B-401298.4, Alsalam Aircraft Company, January 8, 2010
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Decision
Matter of: Alsalam Aircraft Company
Kevin
P. Mullen, Esq., Gregory A. Smith, Esq., David E. Fletcher, Esq., and
Christopher J. Kimball, Esq., Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, for the protester.
Richard
P. Rector, Esq., Seamus Curley, Esq., and C. Bradford Jorgensen, Esq., DLA
Piper LLP, for DynCorp International LLC, an intervenor.
Vera Meza, Esq., and Kim B. Tycer, Esq., Department of the Army, for the
agency.
Jonathan L. Kang, Esq., and Ralph O. White, Esq., Office of
the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Protest challenging the reevaluation--after
corrective action in response to an earlier protest--of an awardee's proposed transition
approach is denied where the agency reasonably concluded that the approach
could be achieved within the time required by the solicitation, even though the
approach was inconsistent with solicitation guidance indicating that such an
approach would not likely be successful; protester cannot claim to have been
prejudiced by the agency's revised views about the solicitation guidance because
there is no reason to think, based on the record, that the protester would have
offered a different approach had it known of the agency's revised views.
DECISION
Alsalam Aircraft Company of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, protests the award of a contract to DynCorp International LLC by the Department of the Army under solicitation No. W58RGZ-08-R-0107 for support services for the Saudi government, Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command (RSLFAC). Alsalam argues that the Army's evaluation of DynCorp's transition plan and proposed costs were flawed.
BACKGROUND
The RFP was issued on July 1, 2008, and sought proposals
to provide aircraft operations support services for the RSLFAC, including
maintenance, training, and other services.
The procurement was conducted under the Foreign Military Sales program,
which is authorized by the Arms Export Control Act. 22 U.S.C. sect. 2751 et seq. (2006). The RFP anticipated award of a contract with
fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contract line item numbers (CLINs), with a 2-year
base period and three 1-year options.
The statement of work (SOW) stated that the contractor will be required
to provide support for the RSLFAC, primarily by providing and managing qualified
personnel, called direct manning augmentees (DMAs), who will perform the
support work, as directed by the RSLFAC.
RFP, SOW sect. 4.2. The RFP specified
the monthly base salaries for the DMAs, and instructed offerors to use an
annual escalation rate of 4% to calculate the costs for these individuals for
the option years. RFP attach. 2, at 4-6.
The RFP stated that proposals would be evaluated on the
basis of three factors: past performance,
technical, and price (which, as discussed above, contains both fixed-price and
cost-reimbursement CLINs). RFP sect. 1.0. The technical evaluation factor had three subfactors,
listed in decreasing order of importance: technical performance, management, and transition. Id. sect. M-4.1.2.1.a. The RFP advised that the past performance
factor was "slightly more important" than the technical factor, and that these
factors, both individually and combined, were more important than price. RFP sect. M.4.1.1.
As relevant here, the transition subfactor required
offerors to submit a "detailed transition plan with milestones," and stated that
the agency would evaluate "the soundness of the proposed approach and the
ability of the offeror to provide high quality transition, teaming and subcontracting
in accordance with the SOW." Id.
sections L-20.2.2.4(a), M-4.2.0. The RFP
required the contractor to complete a transition phase-in within 60 days of
contract award. RFP sect. B, CLIN 0012AA.
The RFP also stated that the contractor would be required
to obtain Saudi work permits, known as "igamas," for the DMAs during the
transition phase-in period. The parties
have represented, without dispute, that under Saudi law, igamas must be obtained
by an employer for a worker; that is, a worker must have an igama that is
associated with a particular employer. As
relevant here, the solicitation advised offerors--using a question and answer
(Q&A) format--that, based on the agency's experience, a contractor that is not
registered to do business in Saudi Arabia would require more time than the
60-day phase-in period in order to become registered and be authorized to obtain
the necessary igamas for its workers.
Specifically, the solicitation stated:
QUESTION 44. Will the incumbent workforce's visa roll over to the new contractor during the transition period?
ANSWER 44: No. The incumbent contractor is required to work with [] any new contractor in rolling over the employees from their Igamas (Work Visas) to the new employer's Igamas (work visas), in most cases this rollover cost of the visa rollover is around 2,000SR but that will depend upon how many rollovers the DMA has had in the past, and it is up to the Saudi Labor Department and the new Contractor. The new contractor must have the ability to obtain Igamas for the work force within the transition period, or they will not be able to live up to the requirements. Past experience from new contractors that are not now established with the in-Kingdom Labor Department to obtain work visas (Igamas) indicates it take[s] a very long period of time to get established--up to 6 to 8 months. Most new contractors have to sub-contract, or team, with in-Kingdom contractors who already have the ability.
