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United States General Accounting Office: 


Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee 
on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m., EDT: 
Wednesday, February 27, 2002:  

Defense Acquisitions: 

DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices: 

Statement for the Record by Jack L. Brock, Jr. 
Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
Randolph C. Hite: 
Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems: 


Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the record. 
At your request, we are discussing our work on best practices related 
to the acquisition of services, information technology, and weapon 
systems. Additionally, we are providing you with information on our 
other work for the subcommittee related to acquisitions. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on acquisitions. It 
spends close to $100 billion annually to research, develop, and 
acquire weapon systems and tens of billions more for services and 
information technology. Moreover, this investment is expected to grow 
substantially. From 1995 to 2007, investments in weapon systems are 
planned to escalate from $90 billion to $157 billion-—about a 74-
percent increase. And over the next 5 years, starting in fiscal year 
2003, DOD's request for weapon system development and acquisition 
funds is estimated to be about $700 billion. Similarly, DOD's spending 
on services is expected to continue to grow, largely attributable to 
increased purchases of information technology services and 
professional administrative and management support services. 

The goals for this investment are ambitious. While continuing to keep 
legacy systems, DOD plans to fund newer programs such as Global Hawk 
and Predator, as well as future capabilities such as unmanned 
airplanes, satellite networks, and information and communication 
systems. Additionally, information technology is expected to play a 
critical role in DOD's business transformation. 

Despite these heavy investments, our work continues to show that DOD 
is not carrying out acquisitions cost-effectively and that the 
acquisitions themselves are not always achieving DOD's objectives. 
Although the department has many acquisition reform initiatives in 
process, pervasive problems persist regarding the use of high risk 
acquisition strategies; questionable requirements and solutions that 
are not the most cost-effective available; and unrealistic cost, 
schedule, and performance estimates. For these reasons, we have 
reported DOD contract management, information technology management, 
and weapon systems acquisition as high risk areas for more than a 
decade.[Footnote 1] 

To help DOD meet these challenges, you have asked us over the past 
several years to identify how leading organizations are addressing 
similar problems. Our work has identified numerous practices and 
principles that have consistently resulted in better outcomes—
including dramatic cost savings, improved services and products, and 
ultimately, a better return on investment. The changes leading 
organizations make often reflected common sense approaches, but they 
are nevertheless dramatically different from the traditional ways of 
doing business and they each enhance performance. For example: 

* In analyzing just how much was being spent on acquiring services and 
where the dollars were going, leading organizations were able to 
substantially reduce the number of suppliers and negotiate lower rates.
Sometimes, thousands of suppliers were reduced to just a few. 

* Leading organizations were able to make sure that their business 
systems could interoperate and truly help to achieve corporate-—rather 
than business unit—-objectives by using enterprise architectures to 
guide and constrain their investments. These architectures are 
essentially blueprints that define where the organization is going in 
terms of mission, business operations, and technology. 

* In developing and manufacturing complex products, leading 
organizations have learned to treat technology development and product 
development differently and manage them separately. Doing so helped 
them to reduce design and production difficulties and to deliver more 
sophisticated products quicker and cheaper. 

DOD is committed to adopting many best practices and has already taken 
steps to change its policies and procedures. Implementing these 
practices, however, will be extremely challenging. For instance, the 
sheer size of the department, the number of acquisitions, and the 
hundreds of organizations involved will make it difficult to gain much-
needed visibility over spending on services as well as to implement 
enterprisewide management and oversight mechanisms. Moreover, the 
changes DOD makes must extend well beyond policies and procedures. 
Incentives driving traditional ways of doing business, for example, 
must be changed, and cultural resistance to new approaches must be 
overcome. Undoubtedly, DOD will need strong and sustained commitment 
from its leadership to tackle these more elusive challenges-—not just 
to initiate changes but to continually support them. 

Best Practices in the Acquisition of Services: 

DOD is, by far, the government's largest purchaser of services. In 
fiscal year 2000 alone, it bought more than $53 billion in services 
ranging from clerical support and consulting, to information 
technology services, to the management and operation of facilities. 
However, this spending is not being managed efficiently. 
Responsibility for acquiring services is spread among individual 
military commands, weapon system program offices, or functional units 
on military bases, with little visibility or control at the DOD- or 
military department level. And when it comes to making procurements, 
our work, as well as that of other oversight agencies, continues to 
show that requirements are not always clearly defined, alternatives 
are not fully considered, and contractors are not adequately overseen. 
DOD leadership has recognized the need to change current practices for 
acquiring services and is seeking to adapt the same revolutionary 
business and management practices that helped the commercial sector 
gain a competitive edge. 

GAO Findings: 

In view of private sector successes with service acquisitions, this 
subcommittee asked us to examine how leading companies reengineered 
their approach and the extent to which DOD is pursuing a similar 
approach. Our first report, which describes the general framework 
adopted by leading companies, was issued in January 2002.[Footnote 2] 

The leading companies we studied made a number of dramatic changes to 
the way they bought services and found that these changes, in turn, 
resulted in significant cost savings and service improvements. These 
changes generally began with a corporate decision to pursue a more 
strategic approach to acquiring services. Taking a strategic approach 
involves a range of activities—from developing a better picture of 
what the company is spending on services, to taking an enterprisewide 
approach to procuring services, to developing new ways of doing 
business. For example: 

* The companies we visited analyzed their spending on services to 
answer the basic questions of how much was being spent and where the 
dollars were going. In doing so, they realized that they were buying 
similar services from numerous providers, often at greatly varying 
prices. The companies used this data to rationalize their supplier 
base, or in other words, to determine the right number of suppliers 
that met their needs. 

* The companies we studied changed how they acquired services in 
significant ways. They elevated or expanded the role of the company's 
procurement organization; designated commodity managers to oversee key 
services; and made extensive use of cross-functional teams to help 
identify their service needs, conduct market research, evaluate and 
select providers, and manage performance. 

