Decision
Matter of: Coffman Specialties, Inc.
File: B-400706.2
Date: November
12, 2008
Angela
J. Soldner, Esq., Coffman Specialties, Inc., for the protester.
James H. Roberts, III, Esq., Van Scoyoc
Kelly PLLC, for Baldi Bros., Inc., the intervenor.
Bryan C. Naquin, Department of the Navy, for the agency.
Linda S. Lebowitz, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO,
participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Protest based on speculation is
dismissed because the protester failed to state sufficient legal and factual
grounds for protest as a direct result of not making a timely request for a
post-award debriefing.
Coffman Specialties, Inc. (CSI)
of San Diego, California, protests the award of a contract to Baldi Bros., Inc.
of Beaumont, California, under request for proposals (RFP) No.
N62473-08-R-2206, issued by the Department of the Navy, for runway repairs and
improvements at Travis Air Force Base in California. As discussed below, CSI
failed to state sufficient legal and factual grounds for this Office to
consider its protest as a direct result of the firm’s failure to timely request
a post-award debriefing.
We dismiss the protest.
The record shows that on September 19, 2008, the agency advised CSI
that the contract had been awarded to Baldi in the amount of approximately $44.3
million. By letter dated September 21, CSI
sent a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the agency, requesting “the
breakdown of the bids and all the alternate items from all bidders.” CSI
Letter, Sept. 21, 2008. By e-mail dated September 22, CSI
posed the following question to the agency:
“Was wondering if we could get all the bid results from the above[-]subject
project?” CSI
E-mail, Sept. 22, 2008. By e-mail dated September 23, the agency
responded that “bid results [are] not releaseable [sic] information.” Agency E-mail, Sept. 23, 2008.
Referencing the post-award debriefing provisions in Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 15.506, by letter dated October 8, CSI
“request[ed] a review of the contract award information.” CSI
Letter, Oct. 8, 2008. In this letter, CSI
stated that it “requests [a] debriefing within 5 days of this letter, to the
extent practicable, as set forth above.”
Id. By e-mail dated October 9, the agency
advised CSI that its “request for a debrief
is being denied due to [the firm’s] untimely request.” Agency E-mail, Oct. 9, 2008. By
letter dated October 10, CSI requested to
know when the agency would conduct a “full debriefing” and provide CSI
“an opportunity to inspect all records requested under FOIA.” CSI
Letter, Oct. 10, 2008. In its October 10 letter, CSI
stated that, “[i]rrespective of the timeliness of [its debriefing] request,” FAR
sect. 15.506(a)(4)(i)
provides that “[u]ntimely debriefing requests may be accommodated.” Id.
By e-mail dated October 14, the agency advised CSI
that the firm’s “request for [a] debrief was untimely and [would] not be
accommodated.” Agency E-mail, Oct. 14, 2008. By letter dated October 16, the agency denied
CSI’s FOIA request, explaining that the
“breakdown of the bids and all the alternate items from the bidders are exempt
or prohibited from release” under FOIA because, essentially, a proposal
submitted in response to a competitive solicitation contains confidential,
commercial, and financial information that is proprietary to the offeror. Agency Letter, Oct. 16, 2008.
CSI filed its protest
with our Office on October 20 and, as relevant here, maintained that its
September 22 e-mail, as set forth above, constituted a timely request for a
post-award debriefing. In its protest, where
it raised four issues,
CSI stated that it had been “precluded by
the [a]gency from receiving or viewing information” concerning this procurement
and, as a result, it “makes certain assumptions . . . on the basis of
belief.” Protest at 1. CSI
further stated that it “still does not have knowledge that the bases it makes
[in its] protest are true and accurate, and makes the allegations based on its
good faith belief.” Id.
at 4. CSI
stated that it “submits [its] protest prematurely solely, since the 10-day
period has not yet begun since, without access to the [a]gency’s records, it
cannot be said that CSI has knowledge or
should have had knowledge of the bases for this protest.” Id.[1]
The threshold issue presented here is whether CSI
timely requested a post-award debriefing, pursuant to FAR sect. 15.506(a)(1), which
provides that “[a]n offeror, upon its written request received by the agency
within 3 days after the date on which that offeror has received notification of
contract award in accordance with [FAR] [sect.] 15.503(b), shall be debriefed and furnished the
basis for the selection decision and contract award.” Contrary to CSI’s
position, we conclude that CSI’s September 22
e-mail, in which the firm simply asked the agency “if [it] could get all the
bid results from the above[‑]subject
project,” did not constitute a request for a post-award debriefing pursuant to
FAR sect. 15.506(a)(1).