RFP attach. 14, Q&A No. 44 (emphasis added).
The agency received two proposals, from Alsalam and
DynCorp, by the closing date of September 5, 2008. As relevant here, DynCorp's proposal stated
that the company was not registered to do business in Saudi Arabia, but would complete
the required registration and also transfer or obtain all necessary igamas
within the 60-day transition period. AR,
Tab 17.1.2, DynCorp Proposal, Vol. II, at 14, 98-99. Alsalam, the incumbent contractor, did not
propose any costs for transition and stated that "the transition will have
little or no impact due to fact that all resources and experienced personnel
are currently in place." AR, Tab 16.2,
Alsalam Proposal, Vol. II, at 41; Tab 16.3, Alsalam Proposal, Vol. III, CLIN 0012AA. The Army rated DynCorp's proposal under the transition
subfactor as "above average," and Alsalam's proposal as "marginal."[1] AR, Tab 14-0, Initial Selection Decision, at
2.
The Army's final evaluation of the offerors' proposals was
as follows:
|
ALSALAM |
DYNCORP |
|
|
PAST PERFORMANCE |
LOW RISK |
LOW RISK |
|
TECHNICAL |
ACCEPTABLE |
ABOVE AVERAGE |
|
Technical Performance |
Acceptable |
Outstanding |
|
Management |
Acceptable |
Above Average |
|
Transition |
Marginal |
Above Average |
|
PRICE |
$76,264,855 |
$64,841,937 |
AR, Tab 14-0, Initial Selection Decision, at 2.
The Army selected DynCorp for award on April 9, 2009, based
on its higher technical rating and lower price.
Id. at 5. The agency
provided Alsalam a debriefing on April 16.
Alsalam filed a protest challenging the award to DynCorp on
April 21. As relevant here, Alsalam's initial
protest argued that the agency's evaluation of DynCorp's transition plan was
unreasonable in light of the solicitation's guidance about the necessary
lead-time for non-Saudi companies to obtain igamas for its workers. The protester also argued that the agency had
not reasonably evaluated DynCorp's proposed costs for certain
cost-reimbursement CLINs.
On July 6, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
attorney assigned to the protest conducted "outcome prediction" alternative
dispute resolution (ADR), during which he stated that he viewed it likely that
Alsalam's protest would be sustained.[2] As relevant here, the GAO attorney advised
that the Army's evaluation of DynCorp's transition plan did not reconcile the favorable
rating under the transition subfactor with the solicitation's guidance that a
company not currently registered in Saudi Arabia would require 6-8 months to become
registered and obtain igamas. The GAO
attorney also advised that he had concerns regarding the agency's cost realism
evaluation of three cost-reimbursement CLINs:
No. X004AA (DMA salaries), No. X004AB (DMA bonuses), and No. X006AA
(maintenance support services temporary duty and DMA vacation airfare).[3] In this regard, the GAO attorney explained that
the agency's reliance on Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reports as evidence
that DynCorp's proposal contained all required cost elements and that DynCorp's
proposed costs were realistic, appeared unreasonable because those reports did
not address the realism of the costs for those CLINs.
On July 7, the agency advised our Office that it would take corrective action by reevaluating both proposals under the transition plan technical subfactor, and reevaluating DynCorp's cost proposals with regard to the three cost-reimbursement CLINs. On July 8, we dismissed the protest as academic based on the agency's notice of corrective action. [4]
As part of its reevaluation of the offerors' transition
plans, the Army consulted U.S. government subject-matter experts from the
following offices: the U.S. Military
Training Mission in Saudi Arabia, the Office of the Program Manager (OPM) for
the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG)[5],
and the Defense Contract Management Agency office for Saudi Arabia. Agency Report (AR) at 7-8. These resources advised that, contrary to the
views expressed in the solicitation, it was possible for a company to become
registered to do business in Saudi Arabia, and to obtain igamas, within the
60-day transition period. Based on these
comments, the Army concluded that DynCorp's proposed transition could be
achieved within the time required by the RFP.
The Army also prepared a new cost evaluation, which concluded that
DynCorp's proposed costs were complete and realistic.
The Army made no changes to either offeror's evaluation
ratings or evaluated costs. The agency
reaffirmed the award to DynCorp on September 23, and this protest followed.
DISCUSSION
Alsalam raises two primary arguments: (1) the Army unreasonably evaluated DynCorp's
proposal under the transition subfactor of the technical evaluation factor, or,
alternatively, the Army failed to allow offerors an opportunity to submit
revised proposals in response to the agency's changed understanding of that
subfactor; and (2) the agency unreasonably evaluated DynCorp's cost
proposal. For the reasons discussed
below, we deny the protest.