Bringing about new ways of doing business was challenging. For 
example, some companies spent months piecing together data from 
various financial management information systems and examining 
individual purchase orders just to get a rough idea of what they were 
spending on services. Other companies found that in establishing new 
procurement processes, they needed to overcome resistance from 
individual business units reluctant to share decision-making 
responsibility and to involve staff that traditionally did not 
communicate with each other. To do so, the companies found they needed 
to have sustained commitment from their senior leadership; to clearly 
communicate the rationale, goals, and expected results from the 
reengineering efforts; and to measure whether the changes were having 
their intended effects. The figure below highlights specific 
principles and practices the companies we studied followed. 

Figure 1: Principles and Practices of Leading Companies: 

[Refer to PDF for image: list] 

Commitment: Secure up front commitment from top leaders; 
* Recognize and communicate the urgency to change service spending 
* Provide clear and strong executive leadership, including goals and 

Knowledge: Obtain improved knowledge on service spending; 
* Develop information system to identify how much is being spent with 
which service provider for what services; 
* Analyze the data to identify opportunities to reduce costs, improve 
service levels, and provide better management of service providers. 

Change: Create supporting structure, processes, and roles; 
* Create or identify organizations responsible for coordinating or 
managing service purchases; 
* Establish proactive business relationships between end users, 
purchasing units, and other stakeholders; 
* Implement more integrated team-based sourcing processes; 
* Create commodity/service experts. 

Support: Enable success through sustained leadership, communication, 
and metrics; 
* Obtain sustaining support from senior leadership to facilitate 
* Establish clear lines of communication between all affected parties; 
* Demonstrate value and credibility of new processes through use of 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Taking a strategic approach clearly paid off, as companies found that 
they could save millions of dollars and improve the quality of 
services received by instituting these changes. In some cases, 
thousands of suppliers were reduced to a few, enabling the companies 
to negotiate lower rates. In other cases, new information systems 
enabled companies to better match their business managers' needs with 
potential providers. 

The strategic approach taken by the leading firms we visited could 
serve as a general framework to guide DOD's service contracting 
initiatives. DOD has certain elements critical to taking a strategic 
approach already in place, such as the commitment by senior leadership 
to improve its practices for acquiring services and to adopting best 
commercial practices. However, DOD has not conducted a comprehensive 
analysis of its spending on services or thoroughly assessed its 
current structure, processes, and roles—two elements that companies 
found to be crucial to reengineering their approaches to purchasing 
services. It also lacks a strategic plan that integrates or 
coordinates the various initiatives underway within the department or 
that provides a road map for identifying or prioritizing future 

To achieve the significant improvements possible by the use of best 
practices in the acquisition of services, we recommended that the 
secretary of defense evaluate how a strategic reengineering approach, 
such as that employed by the leading companies we visited, could be 
used as a framework to guide DOD's reengineering efforts. 
Specifically, we recommended that DOD assess (1) whether current or 
planned financial or management information systems can provide the 
type of spending data that DOD needs to identify opportunities to 
leverage its buying power and improve oversight and (2) whether its 
current organizational structure, processes, and roles are adequate to 
support a more strategic approach to acquiring services. 

DOD concurred with our recommendations, and it is implementing 
improvements on several fronts. For example, it will be upgrading the 
Federal Procurement Data System to provide more detail on service 

DOD is also required by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2002 to establish and implement a management structure for 
the procurement of services comparable to the management structure 
that applies to the procurement of products by DOD, and to establish a 
data collection system to provide management information on each 
purchase of services in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold. 

Challenges Still Ahead: 

Undoubtedly, DOD will find it challenging adopting best practices for 
buying services. First, DOD's size and the range and complexity of the 
services it acquires may mean that it cannot adopt a "one-size-fits-
all" approach to services acquisitions. According to DOD officials, 
there are individual commands that are comparable to a Fortune 500 
company, each spending billions of dollars annually on services. 
Further, while some services can be acquired departmentwide, others 
(such as ship support and maintenance) may be unique to specific 
commands, units, or geographic locations. Other challenges that could 
affect DOD's service contracting initiatives include existing problems 
in its information technology and financial management systems and the 
unique requirements of the federal environment. 

As noted earlier, our January report provided an overall framework of 
practices. We plan to assess each practice area in more depth, looking 
further at such questions as what are the best practices for 
conducting a spending analysis and how to ensure an organization is 
getting the right information. 

Best Practices in Information Technology Acquisitions:  

DOD is the federal government's largest consumer of information 
technology (IT) resources, spending almost $22 billion on IT in fiscal 
year 2001. For this reason, it is critical that DOD adopt effective IT 
acquisition practices. Our past reviews have shown that this is not 
always done. Particularly, because of inefficient and ineffective 
processes, DOD is at risk of pursing systems and services that do not 
deliver value commensurate with costs, and that are duplicative, are 
not well integrated, and do not help to optimize mission performance. 

GAO Findings: 

Our work in recent years has looked at best practices for acquiring IT 
systems and acquiring IT services (e.g., network support or help desk 
support). Like the framework we described for services acquisitions, 
these practices do not represent cookie cutter approaches; rather, 
they need to be tailored to the type of system and service being 
acquired, how it will be used, and its importance to an organization. 

