Weapons systems (1 - 10 of 33 items)
Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments Are Optimized
GAO-13-508T: Published: Apr 24, 2013. Publicly Released: Apr 24, 2013.
Most of the Department of Defense's (DOD) major satellite programs are in mature phases of development, that is, the initial satellites have been designed, fabricated, and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design are being produced. For the portfolio of major satellite programs, new cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years, but DOD is still e...
Department of Defense's Waiver of Competitive Prototyping Requirement for Enhanced Polar System Program
GAO-12-983R: Published: Aug 23, 2012. Publicly Released: Aug 23, 2012.
DOD's rationale for waiving WSARA's competitive prototyping requirement for CAPS covered both bases provided in the statute; however, DOD did not provide complete information about the potential benefits of competitive prototyping or support for its conclusion that prototyping would result in schedule delays. In the waiver, DOD found reasonable the Air Force's conclusion that the additional $49 mi...
Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems
GAO-09-648T: Published: Apr 30, 2009. Publicly Released: Apr 30, 2009.
Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-scale acquisition programs in the Department of Defense's (DOD) space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. The cost resulting from acquisition problems along with the ambitious nature of space programs have resulted in cancellations of progra...
China: U.S. and European Union Arms Sales Since the 1989 Embargoes
T-NSIAD-98-171: Published: Apr 28, 1998. Publicly Released: Apr 28, 1998.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the status of the arms embargoes imposed on China by the European Union (EU) and the United States following the 1989 massacre of demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, focusing on the: (1) terms of the EU embargoes; (2) extent of EU and U.S. sales of military items to China since 1989; and (3) potential role that such items could play in ad...
Multiple Launch Rocket System: Range Less Than Needed and Sustained Rocket Production Not Ensured
NSIAD-97-196R: Published: Jul 30, 1997. Publicly Released: Jul 30, 1997.
GAO reviewed the Multiple Launch Rocket System's (MLRS) improvements.GAO noted that: (1) although the extended range rocket meets its requirement to provide longer range capability, it will not satisfy the Army's stated needs concerning range; (2) the Army approved limited production of extended range rockets about 1 year ago, but one of the rocket's five critical performance requirements has not...
Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost
NSIAD-96-98: Published: Jun 18, 1996. Publicly Released: Jun 18, 1996.
GAO reviewed the Navy's plan to procure with F/A-18E/F aircraft, focusing on: (1) whether operational deficiencies in the F/A-18C/D cited by the Navy to justify the need for the F/A-18E/F have materialized and, if they have, the extent to which the F/A-18E/F would correct them; (2) whether the F/A-18E/F will provide an appreciable increase in operational capability over the F/A-18C/D; and (3) the...
Missile Development: Status and Issues at the Time of the TSSAM Termination Decision
NSIAD-95-46: Published: Jan 20, 1995. Publicly Released: Jan 20, 1995.
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) program, focusing on the: (1) reliability of TSSAM; (2) increases in TSSAM unit production costs; (3) changes in the number of variants and quantities to be acquired; and (4) availability of alternative systems. GAO noted that: (1) in December 1994, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to cancel the TSSA...
B-2 Bomber: Comparison of Operational Capabilities and Support Costs for 15 Versus 20 Aircraft
NSIAD-93-209: Published: Aug 20, 1993. Publicly Released: Aug 20, 1993.
In response to congressional requests, GAO reviewed the operational and support plans for the B-2 bomber, focusing on the differences in the bomber's conventional operational capabilities, military construction funding, and operations and maintenance costs for 20 aircraft instead of 15 aircraft.GAO found that: (1) the B-2 force's size will limit its conventional missions primarily to precision str...
Triad Hearing Follow-up
PEMD-93-28R: Published: Aug 6, 1993. Publicly Released: Aug 6, 1993.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO responded to questions concerning the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. GAO found that: (1) the B-2 program involves the greatest number of unknowns for any weapon system and presents the highest level of cost uncertainty; (2) the Air Force could not justify the Minuteman III modernization program because of the program's high cost, extensive testing needs, and...
Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-Consuming, and Costly
NSIAD-93-45: Published: Feb 5, 1993. Publicly Released: Feb 22, 1993.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed current conventional strategic bomber force capabilities and assessed Air Force plans, schedules, and costs for equipping strategic bombers with conventional war fighting capabilities.GAO found that: (1) the Air Force planned to make the B-1B strategic bomber the backbone of its bomber force and equip B-52, B-1B, and B-2 bombers with precision-guid...