Ensuring Effective Law Enforcement Coordination

Effective coordination, collaboration, and information sharing among law enforcement agencies within and outside the department are critical to its efforts to combat terrorism and fight existing and emerging criminal threats. GAO work on effective interagency collaboration has found that overlap among programs can waste funds and limit effectiveness, and that agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and facilitate information sharing. The department has faced several key coordination challenges, as the following examples illustrate:

• DOJ’s four law enforcement components— the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)—have overlapping jurisdiction over violent crime investigations, specifically when they involve illegal drugs, gang violence, firearms, explosives, arson, and fugitive apprehension. GAO surveyed a randomly selected, nongeneralizable sample of 315 field agents across the four components. Even though the majority of the agents who responded to the survey reported that they are very clear about their components’ roles and responsibilities in the overlapping investigative areas, 37 percent of the survey respondents reported that they had experienced disagreements with another component over the past 5 years when determining roles and responsibilities during an investigation. Most of these agents said that the disagreements negatively affected the investigation to some degree, for example, by prolonging the investigation, calling for unnecessary use of resources, and causing low morale. DOJ components have mechanisms in place to monitor how well components are coordinating, such as conducting periodic field offices inspections. However, the scope of these mechanisms limits DOJ’s ability to identify some problems. For example, when conducting inspections, three of the four components rely on interviews with senior management, such as the highest official in the field office, to gauge coordination and the working relationships among the components, and do not solicit input from agents, who are the ones working with other components on a daily basis.
  Highlights of GAO-11-314 (PDF)
• Both ATF and FBI have investigative jurisdiction over crimes that involve the use of explosives. Since 2004, DOJ has taken actions intended to address duplication, overlap, and fragmentation with regard to ATF and FBI’s explosives jurisdiction, training, databases, and laboratories. However, a 2009 report from DOJ’s Inspector General found there to be little progress in this area. In response to the Inspector General’s report, in August 2010, the Acting Deputy Attorney General issued guidance for assigning lead agency jurisdiction in explosives investigations and directed ATF and FBI to take actions to assess its explosives operations and make recommendations by November 1, 2010, for consolidating and eliminating redundancies as appropriate. The components have made progress in consolidating explosives training programs and curricula and ensuring consistent use of a shared database to document explosives incidents, and they are evaluating opportunities for more efficient use of their explosives laboratories. GAO-11-318SP (PDF)
  Full Report of GAO-11-318SP (PDF)
• The Department of the Interior (DOI), through its Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and DOJ components have taken action to coordinate their efforts to support tribal court and tribal detention programs. However, GAO reported that the two agencies could enhance their coordination on tribal courts by strengthening their information sharing efforts. Specifically, BIA and DOJ need to enhance their information sharing and coordination mechanisms for their shared activities to enhance the capacity of tribal courts to administer justice. For example, BIA has not shared information with DOJ about its assessments of tribal courts. Further, both agencies provide training and technical assistance to tribal courts; however, they are unaware as to whether there could be unnecessary duplication.
  Highlights of GAO-11-252 (PDF)
• To combat gangs with connections to Central America, the National Security Council, in conjunction with the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State, as well as the United States Agency for International Development, developed a strategy that integrates law enforcement with youth crime prevention and interventions that provide alternatives to gangs. Under the law enforcement component of this strategy, federal agencies have taken action to coordinate their anti-gang programs and share information with each other and foreign law enforcement. For example, the FBI established a joint U.S.-Salvadoran Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) unit in El Salvador to exchange information on gangs and gang members between the Salvadoran national police and U.S.-based law enforcement agencies for use in criminal investigations and prosecutions. However, in April 2010, GAO reported that DHS’ largest investigative agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is also involved in investigations of gangs with connections to Central America, does not have an agent at the unit. Although FBI and ICE officials agree that the TAG could be improved by posting an ICE agent at the unit, they have not reached agreement on ICE’s role.
  Highlights of GAO-10-395 (PDF)
• Various DOJ and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components focus on different aspects of gang enforcement as part of their broader missions. Since 2004, at the headquarters level, DOJ and the FBI have established several entities to coordinate and share information on gangs and gang enforcement efforts across department and agency boundaries. However, GAO found that two entities, the MS-13 National Gang Task Force and the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC), had not sufficiently differentiated their roles and responsibilities, thus impacting their ability to coordinate anti-gang efforts and risking unnecessary federal resource expenditures.
  Highlights of GAO-09-709 (PDF)
• In recent years, illicitly trafficked firearms have fueled the drug trafficking violence along the U.S. Mexico border and approximately 87% of firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced over the last 5 years have come from the United States. GAO found that ATF and ICE, the primary agencies implementing efforts to stem the flow of firearms into Mexico, do not consistently and effectively coordinate their efforts, in part because the agencies lack clear roles and responsibilities and have been operating under an outdated interagency agreement. This has resulted in some instances of duplicate initiatives and confusion during operations.
  Highlights of GAO-09-709 (PDF)
• In the years since 9/11, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has taken steps to support U.S. counterterrorism including prioritization of narcoterrorism cases—drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism. Because most of the nation's illegal drug supply is distributed by Mexican drug organizations, DEA's partnerships and coordination with DHS agencies that have border-related missions—ICE and CBP—are important. However, in March 2009,GAO reported that an outdated interagency agreement—and long-standing disputes involving ICE's drug enforcement role and DEA's oversight of that role—have led to conflicts and the potential for duplicative investigative efforts. Similarly, we found that another interagency agreement—predating CBP's organization under DHS—has led to operational inefficiencies, as reflected in a bifurcated process as drugs seized by CBP between ports of entry are to be referred to DEA, but drugs seized at ports of entry are to be referred to ICE.
  Highlights of GAO-09-63