IT System Acquisitions: The goals of any IT system acquisition, 
whether commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)-based or customized, can be 
viewed as threefold: (1) to deliver needed functional and performance 
capabilities by a certain time for a certain cost, (2) to reasonably 
ensure that, over the system's useful life, these capabilities will 
provide mission or business value in excess of costs, and (3) to 
ensure that the system is defined, designed, and implemented in a 
manner that properly fits within the context of the organizationwide 
systems environment. In pursuit of these goals, we have categorized IT 
system acquisition best practices into three corresponding groups, and 
we apply these practices, as appropriate, in our evaluations of system 
acquisition across the federal government, including recent and 
ongoing work at DOD for the Senate Committee on Armed Services. A 
brief description of the three categories follows: 

* Is the system being acquired in accordance with mature software 
acquisition processes? The Software Engineering Institute (SEI), 
[Footnote 3] recognized for its expertise in software processes, 
publishes best practice models and methods governing software 
engineering, acquisition, and development. Collectively, these best 
practice tools provide logical frameworks for understanding the 
strengths and weaknesses of an organization's existing software 
practices, including acquisition practices, and a structured approach 
for incrementally implementing them. For example, SEI has defined a 
five stage software acquisition capability maturity model with 
specific best practices associated with each stage of maturity, 
including practices governing acquisition planning, solicitation, 
requirements development and management, project management, contract 
tracking and oversight, evaluation, and risk management.[Footnote 4] 
Other examples of SEI best practice models include its emerging 
Integrating Technology by a Structured Evolutionary Process model, 
which addresses the unique challenges associated with COTS-based 
systems, and its IDEALSM,[Footnote 5] model, which provides a 
systematic, five phase best practices-based approach to continuously 
improving software practices. 

* Is the system being acquired in a series of economically justified 
incremental builds? Both federal law and guidance[Footnote 6] advocate 
the use of incremental investment management when acquiring or 
developing large systems. Incremental investment management can be 
broken into three major practices: (1) acquiring/developing the system 
in a series of smaller system increments, (2) individually justifying 
investment in each separate increment on the basis of costs, benefits, 
and risks, and (3) monitoring actual benefits achieved and costs 
incurred on ongoing increments and applying these lessons learned to 
future increments. Using these system investment practices helps to 
prevent discovering too late that a given acquisition/development 
effort is not cost beneficial. 

* Is the system's proposed architecture compliant with the 
organization's relevant enterprise architecture(s)? Enterprise 
architectures[Footnote 7] are essential tools for effectively and 
efficiently reengineering business processes and for acquiring and 
evolving supporting systems. As such, using them is a recognized best 
practice that is embodied in federal guidance.[Footnote 8] An 
enterprise architecture can be viewed as a master blueprint that 
defines operational and technological change across a given entity, 
which can be an organization (e.g., a military service or Defense 
agency) or a functional or mission area spanning more than one 
organization (e.g., financial management or combat system 
identification). In some cases, both organizational and 
functional/mission area architectures are appropriate because 
organizations interrelate closely, sharing functional and mission area 
responsibilities. This is the case for DOD and its component 

IT Service Acquisitions: At the request of this committee, we studied IT
services acquisition best practices and captured these practices in a 
framework, which includes seven phases as described below.[Footnote 9] 
Embedded within each of the phases are specific practices. For 
example, during the first phase, the business and technical reasons 
for undertaking an outsourcing effort are explicitly described. This 
practice ensures, among other things, that the organization has 
evaluated the appropriateness of outsourcing in its environment. 
During the second phase, the boundary of responsibilities between 
provider and acquirer is defined. This takes place prior to even 
developing the proposal so that the acquirer understands what 
resources will be required of it, and the prospective provider 
understands its responsibilities prior to bidding. The remaining 
phases of the framework focus on managing and monitoring provider 

Table 1: Description of Phases for IT Outsourcing: 

Phase: 1. Determine sourcing strategy; 
Definition: Determine whether internal capability or external 
expertise can more effectively meet IT needs. 

Phase: 2. Define operational model; 
Definition: Formalize executive leadership, team composition, client  
responsibilities, and operating relationships between client and 
provider organizations. 

Phase: 3. Develop the contract; 
Definition: Establish the legal terms for the IT outsourcing 

Phase: 4. Select provider(s); 
Definition: Find one or more providers who can help reach IT 
outsourcing goals. 

Phase: 5. Transition to provider(s); 
Definition: Transfer responsibility of IT functions to one or more 

Phase: 6. Manage provider(s) performance; 
Definition: Make sure each provider is meeting performance  

Phase: 7. Ensure services are provided; 
Definition: Periodically benchmark whether end-users needs are being 
met to assess whether the organization is still getting good value. 

[End of table] 

In addition, the framework recognizes three critical success factors 
that transcend the seven phases: executive leadership, partner 
alignment, and relationship management. For example, relationship 
management describes a process of managing the vendor's performance 
that goes beyond the specifics of the contract. In relationship 
management, the acquirer and the provider work together to identify 
issues and concerns before they evolve into situations requiring 
official action. 

DOD Has Inconsistently Applied Best Practices:  

Our recent work has shown that DOD has not consistently applied best 
practices when acquiring IT. For example, we recently reported to this 
committee that two Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) system acquisitions—-
the Business Systems Modernization (BSM) and the Fuels Automated 
System (FAS)[Footnote 10]-—represented a "tale of two cities" with 
regard to application of the best practices embodied in SEI's software 
acquisition maturity model.[Footnote 11] Specifically, while DLA was 
implementing the vast majority of these best practices on BSM, it was 
not on FAS because of resource constraints. By not following these 
practices, we concluded that FAS was at risk of not delivering 
promised system capabilities on time and within budget. To address the 
weaknesses we identified, we made a number of specific recommendations 
that DLA intends to implement, including launching a software process 
improvement program. 

We also recently reported to this committee that DOD components varied 
in the degree to which they were implementing software process 
improvement.[Footnote 12] In particular, we reported that the Air 
Force, the Army, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
generally satisfied the best practice tenets of SEI's IDEALSM model, 
as did certain Navy units. However, DLA, the Marine Corps, and other 
Navy units did not. This particular model defines a systematic, five-
phased approach for software process improvement. Accordingly, we made 
recommendations to correct these weaknesses, which DOD is implementing. 

