN attorneys initiated a total of 61 election fraud matters, or investigations, related to election years 2000 through 2003. Most of the 61 matters related to elections held in 2002. Matters were initiated in 28 states and 1 U.S. territory (the U.S. Virgin Islands) and ranged from 1 to 7 matters per state/territory over the 4-year period. The most frequent allegations of election fraud were for absentee ballot fraud and vote buying. According to PIN, many of these matters resulted in indictments and subsequent convictions. According to the Criminal Division, the information provided by PIN does not include all election fraud investigations that the U.S. Attorneys have initiated because (1) U. S. Attorneys are not required to consult with PIN for preliminary investigations as opposed to grand jury investigations, which require consultation; (2) PIN did not track election fraud investigations prior to October 2002; and (3) election fraud investigations are sometimes initiated under non-election statutes. [End of section] Attachment III: Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003: Table 1: Attorney General-Certified Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003: State: Alabama; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Hale County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Hale County. State: Alabama; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Selma (Dallas County)[A]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Chambers County. State: Alabama; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Lowndes County. State: Arizona; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Apache County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Apache County. State: Arizona; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Navajo County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Navajo County. State: Georgia; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Randolph County [A]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Randolph County. State: Georgia; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Brooks County. State: Georgia; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Sumter County. State: Georgia; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Twiggs County. State: Louisiana; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Tensas Parish. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Aberdeen (Monroe County)[A]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Clarksdale (Coahoma County) [B]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Adams County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Greenville (Washington County). State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Bolivar County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Isola (Humphreys County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Amite County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Humphreys County. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Grenada County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Macon (Noxubee County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Centreville (Wilkinson County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Noxubee County [A]. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Neshoba County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Sunflower (Sunflower County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Drew (Sunflower County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Neshoba County. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Newton County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Newton County. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Kemper County. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Vicksburg (Warren County) [A]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Leake County. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Webb (Tallahatchie County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Jones County. State: Mississippi; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Winston County. State: New York; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Kings County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Kings County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Kings County. State: New York; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: New York County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: New York County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: New York County. State: New York; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Bronx County. State: South Carolina; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Marion County [A]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Ridgeville (Dorchester County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Ridgeville (Dorchester County) [A]. State: Texas; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Irving (Dallas County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Irving (Dallas County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Titus County. Total jurisdictions; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: 19; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: 11; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: 13; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: 9. Source: GAO's analysis of election monitoring data provided by DOJ's Voting Section. [A] Elections were monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff only, not OPM federal observers. [B] Three elections were held in Clarksdale (Coahoma County), Mississippi, in calendar year 2001. Only DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored one of the three elections, held on June 5, 2001. For the remaining two elections held that year, DOJ attorneys and professional staff accompanied OPM observers in monitoring the elections. [End of table] Table 2: Court-Ordered Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003: State: California; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Alameda County[A]. State: Illinois; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Cicero (Cook County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Cicero (Cook County)[B]. State: Louisiana; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: [C]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: [C]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: [C]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: [C]. State: Michigan; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: City of Hamtramck; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: City of Hamtramck; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: City of Hamtramck; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: City of Hamtramck. State: New Jersey; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Passaic County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Passaic County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Passaic County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Passaic County[D]. State: New Mexico; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Bernalillo County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Bernalillo County. State: New Mexico; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Cibola County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Cibola County. State: New Mexico; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Sandoval County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Sandoval County. State: New Mexico; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Socorro County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Socorro County. State: Pennsylvania; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Reading (Berks County) [B]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Reading (Berks County)[B]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Reading (Berks County). State: Utah; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: San Juan County[E]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: San Juan County[E]. Total jurisdictions; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: 8; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: 4; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: 8; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: 4. Source: GAO's analysis of election monitoring data provided by DOJ's Voting Section. [A] The court order for Alameda County, California, was in effect until January 22, 2001. [B] Elections were monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff only, not OPM federal observers. [C] A court order for St. Landry Parish was entered into on December 5, 1979. Data from the Voting Section shows that as of August 26, 2003, the court order was still in effect and that no elections were monitored at this parish during calendar years 2000 through 2003. [D] Four elections were held in Passaic County, New Jersey, in calendar year 2003. Only DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored one of the four elections, held on May 13, 2003. For the remaining three elections held that year, DOJ attorneys and professional staff accompanied OPM observers in monitoring the elections. [E] The court order for San Juan County, Utah, was in effect until December 31, 2002. [End of table] Table 3: Other Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003: State: California; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: San Francisco County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: San Francisco County. State: Connecticut; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Waterbury (New Haven County). State: Florida; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Osceola County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Osceola County. State: Florida; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Duval County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Duval County. State: Florida; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Miami-Dade County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Miami-Dade County. State: Florida; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Century (Escambia County). State: Florida; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Orange County. State: Florida; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Broward County. State: Georgia; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Putnam County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Atlanta (Fulton County). State: Hawaii; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Honolulu County. State: Kentucky; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Jefferson County. State: Louisiana; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: St. Martinville (St. Martin Parish); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Baker (East Baton Rouge Parish). State: Louisiana; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Winnsboro (Franklin