Transition Evaluation
First, Alsalam argues that the Army unreasonably found
that DynCorp's proposed transition plan was technically acceptable, given the
guidance about the time a company, such as DynCorp, would need to become
registered to do business in Saudi Arabia.
We disagree.
As discussed above, the RFP required offerors to propose a
60-day phase-in transition, wherein the contractor would be required to, among
other things, obtain or renew igamas for the DMAs.[6] That said, the solicitation also explained that,
"[p]ast experience from new contractors that are not now established with the
In-Kingdom Labor Department to obtain work visas (Igamas) indicates it takes a
very long period of time to get established--up to 6 to 8 months." RFP attach. 14, Q&A No. 44.
DynCorp's proposal stated that it would conduct the
required phase-in transition within 60 days.
AR, Tab 17.2.2, DynCorp Proposal, Vol. II, at 111. The awardee's transition plan also contained schedule milestones, which included, as relevant here:
(1) establishing a business office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, within [deleted]
days; (2) establishing ability to obtain igamas "through valid registration of company"
in Saudi Arabia within [deleted] day; and (3) processing the paperwork to "transfer
certification, visas, and employment forms from incumbent contractor to DynCorp
International of employees" within [deleted] days. Id. at 111-114.
The Army's initial evaluation found that DynCorp's transition
would be successful, based on the detailed milestone schedule, and also because
the agency assumed that both the incumbent contractor, under its existing
contractual obligations, and the Saudi government, would cooperate with the
awardee to ensure a successful transition.
AR, Tab 7.2.1, DynCorp Technical Evaluation, at 14. As discussed above, the GAO attorney assigned
to the initial protest expressed concern during the outcome prediction ADR that
the agency had not reconciled its view of DynCorp's transition plan with its
stated assumptions about the amount of time it would take for a company to become
registered to do business in Saudi Arabia and obtain igamas.
During the reevaluation, the Army sought and received
responses from U.S. government subject-matter experts regarding the time needed
for business registration activities in Saudi Arabia. See AR, Tab 24.1, Email Correspondence,
July 7, 2009-Sept. 22, 2009; Tab 26.1, DynCorp Revised Technical Evaluation, at
1. The Army was advised by these
subject-matter experts that a company would be able to obtain business
registration through Saudi government sponsorship within approximately 2 weeks,
and that upon registration, the company would be able to obtain the required
igamas.[7] AR, Tab 26.1, DynCorp Revised Technical
Evaluation, at 1. The agency was also advised by the
subject-matter experts that it was realistic to assume that DynCorp could,
within 60 days, achieve its plan of transferring igamas for the DMAs that would
be retained from the incumbent contract, and obtain new igamas for the new
DMAs. Id.
Given the information received during the reevaluation,
the agency concluded that the guidance in the solicitation about the amount of
time needed to register and obtain igamas was incorrect, and therefore provided
no basis to question DynCorp's proposed transition approach or change its
rating for that subfactor. Id. at
2. We think that the Army reasonably
relied on the information provided by the subject-matter experts, and for this
reason, conclude that the agency's reevaluation of DynCorp's proposed
transition was reasonable.
Alsalam also argues that even if the Army's evaluation was
reasonable, the agency should have revised the solicitation's guidance and reopened
the competition to allow Alsalam to submit a new proposal based on the agency's
changed understanding of the transition requirements. We disagree, because we do not think that the
protester was prejudiced by the agency's actions. Our Office will sustain a protest that an
agency improperly changed or relaxed its requirements for the awardee only
where the protester establishes a reasonably possibility that it was prejudiced
by the agency's actions; that is, had the protester known of the changed or
relaxed requirements, it would have altered its proposal to its competitive
advantage. Datastream Sys., Inc.,
B-291653, Jan. 24, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 30 at 6.
While we think that an offeror could have been prejudiced
by this change, we do not think that the record shows that Alsalam was
prejudiced. In this regard, Alsalam's
proposal stated that, because it was the incumbent contractor, "the transition
will have little or no impact due to fact that all resources and experienced
personnel are currently in place." AR,
Tab 16.2, Alsalam Proposal, Vol. II, at 41.