In July 2000, we reported on DOD system acquisitions that were not 
employing incremental investment management best practices. 13 As an 
example, we reported that the department had divided its multi-year, 
billion dollar Standard Procurement System (SPS)[Footnote 14] into a 
series of incremental system releases. However, it had not treated 
each of these system increments as a separate investment decision. 
Instead, it had treated investment in all SPS increments as a single 
decision that it made when the acquisition was begun. Moreover, it was 
not attempting to validate whether expected system benefits were 
actually accruing from deployed system releases. This type of approach 
to making investment decisions has historically resulted in agencies' 
investing huge sums of money in systems that do not provide 
commensurate benefits, and thus has been abandoned by successful 
organizations. Accordingly, we made a series of recommendations to 
correct the situation. DOD is in the process of addressing our 

Lastly, in June 2001, we reported that DOD was in the process of 
investing billions of dollars in acquiring various financial and 
logistics management systems without having enterprise architectures 
for either functional area to guide and constrain these investments. 
[Footnote 15] As part of these reports, we made a series of 
recommendations to systematically correct this IT acquisition 
weakness. DOD has initiated steps to implement the recommendations. 

Challenges Ahead: 

While DOD has taken steps to implement our recommendations, the 
challenges ahead are still substantial. To make the most out of its 
investment in IT, DOD needs to fully incorporate best practices into 
its policies and procedures and implement our recommendations. Until 
this is done, DOD risks not meeting its objectives—leading to costly 
scheduling delays and rework. 

Our work for the committee will continue to look at systems 
acquisitions important to DOD operations and determine whether best 
practices are being effectively applied to them. Currently, we are 
evaluating how effectively best practices have been applied to DOD's 
Composite Health Care System. We are also working with this committee 
to identify DOD IT acquisitions to evaluate against our IT outsourcing 

Best Practices for the Acquisition of Weapon Systems: 

As noted earlier, DOD spends close to $100 billion annually to 
research, develop, and acquire weapons systems. Moreover, it is 
seeking to considerably ramp up spending to replace a force it 
believes is becoming outdated and too costly to operate. (See figure 2 
for DOD's planned investments in weapon systems.) Our reviews over the 
past 20 years have consistently found the same problems with these 
investments—-cost increases, schedule delays, and performance 
shortfalls Clearly, it is critical to find better ways of doing 
business—to make sure that weapon systems are delivered on time, at 
cost, and effectively. Failure to do so can jeopardize other programs 
in the department and limit DOD's ability to effectively execute 
warfighting operations. 

Figure 2: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement 
Funding for Fiscal Years 1995 to 2007: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

The graph depicts years 1995 through 2007 in billions of then year 


Total from 2003 through 2007: $700 billion.  

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 
GAO Findings: 

At the request of the committee, we have undertaken an extensive body 
of work that examines weapon acquisition issues from a different, more 
cross-cutting perspective-—one that draws lessons learned from the 
best commercial product development efforts to see if they apply to 
weapon system improvement. 

This work has consistently shown that leading commercial firms expect 
that their program managers will deliver high quality products on time 
and within budget. Doing otherwise could result in the customer 
walking away. Thus, the firms have created an environment and adopted 
practices that put their program managers in a good position to 
succeed in meeting these expectations. Collectively, these practices 
ensure that a high level of knowledge exists about critical facets of 
the product at key junctures during development. Such a knowledge-
based process enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about 
critical facets of the product under development when they need it. 

The process followed by leading firms can be broken down into three 
knowledge points: 

* At program launch, when a match must be made between the customer's 
needs and the available resources—technology, design, time, and 

* Midway through development, when the product's design must 
demonstrate its ability to meet performance requirements; and; 

* At production start, when it must be shown that the product can be  
manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. 

Figure 3 further illustrates how this process works, while figure 4  
highlights some specific best practices within this process as well as 
criteria used to move forward. 

Figure 3: Knowledge-based Process for Applying Best Practices to the 
Development of New Products: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Technology Development: 
Knowledge Point 1: Technologies match requirements. 

Product Development: 
Program Launch; 
Knowledge Point 2: Design performs as expected; 
Knowledge Point 3: Production can meet cost, schedule, and quality 


Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: Highlights of Specific Best Practices: 

[Refer to PDF for image: list] 

Knowledge Point 1: 

* Separate technology from product development. 

* Have clear measures and high standards for assessing technology 
maturity, such as technology readiness levels. 

* Use a disciplined systems engineering process for translating and 
balancing customer desires with the product developer's technology, 
design, and production limitations; in other words, bring the right 
knowledge to the table when laying down a program's foundation. 

* Identify the mismatches between desired product features and the 
product developer's knowledge and either (1) delay the start of the 
new product development until the knowledge deficit can be made up or 
(2) reduce product features to lessen their dependence on areas where 
knowledge is insufficient (evolutionary acquisition). The main 
opportunities for trading off design features to save time and money 
occur here, before a program is started. 

When do you know you have achieved this knowledge point? When 
technologies needed to meet essential product requirements have been 
demonstrated to work in their intended environment and the producer 
has completed a preliminary design of the product. 

Knowledge Point 2: 

* Hold a major decision review between system integration and system 
demonstration that determines the product design is stable and 
includes specific criteria to move into the system demonstration phase. 

* Use integrated engineering prototypes to demonstrate design 
stability and prove with testing that the design meets the customer 
requirements. It is important that this happen before initial 
manufacturing begins--a point when investments are increased to 
produce an item. 

* Identify critical manufacturing processes and establish a plan to 
bring these under statistical control by the start of production; also 
establish reliability goals and a growth plan to achieve these by 
production. This facilitates the achievement of process control and 
reliability goals at the completion of knowledge point 3. 

When do you know you have achieved this knowledge point? When 90 
percent of engineering drawings are released to manufacturing 
organizations. Drawings are the language used by engineers to 
communicate to the manufacturers the details of a new product--what it 
looks like, how its components interface, how to build it and the 
critical materials and processes needed to fabricated it. This makes 
drawings a key measure of whether the design is stable or not. 