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

• It will be important for DOJ to assess the feasibility of options, which may include soliciting input from agents, to better determine the extent to which agents are clear on their roles and responsibilities and have experienced disagreements with other components in areas of shared jurisdiction. Taking these steps may help DOJ avoid any negative impact on investigations and enhance the working relationships among components.

  Highlights of GAO-11-314 (PDF)

• Given that ATF and FBI did not fully follow through on past efforts to reduce overlap and duplication in their explosives training, information sharing, and forensic analysis, it will be important for Congress and DOJ to continually monitor the components’ current efforts to ensure that they are enforced and have their intended effect.

  Full Report of GAO-11-318SP (PDF)

• To maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of each agency’s efforts to support tribal courts by increasing interagency coordination and improving information sharing, it will be important for DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs and BIA’s Office of Justice Services to work together to develop mechanisms, using GAO collaboration practices as a guide, to identify and share information and resources related to tribal courts.

  Highlights of GAO-11-252 (PDF)

• To strengthen coordination of anti-gang efforts and maximize use of federal law enforcement resources in combating gangs with connections to Central America, DOJ and DHS need to reach agreement on ICE’s role and participation in the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Gang unit. By reaching agreement on ICE’s participation in the unit, both agencies could realize additional information-sharing benefits not only with each other and foreign counterparts, as well as help ensure that resources to combat gangs with connections to Central America are used efficiently and effectively.

  Highlights of GAO-10-395 (PDF)

• To strengthen federal agencies' coordination of anti-gang efforts and help reduce gaps or unnecessary overlaps in federal entities' roles and responsibilities, DOJ, in consultation with DHS, needs to reexamine and reach consensus on the roles and responsibilities of DOJ headquarters anti-gang coordinating entities, including identifying and addressing any potential gaps and unnecessary overlaps.

  Highlights of GAO-09-708 (PDF)

• In June 2009, in response to a GAO recommendation, DOJ and DHS finalized a Memorandum of Understanding between ATF and ICE to further enhance interagency collaboration in combating arms trafficking to Mexico and to help ensure integrated policy and program direction. DOJ and DHS need to develop processes for periodically monitoring its implementation and making any needed adjustments.

  Highlights of GAO-09-709 (PDF)

• In June 2009, in response to a GAO recommendation, DOJ and DHS signed an interagency cooperation agreement to clarify ICE and DEA's roles and responsibilities. To further enhance interagency collaboration in combating narcotics trafficking—and its links to terrorist organizations or activities—and to help ensure integrated policy and program direction across all parts of DEA, DOJ and DHS need to monitor the implementation of this agreement. We evaluated their efforts to monitor the implementation of this agreement and issued a report in July 2011. DOJ and DHS also need to clarify roles and standardize procedures for CBP as it relates to handling illegal drugs seized at the nation's borders and making referrals to DEA.

  Highlights of GAO-09-63, Highlights of GAO-11-763

^ Back to topKey Reports

Combatting Illicit Drugs

Law Enforcement Coordination

Indian Country Criminal Justice

Combating Gangs

Combating Gangs

Firearms Trafficking

Drug Control

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The External Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization Efforts, 05-37

(Washington, D.C.: September 2005).

DOJIG 05-37

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-up Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts, 07-30

(Washington, D.C.: April 2007).

DOJIG 07-30

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts, 05-20

(Washington, D.C.: May 2005).

DOJIG 05-20

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