More significantly, Alsalam did not propose any costs for its phase-in transition
effort. AR, Tab 16.3, Alsalam Proposal,
Vol. III, CLIN 0012AA. On this record, we
do not think that there is any likelihood that Alsalam would have submitted a
different proposal in response to a relaxed understanding of these requirements.[8]
Cost Realism Evaluation
Next, Alsalam argues that the Army failed to reasonably
evaluate DynCorp's cost proposal, either as part of the agency's initial
evaluation, or its reevaluation. We
agree with the protester that the record here does not sufficiently establish that
the agency reasonably evaluated DynCorp's proposed costs. However, as discussed below, we again think,
on this record, that there was no prejudice to Alsalam, because we see no
reasonable possibility that correcting the alleged errors would make Alsalam
the low-cost offeror.
When an agency evaluates a proposal for the award of a
cost-reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs are not
dispositive because, regardless of the costs proposed, the government is bound
to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs. FAR sections 15.305(a)(1); 15.404-1(d); Palmetto
GBA, LLC, B-298962, B-298962.2, Jan. 16, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 25 at 7. Consequently, the agency must perform a cost
realism analysis to determine the extent to which an offeror's proposed costs
are realistic for the work to be performed.
FAR sect. 15.404-1(d)(1). We review
an agency's judgment in this area only to see that the agency's cost realism
evaluation was reasonably based and not arbitrary. Hanford Envtl. Health Found.,
B-292858.2, B-292858.5, Apr. 7, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 164 at 9.
Alsalam primarily argues that, despite the agency's reevaluation,
the record does not show whether the agency reasonably evaluated DynCorp's
proposed costs for DMA salaries under CLIN X004AA.[9] Specifically, the protester contends that the
awardee's proposal does not show whether the costs for CLIN X004AA included certain
fringe benefit cost elements required by the solicitation, such as the Saudi
insurance known as General Organization for Social Insurance, Defense Base Act
insurance, and hardship and housing allowances.
See RFP attach. 2, at 4-6.
The protester argues that since these costs are not identified in the
awardee's proposal, they may not have been included in its costs for this CLIN. Alsalam notes that DCAA report on its cost
proposal concluded that, for Alsalam, these costs represented approximately $[deleted]--indicating
the potential cost effect on DynCorp's costs.
AR, Tab 5.1, DCAA Alsalam Evaluation, at 11.
As part of its reevaluation, the Army prepared a new cost
evaluation document. This document
primarily reiterates the agency's position that the initial evaluation
reasonably found that the awardee's proposed costs for CLIN X004AA contained
all of the required cost elements. See
AR, Tab 25.2/25.3, Addendum to Final Cost/Price Analysis, at 1. The Army contends that the DCAA reports cited
in the initial evaluations also confirm that DynCorp's costs for this CLIN
contained the cost elements at issue, and that the Army cost evaluation also
verified that the cost elements were included.
Price Analyst Response to GAO Questions, Dec. 14, 2009,
at 1. The agency argues that the
difference between the offerors' costs for this CLIN is due to differences
between their profit and general and administrative (G&A) rates. AR, Tab 25.2/25.3, Addendum to Final
Cost/Price Analysis, at 1. As discussed
above, offerors were required to propose fixed and cost reimbursement
CLINS. For CLIN X004AA, the base DMA
salaries were established by the solicitation.
RFP at 17; attach. 2 at 4-6.
Thus, proposed costs should have primarily reflected differences between
offerors' profit, indirect rates, and fringe benefit costs.
While it appears possible that the majority of the cost
difference between the offerors for this CLIN is explained by the differences
between the offerors' profit and G&A rates[10],
the record does not clearly show how or whether the agency reached this
conclusion. In this regard, the agency's
reevaluation document provides only summary and conclusory remarks regarding whether
DynCorp's proposed cost for CLIN X004AA included all of the required cost
elements. Although the reevaluation
again states that the DCAA report concluded that the cost elements were
included in DynCorp's proposal for this CLIN, the DCAA report does not mention
the disputed cost elements. Compare
Price Analyst Response to GAO Questions, Dec. 14, 2009,
at 1, with AR, Tab 5.2, DCAA Report for DynCorp, Jan. 15, 2009. Moreover, despite requests by our Office for specific
citations to the record, the Army has not shown that DynCorp's proposal
included the disputed cost elements or that the agency evaluated those costs.[11]
Notwithstanding these concerns, we think that, based on
the record, there is no possibility of prejudice to Alsalam here because even
if DynCorp failed to include the fringe benefit costs, a cost realism adjustment
would not overcome the awardee's $11.4 million advantage over the protester's overall
price.[12]
Specifically, the protester's estimate
of the required cost realism adjustments--$[deleted] for CLIN X004AA and $[deleted]
under CLINs X004AB and X006AA--would not make Alsalam the lower-priced offeror. Because DynCorp's proposal would remain higher-rated
technically, and lower priced, we think that there is no reasonably possibility
of prejudice to Alsalam.[13]
The protest is denied.