Knowledge Point 3: 

* Demonstrate that all critical manufacturing processes are under 
statistical control and consistently producing items within the 
quality standards and tolerances for the overall product before 
production begins. This is important since variation in one process 
can reverberate to others and result in defective parts that need to 
be repaired or reworked. 

* Demonstrate product reliability before the start of production. This 
requires testing to identify the problems, design corrections, and 
retest the new design. Commercial firms consider reliability important 
and its achievement a measure of design maturity. 

When do you know you have achieved this knowledge point? When all key 
manufacturing processes have come under statistical control and 
product reliability has been demonstrated. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

We have found that when DOD programs employed similar practices, they 
have experienced outcomes similar to leading firms. The AIM-9X air-to-
air missile program is a good example. By adopting practices that 
mature technology before going into product development and stabilized 
the design by releasing over 90 percent of the drawings, the program 
has experienced very minimal cost increases and scheduling delays. 

Conversely, problems occur in programs when best practices are not 
adopted. For example, the PAC-3 missile program began nearly 5 years 
before most of the technical discovery was complete, and only 20 
percent of design drawings were released at the point when knowledge 
point 2 should have been achieved. As a result, the early part of the 
program was plagued with technical difficulties that impaired efforts 
to stabilize design, and manufacturing the missile has been difficult. 
The result was costs that doubled and over a 3-year schedule delay. 

Knowledge-based acquisitions embraced in DOD policy: 

In 2000 and 2001, DOD made constructive changes to its acquisition 
policy that embrace best practices. These focused primarily on (1) 
making sure technologies are demonstrated to a high level of maturity 
before beginning a weapon system program and (2) taking an 
evolutionary, or phased, approach to developing the system. 

DOD's policy changes are a positive step. First, they would separate 
technology development from a weapon system development program. This 
would help to curb incentives to overpromise the capabilities of a new 
weapon system and to rely on immature technologies. By having a 
baseline requirement, decisionmakers would also have a means for 
deciding not to launch a program if a match between requirements and 
resources was not made. Second, the changes recommend an evolutionary 
approach to developing requirements and making improvements to a 
system's capabilities. This is substantially different than the 
historical approach, which sought to deliver all desired capabilities 
in one "big bang." For example, the F-22 fighter program was justified 
on the basis of achieving stealth, supercruise propulsion and fuzed 
avionics in one-leap with the first product off the production line. 
But the technologies, and even the funds, were not available to make 
good on such a promise. 

While DOD's policy changes are a good step, implementation has been 
mixed. There have been some successes with evolutionary acquisitions, 
but they are exceptional cases in that they required significant and 
unusual intervention from top leadership in the services and DOD. For 
example, the Global Hawk and Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
programs-—both born from Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations—-
have so far been successful in reducing the time it takes to develop 
and field a new weapon. In the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
program, the top military acquisition executive met with the head of 
the user representative's organization, struck an agreement that the 
product was to be fielded in stages, with the first stage being a very 
basic system, and then enforced the agreement. The personal 
involvement of the under secretary of defense for acquisition, 
technology, and logistics helped set the stage for Global Hawk's 
evolutionary approach to meeting requirements. In both cases, this top-
level intervention allowed requirements to be flexible and gave the 
product developers parity with the requirements setters in influencing 
requirements. Equally important, we believe the intervention signaled 
support for the programs, which eased some of the pressures that 
normally accompany efforts to get programs approved. 

In some of DOD's larger, more complex programs, best practices 
recommended by the new policy have not been effectively implemented. 
For example, we recently reported that although the Joint Strike 
Fighter program has made good progress in some technology areas, the 
program is at risk of not meeting its affordability objective because 
critical technologies are not projected to be matured to levels that 
we believe would indicate a low risk program at the planned start of 
product development.[Footnote 16] Earlier this week, we also reported 
that while the Crusader program has made considerable progress in 
developing key technologies and reducing its size and weight, it was 
also likely to enter product development with the majority of its 
critical technologies less mature than best practices recommend. 
[Footnote 17] As stressed in both reports, failure to make sure 
technologies are sufficiently mature before product development could 
result in increases in both product and long-term ownership costs, 
schedule delays, and compromised performance. 

Challenges Still Ahead: 

New policies will not produce better outcomes unless they influence 
decisions made on weapon systems. A major challenge ahead for DOD is 
taking steps necessary to make this happen. Specifically: 

* Programs must be structured so that requirements will not outstrip 
resources. This means getting requirements-setting organizations to be 
open to redefining their needs to better match resources available. 

* DOD's funding process must provide assurance to evolutionary 
programs that the end-state capability will eventually be achieved. 
This means getting decisionmakers to commit to providing funding for 
later, more improved versions of a system. 

* The role of the science and technology community must change to 
accept more responsibility for maturing relevant technologies-—without 
harming DOD's long-term basic research needs. This may require DOD to 
increase funding and support for science and technology. 

* Measures for success need to be defined for each stage of the 
development process so that decisionmakers can be assured that 
sufficient knowledge exists about critical facets of the product 
before investing more time and money. 

* Responsibility for making decisions must be squarely positioned in 
those with authority to adhere to best practices and to make informed 
tradeoff decisions. 

Our work in this area continues to take aspects of the best practice 
framework and look deeper into how specific practices can enhance how 
weapon systems are developed and managed. We are currently looking at 
the management of product design and manufacturing and the question of 
how leading firms reduce total ownership costs of capital equipment. 

Additional Ongoing Work of Interest to the Subcommittee: 

We were also asked to provide updates on our ongoing work related to 
(1) competition under task- or delivery-order contracts, (2) spare 
parts price increases, and (3) DOD's use of waivers for certified cost 
data in negotiating contracts. The following sections highlight our 
findings and describe ongoing work. 