Parish); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Tangipahoa Parish. State: Massachusetts; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Lawrence (Essex County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Lawrence (Essex County). State: Michigan; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Flint (Genesee County). State: Missouri; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: St. Louis; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: St. Louis; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: St. Louis. State: New Jersey; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Hudson County. State: New Jersey; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Middlesex County. State: New Mexico; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: McKinley County[A]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: San Juan County. State: New York; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Queens County[A]; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Queens County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: New York City (Queens County). State: New York; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Suffolk County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Suffolk County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Brentwood Union Free School District (Suffolk County). State: Ohio; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Maple Heights (Cuyahoga County). State: South Carolina; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Marion County. State: Texas; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: Fort Worth (Tarrant County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Bexar County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Kenedy ISD (Karnes County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Harris County. State: Texas; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Comal County; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: Seagraves (Gaines County); Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: Moore County. State: Texas; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: Guadalupe County. Total jurisdictions; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2000: 5; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2001: 9; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2002: 19; Election jurisdictions monitored during 2003: 13. Source: GAO's analysis of election monitoring data provided by DOJ's Voting Section. Note: DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored the election jurisdictions shown in this table unless otherwise noted. [A] OPM federal observers also monitored elections in these counties even though the counties are not under Attorney General-certification or court order. [End of table] [End of section] Attachment IV: Summaries of Election-Related Preliminary Investigation, Matters, and Cases Initiated from November 2000 to December 2003: Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Case Initiated during November or December 2000: No: 1; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Florida; Date matter initiated: December 2000; DJ No.: No[A]. No: 2; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Hillsborough County, Florida; Date matter initiated: November 2000; DJ No.: No[A]. No: 3; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Palm Beach County, Florida; Date matter initiated: November 2000; DJ No.: Yes. No: 4; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Several counties in Florida; Date matter initiated: November 2000; DJ No.: Yes. No: 5; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: DeKalb County, Georgia; Date matter initiated: December 2000; DJ No.: Yes. No: 6; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Gwinnett County, Georgia; Date matter initiated: November 2000; DJ No.: Yes. No: 7; Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: St. Louis, Missouri; Date matter initiated: November 2000 (case filed in August 2002); DJ No.: Yes. Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division. [A] For the matters that the Voting Section initiated in Florida after the 2000 election, the Voting Section initially used a general DJ number for all work on investigations and inquiries related to the Florida election. This number was opened in November 2000. Subsequently, the Voting Section assigned separate DJ numbers for individual matters. The 2000 matters in Florida and Hillsborough County, Florida, were inadvertently not given an individual DJ number. [End of table] Summary of Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Case Initiated during November or December 2000: Description based on Voting Section information: 1. The Voting Section received a large number of complaints alleging that Florida voters arrived at the polls expecting to be properly registered to vote, but were told that their names were not on the voter rolls. Some people who tried to vote but whose names were not on the voter rolls were often told to stand in another line so election officials could be called to verify their registrations, but many voters alleged that office phones were busy all day and registrations could not be verified. Some voters apparently left and some remained at the polls until they closed, at which time they were apparently told they could not vote because the polls were closed. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: Voting Section staff contacted individuals mentioned in complaints that the NAACP had forwarded to determine the nature of their alleged registration problems. Voting Section staff monitored election-related hearings and lawsuits in Florida to see what steps the state was going to take. The Voting Section reviewed election reform legislation that Florida enacted in 2001. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Interviews by Voting Section staff with individuals mentioned in the complaints did not reveal a distinct pattern of registration problems in any one Florida county sufficient to warrant litigation, but taken as a whole the registration complaints seemed to indicate general problems with the state of compliance with NVRA provisions for clarity and processing of voter registration forms, transmission of the forms to election officials, education of registration personnel, adherence to NVRA registration deadlines, maintenance of registration lists, ability to verify registration at the polls, and education of voters, state registration personnel, election officials, and poll workers. Disposition by Voting Section: Florida enacted election reform legislation in 2001 requiring, among other things, that the state implement a statewide voter registration database, permit provisional voting, and provide funds to counties for voter education and poll worker training. The Voting Section reviewed this law under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and precleared it on March 28, 2002. With respect to this investigation, the Voting Section noted that these reforms should help address the problems alleged to have occurred in 2000. While the Voting Section further noted that the new state legislation did not appear specifically to address all the NVRA-related issues, such as the voter registration process and education of motor vehicle agency and other state agency employees regarding state registration procedures and requirements in federal law, such issues could be addressed through design and implementation of the forthcoming election procedures to carry out the requirements of the new law. Therefore, the Voting Section determined that it would monitor Florida's NVRA actions in the future in light of the new state legislation and ongoing federal legislative efforts in election reform which might also impact Florida's election procedures. The Voting Section closed the matter because, based on its monitoring of the situation and the provisions in the state law pertinent to registration that had been precleared, it concluded that the problems which occurred in the 2000 election were being adequately addressed. Description based on Voting Section information: 2. The NAACP National Voter Fund alleged (1) that on Election Day 2000, sheriff's deputies in marked cars in Hillsborough County, Florida, blocked access to a polling place, (2) that their presence had an intimidating effect on voters, and (3) that at least on one occasion they harassed a voter. An African-American man approached sheriff's deputies after they left the scene of a burglary complaining that he was not allowed to vote. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: Voting Section staff met with, among others, officials from the county sheriff's office and several local residents, and spoke with a poll watcher to gather additional observations. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The sheriff's office reported that the presence of sheriff's deputies near the polling place was related to a burglary nearby. One of the sheriff's deputies learned two days after the election that the same man who had approached the deputies on Election Day returned to the polling place and successfully voted. A poll worker observed the presence of the sheriff's cars around the same time they were responding to the burglary, and observed that no voter had been deterred from voting due to the police activity. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter because the complaint lacked merit since there was no evidence on any of the allegations raised. Description based on Voting Section information: 3. It was alleged that the design of the butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County, Florida, violated federal voting rights laws. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section opened a matter related to this issue and reviewed federal law for which the Section had enforcement authority to determine if any action was appropriate. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The Voting Section determined that there was no basis for asserting federal jurisdiction. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section concluded that because it had no jurisdiction concerning this matter, no further action was warranted. In addition, according to the Voting Section, the new Florida election reform law should help to alleviate faulty ballot design by providing for greater oversight of ballot design. Description based on Voting Section information: 4. Four state troopers with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ran a driver's license checkpoint on Election Day 2000 in Leon County, Florida. This checkpoint was located near (about a mile from) a voting precinct. Another checkpoint was held in Bay and Escambia Counties. According to a highway patrol official, this checkpoint was not located near a voting precinct. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section opened a matter to investigate this issue and asked the Florida State Office of the Attorney General about the checkpoint in Leon County. A Voting Section attorney also spoke with an African-American voter who was stopped at one of the driver's license checkpoints. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The Voting Section's investigation revealed that the Florida Highway Patrol had set up a traffic check stop close to a polling place (about a mile away) located in a predominantly African-American neighborhood. The Voting Section investigation also indicated that the troopers' traffic stop plan had not been pre-approved by their commander, as is the standard procedure. Further investigation revealed that the traffic checkpoint was in effect for about 3 hours, and a higher number of white drivers were stopped than African-American drivers. According the Voting Section, an African-American voter who was stopped was treated courteously and proceeded to vote without incident. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter because there was no evidence of intimidation or racial intent to affect or intimidate voters. Description based on Voting Section information: 5. A U. S. Representative raised concerns regarding long voting delays in predominantly African-American precincts in DeKalb County, Georgia during the November 2000 election. It was alleged that there were no corresponding delays in majority white precincts. In one predominantly African-American precinct, several hundred voters apparently left the precinct without voting after waiting in line for several hours. In districts with a majority of white residents, voting lines apparently moved quickly with some people being able to vote in less than 15 minutes. In addition, two people complained about possible voting irregularities during a March 2001 election. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: A Voting Section attorney met with the following in Georgia to address these concerns: (1) the DeKalb County Elections Supervisor, (2) the Chairman of the DeKalb County Elections Board, (3) the Gwinnett County Elections Supervisor, (4) the president of the DeKalb County NAACP, (5) the Assistant DeKalb County Attorney, and (6) one of the representative's staff members. The Voting Section attorney received and reviewed documents from both counties' elections departments regarding the November 2000 election. The Voting Section attorney requested additional documents from the Assistant DeKalb County Attorney and DeKalb County Elections Supervisor to determine if there was an unequal division of resources among African-American and white districts. These documents outlined the budget for expenses related to the elections from 1998 through 2000. The Voting Section attorney also spoke with the president of the DeKalb County NAACP and the U. S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia. The Voting Section attorney spoke with the two persons alleging fraud during the March 2001 election. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The Voting Section attorney's analysis of the documents that DeKalb County provided revealed that most of the county's polling places that stayed open past closing time were located in majority African-American precincts. The polls' extended hours almost uniformly resulted from there being large numbers of people in line as well as insufficient numbers of poll workers and voting machines. The attorney also determined that there had been no unequal division of electoral resources between majority white and majority African-American precincts. According to investigations of the November 2000 election by the county's elections department, the area manager and his assistants at the main precinct of concern failed to contact the precinct office about the long lines and insufficient voting machines. The former area manager also denied the poll workers' requests for additional voting machines, stating none were available. The president of the DeKalb County NAACP, staff in the office of the U. S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, and the DeKalb County Elections Supervisor did not receive complaints related to Election Day in DeKalb County. With respect to the March 2001 allegations, the Voting Section attorney noted that the two persons could not identify the precincts where alleged irregularities occurred, and that they did not have allegations of racial intimidation or vote suppression. The Voting Section attorney determined that their complaints seemed to concern Georgia state law, suggested that they explore their state law remedies, suggested that they contact the county elections department and the office of Georgia's Secretary of State, and asked them to keep the Voting Section attorney informed of developments. Disposition by Voting Section: The county implemented the following changes for the March 2001 election: (1) increased the number of voting machines, (2) assigned additional poll workers and managers, (3) assigned at least 10 additional staff members to answer telephones at the Elections Department and installed 10 more telephone lines, and (4) gave the Elections Department and area managers cell phones in case regular telephone lines were busy. The Voting Section determined that a dramatic improvement resulted from these remedial actions and, as a result, closed the matter. Description based on Voting Section information: 6. The Voting Section received information that people in Gwinnett County, Georgia who had registered to vote via the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) were not on the voter registration rolls and were not allowed to vote. DPS operated vehicle registration sites in Georgia. Subsequently, DPS began the process of transitioning National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) responsibilities to the state's newly created Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). It was alleged that voters were turned away from the polls and were not offered provisional ballots. Some voters were told to go to the county registration office, but officials there told them they were not allowed to vote. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section spoke with staff in the Georgia Attorney General's office and the Georgia DPS and DMV, a voter who raised the allegations, and the Deputy Director of Elections in the Secretary of State's Office. The Voting Section monitored the transition of NVRA responsibilities from DPS to the new DMV from April 2001 to April 2002. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The Voting Section's investigation revealed that the problem likely arose from the DPS paperless system to obtain and renew a driver's license. The process seemed to result in people believing they had been registered to vote when they had not. A person who indicated the intention to register to vote did not receive any confirmation at the time of the transaction. The Voting Section's investigation revealed that since DPS implemented a paperless system in 1996, the percentage of those who registered to vote at DPS sites when they applied or renewed their licenses had dropped almost every year. There was also evidence that DPS officials knew of concerns regarding the agency's paperless registration system from its implementation. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter in April 2002 mostly because the state had created a new agency, the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety, to which responsibility for voter registration was in the process of being transitioned. The Voting Section determined this system would remedy the problem. Description based on Voting Section information: 7. DOJ, on behalf of the United States, alleged that the St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners' (referred to hereafter as the Board) placement of eligible voters on inactive status, when combined with election-day procedures that inactive voters were required to follow to restore their active voter status and vote during the November 2000 and March 2001 elections, constituted a removal of those voters from the voter registration rolls in violation of Section 8 of NVRA. As of the November 2000 general election, more than 54,000 registered voters in St. Louis had been designated as inactive and excluded from the lists of eligible voters following a series of mail canvasses that the Board conducted of its voter registration rolls. These mail canvasses did not include the notices required by Section 8(d)(2) of NVRA. The Board did not make an effort to notify inactive voters that their registration status had changed, that their names would not appear on the voter registration lists, or that they would face more administrative efforts on election day before being permitted to vote. As a result, certain eligible, but inactive voters, were not able to vote in the November 2000 general election and March 2001 municipal primary election due to the lack of an adequate infrastructure (i.e., insufficient phone lines, working telephones, and staff) in place to enable voters to complete the verification procedures required by the Board on election day. For the November 2000 election, over 300 eligible inactive voters were able to obtain authorization to vote after going to the Board's headquarters as instructed by the election judges. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: Following an investigation, DOJ filed a complaint with the U. S. District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri on August 14, 2002. On the same date, DOJ entered into a consent order with the city of St. Louis. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The Voting Section alleged that the state was in violation of NVRA and filed a complaint. Disposition by Voting Section: The consent order gives court jurisdiction over the proceeding until January 31, 2005. The consent order requires the Board to initiate procedures to remedy the problems that occurred during the November 2000 election, such as improved methods of notifying voters who are moved to an inactive status, improved methods of canvassing, and improved resources to process eligible voters not included on the rolls on Election Day. This relief included requiring that every polling place have a complete list of registered voters, including inactive voters, and a polling place locator to assist voters in finding their correct precincts. The consent decree is valid until January 31, 2005. The case remains open to monitor implementation of the consent order. [End of table] Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2001: No: 1; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Florida; Date matter initiated: March 2001[B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 2; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Florida; Date matter initiated: June 2001[B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 3; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Florida; Date matter initiated: June 2001[B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 4; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Florida; Date matter initiated: August 2001[B]; DJ No.: No[C]. No: 5; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Broward County, Florida; Date matter initiated: October 2001 [B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 6; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Miami-Dade County, Florida; Date matter initiated: June 2001 [B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 7; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Miami-Dade County, Florida; Date matter initiated: June 2001 [B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 8; Matter/Case: Matter (election monitoring); Jurisdiction: New York, New York; Date matter initiated: July 2001; DJ No.: Yes. No: 9; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Georgetown County, South Carolina; Date matter initiated: Apr-01; DJ No.: Yes. No: 10; Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Seagraves, Texas; Date matter initiated: July 2001; DJ No.: Yes. No: 11; Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: Miami-Dade County, Florida; Date matter initiated: March 2001 (case filed in June 2002) [B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 12; Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: Orange County, Florida; Date matter initiated: June 2001 (case filed in June 2002) [B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 13; Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: Osceola County, Florida; Date matter initiated: June 2001 (case filed in June 2002) [B]; DJ No.: Yes. No: 14; Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: Berks County, Pennsylvania; Date matter initiated: March 2001 (case filed in February 2003); DJ No.: Yes. No: 15; Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: Tennessee; Date matter initiated: April 2001 (case filed in September 2002); DJ No.: Yes. Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division. [B] Each of these Florida matters was initiated in the period shortly after the November 2000 election-i.e., in November or December 2000-and was reported under the general DJ number for Florida discussed previously (see note a under the summary table for November and December 2000 and note c below). The above dates are the dates they received individual DJ numbers. [C] For the matters that the Voting Section initiated in Florida after the 2000 election, the Voting Section initially used a general DJ number for all work on investigations and inquiries related to the Florida election. This number was opened in November 2000. Subsequently, the Voting Section assigned separate DJ numbers for individual matters. The 2000 matters in Florida and Hillsborough County, Florida, were inadvertently not given an individual DJ number. [End of table] Summary of Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2001: Description based on Voting Section information: 1. There were allegations made by students at Florida A&M University (FAMU) in Tallahassee (Leon County), Florida, and Bethune-Cookman College in Daytona Beach, Florida, regarding discriminatory treatment of African- American students in the registration process or at the polls. First- time voters, apparently unfamiliar with the registration process, had greater difficulty registering to vote. Older students did not seem to have such difficulty. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section's investigation consisted of phone interviews with Bethune- Cookman students, on-campus interviews of FAMU students and student government leaders, and a review of statements taken by a representative of the Service Employees International Union legal department working in association with the NAACP. A Voting Section attorney interviewed three students on FAMU's campus who claimed to experience difficulty voting, but were able to vote. The Voting Section attorney left his contact information with FAMU's student government association for any individuals who wanted to give statements regarding voting problems but could not meet with the attorney. The Voting Section attorney attempted to contact all ten students from Bethune- Cookman, but was only able to speak with three. The attorney sent letters to the remaining students but never received responses to the letters. The Voting Section attorney followed up with his contacts at FAMU, but the Voting Section did not receive any response from students to its efforts to conduct further inquiries. The student government association also posted and distributed flyers and sent out internet notices with the attorney's contact information. Neither the attorney nor the student association at FAMU received additional allegations of voting irregularities. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The Voting Section determined that the problems were likely attributable to voter confusion, not racial animosity. The Voting Section noted that the incidents of the three FAMU students who successfully voted were isolated incidents, and since each student ultimately voted, the problems they suggested did not suggest a pattern of intimidation or attempted vote denial. The Voting Section concluded that most of the allegations were likely to have been the result of students not being familiar with the voting process. Many students had registered at their permanent home addresses and did not understand they had to re-register in Leon County. The Voting Section found that voter inexperience and confusion were to blame at Bethune-Cookman, not any pattern of discriminatory treatment. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter because it lacked merit based on the evidence gathered during the investigation. Description based on Voting Section information: 2. Beginning in 1999, under Florida state law, the state contracted with a firm to compare names of registered voters with names of convicted felons who under Florida law were disqualified from voting. The state elections division sent lists of felon names for each of Florida's 67 counties to election officials in those counties for investigation and purging. The Voting Section was concerned that county and state actions with regards to the purging process may have been flawed and impermissible under NVRA. The Voting Section questioned whether eligible voters had been inadvertently removed from the voter rolls. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section reviewed testimony from Florida election officials and representatives of the company that compiled the database and obtained information on how the lists of felons' names were matched to voter registration lists. The Voting Section also did extensive additional investigation to determine whether the method in which Florida compiled a list of felons and how they purged these felons violated any of the statutes enforced by the Voting Section. In addition, the Voting Section reviewed Florida's 2001 election reform law pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. This review included provisions of the new law related to the voter purge procedures that were the subject of the investigation. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The evidence gathered by the Voting Section showed that the matching at the state level was set up in a way that it captured names that were less than definite matches. The Voting Section also learned that after receiving the state-generated list, counties' actions varied. For example, some counties refused to use the list because they perceived it to contain many errors. Other counties sent letters to all the people on the state's list telling them that their names were matched to those of disqualified felons, and they would be required to show their eligibility to vote or be removed from the rolls. The Voting Section determined that evidence gathered for this matter was inconclusive, but showed there was a possibility that voters could have been removed in violation of federal law. With respect to the Section 5 review of the 2001 election reform law, this law was precleared on March 28, 2002 after careful review. Preclearance was granted only after receiving explicit assurances from the Attorney General of Florida describing how the law would be implemented with respect to voter purge lists generated by the state pursuant to the new state law. These assurances included (1) a statement that there would not be a presumption in favor of the accuracy of the statewide database, and any presumption would be in favor of the voter and (2) the appearance of a voter's name on any voter purge list of potentially ineligible voters generated by the state would not by itself confirm a voter's ineligibility, and that the burden of determining ineligibility was on county supervisors of elections, a burden which must meet the highest degree of proof. These assurances were specifically noted when preclearance was issued by the Voting Section. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter in April 2002. The closing memo noted that the new statute appears to require no additional procedures for accurate name matching compared to the old law. It also noted that the new statute appeared to codify a procedure used by many counties under prior law where voters whose names are matched by the state must affirmatively prove their eligibility to avoid removal. However, the Voting Section closing memo also noted that the new voter purge procedures (which included the assurances made by the Attorney General of Florida to protect voters from erroneous purging) had been precleared on March 28, 2002. It further stated that the Florida felon purge statute in effect at the time of the 2000 election no longer existed and that any litigation against it based on how that law was implemented would be moot. Based on these two factors, the matter was closed. The memo also stated that the Voting Section may open a new investigation depending on any information received regarding the operation of the new statute and related regulations. Finally, the closing memo also made note of pending litigation in the case of NAACP v. Harris, which included allegations that the voter purge list used in 2000 violated the NVRA. Subsequent to the April 2002 closing of this matter, a settlement was reached in this case which required new procedures for how the state was to complete its voter purge lists in the future. This change in voter purging procedures was precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in 2003. Description based on Voting Section information: 3. A newspaper article provided to DOJ by a member of the U. S. Senate provided information that officials in several Florida counties disabled a feature in optical scan voting machines used during the November 2000 election to detect ballots spoiled by over-voting and allow voters to correct the error. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: A Voting Section attorney analyzed rates of ballot spoilage in counties that had disabled the spoilage detection function in their optical scan machines and compared those rates to those of ballot spoilage in counties that had not disabled this function. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The investigation found that Florida counties with optical scan machines that activated the spoilage detection technology had lower rates of ballot spoilage than counties that did not have or did not use the technology. Some counties that had this detection feature disabled it on their voting machines. There were also isolated instances where the technology was either disabled or failed to function properly. The Voting Section determined that there was no evidence that the disabling of this feature was done with a discriminatory effect or purpose. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed this matter because it found no evidence indicating a violation of federal law. Moreover, election reform legislation enacted in Florida in May of 2001 requires all counties to acquire voting machines with precinct-based spoilage detection technology by September 2002. The election reform law also requires counties to activate this technology during voting. The Attorney General, under Section 5 of the VRA, precleared election procedures provided for in this legislation. Description based on Voting Section information: 4. The U. S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report that posed questions regarding spoiled ballots in Florida during the November 2000 election. The Commission questioned whether the racial disparity in spoiled ballots that occurred in Florida in 2000 was a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Commission stated that the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ) should specifically investigate whether the racial disparity in spoiled ballots violated Section 2. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section reviewed the findings of the Commission's report regarding ballot rejection disparity and several newspaper studies of the spoilage issue. It then prepared a factual and legal analysis of issues raised in the Commission's report to determine if a Section 2 violation had occurred. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Several analyses suggested patterns of racial disparity in the ballot rejection practices of a few Florida counties during one election. However, the Voting Section determined that the disparity alone did not meet the standards for a Section 2 lawsuit. The Voting Section noted that more investigation, analysis, and careful thought would have to be given to the causes of ballot rejection problems in Florida, the actual level of racial disparities, and the role played by state and county officials before a decision could be made concerning a Section 2 violation. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section concluded that there was no basis for bringing a Section 2 lawsuit against Florida on the basis of the evidence of racial disparities found in spoilage rates. Furthermore, it was determined that because Florida's 2001 election reform law required new election machines, significant steps had been taken by Florida towards remedying the election problems with respect to voting machines. The Voting Section also concluded that it would make sense to monitor the actions of Florida and its counties over the subsequent few years to see whether they would follow through in acquiring new voting machines with error detection technologies and educating voters to see what impact such actions would have on ballot rejection rates. Description based on Voting Section information: 5. DOJ received allegations of inaccessible polling places and voting booths in Broward County, Florida. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section opened a matter and looked into the county's compliance with the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (VAEHA). The Voting Section sent a letter to the Broward County Supervisor of Elections requesting specific information regarding procedures in place to ensure the physical accessibility of polling places for federal elections pursuant to VAEHA. Attorneys from the Voting Section and the Civil Rights Division's Disability Rights Section met with the county supervisor of elections and the supervisor's attorney to discuss physical accessibility of polling places and purchase of new voting machines. The Voting Section and Disability Rights Section's attorneys requested documentation such as copies of county surveys covering accessibility procedures, a list of polling place changes spurred by accessibility concerns; a list of disability community contacts with whom officials from the office of the county supervisor of elections met, and procedures for reassignment or curbside voting. The county provided both attorneys with a demonstration of the new touch-screen voting machines with an audio component for the blind or visually impaired. The Voting Section attorney also contacted the county supervisor of election's attorney requesting information on VAEHA compliance. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Based on information that the county provided, the Voting Section found that the county conducted polling place surveys in 1999 and conducted another survey devised to address the problem of disabled voters' access to the polls. The investigation revealed that the people conducting the surveys had no training in accessibility standards. The county provided the Voting Section attorney with a memo and a plan stating that Florida intended to purchase new touch-screen voting machines with an audio component for the blind or visually impaired, with one such voting machine available per precinct. Disposition by Voting Section: As a result of the problems experienced in the 2000 election, the Florida legislature enacted changes to its accessibility requirements for polling places and voting machines. In light of this and the Voting Section's determination that the new Florida law went further than the requirements in VAEHA, the investigation was closed. Description based on Voting Section information: 6. It was alleged that a crowd of persons attempted to intimidate election officials on the canvassing board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, during the presidential vote recount after the November 2000 election. It was alleged that this group's activities at the county courthouse during the recount intimidated the canvassing board into abandoning the recount. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section attorney reviewed the allegations along with numerous accounts of events that transpired that day. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Based on the information gathered, the Voting Section determined that no cause of action existed under the civil enforcement provisions of the federal voting laws that the Voting Section is charged with enforcing. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section concluded that no further investigation was warranted and closed the matter. Description based on Voting Section information: 7. There were allegations made after the November 2000 election that ballot boxes in two predominantly minority precincts in Miami-Dade County, Florida, had not been picked up on Election Day, and that they were allegedly later found in the polling places. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section attorney examined voter turnout data for the two precincts in question. The Voting Section attorney also held discussions with the First Assistant County Attorney in Miami-Dade County, who in turn contacted the county supervisor of elections. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: The discussions that the Voting Section conducted with counsel for Miami-Dade County indicated that all of the county's ballot boxes had been accounted for on that day. According to the county supervisor of elections, the boxes that were later located in the two precincts contained election supplies, not ballots. Analysis of data from the two precincts indicated that both precincts reported voter turnout rates in the expected range given the county's overall turnout rate. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter because it lacked merit. According to the Voting Section, the evidence that the Voting Section collected made it seem doubtful that there were any missing ballot boxes. Description based on Voting Section information: 8. The Voting Section opened this matter in August 2001 to initiate the monitoring of an election in New York City in November 2001 on the basis of observations made during the November 2000 election. Thirty federal observers and seven DOJ staff members monitored polling place procedures during municipal general elections in 2001 in Kings County (also known as Brooklyn) and in Bronx County. The Attorney General had previously certified both counties for federal observers pursuant to Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act. Also, 17 federal observers and 5 Voting Section attorneys monitored polling place procedures during the general election in 2002 in Brooklyn. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: In pre-election activities, two Civil Rights Division attorneys met with officials from the New York City Board of Elections to discuss concerns about preparations for the election, including the need for poll worker training for the election, the need for voting machines to accommodate the number of registered voters, the need for Spanish-language voter registration materials for poll workers to distribute minority language assistance, and consolidation of polling places. A Voting Section attorney also attended four poll-worker training classes. After the election, the Voting Section attorneys met with several Board of Elections officials to debrief them. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Thirty federal observers monitored activities at 31 polling places in Bronx County and 12 polling places in Brooklyn County during the municipal general elections. Three staff members from DOJ's Civil Rights Division and one AUSA for the Southern District of New York traveled with the observers to provide additional monitoring. Two Voting Section staff members visited six polling places in both counties. During the election, observers found that materials to be displayed to inform Spanish- speaking voters of assistance to interpret the ballot were not always clear or in public view at nearly half of the polling places in both counties. The Board of Election officials were informed of this and took action. These officials noted that it was up to each polling place inspector to display the materials they are given. Poll workers were observed asking voters for identification, which was in violation of New York State law; Board of Election officials were notified of this and went to the polling place to address the issue. DOJ monitors did not witness any Spanish-speaking poll workers at the 12 polling locations visited in Brooklyn; this was discussed with Board of Election officials; however, DOJ officials found that appropriate language assistance was available in both counties. Seventeen federal observers and five attorneys from the Civil Rights Division monitored polling place procedures during the general election in Kings County. The Voting Section attorney who attended four poll-worker training classes found that the classes appropriately addressed minority language issues and assistance. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter because the monitoring of the election was completed. Voting Section staff could not comprehensively identify failure by individual poll workers to post or provide all materials to Spanish-speaking voters because of the large number of election districts-nearly 2,000-and the small number of observers. However, the Voting Section found that the Board of Elections was very responsive to all of the Voting Section's concerns and sent Board officials to places where problems arose, usually within 30 minutes. Description based on Voting Section information: 9. The Voting Section received an allegation from an African-American voter that a supervisor at a voting precinct in Georgetown County, South Carolina, discriminated against African-American voters during the 2000 presidential election. The voter alleged that the supervisor treated African-American voters in a rude and discriminating manner. In talking to the complainant and others, it was learned that there were also alleged voter registration problems during the 2000 election related to precinct changes and the local DMV. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: The Voting Section attorney interviewed officials with the Georgetown County Board of Registration and Elections, representatives of the Republican and Democratic parties, voters, and an attorney representing the county. The Voting Section attorney also interviewed an official who managed the Georgetown County DMV office regarding the second-hand allegations from a Democratic party representative regarding possible registration problems at the local DMV. After interviewing the DMV official and examining the forms that the DMV provides to drivers applying for new licenses to simultaneously allow them to register to vote, the Voting Section attorney noted that the form on the DMV driver's license application did not contain a box for people to check if they wanted to register to vote and that this might not adhere to the NVRA provision for a simultaneous process to apply for a driver's license and register to vote. In addition, in the interview with the employee in the local DMV office, the Voting Section attorney learned that they may have been only asking people applying for new drivers' licenses, not people renewing their licenses, if they wanted to register to vote. However, this employee further informed the Voting Section attorney that in October 2000 she received instructions from the head of the state DMV to ask every person who was applying for a driver's license whether he or she wished to register to vote, and she followed that instruction through the election. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Voting Section staff wrote to the Voter Registration and Election Commission for Georgetown County outlining the allegations concerning the rude treatment by the poll worker and the Voting Section's findings and asked the commission how it planned to respond. The county's Voter Registration and Election Commission responded in writing that the election supervisor was informed by letter that she would be reassigned to another precinct and not permitted to serve in a supervisory capacity for the June 11, 2002, election. She decided not to work the June 2002 election. Other issues examined in this investigation were not raised with the county in this letter. With respect to the precinct change allegations, the Voting Section learned that confusion as to proper voting precincts was likely the result of a change in the method of identifying addresses of voters. With respect to allegations about the DMV procedures, the Voting Section received no complaints from voters who indicated that the alleged problems at the DMV existed or resulted in denying them the right to vote. In addition, after the examination of the DMV forms and interview with the local DMV employee, it was concluded that there did not appear to be a violation of the NVRA. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter on March 9, 2004. As of that date, the Voting Section had not received additional complaints concerning the treatment of African-American voters in Georgetown County or about voting registration issues previously investigated. According to the complainant, the election held on June 11,2002, went smoothly. Description based on Voting Section information: 10. The Voting Section received a complaint alleging that the Seagraves Independent School District and the City of Seagraves, both in Texas, held elections without bilingual judges or bilingual training. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: A Voting Section attorney visited Seagraves and the Seagraves Independent School Board. The Voting Section also contacted a newspaper to review published articles regarding the school board election. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Information in a newspaper article indicated that the allegations were untrue, and that all election material was produced in English and Spanish. The Voting Section attorney was told that confusion existed for all voters because of the present districting system. The Seagraves City Secretary wrote a letter to the Voting Section attorney stating that each year the city names a Hispanic judge who is also bilingual. The City Secretary also provided the Voting Section attorney with minutes of prior city council meetings highlighting the nomination and approval of the election judges, and a sample ballot printed in both English and Spanish. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section attorney suggested that the town should make an effort to educate voters of district boundaries by methods other than newspaper advertising. Subsequent to the election, the city of Seagraves sent a map of district boundaries and candidates running in each district to each city household. The Voting Section closed the matter. Description based on Voting Section information: 11. During the November 2000 election, Miami-Dade County, Florida, allegedly engaged in practices that prevented the county's Creole-speaking Haitian- American voters with limited ability to speak English from securing assistance at the polls. In circumstances where the county permitted voter assistance from persons of the voters' choice, the scope of the assistance was limited (e. g. , standing next to voters during poll worker demonstrations) and of little value to voters once they entered the voting booths. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: After a full investigation, the Voting Section initiated litigation against Miami- Dade County because of its alleged violation of Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. Prior to initiating litigation, the Voting Section conducted an investigation of the county's voter assistance practices during the 2000 election. DOJ filed a complaint with the U. S. District Court in the Southern District for Florida on June 7, 2002. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: Evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrated that Creole-speaking Haitian-American voters at several precincts were denied assistance from persons of their choice in violation of Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. Oftentimes, only poll workers, who did not speak Creole, were permitted to assist the voters, and they limited their assistance to voter demonstrations outside the voting booths. The Voting Section did not find evidence that noncompliance with Section 208 was the result of intentional discrimination. In this regard, it was noted that the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners passed ordinances in 1999 and 2000 mandating that Haitian-Creole ballot translations be available in voting booths located at precincts where "significant" numbers of Haitian-American people vote. Disposition by Voting Section: A consent order was entered into on June 17, 2002, that, in part, prohibited the county from denying Haitian- American voters assistance from persons of their choice and mandated that the county take certain steps to prevent violations of Section 208 and to redress the harm caused these voters, such as modifying poll worker training to include instruction on how to handle requests for language assistance. The consent order is in effect through December. 31, 2005. The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent order. Description based on Voting Section information: 12. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that various election practices and procedures in Orange County, Florida, unlawfully denied or abridged the voting rights of Spanish-speaking citizens. The challenged practices concerned the alleged failure of the county to: (1) provide an adequate number of bilingual poll workers trained to assist Hispanic voters on Election Day; (2) ensure that poll officials allow Spanish-speaking voters to have persons of their choice assist them in casting their ballots; and (3) translate certain written election materials into Spanish. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: After investigating these allegations, DOJ filed a complaint in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on June 28, 2002, and entered into a consent decree with Orange County on October 9, 2002. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that Orange County violated VRA Sections 203 and 208. Disposition by Voting Section: The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent decree. The consent decree permits DOJ to monitor elections in Orange County from October 9, 2002 until January 31, 2005. The consent decree also mandates policies and procedures that Orange County must adopt with regards to treatment of Spanish-speaking voters. The consent decree is valid until January 31, 2005. DOJ did not contend that Orange County's failure to adhere to VRA Sections 203 and 208 was the result of intentional discrimination. Description based on Voting Section information: 13. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that Osceola County, Florida, engaged in various election practices and procedures that unlawfully denied Spanish-speaking citizens an opportunity equal to that of other citizens to vote. The challenged practices concerned: (1) the failure of poll officials to communicate effectively to Spanish-speaking voters necessary information concerning their eligibility to vote, voter registration status, identification requirements, and polling place changes and assignments; (2) the refusal of poll officials to allow certain Spanish-speaking voters assistance in voting by persons of their choice; and (3) hostile remarks by poll officials directed towards Hispanic voters with limited English proficiency. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: After investigating the matter, DOJ filed a complaint in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on June 28, 2002, and entered into a consent decree with Osceola County on July 22, 2002. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that Osceola County violated VRA Sections 2 and 208. Disposition by Voting Section: The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent decree. The consent decree allows DOJ to monitor elections held in Osceola County from the date of the consent decree through January 31, 2005. It specifies procedures that the Osceola County Board of Elections must implement with regards to the treatment of Spanish-speaking voters and efforts the county must engage in to facilitate voting by Spanish-speaking voters. The consent decree is valid through January 31, 2005. DOJ did not contend that Osceola County intended to deny Spanish-speaking voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. Description based on Voting Section information: 14. It was alleged that, in conducting elections in Reading City, Pennsylvania, Berks County denied Hispanic citizens with limited English proficiency an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect the representatives of their choice. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: After extensive investigation, which included the monitoring of several elections held in the county, the Voting Section initiated litigation against Berks County because of its alleged violation of several provisions of the Voting Rights Act. DOJ filed a complaint with the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on February 25, 2003. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that actions contributing to the denial by Berks County to provide Hispanic citizens with limited English proficiency an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect the representatives of their choice included the following: poll officials directed hostile remarks at, and acted in a hostile manner toward, Hispanic voters to deter them from voting and make them feel unwelcome at the polls; poll officials engaged in election practices including the failure to communicate effectively with Spanish-speaking voters regarding necessary information about their eligibility to vote, voter registration status, identification requirements, and polling place changes and assignments, and turning away Hispanic voters at the 2001 and 2002 elections; and Berks County failed to recruit, train, and maintain an adequate pool of Hispanic and bilingual poll officials despite their knowledge of the needs of Hispanic voters with limited English proficiency. Disposition by Voting Section: On July 17, 2003, DOJ filed a motion for (1) permanent injunction and entry of final judgment that sought to permanently enjoin the county's conduct of elections using policies, practices, procedures, and methods that violate certain VRA requirements and (2) the court to issue an order authorizing OPM to appoint federal examiners pursuant to VRA to serve in Berks County through June 30, 2007. The court granted the United States' motion on August 20, 2003. The case remains open for monitoring and several elections have been monitored since entry of the consent decree. Description based on Voting Section information: 15. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that the state of Tennessee engaged in practices that unlawfully denied certain citizens full and complete opportunities to register to vote in elections for federal office as mandated by NVRA. The challenged practices included the failure of the state and agency officials to: (1) provide applications to register to vote simultaneously with applications for motor vehicle driver's licenses (including renewal applications); (2) request only the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent duplicate voter registration and enable state election officials to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration and other part of the election process; (3) distribute voter registration applications with every application for public assistance or services to persons with disabilities; and (4) transmit completed voter registration applications in a timely manner. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: After investigating this matter, DOJ filed a complaint against the state of Tennessee in the U. S. District Court of Tennessee on September 27, 2002. On that same day, the state of Tennessee entered into a consent decree with DOJ. Voting Section's assessment of allegations: In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that Tennessee violated provisions in NVRA. Disposition by Voting Section: The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent decree. The consent decree requires the state and state agencies to develop uniform procedures with regards to the voter application process and the implementation of NVRA and report progress to DOJ annually while the consent decree is in effect. The consent decree expires on August 1, 2005. [End of table] Election-Related Closed Preliminary Investigation and Matters and Closed Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2002: No.: 1; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Preliminary investigation; Jurisdiction: Hinds County, Mississippi; Date investigation or matter initiated: November 2002; DJ No.: No: No.: 2; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter (election monitoring); Jurisdiction: Apache and Navajo Counties, Arizona; Date investigation or matter initiated: Sep-02; DJ No.: Yes. No.: 3; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter (election monitoring); Jurisdiction: Broward County, Florida; Date investigation or matter initiated: November 2002; DJ No.: Yes. No.: 4; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter (election monitoring); Jurisdiction: Duval County, Florida; Date investigation or matter initiated: November 2002; DJ No.: Yes. No.: 5; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Georgia; Date investigation or matter initiated: October 2002; DJ No.: No[D]. No.: 6; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Minnesota; Date investigation or matter initiated: October 2002; DJ No.: Yes. No.: 7; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: New Jersey; Date investigation or matter initiated: October 2002; DJ No.: Yes. No.: 8; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter (election monitoring); Jurisdiction: Bexar County, Texas; Date investigation or matter initiated: October 2002; DJ No.: Yes. No.: 9; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Matter; Jurisdiction: Hidalgo County, Texas; Date investigation or matter initiated: December 2002; DJ No.: Yes. No.: 10; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: Oklahoma; Date investigation or matter initiated: August 2002 (case filed in September 2002); DJ No.: Yes. No.: 11; Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case: Case; Jurisdiction: Texas; Date investigation or matter initiated: March 2002 (case filed in March 2002); DJ No.: Yes. Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division. [D] According to the Voting Section, this matter did not receive a DJ number inadvertently. [End of table] Summary of Election-Related Closed Preliminary Investigation and Matters and Closed Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2002: Description based on Voting Section information: 1. The wife of a soldier from Hinds County, Mississippi, assigned to Guantanamo, Cuba, alleged that her husband and approximately 50 other soldiers from that county did not receive their absentee ballots in the mail. Hinds County acknowledged receiving their requests in mid-September of 2002, and the circuit clerk confirmed they were mailed in the first week of October 2002. The Mississippi Secretary of State's office suggested that the soldiers fax in federal ballots but was not sure the ballots would be counted. That office also suggested to the soldier's wife that she contact the Voting Section. She reported to the Voting Section that soldiers from Madison and Rankin counties, also in Mississippi, did not receive their ballots until after the election. She also contacted the Assistant U. S. Attorney (AUSA) for Hinds County. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: A Voting Section official discussed the allegation with an official in the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) under the Department of Defense (DOD), who said that someone in Hinds County told FVAP on November 20, 2002, that about 20 ballots had been sent to soldiers in Guantanamo. Voting Section staff also phoned the AUSA in Jackson, Mississippi, and noted in a memo that the AUSA had directed a local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent to interview the chancery clerk, the registrar, and all others in the chain of custody of the ballots. The Voting Section also discussed asking FVAP to monitor transit of absentee ballots to soldiers from Hinds and Brandon Counties during the next election in response to the soldier's wife January 2003 request that the Voting Section keep these counties on its "radar screen. " The AUSA told the soldier's wife that an investigation revealed the ballots had been lost in the mail. The FBI agent concluded that the county officials had mailed the ballots to the soldiers, but they had been lost or disappeared. The private company that processed mail for the county told the FBI agent that they were unable to check the zip codes of mail processed on a particular day. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the preliminary investigation after the AUSA concluded, and the Voting Section agreed, that there was no basis for bringing charges against anyone involved in the handling of the ballots because the ballots had been lost in the mail and no further action was needed. Description based on Voting Section information: 2. On November 5, 2002, federal election observers and Voting Section staff monitored polling place activities at 21 locations in Apache and Navajo Counties, Arizona. The Attorney General, pursuant to VRA Section 6, had certified these counties for federal observers. Since then, federal observers have documented problems related to the counties' inability to provide consistently effective Navajo language assistance to voters and other related circumstances affecting the Navajo voting population. The Voting Section was concerned about the following issues related to the primary held in September 10, 2002, and the general election held in November 5, 2002: (1) the counties' provision for Navajo language assistance, (2) voters being turned away at the polls, (3) crossover voting, and (4) polls not opening on time. During the 2000 election cycle and 2002 primary, federal observers documented several problems with the counties' provision of Navajo language assistance to voters. The Voting Section suggested that both counties distribute cassette tapes containing Navajo language ballot translations to poll workers. The counties committed to preparing and distributing the tapes to poll workers. Officials from both counties also informed the Voting Section that they would use updated flip charts for the November election. These charts, which were used for the September primary at the Voting Section's suggestion, displayed pictorial representations and written Navajo translations of each of the offices on the primary election ballot. There had been confusion in previous elections among many elderly Navajo voters who live near the Navajo/Apache county line about polling place and voter registration. These voters often vote in different locations for tribal and state/federal elections. Tribal elections do not recognize county boundaries. Poll workers at polling places near the county line apparently turned away dozens of elderly voters because of voting location confusion during the 2000 primary and general elections and the 2002 primary. In 2000, poll workers gave affidavit ballots to other crossover voters in the mistaken belief that the ballots would be accepted later. However, since these voters were not registered in the counties where they voted, their votes were considered invalid. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: In September 2002, the Voting Section met with the Apache County Election Director, the Apache County Deputy County Attorney, the Navajo County Election Director, the Navajo County recorder, and two Navajo County outreach workers to discuss several issues related to elections in the two counties. The Voting Section provided suggestions on how to prevent prior problems from recurring. The Voting Section observed the November 2002 election. The original poll worker training schedules that the two counties had provided to the Voting Section allotted approximately 2 hours for training. The Voting Section suggested having all-day training sessions, and the schedules were revised to allot 6-½ hours for training. The Voting Section suggested that both counties provide each polling place on the Navajo Reservation with voter registration lists from both counties, and train poll workers to check both lists and check with the appropriate county election department before turning voters away. Both counties agreed to adopt this suggestion. The Voting Section also expressed concern about polling places that opened late for the September primary. The counties agreed to address this prior to the November 2002 election. The counties' implementation of their Navajo Language election information program was inadequate. While the counties provided language assistance to many voters, the assistance was frequently insufficient and failed to provide consistent and accurate language translation of the offices and propositions on the ballot's 14 propositions. The Voting Section concluded that the counties must improve and expand their training program for interpreters. The federal observers reported that the interpreters and poll workers believed more training in Navajo language translation was necessary. Some poll workers told the observers that the audiotapes containing Navajo translations were too long and confusing. One polling place was not well organized, resulting in very long lines. The Voting Section reported this to the Navajo County Elections Director, who sent an outreach worker to remedy the problem. The line was moving more quickly by mid-afternoon. The number of voters turned away from the polls was less than during the September primary. However, while all the polling places had both counties' registration books, poll workers at most locations did not use them. Some did not know the books were available. At one Apache County location, observers reported that the Navajo county list was not present. The Voting Section informed the county elections director, who showed the Navajo County book to the polling place inspector. The poll workers had not removed the book from the elections supply box. The Voting Section felt that more training and practice would make the poll workers more familiar with this new system. There were no complaints about polls not opening on time. Disposition by Voting Section: A November 22, 2002, memo discussing the monitoring of the November 5, 2002, election indicated that the Voting Section would meet in the future with election officials from both counties to discuss the November 5, 2002, election and develop methods to improve the counties' provision of language assistance and overall Election Day performance. The matter was closed after the election. According to the Voting Section, this is standard Voting Section procedure when irregularities are observed during election coverage. In the case of Navajo language assistance in these counties, the Voting Section stated that such outreach has been continuous for many years. Another memo discussing compliance and outreach efforts since the 2002 election indicates many improvements in Navajo language assistance efforts as a result of this outreach, including: (1) improved poll worker training which included the use of pictorial flip charts to assist voters in understanding the ballot; (2) outreach and voter registration efforts on the reservation at various events; (3) the opening of new early voting locations on the Navajo Reservation; (4) the opening of a new satellite election office on the reservation to disseminate voter information and register voters; and (5) greater cooperation among the counties providing Navajo language assistance. Description based on Voting Section information: 3. Voting Section personnel and 2 AUSAs monitored 84 precincts in Broward County, Florida, during the November 2002 election. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: Actions taken by DOJ staff included interviewing the clerk of the precinct where a white male precinct worker who allegedly harassed African-American voters was employed about any complaints or problems with the assistant precinct clerk in question. DOJ staff spoke with four voters at this precinct regarding their experience voting and asked election officials to make chairs available for the disabled and elderly waiting in line to vote. They contacted county election officials about a voter who was told he could not vote because he had already sent an absentee ballot; the precinct clerk eventually verified that the voter had not been sent an absentee ballot, and the voter was allowed to cast his vote on election day. With regard to the absentee ballot issue, DOJ staff advised the poll official to contact the Broward County Election Board. In addition, DOJ staff: (1) gave a voter the toll-free telephone number for the Voting Section because the voter wanted to complain about the lack of voting machines; (2) asked a poll clerk and poll workers if they had received complaints about not having enough voting machines; and (3) spoke with two voters who complained about a precinct being hard to find. Voting Section staff provided assistance to help correct issues that arose during the monitoring. Examples of issues/problems observed were: (1) African-American voters felt somewhat harassed by a white male precinct worker; (2) a poll official did not want to allow a person to vote who said he had requested an absentee ballot but did not receive it; and (3) persons were turned away because of precinct changes due to redistricting, because they moved, and for other reasons. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter because the election being monitored was completed. Description based on Voting Section information: 4. At the request of Florida's Secretary of State, the Voting Section monitored the election in November 2002 in Duval County, Florida. Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation: Voting Section attorneys monitored the election and facilitated the resolution of problems that arose by communicating proper election procedures to the Supervisor of Elections. Prior to monitoring the election, Voting Section attorneys met with the Supervisor of Elections, minority leaders in the community, leaders of the NAACP, and representatives from the local Democratic and Republican parties. They exchanged telephone information and invited each person or group to contact them with details of any problems that they might help address. They also provided guidance on issues that might arise to provide a common understanding of action that should be taken if a particular problem arose. The Voting Section attorneys worked with the Supervisor of Elections to improve election processes and were invited by the Supervisor of Elections to monitor elections in April and May 2003 to further improve upon their election processes. While monitoring the election, the Voting Section found various areas of clarification and improvement. One issue involved absentee ballots and Florida law allowing a person who requested an absentee ballot but did not submit it to vote at the polls. There was confusion when absentee ballots were submitted but rejected as being incomplete because they lacked voters' signatures and voters then being able to vote at the polls. Voters who submit absentee ballots are considered to have voted and cannot vote at the polls on election day if the absentee ballot is rejected. Also, poll workers had given incorrect ballots to some voters. Voters were turned away who lacked signed photo identification and were not allowed to vote by provisional ballot. There were also a few instances of insensitivity to minority voters and voters with disabilities. Disposition by Voting Section: The Voting Section closed the matter because the election being monitored was completed. Description based on Voting Section information: 5. Georgia state law requires counties to have absentee ballots on hand 45 days before a general election. Georgia missed the September 20, 2002, deadline for the November 5, 2002, general election because of the compressed election schedule in 2002. The 45-day deadline was set to comply with federal mandates to make it easier for U. S. military personnel stationed outside the United States to vote. Georgia had compressed its 2002 primary and runoff election schedules such that the runoff was held only 49 days before the November 5 general election. This precluded the printing of the general election ballot in time for the mailing deadline required under state law. Georgia election officials had contacted FVAP during the first week of October regarding the state's compliance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). Catoosa County ballots omitted the names of the Republican candidate for the U. S. Senate and the Republican gubernatorial candidate from the ballot. An allegation was made that this, among other absentee ballot irregularities, violated UOCAVA because the correct ballots, even if sent at the time this concern was raised on October 16, 2002, would not be received in time. Georgia's Secretary of State asked DOJ to bring suit against the state to extend the deadline for receipt of military and other absentee ballots. Voting Section's actions tak