Lynn H. Gibson
Acting General Counsel
[1]
For the past performance factor, the agency used an evaluation scheme of low,
moderate, high, and unknown risk; for the technical factor, the agency used an
scheme of outstanding, above average, acceptable, marginal, susceptible to
being made acceptable, and unacceptable.
AR, Tab 4.0, Source Selection Plan, at 20-21.
[2] In
outcome prediction ADR, the GAO attorney handling the case convenes all of the
participating parties and advises them of what he or she believes the likely
outcome would be if a decision on the merits were written, and the reasons for
that belief.
[3]
The "X" designation indicates a total cost for the two base and 3 option years
for each of the CLINs.
[4] We
issued a decision granting Alsalam's request for a recommendation that it be
reimbursed its protest costs associated with its earlier protest. Alsalam Aircraft Co.--Costs,
B-401298.3, Nov. 5, 2009, 2009 CPD para. 208.
[5]
OPM SANG is a U.S. Army office that advises the SANG.
[6]
The RFP required offerors to provide a "detailed transition plan with
milestones," and stated that the agency would evaluate the "ability of the
offeror to provide high quality transition, teaming and subcontracting in
accordance with the SOW." RFP
sections L.2.2.4, sect. M-4.2.0.
[7]
Alsalam notes that the agency appeared to conclude that DynCorp's transition
plan was acceptable prior to receiving all of the information from the
government sources. We think that the
record shows that initial responses from the sources indicated that a 60-day
transition was feasible for a company not already registered to do business in
Saudi Arabia, and that subsequent correspondence confirmed this
information. See AR, Tab 24.1,
Email Correspondence, July 7, 2009-Sept. 22, 2009; Tab 26.1, DynCorp Revised
Technical Evaluation, at 1.
[8]
For the record, DynCorp acknowledges in its comments on the Agency Report that
it experienced difficulties in becoming registered, and will seek to partner
with a Saudi company to ensure that its transition is successful. DynCorp Supp. Comments on AR, Dec. 4, 2009,
at 2. This information was not known to
the agency at the time of award, and therefore provides no basis to question
the agency's decision at the time it was made; moreover, any noncompliance with
the transition requirements are a matter of contract administration that our
Office does not review. See United
Seguranca, Ltda., B- 294388, Oct. 21, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 207, at 4.
[9]
Although Alsalam also argues that the record does not show that the agency
reasonably evaluated the realism of DynCorp's proposed costs for CLINs X004AB
and X006AA, the protester does not explain what parts of the awardee's costs
were unrealistic, other than the fact that they were lower than Alsalam's. The difference between the offerors' proposed
costs for these CLINs was approximately
$[deleted] million. See AR, Tab
6.3, Alsalam Cost Evaluation, at 5; Tab 7.3, DynCorp Cost Evaluation, at 3.
[10]
The record shows that the differences between the offerors' proposed costs for
CLIN X004AA could be largely explained by the differences in profit and
indirect rates. For the overall CLIN
cost, DynCorp was $[deleted] lower than Alsalam. AR, Tab 6.3, Alsalam Cost Evaluation, at 5;
Tab 7.3, DynCorp Cost Evaluation, at 3.
The offerors' base labor costs, which should include the disputed cost
elements, differed by approximately $[deleted]:
$[deleted] for Alsalam, $[deleted] for DynCorp. Id.
DynCorp proposed a profit rate of [deleted]% for the base period, and a
[deleted]% rate for the option periods, with a G&A rate ranging from
[deleted]% to [deleted]%. In contrast,
Alsalam proposed a profit rate of [deleted]%, with a G&A rate ranging from
[deleted]% to [deleted]%. Id. Thus,
differences between the offeror's profit and G&A rates accounted for
approximately $[deleted] of the $[deleted] difference.
[11]
In its comments, DynCorp identifies areas in its proposal where it claims these
items can be found, although they are not so labeled. As discussed above, however, it is not clear
from the record that the Army understood whether DynCorp in fact included these
items in its proposal.
[12]
As discussed above, the RFP stated that award would be made based on "price,"
despite containing both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement CLINs.
[13] Alsalam also argues that the agency failed to reasonably consider negative information concerning DynCorp's financial controls, as indicated in DCAA reports issued after the initial award. We agree that the record here is not entirely clear as to how the agency considered cost risk arising from these reports. However, the cost reevaluation notes that DCAA considered DynCorp a "high risk," and the risks are clearly set forth in the agency's evaluation document, which, we think, shows that they were considered by the agency. See AR, Tab 25.2/25.3, Addendum to Final Cost/Price Analysis, at 2-4.