Competition Under Task- or Delivery-Order Contracts: 

The government acquires billions of dollars worth of products and 
services each year using task- or delivery-order contracts—also known 
as multiple award contracts—that are available for use by all federal 
agencies. A task- or delivery-order contract provides for an 
indefinite quantity of supplies or services (within specific limits) 
to be furnished during a fixed period, with deliveries scheduled 
through orders with the contractor. There have been persistent 
concerns that agencies avoid competition when ordering under such 
contracts. To prevent this from occurring, the Congress, through the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act,[Footnote 18] imposed statutory 
requirements on the use of these contracts. Agencies must now consider 
awarding multiple contracts rather than a single contract when 
planning a task- or delivery-order contract. Even with this change, 
concerns about a lack of competition when ordering under task- and 
delivery-order contracts have persisted. 

In 1998, we examined how multiple award contracts were being 
administered by six organizations, including several within DOD such 
as the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Standard Systems Group, 
and the Electronic Systems Center's Hanscom Air Force Base operations.
We found that efforts to promote competition for orders placed under 
multiple award contracts varied at the six organizations. Two 
organizations achieved consistent competition for orders under their 
contracts while four others experienced more difficulty obtaining 
competition. One organization, for example, issued 64 percent of 
orders (accounting for 20 percent of dollars awarded) on a sole-source 
basis through the end of fiscal year 1997. Another organization named 
preferred vendors in announcements of opportunities, resulting in only 
one proposal being received on most orders.[Footnote 19] 

In 2000, at the request of this subcommittee, we expanded our review 
to examine DOD's use of large orders placed under multiple award 
contracts to acquire IT products and services. We reported that most 
of the 22 large orders we reviewed had been awarded without competing 
proposals having been received. Agencies frequently issued orders on a 
sole-source basis using one of the statutory exceptions to the fair 
opportunity requirement, and contractors frequently did not submit 
proposals when provided an opportunity to do so. In most cases, the 
proposals received involved incumbent contractors.[Footnote 20] 

The DOD Office of the Inspector General (IG) reported in September 
2001 that competition was limited for orders under multiple award 
contracts DOD organizations administered.[Footnote 21] According to 
the IG, contracting offices continued to direct awards to selected 
sources without providing contractors a fair opportunity to be 
considered--304 of the 423 orders reviewed had been awarded on a sole-
source or directed source basis. As a result, the IG concluded, DOD 
was not obtaining the benefits of sustained competition and the 
reduced costs that the Congress envisioned multiple award contracts 

Also, since our reviews began, steps have been taken by the executive 
branch and the Congress to promote broader competition. First, the 
executive branch revised procurement regulations in June 1999 to 
prohibit agencies from designating preferred vendors for orders-—the 
practice we had reported on the previous year. Second, the Congress 
directed, through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2000,[Footnote 22] that the procurement regulations be revised to 
provide guidance on steps agencies should take to ensure contractors 
are provided a fair opportunity to be considered. An initial revision 
to the regulations was issued in April 2000 that directed contracting 
officers to avoid situations where contractors will specialize in one 
or a few areas within the contract's scope, creating the likelihood 
that orders in those areas will be awarded on a sole-source basis. The 
revision directs contracting officers to consider such factors as the 
scope and complexity of the requirement, the expected duration and 
frequency of task orders, and the mix of resources a contractor must 
have to perform expected task-or delivery-order requirements. The 
revision also changed the requirements for placing individual orders 
under these contracts. An additional revision to the regulations has 
been proposed that identifies issues contracting officers should 
consider when developing ordering procedures for multiple award 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directs us 
to evaluate conformance of the guidance it mandates with existing law.
Although the act indicates this guidance should be in place by April 2,
2000, the regulations have not yet been issued in final form. We will 
initiate the evaluations the act requires once the regulations are 
finalized, and we look forward to continuing to work with you and your 
staff on issues related to multiple-award contracting. 

Increases in Spare Part Prices:  

In recent years, the military services have expressed concern to the
Congress that spare part prices have been increasing at a higher rate 
than inflation and have taken an unanticipated bite out of the limited 
funds available to meet readiness requirements. Because the planned 
price changes for spare parts drive the ordering units' budget 
requests, unexpected price increases could affect their ability to 
purchase all the parts they need. In response to these concerns, this 
subcommittee asked us to determine whether spare part prices had been 
increasing and to identify some of the factors driving the escalation. 
In 2000, we issued reports on the prices DOD activities paid for Navy-
managed aviation reparable parts, consumable spare parts[Footnote 23] 
purchased from DLA, and Marine Corps ground system reparable parts. 
[Footnote 24] At the request of the subcommittee, we are following-up 
on our prior work at the Navy and are examining the status of DLA's 
efforts to address spare part price increases. 

Overall, we found that price increases at the Defense organizations we 
reviewed were high for certain categories of parts. At the Navy, for 
example, the prices increased an average of 12 percent annually, but 
parts with high sales volume increased substantially more than parts 
overall. Results from our ongoing review indicate that these price 
increases are continuing. At DLA, the annual price change was less 
than 5 percent for most parts; but for about 14 percent of the parts, 
price changes were considerably higher, with a very small percentage 
experiencing price changes of 1,000 percent or more. 

Our specific findings at the Navy, DLA, and Marine Corps are described 

Navy: We found that prices for all Navy-managed aviation parts 
increased at an average annual rate of 12 percent from 1994 to 1999. 
However, prices for parts with high sales volume increased 
substantially more, at an average annual rate of 27 percent. From year 
to year, there were strong fluctuations in prices, making it difficult 
for the Navy to project price changes. These fluctuations were largely 
driven by dramatic swings in the surcharge rate. The lack of stability 
in prices affects ordering units, which may not have sufficient funds 
budgeted if unexpected price increases occur. In addition, we reported 
that the Navy had sought to alleviate concerns about high surcharge 
rates by moving certain overhead costs from the surcharge rate to the 
repair cost. This approach merely reallocated the overhead costs 
rather than reducing them. 