More specifically, in its September 22 e-mail, CSI
made no reference to a request for a post-award debriefing--all CSI
requested was to “get all the bid results.”
While CSI is correct that no specific
language is prescribed in the FAR in terms of how to request such a debriefing,
we believe that a protester must reasonably communicate to an agency that it is,
in fact, seeking a formal debriefing, rather than simply making a general
informational request. In our view, CSI’s
September 22 e-mail fails to convey anything more than that the firm was seeking
unspecified “bid results,” not a formal debriefing to be conducted in
accordance with FAR sect. 15.506, which specifies the procedures for the conduct of
the post-award debriefing and the information to be provided to offerors during
such a debriefing.[2] Moreover, we point out that, in contrast to CSI’s
September 22 e-mail, CSI’s letter dated
October 8 constituted a clear request for a debriefing where the firm
referenced the post-award debriefing provisions in FAR sect. 15.506 and
specifically “request[ed] [a] debriefing within 5 days of this letter, to the
extent practicable”; however, because CSI’s
October 8 debriefing request was not timely made within 3 days after the firm
received notice of award, the agency was not obligated to accommodate this
untimely request. FAR
sect. 15.506(a)(4)(i).[3]
Thus, as a direct result of not timely requesting a
post-award debriefing, CSI has failed to
state sufficient legal and factual grounds for our Office to consider its
protest. In this regard, the
jurisdiction of our Office is established by the bid protest provisions of the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. sections 3551-3556 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004). Our role in resolving
bid protests is to ensure that the statutory requirements for full and open
competition are met. Pacific
Photocopy and Research Servs., B‑278698, B-278698.3, Mar.
4, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 69 at 4.
To achieve this end, our Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.1(c)(4)
and (f) (2008), require that a protest include a detailed statement of the
legal and factual grounds for protest.
This requirement contemplates that protesters will provide, at a
minimum, either allegations or evidence sufficient for this Office to
reasonably conclude that a violation of statute or regulation has occurred. See, e.g., View One, Inc.,
B-400346, July 30, 2008, 2008 CPD para. 142 at 3. Bare assertions that an award was improper,
with neither evidence nor explanation of the protester’s theory regarding the
alleged violation, are insufficient to satisfy this Office’s requirements. Id.
Here, by CSI’s own
admission, as set forth above, in filing its protest “prematurely,” it made
“certain assumptions . . . on the basis of belief,” acknowledging that it
“still does not have knowledge that the bases it makes [in its] protest are true
and accurate,” and that it “makes the allegations based on its good faith
belief.” For example, in challenging the
evaluation of its own proposal, CSI states
that it “was denied information from the [a]gency and cannot determine if it
was deemed an acceptable bidder.”
Protest at 6. CSI
speculates that while its price, including options, was lower than Baldi’s
price, “it is possible that the [a]gency determined CSI
to be nonacceptable . . . and/or the [a]gency applied a preference to Baldi’s
bid price.” Id. CSI
concludes that “[w]ithout further information, CSI
has no information and cannot provide any detail concerning this basis for
protest.” Id.
This example illustrates that CSI’s
protest is based on speculation as a direct result of the firm’s failure to
timely request a post-award debriefing. On
this record, we conclude that CSI’s protest,
based on bare allegations, without any supporting evidence for its positions,
fails to comply with the requirement that a protest provide a sufficiently detailed
statement of the legal and factual grounds for protest. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.1(c)(4) and (f). Accordingly, CSI’s
protest does not warrant further consideration by our Office.
Finally, CSI contends
that even if its protest is untimely, we should consider it pursuant to the
“good cause” and “significant issue” exceptions to our timeliness rules. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(c). The short answer to CSI’s
contention is that these exceptions to our timeliness rules are not applicable in
this situation where CSI’s protest is
dismissed because it fails to state legally and factually sufficient grounds
for protest. In other words, the
exceptions to our timeliness rules address those limited circumstances under
which we will consider an otherwise untimely protest; these exceptions do not remedy, and ultimately do not
provide a basis for our consideration of, a protest that is legally and
factually insufficient in the first instance.
The protest is dismissed.[4]
Gary L. Kepplinger
General Counsel