Our follow-on work indicates that prices continue to increase. We will 
report on reasons for the increases later this year. Our work thus far 
suggests that the primary reason for the increase is higher material 
cost associated with repair of the items. Factors we are looking at as 
drivers for the higher material costs include (1) increased cost of 
parts ordered from DLA, (2) new, more expensive material being used in 
the repair process, (3) increased material usage in the repair 
process, and (4) a change in the mix of parts used in repair. 

DLA: We found that from 1989 through 1998, an average of 70 percent of
the consumable parts requisitioned by DLA's customers experienced an 
annual price change of less than 5 percent. However, a relatively 
small number of parts experienced significant annual price increases; 
that is, increases of 50 percent or more. The proportion of parts with 
increases of 50 percent or more had been increasing since 1994, 
reaching nearly 14 percent in 1998. In addition, a very small 
percentage of the parts experienced extreme increases in price-1,000 
percent or more from one year to the next. These extreme price 
increases are due to outdated or estimated prices in the catalog that 
DOD units consult when ordering parts. When the catalog price reflects 
an outdated or estimated price, ordering agencies experience "sticker 
shock" when confronted with the actual price of the item, which in 
some cases is significantly higher than the listed—-and anticipated—-

Since our review, DLA has undertaken a range of efforts to respond to 
concerns about significant spare part price increases. For example, 
the agency has recently completed two procurement management reviews 
concerning price reasonableness determinations and is developing two 
computer software programs to assist buyers in evaluating contractor-
offered prices. These efforts, however, are in various stages of 
completion and it is too early to assess the results. In March 2001, 
DLA reported to the secretary of defense on price increases for 
commercially available spare parts. DLA reported that, from fiscal 
year 1993 to 2000, materiel costs grew 10.8 percent for competitively 
purchased commercial items, but increased more than twice as much for 
noncompetitive purchases. DLA is examining the causes of the price 
increases and plans to provide the Secretary of Defense with more 
detailed explanations of cost growth disparities and any remedies. 
This analysis will be part of DOD's third report to Congress as 
required in the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999.[Footnote 25] 

Marine Corps: We focused our work on the ground system spare parts 
that end-users actually procured during fiscal years 1997-99. We found 
that the prices for these parts had increased at an average annual 
rate of about 14 percent from 1995-99. Increases in the surcharge 
rates charged by the Marine Corps were a major cause of the price 
escalation. We also found that the Marine Corps did not follow DOD 
pricing regulations in setting prices and that mathematical and 
computer errors had occurred in price-setting. As a result, the prices 
of most parts sold to Marine Corps customers were not correct. The 
Marine Corps has since corrected its prices and implemented a number 
of corrective actions pertaining to its pricing methodology. 

Waiving the Requirement for Certified Cost Data in Negotiations of 

To maximize the value of taxpayer dollars, the federal government 
generally seeks to compete its contracts. However, DOD buys many 
unique products and services for which it cannot always rely on 
competitive forces of the marketplace to get fair prices and values. 
Instead, it must turn to just a few sources or even a sole source for 
its procurements. Each year, DOD purchases billions of dollars in 
weapons systems without competition. 

In these cases, contractors and subcontractors normally provide the 
government with cost or pricing data supporting their proposed prices 
and they certify that the data submitted are accurate, complete, and 
current. This requirement, established by the Truth-in-Negotiation 
Act, is meant to put the government on an information parity with sole-
source contractors and protect against inflated prices. The act, as 
amended, specifically provided that the requirements did not apply in 
"exceptional cases," but it did not include an explanation of what 
constituted an exceptional case and it has never been amended to 
define that term. In September 1995, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation was amended to allow the head of contracting activities to 
authorize exceptional case waivers if contracting officers have 
sufficient information available to negotiate fair and reasonable 
contract prices without requiring certified data. 

Concerned about the waiver process, this subcommittee requested that 
we look at cases where waivers have been made to identify the 
circumstances in which the waiver was used and techniques used to 
negotiate prices in place of requiring certified data. We identified 
20 cases in which the requirement for certified data was waived, 
covering fiscal year 2000 contracting actions of $5 million or more at 
six buying activities. The total contract value for which certified 
data was waived was $4.4 billion. Contracting officers cited the 
authority contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation as the basis 
for all 20 waivers we reviewed. We are evaluating the agencies' bases 
for the decisions to waive cost and pricing data. We will be reporting 
on our findings later this year. 

This concludes our statement. We appreciate the opportunity to have it 
placed in the record. If you have questions about our work on service 
acquisitions and other contracting issues, please call David Cooper at
(202) 512-4125, on information technology issues, please call Randolph
Hite at (202) 512-3439, and on weapon system issues, please call 
Katherine Schinasi at (202) 512-4841. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Contract Management Acquisition Reform: Multiple-award Contracting at 
Six Federal Organizations. [hyperlink,]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 30, 1998. 

Acquisition Reform: Review of Selected Best-Value Contracts. 
[hyperlink,]. Washington, 
D.C.: April 14, 1999. 

Best Practices: Taking a Strategic Approach Could Improve DOD's 
Acquisition of Services. [hyperlink,]. January 18, 2002. 

Contract Management: Few Competing Proposals for Large DOD Information 
Technology Orders. [hyperlink,]. March 20, 2000. 

Contract Management: Not Following Procedures Undermines Best Pricing 
Under GSA's Schedule. [hyperlink,]. November 28, 2000. 

Contract Management: Service Contracting Trends and Challenges. 
[hyperlink,]. August 22, 2001. 

Contract Management: Trends and Challenges in Acquiring Services. 
[hyperlink,]. May 22, 2001. 

Information Technology: 

DOD Information Technology: Software and Systems Process Improvement 
Programs Vary in Use of Best Practices. [hyperlink,]. March 30, 2001. 

DOD Systems Modernization: Continued Investment in the Standard 
Procurement System Has Not Been Justified. [hyperlink,]. July 31, 2001. 

DOD's Standard Procurement System: Continued Investment Has Yet to Be 
Justified. [hyperlink,]. 
February 7, 2002. 

Information Technology: Architecture Needed to Guide Modernization of 
DOD's Financial Operations. [hyperlink,]. May 17, 2001. 

Information Technology: DLA Should Strengthen Business Systems 
Modernization Architecture and Investment Activities. [hyperlink,].  June 29, 2001. 

Information Technology: Inconsistent Software Acquisition Processes at 
the Defense Logistics Agency Increase Project Risks. [hyperlink,]. January 10, 2002. 

Information Technology: Leading Commercial Practices for Outsourcing 
of Services. [hyperlink,]. 
November 30, 2001. 

Defense Acquisitions: Collection and Reporting of Information 
Technology Purchases. [hyperlink,]. January 28, 2002. 

Weapon System Acquisition: 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,]. July 31, 2000. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 
Improve Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,]. July 30, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,]. March 8, 2001. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 
Improvements for DOD. [hyperlink,]. August 26, 1996. 

Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to Weapon 
System Programs. [hyperlink,]. March 17, 1998. 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System 
Programs Implement Best Practices. [hyperlink,]. August 16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires 
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink,]. February 24, 1998. 

Defense Acquisition: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 
Outcomes. [hyperlink,]. 
March 17, 1999. 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon 
System Decisions. [hyperlink,]. April 26, 2000. 

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible 
[hyperlink,]. March 18, 

Defense Acquisitions: Steps to Improve the Crusader Program's 
Investment Decisions. [hyperlink,]. February 25, 2002. 

Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Mature Critical Technologies Needed 
to Reduce Risks. [hyperlink,]. 
October 19, 2001. 

Pricing Issues: 

Defense Acquisitions: Prices of Navy Aviation Spare Parts Have 
Increased. [hyperlink,]. 
November 6, 2000. 

Defense Acquisitions: Price Trends for Defense Logistics Agency's 
Weapon System Parts. [hyperlink,]. November 3, 2000. 

Defense Acquisitions: Prices of Marine Corps Spare Parts Have 
Increased. [hyperlink,]. 
July 31, 2000. 

Additional GAO Reports: 

High Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,]. January 2001. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense. 
[hyperlink,]. January 2001. 

[End of section] 


[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, High Risk Series: An Update, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 2001). 

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Taking A Strategic 
Approach Could Improve DOD's Acquisition of Services, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 

[3] SEI is a nationally recognized, federally funded research and 
development center established at Carnegie Mellon University to 
advance the state of software engineering, development, and 
acquisition practices. 

[4] Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM), Version 
1.02. Capability Maturity ModeISM is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon 
University, and CMM is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark 

[5] IDEALSM is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University and stands 
for initiating, diagnosing, establishing, acting, and leveraging. 

[6] Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, P.L. 104-106, and Office of Management 
and Budget Circular A-130 (Nov. 30, 2000). 

[7] These architectures systematically capture-—in useful models, 
diagrams, and narrative-—the relevant breadth and depth of the mission-
based mode of operation for a given enterprise. Moreover, they 
describe these operations in both (1) logical terms, such as 
interrelated processes, information needs and flows, work locations, 
and system applications, and (2) technical terms, such as hardware, 
software, data, communications, and security attributes, and 
standards. They also provide these perspectives both for the 
enterprise's current or "as is" environment for its target or "to be" 
environment, as well as a plan or road map for moving between the two 

[8] Chief Information Officer's Council, A Practical Guide to Federal 
Enterprise Architecture, Version 1.0 (February 2001). 

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Leading 
Commercial Practices for Outsourcing of Services, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 

[10] BSM is intended to modernize DLA's materiel management business 
functions, thereby enabling the agency to manage supply chains. BSM is 
based on commercially available software products and is expected to 
cost $658 million from fiscal years 2000 through 2005. FAS is intended 
to help the Defense Energy Support Center annually manage about $5 
billion in contracts with petroleum suppliers. FAS also relies on a 
commercially available software package and is expected to cost $293 
million from fiscal year 1995 through 2002. 

[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: 
Inconsistent Software Acquisition Processes at the Defense Logistics 
Agency Increase Project Risks, [hyperlink,](Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2002). 

[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Information Technology: 
Software and Systems Process Improvement Programs Vary in Use of Best 
Practices, [hyperlink,] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2001). 

[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Systems Modernization: 
Continued Investment in the Standard Procurement System Has Not Been 
Justified, [hyperlink,] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001) and U.S. General Accounting Office, 
Information Technology: DLA Should Strengthen Business Systems 
Modernization Architecture and Investment Activities, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

[14] SPS is intended to be DOD's single, standard procurement system 
and is expected to cost $3.7 billion over a 10-year period. 

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: 
Architecture Needed to Guide Modernization of DOD's Financial 
Operations, [hyperlink,] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2001) and U.S. General Accounting Office, 
Information Technology: DLA Should Strengthen Business Systems 
Modernization Architecture and Investment Activities, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.:, June 29, 

[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: 
Mature Critical  Technologies Needed to Reduce Risks, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 19, 

[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Steps to 
Improve the Crusader Program's Investment Decisions, [hyperlink,] (Washington D.C.: Feb. 25, 

[18] P.L. 103-355 (Oct. 13, 1994). 

[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Acquisition Reform: Multiple-
award Contracting at Six Federal Organizations, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
30, 1998). 

[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Contract Management: Few 
Competing Proposals for Large DOD Information Technology Orders, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 20, 2000). 

[21] Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Multiple 
Award Contracts for Services (Sept. 30, 2001). 

[22] P.L. 106-65 (Oct. 5, 1999). 

[23] Consumable items are those that are consumed in use or discarded 
when worn out or broken because they cannot be cost-effectively 

[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Prices of 
Marine Corps Spare Parts Have Increased, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2000); U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Price 
Trends for Defense Logistics Agency's Weapon System Parts, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3, 
2000); U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Prices of 
Navy Aviation Spare Parts Have Increased, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 

[25] P.L. 105-261. 

[End of section]